


**Assessing Cultural Distortion in the Wake of Counter-terrorism Strategies and
the Growing Radicalization in *Pakhtun* Society**



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Abstract

This study critically evaluates the performance of existing states responses such as Pakistan and United States against terrorism in the *Pakhtun* tribal society. It is reflected that forceful responses of states or excessive use of force against terrorism does not recourse to *Pakhtun* culture. Emphasis on the excessive use of force against terrorism caused damaged to *Pakhtuns* socio-cultural institutions. Resultantly, *Pakhtuns* cultural distortion also created the problem of socio-political order in the tribal belt of Pakistan. It is also revealed that collateral damages led to the perception of injustice and suppression which badly affected the performance of Pakistan against terrorism in this region. Collateral damages as a result of current counter-terrorism strategies also provoke *Pakhtuns* cultural traits revenge (*badal*) and resistance against the state forces. Research probes that *Pakhtuns* resistance and their cultural distortion and collateral damage further reinforces the process of radicalization. This study argues that states responses against terrorism in *Pakhtun* tribal society further increased their susceptibility towards radicalization. Lastly, the research concludes by offering non-kinetic approach to curb terrorism in the region. It is analyzed that growing radicalization can be reduced to preserve the socio-cultural institution of *Pakhtun* society and resolve the socio-economic and political problems of the region through culturally recourse counter-terrorism strategies.

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Zafar Khan

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my Mother,
Muntaha, who passed away on 30th
October 1993 and left me alone at the age
of 07 years only.

Chapter 1

Introduction

It is generally believed that the seminal events that took place on September 11, 2001, resulted in a forceful response from the United States in the wake of war against terror. To give proper response to terrorism, the United States and her allies adopted a unilateral policy “to use excessive force” or “kinetic approaches” to fight terrorism in different parts of the world (Tan, 2009: 27). However, due to the complex nature of the present day-terrorism, the existing counter-terrorism strategies¹ of United States and its allies appear ineffective in eradicating terrorism (Rineheart, 2010). The use of military power in the wake of war against terrorism is not enough to annihilate all the possible reinforcing factors of the terrorism in different parts of the world. Therefore, the current-counter terrorism strategies of United States and Pakistan are not only perceived to have failed in eradicating terrorism but are also believed to have caused an intense problem of radicalization particularly in the hotbeds of terrorism (Harrigan & Said, 2011; Taşpınar, 2009). The excessive use of force or kinetic counter-terrorism approach against the unidentified enemies especially in a different cultural setting further reinforces radicalization (Moghaddam & Marsella, 2004).

In the first instance, the United States and its allies attacked Afghanistan to purge the complex causal factors of terrorism; however, they are considered to have been unable to ensure desirable results that guarantee peace not only in Afghanistan but also in the Pak-Afghan border region. After the US invasion and the subsequent disruption of the

¹ Counter- terrorism refers to the action and methods of a country which are intended to stop the activities of the people who use violence to achieve political aims.

Taliban regime² in Afghanistan, most of the terrorists moved to the adjacent Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan in search of safe haven (Marten, Johnson, & Mason, 2009). Their movement into FATA was particularly observed after the disruption of *Taliban*'s regime in Afghanistan by the United States and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) forces (Tellis, 2008). This is why FATA is now generally considered a hub of terrorists' organizations after the US invasion of Afghanistan to dislodge the *Taliban* regime. The presence of such organizations has not only jeopardized the peace of this region but has also caused problems for global security. To curb the growing influence of such terrorists' organizations in this region, Pakistan, as an ally in the global war against terror also initiated military operations against terrorism in the tribal belt adjacent to Afghanistan (see chapter 5 for detail).

However, the current strategies of Pakistan have not been as effective as idealized to curb the roots of terrorism in this region. Its achievements made so far out of such military operations have been marginal in terms of evolving and developing a local-based response³ to combat terrorism on permanent and viable basis (Khan, 2011). In addition, the existing kinetic counter-terrorism strategies have not taken into account the distinctive features of *Pakhtuns*' culture or, in other words have not made any recourse to the peculiar code of *Pakhtun* society (*Pakhtunwali*)⁴. The cultural aspects of *Pakhtun* society in general and Federal Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan (FATA) in Particular have been totally ignored to fight terrorism in this region (see chapter 5 for detail). Therefore, such counter-terrorism approaches, while attempting to curb terrorists' activities, proved

² The *Taliban* initiated Islamic movement following a strict interpretation of *Sharia* who took over Afghanistan in 1996 after the Soviet withdrawal.

³ Local based response refers to the counter-terrorism strategies which recourse to *Pakhtun* cultural values.

⁴ The cultural code of *Pakhtuns*' is normally known as a *Pakhtunwali*, which comprises some local features such as *Badal*, (revenge) *Jirga*, (council of elders) *Nanawate*, (Asylum) and *Tigah* (cease fire)

detrimental to the traditional social chemistry and social fabric and caused disruption to the social organizations of *Pakhtuns*' society⁵ (Ahmad, 2010).

Moreover, military operations initiated by Pakistan in the tribal areas have been primarily based on using force and not evolving a system wherein the local people could defuse the problem of terrorism by creating and utilizing anti-terrorist networks through recourse to culture. In other words, such military operations disregarded the importance of the *Pakhtuns*' distinctive code of life which they normally do not sacrifice at any cost (Sierakowska-Dyndo, 2003; Lindholme, 1982).

Pakhtuns' life, as is explained in chapter 4, is mostly governed by a code of honor called *Pakhtunwali*. The main features of *Pakhtunwali* include; *Jirga* (assembly of the elders for the settlement of a dispute), *Badal* (this obliges *Pakhtuns*' to take revenge), *Namus* (pride or defense of honour), (*Nanawate* (to beg apology), *Nang* (standing for bravery and the honor), *Tigah* (standing for ceasefire among the rival parties), *Melmastia* (hospitality) and *Purdah* (separation of gender) (see Mason, 2009). However, the recent military operations devoid of recourse to considering the importance of cultural features of *Pakhtuns* (*Pakhtunwali*) in shaping mental and social outlook after September 11 have further strengthened the issue of radicalization in the tribal belt of Pakistan (see chapter 6 for detail).

Radicalization, as is explained in chapter 2, is considered a complex behavioral phenomenon. Basically, in this study radicalization refers to a situation where the groups or sometimes a society as a whole resort to violence (Hannah, Clutterbuck & Rubin (2008). In other words, radicalization is the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas that can lead to act of terrorism (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 19). It does not occur at once rather it gradually passes from non-radical state to radical condition.

⁵ In this study, *Pakhtuns*' society refers to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan and *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa* the province of Pakistan.

Various factors such as religious fanaticism, identity crises, injustices and poverty have significance to instigate its process across a globe (Topnor, 2009). Along with other causal factors of radicalization, the disruption of prevalent cultural values has also been identified as a major factor to instigate its process after the commencement of war against terror (Spechard & Ahkmedova, 2006). Such kind of cultural distortion has got occurred especially in those parts where the United States and its allies are engaged in the war against terror. Therefore, the culturally blind counter-terrorism strategies can easily cause cultural distortion⁶ where they are engaged to purge terrorism.

Thus, to understand the radicalized effects of counter-terrorism, this study focuses on the radicalized effects of cultural distortion caused by counter-terrorism strategy or kinetic approach in *Pakhtuns'* society. Further, it analyzes the effects of military operations on the social structure of *Pakhtuns'* society and the resultant radicalization triggered by cultural distortion in the commencement of war against terror. Of course, so many studies (see Sloan, 2006; Swami, 2007; Weimann, 2006; Gupta, 2008; Horgan, 2009) have been conducted on the issue of radicalization, specifically in the context of counter-terrorism strategies, however; none of them has focused, as required, or considered the imminence of cultural paradigm in this respect. Hence, this study intends to fill the existing gap by focusing on the cultural paradigm of counter-terrorism strategies so that a more realistic and cultural-based solution is sought for curbing terrorism particularly in the tribal belt of Pakistan. Furthermore, this study intends to frame counter-terrorism strategies in the light of *Pakhtuns'* cultural values to reduce its radicalized effects on permanent basis especially in the Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. The current study on the radicalizing effects of counter-terrorism strategies is logically justified in the following lines.

⁶ Cultural distortion refers to the overall disruption of the socio-cultural institutions as a result of war against terror.

1.2 Rationale of the Study

Available literature on radicalization, as is discussed in chapter 2, contains adequate data on its causal factors. Among the major causal factors of radicalization include: religious extremism, injustice, identity crises, poverty, political instability and dissolution of traditional institutions (see Assaad, 2011; Bjorgo, 2004; Berman, 2011; Karatnychy, 2002; Ahmad, 2005; Shinwari, 2012; Lakoff, 2006; Richards, 2011; Sial & Anjum, 2010). However, such contributing factors do not cover all the possible dimensions of this (radicalization) complex phenomenon. Owing to the complex nature of radicalization; hence, significant variations can be found in its causal factors in different parts of the world. Some societies/regions provide more fertile grounds for radicalization as compared to others. Such variations in the motivating factors of radicalization are more visible specifically inside the conflict zones such as in Afghanistan, Pakistan and also in the Pak-Afghan border region. This region (Pak-Afghan border region or tribal areas of Pakistan) provides fertile grounds to radicalization as compared to other parts of the Pakistan and Afghanistan (Azam, 2009; Zaidi, 2010). Military and political efforts of Pakistan as a major ally in the war against terror and also the coalition forces have failed to curb the roots of growing radicalization in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan. Thus, the current military operations are perceived to be creating environment to radicalization particularly in this region.

In response to terrorism, the counter-terrorism campaign of the coalition forces has caused considerable damage to the social chemistry and cultural traits of the *Pakhtuns* society. Therefore, the existing kinetic approach of Pakistan as a major ally in the war against terror is considered counter-productive and cultural distortion as a result of this approach has caused further radicalization. The main reason behind the radicalizing

effects of kinetic approach is considered the non-consideration of *Pakhtuns'* cultural paradigm in the war against terror. The existing kinetic approach does not give proper place to cultural discourses which in turn ignite radicalization in the *Pakhtun* society. So far, there is no specific study available to explain the cultural dimensions of radicalization, specifically in the context of *Pakhtun* society in the wake of counter-terrorism campaign. Therefore, in the light of the perceived gap in the available literature regarding the causal factors of radicalization, this study is designed to cover the radicalizing effects of cultural distortion in the back drop of adopting kinetic approach against terrorism in *Pakhtuns'* society. This study analyzes the problem of radicalization in the light of *Pakhtuns'* cultural values and their social structure, damaged by military operations. In short, this study intends to frame counter-terrorism strategies which recourse to *Pakhtun* culture. Thus, this is what the study is justified; however, for more clarity the following provides an analytical ground for the conduct of this study.

1.2.1 Analytical and Substantive Consideration in Conducting this Study

In the wake of war against terror, transnational terrorists' organizations expanded their networks into the tribal areas of Pakistan. Resultantly, *Pakhtun* tribal society is considered a safe haven for *Taliban* and other insurgent groups (Haroon, 2013; Rubin & Rashid, 2008). In order to eliminate the terror networks from this region the US in general started Drone attacks and Pakistan in particular initiated military operations (see chapter 5 for detail). Despite of such military operations in the last one decade, *Taliban* emerged as a strong force to challenge the writ of Pakistan in this region. Meanwhile, the *Tehreek Taliban*⁷ expanded its network to the settled areas of *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa* (Spector, 2009). However, Pakistan failed to control the growing expansion of *Tehreek Taliban* in

⁷ The *Tehreek Taliban* is Islamic movement following a strict interpretation of *Sharia* (Islamic laws) inside the Pak-Afghan border. *Tehreek Taliban* has emerged after the war against terror in the tribal areas of Pakistan. More often than not *Tehreek Taliban* accepted the responsibility of major terrorist acts.

Pakhtun belt. In response to terrorism, military operations have further distorted the cultural values and social organizations of *Pakhtun* society (Rosen, 2011; Usman, 2012). The growing strength of terrorist organizations has raised questions over the performance of current counter-terrorism strategy of Pakistan. The current kinetic counter-terrorism strategies have failed to protect the local inhabitants and their cultural institutions from the onslaught of terrorism.

Therefore, military operations against terrorism left no stone unturned in the destruction of the traditional institutions of *Pakhtun* society (Khan, 2011). The native people left their home towns due to prolonged military operations. The overall social chemistry of *Pakhtun* society has badly affected. The inhabitants of this region are also socio-economically suffered during the war against terror. Furthermore, collateral damages as a result of military operations against terrorism in this region also instigate *Pakhtuns'* revenge because it cannot be tolerated according to the spirit of their culture (Julian, 2011). Revenge is considered as the integral part of their cultural code (*Pakhtunwali*) (see chapter 5 for detail). Such kind of cultural distortion and increasing incidents of collateral damages as a result of military operations further reinforce radicalization and terrorism.

Therefore, neither the *Taliban* expansion has stopped nor the growing radicalization has minimized in the region after the beginning of war against terror (Coolsaet, 2010; Soros, 2006). Therefore, the performance of kinetic approach against terrorism has been criticized in this region (see Ashley & Tellis, 2004; Abbas, 2004). The existing kinetic approach has not encompassed the role of prevalent socio-cultural institutions in fighting terrorism in this region (Richmond, 2009). Loopholes in the available literature of counter-terrorism rationalized the conduct of this study to see effect

of *Pakhtuns*' cultural discourses on the current waves of terrorism and also on its curbing strategies while the following objectives delineate its significance.

