

**THE CHANGING FACETS OF THE US-PAKISTAN
RELATIONS: A REVIEW OF THE BILATERAL
RELATIONS SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF
SOVIET UNION TILL 9/11 (2001)**

By

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Dedicated to
My

ALLAH,

the only God Who is the beneficent and the most merciful.

Declaration

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of my individual research and it has not been submitted to any other university for any other degree.

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A thesis entitled “THE CHANGING FACETS OF THE US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: A
REVIEW OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONS SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF SOVIET UNION TILL
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Abstract

Relations between the United States and Pakistan have a long history spread over nearly six decades. Though these relations have seen various phases of engagements and estrangements, this study takes into account the changing facets of the US-Pakistan relations in the wake of the collapse of Soviet Union in early 1990s till 9/11(2001). The era under focus saw the acute type of estrangement between the two states.

In the changed geostrategic scenario, the US strategic priorities had changed. Pakistan lost her strategic worth for the US policymakers. The issue of Pakistan's controversial nuclear program resurfaced that further pushed these states apart from each other. Pressler Amendment (1985) was invoked by the US and sanctions were applied against Pakistan. Based on such a policy, all the US economic and military assistance to Pakistan was completely choked. The US policy of nuclear non-proliferation was vigorously brought into play. However, these coercive measures proved counterproductive and Pakistan became an overt nuclear state in May 1998. Nuclear proliferation was another manifestation of the failure of this US policy. In late 1990s, terrorism caught US attention and it became a focal point of her foreign policy. To eliminate this menace, Pakistan was urged to help American agencies. But this further heightened tension between them. Thus, US-Pakistan relations were greatly marred throughout the 1990s.

This dissertation analyzes the causes and effects of the event-related ties between Pakistan and the United States and founds the divergence of interests as the main cause of trust deficit in their relationship. The US agenda was global while Pakistan sought after her narrow local objectives. But both wished national security for their nations. It explores how the US policy of sanctions towards Pakistan failed and gave rise to nuclear proliferation. It evaluates the economic, social, political costs of the US benign neglect towards Pakistan. Due to the US strategic myopia, Pakistan's strategic worth was overlooked that gave terrorism a chance to flourish in the region.

This study specially highlights the main areas of conflict and cooperation between Pakistan and the United States and enumerates the ways and means to mitigate the misperceptions between them. Some policy recommendations are also put forward to convert the US-Pakistan relations into strategic partnership characterized with equality and mutual co-existence.

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Flags

Flag of Pakistan



Flag of the United States of America



Maps

Map of Pakistan



Source: <http://images.google.com.pk/images>

Map of the United States of America



Source: <http://images.google.com.pk/images>

List of Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CARs	Central Asian Republics
CBMs	Confidence Building Measures
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CIA	Central Investigation Agency (USA)
COAS	Chief of Army Staff
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DCS	Direct Commercial Sales
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency (USA)
EDA	Excess Defense Articles
BI	Federal Bureau of Intelligence (USA)
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FMCT	Fissile Materials Control Treaty
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FY	Fiscal Year
GHQ	General Headquarter in Pakistan
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Inter Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
LeT	Lashkar-e-Tayyeba
LoC.	Line of Control
MFN	Most Favored Nation

MTCR	Missile Test Control Regime
NAFTA	European Union or North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM	Non Aligned Movement
NMD	National Missile Defence
NPT	Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
PAEC	Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
PL	Public Law
KRL	Kahuta Research Laboratories (Pakistan)
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
SEATO	Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
TTP	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
UN	United Nations
UNOCAL	Union Oil Company of California
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
US-CENTCOM	US Central Command
WB	World Bank
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Chapter 1

Introduction

“.....the relationship between the United States and Pakistan has had almost as many ups and downs as a ride on a roller coaster. At times, the two countries have been close partners and allies. Occasionally, they have had sharp differences. And at other times, including the present, the relationship has been friendly but substantively thin.”

Dennis Kux*

Relations between the United States and Pakistan (US-Pakistan relations) have a fluctuated history that stretches over decades. These inconsistent relations have their roots in early 1950s when the strategic interests of both the countries brought them closer to each other.¹ Owing to the diverse strategic and, sometimes, incompatible strategic interests, these relations have seen various engagements and estrangements. Looking at this decades-long course of relations, one can observe that there have come three high points, three low points and two periods of friendly but not very substantive relations.² Pakistan has always tried to keep these relations intact, even at the cost of her neighbors,³ but the United States has come closer to Pakistan only in times of the latter's own strategic interests.⁴ There is no denying the fact that the US approach towards Pakistan has always remained an issue oriented and as soon as the strategic ends of the former have materialized, she has turned her eyes back. Pakistan's motivation in developing good relations with the United States has mainly been the desire to check Indian aggression⁵. Ironically, however, the United States has never been willing to side with Pakistan against India. The US has always preferred India over Pakistan. But despite this strategic myopia on the part of United States, Pakistan has put all the eggs in the American basket. On the other hand, the Indian leadership adopted the policy of non-alignment and did not support the United States bloc. Therefore, India had great prominence in the Russian Strategy. The Indian approach towards the world politics gave rise to a race between the United States and

* Dennis Kux, 'A Ride on the Roller Coaster', in Hafeez Malik (ed.), 2003, *Pakistan: Founders' Aspirations and Today's Realities*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 309.

¹ M. Raziullah Azmi, 'Pakistan-United States Relations: An Appraisal', in Mehrunnisa Ali (ed.), 2001, *Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy 1971-1998*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 228-229.

² Kux, 'A Ride on the Roller Coaster...', p. 306.

³ General K.M. Arif, 2001, *Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-1997*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 389-390.

⁴ Azmi, 'Pakistan-United States Relations...', pp. 228-230.

⁵ Kux, 'A Ride on the Roller Coaster...', p. 306.

the former Soviet Union to win over the Indian support. To reap benefits from both sides, India began to hunt with the hound and run with the hare and thus got the best of both the blocs.⁶ On the other hand, the United States always found Pakistan ready to accomplish her international agenda; either if it is the checking of communist threat, access to the resources of gulf region, curbing terrorism or diminishing the religious extremism.

The US-Pakistan relations have added much to the defense capabilities of Pakistan but could not ensure the territorial integrity and national security of the latter. Close collaboration between the military establishments and intelligence agencies of both countries undermined the democratic institutions and political culture in Pakistan. These relations have not only dragged the Pakistan army into politics when the military rulers in Pakistan were strongly supported by the United States but also undermined the social fabric of the society. In times of a military or a military controlled elected government in Pakistan, the US-Pakistan relations have seen a boom because only a military dictator could promote the US agenda very well and with a matchless zeal.⁷ Being a dictator, the military ruler is not answerable before anyone and the outside power finds it very easy to deal with a single person as compared to a democratically elected government. The primary compulsion that forced Pakistani military to see towards the United States has been the resourcefulness of the latter. But apart from economic and military support, a military dictator also needs some political support to validate and prolong his rule. He, therefore, looks towards the United States that usually never disappoints him particularly if the latter too is in need of Pakistan's strategic role in the fulfillment of her strategic goals.

In order to make a strategic analysis of the changing facets of the US-Pakistan relations, this study seeks to examine the changing trends in these relations and the overall impact on Pakistani society and politics with a special reference to the post – Cold War era till the incident of 9/11.

Immediately after independence in 1947, Pakistan was faced with the issue of her national security, territorial integrity and economic backwardness. The sense of insecurity was mainly due to the imbalance in the power equation between India and

⁶ Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, 1993, *Pakistan and the Troubled World*. Karachi: Royal Book Company. pp. 148-149.

⁷ Ahmad Faruqui, 'US should rethink Pakistan Policy', *Daily Times Pakistan*, (05 August 2007).

Pakistan, the two arch-rivals and neighbors of the South Asia. Fretted by the rhetoric of the Indian leadership, Pakistan's apprehension multiplied due to the hostile and hegemonic Indian designs that were demonstrated by the latter in 1950 and 1951.⁸ On the western border, Pakistan was equally alarmed by the issue of *Pukhtoonistan* raised by the Afghan government. The *Pukhtoonistan* issue was a longstanding Afghan claim over the north-west "*Pukhtoon*"⁹ populated province of Pakistan that was considered as an integral part of Afghanistan. Pakistan was also worried about the perceived expansionist agenda of former Soviet Union, which was hardly a few kilometers away from Pakistani border.¹⁰ These heightened security concerns and the growing economic needs forced Pakistan to look for an outside power. There were four choices available to Pakistan's policymakers; to establish a friendly if not cooperative relationship with India, to rely upon the Islamic countries and embark upon pan-Islamism by forming an Islamic bloc, to establish close relationship with the then Soviet Union or to get closer to the distant US that had the resourcefulness to ensure Pakistan's territorial integrity and economic well being. As far as the congenial posture of relationship with India was concerned, Pakistan was not willing to bow before the Indian hegemonic dictates as she was sparing no effort in undoing and isolating Pakistan.¹¹ Pakistan could not rely on the Islamic countries only as this idea of forming an Islamic bloc for security and economic purposes was greatly resented to by some leaders of the Arab and Islamic countries.¹² The Soviet expansionist tendencies, lack of understanding between the two countries, the pro-West bureaucratic system and, above all, the inclination of Pakistan's military leadership towards the United States made Pakistan hesitant in establishing close ties with the Soviet Union.¹³ Moreover, Pakistan needed not only military cooperation but she was also in a desperate need for economic assistance and the United States was in a much better position than the Soviet Union to provide both.¹⁴ Thus, all these factors

⁸ K.M. Arif, *Khaki Shadows...*, p. 391.

⁹ A race inhabited in the north-west part of Pakistan but its major part is inhabited in Afghanistan, too. They speak Pashto language.

¹⁰ Shahid M. Amin, 2004, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp.39-40

¹¹ Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled World...*, pp. 148-149; and in Seling S. Harison, "Troubled India and her Neighbours". *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January, 1965), p. 319.

¹² K.M. Arif, *Khaki Shadows...*, pp. 40-41.

¹³ Hasan Askari Rizvi, 2000, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications. p. 77.

¹⁴ Abdul Sattar, 2007, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: 1947-2005*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp.34-36

contributed to Pakistan's decision to choose the United States as an external equalizer against India and to deal with all other security threats beside economic assistance. The United States was initially reluctant to pay heed to the consistent Pakistani requests for assistance. However, looking at the changing geostrategic and geopolitical environment of the region, in March 1949, the United States recognized the strategic importance of Pakistan against Soviet Union. The American leadership also explored Pakistan as a strategic point to gain control over the oil rich Middle East.¹⁵ The rise of nationalist Mohammad Mossadeq in Iran and the nationalization of the Anglo-American Companies by his government augmented the US concerns over the upheavals in the Middle East and she seriously started her efforts to insulate the region against Soviet penetration in it and to check any communist advance towards the Persian Gulf and the Near East generally.¹⁶ The communist revolution in China (1949) had already added more to the United States' apprehension about the spread of communism in South Asian countries.¹⁷ The Korean War (1950) also aroused the US interest in defense cooperation with Pakistan¹⁸ and she began to look for friends in Asia. Thus, the United States considered Pakistan as a more effective player than India in the achievement of her regional interests.¹⁹ In this context, the strategic location of Pakistan was of utmost importance as her borders were touching Iran, Afghanistan, and China and she was less than one mile away from the Soviet border. Moreover, East Pakistan was separating the Pacific from the India Ocean that had a great strategic worth. Hence, it was not only in the interest of the United States but also in the interest of the world-peace that Pakistan should be militarily strong and must have pro-West government. Pakistan was also fully aware of the fact that small states are an element of weakness in the structure of peace and, any move for her defense by herself would invite aggression from her powerful neighbors.²⁰ These overlapping interests brought the two unequal powers in a close collaboration with each other. Although they had different perceptions and threats but the security was the chief and common concern between them.

The US-Pakistan strategic partnership started in May 1954 when they signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement. In 1954-55, Pakistan joined the US-

¹⁵ K. Arif (ed.), 1984, *America-Pakistan Relations-Documents*. Lahore: Vanguard Books. p. 15.

¹⁶ Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, pp. 42-43.

¹⁷ Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled World...*, p. 145.

¹⁸ Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, p. 41.

¹⁹ Oalf Careo, 1951, *Wells of Power*. London: Macmillan. p.112

²⁰ Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled World...*, p.149.

sponsored South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and, later on, signed the Mutual Defense Treaty (1959) with United States which specifically assured that the US would support Pakistan in the event of aggression.²¹ But the type of aggression was not defined. These alliances irritated not only the Muslim States of the Middle East but annoyed the Soviet Union so much that she openly put her full weight behind India. The Soviet Union even went to veto the Kashmir Resolution in the United Nations' Security Council in 1957.²² The Soviet leaders fully supported the Afghanistan over the issue of *Pukhtoonistan*. The shooting down of the US spy plane U-2 during its espionage flight over the Soviet Union pushed the already deteriorated Pakistan-Soviet relations from bad to worse as this aircraft had taken off from Badaber air base, near Peshawar (Pakistan) that was provided by the military government of General Ayub Khan (1958-1969) to the United States.²³

The first swing of opinion in the US-Pakistan relations came to surface in late 1950s when the Indian neutralism was weighted much as compared to Pakistani alignment in South Asia.²⁴ In 1962, the gulf in the US-Pakistan relations further widened when the US decided to provide India with military aid in the aftermath of Sino-Indian war (1962).²⁵ Looking at the changing US perceptions, Pakistan established good relations with the neighboring China and Soviet Union. This move irritated the United States and she expressed her resentment through diplomatic channel.²⁶ Nevertheless, in mid-1960s, this phase of close US-Pakistan relationship completely came to an end when Pakistan did not receive the expected support from the United States in the 1965's Indo-Pak war. This proved the last nail in the coffin of the US-Pakistan relationship. Pakistan established an all-weather-friendship with the neighboring China while the United States tilted more towards India to check the growing-China.²⁷ During 1970s, the US was constantly trying to appease the recalcitrant India and was not ready to meet Pakistan's security needs.²⁸ The US-

²¹ Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, p. 50.

²² K.M. Arif, *Khaki Shadows...*, pp. 392-393.

²³ S. M. Burke, 1994, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*. (2nd ed). Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 267.

²⁴ Dennis Kux, 2000, *The United States and India: Estranged Democracies*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p.154

²⁵ Azmi, 'Pakistan-United States Relations...', p. 229.

²⁶ Kux, 'A Ride on the Roller Coaster...', p. 296.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 297.

²⁸ Azmi, 'Pakistan-United States Relations...', pp. 230-231.

Pakistan relations were touching the lowest ebbs to such an extent that Pakistan did not even figure in the comprehensive Senate hearing in 1969–70.²⁹

In 1971, during East Pakistan crises, the US failed in providing any military or even diplomatic support to her ‘ally against communism’. The futility of all US backed alliances became more evident during the 1965 and 1971 Indian military interventions and, therefore, Pakistan quitted SEATO just after the debacle of East Pakistan and gave up CENTO in 1977.³⁰ To ensure Pakistan’s security and to check any further Indian aggression against herself, Pakistan embarked upon the nuclear posture in 1974. Pakistan faced harsh criticism from the United States due to her efforts to strengthen her defense capability by the acquisition of nuclear technology. Gradually, thus, Pakistan that had remained the ‘most allied ally’ of the United States in early 1950s was relegated to the status of veritable pariah in 1970s.³¹ No doubt, during this phase, the United States strengthened Pakistan’s defense capabilities and supported her economic development. It was due to the US support that Pak-military emerged as an organized, disciplined and modern institution. But this continuous support to a military regime not only prolonged the tenure of the military dictatorship but also undermined the democratic institutions that, in turn, degenerated the political culture of the country. It politicized military, corrupted bureaucracy and destabilized the social fabrics.³² The US had a strategic myopia due to which she developed a very specific issue-oriented approach towards Pakistan and was looking towards India as a permanent natural ally and a regional power.³³ This period of estrangement was followed by another period of close engagement.

A revival of cordiality in the US-Pakistan relations came in December 1979 when a number of factors brought Pakistan’s geopolitical and geo-strategic importance to the fore. The end of a pro-West regime of Raza Shah Pahlavi in Iran, the subsequent anti-US posture of the post-revolution Iran changed the US perception towards the Persian Gulf. Similarly, the pro-Soviet Indian Stance and the Soviet expansionist ambition towards warm-waters of the Indian Ocean was another concern for the United States. The vitality of an uninterrupted flow of oil from the Persian

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled World...*, p. 208.

³¹ M. Ziauddin, ‘Pak-US Relations: The Economic Dimension’. Paper read at the seminar “*Pak-US Strategic Dialogue*” jointly arranged by the Brooking Institute (USA) and the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (Pakistan) on 29-30 January 2002. <http://ipripak.org/papers/Pakustrategic.shtml>

³² Rizvi, *The Military and Politics...*, pp. 255-566.

³³ Amin, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy...*, p. 46.

Gulf to the rest of world and, above all, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were the main catalysts that introduced a drastic change in the US perception towards Pakistan. These geostrategic and geopolitical changes made Pakistan an inevitable strategic ally for the United States.³⁴ The changing geo-strategic environment of the region put Pakistan into a position of a 'frontline' state. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan prompted the United States to invoke and reaffirm the dormant 1959 US-Pakistan Security Agreement against communism.³⁵ The US President Jimmy Carter declared that any attempt to control the Persian Gulf region and its oil resources would be considered as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. He further went on to say that the US alone would go to halt any such incursion by any means necessary, including military force.³⁶ The military regime in Pakistan took it as a blessing in disguise to validate its position and also to get the western border of the state secured.³⁷ General Zia, the then military ruler (1977-1988), subtly readjusted the foreign policy orientation of Pakistan from the socialist tilt given to it earlier by the Bhutto regime, to bring it in the centre of the road with a leaning towards the right.³⁸ This new phase of US-Pakistan close relations provided Pakistan with an opportunity to accelerate her nuclear program. It also enabled Pakistan to strengthen her defense capabilities with the US military hardware.³⁹

But the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the collapse of Soviet Union and the end of Cold War intensified the United States policy on nuclear issue. The United States reverted to the old policy without taking any time. The Bush (senior) administration not only imposed sanctions against Pakistan under Pressler Amendment (1985)⁴⁰ but also withheld the transfer of military equipments for which

³⁴ Ibid., pp.83-89.

³⁵ Kux, 'A Ride on the Roller Coaster...', pp. 301-302.

³⁶ Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, p.84.

³⁷ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics...*, p.270.

³⁸ K.M. Arif, *Khaki Shadows...*, p.421.

³⁹ General (Rtd.) Jehangir Kiramat (former COAS of Pakistan Army), 'Pak-US Relations: The Military Dimension.' Paper read at the seminar "*Pak-US Strategic Dialogue*."

Available at: <http://ipripak.org/papers/Pakusstrategic.shtml>

⁴⁰ In 1985, an amendment was added by the US Congress to the Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act. This amendment was introduced by Senator Larry Pressler and, therefore, named after him as the 'Pressler Amendment'. This amendment made it mandatory for the US President, before the release of US aid to Pakistan, to certify to the US Congress that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device. Before the collapse of Soviet Union, the successive US President used to issue such certificates in favor of Pakistan. However, with the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Afghanistan, the nuclear the geostrategic situation of the region changed altogether. Therefore, in October 1990, President George H. W. Bush refused to issue the required certificate and thus the dormant Pressler Amendment was invoked. Hence, the US military assistance to Pakistan was abandoned.

Pakistan had already paid \$ 658 in advance.⁴¹ The entire panorama of the US-Pakistan relations changed once again. Pakistan lost her frontline status and the United States threatened Pakistan to be put on the 'terrorist state' list for the alleged military support provided by Pakistan army to the insurgency that started in Kashmir in late 1980s.⁴² In 1993, Pakistan and China were alleged for violating the Missile Test Control Regime (MTCR) by the transfer of M-11 missile technology. In short, Pakistan was pushed into isolation at the international level.⁴³ In June 1995, the situation showed signs of improvement in relations when both houses of the US Congress passed Brown Amendment.⁴⁴ This amendment was aimed at improving bilateral relations in the fields of economic cooperation and military training. The US pressure to sign CTBT kept on mounting. Following the nuclear explosion conducted by Pakistan on 28 and 30 May 1998, in response to the Indian explosions on 11 and 12 of May, brought a fresh wave of US-sanctions. The military coup on 12 October 1999 in Pakistan invoked a third layer of sanctions against Pakistan. Three layers of sanctions were imposed against Pakistan; sanctions under Pressler Amendment; sanctions after nuclear explosions (28 May 1998); and sanctions after military coup (1999). In the words of Dennis Kux, "For Washington, the yesterday's partner became today's troublemaker. For Islamabad, the Americans had once more proven their fickleness and inconstancy".⁴⁵ In short, during 1990s the US-Pakistan relations remained hostage to the nuclear issue and sanctions.

On 11 September 2001, the situation got a new and dramatic turn when the twin towers of New York were brought to the ground by a few terrorists. The symbols of US economic might were razed. The United States held Osama Bin Laden and his *Al-Qaeda* network responsible for this terrorist act and asked Pakistan for help against terrorism. The US warned Pakistan of the consequences in case of non-cooperation. The American government threatened Pakistan that she had a choice either to be with the United States or against it and further that there was no room for half measures.

⁴¹ Abdul Sattar, 'Foreign Policy: Relations with the West, China and Middle East', in Hafeez Malik (ed.), 2003, *Pakistan: Founders' Aspirations and Today's Realities*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 402-403.

⁴² Kux, 'A Ride on the Roller Coaster...', pp. 304-305.

⁴³ *The New York Times* (13 March 1993).

⁴⁴ It was an amendment introduced by Senator Hank Brown (Rep.-Colorado) in the US Congress to allow the economic aid and military training facility, but not military assistance, to Pakistan. It was carried by a 55-54 vote in the US Senate on 21 September 1995.

⁴⁵ Kux, 'A Ride on the Roller Coaster...', p. 305.

Pakistan was demanded of a seven steps measure against terrorism.⁴⁶ Pakistan responded positively by providing a full fledged intelligence and logistic support to the US-led coalition against *Al-Qaeda* and Taliban.

Pakistan not only shared intelligence but also captured a large number of *Al-Qaeda* top leaders, sealed off her western border and supplied two naval bases, three air force bases and opened the airspace to the US military. Pakistan deployed more than 70000 troops on her western border, the largest ever in the fifty years long history. No other US-ally in the war on terrorism has laid down so many lives as Pakistan did.⁴⁷

In return, Pakistan received one billion US dollars in aid and debt write-offs from various countries. The US used her influence to reschedule the long-term debts of Pakistan from other western countries and donor clubs.⁴⁸ Besides economic support, Pakistan received state-of-the-art military equipments and technology.

Pakistan's 'front-line' role in the US-led 'war on terrorism' was recognized by Europe and America and they lifted all the nuclear and democracy related sanctions against Pakistan. The US introduced two amendments: the Brownback-II Amendment waived the democracy-related sanctions while the Akerman Amendment (2004) eased the nuclear sanctions for five years. After 9/11, the United States repeatedly assured the durability of the new US policy towards Pakistan.⁴⁹ The 9/11 Commission also recommended a long-term and sustainable relationship with Pakistan.⁵⁰

The new entente between the United States and Pakistan put an end to the decade-long isolation of Pakistan. It improved the economic development of Pakistan. In the comity of nations, it enhanced the political stature of Pakistan and provided her with an access to modern US-warfare technology. But it also greatly destabilized the domestic system of Pakistan in the sense that it strengthened the military dictatorship at the expense of democratic institutions. It facilitated the prolongation of military rule which, in turn, further strengthened Pakistan-army's role in national politics.⁵¹ It

⁴⁶ Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, pp.240-254.

⁴⁷ 'US-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond', A special report of the *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report No. 145, August 2005. available at www.usip.org

⁴⁸ General (Rtd.) Collin Powell, the US Secretary of State, gave the statement on 13 September 2001. cited in Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, pp. 247-249; and *The Washington Post* (14 February 2002)

⁴⁹ An interview of Condoleezza Rice with Pakistan TV, reported in *Dawn*, Islamabad, March 18, 2005.

⁵⁰ *The 9/11 Commission Report*. p. 369.

⁵¹ Ahmad Faruqi, 'US should rethink...'.

has given rise to suicide bombing and has brought the masses in direct confrontation with Pakistan army in North and South Waziristan Agency, a tribal area of Pakistan. This has increased public resentment against military and military operations.⁵² On the other hand, the United States has been demanding to do more. This has created an element of distrust between the two states. In spite of all the cooperation in the war on terrorism, the US Congress adopted a bill to curtail and restrict the US-aid to Pakistan under the pretext of *The 9/11 Commission Report's* recommendations. Reacting to the bill, Pakistan's Foreign Office spokesperson commented thus: "It not only contains references and provisions that cast a shadow of doubt on the existing cooperation between Pakistan and the United States but is also a reminder of the infamous Pressler Amendment".⁵³ The US administration and the candidates for the US Presidential Elections (2008) had been using harsh rhetoric against Pakistan.⁵⁴ The US administration was implicitly indicating the possible direct military intervention in the tribal areas of Pakistan under the pretext of the Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi born suspected terrorist. Both the Republican and the Democratic candidates were in race of harsh criticism against Pakistan and they were advocating direct intervention in Pakistan. These statements were, on the one hand, pressure building tactics while, on the other hand, they showed the future line of US foreign policy. They were also intended to divert the attention of the US public from the US-failure incurred in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Parliament in Pakistan also voiced concerns against the United States and the parliamentarians asked to review Pakistan's support to the United States

Pakistan is now an "indispensable ally" in the war on terrorism but the question arises whether it is the beginning of a durable and sustainable cooperation between the two countries? Is it another marriage of convenience and issue oriented close relationship or a permanent convergence of interests? The volatile history of US-Pakistan relations shows that this latest state of affairs may give way to a valley of resentment and recrimination.⁵⁵ In the backdrop of the prevailing circumstances, it is widely believed that the cost of this third US-Pakistan close relationship and the support against terrorism may be more than expected and the disaster it may bring

⁵² Hamid Alvi, 'Troubled Pak-US Alliance', *Pakistan Times* (07 August 2007)

⁵³ Press briefing by the Foreign Office Spokesperson in Islamabad on Saturday 28 July 2007.

⁵⁴ *The News*, (01 August 2007)

⁵⁵ Devin T. Hagerty, 'The United States-Pakistan Entente: Third Time's a Charm?' in Craig Baxter (ed.), 2005, *Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economics, and Society*. p.1

could be more catastrophic than before even if the United States does not break the ties. It may not prove advantageous to the national interest rather they may prove significantly detrimental.

Aims and Objectives of the Study:

- 1) To evaluate the after-effects of US sanctions, imposed in 1990, on the security of Pakistan;
- 2) To explore the main causes and irritants that turned the erstwhile allies against communism into troublesome partners and what converted Pakistan into a most sanctioned ally of the United States.
- 3) To analyze the foreign policy choices, for Pakistan, under the successive democratically elected governments and the difficulties that arose in the bilateral relations during this era (1989-1999);
- 4) To highlight the prospects of an all-weather US-Pakistan relationship in future in the light of past experiences;
- 5) To bring on record the domestic and international costs and effects of the third phase of US-Pakistan relations since 11 September 2001 (9/11).

Literature Review

- **Sattar**⁵⁶ (2007) narrates the historical perspective of the US-Pakistan relations by saying that it was the Indian hegemonic design that impelled Pakistan to search for foreign defense cooperation. The author says that the Korean War (1954), the Soviet expansionist designs and the key-strategic location of Pakistan brought United States in a close contact with the former. Pakistan wholeheartedly supported the United States' interest but the United States did not keep up to its promises in times of Indian aggressions (1965 and 1971). The author also takes an overview of the costs and benefits of US-Pakistan relations while discussing the various fluctuations in them. The author explores the causes of major changes in the US policy towards Pakistan in wake of the Collapse of Soviet Union. He discusses the nuclear issue in details

⁵⁶ Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, pp. 8-239.

and says that this issue has once again begun to dominate the US-Pakistan relations. Trends and challenges for Pakistan before and after 9/11 have been elaborated. The author also points out the lack of understanding between the two countries and the glaring contradictions in their perceptions.

- **Amin**⁵⁷ (2002) justifies Pakistan's choice for joining hand with the United States. The author says that to correct the power disparity in the subcontinent and cater to the economic needs, Pakistan looked for an outside power and found the United States in a better position to do so. Therefore, Pakistan extended hand to the United States under its own compulsion and not in subservience to a great power. The author further narrates that the United States also recognized the strategic importance of Pakistan in the containment of Communism and, therefore, provided her with military and economic support. Pakistan also entered in the US-led western alliances by joining Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and subsequently, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1954 and 1955 respectively. The author also unveils the fact that in spite of all the efforts, the United States never preferred Pakistan over India and, therefore, the former did not honor the pledges in times of Indian aggressions. The author also analyzes the divergent Pak-US perceptions towards nuclear nonproliferation and security. He also highlights the factors responsible for the geostrategic importance of Pakistan in wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which made the United States to renew her relations with Pakistan. While highlighting the strategic location of Pakistan, the author holds the view that the US cannot override the geostrategic importance of Pakistan because of the fact that it is the only stabilizing factor which can serve the US interests in the Gulf region. Advantages from this new situation are, however, largely dependant upon the extent to which stability is maintained in Pakistan. Pakistan would not have joined the Western-sponsored pacts and military alliance with the US, had it not been eager to find an equalizer against India. In the late 1990s, the US-Pakistan relations were adversely affected on account of Pakistan's detonating nuclear devices. Pakistan, as a result, had to suffer from American sanctions.

⁵⁷ Shahid M. Amin, 2004, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 14-314.

- **Travis**⁵⁸ (1997) analyzes the US-Pakistan relations in the context of post-Cold War paradigm. He argues that Pakistan's regional security has improved due to the fact that her northwestern border has become much secured because of a pro-Pakistan Taliban regime in Afghanistan but concentration over the eastern border has increased due to a change in the US policy following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States declined to play a major political role in South Asia, and the re-imposition of sanctions against Pakistan, under the Pressler Amendments, was a clear indication of the shift in US policy towards Pakistan. Although the sanctions were eased under the Brown Amendment but the alleged violation of MTCR and the issue of ring magnet again aggravated the situation. The author opines that although there was a democratic setup in Pakistan, very much in conformity with the United States' ideological aims, yet it could not help Pakistan in getting any favor from the United States over the issue of Kashmir. The Bush administration viewed Pakistan as a possible member of the 'evil' Islamic fundamentalist bloc. Pakistan was thus in a much disadvantaged situation in the post-Cold War era. In the author's view the most serious setback to Pakistan was the weakening of ties with the United States, Pakistan's historical ally. He admires the US policy objectives towards South Asia but criticizes her goal-setting process.

- **Hagerty**⁵⁹ (2005) has taken a comprehensive view of the present, past and the future of US-Pakistan relations. According to the author, the relations between these two countries have a very volatile history. Pakistan had remained "the most allied ally" in 1950s but in late 1960s and 1970s these relations had not remained so cordial. The scenario changed all of a sudden in December 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The United States took another U-turn when the Soviet red peril disappeared. The author argues that relations between Pakistan and the United States have always been event-related as the United States has looked towards Pakistan whenever the interests of the former stood threatened. No sooner was the threat averted, the nature of

⁵⁸ Thom A. Travis, 1997, *India, Pakistan and the Third World in the Post-Cold War System*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 57-204.

⁵⁹ Devin T. Hagerty, 'The United States-Pakistan Entente...', pp. 1-19.

relations changed. The author observes that the postindustrial, liberal Western democracies have little in common with pre-industrial Islamic “militocracies” and, therefore, ties between the erstwhile alliance partners had been severely strained throughout the 1990s. Pakistan’s nuclear programme has been questioned and this has become the main reason of strained US-Pakistan relations. The inability of the successive democratic governments in Pakistan in pursuing US to ease tension was a major cause for status quo in the relationship. Certain questions have been raised regarding the future of this new entente after 9/11. The author believes that the two countries can forge a sustainable friendship provided they bring makes changes in their behavior towards one another.

- **Azmi**⁶⁰ (1983) evaluates the US-Pakistan relations in its historical perspective and says that the geopolitical realities and strategic compulsions on both sides have been major factors for a closer rapport despite all the differences in their priorities. The sense of insecurity, quest for political stature and need for economic assistance took Pakistan to the US camp while the United States had the sole objective of containment of communism. Thus, cordiality in relations which started from early 1950s went sour in early 1960s when the United States put her weight behind India and refused to defend Pakistan in time of Indian aggression in 1965 despite treaty obligations. The author has evaluated the difference of perceptions and the costs and benefits of the relations for Pakistan. Another phase of warmth in relations came when both Pakistan and the United States got alarmed by the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan (1979). Although there was a common threat to the interest of both countries but their perceptions and approaches were again quite different. A common threat does not essentially provide a stable and durable basis for the bilateral relations between the United States and Pakistan. This is evident from a number of factors as well as the history of their relationship which reveals a fluctuating trend. The apparent cordiality and warmth in the mutual relations has been adversely affected because of the Zionist-influenced congress in the United States questioning Pakistan’s access to the nuclear know-how. The author says

⁶⁰ M. Raziullah Azmi, ‘Pakistan-United States Relations...’, pp. 1-176.

that it has been the geo-strategic importance of Pakistan that makes it important for the United States and, therefore, the latter cannot disregard the former.

- **Arif**⁶¹ (2001) justifies Pakistan's option for establishing close ties with the United States even at the cost of annoying its neighbours. The author analyzes the merits and demerits of all the four available options; either to rely upon the Islamic countries only, or bow before Indian dictates, or join hands with the former Soviet Union, or seek the US support. The author also presents some glimpses to show the effects of US-Pakistan relations on the civil-military equation. According to the author, one of the driving forces behind Pakistan's inclusion into US-sponsored alliances, SEATO (1954) and CENTO (1955), was Ayub Khan's (1958-1969) dominating role in the foreign policy making. An analysis of the gains and losses of the US-Pakistan relations has been made. The author is of the opinion that Pakistan paid heavily in return for the economic and military aid from the United States. The role of the United States during the successive wars between India and Pakistan in 1948, 1965 and 1971 has been examined. While taking into account the US-Pakistan relations during Zia Years, the author argues that it was 'seemingly friendly but internally bruised and uneasy'.

- **Rizvi**⁶² (2003) The author has explored the role of military in Pakistan with particular reference to the role of top brass of the army in seeking Pakistan's alignment with the United States in 1953-54. Though the military benefited enormously from Pakistan's joining the US-sponsored pacts in the 1950s (SEATO and CENTO) but this decision reinforced institutional imbalance between the disciplined and confident military and the weak and incoherent political institutions and thus subdued the democratic process in Pakistan. The author describes as to how the US economic assistance and military sales, the widespread support to the military dictator in 1980s, and the era of Soviet military presence in Afghanistan boosted the martial law regime's position in

⁶¹ K. M. Arif, *Khaki Shadows...*, pp. 385-444.

⁶² Hasan Askari Rizvi, 2003, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications. pp. 1-254.

Pakistan's domestic politics. This rule accentuated the ethnic, linguistic, religious-sectarian cleavages which further divided and fragmented the political forces. These divisions and cleavages made Pakistan's transition to democracy in the post-1988 period difficult and uncertain. The international support, particularly from the US, for a military regime paved the way for all sorts of ills.

- **Kux**⁶³ (2003) analyzes the volatile US-Pakistan relationship in an interesting manner in the sense that he divides its entire history into three categories such as: the three high points, the three low points, and two periods of friendly but not substantive relations. The three high points refer to the alliances years of the 1950s, the Nixon-Ford years, and the Afghan war partnership during 1980s. He has bracketed mid-1960s, 1970s and 1990s as low points. The Truman Presidency and late 1990s have been regarded as friendly periods but not of substantive relationship. The author dispels the impression that the US-Pakistan relations have had any adverse effect on the democratic process in Pakistan because the United States has never encouraged any dictator to assume power. The author, however, confesses that the US decision regarding the Afghan war in 1979 strengthened the position of the then military dictator in Pakistan. The US-Pakistan relations have played a vital role in strengthening the military and economic conditions of Pakistan. The author has argued that the asymmetrical advantages from the US-Pakistan relations are not due to the insincerity of the United States but due to the absence of continuity of common security interests. The author has admitted that except the Nixon's 'tilt' in 1971, Washington has never supported Pakistan against India. Pakistani leadership has been blamed for the lack of sincerity in curbing communism.

Significance of the study

The 'US-Pakistan relations' is a much debated topic and a lot of work has been done on it from different perspectives with different conclusions drawn. The

⁶³ Denis Kux, 'A Rider on the Roller Coaster...', pp. 287-312.

abundance of research does not, however, hinder the scope of research. This study is important in the sense that it will highlight the following aspects of US-Pakistan relations:

- The effects of the US-Pakistan relations on the security, military, polity, and society shall be analyzed especially with reference to the period since the collapse of Soviet Union till 9/11 because it was an era when the entire spectrum of world-politics had been changed and the US priorities also underwent changes.
- The United States and Pakistan have engaged thrice in good relations with each other but ironically all the three engagements have been in the shadow of military or military-backed government and the United States have encouraged the undemocratic tendencies by extending support to the military governments. On the other hand, successive democratic setups in Pakistan since 1989 till 1999 have faced enormous difficulties in the normalization of relations with the US and particularly in seeking the removal of sanctions imposed by the United States. So the study is invaluable in that it seeks to identify the US approaches towards various democratic governments in Pakistan and to assess the effects of these approaches on the US-Pakistan relations. The overall impact of this changing nature of relationship on the democratic process in Pakistan would be specifically explored.
- Pakistan has joined hands with the US because of the fact that she needed an outside power to balance the power disparity within the sub-continent as well as to meet her economic needs. The geopolitical and geo-strategic importance of Pakistan has compelled the United States to come closer to the former. Pakistan has faithfully extended the needed support to the United States, but the former did not get the kind of support that was expected in hours of difficulties. So the future prospects of this new engagement (since 9/11) will be evaluated and measures suggested as to how this flimsy relationship can be transformed into a durable, stable and long term geo-strategic relationship as envisioned by *the 9/11 Commission Report*.

Research Methodology:

The proposed study is both empirical and historical in nature. However, both qualitative and quantitative methods will be employed. Both primary and secondary sources will be activated.

Sources for Data Collection:

Primary Sources

- 1) Some primary sources like the writings and interviews of the people directly concerned with these issues have been studied. Books, memoirs and biographies of the people at the helm of affairs at that time have been studied.
- 2) To enhance the quality of this research, Published interviews of the retired Pakistani officials have been taken into account.
- 3) Other primary sources like press briefings of the concerned departments, the declassified official documents, etc. have also been used.

Secondary Sources

- 1) The secondary sources such as books, journals, periodicals, newspapers and works of other researchers have been studied.
- 2) Institutes of Policy Research, (IPS), Islamabad, Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Islamabad, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, and National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad, have been visited in order to gather relevant data.
- 3) Websites of Institutes like the Brooking Institute (USA), the United States Institute for Peace (USA), etc. have been visited.
- 4) Other online and internet sources like digital libraries have been used.

Organization of the Study (Chapter Structure)

The structure of the study is very simple and both deductive and inductive reasoning has been employed. The stress is more on qualitative rather than quantitative research. The study goes forward in a coherent manner and an attempt has been made to present

a detailed panorama. The dissertation has been divided into the following six chapters:

Chapter One: ‘Introduction’, presents an introduction to the US-Pakistan relations. It elaborates the background of these relations. It also covers the main objectives of the US-Pakistan relations in historical perspective. A review of the literature, significance of the study, research methodology, and the structure of dissertation is discussed briefly.

Chapter Two: ‘The Geostrategic and Geopolitical Factors’, focuses on the geostrategic and geopolitical importance of Pakistan before and after the end of Cold War and discusses the role these factors played in the US-Pakistan relations. It takes into account the role of the changing geostrategic and geopolitical situation of the South Asia, from the American perspective.

Chapter Three: ‘The Collapse of Soviet Union and the Activation of Pressler Ammendment’, highlights the US-Pakistan relations under successive democratic governments in the “New World Order” paradigm since 1988 till 1998. It evaluates the main areas of cooperation and confrontation between the two states. It explores the causes and effects of the nuclear explosions and its effects on the relations between the US and Pakistan. It also gives a detailed account of the successes and failures of foreign policies of these governments and the challenges they faced.

Chapter Four: ‘After Pakistan Goes Nuclear’, takes into account the changing facets of the US-Pakistan relations in the wake of the nuclear explosions by India and Pakistan in 1998. It brings into light the effects of US sanctions upon the nuclear non-proliferation efforts. It explores the main concerns and foreign policy objectives of the US and Pakistan since May 1998 till 12 October 1999.

Chapter Five: ‘After the Military Coup (12 October 1999)’, analyzes the US-Pakistan relations after the military take over in Pakistan in 1999 till 11 September 2001 (9/11). The policies adopted by the military regime to improve the relations with the United States would be assessed. It also covers the main challenges during 1999-2001, especially nuclear non-proliferation, relations between US administrations and democratically elected governments in Pakistan, tension between India and Pakistan and the issue of extremism that irked the United States.

Chapter Six: ‘Gains and Losses’, explores the gains and losses incurred by both the US and Pakistan. It also draws an analogy of the effects of this cost and

benefit ratio on the future course of relations between these two nations and strategic partners of the Cold War era.

In the end of this dissertation, a ***Conclusion*** has been drawn on the basis of overall findings. In the light of this conclusion, some policy recommendations are put forward, both for Pakistan and the United States, to convert the flimsy and roller coaster type of relationship between them into a durable, stable, trustworthy and long term relationship.

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## Chapter 2

### The Geo-strategic and Geopolitical Factors

*“Geography determines a nation’s history-the political significance of an area bears a well-defined relation to its climate, land forms and natural resources.”*

A Napoleonic Dictum

US-Pakistan relations are greatly indebted to the geo-strategic and geopolitical significance of the latter. There is no denying the fact that geography controls the political environment of a country and the same is true about Pakistan. Besides opportunities, the geography poses some challenges too. There is no escape from one’s geography and from its impact on one’s policies.<sup>1</sup> The security of a state largely depends upon the extent to which it adopts a vigilant policy towards her neighbors that postulates a sound frontier policy. It is also stated by the scholars of international politics and diplomacy that the defense and foreign policies of the ‘small’ and ‘weak’ states do contribute to shape regional and international politics.<sup>2</sup> All these are true for Pakistan. Looking at the past, it can be seen that owing to the strategic worth of South Asia, it has always been the focus of world attention and after the partition of Indian subcontinent in 1947 into two independent states of Pakistan and India, its importance remained the same. Both the states were viewed as key players in checking the influence of communist threat emanating from both Soviet Union and China.

In 1947, possessing a unique geographical location, Pakistan consisted two distant parts; the West Pakistan, in the Indus River basin and the East Pakistan (later on became Bangladesh in December 1971) located more than 1000 miles (1600 kilometers) away in the Ganges River delta. Separated from each other, these two wings had 1000km wide Indian territory between them. On the West, Pakistan borders with Afghanistan, whose one kilometer narrow Wakhkan strip kept the defunct Soviet Union away from Pakistani frontiers. To the North, she has the Peoples Republic of China. The oil rich heart of the Persian Gulf region–Iran, is in the northwest of Pakistan. In the South, the Arabian Sea, the northwestern extension of the strategically important Indian Ocean washes Pakistan’s coastal shores. The vitality of

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<sup>1</sup> Mujtaba Razvi, Pakistan’s Geopolitical Environment and Security, in Mehrunnisa Ali (ed.), 2001, *Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy 1971-1998*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 183-184.

<sup>2</sup> Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Defense Policy’, in Mehrunnisa Ali (ed.), 2001, *Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy 1971-1998*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 199.

Indian Ocean has remained unquestionable throughout the known history as it provides not only a commercial and trade link between Europe and the Far East but has also remained a key to the seven seas. The East Pakistan was separating the Pacific Ocean from the Indian Ocean and bordered Burma on the East.<sup>3</sup> Thus, looking from the strategic point of view, Pakistan was and is still at the crossroad of Central, South and Southwest Asia and is the easiest link between the oil-rich Persian Gulf and the East Asia. In short, Pakistan is situated in the region called 'fulcrum of Asia' the strategic centre on which the stability of the Asia depends.<sup>4</sup> Apart from enjoying the proximity with the strategically significant regions, Pakistan, until the disintegration of the Soviet Union, faced the grave geopolitical realities on the ground as it was in the most troublesome region where the clash of interests between the two superpowers of that time was imminent.<sup>5</sup> There were also certain intra-regional conflicts<sup>6</sup> that were startling Pakistan and added much to her agonies. The circumstances of Pakistan's origin and the composition as well as the unique geographical features (especially from 1947 to 1971) had made it particularly a security-conscious country.<sup>7</sup> At the same time she was faced with economic deficiencies as a newly independent state.

Looking at the geostrategic scenario of the region, it becomes obvious that Pakistan was faced with a generally hostile geopolitical and geo-strategic environment because of the pattern of her relationship with her immediate neighbors i.e. India and Afghanistan. The Indo-Pak relations had always been characterized by mutual distrust, hostility and serious disagreements on regional and international political issues since day one of their creation in 1947. India had not accepted Pakistan and she was constantly engaged in weakening Pakistan.<sup>8</sup> The Indian leaders wanted the hegemony of India over the entire subcontinent. To achieve that end, they were openly striving to merge Pakistan with India. The forceful annexation of the Muslim States of Hyderabad (Deccan) and Kashmir in 1947-1948, the deployment of a massive part of her army and all her armor on Pakistani border and imposition of a

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<sup>3</sup> Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, 1993, *Pakistan and the Troubled World*. Karachi: Royal Book Company. pp. 148-149.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 202.

<sup>5</sup> Farhat Mahmud, 1991, *A History of US-Pakistan Relations*. Lahore: Vanguard Books (Pvt.) Ltd. p. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Rizvi, 'Pakistan's Defense Policy', p. 202.

<sup>7</sup> Razvi, *Pakistan's Geopolitical Environment*..., p. 184

<sup>8</sup> Shahid M. Amin, 2004, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 25-38. ; Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan*... p. 1; and Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled ...*, p. 224 .

war, just within a year of partition, were clear indications of the Indian hegemonic designs.<sup>9</sup> India was applying not only warfare tactics but was also exerting political and psychological pressure of relentless propaganda against the very *raison d'être* of the origin of Pakistan. Indian leadership, with the help of some other countries, was also engaged in isolating Pakistan from the comity of nations.<sup>10</sup> Pakistan was in a real stalemate and she had to look for an external ally to check the Indian designs. Therefore, the entire edifice of Pakistan's foreign policy was based upon Indian fear.<sup>11</sup>

Pakistan's relations with her western neighbor—Afghanistan, had also been far from cordial due to the *Pukhtoonistan* issue.<sup>12</sup> It was in 1947, that the Afghan government denounced the 1893's Anglo-Afghan treaty of the demarcation of an international boundary between Afghanistan and India (then a British colony). She also launched her irredentist claim over the North Western *Pukhtoon*<sup>13</sup> populated area and started supporting secessionist elements in Pakistan. Afghanistan was also pampered by India by extending support on this issue. Afghanistan also had the Soviet Union on her back. Moreover, Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan's admission into the United Nations.<sup>14</sup> This wave of tension kept creeping under the carpet but was not allowed by King Zahir Shah, the then Afghan king, to take a violent form although his cousin Sardar Mohammad Daud was fanning it.<sup>15</sup> However, Pakistan had a perception of resurrection of this issue.

This precarious geopolitical situation confronted Pakistan with two-fold security concerns. This fear was further aggravated due to the narrow strategic waist of Pakistan as all her major cities were border outposts especially one of her provincial capitals, Peshawar, was just next to the border.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled ...*, p. 148.

<sup>10</sup> Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, p. 39.

<sup>11</sup> Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan...*, p. 1.

<sup>12</sup> The Afghan government had signed a border agreement with the British government in 1885, according to which border between Afghanistan and the United India, of which Pakistan was a part before partition in 1947, was demarcated and given the name of 'Durand Line'. But after the departure of British from the Indian sub-continent and the subsequent partition of India into India and Pakistan, Afghanistan started an irredentist claim over the North-Western part of Pakistan and gave it the name of Pukhtoonistan. Afghanistan has not only been taking up this issue from time to time but has also been extending support to the secessionist elements in Pakistan.

<sup>13</sup> A nationality occupying the North-Western province of Pakistan who speaks Pashto language. The largest part of this nationality is living on the Afghan side and makes the dominant part of the Afghan population.

<sup>14</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Foreign Policy: Relations with the West, China and the Middle East*, in Hafeez Malik (ed.), 2001, *Pakistan: Founders' Aspirations and Today's Realities*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 381.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., pp. 381-382.

<sup>16</sup> Rizvi, 'Pakistan's Defense Policy', pp. 202-204.

In such a grim geopolitical milieu, Pakistan needed a strong, modern, well-equipped and hard-hitting army capable of combating any threat arising from her western or eastern border that could jeopardize her national security and territorial integrity.<sup>17</sup> Pakistan had a number of options for making her security invincible and to keep her national integrity intact. But the common democratic ideals, the westernized bureaucratic set-up and, above all, the inclination of her armed forces towards the United States pushed Pakistan to opt for a close US-Pakistan relationship in order to get a strong external equalizer against the regional threats to her national security and territorial integrity.<sup>18</sup> Pakistani leaders were fully aware of the strategic importance of this nascent state.<sup>19</sup> These leaders even could not afford to ignore the geopolitical compulsion of their country for they had influenced the course of Pakistan's foreign policy throughout the history.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, the economic needs of the country were considered to be best catered by the economically potent United States.

Pakistan, therefore, started efforts to win the United States' strategic and economic support.<sup>21</sup> But till 1949, the United States did not respond in the same coin as the focus of world-politics, at that time, was Europe. Europe was passing through a very critical situation and there was a race between the United States and Soviet Union to win its support. Therefore, the United States was giving much importance to Europe than any other region in the world. However, during 1949-1951, just after the communist triumph in China, the war on the Korean Peninsula, and the volatile political situation in the Middle East, the strategic analysts in the United States started to realize the importance of Pakistan's geographic location.<sup>22</sup> The US States Department, in a policy statement, recognized the leading role of Pakistan in the Middle Eastern region and viewed it as a potential balancer in the South Asian power paradigm but looked at India as a Japan's successor in Asiatic imperialism.<sup>23</sup> The

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan...* pp. 6-21; and General K. M. Arif, 2001, *Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-1997*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 389-390.

<sup>19</sup> Aziz Ahmed Khan (former Ambassador) "American Alliance with Asian Countries," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, July 1960; and Dr. Safdar Mahmood, 1984, *Pakistan: A Political Study*. Lahore: Pakistan Education Press. p. 146.

<sup>20</sup> Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled ...*, p. 230.

<sup>21</sup> Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan...*, p. 6.

<sup>22</sup> Abdul Sattar, 2007, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: 1947-2005*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 41; and Department of States Policy Statement with respect to Pakistan, (3 April 1950), quoted in Rashmi Jain (ed.), 2007, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2006: A Documentary Study*. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers. pp. 17-19.

<sup>23</sup> See Department of States Policy Statement with respect to Pakistan (3 April 1950) quoted in Rashmi Jain (ed.), *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 17-19.

United States desired the use of air bases and other facilities in Pakistan during any possible combat with the communist countries, especially Soviet Union and China.<sup>24</sup> Formerly, the US administration had tried to build up India as the leader of Asia to check the flow of communism from China into Asia but on calculating Indian tilt towards non-alignment, her reluctance to join the US camp and her role in Korean War, a visible change came into US policy.<sup>25</sup> Keeping in view the catastrophe of the spread of communist dogma from Soviet Union into the South and Southwest Asia and into the oil-rich Middle East region, the United States seriously diverted her attention to these areas and decided to form a ring of alliances in order to curb this menace.<sup>26</sup> The rapid political changes in the Middle East were also adding to the US discomfort. In these circumstances, the United States found Pakistan as the most important, comfortable and valued asset.<sup>27</sup> Pakistan was also ready to fulfill US strategic objectives<sup>28</sup> not only due to the peculiar geopolitical requirements but also in order to gain economic and military assistance that was essential for her national security and territorial integrity. But still the United States did not want to antagonize India. The officials of the State Department were not in favor of giving any military assistance to Pakistan because they said, “India is the power in South Asia. We should seek to make it our ally rather than cause it to be hostile to us. Pakistan is distressingly weak”. The US ambassador went to the extent of saying: “It is a bad arithmetic to alienate 360 million Indians in order to aid 80 million Pakistanis who are split into two sections”.<sup>29</sup> The US-President, Eisenhower, and Secretary of State, Foster Dulles, were also not dismissive of these views<sup>30</sup> but the vital strategic interests in the Middle East were considered more important by them. The upheavals in the Middle East and a perception of threat to the West’s control over the strategic oil resources

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<sup>24</sup> See US National Security Council Staff Study (98/1): “The Position of the United States with respect to South Asia,” (approved by President Truman on 25 January 1951) quoted in Rashmi Jain (ed.), *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 20-21.

<sup>25</sup> Farzana Shakoor, “Pakistan-US Relations: An Interpretation”, *Pakistan Horizon*, Volume 54, issue 1, January 2001. pp. 19-23; Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled ...*, pp. 145-150.

<sup>26</sup> K. M. Arif, *Khaki Shadows...*, p. 390; and S. Adil Hussain, *Politics of Alliances and Aid: A Case Study of Pakistan (1954-1966)*, *Pakistan Horizon*, Karachi, First and Second Quarter 1979, p. 11.

<sup>27</sup> See First Report of President Truman on the Mutual Security Programme, December 1951; Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, p. 42.

<sup>28</sup> Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan...*, pp. 1-3.

<sup>29</sup> Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled ...*, p. 232.

<sup>30</sup> In a statement John Foster Dulles, the then US Secretary of State, stressed for the flow of US aid to India despite the constant reluctance of the latter to join the US camp against communist countries. He said, “If she (India) lost the economic competition to China, it would mean the loss of another 350 million people to communism”, see S.M. Burke, 1990, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 226.

necessitated a new policy requiring cooperation of Pakistan in arrangements for the defence of the region.<sup>31</sup> The induction of a nationalist government in Iran and nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company testifying to the decline of British power and prestige triggered the new US policy of direct involvement in the defence of the region. Therefore, by 1952, Pakistan came to be looked upon as a potential partner in the arrangements aimed at the containment of the Red Peril, the Soviet communism. Testifying before a congressional committee, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles described Pakistan as ‘a real bulwark’ and remarked that the religious convictions and martial spirit found in Pakistan can play a pivotal role against communism.<sup>32</sup> On June 1, 1953, in an address to the American people, the US Secretary of State expressed the same feelings and it was perhaps the first official introduction of Pakistan to the American people.<sup>33</sup> In other words, it was the geo-political and geo strategic importance of Pakistan which brought her into the limelight of world politics and there established a close strategic partnership between Pakistan and the United States in early 1950s.<sup>34</sup> The United States regarded Pakistan not only as a major player in the containment of communism but envisaged military of Pakistan as a ‘stabilizing force’, in the Middle East, and, even in Southeast Asia.<sup>35</sup> The United States established close ties with the Pakistan Army to curb any possible anti-US or pro-communist popular movement in Pakistan, to keep the country’s policies in line with the United States and grab power itself if the politicians show signs of derailing the US interests.<sup>36</sup> In 1958, when there was felt a mounting popular and political pressure for bourgeoisie democratic reforms and withdrawal from US backed defense pact, the Pakistan army led by General Ayub Khan staged a coup, abrogated the constitution and banned all political parties.<sup>37</sup> This military coup gave support to the American and British interests.<sup>38</sup> Ayub Khan, the then military ruler had, later on, revealed that he had consulted officials in Washington, including the CIA Chief, Allen Dulles, before declaring Martial Law in Pakistan.<sup>39</sup> Ayub Khan had

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<sup>31</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Foreign Policy: Relations with the West...*, pp. 356-357.

<sup>32</sup> K. Arif (ed.), 1984, *America-Pakistan Relations-Documents*. Lahore: Vanguard Books. p. 81.

<sup>33</sup> Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled ...*, p. 138.

<sup>34</sup> Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan...*, pp. 1-2.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

<sup>38</sup> Sangat Singh, 1970, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Appraisal*, New York: Asia Publishing House. pp. 86-87.

<sup>39</sup> Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan...*, p. 20.

also spoken about his visits of the United States in May 1958 and he said that he had held extensive discussions with General Nathan Twining and Services Chiefs.<sup>40</sup> This US-backed military take over retarded the already delayed progress of constitutional development in Pakistan, politicized the army and increased the role of army at the cost of civilian and democratic institutions.<sup>41</sup> Neil H. McElroy, the US Defense Secretary, who was present in Karachi just one day before the military take over, defended the military coup in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1959.<sup>42</sup> The US State Department also termed Pakistan-military as “the greatest stabilizing force in the county”.<sup>43</sup> These statements fully endorsed the active US involvement in the military and polity of Pakistan that was in the US interests. In early 1950s, Pakistan, under the bureaucratic-military oligarchy, had joined the US-backed alliances, SEATO (1954)<sup>44</sup> and Baghdad Pact (1955). The latter was subsequently renamed as CENTO.<sup>45</sup> One of the major reasons for Pakistan’s participation in these pacts was propounded as the desire to strengthen her defense vis-à-vis India.<sup>46</sup> Pakistan, with the US support, wanted to check the Indian hegemonic tendencies and to prevent India from becoming a regional power by usurping the independence of her small neighbors and put their territorial security and national integrity at stake.<sup>47</sup> Thus, it becomes obvious that the United States had a global agenda while Pakistan had a narrow regional security perception. But in spite of all the divergence of interests, the geo-strategic significance of Pakistan brought the United States in close strategic collaboration with the former. It was an arrangement between two ‘unequal partners’. Ironically, this collaboration was at the cost of Pakistan’s relations with her two neighboring states; People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. The aforementioned US-backed pacts alienated Pakistan from the Soviet Union and the

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<sup>40</sup> Mohammad Ayub Khan, 1967, *Friends Not Masters*. London: Oxford University Press. p. 59.

<sup>41</sup> Hasan Askari Rizvi, 2000, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-1997*. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications. pp. 91-95.

<sup>42</sup> See US Senate, 86<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, *Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on The Mutual Security Act of 1959, 6<sup>th</sup> May 1959*, pp. 205-206.

<sup>43</sup> See Department of State and Department of Defense, *The Mutual Security Programme Fiscal Year 1958*, vol.1 (Washington, DC: 1962), p. 359.

<sup>44</sup> SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organization) was joined by Pakistan in 1954. its other members were Australia, France, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom and United States.

<sup>45</sup> CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) was the name given to the Baghdad Pact after the withdrawal of Iraq from it in 1959. Pakistan had joined it in 1955. Iran, United Kingdom and Turkey were also its members; See also Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan...*, p. 3.

<sup>46</sup> Rizvi, *The Military and Politics...* p. 80; also see “Pakistan’s Current Economic Situation and Prospects,” Intelligence Report No. 7706 of the office of Intelligence Research of Department of States, 15 May 1958.

<sup>47</sup> Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled ...*, p. 148.

latter got closer to India. The Soviet leaders supported the Indian stance over Kashmir issue and backed the Kabul regime on the issue of *Pukhtoonistan*. Resultantly, the Kashmir issue found no solution under the 'United Nations Resolutions' due to the overwhelming opposition of the Soviet Union. On Kashmir issue, the Soviet leaders clearly stood by the Indian claim when, in November 1955 during a visit to Srinagar, the Soviet leaders declared it as an integral part of India. In 1962, the Soviet veto to the resolution submitted in the United Nation's Security Council for the solution of longstanding Kashmir issue was the direct outcome of close US-Pakistan relationship that had sowed seeds of distrust and antagonism between Pakistan and the Soviet Union.<sup>48</sup> Apart from India, Afghanistan also remained hostile to Pakistan. During Ayub era (1958-1969), Pakistan adopted an anti-China policy in the footsteps of the United States and even on the UN forum voted against People's Republic of China.<sup>49</sup> All these arrangements could not even provide Pakistan with any leverage against India as the United States and Western powers were afraid of annoying India.<sup>50</sup> It is evident from the fact that when India approached the United States for clarification of Pakistan Foreign Office's interpretation of the 1959's US-Pakistan Mutual Assistance Agreement, the United States assured India that this agreement could not be used against her.<sup>51</sup> It was a clear indication that the United States was exploiting the geo-strategic significance of Pakistan for the sake of her own security interests but was not ready to defend the latter against Indian aggression that was the main concern and the cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan was the only country that could facilitate the United States to have a close watch on the Soviet and Chinese activities through her espionage technology system and which could enable her to counteract them. Therefore, this urgency to get an air-base in Pakistan made the United States to sign an agreement with Pakistan in 1959. As a result of close US-Pakistan partnership, an American airbase was established near Badabher, a village in the suburb of Peshawar. Pakistan got nothing in return except increasing her burden of geopolitical compulsions and problems. That is why the United States has always preferred military dictators over democratically elected governments in Pakistan. But

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>49</sup> Mahmud, *A History of US-Pakistan...*, p. 65.

<sup>50</sup> The agreements that Pakistan entered with the US in mid and late 1950s did nothing to boost Pakistan's security but they helped in providing Pakistan armed forces with the latest weapons and technologies available at that time, see Farzana Shakoor, "Pakistan-US Relations...", pp. 19-20; Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled World...*, p. 151.

<sup>51</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, 1964, *Speeches*, Volume VI, 1957-1963, Delhi: Government of India. p. 289.

this nexus of Pakistan army with the CIA and Pentagon (headquarter of the US army) brought a great havoc to the democratic and judicial institutions of Pakistan. It politicized military that, in turn, undermined the democratic and political culture in Pakistan and resulted in the dismemberment of the Eastern wing of the country in 1971, as it created a sense of deprivation due to prolonged military rule (1958-1971). Moreover, the establishment of US-military base in Pakistan made the latter more vulnerable to the Soviet incursion when the Soviet leaders warned Pakistan of the dire consequences after the shooting down of U-2 reconnaissance aircraft which had taken off from that base.<sup>52</sup> According to *The New York Times*, Pakistan would have been the direct victim, had any conflict taken place between the United States and Soviet Union.<sup>53</sup> Thus, the defense problem of Pakistan not only remained unresolved but also became more critical while the military as an institution got strengthened.

The other determining factor in the US-Pakistan relationship was the precarious and volatile geo-strategic scenario in the Middle East. In the late 1950s, Arab nationalism got a new impetus in the Middle East when Jamal Abdul Nasir became the president of Egypt and united the two important countries; Egypt and Syria into United Arab Republic in 1958. Moreover, in the wake of WW-II, the British withdrawal from the Suez Canal had given way to a power vacuum and to the Anglo-Egypt confrontation over the nationalization of strategically important Suez Canal. These and some other developments urged the United States to focus more on this region. The United States was already alarmed by the Korean War (1950) and the socialist revolution in China and the nationalization of the foreign oil companies in Iran. She had also faced a humiliating defeat in Vietnam and could not afford to loose ground to the Soviets in the Middle East, the vital strategic zone to the world politics. Therefore, the United States and her Western allies envisaged a plan of setting up a Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO) on the pattern of NATO but geopolitical environment in this region was different from Europe and the idea of collective security could not get fame in the Arab States of the Middle East.<sup>54</sup> But the non-Arab pro-US states such as Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, took it as a blessing in disguise and overwhelmingly provided their shoulder to carry on this US agenda. Pakistan enjoyed the status of most valued ally in the region and reaped some benefits but the costs

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<sup>52</sup> Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, p. 45.

<sup>53</sup> *The New York Times*, (4 July 1960), cited in Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, p. 45.

<sup>54</sup> Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled ...*, p. 150.

incurred were greater. Her defense dilemma remained intact but got some confidence in the face of Indian threat. The deep sense of insecurity on the part of Pakistan lessened when Pakistan's army organized and modernized itself due to sufficient US-arms supply and military training facilities under the above-mentioned pacts. This military aid also strengthened the position of military at the domestic level as it had the resources, hierarchal system, discipline and *esprit de corps* which made it the most influential and modernized segment of the society.<sup>55</sup>

In fact, during early 1950s and later 1960s, the US-Pakistan relations remained hostage to the Cold War paradigm and the former wasted no time in changing her priorities when she found another broker in the region. Therefore, in early 1960s, there came a great shift in the US policy towards South Asia and she put much of her weight behind India to check the influence of communist China into the South Asian region. In early 1962, the United States had started supporting India against communist China.<sup>56</sup> Simultaneously, the US administration successfully deterred Pakistan from taking advantage of the Sino-India conflict through diplomatic channels. This US move was to save India from a two-front war.<sup>57</sup> But the entire charm of US-Pakistan relationship withered away in October 1962 when the US administration decided to support India both militarily and economically and at the same time asked Pakistan to provide assurance to India that the former will not create problems for the latter during her war against China.<sup>58</sup> Pakistan made it clear that the entire political spectrum in Pakistan was opposed to the US military aid and to offer any assurance to India. But the United States had decided to help India to make her a regional power to counterweight the potential menace of communist expansion in Asia.<sup>59</sup> Therefore, President Kennedy, in reply to Pakistan, said, "question of assurances is [a] matter for Pakistani decision, but [the] US is interested in stopping the advance of communism in Asia."<sup>60</sup> The changing geo-strategic realities in South Asia urged the US and Western leaders to support Indian hegemonic role in the

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<sup>55</sup> Rizvi, *Pakistan's Defence Policy*... pp. 199-208.

<sup>56</sup> *The Wall Street Journal* (9 July 1962).

<sup>57</sup> On 30 June 1963, the US administration, in a statement, made it clear that US aid to India would remain unabated irrespective of the fact that India comes to terms with Pakistan on Kashmir dispute, see S.M. Burke, '*Pakistan's Foreign Policy*'. p. 289.

<sup>58</sup> Naunihal Singh, 2006, *The United States and Pakistan: The Estranged Bedfellows*. New Delhi: Authorspress. pp. 154-160.

<sup>59</sup> President Kennedy's statement assuring Pakistan about military aid to India, 20 November 1962 as quoted in Rashmi Jain (ed.), *The United States and Pakistan*..., pp. 43-44.

<sup>60</sup> Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan*..., pp. 154-160.

region. The United States wished a strong barrier against communist China while India needed dollars, war arsenals and propaganda devices to establish her hegemony in South and Southeast Asia. In November 1962, the Indian premier requested the United States for direct and substantial military aid by providing a couple of squadrons of B-47 US-bombers and 12 squadrons of US-supersonic fighters manned by the US crew to defend the Indian cities and installations against possible Chinese air-attacks. Therefore, the United States and the Western powers rushed to help India both militarily and economically. The United States took the lead by announcing \$100 million annual aid for India.<sup>61</sup> The first outcome of these new developments transcended the geo-strategic relevance of India for the United States and consequently US-Pakistan relations got strained and Pakistan became disenchanted in spite of her enthusiastic policy of alignment.<sup>62</sup> The new injection of US arms aid to India gave rise to a new arms race in South Asia that undermined the future economic growth of the region.<sup>63</sup> The regional balance of power got serious blow and not only Pakistan's geo-strategic importance eroded but also a grave threat was posed to the very security of this country. Pakistan reacted strongly against the arms supply to India and established close relationship with the Peoples Republic of China by concluding trade, boundary, and civil aviation agreements that irritated the United States. The other contributory factor towards close Sino-Pakistan relations was India's intimate relations with the Soviet Union.<sup>64</sup> Pakistan realized that she could no longer rely on the United States but marginal military support.<sup>65</sup> The close Indo-US nexus forced both the Soviet Union and Pakistan to revisit their foreign policies and decided to mend their fences in view of the changing geo-strategic realities. It was the first time in the history of Pakistan that she adopted a balanced posture towards both powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, without being at the cost of the other.<sup>66</sup> With the newly emerged situation, it was established that mere geo-strategic interest could not provide basis for a durable and long-term relationship between two unequal powers. There was a lack of convergence of interests and, therefore,

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<sup>61</sup> Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled World...*, pp. 158-159; and Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 158-159.

<sup>62</sup> Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled ...*, p. 232.

<sup>63</sup> Mohammad Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American Alliance: Stresses and Strains," in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1964; and Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled World...*, p. 164.

<sup>64</sup> Tom Rogers, 'Reverse Influence', in M. Raziullah Azmi (ed.), 1994, *Pakistan American Relations: The Recent Past*. Karachi: Royal Book Company. p. 107.

<sup>65</sup> Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 207.

<sup>66</sup> Statement by Foreign Minister Arshad Hussain in the National Assembly of Pakistan, 20 May 1968.

whenever the United States achieved the specific geo-strategic objectives, the geo-strategic importance of Pakistan relegated and the US-Pakistan engagement has given way to estrangement. The coolness in the US-Pakistan relationship encouraged India to speed up her hostilities against Pakistan that resulted in the 1965 Indo-Pak war. During this war, the United States withheld military supplies to both Pakistan and India but the former was fully aware of the fact India had other sources of procurement of military hardware while Pakistan was dependant on US arms supply only.<sup>67</sup> The US attitude towards Pakistan during this war was quite sufficient to prove that the US can never come to defend the latter against the Indian threat for which Pakistan joined the US backed defense pacts and alienated her from her neighbors, the Soviet Union and China. Hence, all these alliances and treaties between Pakistan and the United States failed in the fulfillment of the objectives for which they were signed by Pakistan.<sup>68</sup> In the Cold-War paradigm, the real concern of the United States had been the 'communism mania' that had made her supporting Pakistan and India at one time or the other. America supplied military and economic aid to win support of these two Asian powers against communist Soviet Union and China but she failed to understand that a serious effort of rapprochement between Pakistan and India could bring stability to South Asia that can ultimately check the expansion of communism in South Asia.<sup>69</sup>

In early 1970s, the situation took a new turn when the United States sought Pakistan's help in the establishment of entente with the Peoples Republic of China. The Pakistan-China relations, which the former US Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson considered abhorrent, became cardinal for US communication with China. To create a new global balance of power, the United States took it essential to have normal relations with China and, therefore, wanted to bring it back into the comity of nations by her inclusion into the United Nations. The US administration intended to use the US relationship with China as a lever for US-Soviet détente.<sup>70</sup> To accomplish this agenda, she sought Pakistan's help. Pakistan arranged secret visit of the then US foreign Secretary Henry Kissinger.

In 1971, the second war between India and Pakistan broke out and the United States again failed in helping out Pakistan, the most allied ally of US in South Asia.

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<sup>67</sup> Farzana Shakoor, "Pakistan-US Relations...", pp. 19-25.

<sup>68</sup> Rashmi Jain, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 62-73.

<sup>69</sup> Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled ...*, pp. 154-157.

<sup>70</sup> Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 217-218.

Although the Nixon administration showed some tilt towards Pakistan but did nothing to preserve East Pakistan from dismemberment on 16 December 1971.<sup>71</sup> On the contrary, US economic and military aid was stopped.<sup>72</sup> On the other hand, the Soviet Union fully supported India by providing political, diplomatic and military support to the latter.<sup>73</sup> In late 1970s, Pakistan's international stature and geo-strategic importance got a more decisive boost by two major developments; Pakistan's progress towards the acquisition of nuclear capability and the Soviet incursion in Afghanistan.<sup>74</sup> The nuclear program was started by Pakistan in 1972, a few months after the separation of East Pakistan, but got impetus in 1974 after the Indian nuclear tests. Pakistan's nuclear program greatly annoyed the United States and she added pace to her efforts for non-proliferation but the main brunt fell on Pakistan. The United States turned the 'most allied ally' of the 1950s into a vital pariah. Nuclear sanctions were imposed against Pakistan under the Symington (1976) and Glen Amendments (1977). The earlier US-offer for the sale of A-7 aircraft to Pakistan was withdrawn.<sup>75</sup> There were reports that in the United States that beside other available options an interagency group, led by arm-control expert Gerard Smith, was planning to attack the Kahuta Research Laboratories in Pakistan in order to destroy the nuclear capability of Pakistan.<sup>76</sup> Alarmed by this plan, Pakistan agitated against the United States. The US State Department denied the plan categorically but suspicions in Islamabad remained unchanged. In November 1979, these relations were touching the lowest ebb. On 21 November 1979, another bitter incident took place when a mob of students set ablaze the US embassy in Islamabad on a report of the indulgence of US administration in the desecration of the Holy Ka'aba. A crisis of confidence was there between Pakistan and the United States until the Soviet military intervention into Afghanistan.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Troubled World...*, p. 234.

<sup>72</sup> The US Congress pressed the administration to suspend economic and military aid to Pakistan until a diplomatic solution of the crisis is found by Pakistan. on 3 August 1971, the US House of Representatives passed a bill while on 5 October 1971, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked the administration through a resolution to choke all aid to Pakistan. See Niloufer Mehdi, 1999, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1971-1981: The Search for Security*. Lahore: Feroz Sons. p. 66.

<sup>73</sup> Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, p. 64.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., p. 78.

<sup>75</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, pp. 148-152.

<sup>76</sup> This story was unveiled by *The New York Times*. See Richard Brut, 'U.S. will Press Pakistan to Halt A-Arms Project', and 'Pakistan Protests to U.S. Envoy on Nuclear Report'. *The New York Times* (12 and 15 August 1979); and Dennis Kux (2003), *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000, Disenchanted Allies*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 240.

<sup>77</sup> Muhammad Islam, 'The Afghan Factor', in M. Raziullah Azmi (ed.), 1994, *Pakistan American Relations: The Recent Past*. Karachi: Royal Book Company. p. 65.

In 1979, the world politics took a new and dramatic turn and once again Pakistan's geo-strategic importance came to the lime-light when on 26 December 1979 the Soviet forces rolled into Afghanistan under the pretext of invitation from the Afghan government.<sup>78</sup> It rose Pakistan's geo-strategic and geopolitical relevance to such an extent that the most critical of all the critics to Pakistan's nuclear program, the United States, rushed to revive her strategic and military relationship with the latter and transformed her 'sanctioned ally' into the 'frontline state role'. The National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter and the Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher rushed to Islamabad to discuss the changed geopolitical scenario and offer a military and economic aid from the United States.<sup>79</sup> Thus, due to the specific geo-strategic location and geopolitical environment of the region, Pakistan not only came out of isolation but also enjoyed the Western and American economic and military support.

The 'Saur Revolution'<sup>80</sup> in Afghanistan was a great political development in Pakistan's neighborhood. After this revolution the then Afghan government revived an old irredentist Afghan claim i.e. *Puktoonistan* over the North-Western Pukhtoon populated areas of Pakistan.<sup>81</sup> The revival of this claim alarmed Pakistani policymakers. This apprehension further aggravated when more than 80,000 Soviet troops marched into the Afghan territory and the Pak-Afghan border became insecure due to the expansion of the Soviet military influence. Thus, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan enormously stirred Pakistan's security environment.<sup>82</sup> The Soviet Union not only had a history of strained relations with Pakistan but the former had also actively engaged in the dismemberment of East Pakistan in 1971 and nurtured secessionist insurgencies in Balochistan province of Pakistan. It had also played an abhorrent role in the Kashmir problem. Moreover, the Soviet communist leadership had an old *Tsarist* aspiration of having access to the warm water of the Arabian Sea.<sup>83</sup> These factors multiplied Pakistan's worries of the future strategic repercussions.<sup>84</sup> Pakistan had two apprehensions; becoming a periphery state of the Soviet Union, and

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<sup>78</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, p. 155.

<sup>79</sup> Kux, 'A Ride on the Roller Coaster', in Hafeez Malik (ed.), 2003, *Pakistan: Founders' Aspirations and Today's Realities*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 302.

<sup>80</sup> The democratic revolution that took place in Afghanistan in April 1978.

<sup>81</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, p. 154.

<sup>82</sup> Islam, 'The Afghan Factor', p. 65.

<sup>83</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Foreign Policy: Relations with the West...* p. 383.

<sup>84</sup> Rizvi, 'Pakistan's Defence Policy...', pp. 213-215.

any possible Soviet collusion with India to harm Pakistan.<sup>85</sup> The Soviet move was viewed to have altered the strategic situation in the area in a very ominous fashion, eliminating a buffer state between the Soviet Union and Pakistan, and presenting a new threat to Iran.<sup>86</sup>

Not only Pakistan but also the South Asian region, as a whole, became vulnerable to the Soviet penetration.<sup>87</sup> It was feared in the backdrop of the history of this region that any power, in the past, which emerged from the Central Asia and consolidated its hold over Kabul, did not stop there but marched into the subcontinent and held sway over it. There was a fear that history would repeat itself.

At the beginning of the *Saur* revolution, the United States had remained unconcerned about the political development in this geographic centre of gravity of Central Asian region, Afghanistan, even at the agitation of Iran. Afghanistan was a country of very low priority for the United States and the latter was a silent onlooker during the overthrow of the monarchy in 1970s. The US did not bother to review its pattern of relations with her old ally, Pakistan, in order to cope with any future insurgency in the region as result of this serious development. This indifference on the part of the US administration was mainly due to her isolationist policy in the wake of Vietnam War. However, the fall of King Raza Shah Pahlvi, a despotic monarch in Iran and the roll over of 80,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan prompted the United States to pay heed to the grave strategic changes in the region.<sup>88</sup> The strategic balance that had already changed in favor of the Soviet Union after the US withdrawal from Vietnam was further tilted towards the former and serious threats posed to the US and Western interests in the region.<sup>89</sup> This Soviet move was a continuation of communist triumphs, which were coming in the form of a chain after the success of communism in North Korea, in North Vietnam, communist victory in Cuba (1959), and fall of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the orbit of communist dogma. Therefore, the Soviet military take-over in Afghanistan urged the United States to check any further Soviet advance in the South and East, which could threaten the security of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean region and jeopardize the supply of oil to the West.

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<sup>85</sup> *Dawn* (December 14, 1981).

<sup>86</sup> President Carter's State of the Union Message to joint session of the US Congress, 21 January 1980; and Islam, 'The Afghan Factor', p. 67.

<sup>87</sup> A. R. Siddiqi, Afghanistan: 'A Geopolitical Watershed', *Defence Journal*, Karachi, June-July 1982, pp. 1-8.

<sup>88</sup> Islam, 'The Afghan Factor', p. 64.

<sup>89</sup> Razvi, 'Pakistan's Geopolitical Environment...', p. 192; also see Islam, *The Afghan Factor...*, p. 67.

President Jimmy Carter declared that any attempt by any outside force would be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.<sup>90</sup> He was clearly referring to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He went on to say that the United States would use military force to keep the oil lanes open.<sup>91</sup> Besides, keeping in view the geopolitical implications, the US administration interpreted the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan in terms of a serious threat to world peace and violation of norms of international behavior.<sup>92</sup> Japan and the Western European countries, which were dependant for two-third of their oil requirements on the oil-rich Persian Gulf region, extended their full-fledged support to the United States and joined voices to denounce the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.<sup>93</sup> China also looked at the Soviet intervention as a potential threat to her own security. Harold Brown, the US Secretary of Defense, visited China and discussed that how the United States and China might work to eradicate this common peril.<sup>94</sup> Thus, China also sided with the United States. The oil-rich states in the Persian Gulf also got alarmed.<sup>95</sup>

In the backdrop of this newly evolved geopolitical and geo-strategic environment, cooperation of the regional countries was desperately needed by the United States. Iran and Pakistan were the two strategically important countries whose geographical proximity and political influence could provide path to check the expansion of Soviet military, political and ideological influence in the South and Southwest Asia. They could obstruct her access to the Gulf oil resources and keep it away from establishing hegemony in the Indian Ocean that could bring it in direct confrontation with the United States.<sup>96</sup> But it was almost impossible for the United States to enlist Iran's support in the aftermath of ouster of the Iranian monarch, following the Iranian Revolution of February 1979.<sup>97</sup> Therefore, Pakistan was seen as the only country with which the United States could easily revive its strategic relationship to overthrow the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Hence, Pakistan came

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<sup>90</sup> Ted Koppel, "Will Fight For Oil," *The New York Times* (24 February 2006).

<sup>91</sup> Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, pp. 84-85.

<sup>92</sup> See US Department of State, Bulletin, May 1989, p. 4.

<sup>93</sup> K. Arif, (ed.), *America-Pakistan Relations...*, p. 372; also see Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, pp. 84-85.

<sup>94</sup> Rizvi, 'Pakistan's Defence Policy...', p. 192.

<sup>95</sup> Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, p. 83.

<sup>96</sup> Islam, 'The Afghan Factor', pp. 67-68.

<sup>97</sup> Statement by Jack C. Miklos, Deputy Assistant Secretary of States for NEA (Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, Department of States), before the House CFA (House Committee on Foreign Affairs) Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 15 May 1979

under international focus, and was praised with the words like ‘a pivotal state’, a ‘wedge’ and a ‘frontline country’ worth eulogizing.<sup>98</sup> The Carter administration was reported to have decided, in October 1978, to resume aid to Pakistan.<sup>99</sup> Pakistan was located at the Eastern flank of the Persian Gulf and, therefore, in case of any threat to her security, the security of the Persian Gulf would have been shattered which meant a direct armed confrontation between the two superpowers. Therefore, the United States decided to help Pakistan both militarily and economically in order to cope with any threat from the Soviet Union.<sup>100</sup>

Pakistan was not only aware of her strategic importance but was also fully acquainted with the geopolitical realities of the region. Therefore, to maximize gains from any new engagement with the United States, Pakistan adopted a cautious course.<sup>101</sup> Pakistan’s motives were not only the containment of the Soviet advance in South Asia but also included the inviolability of her eastern and western borders. For this purpose, Pakistan supported the internal Afghan resistance against Soviet forces to thwart out communist menace and establish a friendly regime in Kabul. Pakistan also needed the maintenance of a US-compatible government in Pakistan, and seeking an international recognition for her pro-West and anti-Soviet stance from the world at large.<sup>102</sup> Another factor was the establishment of US suzerainty over the Indian Ocean after the evacuation of British navy in the wake of World War-II. Pakistan had a strong aversion and resentment to any possible Indian superiority in the Indian Ocean.<sup>103</sup> Pakistan’s security was also linked with the Indian Ocean and Gulf region.<sup>104</sup> Besides these external factors, Pakistan was entangled in domestic problems. The military government in Pakistan was in high need of recognition from the United States and her Western allies. Therefore, Pakistan tried to grab the opportunity with both hands. General K. M. Arif, a close aide of General Ziaul Haq (1977-1988) and a Vice Chief of army staff, has portrayed the scenario in these words:

*“The Soviet intervention provided an opportunity to Islamabad to take advantage of it without compromising her principles. However, Pakistan made it known to US that her nuclear program was not negotiable. And,*

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<sup>98</sup> Farzana Shakoor, “Pakistan-US Relations...”, pp. 19-21; K. M. Arif, *Khaki Shadows...*, p. 185.

<sup>99</sup> Islam, ‘The Afghan Factor’, p. 64.

<sup>100</sup> See Department of States Bulletin (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 83.

<sup>101</sup> Azmi, *Pakistan-United States Relations...*, p. 237.

<sup>102</sup> Rogers, ‘Reverse Influence’, pp. 101-102.

<sup>103</sup> Rizvi, ‘Pakistan’s Defence Policy’, p. 216.

<sup>104</sup> Razvi, ‘Pakistan’s Geopolitical Environment...’, pp. 183-184.

*Islamabad vigorously pursued it despite protests and veiled threats from Washington.*<sup>105</sup>

Thus, it was not only under external compulsions that Pakistan decided to revive the US-Pakistan strategic relationship but there were certain domestic factors too. To General K. M. Arif, “The US-led West wanted a Muslim country to remain in the forefront of the Afghan struggle, and Pakistan was willing to play such a role for her own domestic and security reasons.” According to him, the western media suddenly ‘discovered’ that Zia, the dictator was, in fact, a ‘good guy’. His opposition to the communist invasion in Afghanistan evoked sympathy and support. Pakistan’s decision to act as a conduit for western weapons to Kabul was eulogized.

This is a fact that the US has always found it very easy to deal with a dictator instead of a democratically elected government in Pakistan. That is the reason to suggest that the US-Pakistan relationship flourishes much under a military regime in Pakistan and the most subversive factor to the democratic culture in Pakistan has been the US support for dictators. This time again there was a military ruler to bail out the United States from this monster.

The US attitude towards Pakistan underwent a literally overnight change.<sup>106</sup> The President Jimmy Carter not only declared Pakistan a frontline state between the Soviet Union and the ‘free-world’ and reaffirmed the 1959 bilateral security agreement which was aimed at cooperation against communism.<sup>107</sup> President Carter unequivocally declared, “We will provide military equipment, food and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and national security against the seriously increased threat from the North.”<sup>108</sup> In a message to the US Congress, President Carter stated, “the United States will take action to assist Pakistan in resisting any outside aggression.”<sup>109</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor, and Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, rushed to Islamabad on 1 February 1980, to ease tension between the two countries.<sup>110</sup> They made an offer of US \$400 million in economic and military assistance to Pakistan over a period of 18

<sup>105</sup> K. M. Arif, *Khaki Shadows...*, pp. 185-190.

<sup>106</sup> Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 291.

<sup>107</sup> Kux, ‘A Ride on the Roller ...’, p. 302.

<sup>108</sup> This statement was issued by Jimmy Carter on 4 January 1980. See Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 294.

<sup>109</sup> President Carter’s State of the Union ... on 21 January 1980.

<sup>110</sup> Noor A. Husain ‘Pakistan-US Security Relations: Arms Sales, Bases, and Nuclear Issues’, in Leo E. Rose and Noor A. Husain (ed.), 1985, *United States-Pakistan Relations*. Berkeley: California University Press. p. 55.

months.<sup>111</sup> Pakistan rejected the offer but kept on her resentment against Soviet intervention. The two reasons put forward for turning down the US offer were: it did not commensurate with the magnitude of threat, and it did not further a credible US-Pakistan relationship.<sup>112</sup> This non-acceptance in 1980 reduced the risk of direct involvement of Pakistan in the Cold War orbit and projected the Afghan cause in its genuine perspective of liberation of Afghanistan.<sup>113</sup> It also helped Pakistan in the formation of a broad international diplomatic front against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan that was not possible otherwise.<sup>114</sup>

The next US administration under Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), ranked Pakistan high on the US national security agenda and, therefore, an assistance of US \$3.5 billion, spread over five years, was proposed which was accepted. The United States recognized Pakistan as an important regional ally for three reasons; Pakistan's geographical proximity to the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan; her possible key strategic role in the prevention of Soviet hold over Afghanistan; and her role as a barrier against any further Soviet expansion in the southward direction.<sup>115</sup> Jane A. Coon, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of States for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, expressed the readiness of the United States to help Pakistan cope with the threat emanating from the latter's northwest i.e. Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan. A military and economic aid package along with the sale of 40 F-16 warplanes was agreed upon.<sup>116</sup> Thus, under Reagan administration, the United States and Pakistan came closer due to the striking coincidence of strategic Soviet threat. Although there was a sharp divergence of perceptions yet there was a close resemblance of target which engaged them in a new paradigm of strategic partnership. Pakistan and the US were operating from two different perspectives. The United States wanted to contain Soviet Union in order to safeguard the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf and secure the Indian Ocean suzerainty while Pakistan was apprehended by the Indian and Afghan factor. The Gulf region was also politically, strategically, religiously and economically important for Pakistan because it has common religious,

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<sup>111</sup> Kux, 'A Ride on the Roller Coaster...', p. 302.

<sup>112</sup> Rogers, 'Reverse Influence', p. 117.

<sup>113</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, pp. 158-159.

<sup>114</sup> Islam, 'The Afghan Factor', p. 70.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., p.74.

<sup>116</sup> Statement by Mr. Buckley, US Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, in the hearings before the subcommittee of House on Foreign Affairs on Security and Economic Assistance to Pakistan, 17 November 1981,

political and economic ties with the Persian Gulf countries. Moreover, they could provide a strategic depth to Pakistan that was already anxious about her narrow strategic waist. For the US, the underlying considerations were global but for Pakistan, only regional considerations were important.<sup>117</sup> However, the nuclear differences lurked below the surface as this new relationship flourished. The nuclear relations got a new dimension when US administration abruptly changed her tone and accepted Pakistan's assurances of not developing a nuclear weapon and nuclear non-proliferation.<sup>118</sup> To safeguard the US interests in Afghanistan and the Middle East, President Reagan buried the non-proliferation by dismantling the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency that was set up by the former US President John F. Kennedy. The National Security Council and the office of the National Security Advisor in the US were both degraded.<sup>119</sup> President Reagan and William Casey, the Director CIA, were unanimous in their views that winning a war against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan was a vital strategic objective of the US that could not be overlooked. For this purpose, they wanted to fuel the insurgency in Afghanistan by arming and funding them from the Pakistani soil to bog down the Soviet Red Army, just as the Soviets had done against the US troops in Vietnam. Thus, the US officials focused on Pakistan and pledged to ignore her much criticized nuclear program.<sup>120</sup> Despite remaining outwardly committed to the non-proliferation, Reagan administration did not resort to check Pakistan's nuclear program by taking strict measures against the latter. Funds and arms were provided to Pakistan through the CIA. In a press conference, the US President Ronald Reagan, candidly admitted the strategic value of Pakistan by saying that Pakistan was in a very important strategic position in the changing situation in Afghanistan. He also expressed his belief that it was in the US interests to be supportive to Pakistan.<sup>121</sup> Pakistan was exempted from the provisions of the Symington and Glenn Amendments.<sup>122</sup> In order to promote the US interests in the region, Article 669 of the US Foreign Assistance Act was amended

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<sup>117</sup> Rizvi, 'Pakistan's Defense Policy...', p. 207.

<sup>118</sup> Rashmi Jain (ed.), *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 377-378.

<sup>119</sup> Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, 2007, *Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons*. New York: Walker & Company. p. 4.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> These remarks were given by the US President during a press conference On 16 June 1981, quoted in Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception*. p. 379.

<sup>122</sup> Noman Sattar, 'The Nuclear Issue', in M. Raziullah Azmi (ed.), 1994, *Pakistan American Relations: The Recent Past*. Karachi: Royal Book Company. p. 29.

and some of the nuclear sanctions against Pakistan were waived.<sup>123</sup> However, US apprehensions over Pakistan's nuclear program surfaced now and then due to the presence of some grey area and mutual mistrust in this field.<sup>124</sup> The voices against Pakistan's nuclear posture mainly stemmed from the US Congress and not from the administration. But it is also not wrong to say that of all irritants between Pakistan and the United States, the nuclear issue was by far the most serious.<sup>125</sup> In 1983, despite the conduct of a 'cold test' of the nuclear device by Pakistan, the US left the former unabated.<sup>126</sup> The Pakistan-China nuclear collaboration was also left unattended by the US administration. However, sensing the threat from Pakistan's nuclear program to the non-proliferation efforts, the US Senate adopted an amendment called the "Pressler Amendment" named after the US Senator Larry Pressler, who introduced it in 1985. Tying the US aid to Pakistan with the nuclear issue, this new amendment called for an annual presidential certification that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device. Keeping in view the strategic US interests in Pakistan, the United States kept on issuing the required certificate in favor of Pakistan that paved the way for keeping smooth strategic relations intact.<sup>127</sup> The Reagan administration also urged the US Congress that curbing the US aid to Pakistan based on nuclear issue can hinder the US interests in the Southwest and South Asia.<sup>128</sup> In July 1987, following the conviction of Arshad Pervez, a Pakistani citizen living in Canada, on charges arising from his efforts to export a special steel alloy to Pakistan, the US president invoked the Solarz Amendment. The sanctions were considered counterproductive for the non-proliferation objectives and a blow for US Strategic interest in South Asia. Therefore, in a stroke of Presidential privileges, Reagan at the same time used his authority to waive against Pakistan under Symington and Solarz Amendment and in favor of US strategic interests in South Asia.<sup>129</sup> In April 1988, the Geneva Accord was signed and it was a great watershed in the world politics and the politics of South Asia. Pakistan achieved one strategic goal of the evacuation of Soviet military from Afghanistan

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<sup>123</sup> US Department of States briefing on Pakistan's nuclear intentions, 16 September 1981, also see Rashmi Jain (ed.), *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 378-379.

<sup>124</sup> See statement by Schaffer, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 9 March 1983; quoted in Rashmi Jain (ed.), *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 383-384.

<sup>125</sup> Islam, 'The Afghan Factor', p. 76.

<sup>126</sup> Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception*, p. 5.

<sup>127</sup> See White House Statement, 15 January 1988.

<sup>128</sup> Islam, 'The Afghan Factor', p. 77.

<sup>129</sup> Rogers, 'Reverse Influence', pp. 120-121.

when the last Soviet soldier, General Boris Gromov, crossed ‘the Friendship Bridge’ of Oxus River on 15 February 1989.<sup>130</sup> But for Pakistan, it was just the beginning of a long run. The other objectives were the end of the fratricidal war in Afghanistan, the return of normalcy to this war-ravaged country, achieving regional stability and preservation of unity and territorial integrity of Afghanistan.<sup>131</sup> The Soviet departure from Afghanistan brought a number of benefits for Pakistan but the costs were also very high. On the other hand, the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan was the end of the strategic agenda for the United States and, thereafter, Kabul had no more significance in the US foreign policy. The departure of the Red Army and the collapse of Soviet Union put an end not only to the long-drawn Cold War but changed the strategic and political priorities of the United States. After the Soviet withdrawal, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States that had played the pivotal role in the Afghan War, wanted to clean its hands of the Afghanistan episode.<sup>132</sup> In the given circumstances, the succeeding democratic governments in Pakistan and the expression of determination to the steadfastness of the US-Pakistan relations, the US interests in South Asia changed as she no longer needed allies against Soviet Union; nor could it be blackmailed by countries threatening it to go over to the rival camp. The shift in the focus of the United States on South Asia changed the US attitude towards Pakistan.<sup>133</sup> The strategic significance of Pakistan had diminished, as she had no longer remained the ‘front-line state’. The history repeated itself and once again, the nuclear issue dominated the US-Pakistan relations. With the end of Cold War, the US policy of negligence over Pakistan’s nuclear posture changed altogether. Nuclear sanctions were imposed under Pressler Amendment (1985) when the US President refused to issue the required certificate in 1990.<sup>134</sup> The United States also denied the transfer of twenty-eight F-16 aircrafts and military equipments for which Pakistan had paid \$658 million in advance. In fact, the Afghan issue and the Soviet threat, which had relegated the nuclear issue, were no longer existent. Congressional circles in the United States were firmly persuaded that in the wake of Soviet withdrawal from

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<sup>130</sup> Victoria Schofield, 2003, *Afghan Frontier: Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia*. New York: Tauris Parke Paperbacks. p. 325.

<sup>131</sup> K. M. Arif, *Khaki Shadows...*, pp. 186-187.

<sup>132</sup> Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, 354.

<sup>133</sup> Islam, ‘The Afghan Factor’, p. 90.

<sup>134</sup> Letter by US President Bush-I to his Pakistani counterpart, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, wherein the former expressed his inability to certify Pakistan’s compliance with the Pressler Amendment (1985), 18 September 1990.

Afghanistan, the time had come to force Pakistan to abandon her quest for nuclear weapons.<sup>135</sup> Thus, Pakistan was pushed from international esteem to international isolation just after losing her strategic importance. Even after aid cut-off, several efforts were made by Pakistan to mend fences with the United States but all in vain.<sup>136</sup> On the contrary, Pakistan was put on the watch list of states accused of sponsoring terrorism. Nevertheless, that was a problem of short-sightedness on the part of United States that she not only left Afghanistan at the disposal of the regional powers but overlooked the future strategic importance of Pakistan in her access to the oil-rich Caspian Basin. She also miscalculated the fatal repercussions of the war-nursery left behind in Afghanistan. The United States could not evaluate the outcomes of the Afghan Civil war.

### **Conclusion:**

The unique geo-strategic location of Pakistan has played a key role in attracting the United States towards Pakistan. The US has always come closer to Pakistan to win support of the latter to carry out the US international agenda or to eradicate a menace threatening the US interests directly or indirectly. Thus, whether it was the containment of communist advance in South Asia, the protection of the US interests in the oil-rich Middle East or the US war against terrorism, the US has desperately needed Pakistan because the fulfillment of these objectives was not possible without Pakistan's support. Pakistan has also sought to compensate her weak military position vis-à-vis India through close military ties with the United States. The US economic aid and political support were also needed by Pakistan. But looking at the equation of benefits, the United States has benefited more than Pakistan. The US triumph over the former Soviet Union, which made her the sole power, was indebted to Pakistan's unqualified support during the last phase of the Cold War. The present US hold over Afghanistan is due to the marvelous intelligence and logistic support extended by Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan's gains had remained only marginal. Through US support, Pakistan could never safeguard her national frontiers from frequent Indian aggressions, which was stated as the main objective of Pakistan's strategic support to the US, nor could prevent dismemberment of her Eastern wing in 1971. The two major benefits that Pakistan reaped were; the successful nuclear technology

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<sup>135</sup> Islam, 'The Afghan Factor', p. 91.

<sup>136</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, pp. 225-226.

by turning off the US pressure in 1980s and the military strength got through US support. As far as the nuclear gains are concerned, Pakistan cannot claim herself secure even in the presence of nuclear umbrella. The build up of a strong and well-disciplined military institution is the other gift of close US-Pakistan relationship that has every now and then uprooted the democratic institutions of the country and obstructed the way of evolution of a national solidarity among the federating units of the country. It is also a fact that military has not been successful in defense of the state, which was its prime duty, and it is quite evident from the fall of Dhaka (1971) and misadventurism in Kargil Operation (1999). However, a strong Pakistani military was needed by the US as a stabilizing force to promote US interests in the Middle East and to crush any anti-US sentiments in Pakistan. This US objective has been successfully achieved by the Pakistan army. However, the main drawback of the US-Pakistan relationship is its flimsy nature. The root-cause of this fragility in relations lies in the fact that the main driving force behind the intermittent close US-Pakistan relationship has not been the convergence of interest but the need to accomplish their separate, different and sometimes divergent interests through mutual collaboration. Only the geo-strategic factor cannot turn the alliance among the unequal partners into a durable and long-standing partnership and the same has proved true for the volatile US-Pakistan relationship. Each time the evaporation of strategic relevance of Pakistan has not only resulted in a cleavage in the US-Pakistan relations but also put the latter under much political, economic and diplomatic pressure than before.

Since 9/11, Pakistan has once again become instrumental in the US strategic war against terrorism due to the strategic worth arising from her geographical proximity to Afghanistan, her military superiority in the region and sophisticated intelligence and logistic facilities. Analyzing the history of Pakistan's engagements with the United States, it can be predicted with greater degree of authenticity that this new phase will meet the same fate as in the past i.e. the US strategic interests in Pakistan will diminish as soon as her agenda gets materialized. At the end of this unmatchable relationship, Pakistan may face a number of dreadful consequences both at home and abroad. Once the US military hold over Afghanistan gets firm, the very existence of nuclear Pakistan will be put at stake. The United States would need an uninterrupted flow of hydrocarbons from the mineral-rich Caspian basin. Only Pakistani ports of *Gawader* (constructed with Chinese support), and Karachi can provide the easiest roots for their direct and economical transportation. A peaceful,

stable and sovereign Pakistan could become a hurdle to the smooth transit of the US shipments. The peace in Afghanistan would ultimately turn the US attention towards Pakistan and she would not leave any stone unturned in making her interests secure.

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Chapter 3

The Collapse of Soviet Union and the Activation of Pressler Amendment

“It is dangerous for any country to oppose the US, and fatal to befriend it”.
Henry Kissinger¹

The world after the collapse of Soviet Union presented an entirely different scenario. The disintegration of USSR was a novel development in the history of international politics. It changed the whole edifice of world politics. The world began to acquire a new shape and a new character.² The rollback of the ‘Red Army’ from Afghanistan, the end of Cold War and the subsequent collapse of Soviet Union turned the bipolar world (which existed since earlier 1940s until late 1980s), into a unipolar one in terms of military and multi-polar in terms of economics.³ The entire world was stunned at this unbelievable development and the States started reshaping their foreign policies and redefining their goals and priorities in the light of changed circumstances. The ideological politics of the Cold War era gave way to an economic warfare that had both its advantages and disadvantages for all countries of the world. The dependency of periphery on the core increased but that of the core on periphery decreased. The most adverse outcome for the third world countries was the decline in their relative power that made them more dependant on the United States and Western industrialized states and the same was more effectual for Pakistan.⁴ These states could no longer command the influence to win political and economic gains as they did in the bipolar system. Beside disadvantages, however, Pakistan had certain advantages also.

Pakistan’s regional security improved in certain respects; the threat from the northwest disappeared after the disintegration of Soviet Union. Afghanistan and the newly independent Central Asian Republics (CARs) provided Pakistan with a strategic depth which was the main concern for Pakistan since independence in 1947.

¹ General K. M. Arif, 2001, *Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947-1997*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 391.

² Shahid Javed Burki, 2007, *Changing Perceptions, Altered Reality: Pakistan's Economy Under Musharraf, 1999-2006*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 75.

³ Marvi Memon, ‘Reorientation of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy’, in Mehrunnisa Ali (ed.), 2001, *Readings in Pakistan Foreign Policy 1971-1998*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 408

⁴ Thom A. Travis, 1997, *India, Pakistan and the Third World: In the post-Cold War System*. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications (pvt) Ltd. pp. 61-67.

The United States left the war-torn Afghanistan at the disposal of warring tribes or the neighboring Pakistan. Pakistan had neither resources nor strategy to bring stability to the war-ravaged Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan was found very receptive to Pakistan's political influence and very helpful in sustaining the struggle for Kashmir.⁵ Besides Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan had common religious, historical, commercial and ethnic ties with Pakistan. Pakistan's proximity to these petroleum-rich Central Asian Republics (CARs), which emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet Union, was a blessing in disguise for Pakistan if skillfully handled. The Central Asian region could offer a huge market for the developing open-market economy of Pakistan and the newly emerged Central Asian Republics could benefit Pakistan with their massive hydrocarbons capital. Pakistan could provide these land-locked states with easiest sea routes to facilitate their trade with the world and this could turn this region into a strong economic bloc which, in the ultimate analysis, could provide Pakistan some political leverage in regional and global affairs. It could bring Pakistan in a good bargaining position with the United States and India. To get reciprocal benefits from Washington, it was a great opportunity to transform this hydrocarbon-rich area into an economic bloc on the pattern of European Union or North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or, at least, resembling to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). But the main hurdle in manipulating economic gains from this region was greatly dependant on peace and stability in Afghanistan that was in the grip of constant civil strife since 1978. The US reluctance to play a major political role in Afghanistan provided Pakistan with a free hand there, which could turn into a great opportunity if handled properly.⁶ Pakistan had been able to focus on her eastern border with India. Due to the declined military and economic power of Russia (the successor of Soviet Union), India could no longer enjoy the enormous military, economic and diplomatic support provided to her during the Cold War era.⁷ Pakistan also had an opportunity to draw the US government attention to human rights violations in the Indian-held Kashmir in an attempt to gain US support for the solution

⁵ Hafeez Malik, 2008, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Imperial Dimension*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 76.

⁶ Travis, *India, Pakistan and the...*, pp. 57-59.

⁷ Ibid., p. 58.

of Kashmir dispute.⁸

Looking at the disadvantages, the post-Cold War era especially after 1991 to 1999 was a crises-ridden era for Pakistan. Pakistan not only lost the dubious distinction of a frontline state, the premises of its past foreign policy were shaken to the foundation.⁹ During this period, Pakistan had to face not only domestic problems but also came under enormous external pressures. Pakistan's quest for an outside power to check India was diminished after evaporation of Cold War paradigm of rivalry between the United States and former Soviet Union. During the Cold War, Pakistan had become a US ally because the former was unable to confront India by herself. In global competition with the then Soviet Union, the US needed to manipulate the strategic location of Pakistan, especially during the 1980s when the Cold War ended in a decisive phase. In the wake of that crucial phase, relations between the Cold War allies, the United States and Pakistan, remained mostly hostage to the nuclear issue, (when the Cold War was over). Besides nuclear issue, a number of other issues like drug trafficking from Afghanistan through Pakistan and the alleged 'human rights abuses' in Pakistan had also made Pakistan more exposed to the mounting US and Western pressures.

In the changing world scenario, Russian Federation emerged as a political successor to the defunct Soviet Union. Nearly 90 percent of the oil, 80 percent of the natural gas, 62 percent of electricity, 70 percent of gold and 70 percent of skilled technical workers were inherited by the Russian Federation from the Soviet legacy. She also took control of 80 percent of industry and 60 percent of the territory occupied by former Soviet Union. The industries she inherited were mainly metallurgy, space, aeronautics and nuclear. But these industries could not prove helpful in resolving the problems of nascent capitalist economy of Russia. Russia was in severe grip of economic plight that had already contributed much to the collapse of Soviet Union. Due to economic problems and some other political reasons, Russia could not assert the same degree of power in international politics as did the Soviet Union. Thus, she could not challenge the US supremacy. The then US president

⁸ US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Ms Robin Raphael's statements at a special background briefing for journalists from South Asian region based in the US capital, 28 October 1993, and her statement before the Senate CFR (Committee on Foreign Relations) subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 4 February 1994, clearly indicate the US concern over Human Rights violations in Kashmir.

⁹ Farzana Shakoor, 'Pakistan-US Relations: 1989-1991', *Pakistan Horizon*, Volume. 45, Number 2, April 1992, pp. 23-25.

George Bush (Senior) heralded a new dawn of *imperium*, when he stated that a New World Order has started.¹⁰ The United States rearranged her priorities according to the new slogan she raised. The US academia and leaders began to urge the United States to assume the responsibility of guardianship of the European security and international order. They even suggested models to the grand strategy of assuming an imperial role by the United States. Some retired US generals also favored the idea. General Anthony Zinni, who retired in 2000 as Commander-in-Chief of US Central Command (CENTCOM), went on to call the US ‘an empire of influence’ instead of ‘an empire of conquest, occupation or colonies’. He described the US as ‘an 800-pound gorilla among nations, which defends itself, protects its national interests, maintains stability, and keeps itself atop by taking over greater control (direct and indirect) beyond its immediate border.’ He further stated, “It [the United States] begins to impose her will by direct force unilaterally because it has the power to change the distasteful situations or governments on its own, it asserts that power. It becomes an empire.”¹¹ In the words of Hafeez Malik:

*“ Hardt and Negri have identified three stages of imperial command of the US: inclusive, differential and managerial. In the first stage, all are ‘welcomed within its boundaries, regardless of race, creed, color, gender and sexual orientation.’...the second stage involves ‘the affirmation of differences accepted within the imperial realm.’ The third period is the moment of imperial control which must be followed by the management of these differences in a general structure of command.”*¹²

An analysis of foreign policies under George H. W. Bush, then under Bill Clinton and even the pre-9/11 policy of George W. Bush clearly reflect the US adherence to the well-defined grand strategy ‘an American *imperium*.’¹³ China was a rising economic power with a tremendous growth rate. This Asian giant had a great potential to countervail the US imperial strategy. Therefore, India was looked as a good balancer to check China from posing any threat to the US interests in South, Central, and West Asia. The main catalyst in warm relations between India and the United States was the rise of China as the strongest economic and political power in

¹⁰ Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, p. 41.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 64-68.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 64.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 64-68.

Eurasia.¹⁴ Being short in oil and gas reserves, China was a potential US contender for hydrocarbon resources in the Central Asian and Middle East regions. Looking at the Chinese appetite for oil and gas for the growing industry, the US got alarmed. To ward off any confrontation with communist China and impede her way to economic rivalry, the US needed a proxy. In order to attain the status of a regional power, India was ready to play the role of a regional surrogate for the sole superpower, the United States. Once close Soviet partner, India, reposed all hopes in US military and economic aid. Thus, India also moved closer to the US after the collapse of Soviet bloc. Rapid growth in economy, the booming sector of information technology, a stable democratic system, a huge market for the US finished-goods and, above all, the capability to check growing economic giant China, made India much dearer to the United States. The enhanced economic support from US enabled India to get industrial expertise from the United States and open her economy for the US investors. The United States took full advantage of the Indian information-technology. Thus, a close economic collaboration bound these two countries together in the economic sphere. These ties benefited both in economic as well as political terms. But the US-India nexus was pinching Pakistan in the shoe. This new strategic setup hindered Pakistan's importance vis-à-vis India and thus endangered the security of the former.

Taking cognizance of the changing world-scenario, China introduced some basic changes in her economic system and foreign policy. China entered into the international capitalist system to safeguard her economy from any collapse that scrambled the Soviet system. China joined World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), which are the institutions of international capitalist economy. China opened her economy for foreign investors and the US gave her the status of Most Favored Nation (MFN) to increase mutual interdependence. On the other hand, to ease tension with India, the Chinese leadership exchanged visits with their Indian counterparts. China adopted a moderate position in the disputes between Pakistan and India. As India was no longer a Soviet proxy in South Asian region, China had no need to support Pakistan against the former. The future US intentions to contain China through India urged Chinese leadership to mend fence with India and all other neighbors. To keep India off the US influence, China adopted a balanced political

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 129.

approach towards South Asia. To ameliorate India, China changed her pro-Pakistan stance on Kashmir issue that has remained a constant source of tension and root cause of all wars between India and Pakistan. In the future conflicts between India and Pakistan, China opted to play a neutral role.¹⁵ Sticking to this policy of impartiality, China kept herself aloof from providing any military or economic support to Pakistan during the Kargil war (1999) that was fought between Pakistan and India. In the backdrop of this newly evolved geo-strategic environment, Pakistan's geo-strategic position greatly withered in the US-foreign policy framework. Some scholars believed that after the collapse of Soviet Union, any involvement in the affairs of the third world, especially South Asia, was of no use for the United States.¹⁶ But it was not the whole truth. The US interest in South Asia as a whole was, no doubt, diminished but India was still in the list of priorities of the US administration. Since the main focus of the US administration was on the Middle East, it could not pay much attention to South Asian affairs. However, it does not mean that South Asia remained unattended. In South Asia, the nuclear non-proliferation was on the top of US agenda.

For the US policymakers, Pakistan had become irrelevant in the new world order but her nuclear arsenals were a persistent threat to the US interests. Thus, despite playing a meaningful role in the great triumph of the US-led capitalist world over the communist dogma, Pakistan emerged as a much-troubled country. After the great event of melting away of the Soviet Union, Pakistan had little or no strategic importance in the newly evolved world system not only for US but also for her 'all-weather friend' China. Therefore, the US pressure over Pakistan kept on mounting to roll back her nuclear program. For Islamabad, the major shifts in the US policy were clear indications that the United States proved her short-sightedness, unreliability and incredibility once again.¹⁷ But for the United States, it was an imperative of her national interests. After the downfall of communist Soviet Union, the United States neither needed a regional ally to contain communism nor did she need a conduit to supply weaponry to the anti-Soviet warlords in Afghanistan. Even Afghanistan was no longer on the radar screen of the US foreign policy and it became evident from the closing down of US embassy in Kabul after the departure of Soviet forces. For the US

¹⁵ Elisabeth Rosenthal, 'Nuclear Anxiety: In China; China Voices 'Regret,' but Still Faults India'. *The New York Times* (29 May 1998).

¹⁶ Memon, 'Reorientation of Pakistan's....', p. 412.

¹⁷ Naunihal Singh, 2006, *The United States and Pakistan: The Estranged Bedfellows*. New Delhi: Authors Press. p. 379.

policymakers, Afghanistan was outside the US *imperium*. Therefore, they abandoned it. This policy of disengagement, however, proved detrimental to the US interests. The changing US perceptions towards Pakistan and Afghanistan gave rise to mistrust in these countries. The geo-strategic worth of these countries was erroneously underestimated by the United States, especially the US Congress. The eroded US interest in Afghanistan resulted in a power vacuum that Pakistan was unable to fill. In the absence of a strong force, the extremists got advantage of the situation that, later on, became painful for the United States. In fact, the US-perceptions about this region were far from the fact. South Asia was still strategically important. The Indian Ocean was and is still the main sea route that connects the Atlantic to the Mediterranean Sea.

Following the departure of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the US leadership was making it clear that with winding down of the Cold War, the policy dynamics on the nuclear issue had changed.¹⁸ Henceforth, the issue of nuclear proliferation, extremism, terrorism, narcotics control, and human rights were the main irritants in the US-Pakistan relations that remained under carpet during Afghan war but resurfaced as the cold war ended. These issues were responsible for the 'roller coaster US approach' towards Pakistan. It will be discussed in this part of dissertation that how these irritants reappeared, how they were handled, and what have been their impacts on the bilateral relations. Moreover, it will also be taken into account as to what were the compulsions on both sides that could not patch up mutual differences on these issues and why the US-Pakistan relationship proved so fragile in the post-Cold War era.

The first major irritant in the US-Pakistan relations that gave its appearance was the nuclear issue. Pakistan asserts that in the face of hegemonic designs of neighboring India, the security of the former had always been at stake. But this risk had heightened after the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974.¹⁹ Pakistan's sense of insecurity against Indian military might were felt much seriously when the US refused to support Pakistan during the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971. The Indian explosion left no other option for Pakistan except launching nuclear program of her own. The United States opposed Pakistan's nuclear ambitions from the very beginning but Pakistan refused to bow before the United States. Pakistan even refused to accede to

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 356.

¹⁹ Rizwan Zeb, 'David Versus Goliath? Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine: Motivations, Principles and Future', *Defense & Security Analysis*, Volume 22, Issue 4, December 2000, pp. 387-408.

any Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), in case of Indian refusal to do so. In 1979, reacting to Pakistan's nuclear program, the US cut off all aid to Pakistan under Symington Amendment.²⁰ However, the Soviet army's rollover into Afghanistan in 1979 altered the ground realities. Pakistan became strategic hub against Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The United States needed Pakistan to check any Soviet advance in South Asia. This US strategic interest pushed the nuclear issue under carpet. However, this issue resurfaced after the Soviet evacuation from Afghanistan and the achievement of US strategic objectives. Then, this issue remained dominant throughout 1990s. In the US perspective, Pakistan had not only lost strategic importance but had become a nuclear rabble-rouser and a source of regional instability. Following the US critical stand against Pakistan's nuclear program, the other Western countries also joined the US-orchestra against Pakistan. Since late 1980s, the US intelligence agencies like Central Investigation Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) were out to put Pakistan under nuclear sanctions and cut off all the military aid and sales to Pakistan.²¹ Some elements were constantly engaged in hectic efforts to assure the US administration that Pakistan was configuring the F-16 aircrafts for the delivery of nuclear weapons.²² These reports had alarmed the US administration. During a visit to the United States in 1989, the Pakistan Army Chief General Mirza Aslam Beg was made known by the US administration officials that their hands were tied on the nuclear issue and that they could not continue their policy as adopted during the 1980s. General Colin Powell, National Security Advisor in the Reagan administration, and his successor, Brent Scowcroft, separately met Gen. Beg to explain the US position. General Powell's meeting was an attempt as one general speaking to another.²³ President Bush was signaling his desire to continue the close defense relationship with Pakistan if Islamabad freezes her nuclear program. In February 1989, President Bush told this to

²⁰ Symington Amendment was adopted by the US Congress in 1976 and added as Sec. 101 to the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), formerly Sec. 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended. It aimed at prohibiting most of the US assistance to any country that was to be found trafficking in nuclear enrichment equipment or technology that was outside of international safeguards. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter found Pakistan in violation of the Symington amendment because of the construction of a uranium enrichment plant. US aid to Pakistan was possible between 1982 and 1990 only through the use of presidential waivers. See Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, pp. 94-95.

²¹ Stephen Engelberg. 'Talk to Pakistan, Bush Urges India'. *The New York Times*, (9 July 1989).

²² Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, 2007, *Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons*. New York: Walker & Company. pp. 195-213.

²³ Dennis Kux, 2003, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000, Disenchanted Allies*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 299.

the then Pakistan's Premier Benazir Bhutto in a meeting in Tokyo and asked for a review of nuclear program along the lines similar to those drawn by Brent Scowcroft that he had discussed with the Army Chief of Pakistan.²⁴ Robert Oakley, the US Ambassador to Pakistan, clearly warned the shareholders in the power centers of Pakistan that if their country tried to cross the line drawn by the United States then President Bush would call for Pressler Amendment.²⁵ Pakistan showed willingness to follow the US advice. It was also made clear that Pakistan had no intention to make a nuclear device and it was clearly stated by Benazir Bhutto before the joint meeting of the US Congress in June 1989. "Speaking for Pakistan," she told the congressmen, "I can declare that we do not possess, nor do we intend to make, a nuclear device. That is our policy."²⁶ Despite all the assurances given by Miss Bhutto, the Bush administration believed on the contrary.²⁷ Later on, Benazir Bhutto disclosed that the three members of the power-troika in Pakistan had carefully scripted how she would play the issue during her public appearances in the United States and in her private talks with President Bush and other US leaders. In the Bush administration, a great concern was found about the efforts of Pakistan to purchase parts and technology needed to make nuclear weapons. In her meeting with President Bush (Sr.), Ms. Bhutto was briefed by William H. Webster, the Director of Central Intelligence, about the details of Pakistan's nuclear program.²⁸ This briefing was to show Ms. Bhutto that the United States had the capability to keep an eye on Pakistan's nuclear activities in some detail. In the same meeting, President Bush proposed 'on-site visits' to the Pakistani installations by American inspectors. But Ms. Bhutto regretted to comply with this US demand.²⁹ Ms. Bhutto conditioned the possibility of any such inspection with the Indian compliance to such a proposal.³⁰ In the same meeting, President Bush urged the Pakistani Prime Minister to engage, at least, diplomatic channels to remove bottlenecks in India-Pakistan relations caused by nuclear mistrust. Meanwhile, the Indian lobby was beating drums that the delivery of sophisticated F-16 warplanes,

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 299-300.

²⁵ Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 356.

²⁶ *The Washington Post* (8 June 1989).

²⁷ Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 357-358, and Stephen Engelberg, 'U.S. Sees Pakistan Moving on A-arms'. *The New York Times*, (11 June 1989).

²⁸ The unusual briefing aimed at indicating that Pakistan was involved in purchasing parts and technology to make nuclear weapons and had achieved the uranium enrichment capacity beyond five percent that means making of a nuclear bomb. Reports about this briefing appeared in *The New York Times* as quoted in Farzana Shakoor, 'Pakistan-US Relations...', pp. 25-27.

²⁹ Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 356.

³⁰ Stephen Engelberg, 'Talk to Pakistan, Bush Urges India'. *The New York Times*, (9 July 1989).

from US to Pakistan, would increase the dangers of nuclear proliferations as these aircrafts were considered to be configured for the delivery of nuclear weapons. However, this Indian allegation fell flat on the US and Schaffer, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, rejected these allegations by clearly declaring that it was in the interests of the US to strike a deal of the F-16 jet-fighters with Pakistan.³¹ Although Benazir's visit could not clear up the haziness found in the US about the nuclear program of Pakistan but the deal of F-16 aircrafts was a feather in her cap. Amazingly, after the visit of Benazir Bhutto, the US intelligence reports indicated that Pakistan had stopped Uranium enrichment.³² The whole credit for this go-slow in Uranium enrichment was given to Benazir. After these positive reports about Pakistan, the US desired to support the Benazir-led democratic government in Pakistan. The US confirmed that a deal of 60 F-16 aircrafts would be made and \$600 million as military and economic aid would be issued annually.³³ The required clearance certificate in this respect was also issued by the Bush administration. In September 1989, the F-16 deal was confirmed and a Letter of Agreement (LoA) was signed. But William H. Webster, the Director CIA, had publicly expressed his apprehension over the pace of weapons development and nuclear research in the subcontinent.³⁴ Alarmed by the intelligence reports regarding the rapid increase in nuclear build up and instability in South Asia, the US urged both Pakistan and India to come to the talk-table to resolve bilateral differences. This call was made by President Bush (Sr.) in his telephonic conversation with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Imbued in the spirit of nuclear non-proliferation, the president termed India-Pakistan rivalry as an obstacle in the way to pursue his objectives in South Asia. But Kashmir was the main cause of arms race, nuclear build up and tension between India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, Indian resentment to third party involvement in South Asian disputes did not allow President Bush to mediate between India and Pakistan. Another bone of contention between India and Pakistan was the Sikh insurgence in the Punjab, an eastern province of India where Sikhs are in majority and they had started a movement to get freedom from the Indian yolk. Pakistan's support to the separatist

³¹ Rashmi Jain (ed.), 2007, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2006: A Documentary Study*. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers. p. 335.

³² Stephen Engelberg, 'U.S. Sees Pakistan ...'. *New York Times*, (11 June 1989).

³³ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 302.

³⁴ Stephen Engelberg, 'Talk to Pakistan...'. *The New York Times*, (9 July 1989).

movement of Sikhs was irritating India.³⁵ The conflict over Siachin, the highest battleground between these two neighboring countries was also fueling the bilateral friction. In an effort to diffuse tension between these two nations and to put an end to the growing nuclear arms race in this part of the world, the US President urged the Indian Prime Minister to forge ties with Pakistan through negotiations.³⁶ Rajiv did not make any commitment but was seen receptive by the US officials. However, insurgency in Kashmir had been growing rapidly that widened the gulf between India and Pakistan.

In late 1980s, an insurgent movement against India was started in Kashmir³⁷ by Kashmiri youth who resented the Indian interference in Kashmiri politics after the death of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, a veteran Kashmiri leader and a staunch supporter of Indian stance over Kashmir. This resentment was translated into an armed struggle for freedom from the Indian yoke just after 1987 elections in the Indian-held Kashmir. Pakistan had no role in arising insurgency in Kashmir.³⁸ But when the Indian security failed in putting down this movement, Indian leadership started blaming Pakistan for the troubles. As Naunihal Singh, an Indian Scholar, says, "Frustrated by its inability to put down the uprising, New Delhi strengthened its security forces in Kashmir and blamed Pakistan for troubles."³⁹ Pakistan also could not disregard this development in her neighborhood for a long time. Pakistan's ISI started providing active support to the Kashmiri insurgents. The expertise that Pakistan had gained in providing training for guerilla warfare in Afghanistan was redirected to Kashmir. Grabbing the opportunity with both hands, Pakistan wanted to settle the score with India and pay her back in the same coin as she had done in the 1971 dismemberment of East Pakistan.⁴⁰ In early 1990, India made heavy deployment of troops along the Pakistani border. Pakistan also responded in the same way and thus the tension between two countries got heightened. Indian Prime Minister's rhetoric added more fuel to it when he publicly expressed the possibility of breaking

³⁵ Thomas P. Thornton, 'A Long Way to Lahore: India and Pakistan Negotiate', in Craig Baxter and Charles Kennedy (ed.), 2000, *Pakistan 2000*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 65-66.

³⁶ Stephen Engelberg, 'Talk to Pakistan...'. *The New York Times*, (9 July 1989).

³⁷ A disputed valley in the Northwest of Pakistan which has remained the chief cause of tensions and three wars between Pakistan and India. Some part of it is under an autonomous government facilitated by Pakistan while its major part is occupied and annexed by India.

³⁸ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 304-305; and in Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 360-365.

³⁹ Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 361.

⁴⁰ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 305.

out another war with Pakistan. The threat of possible outbreak of nuclear conflict raised eyebrows in the United States. In May 1990, Robert M. Gates, the US Deputy National Security Advisor, and then US Senator Alan Cranston visited both India and Pakistan and warned them against the terrible outcomes of their mutual collision.⁴¹ Robert Gates expressed his displeasure over the alleged involvement of Pakistan in the eruption of insurgency in Kashmir in the late 1980s.⁴² President Bush (Sr.) phoned the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi asking him to negotiate with Pakistan. Thus, an imminent India-Pakistan war was averted by the hectic US diplomatic efforts. Robert Gates also warned Pakistan about the nuclear program. The main US concern that prompted the dispatch of Mr. Gates to South Asia, was the threat of a nuclear war that could take into its folds not only India and Pakistan but also the entire world. This eminent threat attracted the attention of scholars and intellectuals, too. They all shared the view that Kashmir has turned into a nuclear flash point. The US administration succeeded in war prevention but could not resolve the protracted conflict between the two covertly nuclear states of South Asia. However, as a result of this high-level diplomatic engagement, both the countries agreed to undertake further confidence-building measures (CBMs). In the understanding that reached, it was included that an advance notice about the movement of troops will be given in future and a hot-line would be set up between them. The US did not focus on further defusing tension between India and Pakistan due to a number of factors. Despite bringing these two covert nuclear powers of South Asia to a settlement of disputes, the nuclear issue became the center of attention before the US policymakers. The US priorities changed. Since February 1989, the United States had shifted her goalpost from 'stay where you are' to 'roll back your nuclear capability' through the destruction of bomb cores.⁴³ Efforts to bring both India and Pakistan into the folds of NPT were also intensified.

By the end of 1990, the US Congress, the US President and the US intelligence agencies had no interest in Pakistan except rolling back of the nuclear

⁴¹ On his return to the US, Senator Alan Cranston stated: "During the recent Congressional recess I visited India and Pakistan to learn what I could do about disturbing report of a possible outbreak of hostilities between the two countries. Paramount among these concerns was a perception in Washington that serious strains between India and Pakistan over Kashmir might lead to armed conflict and possibly a nuclear war." See Farzana Shakoore, 'Pakistan-US Relations...', pp.23-27.

⁴² Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 306.

⁴³ Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 368; Munir Ahmad Khan, 'Development and Significance of Pakistan's Nuclear Capability', in Hafeez Malik, 2003, *Pakistan: Founders' Aspirations and Today's Realities*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 159-163.

program of the latter.⁴⁴ President Bush (Sr.), in a formal letter to his Pakistani counterpart, expressed his concern over Pakistan's nuclear program and made it clear that the Pressler Amendment cannot be waived anymore.⁴⁵ Robert Oakley, US Ambassador in Islamabad, put the American concern before Ms. Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and cautioned her that Pakistan was "committing suicide." He also informed her that as far as the US-Pakistan relations were concerned, the rollback of Pakistan's nuclear capability was the only way to keep them unbroken. He expressed similar views before President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and the Army chief in separate meetings.⁴⁶ Believing that the United States would not adopt the hard line of invoking Pressler Amendment, Pakistan denied any advance in her nuclear program.⁴⁷ In February 1990, Pakistan approached France for a nuclear power plant and the French president mentioned about his assent to the deal in a press conference during a state visit to Islamabad. This announcement provoked the United States. The US administration and media reacted strongly against this deal. A spokesman of the US State Department said, "France has apparently agreed to sell a nuclear reactor to Pakistan without requiring that Pakistan accepts full scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all nuclear activities, not just on the item being exported."⁴⁸ The leading US newspaper *The Washington Post* also reacted robustly and alleged both Pakistan and France for nuclear proliferation. Despite all assurances by Pakistan that the French nuclear power reactor would be subjected to all international standards, Pakistan was blamed for using the proposed French reactor for making an atomic bomb. This newspaper greatly reflected the US media approach towards Pakistan. In fact, the US media was portraying Pakistan's nuclear program as a direct threat to the world peace and presenting a very dismal picture of Pakistanis as a nation. Greatly affected by this psyche, the US adopted a very discriminatory policy towards Pakistan in that despite detonating a nuclear device in 1974, the Indian nuclear program was not viewed so seriously by the US and western powers as that of Pakistan. The US had no hesitation in providing fuel for Indian reactors while

⁴⁴ Rashmi Jain, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 390-395.

⁴⁵ This US mood was highlighted by President Bush in a letter to the Pakistani President on 18 September 1990.

⁴⁶ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 307.

⁴⁷ Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, pp. 211-213, Farzana Shakoor, 'Pakistan-US Relations...', pp. 23-25.

⁴⁸ *The New York Times* (28 February 1990) and see Noman Sattar. 'The Nuclear Issue'. in M. Raziullah Azmi (ed.), 1994, *Pakistan American Relations...*, pp. 26-60.

Pakistan was subjected to step-motherly treatment for trying to acquire a nuclear reactor from France.

On 6 August 1990, the democratic government of Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan was dismissed by the President on charges of corruption, nepotism and malpractices in governance. The US Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Chairman of the State Foreign Relations Committee's Near East and South Asia Subcommittee, said that this action "would surely [further] strain the US-Pakistan relations."⁴⁹ Disregarding the diplomatic norms, the US ambassador Robert Oakley criticized the accountability process initiated against Benazir Bhutto after her removal from government. The US Congress was also much critical and vociferous to the dismissal of Bhutto government. Twelve US Senators urged President Bush to condition all sorts of US aid to Pakistan with the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. The US President told his Pakistani counterpart that Symington Amendment would be waived if democratic process is restored in Pakistan. But it is an irony that no US aid was resumed even after the installation of another democratically elected government in Pakistan.⁵⁰ The newly elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif offered talks to the United States on Pakistan's nuclear program. In this context, the US ambassador held talks with Pakistan's Foreign Minister in Islamabad but these parleys bore no fruits.

Soon after resumption of US-Pakistan dialogue on nuclear issue, the first Persian Gulf crises took place when Iraqi forces took control of Kuwait in late 1990. The entire world denounced the Iraqi action. Looking at the Iraqi expansionist designs, the Arab world got alarmed. The Arab League condemned the occupation of Kuwait by Saddam Hossain. The neighboring Saudi government feared the spillover of Iraqi forces into her country. Therefore, Saudi leadership sought the US and international support to check the Iraqi onslaught. The ousted ruler of Kuwait also asked the US and international community to restore sovereignty of his country. The US and her allied voiced against Iraq and moved the United Nations (UN) against the latter. The UN demanded the early withdrawal of Iraqi occupant forces and the restoration of Kuwait's independence.⁵¹ In this context, a number of resolutions were adopted by the

⁴⁹ Barbara Crossett, 'Bhutto Blames Army for Her Ouster'. *The New York Times* (8 August 1990)

⁵⁰ The October 1990 general elections brought Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, a PML leader to power.

⁵¹ M. H. Ansari, 'Security in the Persian Gulf: The Evolution of a Concept', *Strategic Analysis*, Volume 23, Issue 6, September 1999, pp. 857-871.

UN Security Council. But the Iraqi government stood in defiance to all such moves. This non-compliance on the part of Iraq gave rise to an armed confrontation between Iraq and US-led coalition forces. The UN authorized the US-led coalition to use force to eliminate Iraqi forces from the oil-rich Kuwait. Pakistan backed the UN resolutions and endorsed the US stance. Pakistani government decided to join the coalition forces deployed in Saudi Arabia. The policymakers in Pakistan expected that backing the US stance against Iraq would make it easier for Pakistan to win more help from the United States.

Meanwhile, the US President invoked the notorious Pressler Amendment (1985), amid the first Gulf War (1990), and consequently re-imposed nuclear related sanctions against Pakistan.⁵² Pressler Amendment was a Pakistan specific amendment. Thus Pakistan, once the third-highest recipient of US aid, was transformed into a much sanctioned US ally. During 1980s, Pakistan was the principal recipient of US military assistance in South Asia, which received US \$2.29 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grant aid and US \$230.9 million as total military assistance. Although an extension in waiver of Pressler Amendment till September 1993 was desired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Henry S. Rowen in a statement but it was not granted. He was of the opinion that due to the close military ties between the United States and Pakistan it was necessary to keep the military cooperation intact. In his views, this collaboration was also of high value to the US strategic interests in the Persian Gulf where Pakistan Army could be very helpful due to geographical proximity. He opined that Pakistan's strategic importance was still not eroded.⁵³ It is noteworthy that the then US administration was not sure that Pakistan possessed any nuclear device. The decision to invoke this amendment was taken on the basis of CIA reports which claimed that Pakistan may have developed a nuclear weapon. Margaret D. Tutwiler, the US States Department spokesperson, had candidly admitted that the US government had no proof that Pakistan might be working on a project to produce its own nuclear arms.⁵⁴

⁵² The notorious Pressler Amendment that was passed by the US Senate in 1985 to cut down the US aid to Pakistan under the pretext of nuclear proliferation. But it was invoked on 1 October 1990 when the US President refused to certify that Pakistan does not possess any nuclear device. This type of certification was made mandatory for the continuity of any US assistance to Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment.

⁵³ This statement was issued on 6 March 1990. See Rashmi Jain, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 336-338.

⁵⁴ Noman Sattar, 'The Nuclear Issue', in M. Raziullah Azmi (ed.), 1994, *Pakistan American Relations: The Recent Past*. Karachi: Royal Book Company. pp. 26-60.

But the 'frontline Pakistan' that had received approximately \$3.3 billion US aid, including \$2 billion of weaponry, had now turned into 'the most sanctioned US ally'.⁵⁵ As Sino-US and Sino-Indian relations were greatly improving, Pakistan was facing diplomatic bullying. Apart from that, the loss of nearly \$300 million of arms and military supplies a year and the non-delivery of 28 F-16 jet-fighters for which Pakistan had already paid \$658 million was a heavy blow for Pakistan's defense.⁵⁶ Table 1.1 shows the US military and economic aid to Pakistan for the US Fiscal Year (FY) 1989 while Table 1.2 illustrates it for FY1990. Table 1.3 shows the changed aid situation in FY1991. The \$564 million economic and military aid program that US Congress had approved for 1991 was also frozen.⁵⁷ The United States again showed fickleness in friendship and this move marked a new benchmark in the US-Pakistan relationship. The Pressler Amendment created great hurdles in the way of close US-Pakistan collaboration that was needed not only by Pakistan but also by the United States. In fact, the Pressler Amendment was designed to strengthen the prospects of achieving goal of non-proliferation in South Asia but resulted in nothing more than self-defeat.⁵⁸ The US failed to look Pakistan's nuclear posture in true regional perspective of the latter. She adopted an inflexible approach. It enhanced the possibility of pursuing the nuclear option more vigorously by Pakistan as US stopped any conventional arms assistance to Pakistan. It forced Pakistan to exercise nuclear option for security reasons rather than peaceful purposes, especially when her next-door neighbor India was on her way to advance her nuclear program. Moreover, it enhanced the chances of nuclear proliferation as had become evident from the statements of Pakistan's nuclear scientist Dr. A.Q. Khan. It pushed Pakistan to look towards China and France. A 300MW nuclear reactor was negotiated with China and Mirage 2000 fighter-bombers and *Augusta* vessels were obtained from France. Pakistan's economy greatly suffered due to this amendment and thus Pakistan's problems multiplied.⁵⁹ To turn down the economic pressure and boost the defense budget, Pakistan indulged into nuclear proliferation.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ Travis, *India, Pakistan and the Third World...*, pp. 61-92.

⁵⁶ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 309.

⁵⁷ Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, p. 215.

⁵⁸ Farzana Shakoor, 'Pakistan-US Relations...', pp. 31-33.

⁵⁹ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 306.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 309.

⁶⁰ Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, p. 215.

Table: 1.1. US Economic and Military aid to Pakistan during FY 1989.

COUNTRY: PAKISTAN @												
(U.S. FISCAL YEARS - MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)												
-----U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS-OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS-----												
PROGRAM	POST-WAR RELIEF PERIOD	MARSHALL PLAN PERIOD	MUTUAL SECURITY ACT PERIOD	-----FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT-----				TOTAL FAA PERIOD	TOTAL LOANS AND GRANTS		TOTAL PRINCIPAL REPAY- MENTS	OUT- STANDING LOAN BALANCES
	1946-48	1949-52	1953-61	1962-05	1966	1967	1968	1969	1962-89	1946-89	1946-89	1946-89
I. ECON. ASSIST.-TOTAL...	0.1	11.1	1410.7	5001.9	356.3	351.5	465.7	352.1	6527.6	7393.0	**	**
LOANS.....	0.1	-	476.8	3384.4	118.5	142.9	166.0	76.0	3887.8	3878.9	945.0	2933.0
GRANTS.....	-	11.1	941.9	1617.5	237.8	208.6	299.7	276.1	2639.8	3514.1	-	-
A. AID AND PREDECESSOR...	-	10.6	935.4	2816.4	263.4	275.5	384.5	265.0	4004.9	4631.8	686.0	1783.0
LOANS***.....	-	-	339.5	2118.8	71.0	91.3	90.0	-	2371.1	2469.5	686.0	1783.0
GRANTS.....	-	10.6	595.9	697.6	192.4	184.2	294.5	265.0	1633.8	2162.3	-	-
(SEC. SUPP. ASSIST.)... (	-)	-)	586.6)	758.1)	239.3)	250.5)	334.0)	215.0)	1796.9)	2300.4)	-	-
B. FOOD FOR PEACE.....	-	0.1	415.9	2164.1	89.5	69.1	76.0	80.0	2478.6	2650.1	259.0	1150.0
LOANS.....	-	-	137.3	1265.6	47.5	51.6	76.0	76.0	1516.7	1409.3	259.0	1150.0
GRANTS.....	-	0.1	278.6	898.5	42.0	17.5	-	4.0	961.9	1240.8	-	-
TITLE I-TOTAL.....	-	-	334.1	1828.4	47.5	51.6	76.0	76.0	2079.5	2169.0	259.0	1150.0
RRPAY. IN \$-LOANS.....	-	-	-	922.3	47.5	51.6	76.0	76.0	1173.4	1172.2	117.0	1055.0
PAY. IN FOR. CURR.....	-	-	334.1	906.1	-	-	-	-	906.1	996.8	142.0	95.0
TITLE II-TOTAL.....	-	0.1	81.8	335.7	42.0	17.5	-	4.0	399.1	481.1	-	-
E. RELIEF, EC, DEV & WFP...	-	-	48.6	306.8	42.0	17.5	-	-	366.3	414.9	-	-
VOL. RELIEF AGENCY.....	-	0.1	33.2	28.9	-	-	-	4.0	32.8	66.2	-	-
C. OTHER ECON. ASSIST....	0.1	0.4	67.4	21.4	3.4	6.9	5.2	7.1	44.1	111.1	-	-
LOANS.....	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	-
GRANTS.....	-	0.4	67.4	21.4	3.4	6.9	5.2	7.1	44.1	111.0	-	-
PEACE CORPS.....	-	-	-	7.3	-	-	0.2	0.3	7.8	7.8	-	-
NARCOTICS.....	-	-	-	14.1	3.4	6.9	5.1	6.8	36.3	35.4	-	-
OTHER.....	-	0.4	67.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	67.8	-	-
II. MIL. ASSIST.-TOTAL...	-	-	508.2	1096.2	311.9	313.6	260.8	230.9	2213.5	2721.5	922.0	827.0
LOANS.....	-	-	-	895.0	311.0	312.5	230.0	-	1748.5	1748.5	922.0	827.0
GRANTS.....	-	-	508.2	201.2	0.9	1.1	30.8	230.9	465.0	973.0	-	-
A. MAP GRANTS.....	-	-	480.8	169.6	-	-	-	-	169.6	650.3	-	-
B. CREDIT FINANCING....	-	-	-	895.0	311.0	312.5	230.0	-	1748.5	1748.5	922.0	827.0
C. INTL. MIL. ED. TRNG....	-	-	12.2	15.6	0.9	1.1	0.8	0.9	19.4	31.5	-	-
D. TRAN. EXCESS STOCK...	-	-	15.2	11.6	-	-	-	-	11.6	26.8	-	-
E. OTHER GRANTS.....	-	-	-	4.4	-	-	30.0	230.0	264.4	264.4	-	-
III. TOTAL ECON. & MIL....	0.1	11.1	1926.9	6098.1	668.2	665.1	724.5	583.0	8741.1	10114.5	1867.0	3760.0
LOANS.....	0.1	-	476.8	4279.4	429.5	455.4	396.0	76.0	5636.3	5627.4	1867.0	3760.0
GRANTS.....	-	11.1	1450.1	1818.7	238.7	209.7	330.5	507.0	3104.8	4487.1	-	-
OTHER US LOANS.....	-	-	12.9	408.8	-	-	-	-	408.8	405.8	398.0	8.0
EX-IM BANK LOANS.....	-	-	12.9	277.6	-	-	-	-	277.6	275.8	268.0	8.0
A.I. OTHER.....	-	-	-	131.2	-	-	-	-	131.2	130.0	130.0	-

* LIES THAN \$50,000.

@ SEE COMMENTS IN COUNTRY NOTES SECTION

** VALUES IN THESE COLUMNS ARE NET OF DEOBLIGATIONS. SEE GENERAL NOTES-REPORTING CONCEPTS

*** INCLUDES CAPITALIZED INTEREST ON PRIOR YEAR LOANS.

Source: USAID Greenbook 1989.

Table: 1.2. US Economic and Military aid to Pakistan during FY 1990.

COUNTRY: PAKISTAN @												
(U.S. FISCAL YEARS - MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)												
-----U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS-OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS-----												
PROGRAM	MUTUAL				-----FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT-----				TOTAL			
	POST-WAR RELIEF PERIOD 1946-48	MARSHALL PLAN PERIOD 1949-52	SECURITY ACT PERIOD 1953-61	1962-86	PERIOD				TOTAL FAA PERIOD 1962-90	LOANS AND GRANTS 1946-90	PRINCIPAL REPAY- MENTS 1946-90	OUT- STANDING LOAN BALANCES 1946-90
I. ECON. ASSIST.-TOTAL...	0.1	11.1	1418.7	3358.2	351.5	465.7	352.1	357.3	6884.9	7748.5	1044.8	2908.3
LOANS.....	0.1	-	476.8	3182.5	142.9	166.0	76.0	76.0	3363.8	3953.1	1044.8	2908.3
GRANTS.....	-	11.1	941.9	1855.3	208.6	299.7	276.1	281.3	2921.1	3795.4	-	-
A. AID AND PREDECESSOR..	-	10.6	935.4	3079.8	275.5	384.5	265.0	275.5	4280.4	4907.4	754.6	1715.0
LOANS.....	-	-	339.5	2189.8	91.3	90.0	-	-	2371.1	2469.6	754.6	1715.0
GRANTS.....	-	10.6	595.9	890.0	184.2	294.5	265.0	275.5	1909.3	2437.8	-	-
(SEC. SUPP. ASSIST.)...()	(-)	(-)	(586.6)	(997.4)	(250.5)	(334.0)	(215.0)	(229.0)	(2025.9)	(2529.4)	-	-
B. FOOD FOR PEACE.....	-	0.1	415.9	2253.6	69.1	76.0	80.0	76.0	2554.6	2724.2	290.1	1193.3
LOANS.....	-	-	137.3	1313.1	51.6	76.0	76.0	76.0	1592.7	1483.4	290.1	1193.3
GRANTS.....	-	0.1	278.6	940.5	17.5	-	4.0	-	961.9	1240.8	-	-
TITLE I-TOTAL.....	-	-	334.1	1875.9	51.6	76.0	76.0	76.0	2155.5	2243.1	290.1	1193.3
REPAY. IN \$-LOANS.....	-	-	-	969.8	51.6	76.0	76.0	76.0	1249.4	1248.2	137.7	1110.5
PAY. IN FOR. CURR.....	-	-	334.1	906.1	-	-	-	-	906.1	994.9	152.4	82.8
TITLE II-TOTAL.....	-	0.1	81.8	377.7	17.5	-	4.0	-	399.1	481.1	-	-
E. RELIEF, EC. DEV & WFP.	-	-	48.6	348.8	17.5	-	-	-	366.3	414.9	-	-
VOL. RELIEF AGENCY.....	-	0.1	33.2	28.9	-	-	4.0	-	32.8	66.2	-	-
C. OTHER ECON. ASSIST...	0.1	0.4	67.4	24.8	6.9	5.2	7.1	5.8	49.9	116.9	0.1	-
LOANS.....	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	-
GRANTS.....	-	0.4	67.4	24.8	6.9	5.2	7.1	5.8	49.9	116.8	-	-
PEACE CORPS.....	-	-	-	7.3	-	0.2	0.3	0.8	8.6	8.6	-	-
NARCOTICS.....	-	-	-	17.5	6.9	5.1	6.8	5.0	41.3	40.4	-	-
OTHER.....	-	0.4	67.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	67.8	-	-
II. MIL. ASSIST.-TOTAL...	-	-	508.2	1408.1	313.4	240.8	230.9	229.9	2483.4	2951.4	954.6	793.9
LOANS.....	-	-	-	1206.0	312.5	230.0	-	-	1748.5	1748.5	954.6	793.9
GRANTS.....	-	-	508.2	202.1	1.1	30.8	230.9	229.9	694.9	1202.9	-	-
A. MAP GRANTS.....	-	-	480.8	169.6	-	-	-	-	169.6	650.3	-	-
B. CREDIT FINANCING....	-	-	-	1206.0	312.5	230.0	-	-	1748.5	1748.5	954.6	793.9
C. INTL MIL. ED. TRNG....	-	-	12.2	16.5	1.1	0.8	0.9	0.9	20.3	32.4	-	-
D. TRAN-EXCESS STOCK...	-	-	15.2	11.6	-	-	-	-	11.6	26.8	-	-
E. OTHER GRANTS.....	-	-	-	4.4	-	30.0	230.0	229.0	493.4	493.4	-	-
III. TOTAL ECON. & MIL....	0.1	11.1	1926.9	6766.3	665.1	726.5	583.0	587.2	9328.3	10699.9	1999.4	3702.2
LOANS.....	0.1	-	476.8	4708.9	455.4	396.0	76.0	76.0	5712.3	5701.6	1999.4	3702.2
GRANTS.....	-	11.1	1450.1	2057.4	209.7	330.5	507.0	511.2	3616.0	4998.3	-	-
OTHER US LOANS.....	-	-	12.9	408.8	-	-	-	-	408.8	405.8	400.7	5.1
EX-IM BANK LOANS.....	-	-	12.9	277.6	-	-	-	-	277.6	275.8	270.7	5.1
ALL OTHER.....	-	-	-	131.2	-	-	-	-	131.2	130.0	130.0	-

* LESS THAN \$50,000.