1.3 Objectives of the Study:

This study intends to:

- Understand the cultural paradigms for exploring the problem of terrorism and radicalization in *Pakhtuns*' society;
- Understand cultural distortion of *Pakhtuns*' society as a result of counter-terrorism strategies; applied by US-led NATO in general and the Pakistan in particular as a major ally in the war against terror inside the Pak-Afghan border;
- Analyze the extent of cultural distortions and its radicalizing impacts on *Pakhtun* society.

1.4 Research Questions

This study focuses on addressing the following questions.

- Why the current approaches of the United States and her ally Pakistan, do not recourse to *Pakhtuns*' cultural values?
- How do the existing counter-terrorism strategies cause cultural distortion?
- How culture distortion as a result of war against terror provides spaces for radicalization in *Pakhtun* belt?
- How the traditional institutions of *Pakhtun* society can play a pivotal role in peace maintenance?
- Why *Pakhtun* society is considered a worse conflict zones.
- Why *Pakhtuns* impede state authority?

- Why Pakistan has failed to fight the menace of terrorism particularly in the tribal belt of Pakistan?

1.5 Significance of the Study

In the last one decade, Pakistan has not evolved any concrete policy to fight terrorism on more viable basis in Pakistan in general and tribal areas in particular. Even still, it does not have a clear policy to achieve tangible results against terrorism particularly inside the Pak-Afghan border. The civil and military leadership failed to develop a holistic counter-terrorism strategy to fight terrorism in *Pakhtun* belt which recourse to their culture (Reich, 2010). Culture has significant influence on terrorism and state policies in the tribal belt of Pakistan in particular. *Pakhtuns* are famous for their strong cultural values (see chapter 4 for detail). Culturally accepted states policies provide more legitimate grounds and can easily avoid tribal resistance. Therefore, cultural acceptance is essential for the successful states policies in the *Pakhtun* tribal belt.

However, the current counter-terrorism strategies in the wake of war against terror are considered particularly against the *Pakhtun* culture (Siddiqa, 2009). The excessive use of military power, besides other things, has been considered a major factor putting the indigenous population on the way to radicalization. In order to stop future terrorism in the shape of radicalization the existing counter-terrorism strategies of Pakistan in particular and the coalition forces in general need a major paradigm shift: one that addresses *Pakhtuns*' cultural sensitivities to curb radicalization in the wake of war against terror.

The existing kinetic approaches do not realize the importance of *Pakhtuns* cultural values in the war against terror. These counter-terrorism strategies as stated before have failed to address the influence of culture on the process of radicalization and terrorism. Radicalization is also considered the root cause of terrorism in different parts of the

world. Terrorism is considered the by-product of radicalization. To fill this gap this study analyzes not only the importance of culture in response to terrorism but also its influence on the growing radicalization in *Pakhtun* belt. In other words, this study provides necessary food for thought to the counter-terrorism experts to come up with new strategies to effectively eradicate terrorism and also stop future terrorism in the shape of radicalization in the tribal belt of Pakistan in particular. Furthermore, this study is focused to use the knowledge and theories of sociology in security issues and give emphasis on the utilization of cultural paradigms to abate the susceptibility of *Pakhtuns*' towards radicalization that exacerbates the problem of terrorism in this region. Moreover, the study gives insight to the policymakers and other stakeholders to come up with new paradigms to seriously think about the problem of radicalization in *Pakhtun* society.

Furthermore, it provides new insights to policymakers to frame their counter-terrorism strategies on more realistic grounds to eradicate terrorism once for all in the tribal belt. At the same time this study highlights the importance of *Pakhtun* cultural values to help out the law enforcement agencies in the maintenance of socio-political order in the tribal belt of Pakistan. This study also explores the new socio-political realities which are important for the effective counter-terrorism strategies. Furthermore, this study provides insight to the policy makers to adopt the counter-terrorism strategies, which are recourse to *Pakhtuns* culture. Such kinds of counter-terrorism strategies will hamper the growing radicalization in *Pakhtun* belt which recourse to their culture. Such kind of indigenous approach can effectively curb terrorism particularly in a cultural setting. The state policies which are made in the light of prevalent culture will be more effective in curbing terrorism in this region.

1.6 Organization of the Study

Chapter 1 provided a clear picture of the study's nature, rationale, importance to the reader(s) while chapter 2 reflects on the concept of radicalization and its relevant theories. This chapter also elaborates the reinforcing factors of radicalization and explores its different dimensions in *Pakhtun* belt. Furthermore, it gives the theoretical framework for this study.

Chapter 3 gives the detail of procedure employed in undertaking this study. The overall research procedure, methods and tools of the study are justified with proper rationale. Further, this chapter puts emphases on the justification of using the ethnographic approaches for the completion of this study.

Chapter 4 describes the origin of *Pakhtuns* and their salient cultural values. It also analyzes the roots of violence in *Pakhtun* society. Furthermore, the chapter also elaborates the various dimensions of *Pakhtuns* cultural violence and explores its influence on the present-day radicalization.

Chapter 5 elaborates the concept of counter-terrorism strategies especially the existing kinetic approaches of the coalition forces in *Pakhtun* belt. Further, this chapter also evaluates the performance of the existing counter-terrorism strategies in *Pakhtun* belt. It also explains criticisms on the kinetic approaches of counter-terrorism in the context of *Pakhtun* culture.

Chapter 6 analyzes people's perception regarding the issue of radicalization in *Pakhtun* society in the wake of war against terror. It also explores the opinions of people about the counter-terrorism strategies and their radicalizing effects in the wake of *Pakhtuns*' cultural distortions. The chapter also analyzes primary data in the light of given theoretical framework to see the radicalized effects of counter-terrorism strategies on *Pakhtun* society.

Chapter 7 derives the conclusions and recommends effective measures to curb the growing radicalization and terrorism in *Pakhtun* belt. Furthermore, it also explains the theoretical implications of the study and certain areas for future researchers.

Chapter 2

Theorizing Radicalization in the Context of *Pakhtun* Society

Introduction

The previous chapter reflected upon the nature and focus of the study while this chapter reviews the literature on radicalization to set a stage for this study. To understand the issue in-depth and enable the reader(s) to develop a more clear and holistic picture of the issue, the chapter is divided into three parts. The first part covers the conceptual understanding of the phenomenon of radicalization, its causes, theories and conceptual model. The second part of this chapter is specifically focused to trace out the roots of radicalization in *Pakhtun* belt. The third part of the chapter sets a theoretical framework to cover the different dimensions of the current radical trends and its relation with the state policies in the shape of current counter-terrorism strategy in *Pakhtun* society.

Part 1

2.1 Conceptual Understanding of Radicalization

Radicalization is considered a complex behavioral phenomenon (Price, 2010). Since 2004, we have seen dramatic increase in researches especially in the field of radicalization to explore its different dimensions (see Sedgwick, 2010; Atran, 2010; McCauley & Mosalenko, 2008; Berman, 2011). So far, despite of mushroom growth of scholarly works on the issue of radicalization, even still, not only is it difficult to trace out its roots but also hard to define its concept in a logical way (Besley & Persson, 2011). Therefore, there is no comprehensive or an agreed upon definition which can satisfy the question(s) of different professionals and academic leaders. Moreover, there is no single method which can magically provide an answer for the question one might ask about the concept of radicalization. Further, it is such a wide and complex phenomenon

that needs to be investigated by researchers for obtaining a clear and complete picture for generalization (Neumann, 2008). Hence, it is hard to generalize the results of available research on the issue of radicalization. It, thus, requires an integrated quest of all relevant disciplines to uncover all the possible underlying factors deeply entrenched in the shrouded mystery (Richards, 2011).

Numerous researches have not only identified and theorized the reinforcing factors of radicalization but also defined this concept to understand its various dimensions. For the conceptual understanding of radicalization, it is immensely important to understand its pathways and process. Therefore, various definitions of radicalization focused its process, pathways and objectives. In order to understand radicalization it is formally defined as the internalization of set a beliefs that use violence for socio-political objective (Jenkins, 2007: 3). Usually, in the process of radicalization an individuals or groups adopt violent means to achieve socio-political objectives. In other words, it refers to activities that threaten the existing social and democratic order (Dutch ministry of interior, 2006). The radical people support fundamental changes in society that may endanger the democratic order. However, it is worth mentioning here for the understanding of the reader(s) that radicalization cannot only be confined to the disturbance of social and democratic order, rather it, according to Silber and Bhatt (2007: 27), involves the adoption of such opinions, views and ideas by people that could lead to terrorism. It is generally believed that radicalization does not occur at once—ideas—views and opinions change gradually and eventually appear in the shape of terrorism (Borum, 2003). Therefore, terrorism, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, is considered as a by-product of radicalization (Andrea, 2007; Bjorgo & Horgan, 2008). It eventually comes into the surface of society in the shape of terrorism; however, various socio-cultural factors precipitate, initiate and sustain its process. Therefore, the identification of

socio-cultural factors is also considered essential to understand its process and pathways (Randy, 2011).

There are multifaceted socio-cultural, psychological and political factors that instigate its process (Richardson, 2006; Horgan, 2005; Kim, 2004; Taylor & Horgan, 2006). The scholarly works of social scientists and experts in the field of terrorism have explained its various micro and macro reinforcing factors such as globalization; modernization and dissolution of traditional communities and identity crises (see Helfstein, 2014; Victoroff, 2005; Pittel & Rübbelke, 2012; Piazza, 2008; Chenoweth, 2010; Abadie, 2004; Beichelt & Minkenberg, 2002; Speckhard, 2007; Reza, 2004). While, at the micro level social groups, social interactions and family ties also have significant influence on the process of radicalization. People association with extremist groups can easily motivate them towards violence and become the part of extremist networks (Clayton, Barlow & Baliff-Spanville, 1998). The renowned scholar in the field of terrorism, Horgan (2003: 13), further explains its micro dimensions, as he asserts that radicalization refers to the process in which the individual or groups become more radical and actively use violence to achieve their social and political objectives. Therefore, social ties and social networks motivate people towards radicalization (Bjorgo, 2005). Such kind of social networks and social contagions have significant influence on the inclination of people towards radicalization.

Furthermore, religion as a social contagion has significant influence on the process of radicalization (Juergensmeyer, 2003; Abbas, 2011; Feldstein, 2009; Al-Khattar, 2003). However, religion is not directly considered the causal factor of radicalization but usually provides narratives and language to radical and terrorist organizations to motivate people for the radical cause (Al Khattar, 2003). The young people can be introduced overtly to an ideological messages and belief system that

encourage movements from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views in the process of radicalization (Vertigons, 2009; Richeards, 2010). They usually join terrorist organizations when they become radicalize. Most of them are usually ideologically motivated to achieve socio-political objectives by violent means (Lemieux, 2006). Through unorthodox means radical people achieve their socio-political objectives (Ranstrop, 2010).

However, despite of several explanations, and its complex dimensions, it is still difficult to understand the reinforcing factors of radicalization. Its reinforcing or triggering factors have been logically explained with the help of scientific models to explain its different dimensions. Such as system dynamic models, agent-based models and macro-structural models which give insight to understand its process and triggering factors (Choucri, Goldsmith, Madnick, Mistree, Morrison & Siegel, 2007). Further, the conflict and non-conflict zone model also trace out motivating factors of radicalization. This model asserts that significant variations can be found in the stimulating factors of radicalization both in the conflict and non-conflict zone (see Speckhard, 2010). The conflict and non-conflict zone model explains its reinforcing factors from dimension and perspective. In short, what trigger and fuel its process is explained in the following lines.

2.2 Reinforcing Factors of Radicalization

The concept of radicalization, as discussed above, received attention of academia especially after the commencement of war against terror. So far, dozens of scholarly works (see Borum, 2011; Ramakrishna, 2009; Smelser, 2006; Elliott, 2007) have focused on its complex causal factors which motivate people towards violence. People do not adopt radical thoughts and ideas at once rather gradually they start inclination in the process of radicalization towards violent means to achieve their social and political

objectives. In its process various psycho-social, political and economic factors motivate them to adopt violent means. Therefore, radicalization does not take place in vacuum the above factors always influence its process.

Furthermore, it is normally believed that people who adopt violent means for achieving their socio-political objectives are not considered psychologically abnormal. They are psychologically normal and adopt violent means for their cause. Their minds can be gradually manipulated by different means to motivate them for the radical cause. In this regard, religion, poverty, identity crisis and globalization, as mentioned above, play significant role in the manifestation of radical thoughts (Krueger & Melekcova, 2004; Robb, 2007; Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Berman, Callen, Felter & Shapiro, 2011).

It is worth-mentioning that radical thoughts can be easily flourished in developing societies. Its means developing societies provide enabling environment to radicalization as compared to developed, pluralistic and integrated societies (Ndikumana & Kisangani, 2005). The structural inequalities, deprivation, poverty and political conflicts are frequently founded in developing countries which collectively stimulate its process (Richardson, 2006). One of the renowned scholars, Topnar (2009), in the field of terrorism and radicalization argued that poverty and relative deprivation carries significant influence on the process of radicalization. It means that relatively pitiable people have more inclination towards radicalization as compared to economically sound people (Freytag, Krüger, Meierrieiks & Schneider, 2011; Richards, 2003). In addition, the speedy socio-economic changes particularly in the developing countries also reinforce radicalization after the emergence of globalization. Terrorism and radicalization are frequently found in those countries which are in the transition stage (Gold, 2004; Robert, Lieber & Ruth, 2002).