@ SEE COMMENTS IN COUNTRY NOTES SECTION

** VALUES IN THESE COLUMNS ARE NET OF DEOBLIGATIONS AND CANCELLATIONS. SEE GENERAL NOTES-REPORTING CONCEPTS

*** INCLUDES CAPITALIZED INTEREST ON PRIOR YEAR LOANS.

Table: 1.3. US Economic and Military aid to Pakistan during FY 1991.

COUNTRY: PAKISTAN @

(U.S. FISCAL YEARS - MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

-----U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS-OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS-----

PROGRAM	-----FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT-----							TOTAL FAA PERIOD 1962-91	TOTAL LOANS AND GRANTS 1946-91	PRINCIPAL REPAY- MENTS 1946-91	OUT- STANDING LOAN BALANCES 1946-91
	MUTUAL			PERIOD							
	POST-WAR RELIEF PERIOD 1946-48	MARSHALL PLAN PERIOD 1949-52	SECURITY ACT PERIOD 1953-61	1962-87	1988	1989	1990				
I. ECON. ASSIST.-TOTAL...	0.1	10.6	935.4	3355.3	384.5	265.0	275.5	96.0	4376.4	4981.8	817.4
LOANS.....	0.1	-	339.5	2281.1	90.0	-	-	-	2371.1	2457.1	817.4
GRANTS.....	-	10.6	595.9	1074.2	294.5	265.0	275.5	96.0	2005.3	2524.7	-
(SEC. SUPP. ASSIST.)...()	(-)	(-)	(586.6)	(1247.9)	(334.0)	(215.0)	(229.0)	(95.7)	(2121.6)	(2615.0)	-
B. FOOD FOR PEACE.....	-	0.1	415.9	2322.7	76.0	80.0	76.0	-	2554.6	2719.5	319.1
LOANS.....	-	-	137.3	1364.7	76.0	76.0	76.0	-	1592.7	1478.7	319.1
GRANTS.....	-	0.1	278.6	958.0	-	4.0	-	-	961.9	1240.8	-
TITLE I-TOTAL.....	-	-	334.1	1927.5	76.0	76.0	76.0	-	2155.5	2238.4	319.1
REPAY. IN \$-LOANS....	-	-	-	1021.4	76.0	76.0	76.0	-	1249.4	1248.2	159.9
PAY. IN FOR. CURR....	-	-	334.1	906.1	-	-	-	-	906.1	990.2	159.2
TITLE II-TOTAL.....	-	0.1	81.8	395.2	-	4.0	-	-	399.1	481.1	-
E. RELIEF, EC. DEV. & WFP.	-	-	48.6	366.3	-	-	-	-	366.3	414.9	-
VOL. RELIEF AGENCY....	-	0.1	33.2	28.9	-	4.0	-	-	32.8	66.2	-
C. OTHER ECON. ASSIST...	0.1	0.4	67.4	31.7	5.2	7.1	5.8	5.3	55.1	122.1	0.1
LOANS.....	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-
GRANTS.....	-	0.4	67.4	31.7	5.2	7.1	5.8	5.3	55.1	122.0	-
PEACE CORPS.....	-	-	-	7.3	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.6	9.2	9.2	-
NARCOTICS.....	-	-	-	24.4	5.1	6.8	5.0	4.7	45.9	45.0	-
OTHER.....	-	0.4	67.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	67.8	-
II. MIL. ASSIST.-TOTAL...	-	-	508.8	169.6	230.0	230.0	229.0	-	169.6	650.3	-
LOANS.....	-	-	-	1518.5	230.0	-	-	-	1748.5	1748.5	987.4
GRANTS.....	-	-	508.8	209.3	30.0	230.0	229.0	-	493.4	493.4	-
A. MAP GRANTS.....	-	-	480.8	169.6	-	-	-	-	169.6	650.3	-
B. CREDIT FINANCING....	-	-	-	1518.5	230.0	-	-	-	1748.5	1748.5	987.4
C. INTL MIL. ED. TRNG....	-	-	12.2	17.7	0.0	0.9	0.9	-	20.3	32.4	-
D. TRAN-EXCESS STOCK...	-	-	15.2	11.6	-	-	-	-	11.6	26.8	-
E. OTHER GRANTS.....	-	-	-	4.4	30.0	230.0	229.0	-	493.4	493.4	-
III. TOTAL ECON. & MIL...	0.1	11.1	1403.9	5411.5	726.5	581.0	587.2	101.3	7480.5	8196.6	1136.5
LOANS.....	0.1	-	339.5	3509.1	166.0	76.0	76.0	-	4131.1	4684.1	1136.5
GRANTS.....	-	11.1	1064.4	1902.4	560.5	505.0	511.2	101.3	3349.4	3512.5	-
OTHER US LOANS.....	-	-	12.9	408.8	-	-	-	34.4	443.2	440.2	39.5
EX-IM BANK LOANS.....	-	-	12.9	277.6	-	-	-	34.4	312.0	310.2	39.5
ALL OTHER.....	-	-	-	131.2	-	-	-	-	131.2	130.0	-

* LESS THAN \$50,000.

@ SEE COMMENTS IN COUNTRY NOTES SECTION

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*** INCLUDES CAPITALIZED INTEREST ON PRIOR YEAR LOANS.

Resultantly, a great disequilibrium of power came forth on the South Asian panorama. People and press in Pakistan strongly denounced this US action and termed it a discriminatory and anti-Islamic move.⁶¹ It added much to the already flaring anti-US sentiments. Some people in Pentagon were not happy with the sanctions against Pakistan. They were aware of the key strategic role of Pakistan [in the near future] especially with respect to the Middle East. They also eulogized Pakistan's role during Afghan conflict. The Pentagon also had a soft corner for her Pakistani counterpart, military's General Headquarter in Pakistan (GHQ). They were not in favor of breaking ties with Pakistan Army. For this purpose, Pentagon urged Pakistan not to stop payment for the stalled delivery of F-16 warplanes in the hope of an early solution to the problem.⁶² At that time, Pakistan responded positively to this proposal but, later on, stopped the payment in 1993. Bush administration also made a half-hearted attempt to delay sanctions until the induction of the new Pakistani government after general elections of 1993⁶³ but the Indian lobby in the US Senate did not allow it to be successful. Brent Scowcroft, US National Security Advisor, said, "The Bush administration wanted to maintain a friendly relationship with Pakistan but found its hand tied."⁶⁴ On February 1990, Howard Schaffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia, testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, emphasized that despite the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, Pakistan's role in the achievement of US interests in South Asia and post-war Afghanistan cannot be neglected. He, therefore, demanded a waiver of the Symington Amendment, in respect of Pakistan, from April 1990 to 1993.⁶⁵ In March 1990, he again tried to highlight the strategic importance of Pakistan in the future political setup of South Asia and a politically stable, independent, non-aligned Afghanistan. Disregarding the future threats to South Asia and Persian Gulf, the US Congress did not bother to evolve the strategic worth of Pakistan. Had Pakistan and Afghanistan not been left unattended in the aftermath of Soviet withdrawal from Afghan territory, the world would have been presenting a

⁶¹ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 310.

⁶² Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 371.

⁶³ As a result of these elections Nawaz Sharif-led Pakistan Muslim League, representing conservative elements, lost to the liberal and more pro-US Benazir-led Pakistan Peoples Party. Resultantly, Benazir assumed power for a second term (1993-1996).

⁶⁴ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 311.

⁶⁵ Tom Rogers, 'Reverse Influence', in M. Raziullah Azmi (ed.), 1994, *Pakistan American Relations: The Recent Past*. Karachi: Royal Book Company. pp. 98-130.

different political scenario today. Nevertheless, the US Congress was determined to check Pakistan's quest for nuclear deterrence against nuclear India. To achieve this goal, the sanctions under Pressler Amendment were considered the only solution. In an effort to ameliorate the US Congress, in mid-October 1990, Pakistan's caretaker Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan offered to freeze Pakistan's nuclear program in return for a waiver of sanctions imposed under Pressler Amendment. But Mr. Baker, the US Secretary of State, replied negatively and told Yaqub Khan that Pakistan had to destroy her nuclear bomb and "roll back its capability to the other side of the line [the line prescribed by the US arbitrarily]."⁶⁶

Contrary to the US hard action against Pakistan, the latter actively supported the US stance over the Persian Gulf crises in 1990 and sent 10,000 troops to Saudi Arabia to join the US-led coalition forces. Pakistan's backing to the US-led coalition against Saddam was for two reasons; to win the US favor in easing sanctions imposed under the Pressler Amendment and to express solidarity with her Saudi friends who had remained an important source of financial aid to Pakistan.⁶⁷ Moreover, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had remained steadfast in providing political leverage to Pakistan through every thick and thin. On the other hand, the entire political spectrum, from right wing Islamist parties to Benazir-led liberal Pakistan People's Party (PPP), was denouncing US action against Iraq. Huge public demonstrations were demanding government to support Saddam against the United States. Newspapers and journals were not only reflecting but also fanning the public sentiments. Even the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) in Pakistan showed some resentment to the government stance over the Gulf issue, especially against the government support to the US-led coalition against Saddam. He was of the opinion that the United Nations had allowed the allied forces to liberate Kuwait but not to invade Iraq. Therefore, he termed the US-led assault against Iraq as 'Zionist plot against Islam'.⁶⁸ This mind reading of Pakistan's COAS raised eyebrows in the United States and some suspicions about him crept in

⁶⁶ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p.309-310.

⁶⁷ Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 370; Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 312.

⁶⁸ General Aslam Beg said, "The Gulf situation today presents a new example of defiance – a 'strategic defiance' by the people of Iraq against the 'strategic military intimidation', by the powers that be...Such strategic defiance is very important for Pakistan, in view of the kind of threat that we are faced with today...our policy objective must aim at getting the support of other friendly countries who think alike and have common perceptions. I think there should be no problem for Pakistan to establish such an understanding with Iran and Afghanistan with whom we have many things in common." See General Mirza Aslam Beg's address at POFs seminar at Wah Cantt on 2 December 1990, quoted in *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 44, January 1991, pp. 146-148; *The New York Time*, (16 February 1991).

the US administration and the US legislative bodies.⁶⁹ However, the other top military leadership did not endorse the line of their Chief. They put their weight behind the Prime Minister and gave their tacit approval to the government stand.⁷⁰ Despite all the domestic aversion to the US intervention in the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, Pakistan sent troops to Saudi Arabia to augment the US-led forces in the name of protecting the Muslim Holy places in Saudi Arabia. To cool down the anti-US sentiments in Pakistan, the state-controlled media was skillfully used. To gather popular support for Pakistani government's stand on the 'Kuwait-Iraq issue' both the President and Prime Minister of Pakistan made thoughtful speeches but failed in cooling down sentiments of the people against the US and her Western allies. All these government efforts were to ameliorate the US perception against Pakistan over the nuclear issue. To ease the US imposed sanction, every possible step short of nuclear rollback was taken by Pakistan but all in vain. The US intelligence agencies were quite vocal over the alleged nuclear deals of Pakistan with Iraq and Iran and they thought Gen. Beg as a key player in those deals. The CIA officials were suspicious of making an illicit deal of nuclear blueprints and centrifuges by General Beg with Iraq to raise money for providing fiscal support to the insurgency inside Indian-held Kashmir.⁷¹ The focus of US administration was on the Middle East. Pakistan had become a vital pariah for the United States and the latter had no interest in extending military aid to Pakistan. The US administration stressed Pakistan to take three measures to get the US aid intact; *first*, cease the production of enriched Uranium. *Second*, not to produce highly enriched Uranium metal that may lead to the production of nuclear weapon components. *Third*, non-possession of even a single highly enriched Uranium core.⁷² In fact, the US was not ready to give any concession to Pakistan that could put her on the list of nuclear powers. This issue became a writing on the wall in November 1991.⁷³ Pakistani authorities, while pleading their case, called upon the United States to show more understanding for Pakistan's precarious security situation. They also

⁶⁹ The Senate Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific Affairs extended the aid suspension till 1992, see *Dawn* (7 February 1991). Also see Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 370

⁷⁰ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 312.

⁷¹ Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, pp. 264-285.

⁷² Maleeha Lodhi, 'The Recent Past', in M. Raziullah Azmi (ed.), 1994, *Pakistan American Relations: The Recent Past*. Karachi: Royal Book Company. pp. 132-138.

⁷³ When Pakistan was asked to change her policy. Reginald Bartholomew, the US Undersecretary of State for Security Affairs, in a reply to the Pakistani President told that the United States cannot change her policies but Pakistan had to change hers. He stressed that there was no other option available to Pakistani government except molding the nuclear policies in accordance with the US laws in order to resume the flow of aid from the US to Pakistan.

stressed to find some way around legislative barriers.⁷⁴ These parleys ended on the agreement from both sides on the resumption of talks. Remaining optimistic about the revival of close US-Pakistan relations and knowing about the repercussions of strained relationship, Pakistan was continuously engaged in doing more than earlier. Pakistan adopted a two-pronged strategy to address the US concerns over nuclear issue. On the one hand, Pakistan launched a campaign to gather support for a regional non-proliferation treaty, and, on the other hand, diplomatic efforts were accelerated to segregate the nuclear issue from the rest of relations between United States and Pakistan.⁷⁵ To soothe the US anger and to get a diplomatic edge over India, Pakistan called for a five-nation conference to consider a ban on nuclear weapons in South Asia. The proposed participants of the conference were the United States, the Russian Federation, Peoples Republic of China, India and Pakistan. India rejected this idea of regional solution to the problem. Pakistan's efforts to make South Asia a nuclear free region were seconded by the United States but the struggle to insulate the US-Pakistan relations from the nuclear question did not get favor from the United States. The US was not even ready to put pressure over India to sign the NPT.⁷⁶ To ensure nuclear non-proliferation, Pakistan was ready to give any guarantee but strived hard to avoid rollback of the hardly won nuclear technology. In the changing geopolitical scenario, as stated earlier, not only India and the United States were getting closer but China was also mending fences with India. Against this backdrop, Pakistan was facing acute challenge of international isolation especially on the nuclear issue. Pakistan could not disregard the US concerns as the rest of the western world also shared these concerns. Therefore, efforts were kept underway by Pakistan to bridge the credibility gap in the US-Pakistan relations. The US administration firmly believed that both India and Pakistan had pursued chemical weapons besides nuclear and missile technology. Robert M. Gates, the Director of CIA, expressing the American apprehension over South Asia, stated before the US Senate Subcommittee on nuclear nonproliferation in these words:

⁷⁴ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 314.

⁷⁵ Wasim Sajjad, the Chairman Senate in Pakistan, was sent along with a top-profile delegation to US and it was stated by Islamabad that the purpose of this visit was to keep the communication channels between the two countries open. Reginald Bartholomew, the US Under Secretary for International Security, informed the delegation that if Pakistan wants to get the US aid resumed then her nuclear program must be dropped. Thus, this visit bore no fruit. See *Dawn* (26 May 1991).

⁷⁶ In November 1991, Reginald Bartholomew, US Under Secretary of State for International Security, during his visit to Pakistan and India, exerted pressure on Pakistan to sign the NPT while in New Delhi he denied the impression that he was there to put pressure on India to sign that treaty.

“In South Asia, the arms race between India and Pakistan is a major concern ... Not only do both countries have nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs; they have recently pursued chemical weapons as well. These programs are particularly worrisome because of constant tension and conflict in Kashmir.”⁷⁷

This statement shows the American concern about the breakout of a war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. But, ironically, Pakistan was subjected to sanctions under Pressler Amendment while India was set free which was severely affecting security equation in South Asian region. Despite all efforts made by Pakistan to ease tension with the US, the US pressure was mounting day by day to rollback the nuclear program. Pakistan conditioned the nuclear rollback with Indian compliance to a reciprocal action. Consequently, bitterness in relations became more visible in late 1991.

In early 1992, Pakistan adopted a new approach that came to the limelight when Shehryar M. Khan, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary, was sent to Washington where he candidly admitted before the *Washington Post* members that Pakistan possessed the nuclear capability to make a nuclear bomb by putting together its elements. However, he clarified that Pakistan had not yet converted it into a bomb and have no intention to do so. Further, he asserted that Pakistan would never transfer the nuclear technology to anyone. Expressing the purpose of his statement he made it clear that this statement was to “avoid the credibility gaps” between US and Pakistan that was caused by earlier Pakistani statements.⁷⁸ It was believed in Pakistan that a bomb in the basement would always be an inflection in Pakistan’s side, but a declared weapon would have to be negotiated.⁷⁹ However, this attempt also failed to mould the US attitude towards Pakistan. The reason for this US obduracy was the lack of US interests in Pakistan and the US misperception of the inherent animosity between India and Pakistan.⁸⁰

In 1992, it was further realized that the impasse between US-Pakistan relations could not be overcome as the Cold War had gone and the US strategic interests in

⁷⁷ *The New York Times* (21 January 1992).

⁷⁸ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 315.

⁷⁹ Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, p. 227.

⁸⁰ A Pakistani official, while commenting about the US concerns regarding Pakistan’s nuclear program, stated: “We have not forsaken nuclear weapons because our rival (India) has not. Americans do not seem to understand that this is a life and death issue for Pakistan.” See *Time* magazine (10 December 1990); also see Farzana Shakoor, ‘Pakistan-US Relations...’, pp. 23-25.

Pakistan had reduced to zero. Mrs. Abida Hosain, Pakistan's envoy to the US, was of the opinion that the United States "had as much interest in Pakistan as Pakistan had in Maldives."⁸¹ She said that the direct fallouts of Pakistan's cooperation with the US during the Afghan-episode of the cold war were the gun culture, heroin addiction and three million Afghan refugees for the former, which had little resources to address them by her own. The successive elected governments in Pakistan (1988-1993) did their best to mend fences with the United States but all these efforts proved futile. However, there was a consensus among the political leadership of Pakistan that by giving off the endeavors to bridge the gulf in the US-Pakistan relationship was not in the interest of their country.⁸² On the other hand, instead of easing sanctions and improving the bilateral relations, the US administration threatened Pakistan to be put on the 'terrorist state' watch list due to the alleged support that she provided to the Kashmir insurgence movement through her Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).⁸³ Pakistan was told by the US administration to withdraw her covert support for Kashmiri insurgency. On the contrary, Pakistan might be declared a country officially supporting terrorism. The seriousness of the message is evident from the statement: "If you get hit with this on top of Pressler [Amendment] that will end the US-Pakistan relationship."⁸⁴ In late 1991, the new US ambassador to Pakistan, Nicholas Platt had made insurgency in Kashmir as his top priority. He said, "I raised this issue at every level right from the Prime Minister down to the services and intelligence chiefs."⁸⁵ Initially, Pakistan denied any involvement in Kashmir insurgency movement and held that Pakistan's support to *Kashmiris* was only political and moral. Later on, it was claimed by Platt that Pakistani officials admitted the role played by ISI at later stages but that was also stopped.⁸⁶

Looking at the western frontier of Pakistan, Pakistan was faced with some other challenges left unattended by the United States. As mentioned earlier, following the rollback of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the United States disowned

⁸¹ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 315-316.

⁸² Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 377-378.

⁸³ Kux, 'A Ride on the Roller Coaster', in Hafeez Malik (ed.), 2003, *Pakistan: Founders' Aspirations and Today's Realities*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 304.

⁸⁴ This message was conveyed to the Pakistani envoy in Washington by Mr. Arnold Kanter, the US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, see Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 316.

⁸⁵ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 316.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

Afghanistan and put the entire responsibility over Pakistan's shoulders. As one top US State Department official told the then-Pakistan Country Director John Holzman, "Afghanistan is no longer on our radar screen."⁸⁷ In fact, the end of Cold War and the collapse of Soviet Union was the climax of US interest in Afghanistan but it was the beginning of the long-term national interest for Pakistan. Frictions between Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) developed over Pakistan's attitude towards various Afghan militant groups.⁸⁸ But later on, CIA washed its hand of Afghan affairs. However, due to the US congressional support for the *Mujahideen*, the US-backed militant who fought the Soviet forces during 1980s, the Bush administration kept the arms supply intact.⁸⁹ Due to narrow strategic waist, Pakistan was very anxious about her security. In view of Pakistan's policymakers, the required strategic depth that could be provided by Afghanistan if there had been a pro-Pakistan regime. Therefore, the next step for Pakistan was the induction of a friendly regime in Afghanistan but the Afghan civil strife did not allow peace to prevail there. In 1992, Pakistan realized that *Mujahideen* could not promote peace in the war-torn Afghanistan. After the success of militants against Soviet forces, Bush administration feared that militancy could spread from Afghanistan into the South Asian region. This spillover of militancy could endanger the US interests in South Asia. The US administration also urged for a political settlement of Afghan problem. The US aid for Afghan refugees in Pakistan was tied with the progress of a political settlement of the power struggle in Afghanistan and Pakistan was unequivocally made known about it. Keeping all these factors in view, an apparent change came in Pakistan's policy towards these warrior groups. Pakistan was no more interested in the installation of an Islamic government in Afghanistan.⁹⁰ Pakistan was facing enormous economic, social and political problems due to pro-US stance during Afghan war. The desire to have access to Central Asian Republics had also urged Pakistan to see a stable Afghanistan that was the easiest way to manipulate the Central Asian markets. Against the backdrop of ongoing armed struggle to capture Kabul, the newly independent Central Asian Republics had signaled Pakistan that they were not in favor of a fundamentalist government in Kabul. On the other hand, coping with the problems of three million Afghan refugees was not possible for a sanction-ridden

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 317.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 296.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 299.

⁹⁰ *The New York Times*, (16 February 1992).

Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan endorsed the UN efforts to bring together all the Afghan factions, including the former Soviet backed government in Kabul, to the table-talks to evolve a formula for a broad based interim government. Several other steps were taken by Pakistan in the direction of negotiated settlement but they bore no fruit. Looking at the futility of these efforts, Pakistan resorted to other options to bring stability to her war-ravaged neighbor. Even it was speculated that Pakistan was interested in supporting the former king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, to reduce the influence of the radical forces and win over the confidence of Afghan masses.⁹¹ The US administration was also supportive to these efforts. But the ever-growing defense ties of Pakistan with her northern neighbor, China was pinching the US in her shoes.

In early 1991, another issue had arose which deteriorated the already marred relations between Pakistan and the United States. The United States alleged both Pakistan and China for violating the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) by the transfer of *M-11* missile launchers.⁹² The US administration had an apprehension that the transfer of these missiles would not only enable Pakistan to produce ballistic missiles of her own but would also allow this technology to proliferate to other countries. The US was also fretted by knowing about a proposed deal of *M-9*⁹³ to both Pakistan and Syria. This had put the security of India and Israel at stake and this was unacceptable to the United States.⁹⁴ Brushing aside the US allegations, both the countries, China and Pakistan, denied any such deal that violated the MTCR to which China was not a signatory. But turning down the clarification of China, both China and Pakistan were subjected to sanctions. These sanctions blacklisted the Chinese and Pakistani entities involved in this deal. China was barred from the commercial opportunities to launch certain American satellites from their missiles. Chinese access to certain American high-speed computers was also denied. China was selling far fewer arms than sold by the US or the then Soviet Union to the Middle East

⁹¹ Memon, 'Reorientation of Pakistan's Foreign Policy...', p. 411.

⁹² *M-11* missiles were short range ballistic missile that were provided by China to Pakistan. The US believed that it was a violation of MTCR as their range was exceeding the guidelines.

⁹³ The DongFeng 15 (Export name: M-9; NATO codename: CSS-6) is a solid-fuel, short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) system developed by CASC China Academy of Rocket Motor Technology (ARMT, also known as 4th Space Academy). It is a road-mobile, single-stage and solid-propellant missile system. The missile carries a 500kg single warhead and has a maximum range of 600km. also visit <http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/df15.asp>

⁹⁴ Nicholas D. Kristof. 'China said to Plan New Arms Sales; U.S. is Concerned'. *The New York Times*, (10 June 1991).

countries⁹⁵ but whatever was lawful for the US was totally unlawful for China. For Pakistan, the sanctions were no more subversive as US military aid to Pakistan had already been choked as shown in Table 1.4.

However, in February 1992, the sanctions were lifted after Chinese agreement to abide by MTCR.⁹⁶ But, in December 1992, the US intelligence detected the transfer of *M-11* missiles as well as the sale of launchers from China to Pakistan. This time China took the stand that the range of these missile lie under 300Km and, therefore, there is no question of violation of MTCR. The US administration was suspicious about the transfer of nuclear technology from China to Pakistan and active Chinese support to Pakistani scientists in making nuclear arsenal. Nevertheless, these allegations had no proof behind them. The Bush administration delayed any decision regarding this issue and passed on the responsibility to the incoming administration.⁹⁷ Americans feared that these deals could put China in a more influential position that could, in turn, give her a political and economic clout. Hence, the main reason of fraction between China and the US was the arms' sale and Pakistan was one of the great and direct beneficiaries of these deals.

The United States had suspicions not only over the nuclear program and missile deal of Pakistan but also had reservation over the role of ISI in the neighboring countries. Referring to the alleged ISI support to the militants in the Indian-held Kashmir, Mr. John Woolsey, the CIA Director, warned Pakistan of the imposition of another set of sanctions.⁹⁸ The United States considered insurgency in Kashmir as an extension of Pakistan's Afghan policy and feared that this trend may spillover to other parts of the region especially the Central Asia which could directly put the US interests at risk in that region.

In January 1993, the induction of a Democrat President, Bill Clinton, into the Oval office brought no change in the strained US-Pakistan relations. The oil-rich Middle East region remained the focus of US administration and South Asia was left unattended. Robin Lynn Raphael, US Assistant Secretary of States for South Asia, did not even assume office until the fall of 1993.⁹⁹ There was much in Afghanistan and

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 318.

⁹⁷ Nicholas D. Kristof. 'China said to Plan ...'; and see Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 319.

⁹⁸ Zahid Hussain (2007), *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle With Militant Islam*. Lahore: Vanguard Books. p. 26.

⁹⁹ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 321.

Table: 1.4. US Economic and Military aid to Pakistan during FY 1992.

(U.S. FISCAL YEARS - MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

COUNTRY: PAKISTAN @

PROGRAM	U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS-OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS								TOTAL		TOTAL		OUT- STANDING LOAN BALANCES
	POST-WAR RELIEF PERIOD 1946-48	MARSHALL PLAN PERIOD 1949-52	SECURITY ACT PERIOD 1953-61	1962-88	1989	1990	1991	1992	TOTAL FAA PERIOD 1962-92	1946-92	LOANS AND REPAY- MENTS	1946-92	
I. ECON. ASSIST.-TOTAL...	0.1	11.1	1418.7	6175.6	352.1	357.3	101.3	18.8	7004.9	7837.2	1236.2	2698.8	
LOANS.....	0.1	-	476.8	3811.8	76.0	76.0	-	-	3963.8	3933.0	1236.2	2698.8	
GRANTS.....	-	11.1	941.9	2363.8	276.1	281.3	101.3	18.8	3041.1	3902.2	-	-	
A. AID AND PREDECESSOR...	-	10.6	935.4	3739.9	265.0	275.5	96.0	0.4	4376.8	4977.6	887.9	1568.7	
LOANS***.....	-	-	339.5	2371.1	-	-	-	-	2371.1	2456.6	887.9	1568.7	
GRANTS.....	-	10.6	595.9	1368.8	265.0	275.5	96.0	0.4	2005.7	2521.0	-	-	
(SEC. SUPP. ASSIST.)...@	-@	-@	586.6@	1581.9@	215.0@	229.0@	95.7@	0.4@	2122.0@	2611.2@	-	-	
B. FOOD FOR PEACE.....	-	0.1	415.9	2398.7	80.0	76.0	-	15.0	2569.6	2734.1	348.2	1130.1	
LOANS.....	-	-	137.3	1440.7	76.0	76.0	-	-	1592.7	1478.3	348.2	1130.1	
GRANTS.....	-	0.1	278.6	958.0	4.0	-	-	15.0	976.9	1255.8	-	-	
TITLE I-TOTAL.....	-	-	334.1	2003.5	76.0	76.0	-	-	2155.5	2238.0	348.2	1130.1	
REPAY. IN \$-LOANS.....	-	-	-	1097.4	76.0	76.0	-	-	1249.4	1248.2	185.3	1062.9	
PAY. IN FOR. CURR.....	-	-	334.1	906.1	-	-	-	-	906.1	989.8	162.9	67.2	
TITLE II-TOTAL.....	-	0.1	81.8	395.2	4.0	-	-	15.0	414.1	496.1	-	-	
E. RELIEF, EC. DEV. & WFP.	-	-	48.6	366.3	-	-	-	0.2	366.5	415.1	-	-	
VOL. RELIEF AGENCY.....	-	0.1	33.2	28.9	4.0	-	-	14.8	47.6	81.0	-	-	
TITLE III.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
C. OTHER ECON. ASSIST...	0.1	0.4	67.4	37.0	7.1	5.8	5.3	3.4	58.5	125.5	0.1	-	
LOANS.....	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	-	
GRANTS.....	-	0.4	67.4	37.0	7.1	5.8	5.3	3.4	58.5	125.4	-	-	
PEACE CORPS.....	-	-	-	7.5	0.3	0.8	0.6	0.4	9.5	9.5	-	-	
NARCOTICS.....	-	-	-	29.5	6.8	5.0	4.7	3.0	48.9	48.0	-	-	
OTHER.....	-	0.4	47.4	-	-	-	-	-	47.4	-	-	-	
II. MIL. ASSIST.-TOTAL...	-	-	508.2	1982.6	230.9	229.9	-	-	2443.4	2951.4	1057.6	690.9	
LOANS.....	-	-	-	1748.5	-	-	-	-	1748.5	1748.5	1057.6	690.9	
GRANTS.....	-	-	508.2	234.1	230.9	229.9	-	-	694.9	1202.9	-	-	
A. MAP GRANTS.....	-	-	480.8	169.6	-	-	-	-	169.6	650.3	-	-	
B. CREDIT FINANCING.....	-	-	-	1748.5	-	-	-	-	1748.5	1748.5	1057.6	690.9	
C. INTL. MIL. ED. TRNG.....	-	-	12.2	18.5	0.9	0.9	-	-	20.3	32.4	-	-	
D. TRAN-EXCESS STOCK...	-	-	15.2	11.6	-	-	-	-	11.6	26.8	-	-	
E. OTHER GRANTS.....	-	-	-	34.4	230.0	229.0	-	-	493.4	493.4	-	-	
III. TOTAL ECON. & MIL....	0.1	11.1	1926.9	8158.2	583.0	587.2	101.3	18.8	9448.3	10788.6	2293.8	3389.7	
LOANS.....	0.1	-	476.8	5540.3	76.0	76.0	-	-	5712.3	5683.5	2293.8	3389.7	
GRANTS.....	-	11.1	1450.1	2597.9	507.0	511.2	101.3	18.8	3736.0	5105.1	-	-	
OTHER US LOANS.....	-	-	12.9	408.8	-	-	34.4	-	443.2	439.1	402.1	34.4	
EX-IM BANK LOANS.....	-	-	12.9	277.6	-	-	34.4	-	312.0	309.1	272.1	34.4	
ALL OTHER.....	-	-	-	131.2	-	-	-	-	131.2	130.0	130.0	-	

* LESS THAN \$50,000.

@ SEE COMMENTS IN COUNTRY NOTES SECTION

** VALUES IN THESE COLUMNS ARE NET OF DEOBLIGATIONS AND CANCELLATIONS. SEE GENERAL NOTES-REPORTING CONCEPTS

*** INCLUDES CAPITALIZED INTEREST ON PRIOR YEAR LOANS.

Kashmir to make the US intelligence agencies scared. The US intelligence agency FBI alleged Pakistan's ISI for training Ramzi Yousef who was alleged for bombing the World Trade Centre in New York on 26 February 1993. The FBI reports expressed the fear of the use of a more lethal weapon, possibly the nuclear device, by Yousef in the near future. Pakistan's foreign ministry strongly denounced any link between ISI and Yousef but the US administration believed more in FBI rather than Pakistan's stand. Pakistan was considered as an epicenter of global instability by the United States.¹⁰⁰ Warning publicly, the Director CIA, said that Pakistan was 'on the brink' to be declared as 'terrorist state'.¹⁰¹ Worrying about the backlash of anti-American feelings in Pakistan and the fear of slipping of Pakistan into a fundamentalist state, Clinton administration did not declare Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism at official level. However, Warren Christopher, the US Secretary of State, warned Akram Zaki, Pakistan's Foreign Secretary, that the United States expected 'action' to curb groups engaged in terrorism. US-administration believed that Pakistan was harboring extremists trained in guerilla warfare and they had links with terrorists throughout the Islamic world.¹⁰² Thus, the Clinton administration took strong stand against the involvement of the ISI in the Kashmiri insurgency. Because of this harsh US stand, the government of Pakistan took stern action against some of the ISI officers and Arab *Mujahideen* in Pakistan. In a cleansing move, a large number of ISI officers, who had close links with Afghan and Arab *Mujahideen* in Afghanistan and operating from Pakistan, were removed and some eleven hundred other personnel were either forced to accept retirement or sent back to their units in the army.¹⁰³ Complying with US demands, Pakistan stemmed the flow of men and material support to the Kashmiri insurgents.¹⁰⁴ This saved Pakistan's face to some extent but the United States did not give any concession in the sanctions imposed under the Pressler Amendment. By 1993, the US economic aid to Pakistan also dried up. The history of US economic and military aid has been illustrated in Chart 1 and 2. Table 1.5 highlights the US economic and military aid during FY 1993. Nevertheless, the US aid to counter narcotics was still intact and about \$2 million annually were

¹⁰⁰ Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, p. 229.

¹⁰¹ Douglas Jehl, 'Pakistan is Facing Terrorist Listing', *The New York Times* (25 April 1993).

¹⁰² Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 322.


¹⁰³ Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan...*, p. 27.

¹⁰⁴ Douglas Jehl, 'Pakistan is Facing ...', *The New York Times*, (25 April 1993).


Chart 1. US Aid to Pakistan (All numbers are millions, historic dollars)

Blue: Economic Aid

Red: Military Aid



Source: USAID Greenbook of Foreign Assistance. All figures are in millions of dollars. All figures are in historic dollars. <http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html>

Chart 2: Historical U.S. Engagement with Pakistan. FY 1977-2007

Source: Craig Cohen, *A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2007). p. 5.

forwarded to Pakistan.¹⁰⁵ The trade relations also remained intact up to a certain level as shown in the Table 1.6-1.7 and Charts 3–4. Thus, the defense and security of Pakistan was in turmoil. To compensate this deficiency, Pakistan leaned more towards her ‘all weather friend’ China.

In August 1993, controversy over the transfer of *M-11* missiles from China to Pakistan resurfaced when the US administration imposed two-year sanctions for violating MTCR. One Pakistani and eleven Chinese entities suffered from these sanctions. Both Pakistan and China admitted the deal of *M-11* but they stressed that they had not violated any parameter laid down in the MTCR, which prohibits the transfer of missiles having the range of more than 300 kilometers and a payload more than 500 kilogram. But the American Intelligence agencies were divided over whether evidence indicated a violation by China and Pakistan of the control regime. Despite the entire grim situation, a ray of light appeared when Robin L. Raphael, the US Assistant Secretary for South Asia, regarded Pakistan as a useful future partner and a force of moderation in the Muslim World. As stated earlier, the Pentagon was also in favor of close relations with Pakistan as the strategic worth of the latter was still intact and her role in West-Asian and Middle East region was needed by Pentagon. For that reason, Pakistan Army’s role in the peacekeeping missions of the United Nations in Bosnia and Somalia was also highly appreciated by the Pentagon.¹⁰⁶ Clinton administration was engaged in diplomatic dialogue with China for granting the latter with most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status but the pressure of the US Senate was mounting on not to do so.¹⁰⁷ In October 1993, the new elected government of Benazir Bhutto took over in the wake of general elections in Pakistan. Pakistan’s foreign policy and security environment had deteriorated significantly in five years since Benazir Bhutto had first assumed the office in December 1988. On international front, this new government was faced with the problems of nuclear non-proliferation, drug control, terrorism and human rights. These issues were the main irritants in the US-Pakistan relations. Relations with China remained intact but relations with the US withered. However, in spite of tension on nuclear issue, the US-Pakistan relations showed some signs of improvement. In the fall of 1993, there developed a constructive change in US stand on Kashmir as is evident from the statement of Robin

¹⁰⁵ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 323.

¹⁰⁶ Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 388-389.

¹⁰⁷ *The New York Times*, (25 August 1993).

Table: 1.5. US Economic and Military aid to Pakistan during FY 1993.

COUNTRY: PAKISTAN @													
(U.S. FISCAL YEARS - MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)													
PROGRAM	U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS-OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS												
	POST-WAR RELIEF PERIOD 1946-48	MARSHALL PLAN PERIOD 1949-52	MUTUAL SECURITY ACT PERIOD 1953-61	FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT PERIOD				TOTAL FAA PERIOD 1962-93	TOTAL LOANS AND GRANTS 1946-93	PRINCIPAL REPAY- MENTS 1946-93	OUT- STANDING LOAN BALANCES 1946-93		
				1962-89	1990	1991	1992	1993	1962-93	1946-93	1946-93	1946-93	
I. ECON. ASSIST. TOTAL	0.1	11.1	1418.7	6527.6	357.3	101.3	18.8	52.7	7057.5	7898.8	1344.1	2652.2	
LOANS	0.1	-	476.8	5887.8	76.0	-	-	40.0	6003.8	9976.2	1344.1	2652.2	
GRANTS	-	11.1	941.9	2639.8	281.3	101.3	18.8	12.7	3053.7	9914.6	-	-	
A. USAID AND PREDECESSOR	-	10.6	935.4	4004.9	275.5	96.0	0.4	5.7	4382.4	4978.7	959.1	1493.2	
LOANS***	-	-	339.5	2371.1	-	-	-	-	2371.1	2452.3	959.1	1493.2	
GRANTS	-	10.6	595.9	1633.8	275.5	96.0	0.4	5.7	2011.3	2526.4	-	-	
(SEC. SUPP. ASSIST.)...	(-)	(-)	(586.6)	(1796.9)	(229.0)	(95.7)	(0.4)	(-)	(2122.0)	(2610.9)			
B. FOOD FOR PEACE	-	0.1	415.9	2478.6	76.0	-	15.0	42.8	2612.4	2782.4	384.9	1139.0	
LOANS	-	-	137.3	1516.7	76.0	-	-	40.0	1632.7	1523.8	384.9	1139.0	
GRANTS	-	0.1	278.6	961.9	-	-	15.0	2.8	979.7	1258.6	-	-	
TITLE I-TOTAL	-	-	334.1	2079.5	76.0	-	-	40.0	2195.5	2283.5	384.9	1139.0	
REPAY. IN \$-LOANS	-	-	-	1173.4	76.0	-	-	40.0	1289.4	1298.2	212.3	1086.0	
PAY. IN FOR. CURR.	-	-	334.1	906.1	-	-	-	-	906.1	985.3	172.6	53.0	
TITLE II-TOTAL	-	0.1	81.8	399.1	-	-	15.0	2.8	416.9	498.9	-	-	
E. RELIEF, EC. DEV. & WFP	-	-	48.6	366.3	-	-	0.2	-	366.5	415.1	-	-	
VOL. RELIEF AGENCY	-	0.1	33.2	32.8	-	-	14.8	2.8	50.4	83.8	-	-	
TITLE III	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
C. OTHER ECON. ASSIST.	0.1	0.4	67.4	44.1	5.8	5.3	3.4	4.2	62.7	129.7	0.1	-	
LOANS	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	-	
GRANTS	-	0.4	67.4	44.1	5.8	5.3	3.4	4.2	62.7	129.6	-	-	
PEACE CORPS	-	-	-	7.8	0.8	0.6	0.4	-	9.5	9.5	-	-	
NARCOTICS	-	-	-	36.3	5.0	4.7	3.0	4.2	53.1	52.2	-	-	
OTHER	-	0.4	67.4	-	-	-	-	-	67.8	-	-	-	
GRANTS	-	-	508.2	2215.3	229.9	-	-	-	3443.4	2993.4	1155.9	592.6	
GRANTS	-	-	508.2	1748.5	229.9	-	-	-	1748.5	1748.5	1155.9	592.6	
A. MAP GRANTS	-	-	480.8	169.6	-	-	-	-	169.6	650.3	-	-	
B. CREDIT FINANCING	-	-	-	1748.5	-	-	-	-	1748.5	1748.5	1155.9	592.6	
C. INTL. MIL. ED. TRNG.	-	-	12.2	19.4	0.9	-	-	-	20.3	32.4	-	-	
D. TRAN-EXCESS STOCK	-	-	15.2	11.6	-	-	-	-	11.6	26.8	-	-	
E. OTHER GRANTS	-	-	-	264.4	229.0	-	-	-	493.4	493.4	-	-	
GRANTS	-	11.1	1450.1	3104.8	511.2	101.3	18.8	12.7	3748.8	3117.9	-	-	
OTHER US LOANS	-	-	12.9	408.8	-	34.4	-	-	443.2	409.5	394.4	15.2	
EX-IM BANK LOANS	-	-	12.9	277.6	-	34.4	-	-	312.0	279.5	264.4	15.2	
ALL OTHER	-	-	-	131.2	-	-	-	-	131.2	130.0	130.0	-	

* LESS THAN \$50,000.

** VALUES IN THESE COLUMNS ARE NET OF DEOBLIGATIONS AND CANCELLATIONS.


*** INCLUDES CAPITALIZED INTEREST ON PRIOR YEAR LOANS.

@ SEE COMMENTS IN COUNTRY NOTES SECTION
SEE GENERAL NOTES-REPORTING CONCEPTS

Source: USAID Greenbook 1993.

US Trade with Pakistan: FY 1992

Chart. 3.



Source: Chart compiled on the basis of data given in the table 1.6

Table: 1.6


NOTE: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars, and not seasonally adjusted unless otherwise specified.

Month	Exports	Imports	Balance
January 1992	70.5	74.3	-3.8
February 1992	83.5	73.0	10.5
March 1992	54.2	71.7	-17.5
April 1992	50.9	77.4	-26.5
May 1992	52.9	58.1	-5.2
June 1992	55.5	80.8	-25.3
July 1992	51.3	71.3	-20.0
August 1992	94.3	65.5	28.8
September 1992	106.8	74.4	32.4
October 1992	100.5	79.3	21.2
November 1992	91.3	68.1	23.2
December 1992	68.9	71.9	-3.0
TOTAL	880.6	865.8	14.8

SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division, Data Dissemination Branch, Washington, D.C. 20233

US Trade with Pakistan: FY 1993

Chart. 4.



Source: Chart compiled on the basis of data given in the table 1.7

Table: 1.7

NOTE: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars, and not seasonally adjusted unless otherwise specified.

Month	Exports	Imports	Balance
January 1993	117.2	70.8	46.4
February 1993	35.4	77.5	-42.1
March 1993	56.3	82.9	-26.6
April 1993	49.7	68.2	-18.5
May 1993	59.9	62.3	-2.4
June 1993	51.1	74.7	-23.6
July 1993	57.0	77.6	-20.6
August 1993	58.6	84.1	-25.5
September 1993	88.7	82.9	5.8
October 1993	59.9	78.3	-18.4
November 1993	106.1	69.8	36.3
December 1993	71.5	68.2	3.3
TOTAL	811.4	897.3	-85.9

SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division, Data Dissemination Branch, Washington, D.C. 20233

Raphel, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia. While undertaking a journey to South Asia, she told the journalists that the United States had never accepted accession of Kashmir to India. This statement was a good gesture for Pakistan.¹⁰⁸ She thought Pakistan as a potentially useful friend. Taking advantage of this change in US attitude, Premier Benazir invited, in November 1993, the US intervention in Kashmir dispute. Benazir Bhutto, while negotiating the matter with Robin Raphel said:

*“The nuclear program is linked with the Jammu and Kashmir issue,”...“There cannot be peace in the region without the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue.”...“Rolling back the nuclear program is not feasible. It will not serve the purpose of nuclear nonproliferation in the region.”*¹⁰⁹

On regional level, relations with India became more and more tense due to Kashmir issue. In fact, Pakistan could not reap the expected benefits from the collapse of Soviet Union. On western border, the situation was also not good. Continued turmoil in Afghanistan also frustrated Pakistan's hope of gaining significant economic benefits from the opening up of trade and economic relations with the newly independent Central Asian Republics (CARs).¹¹⁰ However, a ray of hope for peace in Afghanistan emerged, when some three dozen students of a religious seminary, called the *Taliban* (the name used for students in Persian and Pashto), got together in *Kandahar*, southern part of Afghanistan and took arms against a local warlord who had raped a young girl. They hanged the said commander and won greater support from the masses. This group of the Taliban was headed by a former *Mujahid*, Mullah Mohammad Omer. Soon this group commanded the popular support of the masses of the war-ravaged Afghanistan who were keen to see law and order restored in their homeland. A number of warlords joined this movement and soon they got control of the southern parts of Afghanistan and restored normalcy in the area under their control. In fact, the Taliban were not raised by Pakistan but they were the outcome of the domestic compulsions of Afghanistan. The US and western allegations and the rhetoric of a Pakistani minister who claimed that the Taliban were Pakistan's children was nothing more than a distortion of the facts. In 1989, the US had no strategy for the future of Afghanistan. Hence, after the pullback of the Soviet forces from

¹⁰⁸ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 327-328.

¹⁰⁹ 'Pakistan Holding Firm To Nuclear Arms Plan'. *The New York Times*, (21 November 1993).

¹¹⁰ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 326.

Afghanistan, the anti-soviet forces engaged in an armed struggle among themselves on the basis of ethnicity. Thus, ethnic conflict also contributed to the Taliban movement who were predominantly *Pukhtoos*. However, at a later stage, Pakistan took the emergence of the Taliban as a blessing in disguise that could promote Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan and the Central Asia. Every nation promotes its national interest and so did Pakistan by extending support to the Taliban. Pakistan's support was for the sake of economic and strategic purposes and not for religious reasons. For Pakistan, the strategic depth, vis-à-vis India, which was wished by Pakistan since 1947, would not materialized unless and until a pro-Pakistan government was installed in Afghanistan. A politically fractured, ethnically divided and socially anarchical Afghanistan would have been a menace to the territorial integrity of Pakistan. When *Mujahideen* (the warlords supported by the US against Soviet Union) failed to bring peace to Afghanistan and deliver justice to the Afghan masses even after the removal of pro-Soviet Afghan government headed by Dr. Najib Ullah in 1992, the Afghan people felt disappointment. The Taliban gave them a hope. At first, Pakistan's intelligence agency ISI was not in favor of making links with the Taliban but Pakistan's Interior Minister General (R) Naseer Ullah Baber, showered the Taliban with much applause as he read the potential of the Taliban as a peacemaker force in the war-torn Afghanistan.¹¹¹ The pro-Pakistan Taliban were considered as a panacea to the longstanding Afghan claim of *Pukhtunistan*. Likewise, an alliance between the Taliban in Afghanistan and their like-minded *jihadi* organizations in Pakistan was a source of support to the ongoing insurgency in Kashmir. Therefore, in October 1994, Pakistani security officials contacted Mullah Mohammad Omer, the supreme Taliban leader in Afghanistan, for the first time, to seek Taliban's help for safe passage of a convoy of trucks transporting goods to Turkmenistan. Policymakers in Pakistan were of the opinion that the installation of a pro-Pakistan regime in southwest Afghanistan could pave the way for a smooth, easy and safe energy and trade corridor between Pakistan and Central Asia. In return, Pakistan could provide the shortest possible access to the vast hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian basin through Gawadar port and port Qasim in Pakistan. The US was also favoring a calm and peaceful Afghanistan and looking the Taliban as moderators. Hence, the US response to the Taliban movement was very sympathetic in the

¹¹¹ Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan...*, pp. 28-30.

beginning. But Pakistan's material support was resented to by the US from the beginning of Taliban insurgency. In fact, Pakistan exploited Afghan religious fervor in the post-Cold War era, as did the United States in the last phase of Cold War. But what was lawful for the United States in 1980s became unlawful for Pakistan in 1990s and it became a stigma for Pakistan. Expressing the US concern, James Baker, the US Secretary of State, warned Pakistan of dire consequences for extending help to the Taliban insurgents in early 1992. The real US worry was about the access of the Taliban to the nuclear weapons of Pakistan. Nevertheless, every sovereign state has its own foreign policy objectives.

The possible nuclear proliferation was a nightmare for the United States. Therefore, sanctions were intact against Pakistan since 1990. But the US policy of sanctions had badly failed, as it could not bridle the nuclear proliferation and arms race in this part of the world – South Asian region. Both Indian and Pakistani nuclear program entered in a very advanced stage to make nuclear arsenals. The issue of Kashmir was responsible for this nuclear arms race. But ironically the US policymakers did not look behind the nuclear issue and thus they de-linked these correlated issue. In March 1994, disregarding Pakistan's grievances, the US stressed on capping Pakistan's nuclear program for the interest of the whole region including India. Robin Raphel, the US Assistant Secretary of State, came with a proposal of offering the resumption of the stalled delivery of F-16 jet bombers in return for capping Pakistan's nuclear program and allowing international inspection and monitoring of her nuclear assets. This proposal was turned down by Pakistan and was also opposed by India as the latter considered the F-16 fighter jets detrimental to her security. Responding to this proposal, India warned the US that if this deal was finalized with Pakistan, India would be forced to take 'retaliatory measures'.¹¹² It must be noted that this US proposal had come after India's denial to comply with the US nonproliferation call. But to produce a soft corner in the US policy towards Pakistan, Pakistan again proposed a regional non-proliferation arrangement at the South Asian level. India rejected any South Asian specific non-proliferation efforts and favored a global non-proliferation including the undoing of all the nuclear arsenals possessed by the five major nuclear powers, the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China. In the meanwhile, India took a serious note of the remarks

¹¹² John F. Burns. 'India Rejects U.S. Bid for Nuclear Pact with Pakistan'. *The New York Times*, (26 March 1994).

of Miss Raphel in which she had admitted the disputed nature of Kashmir. Indian leadership also expressed concern over Clinton's statement in which he had shared Pakistan's concern over the alleged human rights violations by Indian forces in Kashmir. To cool down Indian fury, Ms. Raphel stated that militants shared the responsibility of human rights violations in Kashmir. She also made it clear that the US had no quarrel with the territorial integrity of India.¹¹³ But even this apologetic US approach could not change the Indian stance on nuclear issue. However, this state of affairs showed the degree of Clinton administration's tilt towards India.

Strobe Talbott, US Deputy Secretary of State, launched another initiative to freeze Pakistan's nuclear program.¹¹⁴ He reiterated the offer made by Miss Raphel before Pakistan's Army Chief General Abdul Waheed Kakar, who was on his visit to the United States. General Kakar bluntly refused to accept this offer and declared that military would not "bargain away Pakistan's nuclear program for the F-16 aircrafts or anything else."¹¹⁵ This statement washed out all the US efforts. The political leadership in Pakistan, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, also told Talbott that Pakistan would not agree to any proposal for non-proliferation if India was not ready to give her assent to it. Consequently, this strategy failed in bearing fruit. Realizing the futility of sanctions against Pakistan and India, the US started reconsidering the sanctions.¹¹⁶ Clinton administration tried to find out ways to restart the flow of military hardware to Pakistan, as the sanctions were hindering the trade interests of the United States. Pakistan withheld payment of installments for the halted F-16 bomber jets in 1993 that was a blow for the US stakeholders in the deal. Moreover, the decline in the US-Pakistan relations had given way to an increase of Chinese and Iranian influence in Pakistan. This trend was not favorable to the US strategic interests. The US did not give up her non-proliferation policy but tried to reshape the strategy. Preparations were underway in the US administration to replace coercive instruments with incentives. In other words, sticks were giving way to carrots to ensure South Asia as a nuclear-free Zone. But in the face of strong opposition from lawmakers, the US administration could not carry forward the plan. Therefore, in August 1994, the US State Department ruled out the possibility of any delivery of the

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ This was taken in April 1994.

¹¹⁵ Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 387-388.

¹¹⁶ Lee H. Hamilton (Democrat of Indiana, the then chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee). 'Bomb Scares'. *The New York Times*, (22 February 1994).

F-16 aircrafts in the face of immense Congressional pressure. David Johnson, a spokesman of the US State Department, said that ‘any release of the planes was subject to approval from Congress, which has generally opposed delivery of the jets’.¹¹⁷ Unfortunately, the US administration did stick to efforts to ease tension in the US-Pakistan relations. Looking at the economic aspect of relations between China and the United States, Clinton administration lifted sanctions imposed by the latter against the former in November 1994 for violating MTCR by transferring *M-11* missile technology from China to Pakistan. Equally concerned about Pakistan’s missile deal with North Korea, the US played a great role in the ousting of the then Pakistani premier Ms. Benazir Bhutto, as she herself stated repeatedly.¹¹⁸ According to the US reports, Dr. A.Q. Khan was the man behind close collaboration between Islamabad and Pyongyang and for this purpose he visited North Korea a number of times but the acquisition of missiles blueprints became possible when Ms. Bhutto visited Pyongyang. In return, the North Korean nuclear scientists got briefings about the nuclear devices at Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) in Pakistan. However, in the absence of concrete evidences, the US could not take any punitive measure against Pakistan or North Korea. But cautioned by the catastrophic outcomes of the missile race, the US stressed upon India and Pakistan not to deploy missiles against each other. Since January 1994, relations between India and Pakistan were facing many difficulties. Bilateral talks were suspended in the seventh round. Each side expelled diplomats and Mumbai and Karachi consulates were closed. Insurgency in Kashmir was becoming much costly for the Indian forces to overcome. Thus, India became more hostile towards Pakistan.

In early 1995, William J. Perry, the US Secretary of Defence, visited Pakistan and India and held talks with the leaders of both countries over the resumption of negotiations to reduce bilateral tension. It was a serious effort on the part of US administration to launch a peace process between India and Pakistan. He also suggested the revival of Pakistan-US Consultative Group to re-establish the military-to-military contact on security co-operation. But Pakistan stressed for the release of the F-16 aircrafts or refund the money paid for them.¹¹⁹ In other words, the US military contacts with both South Asian powers indicated the revival of US strategic

¹¹⁷ *The New York Times*, (10 August 1994).

¹¹⁸ Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan*..., p. 163.

¹¹⁹ Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan*..., pp. 389-390.

involvement in this region. India opposed any equal US treatment with Pakistan. India wanted to be given with a 'big-power status'. Recognizing the Indian role as a regional power, the US Defense Secretary William J. Perry signed an agreement to evolve a framework for expanded military contacts between India and the United States. This agreement included joint naval exercises, training exchanges and high-level consultations on military and security issues.¹²⁰ This US-India collaboration was a matter of serious concern for Pakistan. In the US perspective, Washington took this initiative to encourage Indian military growth as counterbalance to China. But for Pakistan, every step to strengthen India had a negative impact on Pakistan's security. On the other hand, China had suspicions about the warmth in the US-India military cooperation. To check Indian threat, China came more closer to Pakistan, especially in the defense and security field. China wanted to hold back India through Pakistan. To make some breakthrough in the US-Pakistan relations, Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's Prime Minister, visited the United States in April 1995. During her visit, Benazir Bhutto stressed the US administration to release the 28 F-16 fighter aircrafts that Pakistan had already paid for. She also asked for relaxation of the Pressler Amendment (1985). In a lecture at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Bhutto said, "Pakistan has honored contract with America. We want America to honor her contract with us."¹²¹ The US President Clinton candidly admitted the unjust US attitude and said, "I don't think it is right for us to keep the money and equipment. That is not right, and I am going to try to find a solution to it."¹²² He vowed to work with the US Congress to find a way to reimburse Pakistan \$1 billion paid for the US-made F-16 combat aircrafts and the military equipments but US law held that up for five years on the question of Pakistan's nuclear program. In return, he also demanded the inspection of Pakistan's nuclear installations by the US inspectors to make it sure that it was for peaceful purposes.¹²³ This demand was unacceptable to Pakistan. Before the above-mentioned visit of Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan had arrested Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf, an Islamic extremist believed to be the mastermind of the 26 February 1993 bombing of New York's World Trade Centre

¹²⁰ John F. Burns. 'After Decades of Wariness, Forces of U.S. and India Begin to Cooperate'. *The New York Times*, (11 June 1995).

¹²¹ Todd S. Purdum, 'Bhutto Renews Demands for Delivery of Jet Fighters or a Refund', *The New York Times*, (11 April 1995); and also see Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 330.

¹²² *Washington Post* (23 March 1995); and in Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 391.

¹²³ Farzana Shakoor, 'Pakistan-US Relations...', pp.23-25.

(WTC) that killed six and injured more than a thousand people. In the operation against Ramzi, the US agents were allowed to join Pakistani law enforcement agencies, which was a clear violation of the law of the land. Moreover, Ramzi had been handed over to the United States without presence of any 'extradition treaty' between US and Pakistan. It was an effort made in the hope to restore the severed ties between Pakistan and the United States. In the words of Hosain Haqqani, an aide to Ms. Bhutto, "Pakistan has been able to prove her cooperative and friendly attitude towards the United States."¹²⁴ Acting in accordance with another US demand, Ms. Bhutto had also ordered a crackdown on some of the drug barons who were blamed by the US intelligence agencies for the trafficking hundreds of tons of narcotics, especially heroin, to Europe and the United States each year. Bank accounts of the top alleged drug-barons were frozen and armed raids against them were launched even in remote inaccessible tribal areas of the North-West of Pakistan.¹²⁵ Coupled with these efforts was Ms. Bhutto's demand for US aid to eradicate the menace of terrorism. According to the *New York Times*, Ms. Bhutto appealed by saying, "You are a fair nation. You have been our ally. Help us to overcome militancy and terrorism."¹²⁶ But ironically, all these moves could not produce any soft corner in the United States for Pakistan on the release of the F-16 aircrafts. Neglecting the swift extradition of Ramzi by Pakistan, some US Senators portrayed Pakistan as a 'safe haven for terrorists'. This notion was felt by Pakistan as 'holding the victim responsible for the crime'. Senator Pressler even went on to call Pakistan a 'rogue state' and opposed any concession to Pakistan. He blamed Pakistan for holding nuclear bombs and extending tacit support to Iran on the nuclear technology and thus was indulged in nuclear proliferation. He referred to the Clinton's leniency on easing sanctions against Pakistan as an effort to undermine the NPT.¹²⁷ However, the other US legislators gave ear to these allegations and heard the visiting female Prime Minister of Pakistan more ardently. After the visit of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, a new round of hectic discussion over Senator Hank Brown's desire to ease the Pressler amendment sanctions began in earnest. Conforming to the US administration, the US Senators started pondering over easing sanctions imposed by the US against Pakistan under

¹²⁴ John F. Burns. 'Pakistan Officials Hope to Repair Ties with U.S'. *The New York Times*, (13 February 1995).

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ John F. Burns. 'Pakistan Asks for U.S. Help in Crackdown on Militants'. *The New York Times*, (22 March 1995).

¹²⁷ Larry Pressler. 'Bhutto Came, She Saw, She Conquered'. *The New York Times*, (16 April 1995).

Pressler amendment. In May 1995, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 15 to 1 to ease sanctions imposed on Pakistan. Realizing the sensitivity of this issue, Brown Amendment was passed on 21 September 1995. Clinton administration fully backed this amendment. Indian lobby and the two US senators, Larry Pressler and John Glen fought, tooth and nail to curb the passage of the Brown Amendment under the pretext of non-proliferation. The Indian lobby pleaded that this amendment would disturb the strategic equilibrium in South Asia. However, Brown carried the day. This amendment allowed economic assistance, loan guarantees by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and Export-Import Bank lending. It also provided an opportunity to Pakistan to take possession of the military equipments worth \$368 million already purchased by Pakistan but kept frozen in the United States due to the Pressler Amendment.¹²⁸ These military equipments included surface-to-surface missiles, three Orion anti-submarine aircrafts, Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, radar equipment, parts for Cobra helicopters, and parts and improved equipment for the F-16 jet bombers. Pakistan welcomed this amendment despite the fact that it was only a symbolic relief, as the ban on the US military assistance and government-to-government transfers was still there. It failed to resolve the issue of the F-16 warplanes or pave the way of meaningful cooperation between the two countries.¹²⁹ The amendment was also silent about the delivery of F-16 fighter jets or the reimbursement of the huge price paid for them. Robin Raphel, the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, also admitted that the impact of Brown amendment would be political rather than military or financial. She told a US subcommittee,

*“The key impact of the sanctions relief is not military or financial. The effect would be primarily in the political realm, creating a sense of faith restored and an unfairness rectified with a country and a people who have been loyal friends of the United States over the decades.”*¹³⁰

But the later events proved that the US did not provide any significant political support for Pakistan’s shaky system of democratic governance.¹³¹ However, Pakistani government was satisfied that at least the Clinton administration acknowledged the unfairness of the Pressler Amendment. Moreover, it removed the bar to the much-

¹²⁸ Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 392.

¹²⁹ Munir Ahmad Khan, ‘Development and Significance...’, p. 162.

¹³⁰ Elaine Sciolino. ‘Despite Nuclear Fears, Senate Acts to Lift Pakistan Curbs’, *The New York Times*, (22 September 1995).

¹³¹ Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 393.

needed economic assistance. But the Clinton administration still did not re-establish the bilateral aid program.¹³² Had the Clinton administration supported the unsteady democratic system in Pakistan, it would have provided, at least, economic support. The Clinton administration's rhetoric of 'enlarging democracy' was a slogan only. Consequently, the Brown amendment did not bear the fruit desired by Pakistan. An overview of US economic and military aid to Pakistan in FY 1995 and FY1996 is given in the Table 1.8 and 1.9 respectively. On the other hand, Clinton adopted a very lenient policy towards Pakistan's bitter rival India. Much sensitive to any nuclear development in South Asia, the US spy satellite sensed preparation for nuclear detonation on the Indian soil. But India strongly rejected the US allegations. In mid-1995, the US planned joint military exercises with India. It was a clear inclination of the US towards India, which was considered by Pakistan as detrimental to Pakistan's security and strategic interests in the region. To handle the security threat arising from India, Pakistan decided to keep her western border calm and peaceful. On the western border of Pakistan, the Taliban's advance in Afghanistan was on high peak. Therefore, Pakistan started pondering over this development in Afghanistan and soon reached a conclusion.

In 1995, officially recognizing the importance of *Taliban* in Afghanistan, Pakistan's foreign policy towards Afghan warring factions changed altogether. Pakistan explicitly recognized the Taliban as legitimate rulers of Afghanistan and the ISI started to back them both in men and material. Pakistan adopted a very pragmatic course of policy towards the Taliban. In case of benign neglect on part of Pakistan would have caused more subversion to her geo-strategic, geo-economic and geopolitical interests in the region. To reap benefits from the new developments in Afghanistan, Amir Sultan Tarar, code-named as *Colonel Imam*, of the ISI was entrusted with the task of extending active support to the victorious Taliban. He developed close relationship as an advisor with the Taliban leader Mullah Omer after being appointed as Pakistan's Counsel General in Kandahar.¹³³ This apparent change in Pakistan's 'Afghan policy' dismayed the US later on. But Pakistan rightly apprehended the mega drawback of the unending Afghan strife and had tried time and

¹³² Kux, 'US-Pakistan Relations As The Twentieth Century Ends', in Craig Baxter and Charles Kennedy (ed.), 2000, *Pakistan 2000*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-91.

¹³³ Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan...*, pp. 28-30.

Table: 1.8. US Economic and Military aid to Pakistan during FY 1995.

COUNTRY: PAKISTAN @												
(U.S. FISCAL YEARS - MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)												
-----U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS-OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS-----												
PROGRAM	MUTUAL				-----FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT-----				TOTAL FAA PERIOD	TOTAL LOANS AND GRANTS	PRINCIPAL REPAY- MENTS	OUT- STANDING LOAN BALANCES
	POST-WAR RELIEF PERIOD 1946-48	MARSHALL PLAN PERIOD 1949-52	SECURITY ACT PERIOD 1953-61	1962-91	1992	1993	1994	1995				
ECON. ASSIST.-TOTAL...	0.1	11.1	1418.7	6986.1	18.8	52.7	49.6	17.1	7124.2	7933.4	1547.6	2477.6
LOANS.....	0.1	-	476.8	3963.8	-	40.0	40.0	-	4043.8	4025.2	1547.6	2477.6
GRANTS.....	-	11.1	941.9	3022.3	18.8	12.7	9.6	17.1	3080.4	3908.2	-	-
A. USAID AND PREDECESSOR	-	10.6	935.4	4376.4	0.4	5.7	-	7.5	4389.9	4953.1	1083.7	1368.6
LOANS***.....	-	-	339.5	2371.1	-	-	-	-	2371.1	2452.3	1083.7	1368.6
GRANTS.....	-	10.6	595.9	2005.3	0.4	5.7	-	7.5	2018.8	2500.8	-	-
(SEC. SUPP. ASSIST.)... (	-)(	-)(	586.6)(	2121.6)(	0.4)(	-)(	-)(	-)(	2122.0)(	2571.2)	-	-
B. FOOD FOR PEACE.....	-	0.1	415.9	2554.6	15.0	42.8	47.1	7.1	2666.6	2845.6	463.8	1109.0
LOANS.....	-	-	137.3	1592.7	-	40.0	40.0	-	1672.7	1572.8	463.8	1109.0
GRANTS.....	-	0.1	278.6	961.9	15.0	2.8	7.1	7.1	993.9	1272.8	-	-
TITLE I-TOTAL.....	-	-	334.1	2155.5	-	40.0	40.0	-	2235.5	2332.5	463.8	1109.0
REPAY. IN \$-LOANS.....	-	-	-	1249.4	-	40.0	40.0	-	1329.4	1348.2	257.4	1090.8
PAY. IN FOR. CURR.....	-	-	334.1	906.1	-	-	-	-	906.1	984.3	206.4	18.2
TITLE II-TOTAL.....	-	0.1	81.8	399.1	15.0	2.8	7.1	7.1	431.1	513.1	-	-
E. RELIEF, EC. DEV. & WFP.	-	-	48.6	366.3	0.2	-	-	7.1	373.6	422.2	-	-
VOL. RELIEF AGENCY.....	-	0.1	33.2	32.8	14.8	2.8	7.1	-	57.5	90.9	-	-
TITLE III.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
C. OTHER ECON. ASSIST....	0.1	0.4	67.4	55.1	3.4	4.2	2.5	2.5	67.7	134.7	0.1	-
LOANS.....	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	-
GRANTS.....	-	0.4	67.4	55.1	3.4	4.2	2.5	2.5	67.7	134.6	-	-
PEACE CORPS.....	-	-	-	9.2	0.4	-	-	-	9.5	9.5	-	-
NARCOTICS.....	-	-	-	45.9	3.0	4.2	2.5	2.5	58.1	57.2	-	-
OTHER.....	-	0.4	67.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	67.8	-	-
III. MIL. ASSIST.-TOTAL...	-	-	508.2	2443.4	-	-	-	-	2443.4	2951.4	1378.0	370.6
LOANS.....	-	-	-	1748.5	-	-	-	-	1748.5	1748.5	1378.0	370.6
GRANTS.....	-	-	508.2	694.9	-	-	-	-	694.9	1202.9	-	-
A. MAP GRANTS.....	-	-	480.8	169.6	-	-	-	-	169.6	650.3	-	-
B. CREDIT FINANCING....	-	-	-	1748.5	-	-	-	-	1748.5	1748.5	1378.0	370.6
C. INTL MIL. ED. TRNG....	-	-	12.2	20.3	-	-	-	-	20.3	32.4	-	-
D. TRAN-EXCESS STOCK...	-	-	15.2	11.6	-	-	-	-	11.6	26.8	-	-
E. OTHER GRANTS.....	-	-	-	493.4	-	-	-	-	493.4	493.4	-	-
III. TOTAL ECON. & MIL....	0.1	11.1	1926.9	9429.5	18.8	52.7	49.6	17.1	9567.6	10884.8	2925.6	2848.2
LOANS.....	0.1	-	476.8	5712.3	-	40.0	40.0	-	5792.3	5773.7	2925.6	2848.2
GRANTS.....	-	11.1	1450.1	3717.2	18.8	12.7	9.6	17.1	3775.3	5111.1	-	-
OTHER US LOANS.....	-	-	12.9	443.2	-	-	-	37.5	480.7	446.7	402.4	44.3
EX-IM BANK LOANS.....	-	-	12.9	312.0	-	-	-	37.5	349.5	316.3	272.0	44.3
ALL OTHER.....	-	-	-	131.2	-	-	-	-	131.2	130.4	130.4	-

* LESS THAN \$50,000.

** VALUES IN THESE COLUMNS ARE NET OF DEOBLIGATIONS AND CANCELLATIONS.

*** INCLUDES CAPITALIZED INTEREST ON PRIOR YEAR LOANS.

@ SEE COMMENTS IN COUNTRY NOTES SECTION

SEE GENERAL NOTES-REPORTING CONCEPTS

Source: USAID Greenbook 1995.

Table: 1.9. US Economic and Military aid to Pakistan during FY 1996.

COUNTRY	PAKISTAN @	(U S FISCAL YEARS - MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)											
		--U S OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS-OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS----											
		-----FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT-----							TOTAL		TOTAL		OUT
		POST-WAR	MARSHALL	SECURITY					FAA	LOANS	PRINCIPAL	STANDING	
		RELIEF	PLAN	ACT					AND	REPAY-		LOAN	
		PERIOD	PERIOD	PERIOD					PERIOD	GRANTS	MENTS	BALANCES	
		1946-48	1949-52	1953-61	1962-92	1993	1994	1995	1996	1962-96	1946-96	1946-96	
PROGRAM		1946-48	1949-52	1953-61	1962-92	1993	1994	1995	1996	1962-96	1946-96	1946-96	
I.ECON. ASSIST.-TOTAL...		0.1	11.1	1418.7	2004.9	52.7	49.6	17.1	16.5	7140.8	7942.5	1675.4	2357.8
LOANS.....		0.1	-	476.8	3963.8	40.0	40.0	-	10.0	4053.8	4033.3	1675.4	2357.8
GRANTS.....		-	11.1	941.9	3041.1	12.7	9.6	17.1	6.5	3087.0	3909.2	-	-
A USAID AND PREDECESSOR		-	10.6	935.4	4376.8	5.7	-	7.5	-	4389.9	4947.5	1180.8	1271.5
LOANS***		-	-	339.5	2371.1	-	-	-	-	2371.1	2452.3	1180.8	1271.5
GRANTS		-	10.6	595.9	2005.7	5.7	-	7.5	-	2018.8	2495.2	-	-
(SEC SUPP ASSIST) (		-)(	-)(	586.6)(	2122.0)(	-)(	-)(	-)(	-)(	2122.0)(	2571.2)	-	-
B FOOD FOR PEACE		-	0.1	415.9	2569.6	42.8	47.1	7.1	14.0	2680.7	2857.8	494.5	1086.3
LOANS		-	-	137.3	1592.7	40.0	40.0	-	10.0	1682.7	1580.9	494.5	1086.3
GRANTS		-	0.1	278.6	976.9	2.8	7.1	7.1	4.0	998.0	1276.9	-	-
TITLE I TOTAL		-	-	334.1	2155.5	40.0	40.0	-	10.0	2245.5	2340.6	494.5	1086.3
REPAY IN \$ LOANS		-	-	-	1249.4	40.0	40.0	-	10.0	1339.4	1358.2	302.8	1055.4
PAY IN FOR CURR		-	-	334.1	906.1	-	-	-	-	906.1	982.4	191.7	30.9
TITLE II TOTAL		-	0.1	81.8	414.1	2.8	7.1	7.1	4.0	435.2	517.2	-	-
E RELIEF, EC DEV & WFP		-	-	48.6	366.5	-	-	7.1	2.8	376.4	425.0	-	-
VOL RELIEF AGENCY		-	0.1	33.2	47.6	2.8	7.1	-	1.2	58.8	92.2	-	-
TITLE III		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
C OTHER ECON ASSIST		0.1	0.4	67.4	58.5	4.2	2.5	2.5	2.5	70.2	137.2	0.1	-
LOANS		0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	-
GRANTS		-	0.4	67.4	58.5	4.2	2.5	2.5	2.5	70.2	137.1	-	-
PEACE CORPS		-	-	-	9.5	-	-	-	-	9.5	9.5	-	-
NARCOTICS		-	-	-	48.9	4.2	2.5	2.5	2.5	60.6	59.7	-	-
OTHER		-	0.4	67.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	67.8	-	-
II. MIL. ASSIST.-TOTAL...		-	-	508.2	2443.4	-	-	-	-	2443.4	2951.4	1491.6	256.9
LOANS.....		-	-	-	1748.5	-	-	-	-	1748.5	1748.5	1491.6	256.9
GRANTS.....		-	-	508.2	694.9	-	-	-	-	694.9	1202.9	-	-
A MAP GRANTS		-	-	480.8	169.6	-	-	-	-	169.6	650.3	-	-
B CREDIT FINANCING		-	-	-	1748.5	-	-	-	-	1748.5	1748.5	1491.6	256.9
C INTL MIL ED TRNG		-	-	12.2	20.3	-	-	-	-	20.3	32.4	-	-
D TRAN EXCESS STOCK		-	-	15.2	11.6	-	-	-	-	11.6	26.8	-	-
E OTHER GRANTS		-	-	-	493.4	-	-	-	-	493.4	493.4	-	-
III. TOTAL ECON. & MIL. ...		0.1	11.1	1926.9	9448.3	52.7	49.6	17.1	16.5	9584.2	10893.9	3167.0	2614.7
LOANS.....		0.1	-	476.8	5732.3	40.0	40.0	-	10.0	5802.3	5781.8	3167.0	2614.7
GRANTS.....		-	11.1	1450.1	3716.0	12.7	9.6	17.1	6.5	3781.9	5112.1	-	-
OTHER US LOANS		-	-	12.9	443.2	-	-	37.5	97.0	577.7	544.4	403.4	141.1
EX IM BANK LOANS		-	-	12.9	312.0	-	-	37.5	97.0	446.5	414.0	273.0	141.1
ALL OTHER		-	-	-	131.2	-	-	-	-	131.2	130.4	130.4	-

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SEE GENERAL NOTES-REPORTING CONCEPTS

Source: USAID Greenbook 1996.

again to bring a political settlement to this chronic problem of law and order, which had jeopardized Pakistan's strategic, economic and political interests in the region.

After the Taliban triumphs in southern part of Afghanistan, Pakistan had heightened her support to the Taliban while any active support to the former warlords including Gulbadin Hikmatyar, who was made Prime Minister of Afghanistan under Islamabad accord, was abandoned. Pakistan decided to back the Taliban movement more vigorously both in men and material¹³⁴. Thousands of students from *madrassas* (Islamic religious seminaries) near the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan took part in the struggle against anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Pakistan's ISI extended intelligence and professional support to the Taliban. This new armed-movement gained enormous fame among the masses as normalcy promptly restored and law and order in the areas held by the Taliban was ensured. Lawlessness gave way to Islamic laws, and a continuous civil war was replaced with a spectacular law and order situation at the domestic level. This restoration of peace in Afghanistan, after years of turmoil, was welcomed not only by Afghan people but also by the US administration and the press. The most significant achievement of the Taliban regime was the eradication of opium poppy in the width and breadth of Afghanistan. Upon taking some of these measures by the Taliban, the US State Department's spokesman declared, "The United States could see nothing objectionable in the steps the Taliban had taken to impose Islamic laws in the areas under their control." He also called the Taliban to "move quickly and restore order" [in remaining parts of Afghanistan] and to form "a representative interim government".¹³⁵ But having reservations about the Taliban government, the US did not recognize them as legitimate Afghan government. However, regardless the US reaction to Taliban, Pakistan supported the Taliban movement in order to establish trade, commercial and political links with countries of Central Asia and to have a peaceful neighbor on the western border.¹³⁶ Despite the fact that the Americans were reacting cautiously to the Taliban but did not lag behind in establishing close links with them. In September 1995, the capture of Herat, an important city in Afghanistan, set off a diplomatic confrontation between Pakistan and three other countries of the region i.e. Iran, the Russian Federation and India. These countries had strategic, economic and political interests in Afghanistan,

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 399.

¹³⁶ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 336-337.

which got jeopardized when the Taliban took control of 90 percent of the Afghan territory. The US strategic and economic interests were also at stake. This new trend of militancy in Afghanistan and their strict outlook about running the affairs of the state gave rise to a new 'Great Game'. The US intelligence agencies reported that Russia and India were helping to arm and finance Rabbani group.¹³⁷ Later on, Iran adopted the same course. The US used to mend fences with the Taliban to exploit the Afghan soil. Therefore, in October 1995, the US Ambassador John C. Monjo also traveled to Afghanistan along with a convoy of trucks led by Pakistan's Interior Minister Nasir Ullah Babar.¹³⁸ This initial applause was due to the marvelous achievement in putting an end to the civil war in Afghanistan and the establishment of peace, which were the prerequisites to materialize the large gas-pipeline project that was aimed at transporting oil from Turkmenistan, a Central Asian republic, through Afghanistan to India and Pakistan. This was to be completed by a US-led consortium called Union Oil Company of California (UNOCAL). For this purpose, the UNOCAL had provided some money to the Taliban movement.¹³⁹ The same company was financing a University of Nebraska program to train Afghan workers and teachers in regions controlled by both sides. An Argentine oil company called BRIDAS Corporation, and a UNOCAL's business-rival, with its own plans for an Afghan pipeline, started investment in Afghanistan to get support from both the northern alliance and the Taliban leaders.¹⁴⁰ Before the seizure of Kabul by Taliban, even the US administration was optimistic that the Taliban would not allow Afghanistan to be the breeding ground for terrorism and narcotics trafficking.¹⁴¹ The Taliban had assured so publicly. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) was much concerned about instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially after the Soviet pull back. It was feared in the CENTCOM that instability in these two countries would not remain confined to their borders but extend far beyond the Central Asia. The instability in Afghanistan had already checkmated all the efforts to open routes to Central Asia. Therefore, in early stages US-CENTCOM was hopeful that Taliban would bring some

¹³⁷ John F. Burns, 'Islamic Rebels Renew a Siege to Win Kabul'. *The New York Times*, (16 October 1995).

¹³⁸ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 334-335; Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 398.

¹³⁹ Larry Goodson, 'Foreign Policy Gone Awry: The Kalashnikovization and Talibanization of Pakistan', in Craig Baxter and Charles H. Kennedy (ed.) (2000), *Pakistan 2000*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 168.

¹⁴⁰ James Risen, 'Russians Are Back...'.
¹⁴¹ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 337.

stability to Afghanistan.¹⁴² In 1996, Kabul fell like a ripen fruit in the lap of the Taliban just after a brief battle. After establishing firm hold over Kabul and major chunk of Afghanistan, the Taliban abandoned girls' schools, women were to be confined to their houses, adulterators were stoned and stripped publicly. Pakistan's support to the Taliban was equally disliked by the United States. Although most of the Taliban like Islamic rules enforced in the Saudi Arabia were not abhorrent to the US but the same rules regarding women were indigestible for the US in Afghanistan. Therefore, when the Taliban implemented their policies regarding women and their education, the US policy underwent a drastic change and a senior US official told the *New York Times*, "The last thing we wanted to do was to dispel this total misperception that we were recognizing and embracing the Taliban".¹⁴³ Distressed by these steps, the US considered the Taliban as violators of Human Rights. The US administration and the media expressed dissatisfaction over some measures taken by the Taliban after the seizure of Kabul (the Afghan capital). One of these disquieting measures of the Taliban was the execution of Dr. Najibullah, the former communist President of Afghanistan who had taken refuge in the UN compound in Kabul after ouster as President in 1992. For the Americans, the second unsettling step of the Taliban government was the enforcement of Islamic Sharia in Afghanistan. But Pakistan's support for the Taliban was motivated by the desire to have a calm and peaceful Afghanistan on her eastern border and a friendly regime in Kabul that could ensure her a "strategic depth" vis-à-vis India.¹⁴⁴ This pro-Taliban policy of Pakistan caused friction not only with the United States but also created a cleavage in relations with Iran, the Central Asian Republics, and even China. The Taliban were considered by all these countries as potential threat to the Central Asian region. Worried by their militant approach, they were supposed to have the ability to topple the governments of the Central Asia. The US viewed the Taliban as exporters of terrorism abroad. Western media played a greater role in portraying a negative image of the Taliban. The Taliban policies regarding women, education, *jihad* (holy war) and enforcement of strict Islamic penal code were severely criticized by the United States, all Western countries, Russian Federation, and some Muslim countries. Even Turkey was seeking

¹⁴² Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, p. 62.

¹⁴³ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 336; Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 399.

¹⁴⁴ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 341; Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 405.

to have influence in war-torn Afghanistan.¹⁴⁵ Being the staunch supporter of secularism, the Turkish government wanted to support the secular forces in Afghanistan. Secular Turkey was anxious about any 'fundamentalist' movement anywhere in the Islamic world.¹⁴⁶ The United States had adopted a policy of benign neglect towards Afghan warring groups in the aftermath of Soviet withdrawal but did not let the US interests out of hand. Clinton administration had an eye over all the players especially the Russian Federation and China. Asserting her prominence in Central Asia, the Russian Federation actively supported the former Soviet detractors, the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan headed by Burhanud Din Rabbani. By 1996, Russia succeeded in building a new bridge over *Amu* River in Afghanistan. This bridge could provide access to the Russian Army convoys from Tajikistan into northern Afghanistan without passing through Uzbek-controlled city, Mazari Sharif. By 1996, twenty thousand Russian troops were stationed on border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan to check any Taliban influence. Pakistan's next-door neighbor, Iran, entered into a close strategic partnership with the Russians due to three geo-strategic concerns. *First*, both of them resented any possible US access to the oil-rich Caspian basin through the US oil companies. *Second*, both Russia and Iran were interested in providing outlet to the oil and gas resources of Central Asian countries through the Russian and Iranian territory only.¹⁴⁷ *Third*, both wanted to keep the Taliban influence away from their borders and the newly independent Central Asian republics. Worrying about the US hegemonic role at the global level, Russia wanted to counterweight the former by having strategic control over the energy resources of Caspian Basin.¹⁴⁸ In future, any US dominance over the Central Asia could undermine the geopolitical interests of Russia. Besides the Russian Federation, the US was considered by many countries of the region as a potential threat to their economic interests in the region. These countries thought that the Pakistan-backed Taliban could bring the US companies to the doorsteps of Central Asian energy resources. Iran also practiced the fundamentalist Islamic rules but was totally opposed to the fundamentalist policies of the Taliban regime in the neighborhood because of sectarian grounds along with economic and political ones. Being the followers of *Shia*

¹⁴⁵ Shahid M. Amin, 2004, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 104-105.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 131.

¹⁴⁷ James Risen, 'Russians Are Back in...'

¹⁴⁸ Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, p. 91.

sect, Iranian leadership could not afford the Taliban, the followers of *Sunni* school of thought. Thus, the convergence of strategic objectives forged an alliance among Russia, Iran and India. In this alliance, the 'fundamentalist' Iran was most vocal and active against the 'fundamentalist' Taliban. On the other hand, the Benazir-led secular and ultra-liberal government in Pakistan was supporting the 'fundamentalist' Taliban regime both in men and material. This indicated that the war on Afghan soil was backed by the external forces not because of ideological zeal but for secular national interests of their own nations. Fuel was provided by the outsiders but victims were the natives. To check the Taliban influence, Russia provided heavy weapons, training and logistic support to the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan. Iran supplied arms, fuel and other resources to the anti-Taliban alliance in Afghanistan. India also did not lag behind. Russian and Indian technicians upgraded Kabul's Bagram airport, which was under the command of Ahmad Shah Massud. It was an alarming move for Pakistan as any Indian involvement through Russians in Afghanistan was detrimental to Pakistan's interests. However, despite all these supports, the Northern Alliance could not rebuff the robust Taliban advance. Pakistan had also extended recognition to the Taliban government because of the fact that they controlled more than two-third of the territory of Afghanistan. Later on, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) also recognized the Taliban as legitimate government of Afghanistan. But no other state or organization treated them as lawful. The policies of Taliban regime in Afghanistan had a drastic impact on the politics and society of Pakistan, especially in the north-western tribal belt that borders Afghanistan as the Taliban shared common ethnic bonds with the people of that belt. The United States was in constant fear of spillover of these changes into other countries of the region. Prompted by the US and European interests, the successive US administrations were exerting pressure on Pakistan to make the Taliban rollback their policies. Thus, Pakistan's support to the Taliban was one of the causes of friction in US-Pakistan relations. However, the Taliban were not the only cause to be assigned to this strained course of relations. Pakistan-China relations were also annoying the United States.

In February 1996, frictions between US and Pakistan grew further when the US administration alleged China for the transfer of Ring-magnets to Pakistan in the year 1995.¹⁴⁹ It was alleged that Pakistan could use these magnets in the enrichment

¹⁴⁹ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 332-333.

of Uranium for nuclear weapons. Both Pakistan and China rejected the allegation but they could not satisfy the Americans. Despite all the US concerns, 'giving up' the nuclear option was not affordable for Pakistan as the India-Pakistan tension was running high over the insurgent movement in Kashmir. Looking at the tension between Pakistan and India, it seemed that the Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union had ended but South Asia was still entangled in the Cold War like paradigm. Therefore, in the wake of cutoff of all US aid in 1991, Pakistan constantly looked towards China for meeting her security needs.

In 1996, an important development took place at the regional level. The induction of the BJP government in India alarmed both Pakistan and the United States.¹⁵⁰ To avoid any nuclear conflict in South Asia, the US was striving hard to keep tensions between India and Pakistan far from exploding. A nuclear combat between these two bitter foes was not affordable for the US economic and strategic interests in fast growing India. The American corporate interest and the US objective to contain China prompted the Clinton administration to ensure stability in this region of high potential, especially in the face of nuclear challenge. Fretted by the nuclear ambitions of the newly inducted government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee in India, Clinton administration intensified diplomatic efforts to check any showdown of power on the Indian sub-continent. Contrary to Pakistan's perceptions about India, the Vajpayee-led nationalist Indian government offered an olive branch to the former. Thus, the new Indian government and Clinton administration enjoyed a meeting of minds. But the US-Pakistan relations were still strained due to a number of factors like the nuclear issue, Pakistan's support for the Taliban,¹⁵¹ the alleged Pakistani support to the Kashmir insurgents, the presence of Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan and, to some extent, the human rights issue. The much-criticized missile deal between China and Pakistan was necessarily a part of these irritants. To check nuclear proliferation, the US did all her best to persuade India and Pakistan to sign CTBT but the refusal of India and reservations of Pakistan hindered the coming into effect of the treaty. The US assertion for signature on CTBT suffered great setback at home when the US Senate rejected the treaty and declined to ratify it. Already dismayed over the *M-11*

¹⁵⁰ Baharthia National Party (BJP) was an ultra nationalist party of India that had a strong Hindu nationalist outlook. It was looked as an anti-Pakistan party. Its leaders were determined to make India as sixth declared nuclear power of the world. During election campaign, in 1996, its leaders had pledged to explode nuclear devices after coming into power.

¹⁵¹ Kux, 'A Rider on the Roller Coaster...', pp. 306.

missile deal between China and Pakistan, the US got much irritated by China's announcement of the installation of a second power plant in Pakistan in December 1996.¹⁵² This new development in the field of defense collaboration raised eyebrows in Washington. The dubious defense and nuclear ties between China and Pakistan dominated the US-Pakistan relations throughout 1990s. While, on the one hand, the Clinton administration was hesitant to impose sanctions against China and Pakistan, the US Congress was not ready to give any concession to these countries over the transfer of nuclear or missile technology, on the other hand. This dilemma persisted throughout 1996 and the subsequent years.

In February 1997, a newly elected government came into power in Pakistan. Conservative Nawaz Sharif became Prime Minister of Pakistan after the ouster of Benazir Bhutto in November 1996. On the other hand, in the United States, President Bill Clinton retained his office for a second term following the November 1996 US Presidential elections. The US President inducted a new foreign policy team that revisited the US policy towards South Asia and focused more on broadening relations with Pakistan and India and placed less emphasis on the non-proliferation efforts.¹⁵³ Former US ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline K. Albright, was appointed as the new US Secretary of State. Thomas Pickering was inducted as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Karl Inderfurth succeeded Robin Raphel as US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia. This new team of foreign policy decided a departure from neglect and resorted to focus on South Asia, especially the Indian subcontinent. Reflecting this mindset, Thomas Pickering declared, "We want to show that we don't consider South Asia the backside of the diplomatic globe."¹⁵⁴ To prove this claim a series of high-level trips were chalked out. Still Pakistan was not treated on equal footing with India that distressed the former. Hence, a trust deficit came forth in relation between the one time closed strategic partners of the Cold War era. The US high officials were also fully aware of this fact. In the words of Karl Inderfurth, Clinton's Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, the great missing ingredient with the US-Pakistan relationship was trust.¹⁵⁵ To further fan the flames of tension, the long halted delivery of the F-16 aircrafts was further suspended, as Indonesia could not purchase the US-held F-16 fighter jets due to the collapse of

¹⁵² *The New York Times* (6 December 1996).

¹⁵³ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 339-340.

¹⁵⁴ Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 403-404.

¹⁵⁵ Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, p. 265.

Indonesian economy. It was decided by Clinton administration that the price incurred from the sale of F-16 jets to Indonesia would be given to Pakistan as a reimbursement of price already paid by Pakistan. To boost the defense capabilities, Pakistan was persistently asking for the release of F-16 aircrafts or payback of the price. Clinton administration was making promises but not keeping the words. Thus, despite the passage of Brown Amendments, the F-16 aircrafts' deal showed no advance as the Clinton administration did not demonstrate any specific interest in honoring the pledge to sell the aircrafts to a third party to payback to Pakistan. Meanwhile, Sharif government in Pakistan left no stone unturned to get the US favor. In an effort to induce the US administration to ease sanctions, Pakistani government indicated to take up the issue of repayment of \$650, paid by Pakistan for the purchase of the F-16 fighter aircrafts, in the American courts. It was also disclosed that Pakistan intended to bring the lawsuit in the United States and not in the international courts in view of Washington's habit of disregarding rulings of international court.¹⁵⁶ At one time, Pakistan even tried to use Russia to obtain the stalled F-16 American aircrafts and asked Russia to strike a deal of SU27 fighter aircrafts, as a substitute for the F-16 jets, with Pakistan. But Russia declined to make such a deal.¹⁵⁷ However, in the hope of lifting sanctions and repealing the Pressler Amendment, Pakistan kept on trying to convince the United States. To win the US goodwill, many a times the Pakistani governments had been violating the law of the land. For instance, in June 1997, the arrest and extradition of Mir Aimal Kansi from Pakistan was a rare example of the efforts to illegally appease the United States. Mir Aimal Kansi was a Pakistani citizen who was alleged for killing of two employees of CIA in Virginia.¹⁵⁸ He was apprehended by the American law enforcement agencies from Dera Ghazi Khan, the native town of the then Pakistani President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari. Then, he was handed over to FBI officials in Pakistan without going through the legal proceedings. The arrest of Mr. Kansi was brought into the notice of Pakistani Prime Minister by Madeline Albright, the US Secretary of State, through phone while he was on a foreign tour. Ms. Albright also told the Prime Minister that this matter should not come up in the press.¹⁵⁹ Further, it was also at the expense of the law of the

¹⁵⁶ *The New York Times* (24 May 1997)

¹⁵⁷ Gohar Ayub Khan, 2009, *Testing Time As Foreign Minister*. Islamabad: Dost Publications. pp. 31-32.

¹⁵⁸ Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 404.

¹⁵⁹ Gohar Ayub Khan, *Testing Time...*, p. 52.

land when Pakistani officials extradited him to the United States without fulfilling legal requirements in Pakistan. It is also noteworthy that there was no extradition treaty between Pakistan and the United States. But just like earlier, this free hand to the American operations on Pakistani soil could not change the US approach towards Pakistan. Moreover, such an action was rebuffed by the US authorities when asked by Pakistan for the handing over of a Pakistani air force officer, who was arrested by the US authorities on charges of drug trafficking. However, this extrajudicial act stirred domestic criticism in Pakistan. Referring to these contradictory perceptions, *The Nation*, an English daily in Pakistan, wrote that the United States “rarely acts to circumvent its own laws, but expects others to waive and ignore theirs.”¹⁶⁰ Ignoring the domestic criticism, Pakistani government worked unabatedly to get US military help that was needed by the former to augment her defense capability vis-à-vis India and to urge the latter to help in resolving the longstanding Kashmir dispute. But all in vain. Table 1.10 shows the plight of the US economic and military aid to Pakistan in 1997 while chart 5 and Table 1.11 illustrates the trade relation between them. Contrary to the Pakistani efforts to urge the US to mediate on Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, the US branded a Kashmiri militant group *Harkatul Ansar* as a terrorist outfit operating in the Indian-held Kashmir. Similarly, unlike Raphel, who had an inclination towards Pakistan, her successor Karl Inderfurth, unequivocally declared that the US had no intention to become directly involved in the Kashmir dispute and urged both Pakistan and India to resolve their differences through bilateral talks. This was an endorsement of the Indian stance over Kashmir as a bilateral dispute between the two countries.¹⁶¹

In 1997, the US President, in his meeting with Pakistani Premier during the UN General Assembly session, stressed upon bilateral talks between Pakistan and India and expressed his desire to visit South Asia. Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif was already determined to restart the stalled peace process with the stubborn neighbor of Pakistan, India. In a greeting message to his Indian counterpart, Pakistani premier emphasized on the resumption of talks.¹⁶² Indian government responded positively. In February 1997, Nawaz Sharif proposed a meeting of the foreign secretaries of Pakistan and India. The proposed meeting was promised to be held

¹⁶⁰ John F. Burns. ‘Spiriting off of Fugitive by U. S. Irks Pakistanis’. *The New York Times* (23 June 1997).

¹⁶¹ Kux, ‘U.S.-Pakistan Relations ...’, p. 93.

¹⁶² Thornton, ‘A Long Way to Lahore...’, pp. 67-68.

Table: 1.10. US Economic and Military aid to Pakistan during FY 1997.

COUNTRY PAKISTAN @	(U S FISCAL YEARS MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)												
	- U S OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS-OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS--												
	MUTUAL				FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT -				TOTAL		TOTAL		OUT- STANDING LOAN BALANCES
	POST-WAR RELIEF PERIOD 1946 48	MARSHALL PLAN PERIOD 1949-52	SECURITY ACT PERIOD 1953-61	1962 93	PERIOD 1994	1995	1996	1997	FAA PERIOD 1962-97	1962-97	LOANS AND GRANTS 1946 97	PRINCIPAL REPAY- MENTS 1946-97	
PROGRAM	1946 48	1949-52	1953-61	1962 93	1994	1995	1996	1997	1962-97	1962-97	1946 97	1946-97	1946-97
I.ECON. ASSIST. TOTAL	0.1	11.1	1418.7	7057.5	49.6	17.1	16.5	42.3	7183.1	7983.0	1791.6	2274.8	**
LOANS.....	0.1	-	476.8	4003.8	40.0	-	10.0	35.0	4088.8	4066.5	1791.6	2274.8	**
GRANTS.....	-	11.1	941.9	3053.7	9.6	17.1	6.5	7.3	3094.3	3916.5	-	-	*
A USAID AND PREDECESSOR LOANS***	-	10.6	935.4	4382.4	-	7.5	-	-	4389.9	4947.5	1258.2	1194.0	
GRANTS	-	-	339.5	2371.1	-	-	-	-	2371.1	2452.3	1258.2	1194.0	
(SEC SUPP ASSIST) (	(	(	586.6)	2122.0)	(	(	(	(	2018.8	2495.2	-	-	
B FOOD FOR PEACE	-	0.1	415.9	2612.4	47.1	7.1	14.0	39.8	2720.5	2895.8	533.3	1080.8	
LOANS	-	-	137.3	1632.7	40.0	-	10.0	35.0	1717.7	1614.1	533.3	1080.8	
GRANTS	-	0.1	278.6	979.7	7.1	7.1	4.0	4.8	1002.8	1281.7	-	-	
TITLE I TOTAL	-	-	334.1	2195.5	40.0	-	10.0	35.0	2280.5	2373.8	533.3	1080.8	
REPAY IN \$ LOANS	-	-	-	1289.4	40.0	-	10.0	35.0	1374.4	1393.2	334.6	1058.6	
PAY IN FOR CURR	-	-	334.1	906.1	-	-	-	-	906.1	980.6	198.7	22.2	
TITLE II TOTAL	-	0.1	81.8	416.9	7.1	7.1	4.0	4.8	440.0	522.0	-	-	
E RELIEF, EC DEV & WFP	-	-	48.6	366.5	-	7.1	2.8	4.8	381.2	429.8	-	-	
VOL RELIEF AGENCY	-	0.1	33.2	50.4	7.1	-	1.2	-	58.8	92.2	-	-	
TITLE III	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
C OTHER ECON ASSIST	0.1	0.4	67.4	62.7	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	72.7	139.7	0.1	-	
LOANS	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	-	
GRANTS	-	0.4	67.4	62.7	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	72.7	139.6	-	-	
PEACE CORPS	-	-	-	9.5	-	-	-	-	9.5	9.5	-	-	
NARCOTICS	-	-	-	53.1	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	63.1	62.2	-	-	
OTHER	-	0.4	67.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	67.8	-	-	
II MIL. ASSIST. TOTAL	-	-	508.2	2443.4	-	-	-	-	2443.4	2951.4	1586.7	161.8	
LOANS.....	-	-	-	1748.5	-	-	-	-	1748.5	1748.5	1586.7	161.8	
GRANTS, ...	-	-	508.2	694.9	-	-	-	-	694.9	1202.9	-	-	
A MAP GRANTS	-	-	480.8	169.6	-	-	-	-	169.6	650.3	-	-	
B CREDIT FINANCING	-	-	-	1748.5	-	-	-	-	1748.5	1748.5	1586.7	161.8	
C INTL MIL ED TRNG	-	-	12.2	20.3	-	-	-	-	20.3	32.4	-	-	
D TRAN EXCESS STOCK	-	-	15.2	11.6	-	-	-	-	11.6	26.8	-	-	
E OTHER GRANTS	-	-	-	493.4	-	-	-	-	493.4	493.4	-	-	
III. TOTAL ECON. & MIL	0.1	11.1	1926.9	9500.9	49.6	17.1	16.5	42.3	9626.5	10934.4	3378.3	2436.6	
LOANS.....	0.1	-	476.8	5752.3	40.0	-	10.0	35.0	5837.3	5815.0	3378.3	2436.6	
GRANTS	-	11.1	1450.1	3748.6	9.6	17.1	6.5	7.3	3789.2	5119.4	-	-	
OTHER US LOANS	-	-	12.9	443.2	-	37.5	97.0	-	577.7	544.4	408.2	137.2	
EX IM BANK LOANS	-	-	12.9	312.0	-	37.5	97.0	-	446.5	414.0	277.8	137.2	
ALL OTHER	-	-	-	131.2	-	-	-	-	131.2	130.4	130.4	-	

* LESS THAN \$50,000

** VALUES IN THESE COLUMNS ARE NET OF DEOBLIGATIONS AND CANCELLATIONS


*** INCLUDES CAPITALIZED INTEREST ON PRIOR YEAR LOANS

@ SEE COMMENTS IN COUNTRY NOTES SECTION
SEE GENERAL NOTES-REPORTING CONCEPTS

Source: USAID Greenbook 1997.

US Trade with Pakistan: FY 1997

Chart. 5



Source: Chart compiled on the basis of data given in the table 1.11

Table: 1.11

NOTE: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars, and not seasonally adjusted unless otherwise specified.

Month	Exports	Imports	Balance
January 1997	154.2	100.8	53.4
February 1997	85.7	108.2	-22.5
March 1997	170.7	96.5	74.2
April 1997	74.0	108.0	-34.0
May 1997	69.1	111.5	-42.4
June 1997	103.9	110.3	-6.4
July 1997	60.4	138.8	-78.4
August 1997	95.7	137.0	-41.3
September 1997	139.4	144.5	-5.1
October 1997	98.5	135.4	-36.9
November 1997	79.5	117.7	-38.2
December 1997	108.9	133.5	-24.6
TOTAL	1,240.0	1,442.2	-202.2

SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division, Data Dissemination Branch, Washington, D.C. 20233

in May 1997. Thus, Pakistan tried to engage India through dialogue. Both sides expressed readiness to move forward and this was a positive development. But ironically, the Prime Minister H. D. Deve Gowda's government in India was overthrown in April 1997. Inder Kumar Gujral assumed office of the Prime Minister in India. Sticking to the already adopted conciliatory approach towards India, Nawaz Sharif sent a message to his new Indian counterpart. In May 1997, a meeting between Inder Kumar Gujral, the then Prime Minister of India and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif took place in Male, the capital of Maldives, on the sidelines of the summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). They agreed to continue bilateral talks and decided to establish a hotline between them. They also consented that meeting at the foreign secretary level would take place to chalk out framework for bilateral negotiations. However, the Indian Prime Minister expressed his inefficiency to make a bold shift in the Indian stance regarding Kashmir.¹⁶³ Materializing the pledge made by prime ministers of both India and Pakistan, a meeting of the foreign secretaries took place.¹⁶⁴ Both sides agreed to launch a composite dialogue on all bilateral issues including Kashmir. During the meeting, an eight point agenda was agreed upon which included the core issue of Kashmir.¹⁶⁵ For the first time since 1947, the Kashmir issue was recognized as a 'core issue' and the tension in Pakistan-India relations was identified as a main reason of the lack of economic cooperation between these two nations. However, returning to New Delhi, the Indian Foreign Secretary reneged on the agreed stance on Kashmir.¹⁶⁶ But the process of bilateral talks went on. There came some discrepancies in negotiations but they were overcome. All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), an umbrella organization of all anti-India political parties in the Indian-held Kashmir, called for inclusion of Kashmiri leaders in the negotiation process.¹⁶⁷ Though Kashmiri leaders were not included at any stage in the peace process, the negotiations were heading on over Kashmir.

In September 1997, after a meeting with President Clinton, Pakistani Prime Minister invited India to hold bilateral talks on a "non-aggression pact", between the

¹⁶³ Abdul Sattar, 2007, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: 1947-2005*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 229.

¹⁶⁴ The meeting of foreign ministers of Pakistan and India held on 23 June 1997.

¹⁶⁵ Interview of Shamshad Ahmad Khan, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, published in *Jang Sunday* (Magazine), Karachi (Pakistan), (dated 22-28 February 2009). p. 2-4.

¹⁶⁶ Gohar Ayub Khan, *Testing Time...*, p. 11.

¹⁶⁷ Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, p. 229.

two countries that had fought thrice in a short history of fifty years. But India did not respond positively. However, the prime ministers of Pakistan and India met on the sidelines of the UN summit and renewed the determination to cling to the peace process initiated three months ago at the foreign secretary level. Later on, exchange of firing between armies of both countries and expulsion of diplomats in the subsequent months halted the peace process. The relations became more tense than before and alarmed the world capitals including Washington.

Nonetheless, the US interest in South Asia had obviously increased due to the fear of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. To show that the United States was getting back in the South Asian game, the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited South Asia in November 1997. But ironically the killing of five employees of Union Texas Petroleum (USA) in Karachi, just a week before her arrival in Pakistan, raised questions about the security of US citizens in Pakistan. Albright was equally concerned about Afghanistan. The strict policies of the Taliban about women, the presence of Osama bin Laden, and the terrorist's training camps on the Afghan territory were quite enough to make the US administration anxious. To address these issues, the US turned to Pakistan and three senior US State Department officials were sent to Islamabad.¹⁶⁸ They put enormous pressure over Pakistan to use her influence to mould the stern policies of the Taliban, to expel or apprehend Bin Laden from the Afghan territory, and to force the Taliban to shut down all the terrorist camps in Afghanistan. To pool up social support from Afghan population, Ms. Albright visited an Afghan refugees camp in Pakistan and told them, "We're opposed to their [the Taliban] approach on human rights. We're opposed to their despicable treatment of women and children and their lack of respect for human dignity."¹⁶⁹ For this purpose the so-called Contact Group on Afghanistan had been formed. But, at the very moment of Albright's visit to Pakistan, the country was passing through a political crisis. Pakistan was celebrating 50th anniversary of independence amid unceasing political instability and gloomy state of law and order. Desperate Pakistani efforts to reengage the US, with the same warmth as was there during 1980s, proved counterproductive. The US Secretary of State was aware of the fact that losing

¹⁶⁸ This three member high-level delegation comprised the Assistant Secretary of State for Asia, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright herself. They visited Pakistan at the end of 1997.

¹⁶⁹ Kux, 'U.S.-Pakistan Relations...', p. 94.

contacts with the Pakistan army was not in the strategic interest of the US¹⁷⁰ but she did nothing in this context. Referring to the whispers that Pakistan is a 'failed state', Prime Minister of Pakistan told, "In 50 years we've had our ups and downs like any other nation in the world. "We've been off track, but we're on track now, and dealing with our problems." Further, he went on to say, "Of course, the enemies of Pakistan try to present us as a failed state, but we are not a failed state. We are much better than we were 20, 30, or 40 years ago."¹⁷¹ In the beginning of 1997, the UN Secretary General was keen to impose oil embargo against the Taliban but Pakistan's diplomacy succeeded in averting this embargo.¹⁷² The whole region including the Russian Federation, the major stakeholder in the Central Asian region, was worried about the spread of Taliban ideology and they were looking towards Pakistan as the sole patron of them who can influence them in any way. Primakov, the Russian Foreign Minister, expressed deep concern about the Taliban during a meeting with his Pakistani counterpart in July 1997. He identified the Taliban movement as more threatening to the Russian interests than the Iranian revolution of 1979. He viewed them as a strong destabilizing catalyst for the Russian underbelly.¹⁷³ Although Pakistan was not indifferent to such Russian perception. But even the US concerns were overlooked by Pakistani strategists and policymakers as the Taliban were not bowing before the Pakistani tunes. They had their own way of thinking as proved in the aftermath of horrific incidence 9/11. However, ironically, in the future the Taliban proved the main troublemakers in the US-Pakistan relations.

In late 1997, a new dispute between Pakistani and the US officials arose, when Pakistani law enforcement agencies arrested Ayaz Baluch, a Pakistani national and an employee of the American Drugs Enforcement Administration in Islamabad. He had trapped two Pakistani air force officers suspected of drugs smuggling. These two pilots were tempted to smuggle heroin worth of US \$160000. Then, these pilots were arrested by the US Drugs enforcement officials. Corrupt officers in Pakistan's powerful armed forces were warned, by the US, for involvement in this crime. Being embarrassed over this deceitful act of Ayaz Baluch, Pakistani authorities arrested Baluch for seducing the Pakistani air force officers to commit the crime. After trial in a military court, Baluch was convicted and sentenced to 10 years' hard labor for

¹⁷⁰ Gohar Ayub Khan, *Testing Time...*, p. 12.

¹⁷¹ John F. Burns, 'Premier Says Pakistan is at Last on Track', *The New York Times* (15 August 1997).

¹⁷² Gohar Ayub Khan, *Testing Time...*, p. 12.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

‘seducing’ the Pakistani air force officers. The US officials held Pakistan’s officers for sabotaging the US efforts to curb drugs’ smuggling. They even doubted the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif for having no control over these drug-pusher officers in armed forces. A senior officer in Clinton’s administration was quoted as saying: “There are questions here about human rights, there are questions about corruption, and there are questions about whether the government is doing anything to fight drug trafficking.”¹⁷⁴ Pakistan strongly denied the allegations and backed over the US Drug Enforcement Administration. Accordingly, Baluch’s case further injected acrimony into the difficult US-Pakistan relations. The United States pressed Pakistan to pardon Baluch and to allow him to immigrate to the United States along with his family. Baluch was put behind the bars for five years but then he was set free and allowed to migrate to the US along with his family. Meanwhile, the US officials enraged over Pakistani government’s action against the power projects that were started by foreign investors including the Americans. These projects were allowed by Benazir-led Pakistani government after signing contracts. But Nawaz Sharif’s government moved against them by leveling charges of corruption in these deals. Reacting to this problem, the US officials made it clear to Pakistan that the latter could not expect any future investment by the US if the power projects disputes were not satisfactorily resolved.¹⁷⁵ Thus, without providing any room to Pakistan’s interests, the US wanted relation on her own terms.

The US administration was fully aware of the simmering tensions in South Asia over the India-Russia collaboration to build sea-launched ballistic missiles, the *Sagarika*, for India. The *Sagarika* missile had a range of nearly 200 miles and was meant to be launched from submerged submarines. This missile was a fitful Indian step to develop a nuclear-powered submarine.¹⁷⁶ Despite the intelligence reports, the meaningful connivance of the US administration was spreading suspicions in Pakistan. But the US was not giving heed to Pakistan’s security concerns. On the other hand, the US apathy to the *M-11* missiles deal between China and Pakistan was already pinching Americans in their shoes. Adding fuel to the fire another missile deal was sensed by the US intelligence agencies. In April 1998, Pakistan was again alleged

¹⁷⁴ Tim Golden. ‘Pakistan’s Jailing of a Drug Agent Sours U.S. Ties’, *The New York Times*, (17 November 1997).

¹⁷⁵ Kux, ‘U.S.-Pakistan Relations...’, pp. 94-95.

¹⁷⁶ Steven Lee Myers, ‘Russia is Helping India Extend Range of Missile, U.S. Aides Say’, *The New York Times* (27 April 1998).

for the violation of MTCR and importing missiles from North Korea. This time North Korea and not China was alleged along with Pakistan for the transfer of missile technology by Pyongyang to Kahuta (Pakistan). These allegations were leveled when Pakistan launched an indigenously built missile, the *Ghauri*, on 6 April 1998. The *Ghauri*¹⁷⁷ was a medium range missile with a range of nine hundred kilometers having a capacity of carrying a 1300 kilograms nuclear warhead. Pakistan denied the US allegations of any such deal and declared that these missiles were the product of Pakistani scientists. This missile gave Pakistan with a credible deterrence against Indian missiles. However, the US asserted that the missile was a modified version of North Korean *Nodong* missile and imposed some sanctions against North Korea as well as Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in Kahuta, Pakistan.¹⁷⁸ These sanctions had merely a symbolic effect. Despite the US sanctions, a missile race had set out which had exacerbated the fear of a nuclear combat and missile race in South Asia. But for the US intelligence, Pakistan-North Korea collusion in the field of nuclear technology became another headache. Alarmed by the presence of North Korean counselor on the spot of Pakistan's nuclear tests at *Chaghai* in May 1998, the US intelligence agencies feared that the counselor was more than a passive observer. In a meeting at White House, senior US officials were given the task to get behind the North Korean operation and focus on Dr. A.Q. Khan's links with the Korean nuclear program. In 1997, the British intelligence agency *MI6* had detected the shipment of *maraging* steel on a British Airways flight from Moscow en route to the North Korean embassy in Islamabad. *MI6* officials discovered that this deal was made by North Korean embassy with the All-Russian Institute of Light Alloy in Moscow, on behalf of Pakistan. On the basis of information provided by *MI6*, the CIA redoubled her efforts to find out concrete evidences against the North Korean-Pakistan collusion in the uranium enrichment beside missile technology.¹⁷⁹ However, despite all the hectic efforts, the CIA failed in identifying the place where the uranium enrichment plant was installed in Pyongyang with the active technological support of Pakistan. To step up pressure on Pakistan, a US-Pakistan expert group was established at the assistant secretary level. Meetings of this group were held twice a year since 1998. In March

¹⁷⁷ The *Ghauri* missile was a Pakistan-made missile named after the great Muslim conqueror Shahabud Din Mohammad Ghauri, who defeated Prithvi Raj, a Hindu ruler of India in the twelfth century. This name was given to the Pakistani missile because it was tested against the Indian missile named *Prithvi*, after Prithvi Raj. The *Prithvi* was also capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.

¹⁷⁸ Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 343.

¹⁷⁹ Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, pp. 277-279.

1999, when the nuclear inspectors visited North Korea as a result of an agreement between North Korea and the US, they found nothing more than hollowed caverns. The issue of Pakistan's connection with North Korean nuclear program was raised in Strobe Talbott's meetings with Pakistani officials and even in summit between President Clinton and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Caving into the US pressure, Pakistan's military asked Dr. A.Q. Khan to move out of limelight.¹⁸⁰

Conclusion:

In the post-Cold War perspective, the nuclear non-proliferation had become a linchpin of the US foreign policy and the successive US administrations were keen to halt the transfer of any nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles to the developing world. In this context, the nuclear proliferation and the missile technology got from China were sufficient factors to mar the US-Pakistan relations for a long time since the beginning of 1990s. Hence, in the decade after the collapse of Soviet Union, the US-Pakistan relations were confronting the nuclear challenge in the backdrop of the 'new world order', with the US as the pivot of world politics. In the post-Cold War era, especially in the last decade of the twentieth century, Pakistan's issue of nuclear proliferation resurfaced, which had gone under carpet due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Losing the frontline status, Pakistan was gifted with the US sanctions under the Pressler Amendment when President Bush (Sr.) did not certify to the US Congress that Pakistan has no capability to make nuclear devices. Thus, Pakistan was degraded from the status of 'most allied ally' to the 'most sanctioned ally'. No doubt, the US sanctions hampered the security and economy of Pakistan, but to compensate for defense deficiencies, Pakistan expedited her nuclear program. Pakistan also tried to keep up her defense with Chinese, French and North Korean support. Likewise, to make up the economic needs, illicit nuclear proliferation was resorted. But the transfer of *M-11* from China to Pakistan also added fuel to the fire and the US remained doubtful about the usage of these missiles to deliver the nuclear weapons as a substitute for F-16 aircrafts. The US also voiced concern over the alleged transfer of nuclear know-how from Beijing to Islamabad. In this manner, showing their futility, the US sanctions proved counter-productive. These sanctions had not only encouraged nuclear proliferation but also disturbed the security situation

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 281-282.

in South Asia. Neither restoration of democracy nor Pakistan's efforts to check terrorism by apprehending key US suspects could ameliorate the disgruntled United States. Despite Pakistan's matchless role in the Cold War, Pakistan's image could not improve in the US corridors of power when the strategic worth of the latter eroded. The third irritant that played much havoc to the relations between Pakistan and the United States was the rise of Taliban. Pakistan's policy towards the Taliban caused major image and policy problems. Consequently, Pakistan's Afghan policy before and after the Cold War incurred much cost than the benefit. Insurgency in Kashmir also caused enormous US pressure over Pakistan but the latter skillfully managed to escape. The changing geo-strategic environment brought the players of the opposite camps together while pushed the erstwhile allies apart from each other.¹⁸¹ Despite India's unqualified support to the former Soviet Union, India carried the day and was declared the most important US strategic partner. This emboldened the Indian leadership to become more hostile towards Pakistan. As a result, Indian leadership not only tried its best to isolate Pakistan but also to urge the US to equate the latter with rogue states like Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea. But sanity prevailed on the part of US and Pakistan was not pushed to become another rogue state like Afghanistan. The US-India strategic collusion forced Pakistan and China to enhance cooperation in the field of defense. But outwardly China had also gone closer to India after introducing major policy shifts in the former's foreign policy after the break up of Soviet Union. Pakistan was facing isolations not only at regional level but at international level too. In short, Pakistan was on the verge of economic and political bankruptcy because of the fact that her imbalanced foreign policy had failed to cope with the world after the disappearance of bipolar world system. The US neglect of Afghanistan and Pakistan was becoming the root cause of rising terrorism.

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<sup>181</sup> A leading Indian defense analyst said, "India's main problem was the cold war, because it led the US to support Pakistan. Now that the US-Pakistan relationship is not what it used to be, India should be confident that it can handle any threat from Pakistan," quoted in Farzana Shakoor, 'Pakistan-US Relations...', pp. 28-31.

## Chapter 4

### After Pakistan Goes Nuclear

*Nuclear weapons make the cost of war seem frighteningly high  
and thus discourage states from starting any wars that might  
lead to the use of such weapons.*

Kenneth N. Waltz.<sup>1</sup>

Foreign policies of independent states are dictated by their national interests and not emotions. So was true about the US foreign policy towards South Asia. At the end of 1997, a major change became more visible in the US approach towards South Asia. A clear US tilt towards India while lack of interest in Pakistan was telling about a great change in the strategic equilibrium of the region. The fast growing economy, the second largest population in the world, the vibrant democratic system, the vast US corporate interests, and the significant geo-strategic location of India were quite enough attracting factors for the US to engage India.<sup>2</sup> To convert US-India relations into a strategic partnership, President Clinton had planned a visit of South Asia in 1998. On the other hand, Pakistan was presenting less opportunities than challenges. The US-Pakistan relations were greatly marred due to the rising tide of terrorism in the region, the ISI support to the fundamentalist Taliban regime in Afghanistan, presence of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, and the nuclear proliferation. But in late 1990s, the hub of irritants in relations between Pakistan and the US was Afghanistan. The Afghan soil had become a safe haven for alleged terrorists like bin Laden. Obstructing the US access to the oil-gas rich Central Asian region, the Taliban had turned into a nightmare for the sole super power of the world. Thus, with the beginning of 1998, South Asia became the centre stage for high US involvement.

In March 1998, The 'Baharatia Janata Party' (BJP), the Hindu nationalist party, again came into power in India. The BJP leadership was very outspoken about the conduct of an overt nuclear test. They were eager to bring international respect to India on equal footing with China, the old foe and neighbor of India. Being natives of an ancient civilization, owner of a great land mass, beside the Indian Ocean along with millions of population and a stable democratic system, they thought that India's

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<sup>1</sup> Abdul Sattar, 'Foreign Policy', in Rafi Raza (ed.), 1997, *Pakistan in Perspective 19947-1997*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 138.

<sup>2</sup> Farzana Shakoor, 'Pakistan-US Relations: An Interpretation', *Pakistan Horizon*, Volume 54, Number, January 2001. pp. 20-25.

international stature would be boosted by joining the nuclear club. Pandit Jawahir Lal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, was also of the opinion that India must use nuclear technology to come at par with major powers of the world. He even did not rule out the use of nuclear know-how for purposes other than peace. Referring to the Indian nuclear program, he declared in the Indian Legislative Assembly;

*Consider the past four hundred years of history. The world developed a new source of power, i.e. steam, and the industrial age came in. India with all her many virtues did not develop that source of power and it became a backward and a slave country because of that. Now we are on the verge of atomic age. If we are to remain abreast in the world as a nation, which keeps ahead of things, we must develop this atomic energy quite apart from war.... Of course, if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, no pious sentiments of anyone of us can stop the nation from using it that way.<sup>3</sup>*

The BJP leaders were determined to materialize this dream of the forefathers of India. In the changing world scenario, they wanted a greater and global role for India. They were driven by ‘aspiration and ambition to become a major world power’.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the BJP wanted to thwart out the monopoly of five members of the ‘nuclear club’ over the nuclear arsenals.<sup>5</sup> Known for BJP strong advocacy for nuclear detonations and extremist mindset, the induction of BJP in power stirred the Pakistani leadership about the future course of Pakistan-India relations. Pakistan had no ambitions to project herself as an internationally recognized nuclear power. Pakistan had adopted the nuclear posture to prevent the repetition of 1971 like situation that had torn Pakistan into two parts with Indian aggression. In other words, Pakistan’s nuclear program was for defense rather than offense against India. The sole purpose of Pakistan’s nuclear program was to deter Indian hostilities towards Pakistan and check the Indian hegemonic designs against her neighbors. Therefore, with the ascendancy of nationalist BJP to power in India, the prospects for cooperation seemed grim on the Indian subcontinent. However, the new Indian Prime Minister, Atal

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<sup>3</sup> See Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 15, second session, 6 April 1948, pp. 3326-38. General Mirza Aslam Beg, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme: A National Security Perspective’. *National Development and Security*. Vol. 2, August 1993, Serial No. 5. pp. 1-25.; and also available at: <http://www.friends.org.pk/Beg/>

<sup>4</sup> Walid Iqbal, ‘The Nuclear Subcontinent: Political and Economic Realities’, in Hafeez Malik, 2003, *Pakistan: Founders’ Aspirations and Today’s Realities*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 172.

<sup>5</sup> Devin T. Hagerty, ‘Kashmir and Nuclear Question Revisited’, in Craig Baxter and Charles H. Kennedy (ed.), 2000, *Pakistan 2000*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 117.

Bihari Vajpayee, gave positive signals at the beginning. Responding to his Pakistani counterpart's felicitation, he said, that the two countries "must not remain mired in the past, prisoners of old contentions" but respond "positively and with energy to the call of the future and aspirations of our people, especially the younger generation, for a more cooperative relationship."<sup>6</sup> However, the new Indian government was determined to explode nuclear device in order to get India entered in the nuclear power group. On 3 April 1998, Pakistani Prime Minister warned the United States and fifteen other countries, through letters, about the dreadful Indian designs<sup>7</sup> to test nuclear devices and the possible repercussions of this nuclearization for South Asia and the world at large. The United States did not take it seriously and thought it as Pakistan's obsession towards India. Instead of preventing India from inducting nuclear devices, concrete evidences about the Indian preparation for nuclear tests were demanded from Pakistani government by the US officials. But lacking the spy-satellite technology, Pakistan could not satisfy the US administration while information from the conventional sources were not acceptable to the United States.<sup>8</sup> Lack of information about Indian nuclear test's preparation was a great failure not only on the part of Clinton administration but it also discredited the American CIA, of whom the US was very proud. The structural flaws and sheer reliance on modern technology had led the CIA to failures on a number of occasions. Such structural flaws in the CIA organization had been acknowledged by the US press and analysts and even by George J. Tenet, the Director of CIA. At the end of Cold War, the US intelligence agencies showed the determination that they would tackle threats like terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons. But they did nothing to curtail the threat of terrorism or nuclear proliferation. Despite spending \$27 billions per year on intelligence services, the US could not gather reliable and timely information about the Indian groundwork for nuclear detonations in May 1998.<sup>9</sup> The US media raised fingers at the failure of the CIA and other US intelligence agencies, in case of giving prior information about Indian nuclear test, by saying that these espionage agencies

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<sup>6</sup> Thomas P. Thornton, 'A Long Way to Lahore: India and Pakistan Negotiate', in Craig Baxter and Charles Kennedy (ed.), 2000, *Pakistan 2000*. pp. 72-73.

<sup>7</sup> Gohar Ayub Khan, 2009, *Testing Time As Foreign Minister*. Islamabad: Dost Publications. p. 37.; and Dennis Kux, 2003, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000, Disenchanted Allies*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 344.

<sup>8</sup> Dr. Zulfiqar Khan, 'India-Pakistan Nuclear Rivalry: Perceptions, Misperceptions, and Mutual Deterrence'. IPRI Paper 9, Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute.

<sup>9</sup> Tim Weiner, 'C.I.A. Study Details Failures; Scouring of System Is Urged'. *The New York Times* (3 June 1998).

are neither short of money nor short of technology. The US Congress has showered so many resources over them even after the break down of Soviet Union, to give the US an edge in fighting terrorism and limiting the development of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. The CIA failure in detecting Indian preparations for the nuclear detonations at *Pokran* left suspicions that whether the CIA intelligence officials failed to concentrate enough resources on the Indian test-site in the 'Rajasthan desert', a desert lying in the eastern part of India, or they paid insufficient attention to the information that was collected.<sup>10</sup> The fabricated CIA propaganda about Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) has also proven the ineptness of this organization. Therefore, its reports about links between bin Laden, ISI and Kashmiri insurgents were not seemed trustworthy. Relying on its intelligence agencies, the US administration did not bother to give ear to Pakistan apprehensions arising from Indian nuclear tests. The US was slumbering while India was working. Believing the Indian claim not to resort to nuclear tests, the US administration was stunned on 11 May 1998 when India detonated her four nuclear arsenal at *Pokran*, nearly 70 miles from Pakistan border. The entire world was taken aback when India succeeded in keeping her preparation for the detonations hidden from the modern and costly US satellites. No one except Pakistan expected India to take such an unwise and irresponsible step. Going to nuclearized South Asian region, all the efforts for nuclear nonproliferation like Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), etc, were ridiculed by India. The dismantling of nuclear arsenal by Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus were undermined by these Indian detonations. Reduction of nuclear arms by the US and Russian Federation, the destruction of South Africa's covert capability, compliance of Brazil and Argentina to adhere to NPT, and the successful negotiations of the CTBT were some positive steps in the direction of nuclear nonproliferation but Indian tests was a great setback to such endeavors on international level. These tests brought the nuclear non-proliferation issue back in the focus of the international community. But for Pakistan, it was the greatest blow to her security. Pakistan could do nothing except appealing the world especially the United States to take stern punitive action against India. Contrary to Pakistan's expectations, the world reaction was not strong enough to ward off India from her nuclear posture. Referring to the Indian nuclear explosions, the US President

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<sup>10</sup> 'Silence of the Spies'. *The New York Times* (14 May 1998). Section A, p; 24.

called it a 'terrible mistake' and showed his resentment by imposing sanctions against India. Punishing India, the United States cut off all aid to India, voted against loans by the World Bank and Asian Development Bank.<sup>11</sup> Japan also took similar punitive action against India and cancelled \$30 million in grants.<sup>12</sup> Germany cancelled aid talks with India that were supposed to be held in Bonn in the following week. German aid for India worth \$168 million was put on hold and it was clearly stated that 'no talks will take place very soon'.<sup>13</sup> Russian Federation, a staunch Indian ally, refused to join efforts to punish India for conducting nuclear tests.<sup>14</sup> President Clinton telephoned the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, to discuss the Indian nuclear tests and other security issues. But according to Sergei Prikhodko, an adviser to Mr. Yeltsin, there had been no indication that Russia was prepared to harden her position on the India nuclear move.<sup>15</sup> However, Russian diplomats publicly deplored the blasts and said they hope Pakistan will not respond by exploding a nuclear device. France did not follow the policy of imposing sanctions against India. Adopting a lenient approach, the French government criticized the US sanctions against India. French government's spokesman Daniel Vaillant declared, "The French government does not encourage the Americans to pursue sanctions." He asserted that 'this is not the way' to discourage India.<sup>16</sup> Britain declined to take stern economic measures against India. Derek Fatchett, the British State Minister for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, stressed that idea of sanctions was firmly opposed by his government. Raising objections to the sanctions, he told BBC, "It would be wrong to do that because it would be punishing the poorest and the ordinary people of India for a decision taken by their government."<sup>17</sup> The European Union criticized the Indian tests but declined to announce penalty measure against India. A European Union's presidency spokesman told in an interview that unlike the United States, the European Union has no provisions for automatic sanctions in case of nuclear testing. He said that it was "improbable" that the European Union would take such measures, even after Foreign

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<sup>11</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 344.

<sup>12</sup> Sheryl Wudunn, Nuclear Anxiety: The Allies; Japan Freezes Some Grants; Other Nations Seem Doubtful. *The New York Times* (14 May 1998).

<sup>13</sup> Iqbal, 'The Nuclear Subcontinent...', p. 180.

<sup>14</sup> According to *The New York Times* (cited above) the Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny M. Primakov said, "Sanctions are an extreme measure, which is not always productive, sanctions are an extreme measure, which is not always productive."

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

Ministers discuss the matter at a meeting on May 25.<sup>18</sup> Thus, all the Western nations followed the US in criticizing Indian nuclear explosions but did not take concrete steps to punish India. No significant step was taken at the UN level, except the expression of deep regret by the Secretary General Kofi Annan. The combined short term impact of the ‘world-wide’ economic sanctions against India was expected to be less than \$1 billion.<sup>19</sup> This amount was nearly equal to one day’s output of the Indian economy. In the long term, the effects of these sanctions were nearly nothing. This fact was well known to the Indian leadership beforehand. Before going to test nuclear device, the Indian strategists had carefully calculated the economic and political cost of their tests and had concluded that the Indian economy was far sufficient to bear the burden. Looking at the fact that the Indian output in goods and services had reached \$350 billion in fiscal year 1996, the Indian strategists concluded that Indian economy had the capability to sustain the pressure of foreign sanctions.<sup>20</sup> They estimated the foreign investors would suffer more than the locals would from the sanctions. Immediately after the tests, the Indian Prime Minister dispatched identical letters to the heads of G-8 countries including President Clinton in which he tried to explain the rationale of the Indian nuclear explosions. In these letters, he called China and Pakistan as ‘bitter enemies’ without naming them. He alleged China for fostering Pakistan’s nuclear program and blamed Pakistan for encouraging terrorism in Kashmir and Indian Punjab.<sup>21</sup> In fact, the Indian nuclear detonations were not motivated by Indian insecurity from Pakistan but the main driving force behind these tests was the Indian longing for an international role in the new world order. Referring to this perception, Jaswant Singh, a prominent leader of BJP, said:

*Nuclear weapons remain a key indicator of state power. Since this currency is operational in large parts of the globe, India was left with no choice but to update and validate the capability that had been demonstrated twenty-four years ago in the nuclear tests of 1974.*<sup>22</sup>

China factor was also involved in the Indian quest for nuclear technology but the real motive was not bilateral tension with China. These tests had behind them international objectives for India. Nevertheless, Pakistan and the US got alarmed by this Indian

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Iqbal, ‘The Nuclear Subcontinent...’, p. 181.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 173.

<sup>21</sup> Iqbal, ‘The Nuclear Subcontinent...’, p. 179.

<sup>22</sup> Devin T. Hagerty, ‘Kashmir and Nuclear Question Revisited...’, p. 117.

move. Pakistan was apprehended over the changing security equation in South Asia while the US was distressed over the expansion in the nuclear club, which was antithesis to nuclear non-proliferation agenda of the United States. No doubt, the US and Pakistani perceptions towards these Indian tests were different but the cause of their concern was the same i.e. the nuclear arms race in South Asia. Meanwhile, all these nations, especially the United States, diverted their attention to Pakistan. Taking cognizance of the grave security situation in South Asian region, on 15 May 1998, the US sent the Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to Pakistan in an effort to persuade Pakistani leadership not to follow Indian example. Mr. Talbott was accompanied by Karl Inderfurth, the US Assistant Secretary of State, and General Anthony Zinni, commander-in-chief of the US Central Command. This high profile delegation met Nawaz Sharif and urged him to take a moral high ground to deter nuclear tests but this advice was turned down very swiftly by Pakistan's Prime Minister. Mr. Talbott brought with him a number of carrots. He offered the delivery of halted F-16 aircrafts, resumption of economic and military aid and high political mileage in case of not testing nuclear device. Inducing Pakistan not to go nuclear, he argued that Pakistan would gain a high moral support from the international community and global disapproval will be focused on India if the former does not conduct the nuclear tests.<sup>23</sup> But for Pakistan, the allure for F-16 fighter aircrafts had gone outdated. The US track record of hollow-promises made it hard for Pakistan to believe in them even this time.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, Gohar Ayub Khan, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, turned down this US offer by calling it 'rotting and obsolete'. Referring to the F-16 aircrafts, Gohar Ayub said that these jets were 'shoddy rugs you've tried to sell us before'. The US delegation was told that the Pakistani people would mock their elected government if they accepted the US offer for non-testing the nuclear devices and they will take to the street in protest. Pakistani officials believed that the nuclear-related sanctions against India would be short lived and similarly the sanctions imposed against Pakistan would wither away simultaneously with the ones against India. They were of the view that if Pakistan dissuaded from testing India would be able to get the sixth permanent seat in the UN Security Council, which

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<sup>23</sup> Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, 2007, *Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons*. New York: Walker & Company. p. 269.

<sup>24</sup> Gohar Ayub Khan, *Testing Time...*, p. 37.

would be a great blow for Pakistan.<sup>25</sup> Owing to the populace pressure, the democratic government of Pakistan could not disregard the public sentiment for the US pressure, as the previous dictatorial military government had repeatedly done before. According to Karl Inderfurth, Pakistani Prime Minister warned him that if he failed in detonating the nuclear device, next time, certainly, he would find an Islamic fundamentalist in the office of the Prime Minister of Pakistan.<sup>26</sup> To persuade his military counterpart, General Zinni met Pakistan's army chief but could not bring him in line with the US demand. On the condition of giving up the nuclear tests, the US administration, backed by US senators, offered the repeal of the Pressler Amendment and renewal of the conventional military aid for Pakistan.<sup>27</sup> It was also argued by the US that Pakistan did not need to test her nuclear device, as the former believed that Pakistan's nuclear technology was borrowed from China. The US President himself telephoned Pakistan's Prime Minister four times to dissuade Pakistan from any nuclear detonation. Pakistani Prime Minister was also contacted by his British counterpart in order to prevent the former from resorting to a tit for tat reply to the Indian nuclear blasts at *Pokran*. The Japanese Prime Minister sent a message of restraint to his counterpart in Pakistan through Japanese ambassador in Islamabad.<sup>28</sup> In fact, the US, Japan, and the Western countries were spending more attention to deter Pakistan from testing nuclear arsenal rather than punishing India that had already triggered off the nuclear race and thus provoked her arch-rival, Pakistan, to do the same. To dissuade Pakistan from resorting to nuclear posture, the US administration was ready to roll back all the sanctions provided Pakistan complied with non-testing the nuclear device. Award of Noble Prize was also offered to Pakistan on the condition of not going to detonate the nuclear device.<sup>29</sup> The US offered many incentives to Pakistan but no concrete assurance on the issue of security was put forward. Pakistan needed security guarantee against any Indian aggression but the US administration was busy in presenting various alternates and turned a deaf ear to this genuine Pakistani concern. Setting aside the US pressures and turning down all the offers, Nawaz Sharif called the Defense Committee meeting of his cabinet at the Prime Minister House in

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid., pp. 37-45.

<sup>26</sup> Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, p. 270.

<sup>27</sup> Steven Lee Myers, 'Law to Repeal Pakistani Arms Ban is Proposed', *The New York Times*, 15 May 1998.

<sup>28</sup> Iqbal, 'The Nuclear Subcontinent...', p. 184.

<sup>29</sup> Press interview of Shamshad Ahmad Khan, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, published in *Jang Sunday*, Karachi (Pakistan), (22-28 February 2009). p. 2-4.

Islamabad. The participants were briefed by nuclear scientists from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) about Pakistan's preparation for tests.<sup>30</sup> Talbott was there in Pakistan while modalities for the conduct of nuclear tests were under consideration. Therefore, on return from Pakistan Inderfurth resigned. Gohar Ayub Khan, the then foreign minister of Pakistan, said, "Invoking mandatory sanctions under US laws against India hardly constitute an effective response."<sup>31</sup> On the other hand, Pakistan's political parties ranging from pro-Islamic religious parties to the liberal Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) raucously stressed for nuclear test. Benazir Bhutto, former Prime Minister of Pakistan and chairperson of PPP stated, "If a pre-emptive military strike is possible to neutralize India's nuclear capability, which is the response that is necessary."<sup>32</sup> Pakistani masses took the streets and print media in Pakistan pressed for a matching reply to Indian nuclear tests. Pakistani media were persistently and unanimously exerting pressure on their government to correct the strategic imbalance created by Indian nuclear explosions through detonating Pakistan's own nuclear devices soon. In a meeting with newspapers editors, the Prime Minister of Pakistan was bluntly told by the editor of the daily *Nawa-e-Waqt*, "There is going to be an explosion soon. It will either be a Pakistani nuclear test or you're being blown out of office."<sup>33</sup>

Interestingly, after the nuclear explosions at Pokran, the tone of the top Indian leadership had become more vociferous and more hawkish. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee warned Pakistan to realize the geopolitical realities in South Asia. Lal Kishan Advani, Indian Home Minister threatened: "Islamabad should realize the change in the geostrategic situation in the region and the world [and] roll back its anti-Indian policy, especially with regard to Kashmir". He further stated, "India is resolved to deal firmly with Pakistan's 'hostile activities in Kashmir'."<sup>34</sup> Indian minister for parliamentary affairs, Madan Lal Khurana, warned Pakistan of a 'fourth war.' Pakistan could not neglect these threats. According to *The New York Times*, "the [Indian] warnings to Pakistan showed how India looked herself as a nuclear power

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<sup>30</sup> This meeting was chaired by Nawaz Sharif and was attended by the finance minister, foreign minister, foreign secretary, Pakistan's army chief and all other services chiefs. See Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception*, p. 271.

<sup>31</sup> Dennis Kux, 'US-Pakistan relations As The Twentieth Century Ends', in Craig Baxter and Charles Kennedy (ed.), 2000, *Pakistan 2000*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-91. p. 97.

<sup>32</sup> Hagerty, 'Kashmir and Nuclear Question Revisited...', p. 120.

<sup>33</sup> Naunihal Singh, 2006, *The United States and Pakistan: The Estranged Bedfellows*. New Delhi: Authorspress. p. 411.

<sup>34</sup> Kenneth J. Copper, 'Key Indian Officials Warn Pakistan'. *The Washington Post*, (19 May 1998).

aimed at shifting the region's strategic balance in her favor. The nuclear tests appear increasingly to have been motivated, at least in part, by the Hindu nationalism that guides the Vajpayee government.”<sup>35</sup> These provocative statements were quite enough to heighten tension between India and Pakistan, which was under immense diplomatic pressures from the US and other nations of the world to avoid testing her own nuclear test against domestic political demands to match India. Nawaz Sharif publicly declared that it is up to the international community to address Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns in wake of India’s atomic blasts.<sup>36</sup> The group of the world’s eight leading economic powers (G-8) criticized India, agreed to oppose multilateral lending, but refused more draconian-measures.<sup>37</sup> No international security remedy was offered to Pakistan. Showing non-satisfaction over the G-8 response to the Indian tests, Pakistani Foreign Minister said, “It is a matter of when, not if, Pakistan will test.”<sup>38</sup> Looking at the unreliable past-US response in times of need, Pakistan was not ready to believe that US Senate would waive sanctions against Pakistan and fulfill the defense requirements of the latter. Disappointed by the inadequate sanctions against India, Pakistani government was not convinced that the US would resolve the Kashmir dispute which was the root cause of tense Pak-India relations. Because of the lack of any international security guarantee by international community, Pakistani officials and masses were worried about the territorial integrity and national security and, therefore, could not afford another mishap like the dismemberment of ‘East Pakistan’ in 1971 during which Indian military literally cut Pakistan into two pieces. Annoyed by the hawkish statements of Indian leaders, it became inevitable for Pakistan to calm down the Indian rhetoric with nuclear detonations of her own. Keeping in view the mounting domestic pressure, Pakistani government could not afford to play a political gamble that could push her into political nonentity. Despite the huge economic costs, Pakistani government could not overlook the security predicament emanating from the Indian nuclear move. Therefore, to address all these issues, Premier Nawaz Sharif (1997-1999) asked the US President for a concrete US security guarantee against India but Bill Clinton declined to respond positively.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> John F. Burns, ‘Visiting Nuclear Site, Indian Leader Puts Pakistan on Notice’. *The New York Times* (21 May 1998).

<sup>36</sup> Kux, ‘US-Pakistan relations...’, p. 97.

<sup>37</sup> It was the annual meeting of G-8 held on 17-18 May 1998, at Birmingham in the United Kingdom (UK), see Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 345.

<sup>38</sup> Kux, ‘US-Pakistan relations....’, pp. 97-98.

<sup>39</sup> Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 411.

China, being Pakistan's main military and missile's supplier, was taken into confidence by Pakistan. For this purpose, a high level Pakistani delegation visited Beijing. This consultation between time-tested friends, Pakistan and China, was also aimed at getting security assurances from China in case of any possible Indian aggression. But in the changing geo-strategic scenario, although China refrained from providing a nuclear umbrella to Pakistan vis-à-vis India but assured that no strict action would be taken by the former against the latter.<sup>40</sup> Weeks long inaction and hectic diplomacy made it clear that in case of nuclear restraint by Pakistan, the US could shower Pakistan with handsome benefits, could give her with international respect and gratitude from the rest of the world, but no one could bestow her with the same kind of security guarantee vis-à-vis India as the nuclear capability could.<sup>41</sup> On May 25, Pakistan's Army Chief, General Jehangir Karamat, met in an urgent session with the premier Nawaz Sharif and told him that if Pakistan did not respond quickly with a nuclear explosion of its own, India could attempt a military solution of Kashmir crisis as early as fall of 1998.<sup>42</sup> Therefore, in response to President Clinton's phone call on 28 May 1998, Nawaz Sharif explained his position by saying that "You have said all the right things, but the rest of the world is filing its fingernails." Further, he went on to say that as most of the world failed in punishing India for her tests which made it impossible for him not to follow the nuclear suit. Sharif also added, "I wish I did not have these forces acting on me, but people are demonstrating in the streets, the editorialists and the opposition are demanding test. You have to understand my position. He as much as said this was out of his hands." According to the US official, "There was anguish in Sharif."<sup>43</sup> In the last resort to deter Pakistan from nuclear detonations, Clinton warned Pakistan's Prime Minister, "If you do this, Nawaz, I have to do this, and it'll hurt you a lot more than it'll hurt India... If your hands are tied, mine are too'."<sup>44</sup> Another factor that urged Pakistan to become an overt nuclear power was the nuclear embarrassment by Israel. Recalling the Israeli threat to the nuclear program of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif said:

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<sup>40</sup> Elisabeth Rosenthal, 'Chinese Delegation Seems to Deny Pakistan a Nuclear Umbrella,' *The New York Times* (21 May 1998).

<sup>41</sup> Iqbal, 'The Nuclear Subcontinent...', p. 185.

<sup>42</sup> Hagerty, 'Kashmir and Nuclear Question Revisited...', p. 120.

<sup>43</sup> Tim Weiner, 'After an Anguished Phone Call, Clinton Penalizes the Pakistanis', *The New York Times* (29 May 1998).

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

*We said that Pakistan had picked up intelligence about several countries looking to destroy our nuclear assets. We were very worried about the Israelis—a direct strike. We would not allow anything to come between successes in our nuclear vision.*<sup>45</sup>

Israeli F-15 jets along with the F-16 fighter planes had reached India to launch an Israeli-Indian joint missile-attack from aircrafts on the nuclear test-site of Pakistan. These aircrafts had been stationed at Chennai airbase, an India airbase near India-Pakistan border.<sup>46</sup> Although the US did not recognize this viewpoint but there seems to be a modicum of truth as Israel and India had once earlier planned to do so in 1980s. Pakistan was deterring any possible obstacle that can impede her way to become nuclear and calculating every possible outcome and cost of the nuclear tests. Looking at the meager sanctions applied by the world community against India, Pakistan government got disappointed and her apprehension about her own security multiplied.<sup>47</sup> In such circumstances, after weighing all available options Pakistan had no other way except ‘nuclear explosion’. Therefore, Pakistan detonated her five nuclear devices on 28 May 1998 and the sixth one on 30 May 1998 at *Chaghai*, a desert town in the remote Southwest of Pakistan near borders with Afghanistan and Iran. Thus, the ‘balance of power’ in South Asia, which had shifted in Indian favor, was restored on 28 May. Within minutes after the detonations, in a televised address to the nation, Nawaz Sharif declared, “Today we have settled a score [with India] ... Our hands were forced by the present Indian leadership’s reckless action.”<sup>48</sup> He further said, “Today God has given us the opportunity to take critical steps for the country’s defense. We have become a nuclear power.”<sup>49</sup> People of Pakistan celebrated the detonations and took it as a befitting reply to the archrival India. But these detonations unleashed a new wave of sanctions from the United States and her western allies. Already facing sanctions under Pressler amendment since 1 October 1990, Pakistan lost nothing due to US sanctions after exploding her devices on 28 May 1998 while India had incurred a loss of \$120 million soft annual US aid for her nuclear tests. This fact is evident from the Table 2.1. Trade relationship between Pakistan and the US has been shown in Chart 6 and Table 2.2. Japan cancelled a grant

<sup>45</sup> Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, p. 273.