Along with economic factors, political grievances and political repressions also expedite its process (Reich, 2010; Stohl, 2006). Political conflicts both on the national and international level provide fertile grounds to radicalization. States repressive policies to resolve these conflicts further increase its process (Bueno & Mesquita, 2005; Volkan, 1997). In addition, political conflicts inside the country might occur as a result of religious, ethnic and racial difference. The suppression of ethnic and racial groups by force can further reinforce radicalization.

Furthermore, political disputes on the global level especially of the Muslim world such as Kashmir, Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine instigate radicalization in the respective regions (Mazer, 2008). The inhabitants of these regions are socio-economically humiliated and suffered (Richerson & Boyd, 2008). Their humiliation at the hand of other foreign countries infuriates the course of radical action against the Non-Muslim states in the different parts of the world (Lieberman & Eisenberger, 2006). In this regards, the religious ideologies provide narratives to further reinforce radicalization during conflicts particularly in the Muslim world.

Furthermore, ideological polarization and clash of civilization also cause radicalization on the global level. Various ideological and socio-cultural differences motivate people towards radicalization. Identity crises in the socio-culturally polarized world often promote radical thoughts (Byman, 1998; Chryssochoou, Klandermans & Simon, 2011). For instance, the immigrants of Muslim community in Europe face identity crises. They cannot properly accommodate themselves in Europe (Speckhard, 2007). Therefore, the immigrant community of Europe is considered more susceptible to radicalization. They use violent means to protect their identities in the multi-cultural environment. Moreover, people converted from other religions to Islam are comparatively more prone to adopt radical beliefs (Post, Ruby & Shaw, 2002). This is what motivates

people towards radicalization while the follow part explains its various dimensions in the light of various psycho-social theories. The root of radicalization can be explained in the light of various social-psychological theories.

2.3 Psycho-social Theories of Radicalization

To present a clear picture of radicalization, the Tore Bojorgo's theory (2011) covers its different dimensions. His theory is consisted of four major causal factors of radicalization that include; structural, facilitators or (accelerator); motivational and triggering. The structural causes such as demographic imbalance, globalization, rapid modernization, transitional societies, increasing individualism and relative deprivation reinforce its process. In addition, media, transportation and weapon's diffusion also accelerate its process. Further, this theory asserts that grievances at a personal level also motivate people towards radicalization. Hence, this theory explains some of its micro and macro factors.

Moreover, the social movement theory also describes the different dimensions of radicalization (see Payne, 2009; Sageman, 2004; Beck, 2008). A social movement theory is generally conceived as a self-conscious group to challenge the existing social order (Della Porta, 2006, 1992). The social movement theory also traces the motivating factors of radicalization in different socio-cultural and political circumstances. Along with the social movement theory, the identity crisis theory also elaborates putative factors of radicalization. It explains its psycho-social aspects in the culturally diverse regions. The people of culturally diverse regions are more frequently engaged in identity politics. Besides, in some cases they become integrated, and sometimes become polarized (Assad, 2011). In case of polarization they adopt the most radical means for achieving their socio-

political objectives. Identity crises also consider one of the major reasons of conflict among the different ethnic groups.

Furthermore, socio-political conflicts more frequently reinforce radicalization. The people of conflict zones are more susceptible to radicalization as compared to non-conflicts zones (Speckhard, 2010). Conflicts increase the socio-economic vulnerabilities of local people. The local inhabitants suffer tremendously such as loss of their homes, their love ones and obliteration of infrastructure which increases their socio-economic vulnerabilities (Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005). Therefore, the individual motivation for radicalization can be associated with trauma and desire for revenge particularly in a conflict zone. For instance, in some countries (e.g., Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, Chechnya), recruits are members of locally dominant culture, involved in on-going conflict (Hafez, 2006). Therefore, radicalization is more frequently found in such places.

Moreover, strain theory also gives intellectual insight to us about the reinforcing factors of radicalization. Strain theory asserts that decay of the socio-economic institutions and its efficacy often leads to instability and mass mobilization (Smelser, 1963). Deprivations, conflicts and discrepancies in the social order are considered the outcome of ineffective institutions. Such kinds of strain also occur in social values which often set a stage for radicalization (Lipset & Raab, 1970). Hence, the motivating factors of radicalization can also be traced out with the help of strain theory.

Further, Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko (2008) associate radicalization with the use of power against the innocent people. The illegitimate use of power provides space for radical forces (Lindner, 2006; Bloom, 2005). The harsh government policies create spaces for more violent activities while reconciliatory policies provided spaces for negotiations and settlement. Harsh states policies give ample opportunity to radical forces to advances their violent ideologies. Mishandling the internal socio-political conflicts or states

ambitious to such kinds of disputes by force reinforce further radicalization (Stephen, Shellman & Victor, 2010). For instance, the harsh responses of Pakistan towards terrorism in the tribal belt further reinforce its process. Radicalization as a result of state responses particularly in *Pakhtun* belt is discussed in the following lines.

Part 2

2.4 Roots of Radicalization in *Pakhtun* Society

Pakhtuns are considered more susceptible to radicalization as compared to other ethnic groups of Pakistan (Shahzad, 2007). Along with other factors of radicalization, as explained above, socially engineered violence has also significant influence on its process. The roots of socially engineered violence are associated with the major historical events in the *Pakhtun* belt along with the contemporary war against terror. There are several levels of historical background of radicalization in *Pakhtuns* society such as before the partition of sub-content and after the partition of sub-content. Therefore, the historical background of radicalization is also divided into two time periods i.e., before the partition of Indian sub-content and after the partition. Most of the *Jihadist* movements⁸ were launched against the Sikhs, Hindus, and Britishers before the partition in the *Pakhtun* belt (Qaiyum, 1945). Such *Jihadist* movements injected violence and radical ideologies into their socio-cultural fabrics and social institutions. Such movements against the Sikhs, Hindus, and Britishers left radical trends in this region before the partition of sub-continent. Moreover, Hindus and Muslims conflict before 1947 also left radical impact on the socio-cultural milieu of sub-continent in general and in the *Pakhtun* society in particular.

⁸ *Jihadist* movements refer to ideological organizations that put emphasis on the preaching of *Jihad* (holy war). These movements have been sponsored by different states for political interests in this region.

After the partition of India, several historical events radicalized *Pakhtun* society. In order to understand radicalization, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was considered primary among such historical events specifically in the context of *Pakhtun* society. At that time various states deliberately promoted socially engineered violence for political interests in this region (Roy, 2002). In response to Soviet invasion, the United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia began to arm and fund conservative Islamic organizations in this region to fight the forces of communist regime in Afghanistan (Crile, 2007). During the Soviet-Afghan war the Afghan refugees resided inside the Pak-Afghan border and *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa* (henceforth KP). At that time, they were manipulated in camps to join the so called *Jihadist* organizations on the name of holy war (Jalali, 2002). For this purpose, deliberately *Madrassas* (Religious schools) were established with the help of Saudi Arabia in *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa* and FATA to promote the so-called holy war against Soviet Union forces in Afghanistan (Cooley, 2002). The Afghan refugees were radically manipulated to advance the political interests of United States (US) and Pakistan. They (United States, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia) manipulated them through violent literature to get a space for conservative organizations and violence (Robert, 2007). In this regard, different kinds of Strategies were used for the manipulation of Afghan refugees and especially of their youth in refugee's camps (Napoleoni, 2003).

Violent literature was taught in refugees' schools to manipulate the mind of students. In refugees' camps, they were motivated through violent literature to join the holy war against the Soviet forces (Fair, Hyön & Schreurs, 2008). Afghan refugees' camps were considered radical universities which were mostly situated inside FATA and KP. They (US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) adopted violent teaching methods to easily manipulate students in refugees' schools. Violent examples were given to the students in refugees' camp to promote violence for political ambitious of United States. As for

example “*Yaw topak jama dowa topak da saluru topaku barabar de*” (two plus two guns = four guns). In addition, the new *Klashankove* culture⁹ was introduced in *Pakhtun* society in the time of the Soviet-Afghan war by such violent examples (Tera, 1997).

Moreover, the traditional secular cultural traits of *Pakhtun* society were manipulated to get space for conservative organizations. The traditional power structure of *Pakhtun* society was changed and resultantly the religious clergy became a powerful man after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During the Soviet-Afghan war the legitimacy of their traditional institutions¹⁰ were deliberately undermined by Saudi Arabia and also funded *Wahabist*¹¹ organizations (religious based organization) (Karthia, 1997). The *Wahabist* organizations were supported by Saudi Arabia and United States to achieve certain political interests (Edwards, 2002). The hidden outfits were provided to the national and transnational terrorists’ organizations particularly in the tribal belt of Pakistan to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Such terrorist organizations left various socio-cultural impacts including radical impact on *Pakhtun* society. In addition, during the Soviet-Afghan war *Pakhtuns*’ traditional socio-political institutions lost importance. *Mullah* (Religious clergy) became the dominant socio-political figure in this region. The traditional *Pakhtun Malaki* system¹² got replaced by *Mullah* under the patronage of Islamism.

The impact of the distortion of *Pakhtun* socio-cultural institutions can also be associated with the current radical trends. The distortion of the *Pakhtun* culture started in the colonial era which got more increased with the Soviet invasion. It is commonly believed that in the absence of actual *Pakhtuns* cultural traits the religious leaders, clergy

⁹ *Klashankove* culture refers to the romanticization of guns in *Pakhtun* society.

¹⁰ *Pakhtuns* traditional institutions refer to the traditional organizations such as *Jirga* (council of elder) *Hujra* (community centre) and *Ashar* (collective forming), etc.

¹¹ *Wahabism* is a religious movement or sect of *Sunni* Islam.

¹² A tribal elder was given some socio-political authority to make decisions within the tribe; the title is hereditary.

and military establishment easily promoted violent social engineering in *Pakhtun* society. The importance of their cultural institutions was deliberately undermined to set stage for violent social engineering (Dick, 2002). Such kinds of violent social engineering in *Pakhtun* society provided ample opportunity to *Taliban* in this region (Nojumi, 2002).

Furthermore, *Pakhtuns* warrior attitude was romanticized to promote violence for the sake of political interests. They were introduced as a marshal race (Rand, 2006). In the name of marshal race theory they were exploited by the name of marshal race to romanticize their bravery. In this regard, *Pashto*¹³ literature was used for violent social engineering to motivate them towards extremism. For this purpose, *Pashto* literature songs and dramas in general and *Pashto Tappa*¹⁴ (typical *Pakhtun* poetic literature) in particular were used to put emphasis on violence after various conflicts in this region. In this case, there are and were numerous *Pashto Tappas* that existed and exist in *Pashto* literature. For instance, “*zwaanaano murg pa zaan qabool kro peggelay randey kre che kundthun Na qablaweena*” (males have accepted their deaths, and wives may be blinded as they do not accept to be widows).

There is another *Pashto Tappa*, which also romanticize war and bravery. Illustrated with, “*pa thore dakan dey salay jor sha da benangay awaz dey raa masha mayena*” (O my lover it would be better to become a heap of dust in far-flung *Deccan*¹⁵ than the news of your cowardly flight from the fight). Similarly, *Pashto Tappa* romanticize bravery such as, (*pa tore topak wshtalay rashey, b bay nangay awas dey raa masha mayena*) “O, my lover it is better to see you dead than hearing the news of showing your back in the war”.

¹³ *Pashto* literature refers to *Pashto Tappa* (typical *Pashto* poetic literature), dramas, *ghazal* and songs

¹⁴ *Pashto Tappa* is considered the oldest and integral part of the *Pashto* folk literature. There are two parts in *Pashto Tappa*: one consists of 9 words while the other is comprised of more than 13 words.

¹⁵ *Deccan* in a local context of *Pakhtun* society is used for far-flung area.

Similarly, there is another *Pashto Tappa*, “*hamzulo biya hagha maham day, da Bakht Munir da Garmanay takkaar raazeena*” (O! My friends it’s again an evening like the one, on which *Bakht Munir*’s German made gun, sounded). Hence, *Pashto* literature was used during various conflicts to motivate them for political purposes. Moreover, *Pakhtuns* were radicalized in this way to recruit them into non-state organizations.

However, the non-state actors from the very inception have been supported inside Pakistan (Fair, 2007). The non-state actors have been encouraged to achieve strategic interests in Afghanistan and Indian occupied Kashmir (Rana & Rohan, 2007; Rana & Gunaratna, 2007). The roots of such non-state actors can be seen generally in Pakistani society but such organizations have strong hold in *Pakhtun* society in particular (Gunaratna & Nielsen, 2008). This region has been socially engineered to provide fertile environment for the non-state actors (Byman, 2005). The non-state actors, as described above, also distributed violent literature in Pakistan and particularly in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa*. They (non state actors) exploited the tribal people and recruited them into the terrorist organizations on the name of holy war. They also exploited religion (here it means Islam) to promote radical ideologies for political interests (Roy, 1990; Haqqani, 2004; Stern, 2003). They exploited religion for their own political interest not only during the Soviet-Afghan war but also in the wake of war against terror.