<sup>46</sup> Gohar Ayub Khan, *Testing Time...*, p. 47.

<sup>47</sup> Stephen Kinzer, ‘Restraint By Pakistan Is Eroding, Leader Says’. *The New York Times* (24 May 1998).

<sup>48</sup> Kux, ‘US-Pakistan Relations...’, p. 99.

<sup>49</sup> Iqbal, ‘The Nuclear Subcontinent...’, p. 186-187.

of \$40 million and halted a new loan worth \$230 million to Pakistan. It was a blow for Pakistan as Japan provided more than half of the total world assistance to the former. Germany took the same measures against Pakistan as were already taken against India after her going nuclear. The German government cancelled the planned discussions in June 1998 with Pakistani officials about new development aid worth \$45 million. Australia condemned the nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan and withdrew the Australian offer to double the existing \$1.5 million annual Australian aid to Islamabad.<sup>50</sup> China, Pakistan's most tested friend and defense supporter, expressed "deep regret" over nuclear tests conducted by the latter. But pinned the responsibility of touching off the nuclear crisis.<sup>51</sup> Deploring Pakistan's nuclear explosions, the UN Security Council urged both India and Pakistan to stop further testing and take steps to reduce tension. The US President commented sadly, "By failing to exercise restraint in responding to the Indian tests, Pakistan lost a truly priceless opportunity to strengthen its own security, to improve its political standing in the eyes of world".<sup>52</sup> He described the Pakistani tests as "self-defeating, wasteful and dangerous." Imposing sanctions against Pakistan, President Clinton lamented over Pakistan's decision by saying, "I deplore the decision." Further, he added that the two nations were now embarked on a "dangerous arms race."<sup>53</sup> Strobe Talbott, the US Secretary of State, described the tension in the nuclearized South Asia as, "an extraordinarily serious situation." Commenting on the India-Pakistan relations, he termed them of 'immense importance, complexity and danger'.<sup>54</sup> However, later on, the US President's Press Secretary told the media people: "Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was honest and straightforward in the description of the decision he was wrestling with and India manifestly was not."<sup>55</sup>

The sole purpose of Pakistan's nuclear tests was to calm down the Indian rhetoric and deter India from adopting jingoistic policies towards Pakistan.<sup>56</sup> They were aimed to clear the misperceptions found in the minds of Indian leadership regarding the credibility of Pakistan's nuclear capability. They were also meant to

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<sup>50</sup> Warren Hoge, 'Nuclear Anxiety: The Reaction; Wealthy Nations Cut Aid to Pakistan over Nuclear Tests'. *The New York Times* (29 May 1998).

<sup>51</sup> Elisabeth Rosenthal, 'Nuclear Anxiety: In China; China Voices 'Regret,' but Still Faults India'. *The New York Times* (29 May 1998).

<sup>52</sup> Kux, 'US-Pakistan Relations...', p. 99.

<sup>53</sup> Tim Weiner, 'After an Anguished Phone Call...', *The New York Times* (29 May 1998).

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 346.

<sup>56</sup> Abdul Sattar, 2007, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: 1947-2005*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 202.

Table: 2.1. US Economic and Military aid to Pakistan during FY 1998

| COUNTRY: PAKISTAN @                                                          |                              |                            |                           |                             |      |      |      |                        |                              |         |                                      |        |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|------|------|------|------------------------|------------------------------|---------|--------------------------------------|--------|
| (U.S. FISCAL YEARS - MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)                                    |                              |                            |                           |                             |      |      |      |                        |                              |         |                                      |        |
| -----U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS-OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS----- |                              |                            |                           |                             |      |      |      |                        |                              |         |                                      |        |
| PROGRAM                                                                      | MUTUAL                       |                            |                           | FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT----- |      |      |      | TOTAL<br>FAA<br>PERIOD | TOTAL<br>LOANS AND<br>GRANTS |         | OUT-<br>STANDING<br>LOAN<br>BALANCES |        |
|                                                                              | POST-WAR<br>RELIEF<br>PERIOD | MARSHALL<br>PLAN<br>PERIOD | SECURITY<br>ACT<br>PERIOD | 1962-94                     | 1995 | 1996 | 1997 |                        | 1946-98                      | 1946-98 |                                      |        |
|                                                                              | 1946-48                      | 1949-52                    | 1953-61                   |                             |      |      |      | 1998                   | 1962-98                      | 1946-98 |                                      |        |
| I. ECON. ASSIST. - TOTAL...                                                  | 0.1                          | 11.1                       | 1418.7                    | 7107.1                      | 17.1 | 16.5 | 42.3 | 17.9                   | 7201.0                       | 7999.7  | 1877.1                               | 2198.0 |
| LOANS.....                                                                   | 0.1                          | -                          | 476.8                     | 4043.8                      | -    | 10.0 | 35.0 | 10.0                   | 4098.8                       | 4075.2  | 1877.1                               | 2198.0 |
| GRANTS.....                                                                  | -                            | 11.1                       | 941.9                     | 3063.3                      | 17.1 | 6.5  | 7.3  | 7.9                    | 3102.2                       | 3924.5  | -                                    | -      |
| A. USAID AND PREDECESSOR                                                     | -                            | 10.6                       | 935.4                     | 4382.4                      | 7.5  | -    | -    | -                      | 4389.9                       | 4947.6  | 1321.8                               | 1130.5 |
| LOANS***.....                                                                | -                            | -                          | 339.5                     | 2371.1                      | -    | -    | -    | -                      | 2371.1                       | 2452.3  | 1321.8                               | 1130.5 |
| GRANTS.....                                                                  | -                            | 10.6                       | 595.9                     | 2011.3                      | 7.5  | -    | -    | -                      | 2018.8                       | 2495.3  | -                                    | -      |
| (SEC. SUPP. ASSIST.)....                                                     | -)(                          | -)(                        | 586.6)(                   | 2122.0)(                    | -)(  | -)(  | -)(  | -)(                    | 2122.0)(                     | 2571.5) | -                                    | -      |
| B. FOOD FOR PEACE.....                                                       | -                            | 0.1                        | 415.9                     | 2659.5                      | 7.1  | 14.0 | 39.8 | 16.4                   | 2736.9                       | 2910.9  | 555.2                                | 1067.5 |
| LOANS.....                                                                   | -                            | -                          | 137.3                     | 1672.7                      | -    | 10.0 | 35.0 | 10.0                   | 1727.7                       | 1622.8  | 555.2                                | 1067.5 |
| GRANTS.....                                                                  | -                            | 0.1                        | 278.6                     | 986.8                       | 7.1  | 4.0  | 4.8  | 6.4                    | 1009.2                       | 1288.1  | -                                    | -      |
| TITLE I-TOTAL.....                                                           | -                            | -                          | 334.1                     | 2235.5                      | -    | 10.0 | 35.0 | 10.0                   | 2290.5                       | 2382.5  | 555.2                                | 1067.5 |
| REPAY. IN 9-LOANS.....                                                       | -                            | -                          | -                         | 1329.4                      | -    | 10.0 | 35.0 | 10.0                   | 1384.4                       | 1403.2  | 352.1                                | 1051.1 |
| PAY. IN FOR. CURR.....                                                       | -                            | -                          | 334.1                     | 906.1                       | -    | -    | -    | -                      | 906.1                        | 979.3   | 203.1                                | 16.4   |
| TITLE II-TOTAL.....                                                          | -                            | 0.1                        | 81.8                      | 424.0                       | 7.1  | 4.0  | 4.8  | 6.4                    | 446.4                        | 528.4   | -                                    | -      |
| E. RELIEF, EC. DEV & WFP.                                                    | -                            | -                          | 48.6                      | 366.5                       | 7.1  | 2.8  | 4.8  | 1.2                    | 382.4                        | 431.0   | -                                    | -      |
| VOL. RELIEF AGENCY.....                                                      | -                            | 0.1                        | 33.2                      | 57.5                        | -    | 1.2  | -    | 5.2                    | 64.0                         | 97.4    | -                                    | -      |
| TITLE III.....                                                               | -                            | -                          | -                         | -                           | -    | -    | -    | -                      | -                            | -       | -                                    | -      |
| C. OTHER ECON. ASSIST...                                                     | 0.1                          | 0.4                        | 67.4                      | 65.2                        | 2.5  | 2.5  | 2.5  | 1.5                    | 74.2                         | 141.2   | 0.1                                  | -      |
| LOANS.....                                                                   | 0.1                          | -                          | -                         | -                           | -    | -    | -    | -                      | -                            | 0.1     | -                                    | -      |
| GRANTS.....                                                                  | -                            | 0.4                        | 67.4                      | 65.2                        | 2.5  | 2.5  | 2.5  | 1.5                    | 74.2                         | 141.1   | -                                    | -      |
| PEACE CORPS.....                                                             | -                            | -                          | -                         | 9.5                         | -    | -    | -    | -                      | 9.5                          | 9.5     | -                                    | -      |
| NARCOTICS.....                                                               | -                            | -                          | -                         | 55.6                        | 2.5  | 2.5  | 2.5  | 1.5                    | 64.6                         | 63.7    | -                                    | -      |
| OTHER.....                                                                   | -                            | 0.4                        | 67.4                      | -                           | -    | -    | -    | -                      | 67.8                         | -       | -                                    | -      |
| II. MIL. ASSIST. - TOTAL...                                                  | -                            | -                          | 508.2                     | 2443.4                      | -    | -    | -    | -                      | 2443.4                       | 2951.4  | 1628.7                               | 119.8  |
| LOANS.....                                                                   | -                            | -                          | -                         | 1748.5                      | -    | -    | -    | -                      | 1748.5                       | 1748.5  | 1628.7                               | 119.8  |
| GRANTS.....                                                                  | -                            | -                          | 508.2                     | 694.9                       | -    | -    | -    | -                      | 694.9                        | 1202.9  | -                                    | -      |
| A. MAP GRANTS.....                                                           | -                            | -                          | 480.8                     | 169.6                       | -    | -    | -    | -                      | 169.6                        | 650.3   | -                                    | -      |
| B. CREDIT FINANCING....                                                      | -                            | -                          | -                         | 1748.5                      | -    | -    | -    | -                      | 1748.5                       | 1748.5  | 1628.7                               | 119.8  |
| C. INTL. MIL. ED. TRNG....                                                   | -                            | -                          | 12.2                      | 20.3                        | -    | -    | -    | -                      | 20.3                         | 32.4    | -                                    | -      |
| D. TRAN-EXCESS STOCK...                                                      | -                            | -                          | 15.2                      | 11.6                        | -    | -    | -    | -                      | 11.6                         | 26.8    | -                                    | -      |
| E. OTHER GRANTS.....                                                         | -                            | -                          | -                         | 493.4                       | -    | -    | -    | -                      | 493.4                        | 493.4   | -                                    | -      |
| III. TOTAL ECON. & MIL. ...                                                  | 0.1                          | 11.1                       | 1926.9                    | 9550.5                      | 17.1 | 16.5 | 42.3 | 17.9                   | 9644.4                       | 10951.1 | 3505.8                               | 2317.8 |
| LOANS.....                                                                   | 0.1                          | -                          | 476.8                     | 5792.3                      | -    | 10.0 | 35.0 | 10.0                   | 5847.3                       | 5823.7  | 3505.8                               | 2317.8 |
| GRANTS.....                                                                  | -                            | 11.1                       | 1450.1                    | 3758.2                      | 17.1 | 6.5  | 7.3  | 7.9                    | 3797.1                       | 5127.4  | -                                    | -      |
| OTHER US LOANS.....                                                          | -                            | -                          | 12.9                      | 443.2                       | 37.5 | 97.0 | -    | -                      | 577.7                        | 544.4   | 405.4                                | 139.0  |
| EX-IM BANK LOANS.....                                                        | -                            | -                          | 12.9                      | 312.0                       | 37.5 | 97.0 | -    | -                      | 446.5                        | 414.0   | 275.0                                | 139.0  |
| ALL OTHER.....                                                               | -                            | -                          | -                         | 131.2                       | -    | -    | -    | -                      | 131.2                        | 130.4   | 130.4                                | -      |

\* LESS THAN \$50,000.

@ SEE COMMENTS IN COUNTRY NOTES SECTION

\*\* VALUES IN THESE COLUMNS ARE NET OF DEOBLIGATIONS AND CANCELLATIONS.


SEE GENERAL NOTES-REPORTING CONCEPTS

\*\*\* INCLUDES CAPITALIZED INTEREST ON PRIOR YEAR LOANS.

Source: USAID Greenbook 1998.

## US Trade with Pakistan: FY 1998

Chart. 6.



Source: Chart compiled on the basis of data given in the table 2.2.

Table: 2.2

NOTE: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars, and not seasonally adjusted unless otherwise specified.

| Month          | Exports      | Imports        | Balance       |
|----------------|--------------|----------------|---------------|
| January 1998   | 92.9         | 140.0          | -47.1         |
| February 1998  | 46.8         | 143.6          | -96.8         |
| March 1998     | 54.1         | 128.3          | -74.2         |
| April 1998     | 53.8         | 132.9          | -79.1         |
| May 1998       | 62.2         | 134.6          | -72.4         |
| June 1998      | 57.5         | 150.4          | -92.9         |
| July 1998      | 47.0         | 164.3          | -117.3        |
| August 1998    | 58.2         | 152.6          | -94.4         |
| September 1998 | 43.8         | 153.4          | -109.6        |
| October 1998   | 108.1        | 141.1          | -33.0         |
| November 1998  | 41.9         | 121.3          | -79.4         |
| December 1998  | 54.1         | 129.3          | -75.2         |
| <b>TOTAL</b>   | <b>720.4</b> | <b>1,691.8</b> | <b>-971.4</b> |

SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division, Data Dissemination Branch, Washington, D.C. 20233

correct the imbalance created by the Indian nuclear detonations. Some analysts in the West and the US called Pakistan's atomic bomb as 'Islamic bomb'.<sup>57</sup> But the use of this term was really a misconception of these ill-informed analysts who had a biased attitude.<sup>58</sup> Pakistan's nuclear tests were not of retaliatory nature but solely for the self-defense. These explosions were not meant to give rise to tension at the regional level or to put the regional stability at stake. The aftermath of tests proved that Pakistan's nuclear explosions strengthened the prospects of peace on the Indian subcontinent and calmed down the Indian bellicosity. Beside boosting morale of Pakistani nation, the harsh tone of Indian leaders like that of Lal Krishan Advani changed altogether after Pakistan tested nuclear devices at *Chaghai*. Being an advocate of 'hot-pursuit' of Pakistan-backed Kashmiri militants before Pakistani tests, Advani said his reference to "hot pursuit" had not been intended as a threat to send troops into Pakistani-ruled areas in Kashmir. In the aftermath of the nuclear tests, politicians of both countries stressed their respective governments to embark upon diplomatic channels to avoid any accidental outbreak of war between the two nuclear rivals because of any misunderstanding. But none of them seemed ready to discuss an agreement to avoid the deployment of nuclear warheads over missiles. Indian Prime Minister appeased the opposition leaders in the Indian parliament by welcoming the talk-offer made by his Pakistani counterpart. Guhar Ayub Khan, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, offered that both India and Pakistan sign the CTBT simultaneously.<sup>59</sup> But Indian government declined to do so. Looking at this Indian perception, Pakistani politicians considered the nuclear arsenals necessary to deter the Indian adventurism against Pakistan. This objective of deterrence became more visible when India could not attempt to escalate the Kargil War to any other part, despite her higher embarrassment by *intruders* at the Kargil. This nuclear deterrence made the US to accelerate her efforts to put an end to Kargil War. In 2000, nuclear technology kept the Indian forces at bay from violating international border despite a ten months long eyeball-to-eyeball contact between Indian and Pakistani armies. Nuclearization of South Asia hastened the international power centers to ease tension in this part of the world. Taking advantage of the changed perceptions of the world community, Pakistan lost no time in sending high officials abroad to interact with international community and media to urge India to

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<sup>57</sup> Tim Weiner, 'After an Anguished Phone ...',

<sup>58</sup> Hagerty, 'Kashmir and Nuclear Question Revisited...', p. 120.

<sup>59</sup> John F. Burns, 'Nuclear Anxiety: The Overview; Leaders in India and in Pakistan Tone Down Crisis'. *The New York Times* (30 May 1998).

address the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan through negotiations.<sup>60</sup> During these visits, the centrality of Kashmir issue was highlighted as a core issue that had caused tension between India and Pakistan and had triggered off the nuclear arm race in South Asia.

Realizing the edginess found in the region, the US Secretary of State Talbott was back in South Asia to influence India and Pakistan to accede to Geneva Declaration of June 1998 adopted by the five UN Security Council members. In the wake of Geneva Declaration, Strobe Talbott met seven times separately with Indian and Pakistani leaders in the United States, Europe and South Asia. This was the highest US involvement in South Asia since 1960s.<sup>61</sup> The international community realized that if the disputes between Pakistan and India were not resolved amicably at the talks-table then the South Asian region would be in the severe grip of nuclear threat. Responding to the international public opinion, India accommodated the idea of bilateral negotiations but refused to sign the CTBT while Pakistan eulogized the suggestion for resumption of talks but skillfully avoided banning the nuclear tests by conditioning it to the Indian approval. Accordingly, US-India talks on joining the CTBT remained in the focus as India was reluctant to sign the treaty. Prime Minister of Pakistan expressed Pakistan's desire to join CTBT but linked this offer with two conditions; Indian reciprocation to the Pakistani act and lifting of the US sanctions that were imposed in the wake of nuclear tests by Pakistan in May 1998.<sup>62</sup> At first, Washington welcomed the proposal but after Indian resentment the mindset changed. At the end, both India and the US responded negatively to this suggestion. However, bowing to the mounting international pressure, the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan met at the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting and agreed to resume talks over the disputed territory of Kashmir. Both the leaders acceded to set up a 'hot line' between them and to exercise maximum restraint along LoC. The UN Security Council adopted resolution 1172 and urged both India and Pakistan to enter into a dialogue to remove all the hurdles in the way of peace, including the issue of Kashmir. This exhortation was reflected in the bus-diplomacy and subsequent Lahore

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<sup>60</sup> India Tests Nuclear Weapons, Drawing Worldwide Censure; Pakistan Responds in Kind, Raising Threat of Regional Arms Race. *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, Volume 9, Issue 4 July 1998, pp 32-58., available at <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?aid=3823596>

<sup>61</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000...*, pp. 346-347.

<sup>62</sup> Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made this offer during his address to the UN General Assembly on 23 September 1998. It was an effort to ameliorate the US anger over nuclear development in South Asia and to reduce tension between India and Pakistan. See Barbara Crossette, 'Pakistan Pledges A-Bomb Test Ban if Sanctions End'. *The New York Times* (24 September 1998).

Declaration.<sup>63</sup> In the wake of nuclear tests, the major US-policy objective in South Asia was to avoid the escalation between Pakistan and India. The United States did not want to alienate Pakistan but was not ready to dismay India. As far as the economic aspect was concerned, the nuclear-related US-sanctions over Pakistan put her economy under much pressure. Pakistan's foreign reserves were only \$600 million and there was a great difficulty in meeting the debt service payments, which was more than \$30 billion. The foreign investors were not willing to invest in Pakistan's shaky economy due to the decision of Pakistani government to freeze the foreign currency account in the wake of nuclear explosions. This decision even sent a wrong signal to Pakistanis abroad. However, the US officials feared that if Pakistan faced an economic collapse then the chances of nuclear proliferation would obviously increase, as the latter would compensate her economic losses through nuclear sales. Prompted by the threat of turning Pakistan into a rogue state, the US administration decided to provide Pakistan with some breathing room by facilitating Pakistani government to get the IMF aid. After hectic efforts, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Pakistan agreed on an economic aid program to prevent Pakistan from economic collapse. The United States put no opposition to the IMF decision.<sup>64</sup> Following the US tacit approval to the resumption of IMF aid, the IMF showed willingness to unlock up to \$1.3 billion to facilitate Pakistan to cope with her economic needs. It was agreed that the installments of aid would not start until the end of 1998. Thus, IMF adopted a tactic of 'wait and see' to judge the viability of this new agreement and Pakistan's economic progress as the record of accomplishment of Pakistan's accords with IMF was that encouraging.<sup>65</sup> Just within one month of the imposition of sanctions, not only the people from press but also the corporate US companies like Boeing, Goldman, Sachs & Co. and IBM called the White House with anguish and panic to know the implications of sanctions imposed against India and Pakistan.<sup>66</sup> These companies had hardly made ways into the South Asia market by

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<sup>63</sup> To reduce the bilateral tension and to ward-off the international pressure, the Indian Premier visited Pakistan on an inaugural ride of the bus service between the two countries that had been started as a confidence building measure. This visit was given the name of bus-diplomacy by the media. Farzana Shakoor, 'Pakistan-US Relations: An Interpretation', *Pakistan Horizon*, Volume 54, Number, January 2001. pp. 20-25.

<sup>64</sup> John F. Burns, "US and India Meet on Standoff Over Nuclear Tests," *The New York Times* (21 July 1998); and David E. Sanger, "Despite A-Test, US Won't Bar Pakistan Bailout," *The New York Times* (22 July 1998)

<sup>65</sup> Kux, 'US-Pakistan relations...', p. 101.

<sup>66</sup> Iqbal, 'The Nuclear Subcontinent...', p. 189.

investing millions of dollars in Indian and to a lesser extent in Pakistani economy. Moreover, public opinion and media in the United States was referring to the sanctions as a 'blunt weapon' which was not worthy of producing any desirable results. Therefore, there was a feeling that the US sanctions against India and Pakistan must be reduced or lifted if these two nascent nuclear powers give their commitment to ban further nuclear tests and restrict the flow of nuclear know-how to other countries.<sup>67</sup> Lambasting the effectiveness of the US imposed sanctions against India and Pakistan, Nicholas Platt, former US ambassador to Pakistan, said, "Our own policy, which denied them a credible conventional capability, has in a way forced them to rely more on the nuclear deterrent."<sup>68</sup> Robert Oakley, another former US ambassador to Pakistan, held the US sanctions responsible for accelerating nuclear race rather than toning it down. He said:

*For eight years Pakistan has been deprived of everything and, therefore, we severely weakened their conventional military capability, which was predicated on the use of American equipment. We certainly weakened their confidence in the United States...at the same time, India was getting stronger, So what could the Pakistanis rely upon? Missiles and nuclear capability.<sup>69</sup>*

All other G-8 members had already discarded the idea of sanctions under the dictates of their commercial interests in South Asia. The World Bank and IMF had also taken a way other than sanctions and were engaged in 'routine business' with both India and Pakistan. Looking at this state of affairs, the US policy and decision makers also took perception of the futility of the US sanctions when the US economic interests suffered from them. Therefore, in mid-1998, the US Senate took an initiative to exempt the agricultural credits from the sanction-list and passed legislation in this context. Keeping in view the commercial interests of the US wheat growers, on 15 July 1998, the same suit was followed by the US House of Representatives. Referring to the waiver of US sanction against Pakistan, the Chairman of the Agriculture of the US House of Representatives said, "I would prefer a permanent solution to this, but we can't afford to wait any longer...our farmers are already too close to devastating

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p. 190.

<sup>68</sup> Tim Weiner, 'Nuclear Anxiety: The Know-How; U.S. and China Helped Pakistan Build its Bomb', *The New York Times* (1 June 1998).

<sup>69</sup> Barbara Crossette, 'Nuclear Anxiety: The Rivalry; South Asian Arms Race: Reviving Dormant Fears of Nuclear War', *The New York Times* (29 May 1998).

losses.” Highlighting the importance of the bill he further said, “This bill will fix the immediate problem and permit our farmers to take advantage of the Pakistani wheat tender while allowing Congress time to work towards a more permanent resolution.”<sup>70</sup> This shows eagerness on the part of US Congress to achieve some non-compatible multiple objectives that put the non-proliferation on the back burner and pleaded for renunciation of sanctions on both Pakistan and India. To safeguard the US interests, an 18 member special task force, headed by the US Senator Joseph Biden and McConnell, was assigned with the duty of ascertaining the effectiveness of sanctions on Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs. The real impetus behind this task force was apparently the trading interests of the US white-wheat grower in the Pacific Northwestern States of the United States. Pakistan was one of the leading foreign buyer of US wheat and the third largest overseas purchaser of all the US wheat.<sup>71</sup> Pakistan was annually importing US wheat worth \$500 million. The task force apprehended that the interest of these American growers might face disastrous economic repercussions if they were not lifted. Hence, the domestic political pressure urged the US senate to ignore the US foreign policy objective that could hinder the domestic interests. Consequently, imbued in the spirit of having a voice in foreign policy, the US legislature tried to change the sanctions posture by adopting the Brownback-I Amendment, formally known as the India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998.<sup>72</sup> The proponents of non-proliferation in the US Senate were absent in the debate while the debate was all about helping the US farmers to take part in Pakistan’s wheat auction. By this amendment, the US Senate allowed the President to waive all the sanctions, including those imposed under Pressler Amendment.<sup>73</sup> The US President was given an indefinite authority in this connection. On 11 October 1999, the US Congress adopted another amendment that was called Brownback-II Amendment.<sup>74</sup> It

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<sup>70</sup> ‘House Passes Bill to Lift Nuclear Sanctions on Food for India and Pakistan’, *The New York Times* (15 July 1998).

<sup>71</sup> ‘Confrontation and Retreat: The U.S. Congress and the South Asian Nuclear Tests’. [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000\\_01-02/rhjf00](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_01-02/rhjf00)

<sup>72</sup> This amendment was adopted by the US Congress in 1998. It was incorporated into the fiscal 1999 omnibus appropriations bill (PL. 105-277). It authorized the US president to waive, for a period of one year, the nuclear related sanctions imposed under the Glenn, Symington and Pressler amendments against India and Pakistan, except for those pertaining to military assistance, dual-use exports and military sales. Available at [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000\\_01-02/rhchart](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_01-02/rhchart)

<sup>73</sup> Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 412.

<sup>74</sup> This amendment was adopted by the US Congress in 1999. It was incorporated into the fiscal year 2000 in the Defense Appropriations Bill (PL. 106-79). Through this amendment, the US president was authorized to waive off provisions of the Glenn, Symington and Pressler amendments with respect to India and Pakistan. It stated that the broad application" of export controls on Indian and Pakistani

was a part of the defense appropriation bill. It manifested a great shift in the US policy towards South Asia. Exercising authority under this legislation, the US President Clinton waived almost all the economic sanctions against India but lifted only two sanctions on Pakistan, i.e. agricultural credits and lending by US commercial banks. Despite repeated appeals from Pakistani government, and American based Pakistani community, President Clinton refused to lift sanctions imposed against Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment.<sup>75</sup> This discriminatory treatment showed the US abhorrence for Pakistan and favor for India. President Clinton and his administration had serious reservations over Pakistan's nuclear program.

Amid the nuclear fever on the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan did not give up efforts to check *Al-Qaeda* activists. Two of the key suspects of attacks on US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in August 1998, were apprehended in Pakistan but they were not handed over to FBI, a US intelligence agency. This move of not allowing the FBI agents to interrogate the suspects perturbed the US administration. The US misgiving about Pakistan's links with bin Laden kept on spiraling throughout the year 1998.

Over Pakistan's support to the Taliban in Afghanistan, tension between Pakistan and the US further escalated in August 1998. The US was not only annoyed over the Taliban strict policies but also over the issue of US oil companies' access to the Caspian Basin resources that was still unresolved. Taliban were reluctant to allow them to invest in oil and gas pipeline projects and tap the resources at their own terms and conditions. This move led to a great trust-deficit between the Taliban and US administration. On the other hand, the US and Iran shared a stance against the Taliban. This agreement of opinion was due to the convergence of strategic interests in the region. Both US and Iran resented any diplomatic recognition to the Taliban and demanded a broad based government for Afghanistan. A power-sharing arrangement between Northern Alliance and the Taliban government in Afghanistan was strongly pleaded by US and Iran. But no such arrangement was possible without Pakistan's involvement. Pakistan promoted the idea of a negotiated settlement, which

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government agencies and private companies suspected of having links to their country's nuclear or missile programs is "inconsistent" with the national security interests of the United States. It urged the application of U.S. export controls only against agencies and companies that make "direct and material contributions to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs and only to those items that can contribute to such programs. Available at [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000\\_01-02/rhchart](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_01-02/rhchart)

<sup>75</sup> Hafeez Malik, 2008, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Imperial Dimension*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 96-97.

could put an end to the chaos in her neighborhood but did not wash her hands of supporting the Taliban. Pakistan wanted a friendly broad-based government in Kabul that could bring normalcy to the troubled Afghanistan under an effective power-sharing formula but simultaneously wanted to have a strongly pro-Pakistan setup there. Therefore, despite extending recognition to the Taliban government, Pakistan kept on her efforts for a rapprochement between the Taliban and their rival Northern Alliance. For this purpose, Pakistani diplomats and officials visited both Kandahar and Mazari Sharif, the political centers of the Taliban the Northern Alliance respectively. However, the Taliban took another way and turned down any proposal of coalition with any rival political outfit. The matchless success and control over the great chunk of Afghan territory made the Taliban leadership less enthusiastic in forging alliance with the Northern Alliance. Pakistan's pro-Taliban stance even annoyed China but could not put the Sino-Pakistan defense ties at stake.<sup>76</sup> Turning the upside down, in spite of providing a strategic depth to Pakistan, Taliban sought a strategic depth inside Pakistan. Rather giving Pakistan with a good bargaining position in interacting with US, Pakistan's pro-Taliban policy perturbed the course of US-Pakistan relations and widened the already existing gulf between the two countries. Looking at the domestic front, Taliban influence spilled over into the tribal area and borders of Pakistan. Getting inspiration from the Taliban victory, militancy in Pakistan rose up and posed certain law and order problems to the government. It was not only due to the Taliban triumph in Afghanistan but also due to the *Mujahideen* victory in checkmating the Soviet forces in Afghanistan that changed the perceptions in Pakistan and prevailed militancy. The radius of *Al-Qaeda* also spread into the tribal belt situated in the Northwest of Pakistan and its activities became more visible after 9/11. Taliban also refused to become a client of Pakistan and, on certain occasions, showed a clear deviation from the advices of their Pakistani patrons. Consequently, Pakistan's support to Taliban turned into a liability rather than an asset as envisioned by Pakistani policymakers.<sup>77</sup> On the other hand, the US officials were much more anxious about the possible future assault from *Al-Qaeda* on the US installations.

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<sup>76</sup> Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 404.

<sup>77</sup> Zahid Hussain, 2007, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle With Militant Islam*. Lahore: Vanguard Books. pp. 30-32

Osama bin Laden was a great bone of contention between the United States and the Taliban and Pakistan was viewed as the lifeline of both these menaces. United States was at odd with Taliban regime over the issue of giving asylum to the Saudi dissident who was held responsible for anti-US clandestine activities across the globe. The US was not only disgruntled over Pakistan's diplomatic ties with the Taliban but also resented the non-cooperation of Pakistan in apprehending bin Laden. It was alleged by the CIA that Pakistan was not helping the US in rooting out bin Laden from Afghanistan. The Director of CIA thought that Pakistan was even not providing intelligence support to the CIA to dismantle *Al-Qaeda* in Afghanistan. *Al-Qaeda*'s head, Osama bin Laden, had previously joined the Afghan *Mujahideen* to fight against the Soviet troops in 1980. But the camping of US troops on the Saudi soil in 1990 in the wake of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait turned Osama bin Laden against the United States. He took them as occupying forces in Saudi Arabia. He wanted their withdrawal from his homeland and centre of Islam. Therefore, he declared *jihad* (holy war) against the United States. He was exiled by Saudi Arabia on account of his anti-Saudi and anti-US activities. He was also deprived of his Saudi nationality. He went to Sudan and took refuge there. After immense US pressure over Sudan, he left Sudan and took shelter on the Afghan soil where he received warm welcome from the then Afghan government and later on from the Taliban. Fretted by the capability of *Al-Qaeda* to hit US installations, the US intelligence agencies stressed for the expulsion or extradition of *Al-Qaeda* chief, Osama bin Laden, from Afghanistan. In this context, ISI was in the focus of the American CIA. Covert operations had been proposed by the CIA against bin Laden and his terrorist network but all such ideas ended in smoke. Close contacts between an Afghan commander Ahmad Shah Massoud and the CIA were established to capture Osama bin Laden but the former indicated difficulty in the task due to alleged ISI links with bin Laden and the Taliban.<sup>78</sup> Cautioned by the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan and the US failure in Vietnam, the US hesitated to engage her forces in Afghanistan. The CIA paid dollars to Massoud but refrained from direct military involvement in operations against *Al-Qaeda*. However, on 7 August 1998, Afghanistan got more prominence in the US foreign policy when the intelligence agencies concluded that terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi

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<sup>78</sup> Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan*....p. 136.

(Kenya) and Dares Salaam (Tanzania) were conducted by *Al-Qaeda*.<sup>79</sup> These attacks left 250 people killed and 5000 wounded. The US intelligence agencies' reports held Osama bin Laden directly responsible for these attacks, who was then in Afghanistan. The Taliban were asked to hand over the Saudi-born financier of Taliban to the United States. Simultaneously, Ms. Albright, the US Secretary of State, hinted that by extraditing bin Laden to the US, the Taliban would improve their chances for international recognition.<sup>80</sup> Responding to repeated US call for extradition of bin Laden, the strong-headed Taliban asked the US administration to put forward solid proofs for bin Laden's involvement in bombing the US embassies in Nairobi and Dares Salaam. Another report expressed the vulnerability of US embassies in Tirana and Albania.<sup>81</sup> The US intelligence agencies feared that an 'unholy alliance' between the Taliban and *Al-Qaeda* was behind the anti-US activities and Pakistan's intelligence agencies had a hand on their back. According to the American agencies, this alliance was not only supporting terrorism against the United States but also threatening a nuclear war over Kashmir as the US suspected close links between *Al-Qaeda* and Kashmiri insurgents. The Counter-Terrorism Centre (CTC) at White House and the CIA both believed that Pakistan spawned and nurtured the Taliban with men and material. They were of the opinion that the Taliban provided desired strategic depth to Pakistan, on the one hand, and supported the Kashmiri insurgency, on the other. Therefore, these US intelligence agencies expedited their campaign against the Taliban and *Al-Qaeda* and mounted pressure over Pakistan to help the former out of fix. Meanwhile, the CIA had reports that bin Laden and other *Al-Qaeda* leadership were going to gather at a camp in Afghanistan on 20 August 1998 to assess the impact of their attacks on US embassies and plan their next operations.<sup>82</sup> Already at odd with the Taliban, the United States struck back and launched cruise missiles from US Navy warships against Osama Bin Laden's training camps in Afghanistan. The United States suspected that Pakistani ISI and some military officers were involved in training the terrorists at the Osama bin Laden camps inside Afghanistan.<sup>83</sup> Being in close contact with Osama bin Laden, these officers were alleged for the

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<sup>79</sup> Bill Clinton (former US President), 2004, *My Life*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. pp. 597-98.

<sup>80</sup> James Risen, 'U.S. Seeks Means to Bring Suspect from Afghanistan.' *The New York Times* (20 August 1998).

<sup>81</sup> Bill Clinton, 2004, *My Life*. p.798.

<sup>82</sup> George Tenet, 2007, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers. pp. 115-116.

<sup>83</sup> Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, pp. 137-138.

exchange of some sensitive intelligence information and, therefore, bin Laden was still at large. Amid this environment of mistrust and suspicion, the United States kept Pakistan totally unaware of the violation of the latter's airspace for missile attack on Afghanistan. It was also feared by the US administration that Pakistan might retaliate the cruise missiles launched by the US forces with nuclear warheads if they miscalculated and took them as Indian attack. Therefore, the US administration sent the vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Ralston, to have dinner with the top military commander in Pakistan at the time the attacks were scheduled and to tell him about the US missiles to avoid having them shot down or sparking a counterattack on India.<sup>84</sup> General Karamat, the then Pakistan Army Chief, was not satisfied with this arrangement as he felt that the Americans had not taken him adequately into confidence. Pakistan's Prime Minister also felt humiliated that instead of taking the supreme civilian authority into confidence, the United States talked directly to the Army chief about the missile attack. Pakistan's premier conveyed his displeasure to the US president on telephone. On the other hand, this missile attack could not achieve the real target, Osama bin Laden and his colleagues. Rather it proved counterproductive. It took eleven Pakistani lives on Pakistan territory. This US missile-strike provoked greater resentment in the pro-Islamic groups and all other political parties of Pakistan as it was considered a clear attack on Pakistan's sovereignty. Despite all the sophisticated intelligence networks throughout the world and state-of-the-art intelligence system, the US intelligence agencies were unable to find the whereabouts of bin Laden while his *Al-Qaeda* outfit was very successful in finding out US target across the world. Neither India nor any other country of the world except Pakistan could help US in bringing bin Laden and *Al-Qaeda* to justice. Similar was the case after 9/11 but it was wrongly told to the Pakistani masses that in case of Pakistan's non-compliance India would have provided logistic support to the US to eradicate the Taliban and *Al-Qaeda*. Non-willingness of the ISI to co-operate with CIA in apprehending bin Laden and appeasing the Taliban were pushing the US apart from Pakistan. The CIA officials in the Counter Terrorist Centre got alarmed when, in September 1998, an alleged *Al-Qaeda* member was arrested in Germany and charged with conspiracy to use WMD.<sup>85</sup> The source of the uranium was not disclosed by the intelligence reports but Pakistan was not out of suspicion. The US

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<sup>84</sup> Bill Clinton, *My Life*, p. 799.

<sup>85</sup> Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, p. 294.

administration was worried that Afghanistan might serve as a sanctuary of exporting terrorists to the United States and the Western world and a hidden nuclear threat was also sensed by the Americans. Therefore, to mount pressure over the Taliban to install a broad-based government, the US and Iran put forward the 'Six Plus Two' formula. The 'Six Plus Two' group comprised Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan had to form a group with the addition of US and Russia. On 21 September 1998, a ministerial meeting of 'Six Plus Two' was called by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session. This meeting was called under US pressure to urge the Taliban not to provide any more shelter to international terrorists, like Osama bin Laden, on Afghan soil and push the Taliban to put an end to their policies regarding human rights. The Six Plus Two resolution also called for the release and return of the Iranian diplomats who were captured by the Taliban. An investigation to probe the killing of Iranian diplomats in Mazare Sharif was demanded by the 'Six Plus Two' ministerial group. Pakistan's foreign minister Sartaj Aziz strongly defended the Taliban in this meeting. The US demand for extradition of Osama bin Laden remained unchanged while the Taliban were also adamant to their policy of non-compliance to this US demand. The Taliban again conditioned bin Laden's extradition with the submission of evidence against him. There was also an apprehension in the US administration that a Taliban-like movement would appeal to Pakistani public who were frustrated due to the long-drawn economic mismanagement on the part of successive Pakistani governments, political instability and chaotic law and order situation in the wake of crises in Afghanistan. The National Security Counterterrorism Office of the United States believed that Pakistani intelligence agency ISI was taking the Kashmiri militants to a camp in Afghanistan for training purposes. The State Department's Counterterrorism Coordinator advised the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 'to designate Pakistan as a state sponsoring terrorism'.<sup>86</sup> Madeleine Albright turned down this proposal. But the US government believed that without Pakistan's support, bin Laden was unable to stay any long in Afghanistan. Therefore, in September 1998, the US warned that as long as bin Laden stayed in Afghanistan, Pakistan would be directly held responsible if bin Laden's network attacks on the Americans. In October 1998, the United States asked the Saudi government to use her influence to urge

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<sup>86</sup> Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, p. 120.

Pakistan to expel bin Laden from Afghanistan through the Taliban. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah played a major role in this context. He exercised his influence over Pakistani premier to comply with the US demands. The US President had put off his South Asian tour because of the nuclear explosions by India and then Pakistan but invited Pakistani premier to pay an official visit to the United States. In December 1998, Prime Minister of Pakistan traveled to the United States. He was accompanied by the then ISI chief General Ziaud Din. President Clinton applauded Mr. Sharif's decision about Pakistan's nuclear detonations by saying that if he had in his place he would also had taken the same step.<sup>87</sup> During this visit, a plan was chalked out to capture Osama bin Laden through a secret commando group of Pakistan army. According to this plan, an elite group of Pakistani commando team was to kidnap bin Laden from *Tarnak Farms*, his base in Afghanistan, and hand him over to the Americans. Then he was to be secretly flown to a third country inside a commercial shipping container fitted with a dentist chair with strings. Subsequently, he was to be transferred to the US along with all his luggage. The Americans were to make his arrest public once he had been charged as a result of hectic interrogation. It was agreed that this action would be funded by the CIA but conducted by the ISI.<sup>88</sup> The US President also discussed the nuclear proliferation. Fingers were raised at the alleged nuclear ties between Islamabad and Pyongyang. Closure of Dr. A. Q. Khan's network was also sought by the US President.<sup>89</sup>

Prior to the Nawaz-Clinton summit, it was hoped by Pakistani officials that the summit would help in easing the US sanctions against Pakistan, soften the IMF lending terms under US persuasion, bring the Indian side to the talk-table and resolve the F-16 aircrafts issue. Before the summit took place, Clinton administration announced repayment of the amount paid by Pakistan before 1990 for the purchase of twenty eight F-16 fighter planes from the United States but no concession on sanctions was given. It should be remembered that the announcement of reimbursement was made by the US after Pakistani government's decision to initiate legal action against the US for holding both money and aircrafts. In the wake of this decision by Pakistan, the US Department of Justice concluded that as Pakistani case was strong enough and, therefore, there was a strong likelihood that Pakistan would

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<sup>87</sup> Shamshad Ahmad Khan, former foreign secretary. p. 2-4.

<sup>88</sup> Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, pp. 292-293.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p. 286.

easily win her case in the US courts. This conclusion had made the United States to resolve the F-16 aircraft issue during the official visit of the Pakistani Prime Minister to the United States in December 1998. The US administration offered to pay \$324.6 million from the Judgment fund of the US Treasury, which is a fund allocated to settle legal disputes of the US government. An additional amount of \$142.3 million was pledged to be made through other means. It was also agreed that \$140 million would be issued to Pakistan in the form of US goods and agricultural commodities. New Zealand had agreed to buy all the twenty-eight F-16 bomber jets that Pakistan had paid for, but their delivery had been held under Pressler amendment since 1990. Except the recovery of \$324.6 million, Pakistan reaped no other benefit from the Clinton-Sharif summit. However, this tour was considered as a triumph by Pakistan, as no parallel invitation was extended to the Indian Prime Minister at that time.

In the beginning of 1999, Strobe Talbott, the US Deputy Secretary of State, flew to South Asia for the seventh round of talks to discuss the nuclear issue with both India and Pakistan. This time the US focus was much on the containment of nuclear program and not the rollback as the *jinni* of nuclear arsenal had already come out and it could not be put back into the bottle. Clinton administration was much worried about Pakistan's rather than Indian nuclear development.<sup>90</sup> Thus, during his eighth round of talks, Mr. Talbott offered Pakistani officials that the US administration was ready to ease US-imposed sanctions against Pakistan on the conditions of signing CTBT, stopping the alleged missile cooperation with North Korea, participating in the multilateral negotiations to ban the production of fissile material, and putting in place a comprehensive nuclear export control regime. This protracted diplomacy unveils that the US involvement in South Asia had intensified in the wake of nuclear explosion by India and Pakistan in 1998. Before this development, South Asia was left more or less unattended by the United States. Replying to Talbott's offer, Pakistan conditioned her approval to the Indian positive response to such a proposal.<sup>91</sup> But India had already ruled out signing the CTBT and any effort for nonproliferation on regional basis. Hence, this proposal fell flat upon Pakistan and it was a setback for the US diplomacy. In April 1999, another phase of missile race in South Asia was waiting to irritate the US administration. In mid April Pakistan test-fired the second and improved version of her ballistic missiles called the *Shaheen*, and *Ghauri II* in

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<sup>90</sup> Hagerty, 'Kashmir and Nuclear Question Revisited...', pp. 4-5.

<sup>91</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*..., p. 351.

Baluchistan, southwestern province of Pakistan. According to Pakistan Press Agency (PPA), *Ghauri II* had a range of 1440 kilometers. It was tested in response to the Indian test of *Agni II* missile, which had a range of 1250 kilometers. *Agni II* had been tested by India a few days ago in April 1999. These tests intensified the tension between India and Pakistan and gave rise to an unrelenting missile race. Answering a news-reporter's question, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, then Army Chief in Pakistan, said, "We have developed Ghauri that is a most effective missile and better than that of Agni. India has the ambition to reach the world, but we have the capability to reach India."<sup>92</sup> This tit for tat missile tests reverberated the nuclear tests conducted by these two countries last year. This new development raised eyebrows in Washington, where strong resentment to nuclear proliferation was found earlier. Therefore, officials at the US embassies in Islamabad and New Delhi expressed US administration's displeasure and concern over the missile testing in both countries and described these developments as another step toward developing their nuclear arsenals, even though the tests, particularly by India, were not unexpected.<sup>93</sup>

However, on the diplomatic front, in relations between India and Pakistan a thaw was seen when a summit meeting took place between Prime Ministers of both countries in February 1999 due to US back-channel diplomacy. A bus service was started between Pakistan and India as a move of confidence building measures (CBMs). On the inaugural run of this bus-service, the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee reached Pakistan to hold talks with his Pakistani counterpart. This summit was taking place at the invitation of Pakistani prime minister that was responded positively by his Indian counterpart. Accordingly, a red carpet welcome was accorded to the Indian premier at *Wahga* (an international border between India and Pakistan). Giving a goodwill gesture towards his neighbors, Vajpayee visited '*Minare Pakistan*', the historical monument of struggle for Pakistan's independence, at this historic juncture of India-Pakistan relations. Referring to the Indian nuclear explosion he said, "Our Pokhran tests and my bus trip to Lahore are two sides of the same coin."<sup>94</sup> This was first time in a decade and fifth since 1947 that an Indian prime minister visited Pakistan. The significance of this summit lies in the fact that this was

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<sup>92</sup> Celia W. Dugger, 'Pakistan Tests New Missiles, Matching India in the Arms Race'. *The New York Times* (15 April 1999).

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Celia W. Dugger, 'Coalition Topples in India, Defeated by Just One Vote'. *The New York Times* (18 April 1999).

held in times of peace and not at the end of conflict as the history of Indo-Pak relations shows. This diplomacy was termed as ‘Bus Diplomacy’. The resumption of talks between these two major powers of South Asia was a real victory in itself. Both these nuclear equipped states had rightly concluded that there was no way round to peace in South Asia except talks. The driving forces behind these talks were; international pressure; desire to establish peaceful bilateral relationship; and the desire to minimize the threat of any possible nuclear conflict in South Asia. Good gestures from both sides emanated during this summit. The signing of a joint declaration at the end of this summit was a remarkable document. This declaration was called ‘Lahore Declaration’. It was indeed a ray of hope for peaceful settlement of disputes between Pakistan and India as it embodied both the recognition and determination to ensure peace and stability in South Asia. People of both countries appreciated this declaration and high hopes for peace were attached to it. This summit conveyed a message that these two overt nuclear powers were determined to begin a serious dialogue to remove all the hurdles in their way to become good neighbors. Through a ‘memorandum of understanding’, they promised to adhere to their declared moratoriums on further nuclear tests and agreed to inform the other side beforehand any test of ballistic missiles. These steps were taken to avoid any accidental use of nuclear conflict. Both Indian and Pakistani leaders were satisfied with the results of the summit. India was pleased at Pakistan’s reaffirmation of Simla agreement that called for bilateral talks to resolve issues between Pakistan and India. Expressing his jubilation over the successful summit, the Indian Prime Minister said:

*We can change history but not geography, we can change our friends but not our neighbors. We have seen hostility for years. Now friendship must be given a chance.*<sup>95</sup>

Pakistan was well content with India’s recognition of Kashmir as an issue that needed to be addressed through talks. It was also agreed to establish back-channel diplomatic links to resolve the longstanding Kashmir issue.<sup>96</sup> Subsequently, Pakistan appointed a former Foreign Secretary Niaz A. Naik while India chose R. K. Mishra as an interlocutor to carry on secret talks on Kashmir. To evolve a roadmap to resolve the differences between the two nuclear powers of Asia, a meeting at the foreign

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<sup>95</sup> Barry Bearak, ‘India Promises, With Pakistan, To Seek Peace’. *The New York Times* (22 February 1999).

<sup>96</sup> Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, p. 113.

ministers level was agreed upon in Lahore summit.<sup>97</sup> Taking into its folds all the irritants in the bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, the Lahore Declaration was an all-comprehensive document, which generated hopes for peace among masses on both sides. This declaration comprised the commitment for an intensification of efforts to resolve all the bilateral issues including the ‘core’ issue of Kashmir. Condemnation of terrorism in all forms and manifestation and adoption of measures to reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons were also embodied in the above-mentioned declaration.<sup>98</sup> But, ironically, a lack of coherence in formulation of foreign policy on the part of Pakistani decision-makers and pro-active military adventurism or an *international conspiracy* turned the upside down. The Indian Prime Minister rightly declared, “Peace-bus collided with the peaks of Kargil and was shattered to pieces.”<sup>99</sup> The congenial atmosphere emanated from ‘Bus Diplomacy’ disappeared altogether when the Kargil episode took place. All the euphoria created in the prospect of ‘Lahore Declaration’ melted away at once. Tension between India and Pakistan hit the high point when a limited conflict between them took place at the highest snow-capped peaks of Kargil, a 15000 feet highest mountainous area near the Line of Control (LoC) or the *de facto* border between Pakistan and India in the Kashmir valley. In May 1999, India came to know that a large number of militants had occupied the Kargil heights. It was a new tactic adopted by the guerilla warfare in Kashmir. It was believed that the operation was to enable the intruders to secure a dominant position to interdict Srinagar-Leh National Highway,<sup>100</sup> which was the main supply route to the *Siachin* glacier, the disputed area between India and Pakistan along LoC. This strategic position would have put Pakistan in a better bargaining position in talks with India. But Pakistan Army’s spokesman strongly resented this notion by saying that Pakistani forces can already shell the vital Indian highway that runs between Srinagar and Leh.<sup>101</sup> But nobody believed the Pakistani cover story. Some analysts questioned that if Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was behind the Kargil expediency then why he invited Vajpayee to Lahore and signed the much applauded ‘Lahore Declaration’. Of course, the military leadership that has always ruled Pakistan either directly or from behind the scene, was

<sup>97</sup> Shamshad Ahmad Khan, former Foreign Secretary. p. 2-4.

<sup>98</sup> Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy...*, p. 230.

<sup>99</sup> Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, pp. 116-117.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Celia W. Dugger and Barry Bearak, ‘Kashmir Thwarts India-Pakistan Attempt at Trust’. *The New York Times* (4 July 1999).

disgruntled with Nawaz Sharif's efforts to initiate the peace process with India without taking army into confidence. The military top slot was against the establishment of civilian authority over military institution as Mr. Sharif was asserting.<sup>102</sup> Therefore, the Kargil operation is thought to have been launched simultaneously with Lahore peace process. The India government claimed that the occupants of Kargil were Pakistani soldiers in the garb of Kashmiri infiltrators. Endorsing the Indian claim, the US believed that Pakistanis were behind the Kargil intruders.<sup>103</sup> On the other hand, the pushback of the so-called intruders was far from success. There was no possibility that the occupied area would be cleared by Indian forces in a number of days. It was felt by the Indian government that in the absence of an outside pressure, Pakistan-backed intruders would not withdraw from Kargil heights, as it is evident from the following:

*Given the Indian army's acknowledgement of its own inability to evict the Pak-supported intruders in the immediate future, it seems that unless pressurized by the UN, or the more powerful US, Pakistan may not take any step to withdraw its well-armed protégées from the positions which they have occupied in [the] Indian territory.<sup>104</sup>*

Intense fighting on the highest rugged peaks of the Kargil and Dras sectors kept on for more than two months. Heavy exchange of fire across LoC continued unabated. Missiles were deployed on both sides. War between the two newest nuclear powers of the Indian subcontinent alarmed the entire world.

To bring Pakistan under international pressure to vacate the occupied positions, India intensified her diplomatic efforts. India adopted a two-prong strategy to persuade Pakistan for an early withdrawal. On the one hand, India engaged Pakistan in talks and, on the other, she started gathering international support against Pakistan. At one point India was willing to negotiate the Kargil crises with Pakistan in the middle of June 1999. Indian Prime Minister sent R. K. Mishra to Islamabad to talk to the Pakistani officials and make them aware of the mounting pressure on Indian government to take more forceful action. Pakistani Premier Nawaz Sharif sent Niaz A. Naik to New Delhi to discuss the problem through back channel diplomacy. It was

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Farzana Shakoor.. 'The Kargil Crisis: An Analysis'. *Pakistan Horizon*, Volume 52, Number 3, July 1999. pp. 58-59.

the result of this back-channel diplomacy that persuaded both sides to resort to a diplomatic settlement of the crisis. On 27 June 1999, it seemed that an understanding had been reached 'on final settlement of the Kargil conflict'. The settlement was to be signed in New Delhi by the Prime Minister of India and Pakistan.<sup>105</sup> Therefore, it was suggested by India that Pakistani Prime Minister might make a surprised stopover in New Delhi on his way back from China. For this purpose, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif cut short his visit but suddenly India cancelled the offer.<sup>106</sup> Behind this changed Indian mindset, the US pressure was present.<sup>107</sup> The US administration was of the view that Pakistan was playing a game that was against US interests. The United States tried to prevent war but impeded to resolve the Kargil conflict. To refrain India from any direct settlement with Pakistan, Henry Kissinger was dispatched to New Delhi where he delivered a message of the US administration to the Indian Prime Minister on 9 June 1999.<sup>108</sup> The real motive behind Kissinger's visit to India was to safeguard the US interests as Pakistan was playing a game of brinkmanship that could encourage the Mujahideen to replay the same tactics again and again. The other factor that halted the proposed bilateral settlement of Kargil issue was the pressure from the hardliners in the Indian cabinet. Encouraged by the pro-India US and Chinese stand on Kargil, India demanded nothing less than the complete withdrawal of militants from this highest battlefield among the snow-capped peaks of Kargil. It is widely thought that Pakistan initiated this operation to internationalize the Kashmir issue but it isolated Pakistan internationally. Against the backdrop of this grim and volatile situation in South Asia, the entire world denounced Pakistan's stand on Kargil. In late May, Strobe Talbott, US Deputy Secretary of State, met Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and agreed to take firm stand with Pakistan. In return, India pledged not to cross the LoC or otherwise escalate the fighting.<sup>109</sup> On 12 June 1999, the US President Bill Clinton called the Prime Ministers of both Pakistan and India and urged them not to escalate the conflict. On 20 June 1999, the G-8 summit held in Germany,

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<sup>105</sup> Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, p. 119.

<sup>106</sup> Shamshad Ahmad Khan, former Foreign Secretary. p. 2-4, and Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, p. 119. and Shireen M. Mazari, 2003, *The Kargil Conflict 1999: Separating Facts From Fiction*. Islamabad: The Institute of Strategic Studies. pp. 61-62.

<sup>107</sup> On 9 June 1999, Henry Kissinger met Indian leadership in New Delhi and conveyed them a message from the US government not to negotiate with Pakistan. See Mazari, *The Kargil Conflict 1999...*, pp. 61-62.; Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, p. 119. and "Kissinger calls on Vajpayee, Advani, discusses Kargil", *The Hindustan Times* (9 June 1999).

<sup>108</sup> Mazari, *The Kargil Conflict 1999...*, pp. 61-63.

<sup>109</sup> Hagerty, 'Kashmir and Nuclear Question Revisited...', p. 130.

which demanded Pakistan to restore the LoC and maintain its sanctity. In a joint communiqué issued at the end of this summit, not only the violation of LoC was condemned but an immediate ceasefire was also demanded. This statement endorsed the Indian stance on Kargil. The European Union (EU) urged both Pakistan and India to show restraint by respecting the LoC and putting an end to the infiltration.<sup>110</sup> India used to call the infiltration from Pakistan as ‘cross-border terrorism’. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan expressed his apprehension over the Kargil fighting and asked both India and Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint. Mr. Annan offered to send his envoy to facilitate a ceasefire between the warring factions in Kargil. But the Indian Prime Minister rebuked the offer by saying, “Send the envoy to Pakistan; we don't need any envoy.”<sup>111</sup> All the capitals of the world were very receptive to the Indian stance while no weight was given to Pakistan’s standpoint. Despite the fact that Kargil was an extension of an on-going freedom struggle for Kashmir, no one in the world tried to find a link between the Kargil and Kashmir, a longstanding unresolved issue on the UN agenda. Embarrassed by the US and the Western pressure, Pakistan turned to her steadfast friend China. China declined to support Pakistan’s stand on Kargil.<sup>112</sup> Two factors were responsible for the Chinese approach. *One*, China was worried about the spread of Islamic militancy from Kashmir into Xinjiang, a province of China. *Second*, she was alarmed by the outbreak of a nuclear conflict in South Asia in case of escalation of the limited Kargil war.<sup>113</sup> Regarding the Kargil issue, unanimity of views between the US and China can be judged from the joint statement issued by these states in Washington on 27 June 1999. Referring to Kargil, the statement described:

*We [the US and China] will stay closely in touch on this issue, and will work with other members of P-5 and the Security Council [UN Security Council], the other Asian and Pacific countries and with broader international community to forestall further instability in South Asia, achieve a peaceful and mutually acceptable resolution of differences*

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<sup>110</sup> *Dawn*, (26 June 1999).

<sup>111</sup> Barry Bearak, ‘India Still Weighing Pakistan's Offer of Kashmir Talks’. *The New York Times* (31 May 1999).

<sup>112</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 353.

<sup>113</sup> Farzana Shakoor.. ‘The Kargil Crisis: An Analysis’. *Pakistan Horizon*, Volume 52, Number 3, July 1999. pp. 60-61.

*between India and Pakistan, and strengthen the global nonproliferation regime.*<sup>114</sup>

Thus, the Kargil episode brought a bad name to Pakistan because it was denounced by nearly all the countries of the world. It put Pakistani government in a fix both domestically and internationally. India diplomatically emerged victorious. The US was playing a very active but behind-the-scene role at the political level in the Kargil issue. Looking at the situation in Kargil, three areas irritated the United States. *Firstly*, the Kargil crisis was looked by the US as a threat to the regional stability in case of an escalation of war. *Secondly*, it could lead to the breakout of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan which was catastrophic not only to South Asia but to the world at large. *Thirdly*, the triumph of militancy in Kargil could push Pakistan in the grip of *Talibanization* in the country.<sup>115</sup> Giving ear to the Indian stand on the Kargil conflict, the United States held Pakistan responsible for violating the LoC and asked the latter to take steps for immediate pullback from Kargil. Indian leadership had ordered their armed forces to prepare for the possibility of war all along the international border with Pakistan. The US satellites detected these preparations.<sup>116</sup> According to *The Times* report, India was not only preparing to strike hard in Kargil but if needed it could also open other fronts and was willing to risk even a full-scale war.<sup>117</sup> Looking at these reports, the United States had apprehension that in case of Indian retaliation, the Indian backlash would not remain confined to Kashmir. The US was convinced that the limited Kargil conflict might convert into a full scale war between these two nuclear states. The US was also worried that in case of escalation of war, Pakistan may ask China and Arab states for help while India may call Russia and Israel to help her against her nuclear foe.<sup>118</sup> Consequently, the flames of war may take the whole region in their folds. However, this US perception was mere exaggeration. The possibility of the use of nuclear arms was also there to alarm the United States. But as a matter of fact there was little chance that India would resort to use nuclear option to vacate Kargil as both warring side were not only nuclear powers but fully aware of the consequences of its usage. In fact, there were corporate US

<sup>114</sup> Farzana Shakoor.. 'The Kargil Crisis: An Analysis'. *Pakistan Horizon*, Volume 52, Number 3, July 1999. pp. 61-62.; *Dawn*, ( 4 July 1999).

<sup>115</sup> Farzana Shakoor.. 'The Kargil Crisis: An Analysis'. *Pakistan Horizon*, Volume 52, Number 3, July 1999. pp. 60-61.

<sup>116</sup> Hagerty, 'Kashmir and Nuclear Question Revisited...', p. 129.

<sup>117</sup> Manoj Joshi, 'Michael Fathers, On the Brink', *Times*, 7 June 1999. pp. 48-49.

<sup>118</sup> Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, p. 118.

interests in India that might be at stake in case of a full-fledged war between India and Pakistan. Owing to the fear of full-scale war and the possible use of nuclear arsenals, the United States prompted to intensify her efforts to bring truce to the Indian subcontinent by resolving the dangerous issue of Kargil. On the other hand, the growing Indian casualties in Kargil forced Indian leadership to inform the US National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, that India might be compelled to escalate the operations.<sup>119</sup> Therefore, on 24-25 June 1999, the commander-in- chief of US Central Command (CENTCOM), General Anthony Zinni, was sent to Islamabad to ensure the pullback of forces. He met Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif and Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf from June 23 to 27 and informed them of the US concerns. He turned down Pakistan's claim that Pakistani Army was not involved in this operation and that Pakistan had no control over intruders. He urged the immediate pull back across the Kashmir Line of Control.<sup>120</sup> He also made it clear to Pakistani leadership that in case of any cross-over of international border by India, the United States sympathies would be on India's side. He also warned impliedly that Pakistan's nuclear deterrence had not helped in enhancing Pakistan's leverage with the United States.<sup>121</sup> Pakistan denied the involvement of Pakistani troops in Kargil and stressed the United States not to de-link the Kargil issue from Kashmir. But the US flatly refused to accept Pakistani stance. In fact, the United States did not want to dismay India by preferring Pakistan to India. The reason was obvious, the US looked India as a regional power to check the growing economic power of China. On the contrary, Pakistan was viewed by the US as an economically weak, politically unstable and strategically insignificant country. Therefore, apart from political and diplomatic pressures, Pakistan was put under economic pressure by the international donor agencies. The House Foreign Relations Committee of the US Congress passed a resolution that asked the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) to suspend all loans sanctioned for Pakistan until the withdrawal of militants from the Kargil heights.<sup>122</sup> Pakistani leadership had a fear that failure to early withdrawal may result in the cut-off of IMF aid to Pakistan and the consequent bankruptcy. Public in

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<sup>119</sup> Raj Chengappa, 'Face Saving Retreat', *India Today International*, 19 July 1999

<sup>120</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 352-253.

<sup>121</sup> Farzana Shakoor.. 'The Kargil Crisis: An Analysis'. *Pakistan Horizon*, Volume 52, Number 3, July 1999. pp. 60-61.

<sup>122</sup> *Dawn*, (3 July 1999).

Pakistan and their elected representatives, even the cabinet members were not taken into confidence on this important issue.<sup>123</sup> Only top military leadership and Prime Minister Sharif were in charge of the whole affair. Even the Air and Naval Chiefs of Pakistan were left unaware of this incursion into the Kargil sector. Some of the Corp Commanders of Pakistan army were ignored in the decision making process.<sup>124</sup>

These circumstances left no room for Pakistan except finding a way-out. Taking a political initiative Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, hurriedly flew to the United States in July 1999. Ironically, he consulted neither his members of the cabinet nor the then military chief.<sup>125</sup> Without any consultation at any institutional level and proper homework, he met the US President. The Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, the administrative head of foreign office in Pakistan, also expressed his anguish over the abrupt decision of US tour.<sup>126</sup> In fact, this Washington dash of Nawaz Sharif was decided between three; General Zinni, General Musharraf, the then Pakistan Director of military operations and 'architect of Kargil', and Nawaz Sharif himself.<sup>127</sup> The ill-fated Kargil operation, Gen. Zinni tour and military coup in Pakistan were some of the closely linked events that need to be explored to keep the record correct. Gen. Zinni was the main player who entrapped Nawaz Sharif to go to the US capital, Washington, and beseech before the US President for peace. General Musharraf was the only man in army who was taken into confidence by Gen. Zinni and was fully aware of the results of Nawaz-Clinton summit beforehand. Premier Nawaz Sharif was received halfheartedly in Washington. However, his meeting with President was arranged. He asked President Clinton for an immediate intervention to put an end to the ill-fated Kargil conflict. President Clinton had consulted the Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee before seeing Pakistani Prime Minister. During consultation, the Indian Prime Minister stressed an unconditional withdrawal of militants and Pakistani troops from the Kargil heights. He demanded full restoration of the LoC and refused any talks under the threat of 'aggression'. President Clinton assured him of his support. The US President also gave him surety that US would not put up with Pakistani aggression in Kargil; he would not reward Pakistan for violating the LoC; he would stand for the US commitment to the Lahore agreement; and there would be

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<sup>123</sup> Mazari, *The Kargil Conflict 1999...*, pp. 65-67.

<sup>124</sup> Shamshad Ahmad Khan, p. 2-4.

<sup>125</sup> Mazari, *The Kargil Conflict 1999...*, p. 69.

<sup>126</sup> Shamshad Ahmad Khan, former Foreign Secretary. p. 2-4.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

no third party intervention. While on the other hand, Pakistani Prime Minister was told by the US President, “Come only if you are ready to withdraw.”<sup>128</sup> The US President Clinton urged Nawaz Sharif to announce the pullback of the *Mujahideen* and stressed both countries to restart bilateral negotiations.<sup>129</sup> Pakistani Prime Minister pledged the withdrawal of *Mujahideen* from Kargil and assured that concrete steps shall be taken to restore the sanctity of the LoC. In turn, the US President Bill Clinton promised to take a ‘personal interest’ in encouraging an expeditious resumption and intensification of détente between India and Pakistan. But these US efforts were conditioned with the restoration and maintenance of the sanctity of LoC.<sup>130</sup> At the end of the summit, a joint declaration was issued. The declaration had no mention of Kashmir dispute of which Kargil was an extension. The promise by the US President was not more than eyewash for public in Pakistan or it was a self-deception on the part of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. This was a diplomatic victory for India and failure for Pakistan. It portrayed Pakistan as an aggressor while India was considered as an aggrieved party as her stand was endorsed in all the capitals of the world. Emboldened by this trend, human right abuses against the innocent Kashmiris by Indian forces stationed in Kashmir increased many folds. In bringing the limited Kargil war to a culmination, the US president helped Pakistan because the former needed Pakistan's support in fight against terrorism. The US was firm in the belief that Pakistan had close ties with the Taliban in Afghanistan against whom Clinton administration imposed trade embargo on 4 July 1999, the same day when Nawaz Sharif dashed into Washington. Meanwhile, the United States wanted Pakistan's support in apprehending Osama bin Laden as the latter was asked three times, before the Kargil crisis, by President Clinton.<sup>131</sup> Owing to the fear of ISI backing for the terrorists in Afghanistan, the issue of Osama bin Laden and *Al-Qaeda* was also discussed between Nawaz Sharif and President Clinton. Clinton recalled Nawaz Sharif's promise regarding operation against bin Laden. According to President Clinton:

*On July 4, I told Sharif [Pakistani Premier] that unless he did more to help [the US in capturing Osama bin Laden], I*

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<sup>128</sup> Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, p. 121.

<sup>129</sup> Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 419-420.

<sup>130</sup> Hagerty, ‘Kashmir and Nuclear Question Revisited...’, p. 131.

<sup>131</sup> Bill Clinton, *My Life*. p. 865.

*would have to announce that Pakistan was in effect supporting terrorism in Afghanistan.*<sup>132</sup>

In fact, it was not only the US threat but also the nuclear threat that prevented the escalation of war. The role played by the US was very disappointing for Pakistan.<sup>133</sup> Had the nuclear deterrent not in place, it would have been hard to believe that the limited Kargil conflict would not escalate to a full-scale war like in 1965 and 1971 between India and Pakistan.<sup>134</sup> Thus, the nuclear arsenal kept the battle confined to the Kargil and played a role in putting an early end to it. Therefore, ultimately, on 11 July 1999, the Director Generals of Military Operations of Pakistan and India met and agreed to put an end to the fighting. They also chalked out a timetable for withdrawal by 16 July 1999.

Although the US intervention prevented escalation of a 'limited battle' but it did not ensure peace in the long term. The failure of US to bring these two arch-rivals to the talk-table damaged the prospects for constraints on an arms race and any credible confidence building measure on the Indian sub-continent.

The US role in this whole episode was more pro-Indian than any time else in the history. At one point, amid fighting, Indian and Pakistani leadership had showed willingness to resolve the Kargil conflict but the US backchannel pressure sabotaged the diplomatic efforts. Poor economic condition and utter dependence on US-controlled international monetary institutions forced Pakistan to go on defensive in spite of an upper hand in the military encounter. Pakistani government even could not come off to shape the opinion of Pakistani masses in favor of actions taken. This gap in communication resulted in utter despair of public when they came to know about the Washington Declaration. Moreover, it was a very dangerous step on the part of Pakistani premier, who endangered his political future by taking such an unpopular step.

There were gaps in the policy both at the conceptual and operational levels. The shortcomings in the decision-making, manifested during the Kargil episode, were

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid., p. 866.

<sup>133</sup> It appeared at one time that General Zinni had given some assurance to his Pakistani counterpart that the US would be able to press India to come to the talks-table on Kashmir as a *quid pro quo* for Pakistan's 'withdrawal' from Kargil. Therefore, General Musharraf, then army chief, insisted that there would be no "unilateral withdrawal". See Mazari, *The Kargil Conflict 1999...*, pp. 72-73. also see *The News* (27 June 1999).

<sup>134</sup> Hagerty, 'Kashmir and Nuclear Question Revisited...', p. 134.

systematic and not the episodic.<sup>135</sup> These loopholes in the decision making system and the non-coherence among the policy makers turned the upside down. This episode not only hindered the peace process started at Lahore but also defamed Pakistan in the US power centers. It disclosed Pakistan's vulnerability to the US pressure. It discredited the democratically elected government of Pakistan both at home and abroad. The retreat of Pakistani forces from Kargil, under the Washington declaration, enraged Pakistani masses and opposition political parties. They condemned the accord. They termed this settlement as a 'sellout' of Kashmir to the Americans. They severely condemned Nawaz Sharif for losing hard-won military gains in Kargil for nothing much in return.<sup>136</sup> Newspapers in Pakistan strongly condemned the Washington Declaration and editorials were written against it. Scholars in Pakistan denounced it and questioned the unilateral climb-down of Pakistani troops. Some analysts thought it as a political gimmick of Nawaz Sharif and did not believe that the infiltrators would comply with the words of Pakistani premier. Majid Nizami, chief editor of a Lahore-based English newspaper, *The Nation*, said that he believed that there would be no withdrawal because the Kashmir cause is too close to the heart of most Pakistanis. He further added, "I think it won't be implemented because it would be political suicide for Nawaz Sharif. He will come home and say, 'I'll try to persuade the *Mujahideen* to come back.' After a month or two, there will be the rainy season in Kargil. In areas the *Mujahideen* have held, they will stay if they can. If not, because of weather, they will retreat."<sup>137</sup> Rifaat Hussain, a professor of International Relations at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad commenting on the 'Washington Declaration' said, "They do get support from Pakistan, but that doesn't mean they're willing to do Pakistan's bidding."<sup>138</sup> Some analysts in Pakistan worried that Pakistan's military leaders would not tolerate the promise of a unilateral withdrawal from Kashmir. These analysts feared a possible military coup in Pakistan. But Nawaz Sharif proved that he was true to his words. Had he failed in fulfilling his commitments, the South Asian security situation would have completely collapsed that would have brought innumerable miseries for both Pakistan and India. At the domestic level, though the military coup did not take place immediately but was surely in the offing.

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<sup>135</sup> Mazari, *The Kargil Conflict 1999...*, pp. 72-73.

<sup>136</sup> Celia W. Dugger, 'Pakistani's Pullout Vow: A Very Hard Sell at Home'. *The New York Times* (6 July 1999).

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

Despite the fact that General Musharraf was part of Nawaz-Zinni meeting in Islamabad, misperception between the civil-military leadership in Pakistan gave rise to a visible rift among them just after the climb-down from Kargil height. Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif blamed his military leadership for planning and executing the Kargil episode without bringing it to his notice.<sup>139</sup> While army held the Prime Minister responsible for humiliating retreat from a winning position at Kargil. Blame game and intrigues against each other brought the civil and military leadership in direct confrontation with each other. Consequently, the Kargil adventurism created a divide between Pakistan's armed forces and the elected government. The post-Kargil military reaction raises some questions over the role played by the US and Gen. Musharraf. According to an analysis the Kargil episode was a planned step to nullify the peace process between Pakistan and India and pave the stage for US direct intervention in Afghanistan. The military take over by Gen Musharraf was a plot made by both generals, Musharraf and Zinni. Therefore the first ever phone-call made by General Musharraf, after the military coup and assuming the office as the chief executive of Pakistan, to any official abroad was to General Zinni. During this call, he informed General Zinni about the accomplishment of the first step of their plan.<sup>140</sup> However, a temporary thaw came in the civil-military relations when the Prime Minister appointed General Pervez Musharraf as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff besides his appointment as Pakistan's army chief. On 2 September 1999, the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif extended Gen. Musharraf's tenure of office unto 6 October 2001. But even this gesture could not clear up the mind of the military chief from suspicions about his civilian chief.

In fact, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had sensed an army coup within a few weeks after Kargil conflict and, therefore, had sent his brother Shehbaz Sharif to win the US support against any possible military intervention. Mr. Sharif was warned by his attorney general that his government was about to be thrown out by the military. Reacting to Sharif's plea, the US State Department issued a warning against any military coup.<sup>141</sup> But, according to Shamsad Ahmad Khan, then foreign secretary of Pakistan, the US State Department was fully aware of the military preparedness to seize power in Pakistan but did not react actively to avoid the military coup. Looking

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<sup>139</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 353-254.

<sup>140</sup> Irfan Siddiqui, 'The President's Challenge'. *Daily Jang (Urdu)* (Karachi, Pakistan, 31 December 2009).

<sup>141</sup> Naunihal Singh, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 420.

from this angle, it can be easily understood that why the warning fell flat on the military leadership. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah was also aware of the plan of the rollback of democracy in Pakistan. On receiving this information, the aforementioned foreign secretary of Pakistan asked the Saudi Crown Prince for the life-guarantee of the Prime Minister. To console his apprehension about the life of his Prime Minister, such a guarantee was assured to him by the Saudi ambassador in Islamabad during a dinner between the two dignitaries.<sup>142</sup> In the last resort, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif replaced General Musharraf, who was on his way back from Sri Lanka, with the then ISI chief General Ziaud Din but army top slot refused to obey the orders of the elected Prime Minister and arrested the latter. The military corps commanders decided to take action to keep the army out of dominance of the civil and political leadership. Prompted by their desire to safeguard the interests of their institution in political and economic field, they took control of all key state installations like radio, television, parliament, and civil aviation. Driven by the appetite for power, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif along with his newly appointed General Ziaud Din were arrested and thrown into prison by the military officers.<sup>143</sup> A bloodless coup dismissed an elected government on 12 October 1999 and took control of the country for the fourth time. It was not an effort to defend General Musharraf as an individual but to safeguard the interests of the military as an institution against civilian and democratic incursion. The military leadership was also felt threatened by the possibility of an inquiry in the Kargil adventure. The US was aware of the preparation undertaken for the rollback of democracy in Pakistan but remained a silent spectator. The US State Department termed these anti-democratic developments in Pakistan as a domestic issue of Pakistan when contacted by the then foreign secretary of Pakistan Shamshad Ahmad Khan before the coup.<sup>144</sup> The stage was ready for the future US-Pakistan relationship between a military dictator in Pakistan and the American Pentagon. This new development in Pakistan hindered the US plan to send sixty Pakistani commandos, trained by the US forces with Sharif's support, to capture or kill bin Laden in Afghanistan.<sup>145</sup> For this purpose, the United States had paid \$25 million to Sharif government.<sup>146</sup> But no progress was made by Sharif government and the ISI under

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<sup>142</sup> Shamshad Ahmad Khan, p. 2-4.

<sup>143</sup> Ayesha Siddiqi, 2007, *Military Incorporated in Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 166.

<sup>144</sup> Shamshad Ahmad Khan, p. 2-4.

<sup>145</sup> Bill Clinton, *My Life*. p. 798.

<sup>146</sup> Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan...*, p. 7.

General Ziaud Din who was made army chief by Nawaz Sharif but not accepted by the Pakistan army. Thus, a decade-old democracy in Pakistan was crushed under the heavy military boots. The stage was set for the dawn of another dark era in the history of Pakistan.

### **Conclusion:**

The era since the beginning of 1998 till the end of 1999 had got much significance for South Asia due to three major events; nuclear explosion by Pakistan and India, the Lahore summit between Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee, and the subsequent Kargil conflict between the nascent nuclear powers of the region. These events turned South Asia into a much volatile region and urged the US to focus much on this newly nuclearized region, especially in the backdrop of mounting terrorism and the protracted Kashmir dispute between the nuclear-armed states of the region. Kashmir had turned into a nuclear flash point after the detonations of the nuclear devices by both the claimants of this disputed territory. Any misunderstanding between Pakistan and India could trigger off a nuclear war on the Indian subcontinent. To bring these old foes to the table-talks, the US made various efforts, which resulted in the 'Lahore Summit' but the ill-fated adventurism in the Kargil, brought the forces of both countries in an eyeball-to-eyeball contact with each other at the LoC. Catastrophic results could emanate from the limited Kargil war but sanity prevailed on both sides. The US played her role to prevent the escalation of war to parts other than the Kargil but blocked the way of direct negotiation between India and Pakistan. Despite the revocation of Clinton's visit to South Asia in the wake of nuclear explosions, this area had come into the focus of world community. After the nuclear detonations, the US foreign policy objective changed from roll back to the containment of the nuclear arms race and prevention of nuclear proliferation. Putting signature to CTBT and nuclear disarmament were the corner stones of US policy towards South Asia but all these US efforts were nullified by the Indian assertion to the unjust nature of these efforts. In the changing geopolitical and geo-strategic environment of the region, the US tried to prevent Pakistan from becoming another rogue state like Afghanistan but the US-Pakistan relations still remained hostage to the terrorism in the region and nuclear proliferation. This state of mind was reflected in the repeated allegations leveled by the Clinton administration against Pakistan and the discussion held at the

summit meetings between Pakistan and the United States. Missile technology of Pakistan and missile race between India and Pakistan equally irritated the United States.

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Chapter 5

After Military Coup (12 October 1999)

The fourth military takeover in the history of Pakistan and the first after the end of the Cold War was the result of a tug-of-war between Nawaz Sharif and Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the premier (February 1997-October 1999) and the army Chief (1999-2007) respectively. Lack of coordination among different power centers in Pakistan led to an egocentric tension that disrupted all institutions of the state except military establishment. This tension between two power brokers, Prime Minister and the COAS, resulted in a bloodless military coup on 12 October 1999 when the former tried to exercise his constitutional power to depose the latter and appoint a new army chief of his choice. Although the coup was bloodless but contrary to the past military takeovers in Pakistan, the prevailing international circumstances were not favorable for the army's taking control of power. Due to the dismemberment of Soviet Union, the United States was in no need for a frontline actor to check the communist menace. Therefore, this military takeover was not welcomed by the United States. Thus, the already deteriorated US-Pakistan relations marred further due to this change as these were far from good since the break up of Soviet Union. The European Union and the Commonwealth denounced the rollback of democracy by military and suspended Pakistan's membership in the commonwealth. But contacts were still continuing between Pakistan and commonwealth leaders. Within days after the coup, a Commonwealth ministerial action group met the new military junta in Pakistan and urged them to restore democracy as early as possible.¹ Pakistan was facing acute isolation at this point of history. In the new world order, democracy and checking the nuclear proliferation were the US policy objectives in South Asia. However, in the late 1990s, the prime US agenda was counter terrorism, *Al-Qaeda*, the Taliban in Afghanistan and a check over *Talibanization* in Pakistan. Accordingly, the Taliban ideology took the place of communist threat in the US foreign policy framework. Threatened by the rise of Islamic extremism, growing China had also preoccupied Clinton administration in the second term of office. To address the issue of extremism or terrorism, the US administration was forcing Pakistan to curb the Taliban, *Al-Qaeda* and Kashmiri insurgents. For this purpose, a carrot and stick policy was

¹ Abdul Sattar, 2007, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: 1947-2005*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 235-236.

adopted but stick was much employed than carrot. To avert the threat emanating from China's communist dogma and her economic and military potential to rise to the world horizon, India was supported tooth and nail. Clinton administration was tilted much towards India in mid-1990s. But certainly there were other factors responsible for the US inclination towards India. Just after the evaporation of Soviet Union, India had got prominence in the US strategy for South Asia but during President Clinton's second term of office, the US-India ties grew much faster. Of course, a vigorous economic and strategic engagement with India was desired by the United States due to a number of economic and political reasons.² Prompted by the Indian strategic needs, Indian leadership was also eager to have good relations with the United States. The collapse of Soviet Union had already discarded the notion of non-alignment. Therefore, perceiving the futility of non-alignment in the newly evolved unipolar world system, Indian leaders responded positively to the US call for a political and strategic partnership. In the post-Cold War unipolar world, India was, perhaps, looking for a suitable juncture to shed off the straitjacket of obsolete non-alignment.³ The Clinton initiative to embark upon a new politico-strategic partnership with this largest democracy of the world was a blessing in disguise for India, which was in search of a strategic partner to deter China from spreading her influence in the South Asian region and wanted to assume the status of a major power. The Clinton tilt towards India helped the Indian leadership in exploring new grounds to outlaw the

² In case of India, besides the efforts made by the Indian-Americans community, the domestic Indian corporate sector did her job skillfully. The US reliance on the well-developed Indian information technology (IT) sector has intermingled the US and Indian interests. Mumbai had become an economic hub for the US firms due to the vibrant Indian economic policies. Since 1991, the Indian open-market economy was attracting a large number of business tycoons from the United States. Businesspersons from 'Wall Street' and 'Main Street' showed great enthusiasm in investment in Indian economy. This overlapping of corporate interests urged the Clinton administration to engage India more actively than any other country of South Asia. Being in search of new jobs and business interests for their constituencies, the power holders at Capitol Hill also showed great interest for India. The coincidence of economic and strategic interests paved the way for close partnership between India and the United States. This is evident from the fact that the US-India Business Council and the India Interest Group played a great role in waiving off the sanctions imposed on India after the 1998 nuclear detonations.; See Devin T. Hagerty, 'The United States-Pakistan Entente: Third Time's a Charm?' in Craig Baxter (ed.), 2005, *Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economics, and Society*. pp. 4-5.; and also 'Confrontation and Retreat: The U.S. Congress and the South Asian Nuclear Tests', Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_01-02/rhjf00

³ Indian lobbies in Washington worked hard to forge a US-India alliance. India was paying \$50,000 per month for the lobbying services of Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson & Hand, which had on their panel two former Senate majority leaders, Democrat George Mitchell and Republican Bob Dole, and a former governor of Texas, Ann Richards. Indian government was paying an additional \$25,000 a month to Stephen J. Solarz, a former Democratic Congressman from New York, and famous for India friendly voice in the United States. These factors had added much to explore common grounds between the US and India governments and institutions. For details, see Raymond Bonner, 'Nuclear Rivals Marshal Armies of Lobbyists in Washington'. *The New York Times* (13 February 2000);

threats emerging from the nuclear ties between China and Pakistan, especially after the nuclear detonations of Pakistan in response to the Indian explosions in May 1998. Prompted by the rise of nuclear and economic China, both India and the United States mended fences and ushered into a new era of relations. In fact, a convergence of interests and meeting of minds between the leaders of these two large countries urged them to forge a new alliance where Pakistan had no room to take advantage of her strategic location as had happened earlier during the Cold War period. The growing geopolitical and geo-strategic collaboration between the US and India restricted the US interest in Pakistan as India was considered much influential in political, economic and strategic potentials than Pakistan. The warmth in the US-India relations was viewed detrimental by both Pakistan and China. However, the US-India politico-strategic nexus gave a new impetus to the already present defense cooperation between China and Pakistan. Consequently, an ‘all weather friendship’ and a ‘comprehensive friendship’ between China and Pakistan transformed into an ‘indispensable partnership’.⁴ The US ties with India distanced the two populous neighbors, China and India, from each other. In the US-India détente, the role played by China factor was of unprecedented importance that forced the United States to enter into a close strategic partnership with India. After the Tiananmen episode⁵ (1989), the US was worried about the challenges emanating from the communist China. The outspoken US Senators were advocating for a strong strategic partnership with India and not showering China with economic benefits. Economic reports were showing that in the first quarter of twenty-first century, China could put the US economic interests at stake. This expected economic growth could be achieved with energy resources and the energy short China could enter into a hectic competition with the US over access to the oil and gas reserves of Central Asian and Middle Eastern regions. To obstruct the course of rapidly growing China, the United States was looking towards India as a potential strategic partner. Besides China, the rapid spread in the Islamic militancy and terrorism in the South Asian and Middle East

⁴ Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti, 1996, *Great Powers and South Asia*. Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies.

⁵ The term ‘Tiananmen Square Protests’ refers to a series of demonstration in Beijing, beginning on 14 April 1989, started at the death of Hu Yaobang, a pro-democracy and anti-corruption official. Thousand of students and intellectuals gathered in an around the Tiananmen Square. On 4 June, the protests ended when China’s government took stern military action and the army-tanks cleared Tiananmen Square. The US had a soft corner for the pro-democratic protests and criticized the anti-democratic approach of Chinese government. A rift in the Sino-US relations was apparent in the wake of this incident.

region was also pinching the US in the shoe. In this context, Pakistan was in the US focus.

Being suspicious about Pakistan's links with terrorist groups in the region and the vulnerability of her nuclear assets, the US considered Pakistan as a potential threat. But without Pakistan's support, no efficacy was effective to eradicate terrorism from the region. Solution to the nuclear proliferation also could not be possible in case of the US complete estrangement with Pakistan. Therefore, the US administration could not overlook Pakistan despite the presence of a military regime there. To accomplish the US agenda of counter-terrorism in Afghanistan, the Caspian basin, Middle East and South Asia, Pakistan was still an effective ally but was not the 'most allied ally'. Although a new layer of sanctions was imposed by the United States on 15 October 1999 as a resentment against the military take over in Pakistan but access of the later to international monetary institutions was not impeded. No doubt, these coup-related sanctions against Pakistan added more to the agony of this economically backward country, which was already in the grip of a number of sanctions imposed by the United States and the Western countries after Pakistan's nuclear detonations in May 1998. This new wave of US-imposed sanctions made Pakistan ineligible for many kinds of US aid.⁶ Military aid dropped from US \$110.8 million (in 1999) to zero (in 2000). US-Economic assistance to Pakistan under Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) fell from \$61.8 million (in 1999) to \$3.8 million (in 2000) as Table 3.1 shows. Consequently, Pakistan went on the verge of bankruptcy. To save Pakistan from such a catastrophic situation, the military government desperately needed the US support on international monetary forums because of the fact that the new military government had inherited the fiscal disorder and a huge debt of \$38 billion beside the governance problems. To compensate the economic discrepancies arising from the US imposed sanctions, Pakistan was forced to go to the IMF and the World Bank. The role of the US was equivalently decisive in acquiring economic and technological aid from European countries, European Union, and international economic forums. Thus, to alienate Pakistan from the US aegis was not affordable for any government in Pakistan and the same was true for Musharraf-led military government. No one can deny that regardless the type of regime (civil or military) all governments in Pakistan have attempted to establish stable and long-term

⁶ Hagerty, 'The United States-Pakistan Entente', pp. 4-5.

Table: 3.1. US Economic and Military aid to Pakistan during FY 2000.**Pakistan****2000 U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants - Obligations and Loan Authorizations
(U.S. Fiscal Years - millions of \$US)**

	Post-War Relief Period 1946-48	Marshall Plan Period 1949-52	Mutual Scty Act Period 1953-61	Foreign 1962-66	Assist. 1967	Act 1969	(FAA) 1969	Period 2000	Total FAA Period 1962-00	Total Loans & Grants 1946-00	Principal Repayments 1946-00	Outstanding Loan Balances 1946-00
I. Total Economic Assistance	0.1	11.1	1,418.7	7,140.8	42.3	10.0	81.3	3.8	7,287.1	8,096.6	1,648.2	2,487.8
Loans	0.1	.	476.8	4,053.8	35.0	10.0	13.0	.	4,111.8	4,388.7	1,648.2	2,487.8
Grants	.	11.1	941.9	3,087.0	7.3	0.0	48.3	3.8	3,155.3	4,107.9	.	.
A. USAID & Predecessor	.	10.8	935.4	4,390.0	.	.	5.3	.	4,395.7	5,341.3	1,098.8	1,181.5
Loans	.	.	389.5	2,371.1	.	.	.	.	2,371.1	2,710.6	1,098.8	1,181.5
Grants	.	10.8	585.9	2,018.8	.	.	5.3	.	2,024.2	2,630.6	.	.
(of which Security Supp Assist/ESF)	.	.	586.6	2,122.0	.	.	1.7	.	2,123.9	2,710.2	.	338.3
B. Food for Peace	.	0.1	415.9	2,680.6	39.8	16.5	54.3	0.5	2,791.8	3,207.8	548.5	1,286.3
Loans	.	.	137.3	1,682.7	35.0	10.0	13.0	.	1,740.7	1,878.0	548.5	1,286.3
Grants	.	0.1	278.6	998.0	4.8	6.5	41.3	0.5	1,051.1	1,329.8	.	.
Title I Total	.	.	384.1	2,245.5	35.0	10.0	13.0	.	2,303.5	2,807.8	548.5	1,286.3
Repayment in \$ Loans	.	.	.	1,339.4	35.0	10.0	13.0	.	1,397.4	1,397.4	343.4	1,289.8
Payment in Foreign Currency	.	.	384.1	906.1	.	.	.	.	906.1	1,340.2	205.1	16.4
Title II (Section 416)	.	0.1	81.8	435.2	4.8	6.5	41.3	0.5	488.3	570.2	.	.
Emergency Programs	.	.	48.6	376.4	4.8	1.2	.	.	382.4	431.0	.	.
Development Programs A/16	.	0.1	33.2	58.8	.	5.2	41.3	0.5	105.9	139.2	.	.
Title III Total	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
C. Other Economic Assistance	0.1	0.4	67.4	70.2	2.5	1.5	2.2	3.3	79.8	147.5	0.1	.
Loans	0.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.1	0.1	.
Grants	.	0.4	67.4	70.2	2.5	1.5	2.2	3.3	79.8	147.4	.	.
Peace Corps	.	.	.	9.5	.	.	.	.	9.5	9.5	.	.
Narcotics	.	.	.	60.6	2.5	1.5	2.2	3.3	70.1	70.1	.	.
Other	.	0.4	67.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	67.8	.	.
II. Total Military Assistance	.	.	508.1	2,443.4	.	.	110.8	.	2,554.3	3,062.4	1,730.8	237.0
Loans	.	.	.	1,748.5	.	.	110.8	.	1,859.4	1,859.4	1,730.8	237.0
Grants	.	.	508.1	694.9	.	.	.	.	694.9	1,203.0	.	.
MAP Grants	.	.	480.8	169.6	.	.	.	.	169.6	650.3	.	.
Credit Financing	.	.	.	1,748.5	.	.	110.8	.	1,859.4	1,859.4	1,730.8	237.0
Inf. Military Education & Training	.	.	12.2	20.3	.	.	.	.	20.3	32.5	.	.
Transfer - Excess Stock	.	.	15.2	11.6	.	.	.	.	11.6	26.8	.	.
Other Grants	.	.	.	493.4	.	.	.	.	493.4	493.4	.	.
III. Total Economic & Military Assistance	0.1	11.1	1,926.8	9,584.2	42.3	10.0	172.7	3.8	9,821.3	11,758.9	3,378.1	2,724.8
Loans	0.1	.	476.8	5,802.3	35.0	10.0	123.8	.	5,971.2	6,448.1	3,378.1	2,724.8
Grants	.	11.1	1,450.0	3,781.9	7.3	0.0	48.9	3.8	3,850.2	5,310.9	.	.
Other US Loans	.	.	12.9	577.7	.	.	.	.	577.7	590.6	403.7	162.7
EX-IM Bank Loans	.	.	12.9	446.5	.	.	.	.	446.5	459.4	297.4	162.7
All Other	.	.	.	131.2	.	.	.	.	131.2	131.2	106.2	.

Source: USAID Greenbook 2000.


partnership with the United States. The new military government found itself on the same track. On the other hand, looking at the possible threats emanating from Pakistan's economic plight, the US decided not to block Pakistan's way to international monetary institutions for economic support. US trade links with Pakistan were also intact as Chart 7 and Table 3.2 show. The US administration was sure that in case of economic collapse, Pakistan would never hesitate to put her nuclear arsenal for sale in the black market and that was an antithesis to the US efforts for nuclear non-proliferation. Hence, fear of the terrorists' access to the nuclear devices would also have spurred. The nuclear devices at the hands of terrorists could play havoc even to the US security. Therefore, despite deep overt concerns, the US decided covertly to patronize the nuclear Pakistan ruled by a military ruler. Subsequent developments in the region, however, proved that a ruler garbed in the military uniform was the need of the US agenda, too.

For the United States, it was easy to deal with a military dictator to carry out the US agenda and therefore, George W. Bush (Jr.), then the governor of Texas and the Republican candidate for US Presidential elections 2000, suggested that "the general" now leading Pakistan (Pervez Musharraf) might be better for stability in the Indian subcontinent and its neighboring region. Preferring the general, he went on to say that the general was better than the corrupt and incompetent civilian government that the military ran off. Frank Anderson, former CIA chief of the Near East division and Milt Bearden, a former CIA chief in Pakistan suggested to Clinton that the military takeover in Pakistan should be embraced and no effort should be made to isolate or sanction Pakistan for this coup as it was the best time to force Pakistan to comply with the US interests.⁷ But this idea did not make Musharraf favorite to Clinton administration. Being subdued by her spirit for democracy, the US administration demanded from Musharraf a time frame for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. On the other hand, the military ruler in Pakistan was reluctant to show his cards to the United States and he was shirking any share to any other party except Pakistan army of which he was a concomitant part. Some of the interests of the US and military dictator in Pakistan were incompatible but in the broad spectrum they were best to cater each other need. The divergence of interests led them to confrontation but not estrangement for a while. The period after the military coup

⁷ Frank Anderson and Milt Bearden, "The Case for 'the General'." *The New York Times* (12 November 1999).

US Trade with Pakistan: FY 2000

Chart. 7



Source: Chart compiled on the basis of data given in the table 3.2.

Table: 3.2

NOTE: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars, and not seasonally adjusted unless otherwise specified.

Month	Exports	Imports	Balance
January 2000	31.9	163.0	-131.1
February 2000	25.4	159.8	-134.4
March 2000	28.4	169.6	-141.2
April 2000	33.4	156.2	-122.8
May 2000	37.7	180.8	-143.1
June 2000	41.8	188.9	-147.1
July 2000	35.5	198.4	-162.9
August 2000	38.2	216.2	-178.0
September 2000	42.2	197.3	-155.1
October 2000	59.5	209.9	-150.4
November 2000	45.4	172.1	-126.7
December 2000	42.9	154.6	-111.7
TOTAL	462.3	2,166.8	-1,704.5

SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division, Data Dissemination Branch, Washington, D.C. 20233

in Pakistan (1999) until 9/11 (2001) was full of tension in the history of US-Pakistan relations. However, recognizing the strategic worth of Pakistan, the United States considered political stability in the former as an essential factor in the stability of the entire South Asian region and beyond. Karl Inderfurth, US Assistant Secretary of State, in a testimony at a hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (CFA) for Asia and Pacific subcommittee stated:

Pakistan is important because it can serve as an 'example' of a progressive Islamic democracy, because it is a link—both economic and political—between the Indian Ocean and Central Asia, because it has significant human and economic resources and because it has historically been a friend of the United States.⁸

As stated earlier, nuclear proliferation was the longstanding US concern that had become one of the key objectives of US foreign policy in South Asia, especially Pakistan. To check the nuclear proliferation, the US wanted to engage Pakistan. But in the late 1990s, the issue of nuclear non-proliferation and the A.Q. Khan dilemma were somehow divorced from the rest of the issues, at least, for some time.⁹ Checking terrorism had become the top most US priority as it was considered a direct threat to the US interests. A calm, peaceful and stable South Asia was a prerequisite for the US global agenda.

Meanwhile, the South Asian peace and stability had been greatly perturbed by the grim state of relations between Pakistan and India. Antagonism between India and Pakistan was greatly due to the long drawn Kashmir dispute and Indian hegemonic designs since 1947. In changing strategic environment after the Soviet break up, the US longed an economically sound and militarily strong India to check the influence of communist China into the rest of Asia. But the protracted rivalry between Pakistan and India was hindering the US goals in the region. On the other hand, without addressing the core issue of Kashmir, neither stability at the regional level nor elimination of terrorism at the global level was possible. This fact had become known to the United States long before. The US was also aware that no solution to Kashmir

⁸ Rashmi Jain (ed.), 2007, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2006: A Documentary Study*. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers. pp. 153-154.

⁹ Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, 2007, *Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons*. New York: Walker & Company. p. 292.

was possible without foreign power involvement as taking advantage of her status India was unwilling to find a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir, the only Muslim majority province of India. But the US shunned any intervention in this dispute. The US was equally concerned about Indian antipathy to any outside involvement in her bilateral disputes with neighboring countries. Therefore, instead of responding to Pakistan's repeated calls for mediation, the US urged Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue through negotiations with India. The US wanted to put an end to terrorism but did not try to nip the evil in the bud – the Kashmir dispute. In fact, war prevention on the Indian subcontinent was the longstanding US objective but conflict resolution had never been taken up seriously. The right of self-determination promised to the Kashmiri people by the UN Security Council never got support from the United States. On the other hand, Indian allegation of Pakistani infiltration in Kashmir got prominence in the eyes of Clinton administration. Endorsing the Indian stance, the US administration denounced the alleged infiltration into the Indian-held Kashmir from Pakistan. The US repeatedly urged Pakistan to cease support to the infiltrators. Likewise, the US was more than sure that there were close ties between Pakistani ISI, *Al-Qaeda*, the Taliban and other *jihadi* outfits present and operating from Pakistan and Afghanistan in Kashmir. All these groups were considered as close allies of Osama bin Laden. The Americans were made to believe that terrorism was the greatest threat to the US and that this potent threat was becoming more lethal day by day. The US citizens were assured that the US was the most favorable target of terrorists. They were also told that most of the terrorism was caused by the extremist Islamic groups.¹⁰ Therefore, a close relationship was considered to be there between Osama bin Laden and the Kashmiri militants who had taken up arms as a result of an indigenous political conflict with Indian government. The Kashmiri youth had taken up arms for their right of self-determination and it was not a rare phenomenon. Not only Kashmiri insurgents but also the other groups like the one in Colombia had taken up arms against the political injustices and economic exploitation. But ironically, the Kashmiri insurgence movement was not only misunderstood but also equated with a movement like that of *Al-Qaeda*. *Al-Qaeda* was also wrongly portrayed as a representative of the whole Muslim community and thus Islam and terrorism were identified as the two sides of the same coin. But all this was a malicious effort on the

¹⁰ Larry C. Johnson (a former State Department counterterrorism specialist). 'The Declining Terrorist Threat', *The New York Times*, (10 July 2001).

part of Western, especially the American media, to malign Islam. As Eighty-two percent of the attacks in Colombia were against the management of the Colombian oil pipelines by the American and British companies. These attacks were launched as an instrument of violence but the attackers wanted to disrupt oil production that led to the undermining of Colombian economy.¹¹ These attacks had political motives and, therefore, human beings were not targeted. Even the Americans, who were abducted were, later on, released. Their abduction was due to their working relationship with American oil companies like Halliburton, Shell, Chevron, Mobil, Noble Drilling and Erickson Air-Crane.¹² The case of Kashmiri insurgency was also indebted to political rather than religious causes. Like Columbians, they were struggling to shun out the Indian exploitation. On the other hand, it was a renowned fact that neither the Taliban nor Osama bin Laden declared *jihad* (holy war) against India but the US intelligence agencies were out to find an abstract link between all the militant groups in the region. In fact, the bureaucracies in the Pentagon and in intelligence agencies desperately worked to find an enemy to justify the budget growth.¹³ For this purpose, the US administration was forced to equate Kashmiri insurgency with *Al-Qaeda* network. With the disappearance of communist peril, the ‘terrorist’ threat took the place of the former. Later on, these efforts and some other US policy measures really brought bin Laden and Kashmiri militants in close collaboration with each other as the former provided training facilities to the latter in *Al-Qaeda* camps inside Afghanistan. Pakistan was considered by the US as a hub that joined these two militant movements together. The alleged nexus of bin Laden to Kashmiri militants was considered by the Americans as an axis detrimental to the US interests in the region. Thus, the spillover of bin Laden’s influence in Kashmir prompted the US to insulate rest of South Asia through Pakistan and the Taliban. The American CIA was much vocal against bin Laden threat and demanded the US administration to conduct overt surgical strikes against *Al-Qaeda* and bin Laden inside Afghanistan. But until 9/11, despite CIA’s strong recommendations the US did not want to land her forces into Afghanistan. To achieve this objective, diplomatic and non-violent channels and peaceful political instruments were employed by the United States. The US administration stressed upon diplomatic and economic encirclement of the Taliban regime by imposing

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

sanctions through the UN Security Council resolutions. On 4 July 1999, Clinton administration imposed a ban on US trade with Afghanistan and blocked all the Taliban assets in the United States. The United States also convinced the United Nations' Security Council to impose sanctions against Afghanistan. On the US plea, the UN Security Council passed her first resolution to impose sanctions against the Taliban. Accordingly, all member states of the UN froze Taliban's assets. Afghanistan's national airline (*Ariana*) was banned to fly outside Afghan airspace.¹⁴ Through another resolution, the UN Security Council called for a worldwide ban on the arms supply, a decrease in the diplomatic representation of Taliban and restricting foreign tours by senior Taliban officials.¹⁵ This resolution was particularly directed at Pakistan, which was then the sole supporter of Taliban. It was a signal for Pakistani policymakers to change their Afghan policy to ward off US pressure but Pakistan remained steadfast in her support to the Taliban. Consequently, US-Pakistan relations got much strained. The above-mentioned UN resolution was not only supported by the US but the Russian Federation also backed it to curb the ongoing 'Taliban movement' that was thought an obscurantist movement by them. Basically, these UN sanctions were aimed at pressing the Taliban government to extradite Osama bin Laden to some other country and to close the terrorist centers being run on the Afghan soil. Russia was accusing the Taliban for aiding separatists in Chechnya, a Russian part where Muslims had been demanding a separate state like all other Soviet units who came out of the Russian yolk after the evaporation of communist system. Russia was viewing Pakistan as the lifeline of the Taliban. Therefore, Russia tried to convince the international community to take strong action against Pakistan, too. In fact, neither the US nor Russian Federation was interested in bringing truce to the war-ravaged Afghanistan. They were forwarding their own interests only. According to *The New York Times*, the Human Rights Watch report titled: "Crisis of Impunity: The Role of Pakistan, Russia and Iran in Fueling the Civil War in Afghanistan," alleged that there was a considerable evidence of broad Iranian and Russian support for the anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Further, the report said that some of the Central Asian countries were also augmenting the Russian efforts. With the active

¹⁴ These restrictions were under the Resolution 1267 passed by the UN Security Council on 15 October 1999 against Taliban government. See Hafeez Malik, 2008, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Imperial Dimension*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 167.

¹⁵ These sanctions were imposed against Taliban by the UN Security Council through Resolution 1333 passed on 19 December 1999, see Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, p. 167.

involvement of Russian government, military assistance was provided through the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border. The *New York Times* went on to disclose that UN resolutions proved counterproductive and self-defeating as the movers of these resolutions were themselves hectically involved in adding fuel to the protracted civil war in Afghanistan.¹⁶ According to the Human Rights Watch Report, backers of the above-mentioned UN resolutions on Afghanistan were engaged in providing military support to the Afghan parties that had committed gross violations of the laws of war. The report further disclosed that several members of the "six-plus-two group" -- the six nations bordering Afghanistan, plus Russia and the United States, were trying half-heartedly to reach a negotiated settlement to put an end to the war.¹⁷ But the whole brunt of the mischief in Afghanistan fell upon Pakistan and the latter was criticized for providing active support to the Taliban. Pakistan was constantly refuting this stance. Reacting to this allegation, General Musharraf strongly denied the impression that Pakistan was providing the Taliban with arms and ammunitions. He said, "We don't have the resources ...financial or military, especially now, to pass on to Afghanistan". Defending Pakistan's position for recognizing the Taliban as a legitimate government of Afghanistan, he said that the Taliban were in control of 90 percent of the Afghan territory and, therefore, there was no way around except recognizing them [as the legitimate ruler of Afghanistan].¹⁸ He expressed his determination to carry out Pakistan's Afghan policy. In other words, Pakistan was not ready to wash her hands off the Taliban support. Meanwhile, another resolution was passed by the UN Security Council to station monitors in Pakistan to observe the implementation of UN resolutions against the Taliban, especially to ensure the ban on arms supply.

Simultaneously, US pressure was mounting on Pakistan to make the Taliban regime to revisit their policies. Efforts were made to force the Taliban to form a broad based Afghan government representing all groups and sections of the Afghan society. Pakistan was the centre of these efforts. Arrest or killing of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan was the corner stone of the US policy. To convince the Taliban to hand

¹⁶ Barbara Crossette. 'Rights Group Says Taliban Aren't Solely to Blame for the Afghan Disaster', *The New York Times*, (13 July 2001).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ This statement was given by General Musharraf while addressing a public gathering in Quetta, the capital of Balochistan, southwestern province in Pakistan, on 7 December 1999. See *Dawn*, (8 December 1999).

over bin Laden to the US, the US administration kept on mounting pressure over the military junta in Pakistan. Bin Laden's network, *Al-Qaeda*'s activities against the United States had made it most abominable for the latter. On the other hand, Taliban were asking the US to produce clear-cut evidence against bin Laden before his arrest. They were demanding a fair trial of him. But setting aside all the Taliban offers to hold a judicial trial of bin Laden in Afghanistan through Muslim jurists, the US clung to the expulsion of Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan. Instead of seeking a compromise with the Taliban, the course of confrontation was adopted. To achieve this objective, the American CIA did all her best to convince Pakistani ISI to help her in the eradication of bin Laden and his *Al-Qaeda*. Despite the absence of any anti-Indian reference by Osama bin Laden in his messages to his followers, Kashmiri insurgency was closely related with bin Laden's network by the United States to bring Pakistan under pressure.

Fretted by the instability in South Asia, the United States was much startled about the insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistan was alleged to facilitate all the militant movements in the region. But all this was done to gather storm against Pakistan.¹⁹ *Madrasahs* (religious seminaries) in Pakistan were thought by the United States to be the sanctuaries and recruitment centers of these militants. To cut off the supply line of men to the militant groups, these religious schools in Pakistan were subjected to criticism by the United States. The United States asked Pakistan to close certain religious seminaries inside Pakistan in order to restrain militancy in Kashmir and to derail *Al-Qaeda* in Afghanistan. In order to check the spillover of *Al-Qaeda* activities in Kashmir, Pakistan was also asked to interdict travel of militants to and from camps in Afghanistan. To prevent militant groups from acquiring weapons and to block financial and logistic support to camps in Afghanistan, crackdown against them was demanded by the US from Pakistan.²⁰ These were the US demands which she could not implement herself despite all her military might and physical presence in Afghanistan after 9/11.

¹⁹ Jane Perlez. 'US Ready to End Sanctions on India to Build Alliance', *The New York Times*, (27 August 2001).

²⁰ This statement was issued by Michael A. Sheehan, the US Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, before a Senate Subcommittee on 20 October 1999. He said, "We have repeatedly asked Islamabad to end support for terrorist training in Afghanistan, to interdict travel of militants to and from camps in Afghanistan, to prevent militant groups from acquiring weapons, and to block financial and logistic support to camps in Afghanistan. We have also urged Islamabad to close certain *madrasahs*, or Islamic schools, that serve as conduit for terrorism." See Jain, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 154-155.

Adding much to the US agony, another ironic incidence took place. An Indian Airlines plane was hijacked which was on her flight from Khatmandu (Nepal) to New Delhi on 24 December 1999. Both Pakistan and India condemned the hijacking but simultaneously accused each other for staging the hijacking.²¹ The hijackers were Kashmiri militants or their supporters who demanded the release of a Muslim cleric Massoud Azhar and several other militants, who were in an Indian Jail for propagating and perpetrating *jihad* against Indian occupation of Kashmir. They put forward some other demands, too. Bowing before the hijackers' demands and the handing over of the militant was a humiliating option for India. Unwillingly India yielded before the hijackers to ensure the safety of passengers on the plane. But it was claimed by Indian leadership that these suspects had close connection with Pakistani ISI and a Kashmiri militant group.²² Adding fuel to the fire, the hijacking heightened the tension between the nuclear rivals of South Asia. To pressurize Pakistan and to divert the domestic fury, India reinforced troops along LoC. In the subsequent months, violence along LoC continued that invited diplomatic intervention from the United States. Looking at the possible involvement of Pakistan in the hijacking of the Indian plane, the US-Pakistan relations further aggravated. The Clinton administration issued a public warning to Pakistan that it could be put on the 'watch list' of the countries supporting terrorism. It was alleged that the Pakistan Army had backed the hijacking of an Indian Airlines.²³ This sardonic action of hijacking Indian plane had brought Pakistan on the verge to be declared a 'terrorist state' by the United States that meant winding up all the US aid to Pakistan.²⁴ Nevertheless, sanity prevailed on the part of US administration and ultimately the US officials ruled out the involvement of Pakistan in this plot.²⁵ However, diplomatic pressure stepped up on Pakistan to ban a *Jihadi* outfit named *Harkatul Mujahideen* that actively operated in the Indian-held Kashmir. By these pressure tactics, Clinton administration intended to

²¹ Robert D. McFadden, 'Standoff on Hijacked Jet Is Tangled in India-Pakistan Feud'. *The New York Times* (27 December 1999).

²² Hagerty, 'Kashmir and Nuclear Question Revisited...', p. 24.

²³ James P. Rubin, the US State Department's chief spokesman, said that a possible connection between Pakistan's military and the group tied to the hijacking, Harkat ul-Mujahedeen, "is a matter of extreme concern to us -- this is an organization that we have declared a terrorist organization." See Philip Shenon, 'U.S. Warns Pakistan It May Be Branded a Sponsor of Terrorism'. *The New York Times* (28 January 2000).

²⁴ Zahid Hussain, 2007, *Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle With Militant Islam*. Lahore: Vanguard Books. p. 7.

²⁵ Doug Bereuter, Chairman of the US Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, said at a seminar sponsored by the East-West Center and the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington DC. (2 February 2000). See Jain, *The United States and Pakistan...* pp. 157-158.

bully Pakistan to conform to the US demands regarding the crackdown against terrorists in the region.

As stated in the previous chapter, prior to the coup, Pakistan's Prime Minister during his Washington visit, amid the Kargil crises (1999), had acceded to the US demand to support a CIA sponsored operation against Osama bin Laden. The military coup in Pakistan (12 October 1999) had disrupted this planning of operation against bin Laden. Prompted by the desire to capture bin Laden, the US President had sent a letter to General Musharraf within three days after military coup (1999), urging him to establish a road map for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan and asked him to help the US in apprehending bin Laden. General Musharraf had ruled out any such operation. He advised the Clinton administration to engage the Taliban in talks, to seek their moderation, and to win the hearts and minds of Afghan people.²⁶ In January, three high-ranking US officials Inderfurth, the US Assistant Secretary of State, Michael A. Sheehan, the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism, and Donald Camp, the Director for South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council visited Islamabad and met General Musharraf. They were intended to lay out the administration's concerns about Pakistan on terrorism, the restoration of democracy, and to hear the response. Clinton's non-proliferation specialist, Robert Einhorn, was not accompanying the delegation. Explaining the absence of Robert Einhorn, Inderfurth told that Einhorn was not accompanying them because the immediate US agenda was counter-terrorism, *Al-Qaeda*, the Taliban, and democracy.²⁷ At the beginning of the new millennium, Pakistan's nuclear program and A. Q. Khan network had become secondary issues for the United States. However, the very concept of possible access of *Al-Qaeda* to the weapons of mass destruction was the most horrific thing for the United States. Therefore, the disruption of *Al-Qaeda* was the top-most US priority that had relegated all other priorities. On the assertion of the US Assistant Secretary of State, Musharraf assured him that he would himself meet the Taliban leader to urge him to hand over bin Laden to the United States. However, the military ruler ruled out any action by Pakistani commando group inside Afghanistan. He did not act in accordance with US demand to ban a Kashmiri militant outfit. He was even unwilling to take action on the basis of the US intelligence report against *Al-Qaeda*'s chief recruiter, Abu Zubaida. According

²⁶ Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, p. 156.

²⁷ Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, p. 292.

to the CIA reports, Abu Zubaida was living in Peshawar, the capital city of Northwestern province of Pakistan. Later on, he sent the ISI chief to negotiate the US concerns regarding Osama bin Laden with Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader in Afghanistan. This meeting bore no fruit. In the US, the ISI Chief was doubted as a good sympathizer of the Afghan Taliban, *Al-Qaeda* and Kashmiri militants. The US administration and the CIA were fully affirmed that *Al-Qaeda* and the Taliban were enjoying Pakistan's ISI information, technical and logistic support. Nevertheless, Pakistan repeatedly and strongly negated the notion that ISI was harboring *Al-Qaeda* or the Taliban or any other militant group. The CIA documents showed that *Al-Qaeda* network had presence in sixty countries. These documents also made it clear that *Al-Qaeda* was seeking chemical and biological weapons to use against the United States.²⁸ Against this backdrop, the CIA officials were constantly demanding from the US administration to launch a covert action against *Al-Qaeda* on the Afghan territory. For this purpose, they wanted support from the countries neighboring Afghanistan. George Tenet, the Director of CIA, was of the opinion that no covert or overt action against *Al-Qaeda* was possible without Pakistan's support. He said that it had been obvious that without Pakistan's cooperation, it would be almost impossible to root out *Al-Qaeda* from behind its Taliban protectors. The US administration was not giving sufficient weight to the view of direct physical involvement in Afghanistan.²⁹ An active involvement in Afghanistan was not on the agenda of Clinton administration due to the lessons emanated from military intervention in Vietnam, which resulted in the Vietnam War (1950). Clinton administration had become much concerned about terrorists' access to the lethal weapons, after the US intelligence reports showed a close relationship between the Pakistan military, Pakistani nuclear scientists and *Al-Qaeda*.³⁰ According to US intelligence reports, *Al-Qaeda* had a chief of Weapons for Mass Destruction (WMD), named as Abu Khabab al-Masri who had conducted crude chemical weapon experiments outside Jalalabad, an Afghan city. He was alleged for being in contact with Pakistani nuclear scientists to get nuclear bomb.³¹ In April 2000, The US tried hard to win the ISI chief General Mahmood Ahmad. The US Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering told him that the Taliban were harboring

²⁸ George Tenet, 2007, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA*. New York: Harper Collins Publishers. pp. 130-131.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 130-160.

³⁰ Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, pp. 292-294.

³¹ Ibid.

terrorists who killed Americans. He was warned that the people supporting the Taliban were the US enemies. He also threatened that if ISI did not abandon its support to the Taliban, the United States would deal it like bin Laden. He also made it clear that in case of non-compliance of the Taliban with the US demand of extradition of bin Laden, the US would support the anti-Taliban leader Massoud, a bitter critic of Pakistan.³² It was astonishing that instead of engaging the Taliban directly, the US was asking the Pakistani ISI chief and for this purpose the Massoud-card was used. But in fact, the US was more than sure that the real force behind the Taliban and bin Laden was Pakistan. This seems to be a deliberate US effort to take on Pakistan in the future. In the wake of US invasion of Afghanistan (2001), the US drone attacks in the tribal border of Pakistan with Afghanistan, under the pretext of the hot-pursuit of the Taliban, is an unambiguous evidence of this US planning. However, the ISI chief did not agree with the US Under Secretary of State during that meeting. Thus, this move to change Pakistan's policy towards the Taliban had badly failed in those days. It was also believed by the United States that some of Pakistan's nuclear materials were being offered for sale in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The United States worried that sooner or later the terrorists might get their hand on WMD. Therefore, the American CIA was mulling over Pakistan as the top US-enemy.³³ Being aware of the precarious economic conditions of Pakistan due to a number of US-imposed sanctions, the United States thought that Pakistan might have sought hard currency through nuclear proliferation. Therefore, in late 1990s, the US fears of nuclear proliferation by Pakistan got exacerbated. Planning against Pakistan's nuclear program, a joint training of the US and Israeli secret commando teams was underway in the United States for surprise attacks on Pakistan's nuclear installations.³⁴ To brush aside the US reservation over Pakistan and the threat of nuclear proliferation from the latter, Musharraf took an initiative to set up a National Command Authority and chaired it himself. Still fingers were raised by Washington against Islamabad's nuclear program while Indian nuclear program was viewed by the former as if she was a legitimate nuclear weapons state like China or a US protégé like Israel, which remained outside the nonproliferation regime but seemed to be a responsible enough nuclear custodian.

³² Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, pp. 176-177.

³³ Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, p. 293.

³⁴ Robert Wirsing, 'Pakistan's Strategic Options: From Cold War to the War on Terrorism', in Saeed Shafqat (ed.) (2007), *New Perspectives on Pakistan: Visions for the Future*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 363-365.

As stated earlier, in view of the US administration, the `containment of China was possible through a nuclear India. This thinking made Indian program acceptable for the United States. The other factor was the role played by the Indian American community. During the Clinton's final year in office, there was a great divergence in the US and Pakistani interests while US-India relations enormously bettered due to strategic convergence on several points.³⁵ The US administration viewed India as a global player in the US foreign policy. While on the other hand, Pakistan's role in eliminating terrorist groups and checking their terrorist activities was not considered up to the US demands. Pakistan was feeling discomfort over this US tilt towards India. Despite all Indian desire to keep any foreign power at bay from South Asian problems, the US could not allow the nuclear foes in the region to play havoc with the world peace by embarking into a conflict that could lead to nuclear exchange. Being aware of the catastrophic results of any armed-conflict between Pakistan and India, the US pressed both India and Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint and not to escalate tension to a point that can trigger off a war. Such a war, in turn, could endanger the US corporate and strategic interests in South Asia. But to resolve the longstanding Kashmir dispute was also converse to the US interests in South Asia. Thus, it was a critical dilemma for the US administration to keep a balance in relations with all the stakeholders. On 14 March 2000, before Clinton's tour to South Asia, contrary to the essence of the Washington Declaration, the US Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, issued a statement that the US President was not going to mediate over the Kashmir dispute. She said:

Our interests include avoiding the threat of conflict in South Asia, fostering democracy in Pakistan, fighting terrorism, preventing proliferation, and doing what we can to help create an environment of regional peace and security, and reaching out to a people [Pakistani nation] whose history is one of friendship with the United States.³⁶

President Clinton also expressed the same reluctance on 21 March 2000.³⁷ On the other hand, the alleged Pakistani support to insurgency in Kashmir was enough to dismay the already disgruntled Clinton administration. In an effort to isolate Pakistan,

³⁵ Hagerty, 'The United States-Pakistan Entente', pp.4-5.

³⁶ Jain, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 157-158.

³⁷ An interview of the US President Bill Clinton with Press Jennings of the ABC World News, New Delhi, 21 March 2000.

the Indian leadership and Indian lobbyist Stephen J. Solarz tried hard to convince the US President to bypass Pakistan during his South Asian tour in March 2000. A clear wedge in the US-Pakistan relations became more visible during the weeklong South Asian tour of the US President Bill Clinton. He spent five days in India while stopped only for five hours in Pakistan just to keep the communication channels open. These and some other factors widened the gulf in the US-Pakistan relations. The US President did not want to treat India and Pakistan even handedly. Even the decision to take the five-hour brief stopover was taken after weeks of infighting in his administration. This uneven approach towards India and Pakistan showed the desperate longing of Clinton administration for India while a complete divergence of interests between Pakistan and the United States. According to the US officials, the trip was not meant to give approval to the military coup, but the main purpose of this brief interaction was to urge the military ruler to restore democracy, ratchet down the tensions with India, and outlaw an Islamic fundamentalist group that the United States had accused of terrorism. According to the White House sources, "If Mr. Clinton had rebuffed Pakistan, he would strengthen the militant groups that threaten to push the country into a political and economic collapse and would dishearten advocates of a secular democracy."³⁸ Endorsing these remarks, Clinton asked General Musharraf to restrain militancy in Kashmir and to exert pressure on terrorist groups in Pakistan not to cross the border between Pakistan and the India-held Kashmir. But Pakistan denied any active involvement in insurgency inside Kashmir. Nevertheless, the chief purpose of his visit to Pakistan was to urge the military ruler to co-operate with the US on *Al-Qaeda* and bin Laden's issue, and to restore democracy in Pakistan. Reiterating the persistent US demand to apprehend Osama bin Laden from the Afghan soil, the US President asked General Musharraf to do this great job for the United States.³⁹ In response to this US demand, Pervez Musharraf articulated his problem saying that it was quite difficult to deal with 'people who believe that God is on their side.'⁴⁰ Differences between them on other issues also remained unresolved as both sides remained adamant to their positions. The striking contrast of opinion on these issues emanated from the speeches of the US and Pakistani presidents at the end of their meeting. Ironically, the US president did not even bother to mention the Kashmir

³⁸ *The New York Times*, (8 March 2000).

³⁹ Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, p. 295.

⁴⁰ Dennis Kux, 2003, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000, Disenchanted Allies*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 357.

issue in his speech to the Indian parliament, before coming to Pakistan. The US President addressed Pakistani people through television. Endorsing the Indian stance during the address, he stressed both India and Pakistan to resolve their differences over Kashmir through bilateral talks. Negating the possibility of any US involvement in the issue he declared, “We cannot and will not mediate or resolve the dispute in Kashmir. Only you and India can do that through dialogue.”⁴¹ It was a great Indian victory to keep the US away from any direct involvement in the Kashmir dispute. The US was in no mood to perturb the rising India for the sake of a Cold War ally, Pakistan. However, the military government continued to pull out all the stops to address the US concerns and by putting in plain words various constraints and compulsions on its part. Throughout 1990s, the Indian efforts had intensified to keep Pakistan isolated through propaganda and actions. The Indian government along with the Indian-American community left no stone unturned in putting Pakistan on the US State Department’s ‘Terrorist Countries List’. But to prevent Pakistan from becoming a true rogue state the US administration declined to comply with the Indian views. The reason for not honoring the Indian demand was the US apprehension that such a step might turn Pakistan into another Afghanistan that would not only jeopardize the US interests in the region but would also disrupt the Indian security and so that was not acceptable to the Clinton administration.⁴²

To distant US from Pakistan, another ironic incidence took place in Kashmir while Clinton was still in India. Thirty-six Sikhs were killed in Kashmir. Reacting immediately, India blamed Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT), a militant organization in Kashmir, for this onslaught. Over a long course of time, it did not become clear as to who was behind that plot but the target was indeed the US-Pakistan relationship. This happening further damaged Pakistan’s image. Clinton’s concern over infiltration of militants from Pakistan echoed in his interviews. Answering a question, on ABC World News, President Clinton expressed his concern over a third party involvement in Kashmir violence. On inquiring about the third party’s identity, he ambiguously replied that the propagators of violence were neither Kashmiri people nor Pakistani government but he did not rule out the possibility of some Pakistani elements in Kashmir.⁴³ The spiraling tension between Pakistan and

⁴¹ Hagerty, ‘The United States-Pakistan Entente’, pp.4-5.

⁴² Jain, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 156.

⁴³ An interview of the US President Bill Clinton on 21 March 2000.

India, after the Kargil episode, continued throughout the year 2000. Cross border firing, shelling and blame game continued between the two countries. This hostile trend in the Indo-Pak relations was multiplying the menace of the eruption of a catastrophic conflict between the two South Asian nuclear powers. But the more horrific was the credibility gap between these two powers. Their mistrust could lead to some very disastrous results. Feared by the unpredictable South Asian security situation, the United States repeatedly emphasized for the resumption of bilateral peace talks between India and Pakistan according to the spirit of Lahore Declaration. Convinced by the Indian propaganda of cross-border terrorism (infiltration) in Kashmir, the United States urged both India and Pakistan to ensure the sanctity of LoC. The US call for not violating LoC was much applauded by Indian government, as India was much interested in declaring LoC as an international border. However, Clinton's advice on Indian nuclear build up fell flat on Indian leadership. His call for stopping excessive use of force in Kashmir was also not taken seriously. Indian president rejected the US analysis that South Asia had turned into the most perilous region in the world due to the Kashmir dispute.⁴⁴ The de-escalation of tension between these two nuclear powers was the most important US agenda in the post-Kargil era.⁴⁵ Owing to the Indian resentment to the third party involvement in Kashmir and the US policy, the US administration paid no heed to find out a permanent efficacy to the Kashmir dispute even through peaceful means. Clinton's advice to hold talks was only to pacify Pakistan's calls for mediation. To keep the prospects of US importance in South Asia intact, the United States was in no mood to find a sustainable solution to the long drawn rivalry between Pakistan and India. After the settlement of Kashmir dispute, Pakistan would have no more fears of Indian aggression. The driving force behind the US-Pakistan relations was the feeling of insecurity against Indian hostilities. Any permanent thaw in relations between these two strong-headed neighbors could surely put an end to the US involvement in the region. However, greatly perturbed by the possible extension of *Al-Qaeda* activities into Kashmir, the US President strongly voiced against the involvement of an outside militant group like *Al-Qaeda* in Kashmir. The US administration doubted the ISI role in bringing *Al-Qaeda* and Kashmiri militants in close alliance with each other. On 30

⁴⁴ *The New York Times*, (23 March 2000).

⁴⁵ Address by the US Secretary of State to the South Asian Society, Washington D. C., (14 March 2000).

April 2000, the US State Department's Annual Report on Terrorism leveled the same kind of allegations. This report stated, "While it has arrested and extradited several terrorists, it had refused to end support to groups that train terrorists in neighboring Afghanistan and in Pakistan itself and has declined to close certain religious schools that serve as a conduit for terrorism."⁴⁶ Neglecting the limited resources and geo-strategic compulsion of Pakistan, the United States was demanding so much from Pakistan, which was not even possible for the US herself despite all the resourcefulness. During a press conference, Thomas Pickering, the US Under Secretary of State, stressed: "Pakistan can and must play a role to convince Afghanistan's ruling Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden to face trial."⁴⁷ On 12 July 2000, the US State Department's Coordinator for Counter Terrorism clearly stated that Pakistan had allowed certain terrorist to live there and they had been freely moving everywhere in the country. He raised fingers over Pakistan's policy in her East and West especially the role played by ISI.⁴⁸ In a statement before House International Relations Committee, the US Coordinator for Counterterrorism Michael A. Sheehan stated, "Pakistan has a mixed record on terrorism." Although he admitted the cooperation rendered by Pakistan in curbing terrorism but showed his discontent over the results and demanded to 'do more'. He elaborated Pakistan's generous cooperation with the United States and other countries in apprehending and extradition of some top 'terrorists' but he further said, "Pakistan has tolerated terrorists living and moving freely within its territory." He even admitted that Pakistan was itself a victim of terrorism, but remarked, "Pakistan bears some responsibility for the current growth of terrorism in South Asia. That we are allies makes it all the more important that we cooperate to rid the area of terrorism."⁴⁹ To ward off the US pressure, *Hizbul Mujahideen*, the dominant militant group operating in the Indian-held Kashmir, made an offer of an unconditional dialogue with Indian government on 24 July 2000. But it was asserted by the *Hizbul Mujahideen* that the proposed talks would be out of Indian Constitution. This offer of dialogue by the militants was thought to be tactical move on the part of Pakistani government who

⁴⁶ Jain, *The United States and Pakistan*..., p. 161.

⁴⁷ This press conference was held in Islamabad on 27 May 2000, See *Ibid.*, p. 162.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

⁴⁹ See House International elations Committee of the US Congress. 'A Special Report on Pakistan and Terrorists Link'. Washington, DC., December 2000, pp. 245-289.

was alleged to be the supporter of that militant outfit against India.⁵⁰ Ever since Kargil conflict, Pakistan was seen as an aggressor in the western capitals and to wash out this stigma Pakistan took this initiative. Despite Pakistan's refusal of any link with the aforesaid militant group, no one endorsed this stance. On the other hand, turning a blind eye to Indian use of force was also not possible for international community. Indian revulsion to any outside role in Kashmir dispute kept the major powers at bay from direct involvement but the US back channel diplomacy was in vogue. To appease the world's concern over human rights violation and to keep Pakistan off the talks table, India responded positively to the proposed negotiations with militants. Indian army operations against *Hizbul Mujahideen* were stopped but other militant groups were not awarded with the same concession. It was a deliberate Indian move to divide militants. It is to be noted here that despite General Musharraf's persistent offer for talks with India 'anywhere, anytime and at any level' was bluntly rejected by India under the pretext of infiltration in Kashmir. The truce between Indian government and Kashmiri militants could not last long. *Hizbul Mujahideen's* insistence to include Pakistan in negotiation broke up the peace process between India and the aforementioned militant group. On the other hand, despite unrelenting Indian intransigence to avoid Pakistan, the latter did not give up efforts to resume talks with India. Stressing about the centrality of Kashmir dispute, Gen. Musharraf reiterated in a press conference that there could be no peace without the solution of Kashmir problem.⁵¹

Struggling hard to resume the stalled peace process and bring India to the talks-table, Pakistan repeatedly asked the United States to use her influence to make the Indian leadership realize the gravity of Kashmir problem and open a dialogue between India and Pakistan. Highlighting the importance of foreign mediation on Kashmir dispute, General Musharraf unequivocally said, "Unless there is mediation, strong mediation, justice cannot come about." Quoting the example of East Timor he said, "Mediation is definitely required, and East Timor provides an excellent example of how the situation can be solved if the world community shows the will." Further, he said, "The United Nations never recognized Kashmir as part of India, just as East

⁵⁰ *The New York Times*, (31 July 2000).

⁵¹ Kathleen McNeil, 'Chronology of Events: 12 October 1999-September 2004', in Charles H. Kennedy and Cynthia A. Botteron (ed.), 2006, *Pakistan: 2005*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 261.

Timor was never recognized as Indonesian.”⁵² As mentioned earlier the Indian aversion to the foreign powers’ intervention in South Asian affairs was the main hurdle that restricted the way of US direct mediation in Kashmir. But insulation of Kashmiri militants from *Al-Qaeda* was one of the US policy objectives and India was happy with the US diplomatic onslaught on *Al-Qaeda* and Kashmiri militant groups. To keep the situation in control and not to let the South Asia to go in the grip of serious instability, the US administration used secret diplomatic channels to persuade India to cease her brutal military operations during the holy month of Ramadan in November 2000. Taking pause in the military operations against militants in Kashmir, India announced a one-month truce during the 9th lunar month of the Islamic calendar, Ramadan. It was really a tactical Indian move to gather support from Muslim population in Kashmir and the rest of India. Replying to this Indian move, Pakistan unilaterally declared in December 2000 that Pakistani forces would observe “maximum restraint” along the LoC in Kashmir. Simultaneously, without pressing for Pakistan’s participation in talks, Pakistan’s foreign minister urged India to negotiate the Kashmir issue with All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), a conglomeration of separatist political parties in the Indian-held Kashmir.⁵³ In the given circumstances, Pakistan’s policy was; 1) to diffuse tension along the LoC and international borders with India, 2) offer dialogue on Kashmir, 3) offer CBMs along LoC, 4) let Indian forces be engaged with militants inside Kashmir, and 5) ask international community to mediate. To carry out this agenda, a slight reduction in the number of troops on LoC was announced by Pakistan. Giving a goodwill gesture, Indian forces extended the ceasefire even after Ramadan. Looking at the reduction in skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani armies and a visible decline in Kashmiri *intifada* made the Indian Prime Minister to offer an extension in the cease-fire until the end of May 2001. Pakistan complied with the proposed extension but Indian army intensified its operations against Kashmiri people inside the Indian-held Kashmir. Despite all these Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), the US tilt towards India was a clear indication of endorsing the Indian stance over Kashmir. The US used her diplomatic channels to push Pakistan for stopping cross-border infiltration as was alleged by India.

⁵² Barbara Crossette, ‘Summit in New York: Kashmir; Pakistani Leader Voices Little Hope for India Talks’. *The New York Times* (6 September 2000).

⁵³ Hagerty, ‘The United States-Pakistan Entente’, p. 25.

Amid the entire grim situation in Kashmir, the US nonproliferation sword was hanging over the nuclear assets of Pakistan. Pounding frictions between the US and Pakistan over nuclear and missile programs were still dominating the course of relations between them. To ward off the US pressure and sooth the European anger over the nuclear program of Pakistan, the then military government in Pakistan decided to differentiate between signing and ratification of CTBT. Emboldened by the US Senatorial rejection of the CTBT, Pakistani government started deliberation over signing the treaty but not ratifying it like the United States. Pakistan thought that mere signing would incur no cost as this act would not bring the treaty into effect because of the US non-ratification and Indian refusal to become even a signatory. Getting an edged over Indian stance, this idea floated in Pakistan.⁵⁴ Optimistic about reaping other benefits from signing, Pakistani officials thought that it would not only give high moral ground to Pakistan over India but also isolate the latter. But sensing about this idea, some political parties threatened the military ruler of the use of street power against the government. The military government was in no mood to instigate these parties and, therefore, dropped the idea of putting signature to the treaty. Despite failure of the US Senate to ratify the treaty, the US administration was determined to bring Pakistan and India into the fold of the CTBT. Meanwhile, in mid 2000, US intelligence agencies detected some flow of missile technology from China to Pakistan, which alarmed the US Senate. Owing to the tense US-Pakistan relations, the last gift extended to Pakistan by the outgoing Clinton administration was the imposition of missile related sanctions against Pakistan in November 2000.⁵⁵ These sanctions were imposed under the pretext of the transfer of *M-11* Chinese missile from China to Pakistan. Clinton's non-proliferation advisor Robert Einhorn flew to Islamabad and warned the Director of Strategic Plan Division in Pakistan against the possible repercussions of the transfer of *M-11* missiles from China. Later on, the United States alleged that this deal was a gross violation of MTCR. But both Pakistan and China refuted any violation of MTCR by declaring that these missiles range was quite under the MTCR parameters. Not only Pakistan's Ministry of Defense and Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Council came under the storm of US-imposed sanctions but Iran was also brought in the ambit of these sanctions under the pretext of past Chinese assistance in the Iranian missile program. Despite the

⁵⁴ Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, pp. 198-199.

⁵⁵ Hagerty, 'The United States-Pakistan Entente', pp. 4-6.

strong refusal by China and Pakistan, the US administration could not be convinced. These sanctions could not alter the steadfast flow of technology. China remained undissuaded in supporting Pakistan's defense capability. China augmented Pakistan's defense potential due to the strategic compulsions of the former. To get rid of other constraints, peace at the South Asian level was also necessary. But the long-drawn-out issue of Kashmir was the stumbling block in achieving peace in South Asian region. Therefore, through back channel diplomacy a 'friendly pressure' was put by the US over India to start a dialogue process between India and Pakistan. Beside the political motives the US corporate interests were the driving force behind the US move to bring both Pakistan and India to the talk-table. Meanwhile, a change of administration took place in Washington. George Walker Bush carried the day in the polls at the end of Clinton's second tenure but after winning weeks long legal battle.

On 20 January 2001, George W. Bush took over as the new US President with a fresh, aggressive and apparently well-seasoned foreign policy team. The members of this newly appointed administration had extremely hawkish approach. They had aggressive foreign policy objectives. Along with them, they had brought a determinant resolution in ushering a new chapter in the US foreign policy. They were quite adamant in their vision to make the United States unchallengeable in the twenty-first century. In early 2001, Bush administration worked hard to bury the ungratified international pact that aimed at the banning of tests of nuclear arms. According to a US administration official, Bush had resolved to let the CTBT languish in the US Senate. Bush hoped to convince the supporters of the treaty to acknowledge that the treaty is effectively dead. Bush's aides were trying to persuade the nations of the world to abide by a nonbinding moratorium on nuclear testing but not to put stress on the CTBT.⁵⁶ Bush administration was also stressing on pre-emptive actions rather than engagements in talks as Bush had earlier declared during his acceptance speech at the Republican Convention in 1999, "Now is not the time to defend outdated treaties but to defend the American people."⁵⁷ Instead of resorting to containment and deterrence, they adopted a strict confrontational approach in dealing with any possible threat to the US interests. Elimination of unwanted regimes was on the card of this newly inducted administration. Diplomatic engagement was not favored by it. It was a

⁵⁶ Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, 'White House Wants to Bury Pact Banning Tests of Nuclear Arms'. *The New York Times* (7 July 2001).

⁵⁷ Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, pp. 299-301.

complete shift in US strategy at the dawn of the new millennium. Keeping in view their goals of US *imperium*, they expedited their work on the much-criticized anti-ballistic missile system for the United States. China was still being considered as a threat to the US global ambitions. Instead of following Clinton's economic approach towards China, a completely new outlook was adopted. The policy of purposeful engagement with China was replaced with a 'crafted nebulous policy.' Five areas of divergence with China were identified by the Bush administration; 1) Taiwan; 2) Tibet; 3) Hong Kong; 4) National Missile Defense System (NMD); and 5) human rights.⁵⁸ Friction in relations between China and the United States became more visible when China forced a US reconnaissance plane EP-3 to land on Hainan Island in China. China asserted that the American plane was on an espionage flight inside the Chinese territory. On the other hand, the United States was adamant that the plane was on a routine surveillance mission in international airspace over the South China Sea.⁵⁹ Later on, China resolved the dispute peacefully. But Bush administration kept on her confrontational approach towards China. Differences over Bush's policy on NMD, the US weapon sale to Taiwan, China's missiles deal with Pakistan, and arrest of US scholars by China on charges of espionage still persisted to keep US and China away from cordial relationship. To keep the US supremacy intact and to contain China, Bush suggested that a new cooperative global security regime would be created and targets would be the so-called rogue states and terrorists. This was a new strategic framework for global security. This new power distribution got much applause at the hands of Indian leadership.⁶⁰ India fully supported Bush administration's policy on NMD.⁶¹ This was a great overturn on the part of India, a champion of nonalignment during the Cold War period. But in the context of India's nuclear ambitions, this turn about was easy to understand. Endorsing Bush policy regarding NMD, India's objective was to pave her path to acquire this type of technology in future. The second motivation behind the Indian tactful praise for US policy on NMD was the Indian desire that US mounts pressure on Pakistan to stop infiltration in the Indian held Kashmir, which was a hard nut for India to crack. Other Indian objectives were the repeal of US sanctions imposed on India after Indian nuclear detonations in May 1998, and the acquisition of nuclear reactors from the

⁵⁸ Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, p. 153.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 153-154.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 159-160.

⁶¹ Celia W. Dugger. 'Rare Praise From India on U.S. Defense'. *The New York Times*, (27 May 2001).

United States.⁶² Taking serious notice of the rapidly changing geo-strategic scenario, Pakistan felt more than worried about the possible evolution of this new vision of Bush administration and the US-India alliance in the proposed strategic framework.

The United States considered India as an effective counterweight to China's growing influence in Asia. The financial support of the Indian-American community during Bush's presidential campaign had made Bush administration more lenient towards India.⁶³ India was looked as a natural strategic partner by the United States. Pakistan, on the contrary, was viewed as a country that can offer more problems and few opportunities.⁶⁴ The US wanted to ensure that China must accept the US-led security architecture in South Asia and should not try to undermine or disrupt it. The massive military modernization in China was advancing with an alarming pace. Thus, the changing power equation in Asia was considered detrimental by the United States as it could challenge the US supremacy at both regional and international levels. Therefore, slowing down the tempo of modern military build up in China was one of the key foreign policy objectives of the Bush administration. To safeguard the US interests, the US adopted measures to dissuade China from entering into an anti-American alliance with Russia, Europe, or India. Therefore, when China tried to forge such an alliance in the Shangai-5 conference in late 1990s, the US prompted her efforts to disrupt these efforts. The US intervention in Afghanistan under the pretext of the pursuit of Osama bin Laden, a one time great US missionary in Afghanistan in 1980s, was really to accomplish the objective of hindering a strategic alliance between China and Russia under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Fulfilling the US strategic objectives in the region, the US occupation of Afghanistan (in 2001) choked all the efforts to forge any possible anti-American strategic alliance among China, Russia, countries of the Central, South and East Asian regions. Such an economic politico-strategic partnership was in the offing after the collapse of Soviet Union. In the given circumstances, US-India strategic partnership was the strategic need of the former. The US-India nexus under Bush got impetus that gave a new direction to the world politics and a new 'Great Game' was seen in the offing in South and Central Asia. The sponsors and the beneficiaries were to be the outsiders but the sufferers were to come to the natives of this region. The China-Russia determination

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Jane Perlez. 'US Ready to End Sanctions on India to Build Alliance'. *The New York Times*, (27 August 2001).

⁶⁴ Hagerty, 'The United States-Pakistan Entente', pp. 6-7.

to keep the imperialistic powers away from Central Asia, Iran, and Afghanistan forced them to form Shanghai-5 (1996) and then Shanghai Cooperation organization (2001). But the seasoned and powerful outside player, the United States, refused to leave the oil and gas rich Caspian Basin at the disposal of these two potent rivals of the US and western dominance. Therefore, the new US administration soon found an ally from South Asia. The ever-growing Islamic militancy was another horrific peril against which the US and India mustered power and shared information. To gather support of the Western countries and other US allies, the US fully exploited the possible links between militancy in Kashmir and *Al-Qaeda*. To accomplish the grand US agenda and to avoid the rise of any other possible contender of superpower status, Bush administration adopted a three-pronged strategy in the region to achieve three foreign policy objectives: *First*, to keep China at bay from becoming a challenge for America; *second*, to check the flow of Islamic militancy; *third*, to obstruct the way of any anti-US alliance in the South, East and Central Asia. Any such alliance could jeopardize the US interests in the oil rich Middle East.

To dominate the oil-gas resources of the Central Asian Republics, the US wanted to thwart out any obstruction that may disrupt the uninterrupted flow of these resources. For these purposes, the manipulation of Indian and Pacific Oceans were also on the US card. Being a strong candidate of major power status or, at least, of equal status with China, India shared these strategic goals with the United States. The US administration was supportive of India's growing power and wanted her to play a role beyond South Asian region, too. Expressing his enthusiasm for India, Robert B. Zoellick, the United States trade representative said:

*The United States wants to treat India realistically for it is a major country and an emerging power...we want to engage India in a strategic dialogue that encompasses the full range of global issues...the United States appreciates that India's influence clearly extends far beyond South Asia.*⁶⁵

Mr. Zoellick was the first member of President Bush's cabinet to visit India. He explained Bush administration's desire to work with India to check terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, and promotion of human rights. In July 2001, Richard L. Armitage, the US Deputy Secretary of State in Bush administration unambiguously

⁶⁵ Jane Perlez. US Ready to End Sanctions on India to Build Alliance. *New York Times*, (27 August 2001).

said, "India is a nuclear power. There are a lot of reasons we ought to engage with India, and we're going to."⁶⁶ Maintenance of *status quo* in the strategic equilibrium of Asia Pacific security architecture was a primary concern of the US while India longed for a status of a superpower.

Despite this convergence of interests, a rift may appear between them at some latter stages due to growing influence of India in the international arena, especially due to economic interests. India would not be ready to play a secondary role while the US would not be willing to deal the former at par with the status of the latter. However, in the prevailing geostrategic environment, no strategic partnership with Pakistan was on the US agenda in early 2001. If the US thought Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorism, Pakistan was looked as a safe haven for the terrorist networks and a hub of anti-US activities.⁶⁷ Thus, if the overthrow of the Taliban government was on the US agenda, the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear devices was worrying the US administration so that they could not fall in the hands of the anti-US elements. The US intelligence agencies had explored a covert network responsible for the nuclear proliferation and Dr. A. Q. Khan was held responsible for this outflow of nuclear technology from Pakistan to the countries of Middle East and North Korea.⁶⁸ This scenario was not favorable for Pakistan in any way. Having a strong disliking for A. Q. Khan, General Musharraf removed the former from the headship of Pakistan's nuclear program in March 2001 to appease the United States. Musharraf made Dr. Khan a scapegoat lonely responsible for the illicit nuclear proliferation. Though not satisfied with this version of excuse by the Pakistani leadership, the US accepted it because of the fact that Pakistan was the only country in the region that could carry out the most crucial US objectives of checking terrorism and bringing stability to the South Asian region. The US was also aware that Pakistan was the only country in the region that had always played a second pedal role with the United States to accomplish the US strategic goals in the past. Moreover, the geo-strategic location of Pakistan could provide the US with an easy access to all the three Asias (South, East and Central) beside Middle East. This fact was much realized by Bush administration soon after the 9/11. Therefore, despite all the unfavorable reports about Pakistan, Bush administration did not put Pakistan on the 'watch list of terrorist countries'. But,

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ *The New York Times*, (01 May 2001).