Furthermore, state responses to the growing terrorism in the tribal also reinforced radicalization. The current counter-terrorism strategies do not recourse to *Pakhtun* culture. Resultantly, their cultural distortion as a result of war against has further reinforced radicalization in Pakistan (Buonfino, 2007). Moreover, the terrorists’ organizations exploited *Pakhtuns* cultural distortion in their favors (Bueno, 2005; Nader & Danieli, 2005). They easily get social and cognitive support in *Pakhtun* society as a

result of cultural distortion (Thomas, 2006; Abbas, 2008). Thus, such kinds of counter-terrorism responses in *Pakhtun* society play a key role in the promotion of radicalization (Pick, 2010; Rashid, 2009) (see chapter 5 for detail).

Along with the cultural distortion collateral damages as a result of kinetic approach against terrorism also fuel its process. Revenge (see chapter 6 for further explanation) is considered the integral part of *Pakhtun* culture (Johnson & Mason, 2008). In this regard, there is a famous *Pashto* proverb among *Pakhtun* “*Yaw sare sal kala pas badal waghash yaw bal kas warta wail che was de hum tade wakra*” (A man took revenge after hundred years; another man told him you did it in a hurry). Revenge is normally not tolerated in *Pakhtun* society. Collateral damages in the war against terror instigate their culturally inherent revengeful feeling against the military of Pakistan. Therefore, the counter-terrorism strategies of coalition forces especially of Pakistan increased collateral damages and provided social and cognitive support for terrorism (Zacharias, MacMillan & Van Hemel, 2008). The increasing incidents of collateral damages in a *Pakhtun* cultural setting have opened a new avenue for future terrorism in the shape of radicalization (Everly, 2002; Alexander, 2005). The missing of *Pakhtun* cultural discourses in the existing kinetic approach is considered the source of radicalization (Addison & Murshed, 2005; Mason, 2009).

Along with the war against terror, the circulation of violent literature generally in Pakistan and particularly in FATA also re-enforces radicalization. In Pakistan there is no check on circulation of violent literature. Mostly, the sectarian organizations are involved in circulation of such kinds of literature to create ideological polarization in the tribal belt. So far, Pakistan has failed to keep check on the sectarian organizations to stop such kind of violence.

Along with the government inability to control activities of the sectarian organization the draconian political and administrative laws of FATA also reinforce radicalization. The political structure and administrative laws do not properly work to address the grievances of the local people in FATA (Marten, Johnson & Mason, 2009). In addition, the *Maliks'* power has decreased with the passage of time; however, no substitute system has developed to fill the vacuum that resulted after the decrease in *Maliks'* power (Zalmay, 2014). Hence, the administrative and political problems provide spaces for radicalization in FATA.

Moreover, the complex putative causal factors of radicalization can be associated with the non-availability of economic opportunities to inhabitants of tribal society. They are socially marginalized as a result of poverty, alienation, lack of social services and harsh treatment of security forces. Even still more than 40 percent people are living below the poverty line in *Pakhtun* belt. The radical organizations easily exploit underprivileged people of *Pakhtun* society. Such kind of radical organizations can easily recruit people from this region. Along with the socio-economic problems, the continuous disruption of the democratic process has also accelerated its process (Ahmed, 1999). The lack of democratic institutions has created space for radical forces in Pakistan in general and *Pakhtun* belt in particular. Moreover, radical trends have got momentum in Pakistan as a result of provincialism, ethnic strife and suppression of minorities.

Along with the tumultuous political situation inside Pakistan, *Pakhtun* society is not spared from the influence of globalization. It has brought both positive and negative changes in different parts of the world. Media is also responsible for spreading violence in the different parts of the world after the emergence of globalization (Robb, 2007; Montiel & Anuar, 2002; Hoskins, Akil, & O'Loughlin, 2011; Howie, 2006). For instance, the depiction of Danish blasphemous cartoon and humiliation of Muslim community in

western media reinforce radicalization. Such kinds of incidences promote its process in the Muslim world.

Furthermore, foreign policies of non-Muslims states also instigate radicalization in the Muslim world. For instance, the American foreign policy about Muslim countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and unconditional support to Israel against Philistine promote radicalization in Muslim countries. America's imperialist ambition provides opportunity to religious leader to promote anti-Americanism and radicalization (Allen, 2006). Hence, foreign policy of the western counties provide congenial environment to radicalization in Muslim countries in generals in *Pakhtun* society in particular.

Despite several causal factors of radicalization on the global level, every society cannot be declared as radical one; however, it cannot be denied that some societies may be considered more vulnerable to radicalization. Therefore, radicalization is considered a relative phenomenon as it may occur everywhere, but cannot happen in the same direction and magnitude (Lawrence, 2011; Kuznar, 2009). The acts of terrorism find some sympathy and degree of support in the radicalized society. The social infrastructure and cognitive support of radicalized society can provide psycho-social software for terrorist activities. Thus, *Pakhtun* society also provides more fertile ground to radicalization in light of the above arguments.

Part 3

2.5 Theoretical Model for the Study

Religion, poverty, identity crisis, political grievances and harsh government policies, as discussed above, influence the process of radicalization in the tribal belt of Pakistan. Furthermore, existing kinetic approach against terrorism is also considered responsible for the growing radicalization in the tribal society. Pakistan was/is being pressurized by

international community in the wake of war against terror to extend state authority to tribal society. However, the tribal people always resist state authority and their resistance to the current kinetic approach of counter-terrorism can be traced out in the light of anthropological theories such as glue theory and prospect theory (Groh, 2006; Charles & Kegley, 2003). *Pakhtuns* resistance against the state policies particularly the current counter-terrorism strategies provides enabling environment to radicalization.

2.5.1 State Authority and Tribal Society

It is often said that most of the people fear change (Rosen & Lawrence, 1978). Similarly, *Pakhtuns* also do not accept change especially if someone imposes such changes by force. They resist when a state or occupying force use violence to compel them to follow central authority. They always reject external force and resist to be subjugated to central authority. The normative structure plays essential role in maintaining socio-political order. Anything against the normative order in *Pakhtun* society causes resistance particularly against the state forces. It is held that they highly value their own independence and preserve their way of life for centuries (Lindholm, 1982).

Swindler (1977) famous glue theory describes *Pakhtuns* resistance to state authority. According to glue theory a group should resist a change that is being imposed on it against its will. They normally resist external rules which are against their cultural norms. Moreover, prospect theory sees *Pakhtun* resistance through the lens of cognitive psychology which constitutes loss and gain. The people start risky behavior when they lose something (Manus, 1980). The risk of losing tribal independence creates their resistance. However, they expect benefits from the state, but are not ready to lose their authority and decision-making power.

Moreover, Charles Lindholm's theory of "segmentary societies" is particularly helpful to understand why *Pakhtuns* are so difficult to co-opt. He describes the nature of *Pakhtuns* who live in segmentary society. "They are willing to take money or benefits in exchange for promises to alter their behavior and to be more in line with the state's rule of law, but will not hesitate to break the contract if it contradicts with *Pakhtunwali*" (Lindholm, 1982: 137). They refuse to accept change due to fear of dishonor (Griffiths, 1967; Titus, 1998). Similarly, they do not accept state authority if someone imposes it by force. Therefore, *Pakhtuns* show resistance to the current approaches of counter-terrorism in the tribal belt of Pakistan. Pakistan adopted kinetic approaches (as is discussed in chapter 5) to extend state authority into tribal society (Sana, 2007). Such kind of counter-terrorism strategies are considered against the tribal culture. Therefore, they resist the current approach of Pakistan.

Moreover, socio-political vacuum in FATA can also be explained in the light of Ibni Khalduns' thesis on social solidarity. He believed that socio-cultural values enhance group solidarity in the tribal society. Social solidarity in tribal society is considered the outcome of its group value, clan, and family. Khaldun philosophy of *Assabiyya*¹⁶ gives emphasis on social solidarity and group consciousness (Mahdi, 1968). It strengthens relationship within a particular group. The strong social bonds and social solidarity of the tribal society has got disturbed by military operations. The cultural values and traits such as *Pakhtunwali*, *Jirga* and strong social ties of *Pakhtun* have been distorted by the war against terror. The present social disorder in the *Pakhtun* society is considered the outcome of cultural distortion in the light Ibni Khaldun's philosophy. It is generally believed that weak group unity and solidarity set a stage for social disorder in the tribal society. Social disorder undermines the existing efforts of the coalition forces against the

¹⁶ *Asabiyya* or *Asabiyah* refers to social solidarity with emphasis on unity, group consciousness and sense of shared purpose and social cohesion.

terrorism and provides congenial environment to radicalization and terrorism in the tribal belt of Pakistan.

2.5.2 Conflict and Non-conflict Zone Model of Radicalization

Along with the *Pakhtun* resistance theories this study is also based on the model of conflict and non-conflict zone model. According to this model the people are more vulnerable to radicalization inside a conflict zone. The conflict and non-conflict zone model elaborates the causal factors of radicalization. This model asserts that inside conflict zone the people are more vulnerable to radicalization (Speckhard, 2010: 27). Inside the conflict zone the people are more socio-economically marginalized that resultantly reinforces radicalization. Thus, conflict zone provides congenial environment to reinforce its process.

Pakhtun society can be declared a conflict zone as a result of current war against terror. *Pakhtuns*, as highlighted above, are facing the same situation in the wake of war against terror. They suffered as a result of continuous conflict in the shape of war against terror. The local inhabitants suffered both socio-psychological and economically. Moreover, as a result of indiscriminate shelling they left their native places. In the light of above situation *Pakhtun* society can also be considered as a conflict zone. Therefore, the people of this region are more susceptible to radicalization as a compared to the non-conflict zone.

Conclusion

Radicalization is a complex behavioral phenomenon and refers, in simple words, to the process of adopting more violent means to achieve certain social and political objectives. Its causal factors normally include; religion, poverty, identity crisis, war, and humiliating

foreign policies against Muslims, etc. However, in *Pakhtun* society its emergence is historically associated with the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-88). In the Soviet-Afghan war *Pakhtun* society was socially engineered for certain political interests by United States, Saudi Arabia to defeat Soviet forces. Such manipulation caused an extreme change in the social outlook of the tribal people which resultantly led to permanent radical elements among them. Moreover, the current counter-terrorism strategies which have not taken into account the cultural priorities of *Pakhtuns* and exclusively resourcing to the use of power provide fertile grounds to further radicalization among *Pakhtuns*. This study, as referred above, is based on conflict zone model that believes that people in conflict zones are more prone to radicalization as compared to non-conflict zone. Moreover, the current kinetic approach against terrorism causes *Pakhtuns'* resistance which in turn instigates radicalization. This is what describes the different dimensions of radicalization while the next chapter covers the methodological procedure employed in undertaking this study.

Chapter 3

Methodology

Introduction

Chapter 2 referred to the theoretical debates on radicalizations and the location of the study in the wider literature while this chapter explains the way this study is designed and carried out. It should be noted that research is a tricky job and, therefore, many steps may overlap or happen simultaneously in the field. Therefore, the following order is given to help the reader(s) understand as how the research started and how it culminated. The chapter, hence, begins to describe the ethnographic nature of the study—rationale of selecting the case study method and procedure of sample selection. Moreover, the case study method and the tools of data collection are justified in this section. Further, the pre-field work preparation and practical fieldwork stage are highlighted to reflect the way the study was carried out.

3.1 Ethnography

Ethnography is concerned with what the people are, and how they (ethnographers) see the need to study human behavior in a social context (Wiersma, 1986). Ethnographers adopt cultural lens (Atkinson & Hammersley, 2007) in interpreting the observed human behavior in local setting. In ethnographic research observation takes place in a more meaningful context in a natural setting (Wilson, 1977). Ethnographers generate understanding of a culture through representation of what we call emic perspective or what might be described as the insider point of view (Atkinson, 2002). In other words, ethnography, as compared to other wider research paradigms, is considered a holistic

approach to explore different dimensions of research problems (Dobbert, 1982). As regards its comprehensiveness and completeness Fetterman (2010: 18) holds that:

“[It] refers to a holistic outlook in research to gain a comprehensive and complete picture of a social group. Ethnographers attempt to describe as much as possible about a culture or a social group”.

Thus, ethnography is highly appreciated for studying a group or community in a natural setting (Klockars, 1977; Marcus, 1998). In addition, it has some advantages over other methods such as survey (Goetz & LeCompte, 1984) and requires the researcher(s) to keep open mind in field and study the various subjects (Boyle, 1994). Ethnography allows the personal involvement of the researchers with and participation in the topic being studied. Moreover, with regard to its merits and significance, Van (1988) holds that ethnography enables the researcher(s) to adopt any tool of data collection that suits the situation. Hence, realizing the flexibility and effectiveness of ethnographic approach in unearthing the real information and the nature of the study that requires in-depth information, ethnographic method was adopted in this study. Furthermore, its adoption was made to gather minute information required for understanding the phenomenon of cultural distortion and its radicalized effects in *Pakhtun* society in the wake of war against terror.

As ethnographic research normally requires qualitative methods such as participant observation, interview and focus group discussion, therefore, the researcher adopted all of them for ensuring complete and reliable information. Of course such qualitative methods or, in other words ethnographic approach is criticized for being subjective (see Woods, 1986) in nature, however, extreme care was taken in ensuring objective and reliable information during this study. Hence, in this study qualitative methods were selected according to the nature of this study. The selection of qualitative paradigms was specifically based on the requirements of this study rather on ideological comment to one methodological paradigm. Therefore, the participant observation, in-

depth interview and focus group interview methods were used to collect in-depth and reliable information about the research issue (radicalization). In addition to the primary data secondary data was also extensively and intensively analyzed for answering the research questions.