⁶⁸ Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan...*, p. 162.

giving ear to Indian allegations, the US did criticize Pakistan for backing anti-India militant groups operating in Kashmir.

Prior to the 9/11 horrific incidence, the US intelligence agencies were working tooth and nail to create an atmosphere conducive for the US direct intervention in Afghanistan to check Chinese ambitions. The CIA officials were continuously updating that there was an eminent threat from *Al-Qaeda* that might have access to the weapons of mass destruction and there was a possibility that the US would be targeted with it. The CIA and some other intelligence agencies were repeatedly demanding strict overt action against *Al-Qaeda*'s top leadership like Osama bin Laden who had taken refuge in Afghanistan. Direct US involvement was not liked by Bush administration at that time but US activities, in the neighboring countries, were popped up to ensure physical US presence in the region.

To make the US invincible, President Bush ordered to expedite work on the proposed National Missile Defense (NMD) system that pleased India as the latter herself had the same ambitions and the US move was paving her way.⁶⁹ This move irritated both China and the Russian Federation. Adding much to the Russian fury, President Bush announced a policy declaration that the United States would withdraw from the 'outdated' Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972) 'at a time convenient to America'. Replying to the harsh reaction from China and Russia, Bush declared that the NMD system would be aimed against rouge states like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Besides geostrategic apprehensions about China, the US trade with China became an issue of concern for Bush administration.⁷⁰ Against the backdrop of this geo-strategic and geo-economic state of affairs, a great convergence of interest developed not only between the US and India but Taiwan and Japan were also invited to join hands against China. China also looked suspiciously to the increasingly close military partnership of Israel with India. They all had put their weight behind US-India nexus to get freedom of navigation and security in the Indian Ocean for trade and to have free access to the future energy hub of Central Asia. India wanted to replace Pakistan as a future strategic partner of the United States and get a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Japan also supported India's candidature for a permanent seat in the

⁶⁹ *The New York Times*, (27 May 2001).

⁷⁰ In December 2001, China joined World Trade Organization (WTO). This gave a great impetus to the trade between China and the United States. In 1980, the volume of Sino-US trade was US \$4.8 billion while in 1999 it reached US \$94.9 billion. In 2003, China had a trade surplus of \$124 billion with the United States. See Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, pp. 158-159.

UN Security Council. Thus, prior to 9/11, Pakistan's geo-strategic relevance eroded more in the US foreign policy.

Being a candidate for a permanent seat of the UN Security Council, India tried to appease the international public opinion about Indian relations with her neighbors by inviting Pakistani leadership to the talk-table.⁷¹ The US back-channel pressure to ensure peace and stability in South Asia was also working. Leaning before the US pressure and giving the impression of a peace-loving nation, on 15 January 2001, India expressed the desire to hold a summit meeting with Pakistan. Instead of talks on Kashmir dispute, India called for a 'composite dialogue', which encompasses all the contentious issues along with Kashmir. Indian president Narayanan repeated this offer during his speech one month later. This was an effort to defuse the centrality of Kashmir. In February 2001, both the countries agreed to stop targeting the civilian areas during the cross-border shelling along LoC between armies of the two countries. Meanwhile, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called them to take up bilateral talks.⁷² Other world leaders also expressed the same views but refrained from offering mediation. In April 2001, the US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research with support from the Policy Planning Bureau arranged a conference on Kashmir. It was participated by a number of former US diplomats. Media was not allowed for the coverage of this conference. In the US foreign policy journals, a number of articles were written by notable US think-tank professionals, which stressed upon a negotiated settlement of Kashmir and advocating various options in this context.⁷³ Kashmir was declared as a nuclear flash point, which could trigger off a nuclear combat between India and Pakistan. Looking at the US simmering and international pressure, the Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee invited the military ruler of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, to Agra (India) for a summit meeting on 24 May 2001 to resolve the bilateral differences.⁷⁴ Coupled with this invitation to Musharraf was the surprised Indian announcement of the end of ceasefire in Kashmir. This one-sided ceasefire was declared by the Indian government six months earlier to appease the Kashmiri militants. The Indian Prime Minister was offering an olive branch with one hand and had a slingshot in the other. Both these

⁷¹ Barry Bearak and Celia W. Dugger. 'With a Growl, Pakistan Accepts an Invitation'. *The New York Times*, (25 May 2001).

⁷² Hagerty, 'The United States-Pakistan Entente', pp. 26.

⁷³ Dr. Subhash Kapila, 'United States and the Agra Summit', Published in paper No. 291 of South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG), available at <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org>

⁷⁴ *The New York Times*, (27 May 2001).

moves were antithesis to the previous Indian stand. A few weeks ago, India had engaged a Kashmiri militant in talks while refused to talk to Pakistan. Formerly, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee had persistently refused to talk to Musharaf by calling him as an unconstitutional ruler while Kashmiri insurgents were termed as ‘own people’ by another Indian federal minister. The unrelenting militancy in the Indian-held Kashmir, the failed Indian efforts to bring the Kashmiri militants to the talks-table⁷⁵ and the Indian lust for UN Security Council permanent seat were the factors responsible for this peace initiative on the part of Indian leadership. But the prime factor was the US desire to bring stability to the volatile South Asia. Formerly, the Indian Prime Minister had conditioned the resumption of ‘talks with Pakistani leaders’ with the cessation of ‘cross-border’ infiltration from Pakistan, putting an end to the insurgency in the Indian-held Kashmir and the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. But bowing before the back channel US diplomacy, the Indian Prime Minister retreated from his strict stand and extended invitation to the military ruler in Pakistan for a ‘composite dialogue’. An American interlocutor Mansoor Ijaz once candidly admitted in an interview that he was able to persuade the Indian government to talk to Kashmiri political leaders, Kashmiri militants, and pave way to talk to the military ruler of Pakistan.⁷⁶ The US administration had not only exerted a friendly pressure over India but also assured the latter that the former had changed her policy on Kashmir. Without any threat of war between India and Pakistan, the US urged India to engage Pakistan diplomatically because the former did not want to let Pakistan to slip into the ambit of Taliban like militancy. The Indian offer for resumption of negotiations with Pakistan was not subjected to any precondition because it was pleaded by the United States. In fact, stability in South Asia was a prerequisite for the promotion of US interests in this part of the world. The arrest any breakout of nuclear war in South Asia was also the motive behind US efforts to urge India to engage Pakistan diplomatically. The US administration was also busy in winning Musharraf, who was a staunch supporter of the Taliban, by arranging his summit with Vajpayee. Setting the stage for US intervention in Afghanistan and Central Asia, the American CIA urged Bush administration to get the Pakistani military ruler on her side as it was necessary to safeguard the US interests in the South and Central Asia through a military dictator in Pakistan. Thus legalizing, a General’s

⁷⁵ *The New York Times*, (24 May 2001).

⁷⁶ Dr. Subhash Kapila, ‘United States and ...’.

rule in Pakistan was a strategic need of the US in her oil-politics in the region.⁷⁷ Resolution of the Kashmir was not so possible through one summit meeting but maintaining the sanctity of LoC was really in the US favor. Honoring the US wishes, India extended invitation for talks to Musharraf but no proper consultation at the official level preceded this summit. Resultantly, no meeting of mind at any level was reached. In fact, this summit was the political need of both Indian and Pakistani leadership. Indian leaders wanted to accede to the US demand for negotiation, on the one hand while on the other hand, India wanted to divert the attention of the international community from the atrocities perpetrated inside the Indian-held Kashmir by the Indian military and paramilitary forces. Indian leadership also wanted to exhibit to the world her desire to resolve differences with her nuclear neighbor peacefully through diplomacy. At the bilateral level, India wanted Pakistan to abandon her support for the Kashmiri militants and make the latter to stop infiltration across LoC. Pakistani military leadership also intended to draw benefit from the proposed 'Agra Summit'. Being the chief planner of the Kargil conflict, Musharraf had been termed as 'Architect of Kargil' in India.⁷⁸ To wash this stigma and to get recognition from the US, he accepted the invitation on 29 May 2001. The President of Pakistan adopted the posture of talks to ensure that he believes in diplomacy and not militancy. Due to the eagerness for peace, the people on both sides attached high expectations to this summit. Masses were eager to peace but rulers were brokers of disputes. The Agra Summit lasted for two days (15-16 July 2001) but ended in smoke due to the hawkish attitude of some Indian stakeholders of power. Leaders on both sides remained stuck to their traditional stances over Kashmir. Pakistan wanted the resolution of Kashmir first while India stressed for a comprehensive and all-inclusive dialogue of which Kashmir issue would be a small fraction. *The New York Times* quoted General Musharraf saying that he might as well settle down in the big house in Old Delhi where he lived as a child rather than go home to Pakistan, where his family moved in 1947, if he were seen as selling out on Kashmir. He said, "There are definitely compulsions on my part that I must talk about it."⁷⁹ Indian leadership was much interested in economic cooperation, checking infiltration from Pakistan into

⁷⁷ Dr. Subhash Kapila, 'United States and ...'

⁷⁸ Barry Bearak. 'Leader of Pakistan Accepts India's Invitation to Summit Talks'. *The New York Times*, (30 May 2001)

⁷⁹ Celia W. Dugger. 'India and Pakistan End Talks over Kashmir in Bitterness'. *The New York Times*, (17 July 2001).

Kashmir and keeping the diplomatic channels open. Several drafts of Agra Declaration regarding the results of talks were prepared. But the objections were raised from one or the other side on the basis of one or another sentence. Pakistan objected to the reference given to cross-border infiltration in the proposed draft of agreement while Indian side was reluctant to admit the status of Kashmir dispute as a core issue in the future talks. However, a final joint communiqué was near to sign. All the arrangements for the signing ceremony were in the final process but hawks in the Indian cabinet disrupted the whole process. However, desire to keep the negotiation on was expressed and Indian Prime Minister agreed to visit Pakistan for the next summit of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) which was to be held in 2002 in Islamabad. Of course, this summit was hijacked by media and hardliners but lack of sincerity on both sides was equally responsible for this failure. The failure of Agra summit was a failure of diplomacy. Thus, it was proved that the US could bring the Indian leadership to the table-talks but bilateral negotiations bore no fruits. In fact, there was a need for active US mediation on the pattern of 'Oslo Peace Accord'. Moreover, had this summit preceded by protracted parleys through back-channel diplomacy among India, Pakistan and the United States, the result would have been different and a great breakthrough on Kashmir issue could have been possible.

No doubt, in the pre 9/11 short period, Bush administration focused much on the Middle East than on South Asia. Occupation of Iraq was the immediate concern of the new administration in Washington. The Bush administration officials were pushing hard for the US intelligence community to come up with stronger information on America's enemies like Iraq, as the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsefield was much interested in the oil-rich Iraq.⁸⁰ Of course, Pakistan's nuclear program, the Islamic hard-liners within the Pakistan army and its nuclear establishment, who were linking up with radicals in Afghanistan were not neglected by the US administration but they were not on the immediate US agenda. There had come no change in the US policy towards South Asia. But Iraq and her alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) were much inviting US attention. Bush administration thought Iraq as an unfinished agenda of the first Gulf War (1991) fought by former President George H. W. Bush (Sr.). Saddam Hossain's removal was identified as the prime target of the

⁸⁰ Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, pp. 303-304

US operations in the Middle East.⁸¹ Despite all the intelligence reports against *Al-Qaeda*, bin Laden and Pakistan, the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney were not taking interest in them. They were more concerned about Iraq and Saddam Hossain.

However, Pakistan was closely watched by the CIA for illicit nuclear proliferation and the links between *Al-Qaeda* and some key elements in Pakistan. According to CIA reports, Pakistan was constantly engaged in the transfer of nuclear technology to North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya. Worried about the nuclear proliferation by Pakistan, Richard Clarke, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, briefed the top secretaries in the Bush administration about the links between *Al-Qaeda* and Pakistan and the threats to the US emanating from these ties. Clark suggested an urgent meeting to go on offensive with decisive action to root out the threat from *Al-Qaeda*.⁸² Attack on *Al-Qaeda* camps in Afghanistan was the recommendation of Clarke. He was of the opinion that *Al-Qaeda* could get access to the nuclear weapons with the help of some extremist nuclear scientists in Pakistan. Some US intelligence officers feared that *Al-Qaeda* and ISI were working to overthrow governments of the Muslim states and install a radical multi-national caliphate, an orthodox Islamic theocracy, and wage *jihad*, a holy war, against non-Muslims. To articulate his thinking about the Clark briefing Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, met with counter-terrorism security officers from the US National Security Council, States Department, Defense Department, CIA, FBI and the US military.⁸³ *Al-Qaeda* threat was felt much after the attack on the USS *Cole*, a US submarine, in October 2000 in the Aden harbor in which seventeen US lives were taken. The CIA thought that it was an *Al-Qaeda* operation.⁸⁴ In a letter to President Musharraf, the US President warned Pakistan of the dire consequences of the continued presence of Osama bin Laden and his *Al-Qaeda* on the soil of Afghanistan, in the vicinity of Pakistan.⁸⁵ In May 2001, the US Deputy Secretary of State Richard

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Tenet, *At the Centre of the Storm*..., pp. 160-189.

⁸⁵ President Bush's (Jr.) letter was dispatched to his Pakistani counterpart on 16 February 2001 in which he stated: "The continual presence of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization is a direct threat to the United States and its interests that must be addressed. I believe al-Qaida also threatens Pakistan's long-term interests. We joined the United Nations in passing additional sanctions against the Taliban to bring bin Laden to justice and to close the network of terrorist camps in their country. I urge

Armitage expressed concerns over Pakistan and bracketed them with rogue states like Libya, Iraq and North Korea. On the third anniversary of India's nuclear tests, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage expressed the US concern over Pakistan's development of a nuclear arsenal, but he did not even mention a single word of dismay about India's growing nuclear and missile capacity.⁸⁶ Replying to a question, in a press conference in India, about naming rogue states, he referred to Libya, Iraq, North Korea, and without naming Pakistan directly he pointed by referring the words 'other countries in your neighborhood'. When asked to elaborate the phrase 'other countries' he said, "We have questions about Pakistan which are well known, and of which you are equally aware."⁸⁷ This was a clear manifestation of the downgraded US-Pakistan relationship and US suspicions about the latter. During an interview with an Indian correspondent, Armitage went on to say:

*For years, we had an unbalanced policy in South Asia...People would look at it superficially and say we had a great relationship with Pakistan, but it was in a way a false relationship because in the first instance it was built against the India-Soviet Union axis, and then...it was against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan...so we did not have a policy for Pakistan, we had a policy with Pakistan directed at something else...what we are desirous of our Pakistani friends is to try to develop a relationship about Pakistan.*⁸⁸

In June 2001, Armitage expressed the US concern over the role of the retired Pakistani nuclear scientists like Dr. A.Q. Khan in the nuclear proliferation. The US was also critical about the military rule in Pakistan but it was a pressure tactic to bring the military junta in line with the US agenda in the region.⁸⁹ US stressed both India and Pakistan to resume dialogue over the Kashmir issue. Augmenting Rocca's remarks, in July 2001, the US Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that US could lend her good offices to help India and Pakistan to improve their relations and resolve the outstanding bilateral issues between them whether it was Kashmir dispute or nuclear issue. This was a manifestation of the Bush Administration thinking towards

you to use your influence with the Taliban to bring this about...", See Jain, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 165.

⁸⁶ Celia W. Dugger. U.S. 'Nurtures Growing Bond with India on Defense'. *The New York Times*, (23 May 2001).

⁸⁷ Celia W. Dugger. 'U.S. Nurtures Growing Bond with India on Defense'. *The New York Times*, (23 May 2001). Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, pp. 161-163.

⁸⁸ Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, pp. 161-162.

⁸⁹ On 27 July 2001, Cristina Rocca, Assistant Secretary of States, admitted the geo-strategic significance of Pakistan but she raised finger at the military rule in Pakistan and the possibility of war between India and Pakistan. She pleaded for strategic restraint and nuclear non-proliferation by Pakistan.

South Asia but India was opposed to any foreign assistance that could give relief to Pakistani side. Nevertheless, to avoid any break out of war on the Indian subcontinent, Bush administration favored to keep the peace process intact even after the failure of the Agra Summit.

The Bush administration was displeased with the ISI's non-compliance to US call for combating *Al-Qaeda* in Afghanistan and expulsion or arrest of bin Laden from the Afghan territory. The Taliban who had given asylum to bin Laden were considered by the CIA as ISI protégé in Afghanistan. Bush administration signed an executive order in July 2001 to maintain economic sanctions against Afghanistan and the ruling Taliban who were guilty of giving refuge to Osama bin Laden. This showed the continuation of Clinton's policy about the Taliban. The US ambassador to Pakistan, William B. Milam, warned the Taliban ambassador, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, during a meeting at the Taliban Embassy in Islamabad in the last week of June 2001. Mullah Zaeef assured Mr. Milam that the Taliban would not allow *Al-Qaeda* to attack US targets from the Afghan territory.⁹⁰ But the CIA officials were not accepting these assurances. They were in pursuit of *Al-Qaeda* and bin Laden. Eager to probe into the clandestine activities of *Al-Qaeda*, George Tenet, the Director of the CIA, visited Islamabad to make the ISI chief to exchange information about bin Laden and his terrorist network, *Al-Qaeda*. The ISI chief General Mahmood Ahmad was not ready to extend any such cooperation. The real obstacle was the trust deficit between Pakistan and the United States. The fickleness in the US-Pakistan relations was greatly responsible for this stubbornness in ISI stance of not indulging in the CIA pursuit against Osama bin Laden. Pakistan's military officers were doubtful about the US motives in Afghanistan. They thought that the US intended to keep Afghanistan destabilized in order to obstruct the flow of hydrocarbons from Central Asian Republics through Afghanistan and Pakistan, which provided the easiest outlet to it. Thus, the goodwill won by the US in Pakistan during the Afghan War (1979-1989) evaporated after the imposition of sanctions against Pakistan by the United States. The military-to-military contacts between Pakistan and the United States also waned in the subsequent years.⁹¹ Table 3.3 narrates the history of US military assistance to Pakistan in the post-Cold War era.

⁹⁰ *The New York Times*, (3 July 2001).

⁹¹ Tenet, *At the Centre of the Storm...*, pp. 140-142.

Table: 3.3

US Military Assistance and Sales to Pakistan, FY 1990 - FY 2001					
Fiscal Year (FY)	IMET* (in US \$)	FMF* ¹ (in US \$)	DCS* ² (in US \$)	FMS* ³ (in US \$)	EDA* ⁴ (in US \$)
1990	506000	184369000	99906000	120257000	n/a
1991	0	0	25272000	0	n/a
1992	0	0	8162000	0	n/a
1993	0	0	4789000	0	0
1994	0	0	1781000	0	0
1995	0	0	6286000	0	0
1996	0	0	4224000	143247000	0
1997	0	0	2223000	183295000	0
1998	0	0	346000	76035000	0
1999	174000	0	0	0	0
2000	0	0	0	0	0
2001	680000	0	0	0	0

*Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)

*¹Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

*²Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

*³International Military Education and Training (IMET)

*⁴Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program during that period

Source: Centre of Defense Information available at <http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/pakistan.pdf>

Although White House was busy in gathering evidences against Saddam's weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the US intelligence agencies were making efforts to make their case against Pakistan's involvement in nuclear proliferation. In mid 2001, An American spy satellite detected that missile components were being loaded into a Pakistani C-130 outside the North Korean Capital, Pyongyang.⁹² It was believed that these missile parts were delivered in return for the transfer of Pakistan's nuclear know-how to North Korea. These were the factors responsible for the development of an element of mistrust in the US-Pakistan relationship, which resulted in the lack of durability and stability in relationship between the two countries. But due to the lack of sufficient evidence, the US administration was still reluctant to impose sanctions against Pakistan for the nuclear proliferation.⁹³ Pakistan wanted to avoid a two-front conflict, with India seeking to destabilize Pakistan and the Taliban to export their radical ideology beyond the Afghan border into Pakistan. Pakistan feared that any new conflict with India could trigger off a nuclear war, which was affordable to none. To keep Pakistan away from such a grim security situation, the ISI did not provide full-fledged cooperation to the United States against the Taliban or *Al-Qaeda*. The US pressure was mounting day by day. On 2 August 2001, the US Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca stated during her visit to Islamabad that nuclear-related and democracy-related sanctions prevented the US from pursuing cooperation with Pakistan. She specially stressed that the democracy-related sanctions could only be lifted when democracy is fully restored.⁹⁴ In September 2001, the US State Department imposed 2-year sanctions against Pakistan's National Development Complex and a Chinese company 'China Metallurgical Equipment Corporation'. The official of the US State Department vividly told, "These sanctions were basically directed against China but have, nevertheless, soured Pakistani hopes for a softer US attitude in the removal of five-layers of already existing sanctions."⁹⁵ This statement highlighted the strained relations between China and the United States. But Pakistan was also not in the good books of the United States.

Prompted by the information about some huge attacks on the US, the CIA worked tooth and nail to force ISI to obstruct the way of terrorists. In this context,

⁹² Stephen Fidler and Edward Luce, 'US Fears North Korea Could Gain Nuclear Capability through Pakistan', *Financial Times* (1 June 2001); and Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, p. 309.

⁹³ Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan...*, p. 162.

⁹⁴ Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, p. 98.

⁹⁵ Jain, *The United States and Pakistan...*, pp. 442-443.

hectic consultations were underway between the CIA and ISI. On the day the ugly incident of 9/11 took place, the ISI chief happened to be in Washington. He had been flown over there from Islamabad on a CIA jet to update the CIA Director, George Tenet, on *Al-Qaeda* and bin Laden. General Ahmad was sharing information about Osama bin Laden in a room on the White House side of the Capitol Hill, when New York descended in chaos.⁹⁶ The 9/11 attacks changed not only the US policy but also the entire edifice of the world politics.

After the dreadful incidence of 9/11, Richard Armitage, US Deputy Secretary of State, called out ISI Chief General Ahmad and Pakistani ambassador Maleeha Lodhi to his office and asked them, “Are you with us or against us?” He denounced Pakistan for supporting Taliban in Afghanistan. He demanded that Pakistan being stopping *Al-Qaeda* agents at Pakistani border, grant the United States blanket over flight and landing rights for all military and intelligence operations, provide territorial access to American and allied intelligence agencies, and cutoff all fuel shipments to the Taliban. He also threatened General Mahmood Ahmad that the United States would bomb Pakistan back to ‘the stone age’ if Pakistan refused to comply with these demands.⁹⁷ George Tenet, the CIA Chief, asked Gen. Mahmood Ahmad to meet Mullah Omer and make it crystal clear to him that the Taliban were going to pay a terrible price if they insisted on continuing to protect *Al-Qaeda* and bin Laden.⁹⁸ General Mahmood realized that the Americans were like a wounded animal and they were ready to pursue *Al-Qaeda* and Taliban regardless of any fear of any impediment in their way. Therefore, he agreed to meet Mullah Omer and pursue him to hand over bin Laden to the United States. At that night, Colin Powell, US Secretary of States, called Musharraf and repeated the Armitage’s sentence. Musharraf complied unconditionally.⁹⁹ Next morning, Richard Armitage presented to General Mahmood Ahmad the following him seven demands:

- To stop *Al-Qaeda* operations at its border and end all logistic support for bin Laden;
- To give the United States with blanket overflight and landing rights for all

⁹⁶ Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, p. 312.

⁹⁷ This fear was, later on, disclosed by Gen. Mahmood before General Musharraf. See Tenet, *At the Centre of the Storm...*, p. 179; ‘US Threatened to Bomb Pakistan after 9/11: Musharraf Says He Acted Responsibly’, *Dawn* (Islamabad, 22 September 2006).

⁹⁸ Ibid., pp.177-180

⁹⁹ Hafeez Malik, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan...*, pp. 188-191.

necessary military and intelligence operations;

- To provide the United States with intelligence information;
- To provide the US with logistic support to conduct operations against *Al-Qaeda*;
- To continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts;
- To cut off all shipments of fuel to Taliban and stop recruits from going to Afghanistan; and
- If the evidence implicated bin Laden and *Al-Qaeda*, and the Taliban continued to harbor them, to break relations with the Taliban;¹⁰⁰

No demand regarding the nuclear program or Dr. A. Q. Khan was made. To the surprise of the Americans, Musharraf acceded to all these demands. The US came to realize that there were some extremist outfits having transnational links and these groups could penetrate deep into the security orbits of a major power like the United States. Realizing the remarkable combatant strength of these terrorist groups, Bush administration declared war against 'terrorism'. The US President came up with a slogan "If you aren't with us, you're against us".¹⁰¹ This notion became the cornerstone of the US foreign policy in the coming years. Pakistani ruler was really between the devil and the deep sea. The precarious economic conditions left him with no other option than the narrowest choice of joining the US-led war against terrorism. South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East became the arena of this new war, 'War on Terrorism', but the centre stage was Afghanistan, the next-door neighbor of Pakistan, with whom the latter enjoyed close links. In the given circumstances, Pakistan moved from the status of the 'most sanctioned ally' to the 'frontline state' against terrorism and later on as 'major non-NATO ally'.¹⁰² Thus, the whole edifice of US-Pakistan relations changed once again due to the highest strategic importance of Pakistan. Geographical proximity to Afghanistan and superb information about Afghanistan made Pakistan the most valuable ally of the United States. The 9/11

¹⁰⁰ Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, pp. 244-245.

¹⁰¹ On 20 September 2001, President Bush warned that "Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime", See Robert Wirsing, 'Pakistan's Strategic Options...', p. 356; and 'Transcript of president's Bush's address', *The Washington Post* (21 September 2001).

¹⁰² President Bush for Pakistan used the term 'major non-NATO ally' in his address at MacDill Air Force Base on 16 June 2004. See Farrukh Saleem, 'Capital Suggestion: Obama versus Pentagon', *The News* (8 November 2009).

incidence prompted the US to rediscover common grounds with Pakistan as there was no other country to provide direct access to the US forces into Afghanistan. Iran was at odd with the United States. Due to the lack of common borders with Afghanistan, India too could not provide access to the US troops to the *Al-Qaeda* hideouts inside Afghanistan. Pakistan was the only center of hope for the US. Luckily, for the US, a military dictator was at the helm of affairs in Pakistan. All the US charm for democracy waned altogether. The US reliance upon the military dictator in Pakistan emboldened the latter to enhance his power and prolong his stay in the corridors of power.¹⁰³ Thus, he bowed to all US demands very obediently. He was already searching for recognition from the United States. He took it as a blessing in disguise. He achieved his personal goal but he threw the Pakistani nation and society into another ordeal. He mortgaged national sovereignty for marginal gains. Although he became much dearer to the US and he had brought some goodwill from the US administration but unleashed an irreparable chaos in the society which could prove more than disastrous for the very existence of Pakistan. The prestige of army and law enforcing agencies fell to a very alarming level, which might lead army to an institutional collapse. The popular hatred had brought Pakistan army in direct conflict with the masses in the country. The national security institutions were considered US surrogates. This perception led to a civil war in Pakistan that took more than two thousand precious lives of army soldiers and numerous civilians until now but the number may increase as the war is still going on (January 2010). The perverted law and order emerged out of this new phase of US-Pakistan close strategic partnership and obstructed the way of foreign direct investment (FDI) and developmental works in Pakistan. No doubt, US military and economic aid to Pakistan resumed and multiplied many fold, Pakistan's loans were rescheduled, and some of the US loans to Pakistan were written off. Table 3.4 and 3.5 gives the figures of USAID to Pakistan in FY 2001 and FY 2002 respectively. But all this could not compensate the losses incurred by Pakistan in the 'War on Terrorism'. Of course, foreign remittances in Pakistan shoot up immediately in the wake of 9/11 but waned soon after the departure of Musharraf from power. The poor infrastructure completely collapsed. The life, property and honor of Pakistanis were at stake. Foreign intervention in anti-state activities reached its peak in tribal and northern areas of Pakistan. The first casualty of

¹⁰³ Hagerty, 'Kashmir and Nuclear Question Revisited...', p. 12.

Table: 3.4. US Economic and Military aid to Pakistan during FY 2001.

Pakistan

2001 U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants - Obligations and Loan Authorizations
(U.S. Fiscal Years - millions of \$US)

	Post-War Relief Period 1946-48	Marshall Plan Period 1949-52	Mutual Scty Act Period 1953-61	Foreign 1962-97	Assist. 1998	Act 1999	(FAA) 2000	Period 2001	Total FAA Period 1962-01	Total Loans & Grants 1946-01	Principal Repayments 1946-01	Outstanding Loan Balances 1946-01
I. Total Economic Assistance	0.1	11.1	1,418.7	7,183.1	18.0	61.8	3.8	90.4	7,357.1	8,787.4	1,565.6	2,225.4
Loans	0.1	.	476.8	4,088.8	10.0	13.0	.	.	4,111.8	4,588.8	1,565.6	2,225.4
Grants	.	11.1	941.9	3,094.3	8.0	48.8	3.8	90.4	3,245.3	4,198.6	.	.
A. USAID & Predecessor	.	10.6	935.4	4,390.0	.	5.3	.	.	4,395.3	5,341.7	1,018.9	1,180.0
Loans	.	.	339.5	2,371.1	.	.	.	.	2,371.1	2,710.8	1,018.9	1,180.0
Grants	.	10.6	595.9	2,018.8	.	5.3	.	.	2,024.1	2,630.9	.	.
[of which Security Supp Assist(ESF)]	.	.	586.6	2,122.0	.	1.7	.	.	2,123.6	2,710.5	.	338.3
B. Food for Peace	.	0.1	415.9	2,720.4	16.5	54.3	0.5	86.9	2,878.7	3,294.7	546.5	1,045.5
Loans	.	.	137.3	1,717.7	10.0	13.0	.	.	1,740.7	1,878.0	546.5	1,045.5
Grants	.	0.1	278.6	1,002.8	6.5	41.3	0.5	86.9	1,138.0	1,416.7	.	.
Title I Total	.	.	334.1	2,280.5	10.0	13.0	.	.	2,303.5	2,637.6	546.5	1,045.5
Repayment in \$ Loans	.	.	.	1,374.4	10.0	13.0	.	.	1,397.4	1,397.4	343.4	1,029.0
Payment in Foreign Currency	.	.	334.1	906.1	.	.	.	.	906.1	1,240.2	203.1	16.4
Title II Section 416	.	0.1	81.8	440.0	6.5	41.3	0.5	86.9	575.2	657.1	.	.
Emergency Programs	.	.	48.6	381.2	1.2	.	.	1.9	384.3	432.9	.	.
Development Programs(416)	.	0.1	33.2	58.8	5.2	41.3	0.5	85.1	190.9	224.2	.	.
Title III Total	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
C. Other Economic Assistance	0.1	0.4	67.4	72.7	1.5	2.2	3.3	3.5	83.1	151.0	0.1	.
Loans	0.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.1	0.1	.
Grants	.	0.4	67.4	72.7	1.5	2.2	3.3	3.5	83.1	150.9	.	.
Peace Corps	.	.	.	9.5	.	.	.	.	9.5	9.5	.	.
Narcotics	.	.	.	63.1	1.5	2.2	3.3	3.5	73.6	73.6	.	.
Other	.	0.4	67.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	67.8	.	.
II. Total Military Assistance	.	.	508.1	2,443.4	.	110.8	.	.	2,554.3	3,062.4	1,730.8	237.0
Loans	.	.	.	1,748.5	.	110.8	.	.	1,859.4	1,859.4	1,730.8	237.0
Grants	.	.	508.1	694.9	.	.	.	.	694.9	1,203.0	.	.
MAP Grants	.	.	480.8	169.6	.	.	.	.	169.6	650.3	.	.
Credit Financing	.	.	.	1,748.5	.	110.8	.	.	1,859.4	1,859.4	1,730.8	237.0
Int'l Military Education & Training	.	.	12.2	20.3	.	.	.	.	20.3	32.5	.	.
Transfer - Excess Stock	.	.	15.2	11.6	.	.	.	.	11.6	26.8	.	.
Other Grants	.	.	.	493.4	.	.	.	.	493.4	493.4	.	.
III. Total Economic & Military Assistance	0.1	11.1	1,926.8	9,626.5	18.0	172.7	3.8	90.4	9,911.4	11,849.8	3,296.4	2,462.4
Loans	0.1	.	476.8	5,837.3	10.0	123.8	.	.	5,971.2	6,448.2	3,296.4	2,462.4
Grants	.	11.1	1,450.0	3,789.2	8.0	48.8	3.8	90.4	3,940.2	5,401.6	.	.
Other US Loans	.	.	12.9	577.7	.	.	.	.	577.7	590.6	386.0	162.7
EX-IM Bank Loans	.	.	12.9	446.5	.	.	.	.	446.5	459.4	279.7	162.7
All Other	.	.	.	131.2	.	.	.	.	131.2	131.2	106.2	.

Source: USAID Greenbook 2001.

Table: 3.5. US Economic and Military aid to Pakistan during FY 2002.**Pakistan****2000 U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants - Obligations and Loan Authorizations
(U.S. Fiscal Years - millions of \$US)**

	Post-War Relief Period 1946-48	Marshall Plan Period 1949-52	Mutual Scty Act Period 1953-61	Foreign 1962-96	Assist. 1997	Act 1998	(FAA) 1999	Period 2000	Total FAA Period 1962-00	Total Loans & Grants 1946-00	Principi Repayments 1946-00	Outstanding Loan Balances 1946-00
I. Total Economic Assistance	0.1	11.1	1,418.7	7,140.8	42.3	18.0	61.8	3.8	7,267.1	8,096.6	1,645.2	2,467.8
Loans	0.1	.	476.8	4,053.8	35.0	10.0	13.0	.	4,111.8	4,588.7	1,645.2	2,467.8
Grants	.	11.1	941.9	3,087.0	7.3	8.0	48.8	3.8	3,155.3	4,107.9	.	.
A. USAID & Predecessor	.	10.6	935.4	4,390.0	.	.	5.3	.	4,395.7	5,341.3	1,098.6	1,181.5
Loans	.	.	339.5	2,371.1	.	.	.	.	2,371.1	2,710.6	1,098.6	1,181.5
Grants	.	10.6	595.9	2,018.9	.	.	5.3	.	2,034.2	2,630.6	.	.
(of which Security Supp Assist/ESF)	.	.	886.6	2,122.0	.	.	1.7	.	2,123.9	2,710.2	.	338.3
B. Food for Peace	.	0.1	415.9	2,680.6	39.8	16.5	54.3	0.5	2,791.8	3,207.8	546.5	1,286.3
Loans	.	.	137.3	1,682.7	35.0	10.0	13.0	.	1,740.7	1,878.0	546.5	1,286.3
Grants	.	0.1	278.6	998.0	4.8	6.5	41.3	0.5	1,051.1	1,329.8	.	.
Title I Total	.	.	334.1	2,245.5	35.0	10.0	13.0	.	2,302.5	2,637.6	546.5	1,286.3
Repayment in \$ Loans	.	.	.	1,338.4	35.0	10.0	13.0	.	1,397.4	1,397.4	343.4	1,269.8
Payment in Foreign Currency	.	.	334.1	906.1	.	.	.	.	906.1	1,240.2	203.1	16.4
Title II Section 416	.	0.1	81.8	435.2	4.8	6.5	41.3	0.5	489.3	570.2	.	.
Emergency Programs	.	.	48.6	376.4	4.8	1.2	.	.	382.4	431.0	.	.
Development Programs/416	.	0.1	33.2	68.8	.	5.2	41.3	0.5	105.9	139.2	.	.
Title II Total	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
C. Other Economic Assistance	0.1	0.4	67.4	70.2	2.5	1.5	2.2	3.3	79.6	147.8	0.1	.
Loans	0.1	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	0.1	0.1	.
Grants	.	0.4	67.4	70.2	2.5	1.5	2.2	3.3	79.6	147.4	.	.
Peace Corps	.	.	.	9.5	.	.	.	.	9.5	9.5	.	.
Narcotics	.	.	.	60.6	2.5	1.5	2.2	3.3	70.1	70.1	.	.
Other	.	0.4	67.4	.	.	.	.	.	.	67.8	.	.
II. Total Military Assistance	.	.	908.1	2,440.4	.	.	110.8	.	2,554.3	3,062.4	1,730.8	237.0
Loans	.	.	.	1,748.5	.	.	110.8	.	1,859.4	1,859.4	1,730.8	237.0
Grants	.	.	908.1	694.9	.	.	.	.	694.9	1,203.0	.	.
MAP Grants	.	.	480.8	169.6	.	.	.	.	169.6	650.3	.	.
Credit Financing	.	.	.	1,748.5	.	.	110.8	.	1,859.4	1,859.4	1,730.8	237.0
Int'l Military Education & Training	.	.	12.2	20.3	.	.	.	.	20.3	32.5	.	.
Transfer - Excess Stock	.	.	15.2	11.6	.	.	.	.	11.6	26.8	.	.
Other Grants	.	.	.	493.4	.	.	.	.	493.4	493.4	.	.
III. Total Economic & Military Assistance	0.1	11.1	1,926.8	9,584.2	42.3	18.0	172.7	3.8	9,821.3	11,758.9	3,376.1	2,704.8
Loans	0.1	.	476.8	5,802.3	35.0	10.0	123.8	.	5,971.2	6,448.1	3,376.1	2,704.8
Grants	.	11.1	1,450.0	3,781.9	7.3	8.0	48.8	3.8	3,850.2	5,310.9	.	.
Other US Loans	.	.	12.9	577.7	.	.	.	.	577.7	590.6	403.7	162.7
EX-IM Bank Loans	.	.	12.9	446.5	.	.	.	.	446.5	459.4	297.4	162.7
All Other	.	.	.	131.2	.	.	.	.	131.2	131.2	106.2	.

Source: USAID Greenbook 2002.

the 'War on Terror' was the national sovereignty of Pakistan. The last casualty might be its territorial integrity. The US triumph in Afghanistan was impossible but it was evident in Pakistan that the first casualty was the national sovereignty of the latter.

Conclusion:

Since late 1990s, the US priorities in South Asia underwent an apparent change. Consequently, the US-Pakistan relations witnessed some new dimensions. The nuclearized South Asia was posing many challenges than opportunities for the US interests in the region. The longstanding US foreign policy objectives regarding nuclear proliferation and democracy assumed secondary importance while the containment of the rising China and the rapidly growing Islamic militancy came to the centre stage. Taliban and Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network *Al-Qaeda* assumed a pivotal importance in the US strategy towards Asia. Prompted by these two factors, the United States opted India as a new strategic partner in the region while stepped up pressure on successive Pakistani governments and layers of US sanctions were multiplying with the passage of time. The open market economy and the US based Indian Americans also contributed much towards US-India nexus. For the US, neither the eradication of terrorism nor checking the growing China was possible without taking Pakistan into confidence. Pakistan was still important for the US because of the geographical proximity, traditional and religious ties of the former with the Central Asia and the Middle East. Therefore, although the role of Pakistan as a 'frontline state' had relegated in the eyes of US strategists but neither of the aforementioned US strategic objectives were achievable without Pakistan. Therefore, the decision makers, strategists and analysts in the United States could not overlook Pakistan's role. The US even could not afford *Talibanization* of the nuclear Pakistan. To apprehend bin Laden, to annihilate *Al-Qaeda*, to withdraw support from the Taliban, and to check militancy in Kashmir, successive US administrations adopted different foreign policy instruments to seek Pakistan's active support. But being in chain of sanctions, Pakistan could not bail out Americans from the quagmire of terrorism. The US had many sticks but few carrots for Pakistan. The nuclear Pakistan could not be reprimanded with sticks. Therefore, all the US sanctions failed in bringing down Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs. Instead of checking nuclear proliferation, the sanctions accelerated it.

Clinton's tilt towards India could not deter China from modernizing her military build up but cemented the defense ties between China and Pakistan. On the other hand, the US estrangement towards Pakistan, especially during the last years of Clinton administration, provided the militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir to come closer. Instead of adopting a sane attitude towards Asia, Bush administration adopted a harsh course from the very beginning. President Bush chose a Vulcan administration. This new team adopted an offensive rather than defensive approach. Pakistan's nuclear program and the *M-11* missiles deal with China were still the two irritating factors in the US-Pakistan relations. The startling fear of possible access of extremists to the nuclear arsenal urged the US not to impede Pakistan's way to international monetary organizations but did not make the former to ease sanctions. The United States, which already preferred India to Pakistan, became more tilted towards India in early months of Bush's first tenure of office. Kashmir, being the nuclear flashpoint, had been the root cause of terrorism in South Asia but this protracted perilous problem could not attract due attention of Bush administration like his predecessor. Endorsing the pro-Indian stance over Kashmir, the US stressed upon bilateral talks but did nothing to address this longstanding issue through mediation. Under US pressure, Pakistan introduced major shifts in Kashmir policy and took various CBMs but India did not respond in the same tone. Turning a blind-eye to the post-Kargil tension between nuclear foes on the Indian subcontinent, the US played a great role in prevention of war but failed to resolve the conflict and check the arms race between them. This negligence on the part of successive US administration enhanced the menace of terrorism both at the regional and international level which resulted in the 9/11 mishap.

In short, despite all the differences and divergence of interests and regardless the type of regime in Pakistan, the US could not afford to erase the nuclear Pakistan from her foreign policy framework. Nevertheless, after 9/11 Pakistan's strategic significance became more relevant. On the other hand, the military dictator in Pakistan could not dare to give up efforts to win US favor at international forums. Coupled with the strategic needs was the economic weakness that forced General Pervez Musharraf to opt for the close strategic partnership with the United States. The real test for the military ruler was to maximize the gains from US-Pakistan relations with less domestic and foreign policy cost. Ironically, General Musharraf lost the balance between gains and costs and brought the US war within Pakistani territory.

Consequently, he transformed the US war in Pakistan's own war. The US wanted to manipulate the strategic worth and intelligence superiority of Pakistan in Afghanistan during the 'War on Terrorism'. Therefore, once again the US entered in a close strategic partnership with Pakistan. But only geo-strategic factor cannot bring durability and permanency to this fourth phase of US-Pakistan relationship as it could not remain relevant for a long time. Strategic partnership could forge an alliance between militaries but could not bring two nations together. To avoid any future estrangement in the US-Pakistan relations, common grounds of interest besides strategic relevance were required to be searched out.

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## Chapter 6

### Gains and Losses

*“... Americans have discarded Pakistan like a piece of used Kleenex.”*

Dennis Kux<sup>1</sup>

There is no denying the fact that relations among nations are governed by their national interests and not by emotions. Similarly, it is also an established fact that there are no permanent foes or friends in international relations but only interests are permanent. Every nation enters into a close partnership to achieve certain goals and objectives. In such relationships, some compromises are also inevitable as no country can bully the other to support her unquestionably. Thus, both partners benefit from the partnership. Besides benefits, the bilateral relationships incur costs, too. But the ratio of gains and losses depends upon the tact and skills of the leadership, beside geostrategic and geopolitical factors. Sometimes a weak and small partner is more benefited than the larger and stronger one due to the higher leadership skills. All the above is true for the US-Pakistan relationship except the last one. Pakistan and the United States came closer to each other more than once and both incurred costs besides benefits from their close strategic partnerships. This chapter will take into account the major gains and losses of the US and Pakistan arising from their relationship in the 1990s, the decade after the collapse of Soviet Union.

No doubt, Pakistan's economic needs and security predicaments, arising from her neighborhood, forced her to the doorstep of the United States in late 1940s but the latter did not respond positively at that time. It was after the Indian blunt refusal to join the US camp that the US approached Pakistan to forge anti-communist and anti-Soviet strategic alliances. Hence, the strategic significance of Pakistan made her important to the US policymakers. Taking benefit of the US strategic compulsions, Pakistan eagerly accepted the offer to become a frontline state in the containment of the Soviet-led communist advance into the South Asia and the Middle East. Pakistani leadership expressed concern over the spread of communism and Soviet expansionist designs but this country had no immediate threat from the communist Soviet Union.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Dennis Kux, 2003, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000, Disenchanted Allies*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 310

<sup>2</sup> Shahid M. Amin, 2004, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 44.

Contrary to the international interests of the United States, Pakistan's strategic interests were regional in nature. Pakistan wanted to get a major power involved in the South Asian affairs to check the hegemonic Indian tendencies in the region. History reveals that by joining the US-backed pacts like SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan won a psychological support against India but our security did not boost against Indian incursions.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, Pakistan membership in these pacts infuriated the former Soviet Union to the extent that she made a common cause with both India and Afghanistan against Pakistan and extended support to the separatist movements in Pakistan both in men and material. This was the first great loss for Pakistan that arose from her close strategic partnership with the United States. Pakistan's main objective of alliances was the safeguard of national security and territorial integrity against Indian aggression but none of them were achieved. The breakout of three wars between India and Pakistan (1948, 1965 and 1971) and the US role in these wars was a clear evidence of the failure of Pakistan's policy of alignment with the United States. During all these India-Pakistan wars, the United States not only declined to support Pakistan but also imposed sanctions against Pakistan during the second India-Pakistan war of 1965. In 1971, Pakistan lost her eastern wing when Indian forces encroached upon her territory and the US did not come to rescue her from the shameful defeat. On the other hand, Soviet Union actively supported India in 1971 and on the Kashmir issue in the UN Security Council. No one can deny the significance of the US-Pakistan relations that have played a vital role in the regional and international politics but Pakistan suffered much due to these ties. Owing to the clash of interests in certain areas, these relations could not get firm and durable. In fact, Pakistan and the US have divergent interests and incompatible objectives. Each of them was exploiting the compulsions of the other. This sharp contrast of perceptions gave rise to mistrust and, therefore, all the warmth of the US-Pakistan partnership evaporated as soon as the US objective fulfilled or the threat to the US interests changed or perished. In November 1979, the US-Pakistan relations were touching the lowest ebbs. But when the Soviet forces rolled into Afghanistan, the US policymaker took a U-turn and Pakistan became the focus of US attention to thwart out the Soviet forces from the Afghan territory and to retaliate the Soviet intervention in Vietnam against the United States. Eager for seeking military and economic aid,

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<sup>3</sup> Press interview of Shamshad Ahmad Khan, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, published in *Jang Sunday*, Karachi (Pakistan), (22-28 February 2009). pp. 2-4.

Pakistan was ready to become a 'frontline state' against the spillover of communism into her neighborhood. Consequently, in 1980s, Pakistan put her national security at risk when she actively involved herself in the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Pakistan got much from her relationship with the United States but the list of losses was much longer than benefits. Despite the asymmetry in the cost and benefit ratio, Pakistan succeeded in augmenting her defense capabilities vis-à-vis her strong-headed neighbor, India, especially in the field of nuclear technology. Taking advantage of her close relationship with the United States, Pakistan developed her much-criticized nuclear program at a very high pace. The US had a close eye over this ugly development but did not take any strict action against it.

However, in the decade after the collapse of Soviet Union, the US foreign policy regarding South Asia in general, and towards Pakistan in particular, underwent major shifts. Pakistan lost her geostrategic significance for the US and, therefore, was no longer in the focus of US State Department's global strategy.<sup>4</sup> After the rollback of Soviet Red army from Afghanistan, Pakistan was left to bear the costs of Afghan conflict alone while the US carried the day by reaping most of the benefits. Of course, Pakistan also got some benefits besides incurring costs but loss of the US strategic partnership marred all the gains. Just after the rollback of Soviet forces, the earlier US apprehensions about Pakistan's nuclear program resurfaced. In the words of a former Pakistani ambassador to the United States:

*If one was to sum up the recent phase of relations [in the decade after the collapse of Soviet Union] between Pakistan and the United States in one phrase it would be: confronting an old problem in a new setting. The old problem is, of course, the nuclear issue, while the new setting is provided by the end of the cold war, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence, for the time being, of a unipolar world with all that this implies.<sup>5</sup>*

The collapse of Soviet Union withered the links between Pakistan and the United States. This disintegration was the greatest victory for the US-led capitalist world but it unfolded a number of miseries for Pakistan, the then 'frontline state'. It changed the entire spectrum of the world politics. In the changing geostrategic scenario, Pakistan was no longer considered by the US to be a strategic partner that

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<sup>4</sup> Gohar Ayub Khan, 2009, *Testing Time As Foreign Minister*. Islamabad: Dost Publications. p. 69.

<sup>5</sup> Maleeha Lodhi, 'The Recent Past', in M. Raziullah Azmi (ed.), 1994, *Pakistan American Relations: The Recent Past*. Karachi: Royal Book Company. pp. 132-138.

can be preferred over India which has been Pakistan's bitter foe and hostile neighbor. Far from giving preference, Pakistan was not even treated on equal footings with India. The strategic worth of Pakistan was still acknowledged by the US Pentagon but now it was not taken as important for the US interests as India. To contain China, yet another powerful communist state and the potent economic rival of the US, Clinton administration chose India as a close strategic and economic ally. The development of US-India close relationship not only alarmed Pakistan but also widened the gulf created in the trust between the US and Pakistan. The nuclear Pakistan was considered a threat to the US interests in the region. Without taking into account Pakistan's strategic needs, the US administration was much skeptical about Pakistan's nuclear program. Taking cognizance of eroded strategic relevance of Pakistan, the US President refused to certify that Pakistan had no nuclear devices or going to prepare them. Thus, the notorious Pressler amendment was invoked in October 1990 that choked all the military aid and halted the supply of F-16 fighter planes that Pakistan had already paid for. Not only that the delivery of aircrafts was halted but the money paid for these planes was also withheld. Disregarding Pakistan's concerns, the release of F-16 fighter jets was conditioned with 'capping' of Pakistan's controversial nuclear program. This was the first 'gift' of US-Pakistan estrangement after the end of Cold War. The victor of the Cold War did not bother to take into account the defense needs of his ally whose invaluable sacrifices had reposed her victorious in her long drawn war against communist Soviet Union that had inflicted heavy losses to the US army during the Vietnam War in 1950s. This US act not only tarnished the image of Pakistan at the international level but also sharpened the criticism of the Western countries against Pakistan's nuclear capability that had been resorted to as a defensive against India. The imposition of sanctions under Pressler amendment was an act to throw Pakistan into international isolation. It caused political, economic and military setback to Pakistan. It also shocked Pakistan diplomatically and psychologically. Basically, the Pressler amendment was aimed at deterring Pakistan from becoming a nuclear state but it proved counterproductive. Instead of checking Pakistan's nuclear development, the sanctions imposed under this amendment pushed Pakistan to pursue the nuclear option more vigorously. To keep the Indian forces away from destabilizing Pakistan, the role of nuclear deterrence became more important to compensate the asymmetry between India and Pakistan in conventional warfare. Due to the broken defense ties with the US, Pakistan failed to keep abreast with India in

the conventional arms. This disparity in conventional arms affected Pakistan's defense capability vis-à-vis India. Looking at the Indian nuclear ambitions and her past and present hostile attitude towards Pakistan, the acquisition of nuclear deterrence had become topmost priority for the latter as it had become very difficult to check Indian designs with conventional military might of Pakistan armed forces. Obviously Pakistan's defense budget got adversely affected by the US sanctions after October 1990 but this deficiency was made up from other sources. The nuclear program that was started after the US embargo in 1965 was accelerated after Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 and further augmented after the US sanctions in 1990. This fact was told by Gohar Ayub Khan, Pakistan's foreign minister to the US delegation that came to Islamabad to dissuade Pakistan from testing her nuclear devices in response to Indian nuclear explosions on 11 May 1998. Recalling his discussion with the US delegation, Gohar Ayub Khan writes:

*I told them that it was precisely the US sanctions imposed on us in 1965 that had encouraged Pakistan to acquire long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. India's supplies had continued to come in from Russia which had put us in a position in which it was necessary for us to turn to missiles and nuclear weapons to ensure our national security.<sup>6</sup>*

After the pullback of US military aid in 1990, Pakistan's nuclear program got new impetus. Resulting from the US sanctions, economic compulsion had plagued Pakistan's meager economy. But it is a fact that despite all economic compulsions, no government in Pakistan could dare to abandon the nuclear option. Therefore, the severe US reaction towards Pakistan speeded up the flow of nuclear technology into the Middle East and Korean Peninsula to keep Pakistan's own program intact. Halting the delivery of F-16 bomber aircrafts under Pressler amendment, the US greatly affected Pakistan's defense capability. But deprivation from the American F-16 fighter aircrafts left no room for Pakistan except embarking upon a vigorous missile race that could provide delivery system to the nuclear devices of Pakistan. Pakistan imported M-11 missiles from China and missile technology from North Korea. For the exchange of missile technology, Pakistan extended nuclear technology to North Korea.<sup>7</sup> Thus, the US goal of nuclear non-proliferation was badly checkmated due to

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<sup>6</sup> Gohar Ayub Khan, *Testing Times...*, pp. 37-38.

<sup>7</sup> Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, 2007, *Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons*. New York: Walker & Company. pp.238-285.

the sanctions imposed against Pakistan and the stopping of the delivery of F-16 fighter aircrafts to Pakistan. The US policies regarding South Asia enhanced the already strong Pakistan-China defense cooperation that posed a great threat to India and also hampered the US efforts to contain China. Hence, despite the fact that Pakistan suffered much from the US sanctions, the cost arising out of these sanctions was much greater for the US than for Pakistan. Not only North Korea but certain countries of the Middle East also got nuclear know-how through Pakistan. The US policymakers failed to understand that the rollback of nuclear capability was not possible for Pakistan while the containment of this program was possible through certain US measures. They failed to comprehend that peaceful and persuasive instruments of foreign policy could prove more productive than coercive instrument in achieving the US goal of nuclear non-proliferation. Refusing to provide any security guarantee to Pakistan vis-à-vis India, President Clinton did not help Pakistan in refraining from nuclear tests on 28 May 1998. Pakistan was not given with any security umbrella against her hostile nuclear neighbor by any other criticizer of her nuclear program. Therefore, under security compulsions Pakistan decided to go nuclear when India exploded five nuclear devices on 11 and 13 May 1998.<sup>8</sup> This was a great setback for the US nonproliferation efforts but it was a huge gain for Pakistan. Pakistan paid a heavy economic price for her nuclear detonations conducted in response to India but succeeded in calming down the Indian belligerence towards Pakistan. In 1990, the threat of Indian adventurism against Pakistani-held Kashmir was halted due to the nuclear deterrence.<sup>9</sup> To deter India from escalating the limited Kargil war, Pakistan's nuclear capability played a vital role. Similarly, during the ten months long military standoff between Indian and Pakistan in 2001-2002, India could not dare to encroach upon Pakistani territory due to the fear of the use of nuclear arsenals by the latter. Consequently, the gathering of one million troops on both sides melted away without any crossover of international border. In future, neither India nor any other adventurous nation can have the courage to attack Pakistan due to the fear of nuclear retaliation. Skirmishes and limited wars cannot be ruled out but full-scale war cannot be afforded by anyone of them. In fact, this is the most important Pakistani achievement that resulted from the US non-cooperation in 1990s. With the

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<sup>8</sup> Gohar Ayub Khan, *Testing Times...*, pp. 36-39.

<sup>9</sup> Abdul Sattar, 'Foreign Policy: Relations with the West, China and the Middle East', in Hafeez Malik, 2003, *Pakistan: Founders' Aspirations and Today's Realities*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 405

acquisition of nuclear devices and their detonation in 1998, Pakistan's security became inconvincible that was the cornerstone of the US-Pakistan relations in the past. The US government officials and various US nuclear firms also economically benefited from Pakistan's nuclear program by the sale of nuclear material and nuclear deals.<sup>10</sup> American conventional war industry suffered much from the sanctions imposed against Pakistan as it lost an earnest client. The nuclear related US sanctions against Pakistan and India after their nuclear detonations in May 1998 did not affect these overtly declared South Asia nuclear powers as much as they adversely affected the US interests by undermining the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Fissile Materials Control Treaty (FMCT). Above all these sanctions, adversely affected the US wheat growers who lost one of their earnest buyers. Eager to contain the rising China, President Clinton waved all the nuclear sanctions soon to engage India. But Clinton's discriminatory treatment to Pakistan during his visit to South Asia in the spring 2000 added more to the trust deficit between Pakistan and the United States. The real reason behind this trust crisis was the difference in their strategic perceptions. In 1980s, their respective strategic interests had brought both Pakistan and the US closer towards each other but in 1990s the US had no strategic interests in the former and, therefore, an estrangement prevailed between them throughout 1990s.<sup>11</sup> It was a great loss for Pakistan but, in the long-run, the US also suffered from that estrangement. The horrific incidence of 9/11 is the most catastrophic outcome of this estrangement.

During this period of acute estrangement, Pakistan was forced by the US to choose either the continued US military assistance and economic aid or an uninterrupted nuclear program of her own. Despite isolation at international level and economic plight at the domestic level, Pakistani leadership refused to yield before the US pressure. Pakistan decided to give up the US economic aid and opted to keep her hard-won nuclear program intact but paid heavy economic cost for this choice.<sup>12</sup> No doubt, Pakistan nuclear technology boosted morale of the Pakistani nation and gave them self-confidence but the economic cost of this luxury hampered the economic and social development of the country. It is a non-refutable fact that Pakistan cannot rely

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<sup>10</sup> Levy and Scott-Clark, *Deception...*, p. 5.

<sup>11</sup> Tom Rogers, 'A Study in Reverse Influence'. In M. Raziullah Azmi (ed.), 1994, *Pakistan American Relations*. Karachi: Royal Book Company. pp. 98-131.

<sup>12</sup> Rashmi Jain (ed.), 2007, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2006: A Documentary Study*. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers. p. 245.

only on the nuclear devices to ensure national security and national integrity at home. In the long run, nuclear arsenal cannot ensure a nation her security, as mere possession of lethal weapons cannot make a nation strong enough to overcome the other problems. Without economic well being, mere nuclear deterrence cannot help in resolving the bilateral issue as was seen in the case of Kargil conflict in 1999. These arsenals even could not help the defunct Soviet Union in the face of economic crisis. No doubt, Pakistan's hard-won nuclear arms were valuable assets but her economic loss because of US sanctions prior to the nuclear explosion, affected the entire fabric of Pakistani society. With the imposition of US sanctions in October 1990, Pakistan immediately lost \$564 million US assistance lined up for the fiscal year of 1991<sup>13</sup> and so were her losses for the subsequent years till the US aid completely dried up by 1993. Military assistance was completely restricted throughout 1990s. However, keeping the Narcotics assistance aloof from the sanctions, an anti narcotics aid worth \$3-5 million annually, administered by the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, was kept extended to Pakistan.<sup>14</sup> However, despite taking drastic measures against Pakistan, the US did not obstruct the way of other bilateral donors and the international lending organizations like IMF or the World Bank to Pakistan.<sup>15</sup> This was not out of benevolence on the part of United States, but the fear of nuclear proliferation by Pakistan (in case of total economic collapse) urged the US administration to allow the other donors to do their business with Pakistan. After the passage of Brown Amendment (1995), the economic assistance was exempted from the Pressler Amendment. But the sanctions imposed by US and other countries after the nuclear tests on 28 May 1998 affected Pakistan's economy though for a short time. The economic deficiency due to these sanctions was \$5 billion annually. But Pakistan's decision to freeze the foreign currency accounts pushed the economy from bad to worse. This decision deprived Pakistan from the inflow of \$1.5 billion per annum in new foreign currency deposits and from a similar amount in foreign exchange remittances sent by Pakistani expatriates.<sup>16</sup> This decision even discouraged private foreign investment. Partly owing to the economic sanctions but mainly due to other economic predicament, Pakistan's debt burden mounted to \$38 billion. All these

<sup>13</sup> Kux, 'A Ride on the Roller Coaster', in Hafeez Malik (ed.), 2003, *Pakistan: Founders' Aspirations and Today's Realities*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 304.

<sup>14</sup> CRS Issue Brief for Congress IB 94041, Peter R. Blood. *Pakistan-U.S. Relations*. (Foreign Affairs Press and Trade Division, 10 March 2002), p. 6.

<sup>15</sup> Rashmi Jain, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 247.

<sup>16</sup> Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, pp. 226-227.

indicators pushed Pakistan to the verge of economic bankruptcy. However, lending from the IMF and economic support by the oil-rich countries like Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and China bailed out Pakistan's economy. The coup-related sanctions imposed by the US against the rollback of democracy in Pakistan in October 1999 further affected Pakistan and was pushed to economic bankruptcy but the IMF came to rescue her after the US green signal. The adverse effects of the US sanction against Pakistan's economy and military preparedness can be judged from the tables given in the previous chapters (chapter 3-5) of this dissertation.

On political front, Pakistan's losses were greater than gains. The arrest of Mir Aimal Kansi, a Pakistani national, and an illegal US operation to arrest Yousaf Ramzi, a non-US foreign citizen, were most disregarding steps taken by Pakistani officials to get US back on their side. Similarly, the release of Ayaz Baloch was also an act of shameful subservience to the US administration. Several other Pakistani nationals and people belonging to other nationalities, wanted by the American CIA and the FBI, were allowed to be caught by the US law enforcing agencies inside Pakistan. Even they were handed over to the US intelligence agencies without fulfilling the legal requirements of the national law of the land. The US agencies were allowed by Pakistani governments to conduct operations against Pakistanis on their own territory. This violation of rules was allowed for the sake of resumption of the US aid but this was a very high price. By taking such measures, the national sovereignty of Pakistan was mortgaged with the US that, in turn, lowered the national morale and heightened the vulnerability concerns among Pakistani masses. These abominable acts tarnished the national sovereignty of Pakistan to such an extent that this loss cannot be recovered over years. Ironically, these loathsome steps failed in changing the US policy of sanctions. In fact, they did nothing more than disgracing Pakistan both at home and abroad. Pakistan even failed in bringing back the Pakistani pilots arrested by the US authorities on charges of involvement in drug trafficking. The democratic governments in Pakistan could not win respect from the US democratically elected bodies.

Despite having the so-called democratic ideals, the US government did nothing to help the nascent democratic process in Pakistan. Throughout the last decade of the twentieth century, Pakistan had duly elected democratic governments. All these governments in Pakistan lacked political stability due to economic disorder arising from the economic sanctions and problems of governance. But the US did not

bother to save these governments from early collapse on ground of economic shortcomings. In 1995, the Brown Amendment was passed by the US senate to bail out Pakistan but it was not followed in letter and spirit. After the passage of Brownback-II amendment, all the nuclear related sanctions were lifted from India but the same treatment was negated to Pakistan. This was another great blow for Pakistan. To win the US support and to ward off the economic pressure, these elected governments could not win a soft corner in the US administration. But a military dictator like General Pervez Musharraf could find favor with the US administration and of the CIA after 9/11 due to strategic needs of the United States. This shows the degree of commitment towards democracy on the part of US power-holders. However, owing to the efforts of democratically elected governments, Pakistan escaped twice from being declared to be the state sponsoring terrorism. India worked tooth and nail to further widen the gulf of trust between Pakistan and the US but the latter did not give ear to the Indian advocacy to bracket Pakistan with Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria and Libya. Fretted by the possibility of turning Pakistan into another Taliban state, the US administration turned down the idea of declaring Pakistan as a rogue and terrorist state. However, the democratic government of Pakistan (1997-1999) got a setback when the US Tom Hawk cruise missiles were flown over Pakistan to hit bin Laden and his terrorist camps in Afghanistan. Violating Pakistan's air space, the US authorities did not bother even to inform Pakistani authorities before this missile attack. The missile attack took eleven Pakistani lives within her territory when one of the missiles missed the target. This missile attack intensified the anti-American sentiments and sowed seeds of discontent between Pakistani and American nations. Public diplomacy between Pakistan and the US reached the lowest ebb. Thus, the crisis of trust aggravated the already deteriorating relations and adversely affected both the nations. The meeting of a US General with Pakistan's army chief, on the eve of the missile flight, disregarding an elected Prime minister shows the US affinity for the men in uniform as compared to a democratically elected ruler.

In the past, the Pakistan army had been and is still, after 9/11, the greatest beneficiary of US-Pakistan relations. The interests of military as an institution and those of individual officers had cared better during the close strategic collaboration between the two countries. Therefore, military as an institution has always been in favor of close strategic ties with the United States. Even the genesis of these relations show that due to the military inclination and under compulsion from military

leadership of that time, the US was preferred over the Soviet Union as a strategic ally of Pakistan at the very outset of Pakistan's history.<sup>17</sup> The US had often patronized the military regimes, in frontline states, with an objective to achieve her geopolitical objectives in return for political and economic support to military regimes in those countries. This encouragement has increased the military's lust for power.<sup>18</sup> Due to the US support to military regimes in Pakistan, military emerged as the strongest institution and power broker in Pakistan. Military in Pakistan has always ruled the country either directly or behind the scene. Resultantly, the democratic institutions have not hold roots and the democratic culture has suffered due to frequent military takeovers. In the period between 1989 and 1999, military was playing from behind the curtain but they had made politicians hostage.<sup>19</sup> Captivated by the military's role in the polity, the leaders from opposition in Pakistan's legislature had knocked at the door of GHQ for gaining power. On the other hand, the successive elected governments used the economic reward for the military to buy time to govern. Referring to the civil-military relationship during 1990s, the former Speaker of the National Assembly of Pakistan said, "The military is so powerful an agency and we [the politicians] will get stuck [if we press the issue]."<sup>20</sup>

The military leadership had relinquished power in 1988, after the death of General Ziaul Haq due to the fact that international environment was not favorable to keep the army rule intact but elected governments were not empowered in the real sense. Elected governments were kept under pressure through various tactics. The first (1988-1990) and second (1993-1996) government of Benazir Bhutto was toppled with military support when the military leadership became sure that she was unable to get continued US support.<sup>21</sup> Nawaz Sharif, another elected Prime Minister, met the same fate when he lost the confidence of the military after losing the US support. In this way, military in Pakistan had become a perpetual stakeholder in power due to the strength it got from close ties with the United States. Pakistan army had emboldened so much that her chief took the policy contrary to the elected government in 1999 and conducted the military operation in Kargil while elected government was making

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<sup>17</sup> Hasan Askari Rizvi, 2000, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-1997*. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications. p. 77.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., pp. 11- 16.

<sup>19</sup> Ayesha Siddiqi, 2007, *Military incorporated: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. pp. 151-166.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 95.

truce deals. This ill-fated operation brought a bad name to the country. Sensing that military's economic and institutional interests were at stake, the top military leadership decided to oust the elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The US State Department was fully aware of the military preparedness for a military coup in Pakistan before 12 October but no US diplomatic channel was used to deter the army from seizing power even when contacted by the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Shamshad Ahmad Khan. In fact, the military coup was much suitable for the interests of the US and, therefore, no eyebrow was raised by Washington over the planned military adventurism.

Probing into the failure of democracy in Pakistan, it can be inferred that the US support to military dictators in Pakistan has always derailed the democratic process. In 1958, the military takeover in Pakistan was the result of growing strength of Pakistan's armed forces that it had from the US sources.<sup>22</sup> The 1965's adventurism against India was the option adopted by the then military ruler General Ayub Khan, was the result of overconfidence provided by the US-backed alliances and the US military aid to Pakistan army. In fact, the US also had a role in toppling Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's elected government in July 1977.<sup>23</sup>

Owing to the strong support extended to the military by the US, democracy could not flourish in Pakistan. Army and army generals have strengthened from time to time but democratic institutions have undermined and democratic culture has suppressed. The ongoing extremism in Pakistan (2001 onwards) is also the result of US support to the military dictators in Pakistan. The US support to the military rulers in Pakistan and negligence to the democratic governments has given rise to a number of social rifts, too.

Looking at the social effects of the US neglect to Pakistan in 1990s it becomes clear that it created apathy among Pakistani masses. Pakistani masses felt the unjust US approach and this perception fanned the anti-Americanism and intolerance in Pakistani society. Already disgruntled over Pakistan's unqualified support to the US, the people took the US sanctions under the Pressler Amendment as a betrayal to Pakistan.<sup>24</sup> Any further cooperation between the US and Pakistan was resented to by

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<sup>22</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan...*, p. 363.

<sup>23</sup> Shamshad Ahmad Khan, pp. 2-4.

<sup>24</sup> General Mirza Aslam Beg, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Programme: A National Security Perspective'. *National Development and Security*. Vol. 2, August 1993, Serial No. 5. pp. 1-25.; and also available at: <http://www.friends.org.pk/Beg/>

the people of Pakistan due to the highest anti-US sentiments created by repeated withdrawal of US support from Pakistan in times of need. This was a loss not only for Pakistan but also for the United States.

On the other hand, in early 1990s Pakistan's image remained positive among the US public. But after the rise of extremism in Afghanistan, the American citizens developed a very negative perception about Pakistan and her people. This was all due to the US media cult created by the Indian and Jewish lobby in the United States. The social unrest in Pakistan has roots in pro-US Afghan policy adopted by Pakistan in 1980s but these sentiments found no bound when the US abandoned Pakistan after the end of Cold War. Another catastrophic repercussion of social unrest in Pakistan was the gradual ineptitude of the law-enforcing structure in Pakistan that gave rise to internal insecurity and instability.<sup>25</sup> The rise of the *jihadi* culture in Pakistan in 1990s was the outcome of US policies in Afghanistan in 1980s and the approval provided to it by the military dictator in Pakistan under his own power-compulsions. The uninterrupted flow of arms and Afghan people into Pakistan contributed much to the deterioration of law and order situation. The perverted law and order situation blocked the way of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as well as the investment by the native people. FDI was diminishing day by day but black money was injected into the society at an alarming speed. Narco-money (money earned from the trade of narcotics) was corrupting the social, political and institutional systems of Pakistan. The ever-increasing economic deprivation in Pakistan was inviting the jobless Pakistani youth to take up arms to fulfill their economic needs. The US sanctions had barred Pakistani governments from undertaking developmental projects that could generate economic activity to provide jobs. The industrial sector of Pakistan was also suffering from the US sanctions. Already existing domestic resources of Pakistan were unable to cope with the economic need of nearly 150 million people. The debt burden of Pakistan was increasing day by day and it reached \$38 billion within ten years (1989-1999). The government was running on the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) from the IMF. The IMF conditionalities were exhausting the purchasing power of the people of Pakistan. The defense budget was engulfing more than half of the national budget. The democratic governments opened the economy but this effort was also nullified due to the international image problem of Pakistan that had been

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

tarnished due to the US sanctions and the deteriorating law and order situation. The spread of heroin resulted from the uninterrupted flow of Afghan people and Afghan guerrilla leaders affected each and every stratum of Pakistan. Easy money from opium cultivation lured the rural farmers. Transferring the entire burden of more than three million Afghan refugees also crippled Pakistan's meager economy and this gave rise to economic disorder beside social instability. These social and economic problems contributed much to the ongoing and cureless menace of extremism which might engulf not only Pakistan but also the entire South Asian region. These extremist trends reached even to the US in the form of 9/11. These threats are still endangering stability of South Asia. If the South Asian region destabilizes then even the US cannot insulate herself from the future extremists' assaults. The chief cause of such devastating activities would surely be the economically deprived and socially crumpled areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Presently, Afghanistan and Pakistan are the countries that face terrorism. As the Soviet Red army withdrew from Afghanistan, the US left Pakistan and Afghanistan unattended. The CIA washed hand of her Afghan policy and the US administration shut down the US embassy in Kabul. The war-ravaged Afghanistan was left at the disposal of Pakistan. This turning back on the part of US administration paved way for intervention of other regional players in Afghanistan. This fact has been acknowledged by the US Secretary of State, Ms. Hillary Diane Rodham Clinton, recently.<sup>26</sup> Thus, another 'great game' started due to the US benign neglect in this region. In this newly evolved strategic arena, all the neighboring states of Afghanistan involved actively. Each and everyone wanted to have a government of her own choice in Kabul. This gave rise to another phase of endless civil war among warring Afghan factions. The victory of fundamentalists in Afghanistan and a constant civil war gave rise to militancy in the region and abroad. Russian Federation, India, Iran and Central Asian states were equally afraid of the spillover of this growing Islamic fundamentalism, emanating from Kabul. They were also resenting to any Pakistani role in Afghan politics in the future while Pakistan had no other option except safeguarding her own interests through supporting the dominant Afghan clique, the Taliban. Consequently, a race for winning Afghanistan took place in the region. This tug-of-war helped no one in establishing control over Afghan affairs. Resultantly, the

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<sup>26</sup> Nargis Zahra. 'US Realism towards Pakistan?', *Pakistan Times* (28 May 2009).

civil war in Afghanistan dashed all hopes of the foreign stakeholders. Turning the upside down, the increasing wave of militancy from Afghanistan took the whole region into its folds. The US tried to get a loin share in the hydrocarbons reserves of Central Asia without getting physically involved in Afghanistan. But the Taliban were not ready to cater to the US interests in Afghanistan. Similarly, *Al-Qaeda* took advantage of the anti-US Taliban stand and joined hands with the Taliban leadership. Hence, another phase of rivalry started between the US and all the other foreign and domestic stakeholders of Afghanistan. Plunging of Afghanistan into a protracted civil war, rise of the Taliban and refuge of bin Laden in Afghanistan were the direct outcomes of the US policy of walk away from Afghanistan and Pakistan after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.<sup>27</sup> Now the cost of US benign neglect towards Afghanistan became more and more high for the United States. Looking at the past of Afghan wars against foreign powers, it seems that in the future the US will have to pay unbearable cost for her military intervention in Afghanistan not only in economic terms but also militarily. Pakistan would also suffer from her close strategic partnership with the US in her 'War on Terror', not only economically but also politically, militarily and strategically. Pakistan has lost nearly all the benefits reaped from her Afghan policy in 1980s as well as 1990s, especially from the pro-Taliban policy. Drugs, lawlessness, Kalashnikov culture, social unrest and political instability are some of the gifts of the previous pro-US Afghan policy under General Ziaul Haq (1977-1988) Pakistan's former military ruler and the continuation of pro-Taliban policy by the successive elected governments. The Taliban who were considered a matchless asset by Pakistan turned into a dangerous liability.<sup>28</sup> Thus, the costs surpassed the benefits not only for Pakistan but also for the United States. The post-9/11 Pakistan's Afghan policy presents even the grimmer picture. It appears that the future cost of the post 9/11 US-Pakistan engagement would not be affordable for Pakistan both at home and abroad. This time, not only the national security but also the territorial integrity and even the very existence of Pakistan is called in question. In early 1990s, Pakistan was content with the role played by the Afghan warring factions against the defunct Soviet Union but in late 1990s these groups became an ugly burden for their host. Pleased with the strategic depth that she got, Pakistan was harboring these groups on the Pakistani soil and the ISI was proud of them but, later

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<sup>27</sup> Kux, *The United States and Pakistan*..., pp. 364-365.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

on, the Taliban movement distanced the then *Mujahideen* from their former patrons in Pakistan. Ironically, the Taliban also multiplied Pakistan's problem and contributed much to the tarnished image of Pakistan abroad. Irritating the US-Pakistan relations in 1990s, the Taliban leaders turned a deaf ear to every US demand regarding their policies.