3.2 Qualitative Methods

Drawing an understandable guideline before conducting any academic research in social sciences is considered an important step (Babbie, 2012; Ormrod & Leedy, 2005). Such a guideline or, in other words, ‘research design’ is formulated in the light of the aims and objectives of the study (Marvasti, 2003). Therefore, qualitative research design is structured in the light of the data required for this study. According to the nature of the data, qualitative methods were used to obtain in-depth and reliable information. However, choosing a research method such as qualitative and quantitative does not distinguish right from wrong or truth from falsehood; instead, the goal should be to select an approach that is suitable for the task at hand (Creswell, 2003). As one researcher puts it,

[O]ur decisions ... should depend on the nature of what we are trying to describe, on the likely accuracy of our descriptions, on our purposes, and on the resources available to us; not on ideological commitment to one methodological paradigm or another (Hammersley 1992: 163, as cited by Silverman 2000: 12)

Thus, the qualitative research paradigm has been used with logical justification to diagnose radicalization in a specific social context. The qualitative methods are more suitable as compared to survey or questionnaire in a cultural setting. Qualitative research methods such as, interviews, focus group discussions, and participant observation were selected to probe the issue (radicalization) in a cultural setting (Grills, 1998). Such qualitative methods give insight to get in-depth information about research subjects.

Furthermore, to get more in-depth information, a case study method was employed in this work.

3.3 Case Study

The case study method is considered the oldest methodological tradition in qualitative research and is used in disciplines such as anatomy, biochemistry, psychiatry, sociology etc (Hamel, Dufour & Fortin, 1993: 27). It was used for the first time by Chicago school (Barbara, 1990). Its importance has increased with the passage of time in various disciplines such as in medical sciences, psychology and sociology. The significance of case study is documented by Blumer (1986: 125), who states that “the case study or situational analysis is the bed-rock of scientific investigation”. The case study involves systematically enough information about a particular person or social setting (Fetterman, 2010).

Moreover, the case study method explores the hidden realities and provides a useful insight to collect enough information about a particular issue as compared to other methods such as survey (Payne & Payne, 2004). It is a systematic inquiry of an event or set of related events that aims to describe and explain the phenomenon of interest in scientific way (Bromely, 1990). Thus, the case study is used in the light of its importance and relevance in the research issue (radicalization). It is considered a suitable method to investigate a research issue in a specific social setting. It is considered as a microscopic study looking at the phenomenon very closely (Gillham, 2001). However, different dimensions of radicalization especially in a social context cannot be investigated by other research methods such as survey; content analysis and questionnaire (Thomas, 2010). The minute and empirical information can be collected through case study method about a

particular phenomenon in the real-life context” (Yen, 2002: 27). Moreover, Champion, elaborates the importance of a single case study method and states that:

“Given the scope of the method, case studies can be rather pointed in their focus, or approach a broad view of life and society. For example, an investigator may confine his or her examination to a single aspect of an individual's life such as studying a medical student's actions and behaviors in medical school. Or, the investigator might attempt to assess the social life of an individual and their entire background” (Champion, 1993: 135).

There are different kinds of case studies such as single or multiple case studies (Pyecha, 1988). However, the investigator here confines his interest to single case study method. The focus of the case study method can be classified into three different types: intrinsic, instrumental and collective. Among these three types only intrinsic case studies give emphasis on particular trait, characteristic and problem (Stake, 1995). The single case gives emphasis to cover in one time the different dimensions of the single research subject.

Therefore, this study as stated above is also confined to a single case study to get detail information about the issue of radicalization. Of course, I am aware that one can ask this question that why this study is confined to one case, not many as is being criticized (see Hammersley, 2000; Campbell, Donald & Stanley, 1966). However, due to certain limitations such as accessibility of the whole tribal region, shortage of time and finances restricted this study to single case. Further, this study also requires thorough investigation to see the issue of radicalization in a *Pakhtuns*’ society. Thus, a single case was taken up for enabling the researcher to understand the overall background of the issue and adopt a more holistic approach to understand the phenomenon of radicalization. Moreover, in relation to the importance of a single case study, the research literature attests the advantages of selection of a single case over many (Yin, 1984). For instance, Stake (1995) holds that single case study enables the researcher to focus all on the available meager resources to develop a clearer picture of the complexities of the

situation/issue. Furthermore, various dimensions of a single issue can be easily elaborated in this case. After all, this is what justified the selection of case study method; however, the reason behind the selection of *Pakhtun* society as a case study is described below.

3.4 Justification of *Pakhtun* Society as a Relevant Case

Pakhtun society as a relevant case for this study can be justified through many valid reasons. Firstly, *Pakhtun* society has become a flashpoint of the war against terror. It is considered a safe haven for the terrorist organizations (Carlotta & Ismail, 2006). Therefore, in response to terrorism, the efforts of the coalition forces focused on *Pakhtun* society. Secondly, the importance of *Pakhtun* cultural discourses which undermined the efforts of coalition forces also justifies *Pakhtun* society as a relevant case to explore the different dimensions of terrorism. Arguably, *Pakhtun*'s are culturally susceptible to violence (James, 1963). Historically, they have been labeled in different epoch as the most belligerent ethnic group in the world (Azam, 2009).

However, *Pakhtuns* susceptibility to violence is based on certain myths and stereotypical theories. Such myths developed in the time of foreign invasion about them (Olaf, 1958). *Pakhtun*'s bravery, harshness, violence were romanticized and labeled them the invincible ethnic group (Banerjee, 2000). In fact, their bravery was deliberately romanticized by various states to use them for political interests (Gunaratna & Nielsen, 2008). The *Pakhtuns*' violent nature comes to surface once again in the wake of war against terror. However, in the war against terror the issue of *Pakhtuns*' violence has been dominated by the old narratives which are based on stereotypical theories. Such old narratives about their cultural values are considered the outcome of the stereotypical theories which were written for the political interests of the different states. These theories were based on the biased approaches of the invaders and romanticized the violent

nature of Pakhtuns. Once again, *Pakhtuns* cultural violence, which is based on myths, misguided the doctrines of the current war against terror.

Thus, the current doctrine in the war against terror has failed to achieve desirable results. The existing counter-terrorism strategies of the coalition forces in general and Pakistan approaches as a major ally in the war against terror in particular to fight terrorism on *Pakhtun* soil have failed to see the problem of terrorism through cultural lenses. Thus, understanding of *Pakhtuns* cultural values cannot be denied to frame culturally informed policies for the viable solution of terrorism in this region. In other words, holistic strategy of counter-terrorism is needed that corresponds to *Pakhtun* culture. Such kind of strategies will give insight to differentiate *Pakhtun* cultural violence from the present-day terrorism.

The current approaches do not recourse to *Pakhtun* culture, resultantly, *Pakhtun* cultural values have got distorted in the wake of war against terror. Consequently, the cultural vacuum as a result of counter-terrorism strategies has been filled by radical forces in the *Pakhtun* belt. Therefore, the combined strategies of United States in general and Pakistan in particular have increased further radicalization in the *Pakhtun* society.


Therefore, *Pakhtun* society is considered the most suitable case for this study to identify the motivating factors of radicalization after the war against terror. Data has been collected only from *Khyber* agency because it was difficult for me to collect data from the entire *Pakhtun* tribal society. *Khyber* agency was taken as a target area and justified as a relevant case.

3.4.1 Selection of the Target Area (*Khyber* Agency) or Universe of the Study

Throughout the history the people of *Khyber* agency have been exposed to wars. *Khyber* Agency remained a gateway for all sort of military expeditions (David &

Edwards, 1989). It is generally held that during the military expeditions the foreign invaders faced strong resistance in this region. The British invasion on this region was also strongly resisted by local *Afridi* tribe¹⁷. In this regard, the Britishers still remember the resistance of the *Pakhtuns* in the famous “*Tirah War*”¹⁸ (Edwards, 1997). Therefore, the inhabitants of *Khyber* agency have been famous for their warrior nature and also for the resistance against the foreigners.

Map of Khyber Agency



Source: Business Recorder, Retrieved April 19, 2014 from <http://www.brecorder.com/pakistan/general-news/26841-another-school-blown-up-at-Khyber-agency-.html>

The foreign invaders also left deep socio-cultural imprints on this region. Along with the imprints of foreign invaders on this region the Soviet-Afghan war also left enormous socio-cultural impact on the *Pakhtuns* society. The Soviet-Afghan war caused social cleavage in the socio-cultural fabrics of *Pakhtun* society (Edwards, 2002). Violence as discussed in the previous chapter had been injected into *Pakhtun* society particularly in

¹⁷ *Afridi* tribe is a *Karlanri Pakhtun* tribe present in the tribal region of Pakistan. *Afridi* live in *Khyber* agency.

¹⁸ *Tirah* war refers to the campaign (1897-98) in which the *Afridi* waged *Jihad* (holy war) against the Britishers. In this war more than 40,000 British and Indian troops were sent to *Tirah* against *Afridi*

refugees' camps by *Jihadists* organizations (Fitzgerald & Gould, 2009). Further, Afghan refugees also created economic burden on the existing resources of Pakistan in general and *Pakhtun* society in particular.

Moreover, the geographical importance provided justification for the selection of *Khyber* agency. The region has geographically a close border with Afghanistan as well as with the capital of *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa* i.e. Peshawar. The geographical location of *Khyber* agency received importance as result of war against terror. The region has become the epicenter of such war (Khalid, 2010; Imtiaz, 2009). The *Taliban* and other militants' organizations can easily attack Peshawar and can block the supply route of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and American forces. *Khyber* agency has been used as the supply line for the American and NATO forces since 2001. The protection of main supply line cannot be ignored by national and international community in the wake of war against terror. Therefore, the security situation of *Khyber* agency received an attention of the international community.

To protect the main supply line of NATO and ISAF forces, Pakistan as a major ally in the war against terror launched military operations such as *Daraghlam*,¹⁹ *Bia Daraghlam*²⁰ and *Khuwakh Badesham*²¹ against the terrorists in the region to secure the supply route of NATO forces (Khan, 2011). Such military operations damaged the socio-cultural fabrics of *Pakhtun* society in general and *Khyber* agency in particular (see chapter 5 for detail). Consequently, the inhabitants of the *Khyber* agency have been /are being displaced as a result of military operations. Furthermore, the traditional *Malaki* system has been tarnished by *Taliban* and military operations. As a result of the war against terror, the region has become the worst conflict zone (Jones, 2008).

¹⁹ *Daraghlam* is a Pashto word which means "coming".

²⁰ *Bia Daraghlam* is a Pashto word which means "coming again"

²¹ *Khuwakh Badesham* is a Pashto word which means "to see you"

This is what justified *Khyber* agency a best case for the issue of radicalization due to cultural distortion particularly in the wake war against terror. The growing radicalization as a result of *Pakhtuns* cultural distortion as discussed in the previous chapter can easily set a stage for radicalization. This region provides a good insight for the exploration of cultural distortion as a result of military operations which further undermined security situation in FATA. It reinforced further radicalization. After deciding the case study, the clear picture of the field is also presented in the following lines.

3.5 Entering the Field

Khyber agency as explained above was selected as a case for the completion of this study. After deciding the case study and selection of the target area; I entered into the field. However, before I give an account of how I practically entered into the field for data collection, it is important to explain the geographical location and administrative structure of *Khyber* agency. *Khyber* agency shares western border with Afghanistan and Eastern border with Peshawar, the capital city of *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa*. It is bordered by *Kabul River*²² and *Koh-e-Sufaid* range²³ in the north. The capital city of *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa* is situated in the East and *Kuram* Agency in the West of *Khyber* Agency (Spain, 1963) while the region is still administered under the British invented traditional *Malaki* system²⁴ (see chapter 4 for detail). A significant number of *Maliks* (*supaidpesh*²⁵) belong to *Afridi* tribe who are considered the main tribe of this Agency. However, along

²² The river originates from *Chitral* (northern Pakistan) flows into Afghanistan and goes back into Pakistan.

²³ Pakistan has within its borders some of the world highest and most Spectacular mountains. Some of the famous mountain ranges of Pakistan are *Himalayas*, *Karakoram*, *Hindu Kush*, *Sulaiman*, *Toba Kakar*, *Kirthar* and *Salt* range. The *Koh-e-Safaid* Ranges have an east-west trend and rise to an average height of 3,600m. They are commonly covered with snow. *Sikaram*, the highest peak in *Koh-e-Safaid* Ranges rises to 4,760 m.

²⁴ The title is hereditary and the tribal *Maliks* have political authority to maintain law and order with the help of political agents

²⁵ *Supaidpesh* refers to the elders who traditionally hold socio-political power in the tribal society.

with *Afridi*, *Shinwaris*, *Mullagories* and *Shilmanies* also live in *Khyber* agency. The overall inhabitants of *Khyber* Agency can further be divided into eight sub-sections via *Qamber Khel*, *Malikdin Khel*, *Kuki Khels*, *Aka Khels*, *Zakha Khel*, *Sepah*, *Kamar Khel* and *Adam Khel* (see chapter 4 for detail).

The Agency has three Sub-divisions: *Landikotal*, *Jamrud* and *Bara* with three Assistant Political Agents, seven *Tehsildars* and a number of other administrative functionaries. Moreover, the Head Quarter of the Political Agent is at Peshawar but has also Camp Office/Residence at *Landikotal* (Khan, 2010). The Assistant Political Agents have their Headquarters at *Landikotal*, *Jamrud* and *Bara* respectively. According to Frontier Crimes regulations Authority (FCR), the Political agent is considered the executive head of the agency (Samdani, 2011). Further, he performs multiple tasks in each Agency as a district magistrate, session judge and coordinates with all other departments. However, a political agent (PA) runs the administration through *Maliks*, *Khassadars*²⁶ and *Lungi*²⁷ holders (*Supaidpesh*). The political administration and system of justice are based on the concept of territorial, tribal (collective) and protective responsibility system in *Khyber* Agency. Moreover, the *Jirga*²⁸ system adjudicates the tribal matters under the supervision of political Agent. Hence, this is what the political structure and geographical location of *Khyber* agency is and now how I entered the field to collect the data is explained below. I stayed in University of Peshawar as discussed in the field issue throughout my field work. On daily basis I visited refugees' camps and *Khyber* Agency to collect primary data. The following methods were used in the field to

²⁶ *Khassadars* are recruited by the concerned political agent from the same agency to maintain law and order. They receive their salaries from the office of the political agent. There is no criterion of education for their recruitment.

²⁷ It is similar to a *Malik*, but the title is not hereditary

²⁸ *Jirga* is a traditional assembly of leaders to take decision by consensus over socio-political issue in the tribal society of *Pakhtuns*.

collect first hand information about the given issue. Qualitative methods were used for data collection.

3.6 Procedure and Methods of Data Collection

The qualitative research methods, as discussed above, were used for data collection. The qualitative tools of data collection such as in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and participant observation were selected according to the nature of the qualitative research (see Berg, 2002). The qualitative paradigm can be used to investigate research issue particularly in social context (Denzin, 1978). The ethnographic research, as discussed above, is usually conducted in a cultural setting. This research is also qualitative in nature, therefore; it was also conducted in a cultural setting. However, in a cultural setting various dimensions of radicalization could not be investigated by utilizing a single tool. The triangulation of various techniques was utilized to ensure reliability and validity of the data. Thus, the multiple data gathering tools were used to investigate the phenomenon (Campbell, Fiske, 1959; Leedy, 1993). Hence, the following qualitative tools were used to explore the different aspects of radicalization.

3.6.1 Participant Observation

Conventionally, participant observation, as explained above, is considered as an important method of ethnographic research (Jorgensen, 1989; Spradley, 1980; Prior, 2002). The use of participant observation enables the researcher(s) to understand the research issue in a social setting (Sluka, 1990). The reason behind its use was the sensitivity (see Patton, 1990) of many issues pertaining to the main topic, which direct and conscious questions could not answer. Participant observation enhances the potential of the fieldworkers to understand more and more about the natural setting and it always

conduct in a best way in natural setting (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002). In addition, this method allows the researcher(s) to use it in community setting. Morgan (1997: 127) in this respect puts that:

“The researchers tend to conduct participant observation studies in settings where there is something available to observe. Organizations and organizational structures, social roles among group members, normative values among deviants, and similar topics become typical fodder for participant observers”.

Participant observation enhances the ability of fieldworkers to become familiar with culture. Therefore, it was a suitable tool to depict the real picture of radicalization in cultural setting. Besides, participant observation was used to earn the community trust and to sense out the hidden facts about the issue. This method enabled me to collect the hidden information about the reinforcing factors of radicalization in a cultural setting of *Pakhtun* society. Along with the participant observation another qualitative method i.e. in-depth interview and focus group discussion were also used to get detail information from community members, cultural and security experts.

3.6.2 Interviews and Focus Groups Discussion

Usually, interview refers to purposeful conversation that intends to gather relevant information (Gorden, 1987; Patton, 1980; De Santis 1980). There are different types of interview such as formal and informal (Rubin & Rubin, 2011). However, both formal and informal interview methods are considered the most important data-gathering techniques for ethnographers in a natural setting (Taylor & Bogdan, 1988). Therefore, the importance of interview method cannot be denied to present vivid picture of the ethnographic research. Thus, according to the ethnographic nature of this study the interview method was used to get in-depth information. As an ethnographer, I was aware about the other types of the interview such as formal and informal. However, the informal

method was employed to present a clear picture of radicalization to trace out its reinforcing factors.

The informal interview technique is being used very commonly in ethnographic research (De Santis, 1980). The use of informal interview method enables researchers to get in-depth information about research issue especially in a cultural setting. Therefore, I conducted interviews with different stakeholders such as cultural experts, local community and security experts to collect information about radicalization in *Pakhtun* belt in the wake of war against terror.

Along with interview method, the focus group discussion was also utilized to get further in-depth information about the radical trends in *Pakhtun* society. The focus group discussion gives in-depth information to researchers.

“The use of focus group discussion was due to its merit enhancing the ability of researchers to learn through discussion about conscious, semiconscious, and unconscious psychological and socio-cultural characteristics and process as among various groups” (Basch, 1987:184).

Moreover, the focus group discussion gives insight to ensure cross checking of data (Edmunds, 1999). Through this method hidden information can be explored which might be difficult in an individual interview. Therefore, the use of focus group discussion was important for collecting more authentic information about the research issue. The focus group discussions were conducted in different places with community member to get in-depth information about the research subject. The use of such methods allowed me to cross check the data individually collected in the field. Hence, this is what the tools of data collection and now how I selected the respondents is explained below.

3.6.3 Procedure of Selecting Respondents/*Sampling*

Owing to the complex nature of the issue of radicalization it was necessary to collect reliable information from different stakeholders. Therefore, the respondents were

selected from diverse backgrounds so that views of different people could be ensured for authenticity.

Table 3.1: Expert Sampling Details

Area	Frequency
Cultural Experts	10
Security Experts	10
Intellectual Experts	10
Total	30

For the completion of this study the data was collected from *Pakhtuns'* cultural experts, security officials, intellectuals, and common people of the target area so as to present a vivid picture of the issue. The following table shows the specification of the respondents taken from different *Tehsils* of *Khyber Agency*.

Table 3.2: General Sampling Details

Area	Focus Group Discussion	Individual Interview
<i>Landi Kotal</i>	3	10
<i>Jamrud</i>	3	10
<i>Bara</i>	3	10
Total	9	30

The above-mentioned respondents were selected to probe the different dimensions of this study. Along with the respondents' selection, the sampling technique is considered important part of research process as well. The logic behind the sampling techniques is to make references about some larger population from a smaller one (Senese, 1997). However, the sampling techniques in research process mostly depend on the nature of the research issue (Bruce, 2002). Therefore, significant variations can be found in the sampling procedure of qualitative and quantitative research. The theoretical orientation of

the project determines its methodological procedure and sample selection (Berg & Lune, 2004). Thus, researchers select sampling techniques only to complete the work in hand more efficiently. Different kinds of sampling techniques can be used according to the nature of the research issue. The researcher(s) select purposive sampling on the basis of his/ her interests.

“When developing a purposive sample, researchers use their special knowledge or expertise about some group to select subjects who represent this population. In some instances, purposive samples are selected after field investigations on some group, in order to ensure that certain types of individuals or persons displaying certain attributes are included in the study”(Glassner et al., 1983: 219).

It was used to satisfy the interest of the researchers. Therefore, in this study the purposive sampling technique was used. In the light of purposive sampling the primary data was collected from experts such as in the field of culture, security, and also from the common people in the target area.

3.9 Field Issues and Difficulties in Data Collection

Data collection is considered an integral part of research activity (Rou & Van, 1988). However, due to security situation it was a challenging task for me to collect data in the field area (*Khyber Agency*). The research study as discussed above was held in *Khyber Agency*. Security situation was uncertain in the field area due to *Talibanization* and military operations. This is the area where *Taliban* constantly attacked North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) supply vehicles carrying stuff for their forces in Afghanistan. There was almost complete social and political unrest in the area and the movement of any stranger person was almost impossible. As a result of continuous emergency situation in *Khyber agency* my mobility was almost difficult during the data collection. Therefore, data collection in such an uncertain situation in *Khyber agency* looked too difficult.

In such uncertain situation staying in the field for data collection was almost impossible for me. Thus, to avoid any untoward situation I managed to visit the field everyday from University of Peshawar. University of Peshawar is almost 15 kilometer away from *Khyber* agency. My university friends facilitated me to contact the local *Maliks* particularly after displacement from the native region. Data was collected from *Maliks*, elders and local community of Khyber agency and most of them were displaced from native area as a result of tumultuous security situation. Therefore, my university friends from *Khyber* Agency supported me in seeking appointment with most of the local *Maliks* and elders residing in *Jaluzia*²⁹camp on main trunk road near to Peshawar.

Moreover, data collection was difficult for the unfamiliar person in the native area as well as in camps of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). However, due to my familiarity with the local tribal culture, experience, and being born and raised in the tribal area my presence in the field was not perceived as strange. The local community received me happily and extended their all possible help in data collection. However, due to the sensitive nature of research subject the local people showed concerns about the interview recording. Moreover, recording and taking images in the field were perceived against the tribal culture. Therefore, the local community did not easily allow me to use tape record. Without tape record it could not be easily managed to write everything in field. I was aware about the importance of recorded interview and taking field notes during the data collection. Hence, I made request for tap recording from the respondents and after seeking their permission I recorded their views. Therefore, with prior permission; the tape recorded was used for data recording. The field notes during the data collection were also taken to get minute information. After the completion of the data collection, the tape recorded data was converted into main themes.

²⁹ *Jaluzui* Camp is situated in district Nowshehra, almost 10 kilometers away from grand trunk road on East.

Thus, all essential steps of the data collection were thoroughly observed to ensure validity and reliability of the primary data. The difficult questions were asked in a more simple way to get reliable information from the respondents. This research study too has, like other studies, certain limitations which are described below.

3.8 Ethical Considerations

Research ethics are considered the integral part of the any kind of research activities (Lee-Treweek, 2000). Violation of the ethical issue can undermine the legal status of research activities. Therefore, it is considered the prime responsibility of researchers to take into account the ethical considerations while conducting social research (Marwasti, 2004). Further, it is obligatory for researchers to observe all the prescribed ethics of social research prior to data collection (Fetterman, 2010). Research ethics can be associated with various issues such as consent, privacy, and the confidentiality of data in the research process (Punch, 1994). While keeping in view the importance of the research ethics I observed all the ethical boundaries of right and wrong to conduct this study.

Research activities are difficult to be carried out without the help of other people. For this job nobody can be forced to participate in a research activity. Participation hence in research project should be voluntary; you should not psychologically force your subject to take part in your research. Further, protection of the research participant during the research activity is also considered important part of research ethics. Thus, the most important ethics of anonymity, confidentiality and voluntary participation were thoroughly observed during this study.

Moreover, the consent letter is considered as an integral part in research ethics (Babbie, 2012). Therefore, prior consent letters were sent to respondents to take verbal

and written consent from them. Before conducting interviews, the subject of the study was thoroughly introduced to respondents. After the verbal and written consent I conducted interviews with different community members in field and also with cultural and security experts. Prior consent letters to take consent from the respondents facilitated me during the data collection. Therefore, the required ethics of confidentiality was thoroughly observed during data collection. Owing to the sensitive nature of this study the local community members were worried about their security while participating in this research project. Therefore, they were thoroughly briefed about the objectives of this study. The doubts of the local community members were removed to ensure the participation of various stakeholders in this study.

3.10 Limitations of the Study

Generally, every research activity suffers from certain limitations such as theoretical limitations, methodological shortcoming, time management, and financial barriers (Flick, 2014). Every research activity has certain limitation; hence, it would be difficult to conduct research activity without any kind of barriers. Similarly, this study has also some worth-noting theoretical and methodological, financial, limitations. Not only security and financial problems made this task difficult for me but it was also difficult to cover the theoretical dimensions of this complex issue (radicalizations) in the entire *Pakhtun* society.

Along with the theoretical problems, it was also difficult to cover the entire *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa* and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) for getting more insight into the issue of radicalization. Therefore, despite certain criticism this study is confined to *Khyber* Agency. Moreover, it was also difficult for me to collect data from women in the tribal society. The missing of women voices in this research is considered

one of the worth noting limitation of the study. Moreover, the locals felt hesitation to participate in this study due to uncertain security situation. The security situation also diverted my attention during the data collection and made me conscious about my own security. Not only security situation but resources in hand for this research were also not sufficient. I could not manage the expenditure for this study. The available resources were not enough to purchase books and stationary for this study. Moreover, the sensitive nature of this research project sometime made me hesitant to participate openly with local population to gain more in-depth information. It was also difficult to trace *Maliks* and local elders and take consent from them for interview because they were mostly hesitant to give me interview about this sensitive issue.

Conclusion

This chapter reveals that ethnographic approach was used to understand the issue of radicalization in a cultural setting. The data was collected from *Khyber* agency on the basis of case study method. Extreme care was taken in the research ethics. This is what that how this study was carried out; hence, the next chapter is focused on the origin of *Pakhtuns* and their cultural values. Moreover, the impact of *Pakhtun* violent cultural traits on the current radical trends is clearly presented to trace out relationship between radicalization and *Pakhtun* culture.