There is no denying the fact that the Taliban gave a strategic respite to Pakistan but they were not supportive of establishing a broad-based government in Kabul and thus impeded the way of Pakistan's economic ties with the Central Asian republics. The continuous arms conflict in Afghanistan not only obstructed Pakistan's way to the oil and gas resources of the Caspian Basin but also did not allow any US oil company to exploit the oil and gas resources of the region. This act annoyed the US authorities and they started exerting pressure on Pakistan to make the Taliban leaders to comply with the US demands. Refusal of the Taliban to yield before these demands pushed Pakistan and the US further apart from each other. The landlocked Central Asian republics also distanced themselves from Pakistan. Alarmed by the terrorist menace emanating from Afghanistan, these did not show much enthusiasm in establishing close economic ties with Pakistan. Accordingly, Pakistan could not translate her geographical proximity, strategic worth and religious links with the Muslim republics of Central Asia into economic gains. On the contrary, these republics fully backed the Russian effort to root out the Taliban who were considered the exporter of militancy. The Taliban policies spilled over into Pakistan and launched the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP), the Taliban movement inside Pakistan and also instigated the militants to intensify the Kashmiri insurgent movement.

Emboldened by the militants' victory against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the Kashmiri people took up arms against India and thus an insurgent movement was launched in late 1980s. Kashmiri insurgent movement led to the Kargil conflict that was defused after loud promises made by President Clinton, after his summit with Pakistan's Prime Minister, amid the Kargil war, to take personal interest in the Kashmir issue were not materialized. After the climb down of infiltrators from the Kargil heights, no effort was made by President Clinton to settle the Kashmir dispute or to bring the warring factions to the talks-table. Even amid the Kargil episode, when Pakistani and Indian prime ministers were about to meet in New Delhi, the US sabotaged the proposed summit. This highlights the American approach to the South Asian conflict. However, to deescalate the tension and to press both countries not to

resort to the use of nuclear devices, the US played a very constructive role. It was the US intervention that prevented any full-fledged conflict between the two powers of South Asia. The US used her back-channel diplomacy to urge India and Pakistan to resolve their differences amicably. But it is also an undeniable fact that resolution of disputes between India-Pakistan had never been a US priority. The peace process that culminated at the 'Lahore Declaration' was also due to the US backchannel diplomacy but these bilateral talks bore no fruit. No doubt, the role played by the US administration to prevent war was a great gain though her shy role in taking initiative to resolve the Kashmir dispute through mediation was a great loss for Pakistan.

### **Conclusion:**

The decade after the collapse of Soviet Union was a crisis-ridden era for the US-Pakistan relations. In fact, only the strategic factor had always forged an alliance between these two unequal partners but their interests had always been divergent. Therefore, relations between them lacked durability. With the accomplishment of the US strategic goals, Pakistan has not only been discarded like a used Kleenex but has also been charged with a number of sanctions. Same was the case after the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the subsequent collapse of Soviet Union. Thus, in the post-Cold War decade, relations between them were far from good. Misperceptions about each other's needs, domestic and strategic compulsions and diversification of interests between these strategic partners alienated them. During this era, the US-Pakistan relations faced a severe type of estrangement that posed problems for both. However, both Pakistan and the US reaped benefits besides incurring cost from their strained relations. But, looking at the ratio of losses and gains arising from this phase of relationship, it can be said with a higher degree of authenticity that costs had surpassed the benefits for Pakistan. Even the benefits gained by Pakistan, during engagements with the US, had been mostly rolled back due to the various layers of the US sanctions applied against Pakistan. The most draconian of these sanctions were the ones imposed under the Pressler amendment in October 1990. These sanctions were 'Pakistan specific' and greatly affected defense, economy and society of Pakistan. Discriminatory US sanctions imposed since October 1990 until May 1998 were on the top of Pakistan's losses in her history of relations with the United States. If the acquisition of nuclear know-how was the greatest achievement of Pakistan in

1980s, the continuation of this program throughout 1990s was another success. Despite severe US pressure, Pakistan's nuclear tests against Indian nuclear explosions were the greatest achievement in the field of defense that was the primary concern of all governments in Pakistan. This nuclear technology successfully deterred India for nearly four decades since 1971 from invading Pakistan directly. Compensation of the F-16 aircrafts nuclear delivery system with the missile system was another outcome of the strained US-Pakistan relations in 1990s that lessened Pakistan's reliance for defense on the United States. To keep the IMF aid flow intact through the US support, Pakistan gained a respite to save her from bankruptcy. But at the same time it was a triumph of US endeavors that Pakistan did not slip into the waves of extremism in those days. If it had happened then the nuclear arsenal would have become more vulnerable to use. But the greatest loss for Pakistan, that had marred all the gains, was the loss of the US military and economic aid. However, today (January 2010), the ruptured sovereignty and the shattered internal security of Pakistan have surpassed all the earlier losses.

On the US card, if the defeat of Soviet forces in Afghanistan was the greatest gain, the rise of extremism and its outflow from Afghanistan and Pakistan to the rest of world was the most abominable loss. The US turned a deaf ear to Pakistani calls for the resolution of Kashmir dispute and confined her role to the diffusion of tension between India and Pakistan. Accordingly, threats of attack on Pakistan were nullified which was a plus point for Pakistan. But the US negligence to mediate in Kashmir dispute gave high impetus to extremism in the region.

No doubt, Pakistan's nuclear program was slowed down with the imposition of US sanctions but these sanctions proved more counterproductive than productive. The nuclear non-proliferation policy of the US got a setback that, in turn, affected the US interests. The obstruction of the delivery of F-16 fighter planes and military hardware could not obstruct Pakistan's way to nuclearization. On the other hand, it opened this technology to spread into the Middle East and over Korean peninsula.

The US could not honor democracy in Pakistan that contributed to the problems on both sides. Despite the democratic setups in Pakistan, the US took marginal initiatives to support the meager economy of the former that was the major cause of political instability. Four elected governments were ousted upon charges of economic mismanagement. Hence, political instability resulted in more economic disorder in the country. This economic disorder gave rise to social unrest that

heightened extremism and intolerance. Thus, *Talibanization*<sup>29</sup> in the region came out as the ultimate result of economic chaos. Now not only Pakistan but also the US and the entire world suffers from this menace.

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²⁹ Talibanization refers to the imposition of strict Islamic rules in the society as was seen in Afghanistan under Taliban (1994 – 2001).

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

“Pakistan played the role of an American mercenary for the last 60 years but now this garb be shed out to put the nation on an honorable path by adopting an independent course of action like the great nations. We have done espionage for the US during 1960s and we provided them airbases against Soviet Union just for two million US dollars but mortgaged our sovereignty forever.” Ambassador Shamshad Ahmad Khan¹

The turbulent US-Pakistan relations have seen many ups and downs. But the decade after the fall of Soviet Union was the period of worst type of estrangement for the US-Pakistan relations. The big partner, the US, had alienated her junior partner, Pakistan. This estrangement was not only a manifestation of the fragility of relations but also unveiled the persistent and deep-rooted mistrust between them. The changed geo-strategic environment, both at the regional and global level, pushed them apart from each other. But the chief cause of this push apart was the mistrust found between the two countries due to the divergence of interests and misperceptions about each other's compulsions.

US Interests:

In the changing paradigm of world politics, the United States made certain shifts in her foreign policy after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in early 1990s. The US global and regional strategic interests underwent a radical change. Containment of the Soviet communist peril was no more on the US agenda. The foremost concern, now, was to keep up her economic and military ascendancy and to keep her unipolar status intact by monopolizing the economic and military resources. Backed by the US intelligentsia, most of the think tanks, academicians, and military strategists in the US wanted to establish the US *imperium*.² For this purpose, the US wanted to take the strategic control of the world through different foreign policy instruments. To avoid

¹ Ex. Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, excerpt from his interview published in *Jang Sunday*, Karachi (Pakistan), (22-28 February 2009), pp. 2-4.

² The term US *imperium* can be explained in words of Richard Haas, a member of the US National Security Council, who said (in 2000): “[US policy] would require that Americans reconceive their role from one of a traditional nation-state to an imperial power...To advocate an imperial foreign policy is to call for a foreign policy that attempts to organize the world along certain principles affecting relations between states and conditions within them. The US role would resemble 19th century Great Britain. Influence would reflect the appeal of American culture, the strength of the American economy and the attractiveness of the norms...”, an excerpt of his article published in the *Foreign Affairs* journal (September 1999), quoted in Hafeez Malik, 2008, *US Relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Imperial Dimension*. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 2.

any future confrontation with any potent rival, the US wanted to evolve a new world order where no one could challenge access of the US and her allies to the economic resources anywhere on the globe. Simultaneously, the US aimed at promoting the free market economy across the world in order to strengthen and expand the American influence over the economies of the world.

The post-Cold War change in US foreign policy posture was also reflected in her interests in the South Asia. This region was still considered by the US as the most important strategic hub but this time the focus was not on Pakistan or Afghanistan but on India, a huge market for the US business class. The US had four main interests in this region. *First*, Nuclear Non-proliferation was the chief security concern of the American administration. *Second*, the containment of China was the main political objective of the American foreign policy. *Third*, in this context, a peaceful and stable South Asia was in the interest of the United States. *Fourth*, elimination of Islamic fundamentalism that emerged from the ashes of the protracted Afghan war was on the list of US interests. But, ironically, the US policymakers were not able to take full cognizance of the future terrible consequences of growing militancy and, therefore, they abandoned both Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, in late 1990s, terrorism became the corner stone of US foreign policy.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, in early 1990s, this one-time close ally had no much charm for the American strategists but, still, some controversial issues were quite enough to draw the attention of American strategists. For the United States, Pakistan's controversial nuclear program, acquisition of *M-11* missile from China, nuclear and missile deal with North Korea, the rise of Taliban, the refuge of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, clandestine activities of *Al-Qaeda* network from Pakistan and Afghanistan and the growing militancy in Kashmir with the alleged involvement of the ISI were the main irritants. Thus, in the post-Cold War era, two main US interests in relations with Pakistan were; the rollback of Pakistan's nuclear program, and the elimination of Islamic militancy that emanated from Pakistani soil. Pakistan's role in stabilizing South Asian region was also sought by the United States. But to accomplish all these objectives, the US had more sticks than carrots.

The spread of nuclear weapons, which could trigger off mass destruction, was the most serious challenge to the US *imperium*. The possible access of the fundamentalists to these lethal weapons was the most unfavorable future scenario for the US unipolar status. In this context, Pakistan's nuclear program was the most

important cause of friction in the US-Pakistan relations. From the US perspective, Pakistan's nuclear arsenals were the most vulnerable to the militants as the Pakistani intelligence agency, the ISI, had established close contacts with the fundamentalists during their struggle against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s and the same agency was promoting the Taliban in Afghanistan and insurgency in Kashmir. Therefore, from the very beginning of the 1990s, a nuclear Pakistan was not acceptable to the US and the US efforts continued to rollback Pakistan's nuclear program. To achieve this end, the policy of sanctions was enthusiastically employed by the United States. By the end of 1990s, Pakistan was facing three layers of sanctions; nuclear-related sanctions since 1990, post nuclear tests sanctions since May 1998 and military-coup related sanctions after 12 October 1999. Nevertheless, all these sanctions proved very counterproductive. Due to the hold back of US arms to Pakistan, the latter resorted to embark upon nuclear proliferation for the sake of compensating the security needs. Similarly, due to the non-availability of any other delivery system for nuclear arsenal, Pakistan opted for acquisition of missile technology from China and South Korea. The US overlooked the security needs of Pakistan and took a world view of the nuclear issue from the western perspective. To check nuclear proliferation, the US stressed upon Pakistan to sign NPT and CTBT but the latter refused to do so in case of Indian non-compliance to these treaties as Pakistan's nuclear program was to check Indian hegemonic tendencies. The US proposed a regional conference to make South Asia a nuclear free region but India denied to give her assent to it.

Before May 1998, the US administration stressed that Pakistan must rollback her alleged nuclear program and offered some economic benefits. But in May 1998, when Pakistan asked the US president to extend security guarantee to Pakistan in return for giving up the option of nuclear explosions, the US president refused to comply with the demand. In fact, before the Indian nuclear explosions in May 1998, the US nuclear policy towards South Asia was very imbalanced. India was given free hand as a 'regional power' while Pakistan was sanctioned heavily under Pressler Amendment. This US approach added fuel to the already existing anti-US sentiments in Pakistan that resulted in the eruption of militancy in the whole region. This militancy gave rise to the unabated terrorism. The horrific incident of 9/11 was the direct outcome of terrorism that emanated from the US misperception about Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Middle East.

In late 1990s, Terrorism posed one of the most serious threats to the US military dominance in the unipolar world and became the major irritant in the US-Pakistan relations towards the end of 1990s. Eradication of militancy and terrorism became the topmost US priority towards the close of twentieth century that relegated the relative importance of nuclear non-proliferation. This growing tide of terrorism was mainly due to the US benign neglect towards Afghanistan and Pakistan after the rollback of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The US identified *Al-Qaeda* as the major terrorist outfit and held Osama bin Laden, *Al-Qaeda*'s head, responsible for 9/11 terrorist attacks that razed the twin towers of World Trade Center (WTC) in New York to the ground and also caused damage to the Pentagon. Prior to these attacks, Pakistan's military intelligence agency, the ISI, was alleged for supporting *Al-Qaeda* and the fundamentalist regime in Afghanistan, the Taliban, along with infiltrators in Kashmir. This US mindset was reflected in putting Pakistan on the US State Department watch-list of states sponsoring terrorism. In fact, there was a deficit of trust between the US and Pakistan that was pushing them apart instead of bringing them closer to find a solution to the problem of terrorism. The US phobia about Pakistan's links with terrorists was further manifested during the Kargil crisis between India and Pakistan. During late 1990s, Pakistan was pressed much to check the Taliban, dismantle *Al-Qaeda* and kill or arrest bin Laden. The failure to comply with these US demands made Pakistan the focus of US criticism. This US behavior further aggravated the problem of terrorism. The effective antidote of terrorism was not lying only in fighting with the terrorists but also in finding solution to the problems that were inviting people to join the terrorist outfits [the present day US leniency to hold talks with Taliban leaders in Kabul is a clear manifestation of the findings of this study]. The foremost cause of militancy in Kashmir and Pakistan was the issue of Kashmir. Emboldened by the rollback of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, militants from Pakistan and Afghanistan were focusing on India, especially in the Indian-held Kashmir. For this purpose, they were exploiting the youth who were entrapped by various social and economic problems emanating from the social and economic plight of their countries as a result of Afghan war (1979-1990). The US was not taking cognizance of these problems but insisting on surgical solution which further irritated the militants. Due to the US policy of appeasing India, the solution of Kashmir was never on the US agenda. Successive Pakistani governments did their best to involve the US in the settlement of Kashmir dispute but could not achieve this

objective. Even mediation was ruled out by the US in the face of obdurate Indian attitude towards foreign involvement in the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India. Thus, both India and Pakistan gained time to become overt nuclear powers. However, the horrific incident of 9/11 forced both US and Pakistan to change their mindset and accommodate each other. Pakistan once again assumed the role of a 'frontline state' against terrorism under the leadership of General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008), the fourth military ruler of Pakistan. The military junta complied with all the US demands made by the US Secretary of State through a phone call. Logistic, intelligence and technical support was extended to the US armed forces. The military ruler took it as a blessing in disguise to legitimize his dictatorial rule in Pakistan. In return, the US lifted all the sanctions within days, wrote off some loans, rescheduled some other loans and Pakistan was once again given the status of 'frontline state'. This time the strategic partnership between the erstwhile close allies was against terrorism and not communism. The military dictator in Pakistan was showered with such blessings by the US that were never bestowed upon any elected government of Pakistan in 1990s despite all the efforts made by them. In this way, the US launched a 'War on terrorism'. The entire world joined hands with the US but this was really a part of the new 'great game'. Pakistan again assumed the role of mercenary but this time the drawbacks were much obnoxious for Pakistan, both as a state and as a nation. Pakistan lost not only hundreds of military personnel in this US-led 'War on Terrorism' but also the whole political, social and economic structure of the country destabilized. The very existence of Pakistan has been put at stake. Hundreds of Pakistani soldiers have been lost in combating terrorism in Pakistan's tribal areas, a large number of *Al-Qaeda* activists have been apprehended from Pakistani soil and then handed over to the United States. All kinds of logistic support, transit facilities to the US-led International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) in Afghanistan have been given and, above all, information about *Al-Qaeda* and Taliban in Afghanistan have been shared with the United States. In return, Pakistan has been targeted with drone attacks, with blames of half-hearted cooperation and alleged involvement of the ISI in helping the terrorists. Due to her involvement in the US-led war against terrorism, Pakistan's internal stability has become completely wretched. Two border provinces of Pakistan; Balochistan and the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Province (KPK) have fallen into the severe grip of terrorism. Both Pakistan army and civilian governments have lost credibility and morale in these provinces. Nearly 3.5 million people have been

displaced in Pakistan's hunt for terrorists. This matchless number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have been forced to live a miserable life and this massive displacement would politically, economically and socially affect Pakistan for decades. All these sacrifices could not bridge the gulf in the US-Pakistan relations that has arisen due to trust deficit. Ironically, the trust deficit is increasing day by day and the US involvement in Pakistan's internal affairs is deteriorating the domestic situation for Pakistani military as well as civilian governments.

On the contrary, the US is still not content and persistently demanding 'do more' while Pakistani authorities are asking for 'dollars more', 'aid more' and strategic partnership at par with India. Consequently, the masses of Pakistan are suffering 'more'. This state of affairs would continue until the mutual distrust is replaced with trust. Otherwise, the repercussions of this mistrust would be more catastrophic for Pakistan than the United States.

Recently, US interests are to rout militancy, check nuclear proliferation, save Pakistan from destabilizing and to contain China. Eliminating terrorists from Afghanistan and Pakistan is the main interest of US administration so that it may not spillover to the rest of South Asia and then to the rest of world. Destroying *Al-Qaeda* network is viewed by the US strategists as the only solution to militancy in the region. The constant US failure in achieving this goal is attributed to Pakistan's half-hearted efforts in the 'War on Terror'. In the eyes of Americans, Pakistan is not only part of the problem but the real problem.³

Pakistan's Interests

From the very beginning of her history in 1947, Pakistan faced two hostile neighbors; India on the east and Afghanistan on the west. Being faced by such a grim geo-strategic and geopolitical scenario, militarily weak and economically deficient Pakistan had limited foreign policy choices. For Pakistan, the national security, territorial integrity and economic prosperity were the main national interests along with economic and political stability. To achieve all these ends, Pakistan needed military and economic assistance from the United States. The US responded positively but her basic objective was to contain Soviet communist march into South

³ Eugene Robinson. 'Afghanistan: A war without end, or rationale'. *The Washington Post* (Friday, 01 October 2010).

Asia through Pakistan. But as stated earlier, after the collapse of Soviet Union, the geo-strategic interests of the US changed. The US turned her back. Pakistan had lost her frontline status. However, on the other hand, Pakistan's dependency on US defense system and military inclination did not allow Pakistan to sever ties with her former ally. Moreover, no state of the world could overlook relations with the US as she has assumed the status of the sole military and the most dominant economic power in the world in the post-Cold War era. In these circumstances, Pakistan could not afford to be at odds with the United States.

In 1990s, Pakistan had four main interests. *First*, to revive the US military and economic aid at the same level as it was during the Afghan War (1979 – 1989). *Second*, resolution of long drawn Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India through US mediation. *Third*, Pakistan aimed at keeping India away from becoming a regional power with US support. *Fourth*, securing the long desired strategic depth in Afghanistan. For this purpose, Pakistan engagement in supporting the pro-Pakistan militants was also identified as Pakistan's vital interest.

In the post-Cold War paradigm, the US refused to keep aid intact to Pakistan in the presence of unabated nuclear program of the latter while Pakistan refused to give up the nuclear option for the sake of economic aid. Pakistan's non-compliance with the US demands was because of her sense of insecurity arising from the hostile Indian approach and the repeated promise breaking of the United States in the past.⁴ From Pakistan's perspective, her nuclear program was necessary for her survival. Pakistan was not pursuing nuclear posture as a luxury to get prestige at the international level, as India did. The sole purpose of Pakistan's nuclear posture was defensive while India intended to get international standing and leading role in the world-politics by acquiring nuclear technology. Looking at the past India-Pakistan course of tension, no one could disregard the fact that India had shown hostility towards Pakistan in 1948, 1965 and 1971. Therefore, to deter the future threats to her territorial integrity and national security, nuclear arsenal was the most important device in the hands of Pakistan. In the 1990s, relations between India and Pakistan were touching the lowest ebb throughout the decade. However, the United States stuck to her policy of imposing sanctions. The US was determined to pursue the non-proliferation objective more vigorously in the post-Cold War era through coercive and

⁴ Gohar Ayub Khan, 2009, *Testing Time As Foreign Minister*. Islamabad: Dost Publications. p. 36-39

economic instruments but ignored the strategic needs of holders of this technology. Pakistan did all to win the US support except rolling back her nuclear program. The Americans, on the other hand, were not willing to extend the kind of unqualified military and economic aid to the once 'frontline state' as was done before the end of Cold War. The main driving force behind Pakistan's nuclear program was the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir.

Kashmir dispute had assumed more volatile form in the post-Cold War era, especially after the triumph of Afghan armed struggle against the Soviet Union, the second world power. Pakistan supported the Kashmiri insurgents to destabilize India. India was much irritated over this rising insurgency in Kashmir and wanted to press Pakistan through the US to put an end to the Pakistan-backed infiltration in Kashmir. But Pakistan's perception about it was quite different. Pakistan's ISI and government were interested in destabilizing India through the guerilla warfare on the pattern of Afghan struggle against the Soviet forces. On her failure to eradicate militancy, India started to malign Pakistan for being involved in the cross border infiltration into the Indian-held Kashmir. Looking at the short and long-term consequences of militancy in Kashmir, the US was also concerned about the growing insurgency in Kashmir. This unanimity of stand on Kashmiri insurgence brought the US and India much closer. At the same time, diplomatic channels were used by Pakistan to mount pressure over India to come to the talk-table. But on the contrary, Kashmiri insurgency posed many challenges than opportunities when the American CIA bracketed the Kashmiri insurgent group to Osama bin Laden's terrorist outfit *Al-Qaeda*. Even though the US found links between Kashmiri insurgence and the terrorist networks like *Al-Qaeda* and the Taliban, but she did not pay heed to the root cause of this insurgency and, therefore, refrained from resolving the longstanding Kashmir dispute. The dispute of Kashmir has been the core issue urging Pakistan to resort to the nuclear option for safeguarding her national security and territorial integrity vis-à-vis India. This was also the real objective of Pakistan's strategic ties with the United States since 1950s. The diplomatic solution of Kashmir could have contributed much to the nuclear non-proliferation and regional stability of South Asia. India could have focused wholeheartedly on the containment of China which was the US strategic objective in the region to ensure the US *imperium*. But due to the US shyness to break new ground in the settlement of Kashmir impeded the course of nuclear proliferation in South Asia. On the contrary, the Kashmir dispute heightened

the possibility of a nuclear showdown during the Kargil fallout between India and Pakistan. But even that episode could not prompt the US to find a durable and permanent solution to this long drawn issue. Hence, the nuclear and missile race on the Indian subcontinent remained undiminished.

Checking the India supremacy in the region was the key objective of Pakistan foreign policy but the US was in no mood to indulge herself in this bilateral issue. The US could not dismay the Indian leadership by involving in this dispute. Moreover, no US administration was ready to treat these two South Asian nuclear powers even handedly. Of course, India, the largest democracy in the world, was more important for the Americans than economically backward pro-China Pakistan.

Economic stability of Pakistan was greatly tarnished after the Choked US economic assistance due to the nuclear related sanctions under Pressler Amendment in 1990s. However, the US did not want to push Pakistan to complete economic bankruptcy which could prove more catastrophic than the nuclear threat. Therefore, the US administration did not impede Pakistan's access to the international donors like IMF and the World Bank. The US used her influence to keep these channels open to save Pakistani economy from total collapse. Humanitarian aid from the US also continued in one form or the other. Trade relations between Pakistan and the US were also there in one form or the other. But these alternatives were no remedies to the direct US aid in the economic field. The stalled economic and military assistance adversely affected the economic, social and democratic system of Pakistan. Although the US believed in promoting democracy along with free market economy round the globe but democracy in Pakistan could not catch the US attention. The military dictator in 1980s was tolerated and nurtured by the US only due to his unqualified support to the US intelligent agency CIA in combating communism in Afghanistan. But this US support promoted militancy which had no antidote except democracy and democratic culture in Pakistan. Successive elected governments in Pakistan asked US administration for sound and unstopped economic support to take the polity out of extremist tendencies that crept here during Afghan war. Moreover, to make the image of the US better, the continued economic and military assistance was the prerequisite of promoting a culture of tolerance for other ideologies. But, ironically, the US-Pakistan relationship always prospered when there was a military government in Pakistan. The US-Pakistan relations have largely grown between the American Pentagon and Pakistan's GHQ. This US move strengthened the military and made it

emboldened to subdue all other institutions especially the democratic institutions. The strong, modern, well-equipped and well-disciplined military became the strongest party in the power politics of Pakistan. Unfortunately, four military dictators have taken over control of the country in the short span of time since 1958 and all of them enjoyed an unqualified support from the United States. This support hindered the people-to-people or institutional based relations between the Pakistani and American elected bodies and nations. Thus, an element of mutual trust could not replace mistrust. This mistrust has always given rise to complex problems between them. On the contrary, never in the history of Pakistan, the US paid heed to progressive, liberal and democratic setups in Pakistan. The same was true for the four consecutive elected governments in the decade after the end of Cold War. The failure of these elected governments in Pakistan was mainly due to the domestic economic plight in the wake of US sanctions. Thus, the people started looking towards another military dictator to get the same economic benefits as they reaped under the former dictator in 1980s. Consequently, democracy gave way to another dictatorship on 12 October 1999. The military rule under General Pervez Musharraf served no US interests except complicating her problems. Under his government, the ISI support to militant groups was a gift of military rule to the world. Musharraf was not interested in supporting US interests, he was interested only in saving his rule by borrowing support from the US administration. The absolute US support to him gave rise to a more violent form of militancy and terrorism. Thus, the feeble economic conditions of Pakistan led to the domestic political instability which, in turn, adversely affected the whole region. Apart from hampering the stability of the South Asian region, political instability in Pakistan held back the US interests when it gave rise to unabated militancy. The US failure in Afghanistan is a litmus test of that.

Not only the US failed in getting hold of Afghanistan but Pakistan also lost her desired strategic depth. However, the Afghan episode of the American 'War on Terror' made US realized that Pakistan and Afghanistan were still relevant in the geo-strategic equation of the region. Without Pakistan's active support, the US marines and modern sophisticated lethal arsenals are of no use in winning Afghanistan. This was the reason that Bush administration declared Pakistan as a non-NATO strategic ally in 2004. However, the US administration failed in treating Pakistan on equal footing with India. This is another strategic myopia on the part of US that could hamper her interests in the region. But Pakistan also realized that no satellite

government in Kabul could return the former with full and durable control over this war-ravaged neighbor. Afghans are the people who can be won with love not force.

In the present day scenario, Pakistan is looking for a long, durable and strategic partnership with the United States and this is the prime interest of Pakistan. Even after the lapse of more than sixty years, Pakistan's foremost interests are security, both national and economic, addressing the Kashmir dispute with India through international or US involvement and getting her western and eastern borders safe. But in view of her leadership, both civil and military, a stable and durable strategic US-Pakistan relationship is the prerequisite to achieve these ends. It is also stressed that by supporting the US interests, Pakistan can bring recognition to her nuclear power status. The US also needs Pakistan's role in her 'War on Terror'. Thus, both Pakistan and the US need each other's backing to accomplish their interests. But this time again they are at cross purposes. The main issue in transforming the transactional US-Pakistan relationship into a strategic partnership is the deep-rooted mistrust between these two countries. The main question is how to compensate this trust deficit. To replace mistrust with trust, a few policy recommendations are suggested for both sides, Pakistan and the United States.

Policy Recommendation for the United States:

The US foreign policy is not the exclusive domain of the US administration. There are a number of stakeholders in the formulation of US foreign policy such as US political interest groups in the power centers, economic interest groups in Multinational Corporations (MNCs), US print and electronic media, US Congress, US State Department, Pentagon, the US think tanks and various lobbies.

As far as South Asia is concerned, there is a consensus among all the stakeholders of the US foreign policy that the US must establish a good, durable and comprehensive strategic and economic partnership with India due to her economic might and democratic posture. For them, Pakistan is no more than a mercenary to which they pay for anti-terrorism role in the region. But as stated earlier, this is a great strategic myopia on the part of US policymakers.

Terrorism is a long drawn threat and it shall remain there for a long time on the US agenda. The 'War on Terrorism' may change its façade but may not lose its importance and it cannot be won without Pakistan's backing. Pakistan must be

considered part of the solution and not part of the problem by the US and all stakeholders in this war. One of the main causes of failure of ISAF in Afghanistan is the lack of military cooperation between Pakistan and the United States. In fact, Pakistani leadership and masses have a common perception that, in time of need, the US treats Pakistan as an instrument for accomplishing the US interests but abandon the latter when the US objective is achieved or given up. Recently (in 2011) Pakistan is worried about the growing Indian influence in Afghanistan because of the US support. The United States has no concern over Indian influence in Afghanistan. In fact, she envisages an important role for India in maintaining peace and order in the region. Hence, the US prefers to raise India as a regional super power, if not an international one. Therefore, in Afghanistan the enhanced Indian influence is of key importance to this strategy. On the other hand, the US thinks that Pakistan is not supporting US interests but only her own strategic goals. But this preference is hindering the US goals in Afghanistan. Pakistan is the only country that can bail out the US forces from Afghan war. In the backdrop of this state of affairs, the US needs to engage Pakistan more purposefully. The US must accommodate Pakistan's strategic interests and apprehensions. The United States must not limit Pakistan's role to the counterterrorism but must view her as a potential strategic ally in the future scenario of the South and Central Asian regions. Pakistan must be given the status of a permanent partner, as the threat of terrorism may not be addressed with short-term measures. It cannot be won with 'Drone Attacks'. It can be won with popular support on both sides of nearly 1700 km long Pak-Afghan border. To make the anti-terrorism strategy more fruitful, the US must provide Pakistan with modern equipments, training and technology (including drone technology). But the US must condition her aid with results. Simultaneously, the spending of this aid should strictly be monitored through a joint commission. For this purpose, a transparent mechanism should be employed to ensure that the aid has been utilized rightly.

The US policy in the 'War on Terrorism' in Afghanistan also must undergo some drastic changes otherwise it will meet the same fate as did the Soviet expediency in Afghanistan in 1979 and the British resort to win Afghanistan in the last part of the nineteenth century [this fact has been recognized by Obama administration since the fall of 2009]. The world cannot afford collapse of another power.

To eradicate militancy and terrorism, the US must employ instruments of peaceful settlement along with coercive measures. Without addressing the root causes of militancy, success through other means will be ephemeral. In South Asia region, there are two major sources of growing militant movements; the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan and the foreign intervention in Afghanistan by different regional and international powers. These two major sources have given rise to violent thinking. Such concepts gave room to the non-state actors to exploit the youth of the region. Therefore, the US must focus on the resolution of Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. This longstanding dispute between the two nuclear powers of the region cannot be amicably resolved without a third party involvement. Any breakout of a nuclear conflict as envisioned by the 'Global Trends 2015' would devastate not only South Asia but also can take the whole world into its fold. To avoid this catastrophe, the US should play the role of a mediator from behind the scene through backchannel diplomacy if not openly. This will earn great esteem for the US in the South Asian region and the anti-Americanism will be replaced with goodwill for the US and her policies. Pakistan's dependence on China may lessen if the security problems of the former diffuses after peaceful settlement of Pak-India disputes that are mainly due to Kashmir issue. This will also bring political and economic stability to Indian subcontinent which is the prerequisite of US policy goals in this region. Normalization of Pakistan-India relation will lead to lowering military profile in Pakistan that may, in turn, open new vistas to strengthen democratic institutions in Pakistan and help in evolving a new economic cooperation among South Asian and Central Asian countries. The US objective of nuclear non-proliferation can best be carried forward if India-Pakistan tension melts away in the wake of peaceful settlement of Kashmir dispute. Pakistan will divert her nuclear program to peaceful purposes.

Nuclear proliferation is rightly pinching the US in her shoe but coercive measures have failed in achieving this goal. Pakistan and India have become declared nuclear powers. The US is reluctant to admit Pakistan as legitimate nuclear power and, therefore, no nuclear deal is signed with this nascent nuclear state. Off and on objections are raised over the security of her nuclear program. On the contrary, Pakistan claims that it has a safe and sound command and control system that ensures that these lethal arsenals are in safe hands. Meanwhile, Pakistan has succeeded in making nuclear deals with China to balance the India nuclear development and to overcome her energy crisis. To take Pakistan out of China's sphere of influence and to

save Pakistan's nuclear program from slipping into the hands of terrorists, the US must offer a nuclear deal on the pattern of one the Bush administration signed with India. In case of possible US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US must not sever her ties with Pakistan because any such move may throw Pakistan into an economic quagmire that may force Pakistan to resort to nuclear proliferation to meet her economic needs.

To avoid an economic collapse in Pakistan, the US must not disregard socio-economic aid and development of infrastructure facilities in Pakistan. The US must encourage and strengthen foreign direct investment (FDI) in Pakistan. To save Pakistan from bankruptcy and to safeguard the democratic system in Pakistan, the US must place a Moratorium on Pakistan's foreign debts if cannot write them off. The US must compensate Pakistani losses in the 'War on Terrorism'. Otherwise, earth-shaken, flood-stricken and terrorism ravaged Pakistan will face catastrophic results that may take into its fold the entire region. The United States should establish special Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) in Pakistan. Pakistan's export-quota should be increased by the US to lessen Pakistan's dependency on US aid. The US policymakers and strategists must not underestimate strategic worth and significance of Pakistan in the future economic scenario. Pakistan lies among South, East, and Central Asia. Moreover, due to the geographical contiguity and accessibility to the Middle East, Pakistan can become a hub of future economic activities by revitalizing ECO via Iran if not possible via Afghanistan. Iran is a hard nut to crack for the United States. Iranian leadership refuses to comply with the US demand of nuclear non-proliferation. Consequently, Pakistan is the only country that can provide the US to have an easy access to the hydrocarbon resources of the Central Asian Republics.

For political purposes, again, access to Central Asia can carry out the US agenda to insulate this region from the Chinese influence by bringing them into the US influence through Pakistan and Afghanistan. The economic involvement of the US and European Union can take this area away from the militancy and terrorist tendencies, too. It is a startling reality that a peaceful Afghanistan is the prerequisite for materializing this objective. The US cannot trade peace to the Afghanis through forceful means. The US can do it through peaceful political patch ups with all warring cliques. But all this is possible only if the US recognizes the role of Pakistan as a genuine and durable strategic and economic partner. The US-Pakistan nexus will turn

Central Asia into a US-area of influence that can restrict the Russian influence, too. This nexus will put a limit to the growing Pakistan-China cooperation.

The US policymakers should also realize that no containment of China is possible without taking Pakistan into consideration. Without Pakistan's involvement, any effort to push forward the US agenda in the region may result in catastrophic repercussion for US interests that can replace the uni-polarity with a multi-polar system. A mighty India may present more challenges than opportunities for the US interests. The rise of other poles on the political firmament of the world may endanger not only the US hegemony but also the world peace at large. This would also pose threats to Pakistan's territorial integrity.

The US had been a great partner of Pakistan for longer periods but she could not shape the image of an ally in Pakistani society. Even Pakistani officials privately impute the US administration for lack of cooperation. Political leaders also blame the US for political mishaps. To improve the US image in Pakistani society, the US needs to revisit her policies. The US administration can strengthening social ties with Pakistan by introducing educational, cultural and welfare programs. But these program must not be run through NGOs. They can work effectively if regional consulates arrange them through US donor agencies under the banners of 'US-Pakistan Friendship'. In the recent floods, when the US marines and helicopters came to rescue Pakistanis they were heartily welcomed by Pakistanis despite all hatred for the US policies. Besides giving huge scholarships to students for higher education in American universities, schools for basic education should be established in economically backward areas where all expenses must be borne by the United States. To earn good will for the US, agricultural development programs must be initiated in rural areas.

Policy Recommendations for Pakistan:

Abandoning good relations with the US, which is still the largest military and economic power of the world and likely to continue so for decades if not centuries, is not affordable for any country of the world. Her role in the world affairs shall remain unchallenged till distant future. Therefore, not only for Pakistan but also for any country of the world, it shall be a folly to estrange the United States. But it is also a fact that Pakistan's excessive dependence on the US has made the foreign policy of the former humiliatingly subservient to the latter. This has caused and continues to

cause complications and persistent problems to Pakistan. Pakistan's policymakers must not linger on the ongoing warmth in the US-Pakistan relations that is solely due to Pakistan's strategic relevance for the US-led 'War on Terrorism'. There are still doubts on both sides, US administration and Pakistani government, regarding each other. Therefore, in the light of US track record, all this warmth will evaporate when the US strategic interests in Pakistan will wither. Therefore, to lessen her military and economic dependence on the US, Pakistan must adopt a vibrant multifaceted foreign policy towards the major powers of the world. Pak-China friendship must be strengthened more and more. But, at the same time, efforts to establish durable and broad based and comprehensive partnership and not relationship, that is based on 'equal terms', with the US should be established. There is no denying the fact that Pakistan needs US but in the prevailing circumstances, if not in the long run, the US also badly needs Pakistan. The US knows that without Pakistan's support, her success in Afghanistan is merely illusive. But, ironically Pakistan is not taking advantage of this opportunity. The US is entrapped in Afghanistan by the anti-American warriors. US-NATO forces have failed to overcome insurgency through military force. They have failed in creating divide among Taliban leadership. Military commanders of US and NATO are also of the view that the only solution to this complex issue is the table-talks but the stubborn US leadership is avoiding to recognize Taliban as a lawful political stakeholder. Despite persistent failure inside Afghanistan, the US is stressing Pakistan to conduct an all out military operation along 1700km long Pak-Afghan porous border. Military dictator in Pakistan has brought this US-led war inside Pakistan border but, in fact, it is not Pakistan's war as there was no insurgency in the tribal belt of Pakistan until 2001. But after October 2001 Pakistan is facing acute type of anti-state terrorism at the hands of Taliban and *Al-Qaeda*. Pakistan has lost more than 3000 troops as compared to the 1200 casualties of US military men. In economic terms, Pakistan has suffered much more than any NATO member country. Still Pakistan's role is doubted and her efforts are considered half-hearted. Even now, Pakistan is blamed for fostering Taliban and *Al-Qaeda*. Despite all these sacrifices Pakistan is warned by the higher US officials of dire consequences if any terrorist act occurs on US territory. Economic pressures are also exerted in case of non-compliance to the US demand. The US annoyance shows the helplessness of US strategy in Afghanistan. But, on the other hand, Pakistani leadership is unable to exploit this opportunity. If still Pakistani authorities claim it to be their own war

against terrorism then they have no right to ask US for compensations. But if it is US-led war then Pakistan must urge the US administration to come up to help Pakistan. Pakistan must give up her apologetic stance. Pakistan can also exert pressure by withdrawing her unqualified backing to the US and NATO forces. Besides lucrative economic gains, sophisticated military hardware and political leverage can be drawn in return for the continuous Pakistani support to the United States. In case of US diplomatic initiative to hold talks with Taliban, Pakistan can ask her inclusion to safeguard her strategic interest in that war-ravaged country. Pakistan must put an end to her policy of intervention in Afghanistan as all ethnic groups including Pukhtoons have shown aversion to any direct involvement in their internal affairs. The hunt for strategic depth in Afghanistan be replaced with strategic partnership with Afghan government. Pakistani authorities must not give up their demand for a nuclear deal as was done with India in 2004. This is the only way to bring an international recognition to the nuclear program of Pakistan. In case of US compliance or non-compliance, Pakistan should keep her nuclear collaboration with China intact. This will bring both US and India under enormous pressure to recognize Pakistan as a *de jure* nuclear power. However, Pakistan must make the US sure that any Indian involvement in Afghanistan under the US patronage will further aggravate the security relationship in the region and may destabilize the South Asian politics. Pakistani authorities should make it known to the US administration that in case of growing Indian influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan may withdraw transit trade facility to Afghanistan and logistic support to NATO forces through Pakistan. However, all these benefits are possible only if there is determination on the part of Pakistani leadership. Pakistani authorities must keep this in mind that once US forces leave Afghanistan, Pakistan will face worst types of consequences on many issues.

No one can deny the fact that US-Pakistan partnership has been the outcome of India-Pakistan rivalry ever since their creation in 1947. In the year 2010, floods and terrorists' activities have put Pakistan's security at stake. These facts should not be overlooked by Pakistani strategists and policymakers. Instead of living in euphoria, the ground realities must be taken into consideration. According to the CIA report "Global Trends 2015", an India-Pakistan conflict is likely to occur. If despite Pakistan's close relationship with the US, the latter could not prevent the India-Pakistan conflict then Pakistan should adopt a more pragmatic approach and redefine her role in the US-led 'War on Terrorism'. Attention should be focused on mending

fences with India rather than adopting an apologetic stand before the United States. The core issue between India and Pakistan that has strained their course of relations should be resolved through diplomatic channels. In bringing India to the table-talks, the US role cannot be overlooked. No doubt that Pakistan has been facing security threats both from her eastern as well as western borders, but the mode of threats has changed from direct encroachment upon her territory to employing internal factors to destabilize Pakistan. Pakistan must ask American officials for the provision of modern equipments to deal with terrorists within Pakistan territory. In this context, the surveillance equipments, the drone technology, and combat aircraft along with sharing the latest information must be sought from the United States. It was a great blunder on the part of Pakistani government to own the US-led 'War on Terrorism' but it is still another folly to bow before all US demands. Instead of playing double game, Pakistan must come with open policy and ask her senior partner to help her in addressing the root causes of the on going terrorist activities. Pakistan should ask the US to play her role to address Pakistan's main cause of apprehension i.e. the Indian stubbornness over Kashmir issue. If US apologizes to play a role then Pakistan must apologize to provide logistic support to her forces.

Another serious threat that is startling at the very existence of Pakistan (also mentioned in the above-mentioned CIA report) is the menace of militancy 'in the name of religion' in Pakistan. The CIA report says, "In a climate of continuing domestic turmoil, the central government's control probably will be reduced to the Punjabi heartland and the economic hub of Karachi."⁵ This is an eye-opener for Pakistan. Pakistan must explore and divulge the secret hand behind militancy in her provinces bordering Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the NATO and ISAF have failed in rooting out the Taliban and *Al-Qaeda* and this reality has been endorsed by the US military generals in Afghanistan.⁶ Now to divert the attention of the world, the militancy has been pushed into Pakistan's territory. Stern and decisive actions are needed to eliminate the menace of militancy that has certain foreign agencies behind

⁵ National Intelligence Council, "Global Trends 2015". December 2000. pp. 64-65. available at http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_global/globaltrend2015.pdf

⁶ The report presented by General Stanley A. McChrystal (a top US and NATO commander in Afghanistan) to the US Defense Secretary, in August 2009, asked for more US troops to get success. He described the situation in Afghanistan serious. He repeatedly warned that in case of failure to send more forces and the rapid implementation of a genuine counterinsurgency strategy, defeat is likely. See Bob Woodward, 'McChrystal: More Forces or 'Mission Failure'', Top U.S. Commander For Afghan War Calls Next 12 Months Decisive', The Washington Post, (Monday, September 21, 2009).

it. This fact has become known to everyone in Pakistan that enemies of Pakistan are fostering these militants by providing funds and arms. In case of failure of Pakistani operations against militancy inside the country, the first casualty would be the territorial integrity of Pakistan as envisioned in the CIA report. Keeping in view these facts, Pakistan should adopt a strategy based on national consensus and not upon US interests. Otherwise, this fire may take the whole of Pakistan into its fold. Pakistan must strive hard to root out militancy for her own interests. For this purpose, a policy must be formulated with national consensus after taking the nation and the national leaders into confidence. The writ of the government should be restored at any cost. The most effective antidote to this menace may be the complete sealing of borders along Pakistan.

The apologetic stance adopted by Pakistan on Kashmir issue has been a legacy of the military rulers of this country. It was General Ziaul Haq and General Pervez Musharraf who plunged Pakistan into the turbulent US wars in Afghanistan (1979-1989 and 2001-onward). To avoid any such expediency in future, Pakistan must establish and uphold a vibrant and stable democratic system. Political stability and a vibrant democratic system in Pakistan are not only the prerequisites of a stable, calm and peaceful South Asia but can also prove as an effective remedy to the growing militancy in the region.

Pakistan should revisit her educational, overseas, and economic policies so as to have an equal standing with India in eyes of the US policymakers. To bring Pakistan closer to the US and engage them in a long-term and durable partnership both at the government as well as mass level, certain concerted steps are needed. To encourage the US-based Pakistanis, Pakistan embassy in the United States should make long-term policies. The vigor of a community does not lie in its numerical strength only. No one can deny the utility of numbers in the democratic advantage but in terms of effectiveness, the real weightage can be given to qualitative strength. Of course, there are a number of qualitative factors which can help Pakistani-Americans to draw more benefits from the US policies by influencing them. *First*, the higher educational, managerial and professional skill can put the Pakistani-Americans in a good position to influence and mould the opinion of the US masses and this would be the essence of influence. Therefore, Pakistan should focus on making close contacts with the US policy and opinion makers. These opinion makers must be invited to the social and national gatherings in Pakistani embassy and consulates in the US so that a

better understanding could be developed between them. *Second*, the economic gains reaped from the profitable lucrative jobs attained by the US based Pakistanis due to their high skills would, in turn, boost their economic standard. *Third*, the higher economic gains would put them in a better position in the US corporate sector. *Fourth*, due to their economic uplift they would be quite influential to raise huge funds for the policy and decision makers in the US during their election campaign. In return, these politicians naturally would have a soft corner for Pakistan. *Fifth*, being in possession of key-posts in the US print and electronic media, they would be able to manipulate the US public opinion in Pakistan's favor. Simultaneously, Pakistani lobby in the US must expedite to portray the real perspective about Pakistan and her role in the 'War on Terrorism'. The American people should be made aware of the vitality of the resolution of Kashmir to check militancy and terrorism. In this context, efforts should be made to mould the US public opinion to urge their government to bring these two nuclear powers of South Asia to the talks-table and urge them to resolve their differences within a specific timeframe. Pakistani-lobby in the US and US-based Pakistani community should be encouraged to adopt an offensive approach rather than a defensive one. The US public should also be made aware of the plight of Kashmiris by facilitating the Kashmiri leadership to appear in the US media and unveil the truth about Kashmir. At the same time, the entire political leadership of Kashmir should be taken into confidence to build domestic political pressure on Indian government to start talks and take the peace process to a conclusive end. It is a known fact that Pakistan is facing an image crises nowadays especially after the rise of the Taliban phenomenon. Faced with this kind of situation in the US and western media, Pakistan needs to improve her image through counter media campaigns. Allegation of a 'terror sponsoring state' against Pakistan must be shed out through media campaign by highlighting Pakistan's role in the 'War on Terrorism'. An updated vibrant media is necessary to produce a good image of Pakistan in the US, Europe and Canada. Therefore, establishing new channels in media is the need of time. *Sixth*, not only in the US business centers but also in the American academia Pakistani scholars should make their presence and must establish contacts with academicians and scholars there. *Seventh*, the strong and stable democratic institutions in Pakistan would be of great help in inculcating great respect for Pakistan. *Last but not the least*, Pakistan's vibrant economic system reflecting sound economic policies would attract more US investment to this hub of the Asia. These steps would give rise

to a Pakistan-US economic interdependence that can be easily translated into political mileage. Putting the US-based Pakistani community in such a pivotal position, Pakistan's educational system, high professional skills, economic strength, vibrant democratic system and sound economic policies would play a decisive role.

In short, both Pakistanis and Americans must understand the compulsions and needs of each other and they must try to find a ground to bridge the gulf which the trust deficit has created between them. This understanding will pave the way for mutual cooperation that may usher a new era in the bilateral relations of Pakistan and the United States.

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## Symington Amendment

*Adopted in 1976, added as Sec. 101 of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly Sec. 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.*

### **SEC. 101.[346] NUCLEAR ENRICHMENT TRANSFERS.**

**(a) PROHIBITIONS; SAFEGUARDS AND MANAGEMENT..** Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no funds made available to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or this Act may be used for the purpose of providing economic assistance (including assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), providing military assistance or grant military education and training, providing assistance under chapter 6 of part II of that Act, or extending military credits or making guarantees, to any country which the President determines delivers nuclear enrichment equipment, materials, or technology to any other country on or after August 4, 1977, or receives such equipment, materials, or technology from any other country on or after August 4, 1977, unless before such delivery.

(1) the supplying country and receiving country have reached agreement to place all such equipment, materials, or technology, upon delivery, under multilateral auspices and management when available; and

(2) the recipient country has entered into an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to place all such equipment, materials, technology, and all nuclear fuel and facilities in such country under the safeguards system of such Agency.

Source: Library of Congress (USA) [www.loc.gov](http://www.loc.gov), also available at <http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/legislation.html#AECA101>

## **Glenn Amendment**

*Adopted in 1977.*

*Sec. 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly Sec. 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.*

**(Sect. 102)(b) PROHIBITIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN TRANSFER OR USE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES; EXCEPTIONS; PROCEDURES APPLICABLE.**

Except as provided in paragraphs (4), (5), and (6), in the event that the President determines that any country, after the effective date of part B of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994.

(Sect. 102)(b)(1)(C) transfers to a non-nuclear-weapon state any design information or component which is determined by the President to be important to, and known by the transferring country to be intended by the recipient state for use in, the development or manufacture of any nuclear explosive device, or

(b)(1)(D) is a non-nuclear-weapon state and seeks and receives any design information or component which is determined by the President to be important to, and intended by the recipient state for use in, the development or manufacture of any nuclear explosive device, then the President shall forthwith report in writing his determination to the Congress and shall forthwith impose the sanctions described in paragraph (2) against that country.

(Sect. 102)(b)(2) The sanctions referred to in paragraph (1) are as follows:

(b)(2)(A) The United States Government shall terminate assistance to that country under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, except for humanitarian assistance or food or other agricultural commodities.

(b)(2)(B) The United States Government shall terminate.

(2)(B)(i) sales to that country under this Act of any defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services, and(ii) licenses for the export to that country of any item on the United States Munitions List.

(b)(2)(C) The United States Government shall terminate all foreign military financing for that country under this Act.

(b)(2)(D) The United States Government shall deny to that country any credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance by any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States Government, except that the sanction of this subparagraph shall not apply.

(2)(D)(i) to any transaction subject to the reporting requirements of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (relating to congressional oversight of intelligence activities),

349 (ii) to medicines, medical equipment, and 350 humanitarian assistance, or

349 (iii) 349 to any credit, credit guarantee, or financial assistance provided by the Department of Agriculture to support the purchase of food or other agricultural commodity.

(Sect. 102)(b)(2)(E) The United States Government shall oppose, in accordance with section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act (22 U.S.C. 262d), the extension of any loan or financial or technical assistance to that country by any international financial institution.

(b)(2)(F) The United States Government shall prohibit any United States bank from making any loan or providing any credit to the government of that country, except for loans or credits for the purpose of purchasing food or other agricultural commodities, which includes fertilizer.

(b)(2)(G) The authorities of section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 shall be used to prohibit exports to that country of specific goods and technology (excluding food and other agricultural commodities), except that such prohibition shall not apply to any transaction subject to the reporting requirements of title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (relating to congressional oversight of intelligence activities).

<http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/legislation.html#AECA102>

## **Pressler Amendment (1985)**

*Enacted in 1985, added as Sec. 620E[e] to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.*

PUBLIC LAW 99-83-AUG. 8, 1985

620E(e) No assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan, pursuant to the authorities contained in this Act or any other Act, unless the President shall have certified in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, during the fiscal year in which assistance is to be furnished or military equipment or technology is to be sold or transferred, that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed United States assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device.

Source: Public Law 99-83, Section 902 (8 August 1985; Laws of the 99<sup>th</sup> Congress---First Session), (US Library of Congress available at [www.loc.gov](http://www.loc.gov)), also available at <http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/legislation.html#FAA620E>

### **Brown Amendment (1995)**

SEC. 559. (a) IN GENERAL.-Section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2375) is amended-

(1) in subsection (e)-

(A) by striking the words "No assistance" and inserting the words "No military assistance";

(B) by striking the words "in which assistance is to be furnished or military equipment or technology" and inserting the words "in which military assistance is to be furnished or military equipment or technology";

(C) by striking the words "the proposed United States assistance" and inserting the words "the proposed United States military assistance";

(D) by inserting "(1)" immediately after "(e)"; and

(E) by adding the following new paragraphs:

"(2) The prohibitions in this section do not apply to any assistance or transfer provided for the purposes of:

"(A) International narcotics control (including chapter 8 of part I of this Act) or any provision of law available for providing assistance for counternarcotics purposes.

"(B) Facilitating military-to-military contact, training (including chapter 5 of part II of this Act) and humanitarian and civic assistance projects.

"(C) Peacekeeping and other multilateral operations (including chapter 6 of part II of this Act relating to peacekeeping) or any provision of law available for providing assistance for peacekeeping purposes, except that lethal military equipment provided under this subparagraph shall be provided on a lease or loan basis only and shall be returned upon completion of the operation for which it was provided.

"(D) Antiterrorism assistance (including chapter 8 of part II of this Act relating to antiterrorism assistance) or any provision of law available for antiterrorism assistance purposes.

"(3) The restrictions of this subsection shall continue to apply to contracts for the delivery of F-16 aircraft to Pakistan.

"(4) Notwithstanding the restrictions contained in this subsection, military equipment, technology, or defense services, other than F-16 aircraft, may be transferred to Pakistan pursuant to contracts or cases entered into before October 1, 1990."; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsections:

"(f) STORAGE COSTS.-The President may release the Government of Pakistan of its contractual obligation to pay the United States Government for the storage costs of items purchased prior to October 1, 1990, but not delivered by the United States Government pursuant to subsection (e) and may reimburse the Government of Pakistan for any such amount paid, on such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe: *Provided*, That such payments have no budgetary impact.

"(g) INAPPLICABILITY OF RESTRICTIONS TO PREVIOUSLY OWNED ITEMS.-Section 620E(e) does not apply to broken, worn or unupgraded items or their equivalent which Pakistan paid for and took possession of prior to October 1, 1990 and which the Government of Pakistan sent to the United States for repair or upgrade. Such equipment or its equivalent may be returned to the Government of Pakistan: *Provided*, That the President determines and so certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such equipment or equivalent neither constitutes nor has received any significant qualitative upgrade since being transferred to the United States and that its total value does not exceed \$25,000,000.

"(h) BALLISTIC MISSILE SANCTIONS NOT AFFECTED.-Nothing contained herein shall affect sanctions for transfers of missile equipment or technology required under section 11B of the Export

Administration Act of 1979 or section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act."

Source: (PUBLIC LAW 104-107-FEB. 12, 1996, **110 STAT.** 743)

## Brownback-I Amendment

*It was adopted in 1998. It was called 'The India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998', incorporated into the fiscal 1999 Omnibus Appropriations Bill (Public Law 105-277).*

<<NOTE: India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998. 22 USC 2799aa-1 note.>>

### TITLE IX--INDIA-PAKISTAN RELIEF ACT

Sec. 901. Short Title. This title may be cited as the ``India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998".

<<NOTE: 22 USC 2799aa-1 note.>> Sec. 902. Waiver Authority.

(a) Authority.--The President may waive for a period not to exceed one year upon enactment of this Act with respect to India or Pakistan the application of any sanction or prohibition (or portion thereof) contained in section 101 or 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or section 2(b)(4) of the Export Import Bank Act of 1945.

(b) Exception.--The authority provided in subsection (a) shall not apply to any restriction in section 102(b)(2) (B), (C), or (G) of the Arms Export Control Act.

(c) Availability of Amounts.--Amounts made available by this section are designated by the Congress as an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended: Provided, That such amounts shall be available only to the extent that an official budget request that includes designation of the entire amount of the request as an emergency requirement as defined in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as amended, is transmitted by the President to the Congress.

<<NOTE: 22 USC 2799aa-1 note.>> Sec. 903. Consultation. Prior to each exercise of the authority provided in section 902, the President shall consult with the appropriate congressional committees.

<<NOTE: 22 USC 2799aa-1 note.>> Sec. 904. Reporting Requirement.

Not later than 30 days prior to the expiration of a one-year period described in section

902, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees on economic and national security developments in India and Pakistan.

<<NOTE: 22 USC 2799aa-1 note.>> Sec. 905. Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined. In this title, the term ``appropriate congressional committees" means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

Source: [http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105\\_cong\\_public\\_laws&docid=f:publ277.105](http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ277.105)

## **Brownback-II Amendment**

*It was adopted in 1999 and Incorporated into the fiscal year (FY) 2000 Defense Appropriations Bill (Public Law 106-79).*

### TITLE IX

#### WAIVER OF CERTAIN SANCTIONS AGAINST INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Sec. 9001. <<NOTE: 22 USC 2799aa-1 note.>> (a) Waiver Authority.--

Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the President may waive, with respect to India and Pakistan, the application of any sanction contained in section 101 or 102 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2799aa or 22 U.S.C. 2799aa-1), section 2(b)(4) of the Export Import Bank Act of 1945 (12 U.S.C. 635(b)(4)), or section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, (22 U.S.C. 2375(e)).

(b) Exception.--The authority to waive the application of a sanction or prohibition (or portion thereof ) under subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to a sanction or prohibition contained in subparagraph (B), (C), or (G) of section 102(b)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act, unless the President determines, and so certifies to the Congress, that the application of the restriction would not be in the national security interests of the United States.

(c) Termination of Waiver.--The President may not exercise the authority of subsection (a), and any waiver previously issued under subsection (a) shall cease to apply, with respect to India or Pakistan, if that country detonates a nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of this Act or otherwise takes such action which would cause the President to report pursuant to section 102(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act.

(d) Targeted Sanctions.--

(1) Sense of the congress.--

(A) it is the sense of the Congress that the broad application of export controls to nearly 300 Indian and Pakistani entities is inconsistent with

the specific national security interests of the United States and that this control list requires refinement; and

(B) export controls should be applied only to those Indian and Pakistani entities that make direct and material contributions to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs and only to those items that can contribute to such programs.

(2) Reporting <<NOTE: Deadline.>> requirement.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit both a classified and unclassified report to the appropriate congressional committees listing those Indian and Pakistani entities whose activities contribute to missile programs or weapons of mass destruction programs.

(e) Congressional Notification.--The issuance of a license for export of a defense article, defense service, or technology under the authority of this section shall be subject to the same requirements as are applicable to the export of items described in section 36(c) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776(c)), including the transmittal of information and the application of congressional review procedures.

(f ) Repeal.--The India-Pakistan Relief Act (title IX of the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999, as contained in section 101(a) of Public Law 105-277) <<NOTE: 22 USC 2799aa-1 note.>> is repealed effective October 21, 1999.

This Act may be cited as the ``Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000''.

Approved on October 25, 1999.

Source: Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2000 (Public Law 106-79-OCT. 25 1999).

[http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106\\_cong\\_public\\_laws&docid=f:publ079.106](http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ079.106)

### A glance over the US Trade with Pakistan: FY 1989 –FY 2002

*NOTE: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars, and not seasonally adjusted unless otherwise specified.*

| Fiscal Year FY | Exports | Imports | Balance  |
|----------------|---------|---------|----------|
| 1989           | 1,134.4 | 522.7   | 611.7    |
| 1990           | 1,142.8 | 609.6   | 533.2    |
| 1991           | 950.3   | 662.3   | 288.0    |
| 1992           | 880.6   | 865.8   | 14.8     |
| 1993           | 811.4   | 897.3   | -85.9    |
| 1994           | 718.4   | 1,011.6 | -293.2   |
| 1995           | 941.3   | 1,197.0 | -255.7   |
| 1996           | 1,271.3 | 1,265.6 | 5.7      |
| 1997           | 1,240.0 | 1,442.2 | -202.2   |
| 1998           | 720.4   | 1,691.8 | -971.4   |
| 1999           | 496.7   | 1,740.7 | -1,244.0 |
| 2000           | 462.3   | 2,166.8 | -1,704.5 |
| 2001           | 541.5   | 2,249.5 | -1,708.0 |
| 2002           | 693.5   | 2,305.0 | -1,611.5 |

Source: SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division, Data Dissemination Branch, Washington, D.C. 20233

**Text of the Prime Minister's message sent to the leaders  
of the G-8 countries on May 13, 1998**

Excellency,

The nuclear testing by India of a whole range of weaponry, including systems which are Pakistan specific, has multiplied manifold the immediacy and the magnitude of threat to our security.

Besides fundamentally altering the precarious strategic balance, which contributed to the maintenance of a tenuous peace, this Indian action has raised the possibility of aggressive military acts against Pakistan.

You would certainly agree that overt weaponisation by India is yet another manifestation of the highly irresponsible and reckless actions taken by India to escalate tension in the region in recent weeks.

The BJP government has already shown its aggressive designs against Pakistan a fundamental article of its policy agenda is recent days it has taken steps to implement its designs including military action across the Line of Control in Kashmir.

In the face of these ominous developments which pose an immediate threat to our security, we cannot be expected to remain complacent.

I had in April 1998 drawn your attention to the consequences that would ensue from India induction of nuclear weapons. We are disappointed that our warnings were not heeded. The latest, events have proven us completely right.

We are once again being asked to exercise restraint at an extremely critical juncture on matters involving national security and survival.

I trust that you would recognize and be receptive to Pakistan's legitimate needs for self-defence.

Please accept; Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Muhammad Nawaz Sharif  
Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Source: Gohar Ayub Khan, 2009, *Testing Time As Foreign Minister*. Islamabad: Dost Publications. p. 344.

*Annexure-IX*

*Prime Minister's letter to President Clinton, May 21, 1998*



PRIME MINISTER

Islamabad  
May 21, 1998

Dear Mr President,

As the leader of the country with which Pakistan has enjoyed close and friendly relations, I would like to express my gratitude for your solicitude and attention to ominous developments in the region.

Since my second conversation with you on the telephone on 17 May, the threat to Pakistan's security has become even more ominous.

In the wake of their nuclear tests, the Indians have not tried to keep even a pretence of acting as a responsible or mature "power." The tests have been followed up by serious threats to Pakistan's security with demands that "Islamabad should realize the change in the geo-strategic situation in the region" and threats that India will "deal firmly and strongly with Pakistan". The Indian Prime Minister has even gone to the extent of declaring that India would be prepared to use its nuclear weapons in a situation of conflict.

In this context, it is clear that the Indian nuclear tests have seriously upset the strategic balance and emboldened India to openly assert its hostile intentions towards Pakistan.

At the same time, New Delhi feels secure in its belief that the world would remain helpless if it uses its newly acquired nuclear weapons capability to force a military solution of the Jammu and Kashmir problem, rather than respond to my initiative of resumption of dialogue for a peaceful solution of this dispute.



PRIME MINISTER

I deem it important to draw your attention to the paramount urgency and gravity of this serious threat to our security. We are also disappointed that your initiative to restrain India from its aggressive designs has found little resonance across the globe. Already we are hearing influential voices arguing about the futility of sanctions against India and urging that it be recognized as the sixth nuclear weapon state.

At this critical juncture, it is imperative the United States realize that the peace and stability of our region is being endangered by India's hegemonistic designs. They are recklessly raising the tensions to a very high level by their provocative actions. This situation is fraught with grave danger.

The US would no doubt caution the world about the severe consequences of continued appeasement of India, which is now being advocated.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration

( Muhammad Nawaz Sharif )

His Excellency  
Mr. William J. Clinton  
President of the United States of America  
Washington D.C.

Source: Gohar Ayub Khan, 2009, *Testing Time As Foreign Minister*. Islamabad: Dost Publications. pp. 345-346.

*Annexure-X*

*Prime Minister's letter for President Clinton, May 28, 1998*



PRIME MINISTER

May 1998.

His Excellency  
Mr. William J. Clinton,  
President of the United States of America,  
Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. President,

I wish to thank you for your deep understanding of the perilous situation resulting from India's nuclear tests. Our telephonic conversations in the past fortnight convinced me of your sincerity and your genuine concern for Pakistan's security and the stability of the region.

The overt nuclear weaponization of India has created a strategic imbalance, emboldening Indian leadership to hold out threats of nuclear blackmail against Pakistan and aggression across the line of control in Kashmir.

As advised by you and our other friends, we pondered hard and deliberated carefully on our dire security predicament. Determined to act with utmost responsibility, despite grave provocations, we also closely evaluated the international reaction, which regrettably did not factor the threat to our security and to regional peace and stability.



- 2 -

While I was deeply appreciative of your personal understanding of our security concerns, the overall international response to India's crossing of the nuclear threshold was regrettably deferential, bordering on acquiescence. We saw a familiar pattern, whereby India's incremental steps on the nuclear and ballistic ladder had only generated pressures and even punitive actions against Pakistan.

For more than twenty years, Pakistan advocated, in all earnest, the goal of nuclear non-proliferation. Our impeccable record of restraint and responsibility never earned us any approbation. Selective sanctions only served to degrade our conventional capabilities and produced a totally untenable security equation between Pakistan and India.

The evident selectivity in the pursuit of the global non-proliferation goals, without any regard to the underlying security problems that impel proliferation, had incensed our people.

At this critical juncture, at which our very life and existence are at stake, the people of Pakistan were unanimous in demanding that we seek to rectify the strategic imbalance resulting from nuclear weaponization by India.

Having exhausted all options and left with no choice, we have in our supreme national interest decided to exercise the nuclear option. This decision, which I have taken with a heavy heart, was necessitated by the imperatives of self-defence and to



- 3 -

deter aggression against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of our country.

We are mindful of the need for urgent steps to bring about nuclear stabilization between Pakistan and India. I have, therefore, offered to discuss with India, all aspects of the security situation prevailing in the region as an integral part of our bilateral dialogue.

We trust that the United States and other major powers will encourage and facilitate not only the resumption of the Pakistan-India talks but early conclusion of mutually acceptable restraints, accompanied by confidence enhancing measures.

We would also urge you to fully endorse and support our proposal for a non-aggression pact between Pakistan and India, on the basis of an expeditious settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.

I am also requesting the leaders of the other G-8 countries to seriously consider collectively initiating efforts to engage with Pakistan and India to urgently address stabilization measures so as to prevent the possibility of a nuclear arms race and to reduce the dangers of a nuclear conflict in South Asia.

As the leader of a great nation and an old friend and ally of Pakistan, I hope you would pursue with vigour your policy of greater US engagement in South Asia.

I eagerly look forward to welcoming you most warmly during your forthcoming visit to Pakistan.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

( Muhammad Nawaz Sharif )

## Annexure XI

**Text of the Prime Minister's Message of May 28, 1998 to the Secretary General,  
United Nations (UN)**

Dear Mr. Secretary General,

I had on 23 May, 1998 drawn your attention to the extremely grave situation prevailing in our region and the magnitude of the threat posed to our security.

We had also maintained close contact with the United Nations to underscore our security concerns resulting from nuclear weaponization by India.

As advised by you, we pondered hard and deliberated carefully on our dire security predicament. Determined to act with utmost responsibility, despite grave provocations, we also closely evaluated the international reaction, which regrettably did not factor the threat to our security and to regional peace and stability.

We regret that the United Nations did not take appropriate cognizance of the impending breach of peace in our region. The Security Council's Presidential statement of 14 May, 1998 focused mainly on the global nonproliferation issues and failed to address the security situation in our region.

As you, know, Pakistan took the lead at the United Nations in proposing a nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia. This proposal was repeatedly endorsed by the General Assembly. We also cooperated with international efforts at the Conference on Disarmament to promote equitable and non-discriminatory measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. To India we offered several proposals at the bilateral plane to prevent the nuclearization of South Asia.

For more than twenty years Pakistan, advocated, in all earnest the goal of nuclear non-proliferation. We repeatedly drew the attention of the international community to the serious consequences that would ensue from overt nuclear weaponization by India. Regrettably, our warnings went unheeded.

The evident selectivity in the pursuit of the global non-proliferation goals, without any regard to the underlying security problems that impel proliferation, had incensed our people.

At this critical juncture at which our very life and existence are at stake, the people of Pakistan were unanimous in demanding that we seek to rectify the strategic balance resulting from nuclear weaponization by India.

We have, therefore in our supreme national interest decided to exercise the nuclear option. This decision was necessitated by the imperatives of self-defence and to deter aggression against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of our country.

We are mindful of the need for urgent steps to bring about nuclear stabilization between Pakistan and India. I have, therefore, offered to discuss all aspects of the security situation prevailing in the region with India, as an integral part of our bilateral dialogue.

We trust that you will encourage and facilitate not only the resumption of the Pakistan-India talks, but early conclusion of mutually acceptable restraints, accompanied by confidence enhancing measures.

We would also urge that you to fully endorse and support our proposal for a non-aggression pact between Pakistan and India, on the basis of a just settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Source: Gohar Ayub Khan, 2009, *Testing Time As Foreign Minister*. Islamabad: Dost Publications. pp. 350-351.