Chapter 4

Understanding Radicalization in the Context of *Pakhtuns*' Cultural Violence

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 referred to the theoretical debates on the issue of radicalization and the location of the study in the wider literature while the previous chapter elaborated the overall methodology employed in conducting this study. However, this chapter is determined to understand radicalization in the context of *Pakhtun* culture. To have an in-depth understanding of the issue of radicalization; this chapter is divided into three parts. The first part describes *Pakhtuns* as an ethnic group, their geographical location and the administrative structure of FATA, Pakistan. Part II exhibits the inherent *Pakhtuns*' violent cultural traits imbedded in their code of life "*Pakhtunwali*" and the impact of such violent cultural traits on the present-day radicalization and terrorism particularly in the wake of war against terror. Part III highlights the importance of *Pakhtun* culture in maintaining socio-political order on the one hand and tracing out the impact of the socio-political disorder on the wake of counter-terrorism on the process of radicalization in *Pakhtun* society on the other hand. In short, this chapter presents a clear picture of the association between cultural violence and the current radical trends in the wake of war against terror.

Part 1

4.2 History and Origin of *Pakhtuns*

Pakhtuns are considered the largest tribal ethnic group in the world (Barfield, 2010). They live in a region which is known as a *Khurasan*³⁰ which comprises Afghanistan and

³⁰ *Khurasan* is a *Persian* word used for the places (Afghanistan and Pakistan) predominantly occupied by *Pakhtuns* (*Pashto* speaking people).

Pakistan. In Pakistan they reside predominantly in the province; *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa*³¹ Federal Administered Tribal Area (FATA), and Balochistan. They also migrated from their native places to the urban centers in Pakistan such as Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad etc. *Pakhtuns* are living approximately 3.5 million inside Pakistan that makes almost 15% of the total of Pakistan population (Bangash, 1996: 65).

As far as the origin of *Pakhtun* is concerned, there is no agreed upon concrete theory which can clearly satisfy the thirst of all theorists (Tate, 1973). In this regard, various anthropologists, scholars, researchers, historians and linguists have developed some stereotypical theories to trace out the origin of *Pakhtuns* (see Lindholm, 1982; Caroe, 1952). They include:

- a) Semitic race, (that *Pakhtuns* belong to Israel) (see Aafridi, 2009)
- b) Descendents of Qatora, the wife of Hazrat Ibrahim (see Caroe, 1958; Rehman, 1968)
- c) Belongs to Greek races (see Spain, 1957; Lindhom, 1988)
- d) Arian tribes (see McCarthy, 2010)

As far as, Semitic race theory is concerned, it holds that *Pakhtuns* belong to one of the original 12 tribes of Israel (Aafreedi, 2009). It is considered the first and the most acceptable theory about their origin. Its authenticity is identified by the renowned historians and anthropologists such as Percy (1973) Caroe (1958) and Rehman (1968) in their works. However, it has also been criticized for being unauthentic and not documented anywhere in the overall Arabian Islamic history (Kakakhel, 1981). The *Bani Israel* theory has been rejected by some eminent scholars and historians (Barbara, Juliene, Farid, & Mariam, 2002). It is argued that *Pakhtuns* belong to *Arian* tribes, which are known in the history as Indo-Arian tribes (Lines, 1988). Therefore, the words, *Pashtoon*

³¹ *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa* is a Province which was previously named as North West Frontier Province (NWFP). It is predominantly bordered with the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan lying adjacent to Afghanistan.

and *Pashto* are found in the holy book of *Rig-Veda* of *Arian* tribes and Hindus (Hussain, 2000). In the *Rig-Veda* the word *Pakht* or *Phakta* is used for the geographical surrounding. Later, the word *Pakhtean* converted into *Pakhtun*.

Moreover, the origin of *Pakhtun* is also associated with Arab tribes. It is believed that *Pakhtuns* belong to Arab. Along with the other theories this theory (*Pakhtun* decent from Arab) occupied prominent position in an academic circle (Khan, 1994). Moreover, some tribes especially *Afridis* claim to be direct descendants of Alexander the great (Kakahhel, 1981). Despite of such theories the origin *Pakhtun* is still considered one of the controversial subjects that need to be probed by researchers.

4.3 Major Tribes of *Pakhtun* and Importance of their Geographical Location

Pakhtuns are divided into different tribes. Generally, there are four major tribes of *Pakhtun*; *Duranni*, *Ghilzia*, *Yousafzai* and *Kerlanri* (Hussain, 2000). They are further divided into more than 400 clans and sub-tribes (Glatzer, 2002). The major sub-tribes of *Pakhtuns* are *Duranni*, *Popalzai*, *Sadozai Barakzai*, *Alikozai*, *Muhammadzai*, *Yousafzia*, *Mehsod*, *Abdali*, *Afridi* and the *Achakzai* (Olaf, 1958). However, it would be difficult to trace the lineage of these all tribes. It is held that all these tribes resided in the different places of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Inside Pakistan *Pakhtuns* tribes live in Federally Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan (FATA) *Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa* and also in some parts of Balochistan (Khan, 2002).

As far as location of *Pakhtuns* is concerned they live in the northern part of Pakistan and across Durand line in Afghanistan. Further, *Pakhtuns* hail from a triangular region, of approximately 250,000 sq. miles, in Central South Asia. This triangular region comprises *Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa* (KP), Quetta Division of Balochistan³² and three-fourths of

³² Balochistan is a province in Pakistan while is predominantly bordered with Afghanistan and Iran.

Afghanistan (Azmat, 2005). Approximately, 3 to 4 millions of *Pakhtuns* live in the tribal areas of Pakistan. They live in difficult terrain and in mountainous ranges which can hardly be used for an agricultural purpose (Spain, 1963). The inhabitants of this region are dependent on farming and domesticating animals for economic needs. They have subsistence economy and most of the people are living under the poverty line. Therefore, most of them work abroad especially in Middle East due to extreme poverty.

Moreover, *Pakhtuns* do not have low lands. Therefore, due to their geographical location most of *Pakhtuns* population are scattered in the mountainous ranges. They have no facilities both in the plain and urban areas. Therefore, *Pakhtuns* geographical location has significant influence on the economic development of this region (Anderson, 1978). Their geographical location is considered one of the big hurdles in the way of their progress. As a result of their geography and subsistence economy most of them live below poverty line. After the emergence of globalization they migrated to different parts of the world especially to Middle East to earn livelihood for their family members. They also migrated and work in different urban settings inside Pakistan especially in Karachi. The basic reason behinds *Pakhtuns* migration is the lack of economic opportunities in their regions (Weiner, 1985).

Of course, the geographical location of *Pakhtuns* might not have been or so good in terms of facilities but occupied and still occupy an important strategic position (Rubin, & Rashid, 2008). It was used as a gateway between Central Asia and India. Historically, the foreign invaders attacked different epoch to achieve their own strategic interests in this region. However, various states including British, Soviet Union and Pakistan failed to secure their interests in this region (Haroon, 2007). The region received attention once again recently after the war against terror. This region is considered nowadays not only a threat for Pakistan but also for global peace (Markey, 2008). The government of Pakistan

is perceived to have lost control on this region in the presence of terrorist organizations. Resultantly, the region has become a safe haven for the terrorists' organizations. In response to terrorism the coalition forces are considered to have failed to extend state authority to this region. Meanwhile, *Pakhtuns* resistances in the front of alien forces have created various administrative problems for different states in this region.

4.4 Historical Sketch of *Pakhtuns* Administrative Position in Pakistan

Pakhtuns, as discussed above, reside predominantly in *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa*, FATA and Provincially Administered Tribal Area (PATA), and Frontier Regions (FR) which have different form of administrative structure. In other words, *Pakhtuns* land is administratively divided into settled areas, FATA, PATA and FR regions inside Pakistan. FATA and FR region are directly controlled by the Governor; the representative of central government of Pakistan (Khan, 2005). The British government administratively divided *Pakhtuns*' land into settled and semi-autonomies regions and special status was given to FATA regions (White, 2008).

Before the emergence of Pakistan the British policy towards the tribal belt was based on a mixture of persuasions, pressure and armed intervention to ensure cultural empathy (Swinson, 1967). For this purpose, the Britishers initiated the "close door" and "forward policy" to tame the wild tribes of *Pakhtuns* who had defeated them and almost turned those into ashes in Kabul in the first Anglo war (Woodward, 1962). Britishers were brutally killed by *Pakhtuns* in Kabul. The British, hence, realized after the tribal war of 1897-1898 that it would never be possible to subdue the frontier tribes by force only (Wazir, 2009). Therefore, the colonial administration decided to implement the "close border" policy in FATA. The British established a number of tribal agencies, enclosed by a chain of posts and cantonments for the maintenance of law and order in *Pakhtun* society

(Lambah, 2011). According to the spirit of close border policy, *Pakhtun* tribes were allowed to govern their society according to their own laws and customs under the patronage of Political Agent (PA) (Paul, 1952). They were allowed to follow their own *Riwaj*³³ (custom) under the patronage of Political Agent. In the British regime political Agent was a powerful man who enjoyed all forms of powers such as discretionary police, judicial police and executive in the tribal society as per the Frontier Crimes Regulation (Sarvepalli, 1965). The Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) (mixes traditional customs and norms) was considered the powerful law for the tribal society (Broome & Christakis, 1988).

FCR which was developed and promulgated by the British government is severely criticized by the present-day human rights activists for not giving political and appeal rights to the inhabitants against the decision(s) of political agents. Even, when colonial power departed from this region, the newly independent Pakistan also adopted unfortunately the same policy (FCR) (Ziring, 1980).

Furthermore, the present administration also treated FATA population unfairly as compared to other parts (settled areas) of Pakistan (Rashid, 2005). FATA, which is about the size of Switzerland with a population of over 3 million, is administratively divided among seven agencies. These agencies include; *Bajaur* agency, *Khyber* agency, *Kuram* agency, *Mohmand* agency, *Orakzai* agency, *South Waziristan* agency and *North Waziristan* agency. Further, there are some Frontier Regions (FR) which include; Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Lakki, Dera Ismail Khan (DIK) and Tank (Haq, Khan & Noori, 2005). Nevertheless, federally or provincially recruited bureaucrats Political Agents (PA) head the local administration of each agencies and Frontier Regions. They are all-

³³ *Riwaj* is a *Pashto* word and is a part of *Pakhtunwali* which means custom. It places accountability on the tribe rather than individual. Political agents allow the tribal to follow their *Riwaj* (custom) for the solution of socio-political disputes such as *Jirga*, *Tega* (cease fire), etc (see chapter 4 for details of *Pakhtunwali* and *Pakhtuns Riwayj*).

powerful and backed by *Khassadars*³⁴ and levies³⁵ as well as by tribal military forces that operate under the control of the army. Political Agents exercise, as explained above, a mix of extensive judicial, executive and revenue powers. In short, Political Agents (PAs) retain the ultimate authority and nobody can challenge his authority.

Furthermore, FCR preserves the *Pakhtun* tribal structure of *Jirga* (council of elders) in which civil and criminal matters are referred to political agent. For instance, the *Jirga* ascertains guilt after hearing the parties on different matters and passes verdicts on the basis of *Riwaj* (custom). However, in theory FCR follows *Pakhtuns'* *Riwaj* (custom) but in practice it is normally considered against the tribal customs. The Political Agent initiates cases, appoints the *Jirga*, presides over trials and awards punishments without possibility of revision by a regular court of law. However, the recent government has established FATA tribunal court, which has the power to review certain decisions against which the tribals can file appeals. Despite the FATA tribunal court the power of political agent are still criticized by legal experts and human rights activists (Shinwari, 2011). The extra judicial power of the political agent is considered against the spirit of democratic laws (Gul, 2010). The new generation of the tribal society does not accept, as observed in the field, the extra judicial power of political agents in the 21st century.

The current administration of FATA has failed to facilitate the local inhabitants (Haq, Khan & Nuri, 2005). Therefore, the people raise questions over the authority of Political Agent (PA) and also on Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR). It is considered a draconian political system in the 21st century. However, the tribal people are still facing such inhuman laws in the presence of liberal democratic doctrine on the global level. The existing political system violates the rights of people at the grass root level in the tribal society.

³⁴ Pakistan's locally raised police force; *Khassadars* are selected from each tribe in a locality. The *Khassadar* force was introduced by the British government in 1921. A *Khassadar* is paid a salary by government.

³⁵ *Levies* are recruited on merit from the indigenous tribe. Levies are recruited on tribal basis fall under the federal government's control. They are appointed by PA.

Furthermore, in the wake of the war against terror the administrative issues of the tribal society have become the flash point of discussion on national and international level. The tribal society is considered as the un-governed areas of Pakistan. The present political system has nominal control over the affairs of the tribes. Resultantly, the tribal society has become a safe haven for the terrorists' organizations in the absence of state authority (Haq, Khan & Nuri, 2005). It is generally believed that one draconian system has been replaced by another in the shape of terrorist organizations due to the state negligence of the tribal society. In the present time, the state writ is not seen in the tribal society in the presence of such terrorist organizations. Even, the international community and Pakistan have failed to maintain state writ in the tribal belt. Pakistan civil and military establishment failed to implement law and order in the tribal society. Moreover, the administrative problems in FATA have further exacerbated in the wake of war against terror. Furthermore, the present civil and military administration in the war against terror has failed to realize the importance of *Pakhtuns*' socio-cultural institutions in the administrative matters of tribal society. The socio-cultural institutions play a pivotal role to maintain socio-political order in the tribal society. Negligence of the socio-political realities of tribal region has further created administrative vacuum in FATA especially in the wake war against terror (Fair, 2009; White, 2008). This is what described the origin of *Pakhtuns* and their administrative structure and geography while the following Part explores the roots of violence in *Pakhtun* society.

Part 2

4.5 Roots of Violence in the *Pakhtun* Society

Violence is a complex behavioral phenomenon and needs integrated quest of various disciplines to elaborate its different dimensions. Its roots can be found in human nature, culture, and psyche (Monahan & Steadman, 1996; Galtung, 1990; Widom, 1989). Aggressive traits of human behavior naturally push them towards violence. Therefore,

various biological theories explain instinctual aspects of human behavior (Gearan & Rosenbaum 1996). Hence, biological explanation is not enough to describe all possible dimensions of violent human behavior.

Besides the biological factors, aggressive traits of human behavior can be explained in the light of psychological paradigms. There are various psychological paradigms such as behaviorists, cognitive and learning that address the diverse aspects of violent human behavior (Blackburn, 1995). Along with the psychological aspects of violence, some scholarly works describe the cultural aspect of violence (see Montagu, 1968; Sponsel, 1996; Fry, 2006). Culture also carries a significant influence on the violent traits of human behavior. The people are not equally susceptible to violence due to the cultural variations. Such kinds of cultural variations in human societies have significant influence on the violent traits of their inhabitants (Mead, 1928). For instance, *Pakhtuns* cultural values provide congenial environment to violence.

Pakhtuns, as discussed above, are also famous for violent cultural traits (Schofield, 2003), however, their inclination towards violence is a debatable issue in an academic circle. It is generally believed that they are inclined towards violence but their tendencies towards violence have culture specific explanation. Therefore, *Pakhtuns'* violent behavior can be interpreted in the light of their famous code of conduct (*Pakhtunwali*). The elements of their code of conduct such as *Toora* (bravery), *Badal* (revenge), *Badhi* (vendetta) and *Peghore* (taunt) are considered responsible for provoking violence. These all violent traits of *Pakhtunwali* can be explained in the context of their culture.

Pakhtuns are notorious for family feuds which often begin especially over *Zan* (women) *Zamin* (land) and *Zer* (gold). These family feuds do not occur over ideological differences but mostly when someone disgrace them. Their honor is mostly associated

with *Zar* (gold) *Zan* (women) and *Zameen* (land) (Naz & Chaudhry, 2011). They resort to violence in reaction when somebody attacks their property or honor (Banerjee, 2000). There is a proverb in *Pashto* that “He is not a *Pakhtun*, who does not give a blow for a pinch” (Ahmed, 1975: 57). *Pakhtuns* always romanticize violence when they at war.

Violence is often exercised when conflict arises over land distribution³⁶ among close kins (Dupree, 1973). Therefore, the cousins’ rivalry can be frequently found in *Pakhtun* society. They are ready to kill each other over land, women and gold. There is one famous Arab proverb “I am against my brother; me and my brother are against our cousin; me, my brother and my cousin are against the world” (Barth, 1961: 23). They become united to fight against other tribe and clan. It is often criticized that they are always ready to fight against the world; only the first cousin rivalry is frequently considered as the source of conflict among them (Shakoor, 2013). Therefore, cousin’s rivalry is considered the motivating factor of violence in *Pakhtun* society.

Nonetheless, such kinds of disputes do not occur without logical proof. For instance, there is a *Pashto* proverb “*par me ka nu mar me ka*” (first you have to defeat me by arguments, and then I am ready for death) (Tahir, 2009: 26). You cannot fight against other until and unless you have solid justification for it. Mostly such kind of disputes arises as a result of deviation from their (*Pakhtuns*) cultural values. Moreover, during disputes they follow their norms and do not deviate from their code of conduct. Therefore, the expression of violence is also socio-culturally sanctioned to take revenge from their enemies in *Pakhtun* society. Without known reason they do not become violent. Only in case of social humiliation or *Poza Prekawal*³⁷ (nose cutting) *Pakhtuns* give violent response to restore their respect (Atayee, 1979; Tair, 2009). Social

³⁶ Land distribution or in other words, land reforms were made by British government. Before proper land distribution system there was *Waish* (*distribution*) system. In this system no one was the permanent owner of the land.

³⁷ *Poza Prekawal* (nose cutting) is a *Pashto* word meaning disgracing someone.

humiliation of *Pakhtuns* is also relatively defined in the context of prevalent culture. Therefore, it is only perpetuated to restore the respect of someone according to the spirit of their culture. They even wait for appropriate occasion to take *Badal* (revenge) of their family member. This is what the real picture of violence in *Pakhtun* society is.

However, the present-day violence does not consider the actual part of *Pakhtuns* culture. Such violent cultural traits such as suicide attacking and human slaughtering and the killing of women and children have diffused into *Pakhtun* society in the last three decades. The present-day violence is exercised for the political interests rather to respect the honor of someone. These violent traits have been diffused deliberately for political purpose. Therefore, it is mostly exercised under the patronage of formal organizations to work for specific political objectives. However, *Pakhtuns* cultural violence perpetuated in the light of their normative organization or social structure or according to spirit of culture. For the present-day violence, *Pakhtuns* socio-cultural institutions have been socially engineered to inject new violent traits. Such kind of socially engineered violence deliberately diffused into *Pakhtun* society (Johnson, 200) (see chapter 2 for socially engineered violence in the *Pakhtun* society). The present-day violence such as suicide bombing; killing of innocent people cannot be considered the integral part of *Pakhtun* culture. Such violent cultural traits were diffused actually during Soviet-Afghan war (Yousaf & Adkin, 1992) that gradually distorted *Pakhtun* code of conduct (*Pakhtunwali*) (Wolf, 2013). *Pakhtunwali* has significant influence on the overall socio-political matters of *Pakhtuns*. This is what presents the real picture of violence in the *Pakhtun* society while the following line elaborates the importance of *Pakhtunwali* in *Pakhtuns*' socio-political matters.

4.5.1 *Pakhtuns* Code of life (*Pakhtunwali*) in the Light of Anthropological Perspectives

Culture:

Culture, as described above, carries significant influence on human behavior. Human behavior is culturally embedded. Therefore, they behave differently due to cultural differences. Variations in human behaviors due to cultural diversity can be analyzed in the light of cultural perspectives such as materialist and ideational. These two perspectives explain the different dimensions of human behavior particularly in the context of prevalent culture. The materialist perspective of culture focuses on observable actions or pattern of behaviors (Morphy & Margo 1985; Reilly, 2008; Ross, 1980). In the light of materialist perspective culture refers to the sum of a social group's observable patterns of behavior, customs and way of life (Harris, 1968: 16). In other words, culture is considered socially learned and shared phenomenon.

Moreover, culture cannot be confined only to observable actions and behaviors. It also comprises ideas, beliefs, and knowledge that characterize a particular group of people or ethnic group (Strauss & Quinn, 1997). Hence, customs, traditions and behavior of any ethnic group can be described in the light of culture. The two major cultural perspectives such as ideational and materialists stress both observable actions and beliefs. In order to understand culture of any ethnic group, it is essential to explore both the observable actions, ideas and beliefs system of people. Therefore, *Pakhtuns* and their culture can be analyzed in the light of ideational and materialists perspective.

ii) Pakhtuns and their cultural values:

Cultural values, customs and traditions of *Pakhtuns* — as a major tribal ethnic group — can also be analyzed in the light of cultural perspectives such as materialist and ideational for understanding their behavior in different socio-political matters. Culture has

significant influence on the socio-political matters of *Pakhtun* tribal society. In this regard, various attempts have been made to understand *Pakhtuns* cultural values, traditions, customs and behaviors which give insight to us about *Pakhtun* society.

In the light of available literature *Pakhtuns* behavior is described as of contradictory nature in various socio-cultural matters (Hafizullah, 2005). They (*Pakhtuns*) are avarice, warrior, revengeful, faithful to their friends, hospitable, docile and brave (Barth, 1969). For example, they are poor but behave like a king. They like music but hate musicians (Khan, 1994). As one of the scholars while describing *Pakhtun* behavior states that:

“their voices are revenge, envy, avarice, rapacity and obstinacy; moreover, they are fond of liberty, faithful to their friends, kind to their dependants, hospitable, brave, hardy, frugal, laborious and prudent; they are less disposed than the nations of their neighborhood to falsehood, intrigue and deceit” (Elphinstone, 2009: 52).

Hospitality, faithfulness to their friends, revenge and bravery are considered the integral part of *Pakhtuns*’ behavior. They fight for decades against each others to take avenge of the blood of their family or clan member. Revenge is meant to restore the honor of the fellow *Pakhtun* (Rzehak, 2011). In the context of *Pakhtun* culture, honor refers to the great importance of revenge related to honor and shame as well as to the prevalence of blood feuds among tribal societies. There is a proverb about *Pakhtuns* that “honor, (*nang*), ate up the mountains and taxes, *qalang*³⁸, ate up the plains” (Ahmed 1975: 47). To restore the respect of someone *Pakhtuns* takes revenge according to the spirit of *Pakhtunwali*.

iii) *Pakhtunwali*:

It is not only relevant to *Pakhtuns* but their interaction is also guided by this unwritten code (Hafizullah, 2005). It is considered the integral part of their identity. There

³⁸ *Qalang* is a *Pashto* word meaning taking money from people by force.

are three elements, which are essential for *Pakhtuns'* identity such as *Pakhtun* descent; speaking *Pashto* and leading life in accordance with *Pakhtuns'* cultural code of conduct i.e. *Pakhtunwali*. Furthermore, a person who speaks *Pakhto* language only and does not follow the traits of *Pakhtunwali* he or she is not considered a "*Pakhtun*". In essence, *Pakhtunwali* (the way of life) is:

"... an inflexible ethical code by which all true Pathans traditionally abide. *Pakhtunwali* requires that every insult be revenged and, conversely, every guest protected. To protect his honor, the honor of his family or clan, a Pathan will sacrifice everything include his money and life" (Aisha & Roger, 2003: 27).

The elements of *Pakhtunwali* such as *Badal* (revenge) *Ghayrat* (self-respect), *Nang* (chivalry or bravery) *Mailmastia* (hospitality), *Nanawat*, (asylum), *Purdah*, (gender separation) *Namus*, (pride or defense of honor), *Badragga*, (safe conduct) and *Jirga* (council of the elders) are considered important pillars of *Pakhtun* society (Ahmed, 2004; Emadi, 2005). It elements collectively glue their overall social structure. Its scope has been captured relatively well by Hiro (1994: 135) who describes it as:

"to follow the tenants of *Pakhtunwali*, to avenge blood; to fight to death for a person who has taken refuge with me no matter what his lineage; to defend to the last any property entrusted to me; to be hospitable and provide for the safety of the person and property of guests".

Pakhtunwali establishes general principles to define culturally approved behavior. It guides interaction among clans, tribes and families in accordance with commonly held norms and regulates all aspects of individual, social and political life (James, 1963). It also determines standard of morality to define good and bad behavior for *Pakhtuns* in different situations. Therefore, *Pakhtunwali* is considered a measuring rod to gauge socially approvable and condemnable behavior. Moreover, it provides a strong ethical code to ensure solidarity in the tribal society. If someone deviates from this code of honor; he is treated as a criminal and his house is demolished. It is considered a *sharam* (sham) in *Pakhtun* society, if someone does not follow its traits. Therefore, the inhabitants

of the tribal society follow this unwritten code in strict manner. It also works as a strong mechanism of social control and social coherence in *Pakhtun* society.

iv) *Jirga* (Assembly of Elders) and *Pakhtunwali*:

Pakhtunwali has significant influence on the overall social institution including *Jirga*. *Jirga* is considered the integral part of *Pakhtun* social structure. It is a culturally developed social institution of *Pakhtun* society for resolving social, economic and political disputes. In other words, it is considered as an informal mechanism of conflict resolution. There is no exact criterion for its members (Rudyard, 2009) and anyone irrespective of his economic status can participate in it. All members in *Jirga* set in circle to avoid any kind of discrimination. The socio-economic disputes/issues are debated openly and are likewise resolved. Nobody can easily violate the decision made by the *Jargees* (members of *Jirga*). However, if anyone dishonors their decision he/she is punished by the society. Khan, an expert in *Pakhtun* culture while explaining the same stated that:

“The main purpose of the *Jirga* institution in *Pakhtun* society is to resolve conflicts. Decisions in *Jirga* must be taken unanimously, and must be acceptable to conflicting parties. In case of violation of *Jirga* decision, *Pakhtuns* form *lashkar* (tribal militia) to implement the decision of *Jirga* by hook and crook. However, *Jirga* is considered a single institution to form *lashkar* for a defined task in the tribal society” (Individual interview).

The tribal *Lashkar* (tribal militia) implement the decision of *Jirga* according to the spirit of *Pakhtunwali*. It carries significant influence on the overall process of *Jirga*. It is considered a collective responsibility of *Pakhtuns* to follow its decision according to the spirit of *Pakhtunwali*. It compels them to act collectively in the fortunes and failure of an individual (Lindholm, 1977). They live in a headless or acephalous structure; therefore, they do not have a formal head. Collective responsibility is considered a dominant cultural norm of the tribal people which is carried out in the light of *Pakhtunwali*.

Collective responsibility has strong roots in sedentary society (Johnson, 2000). The structure of *Pakhtun* society is divided into two categories; acephalous, egalitarian group, living in low production zones (nomadic tribes and sedentary hill tribes), and those with a ranked society living on irrigated lands, usually within larger state systems. Sedentary society (nomadic and hill tribes) is often tied to their land and observe strict code of *Pakhtunwali* (Ahmed, 1977). Typically, sedentary hill tribes show more resistance if someone violates the tenants of *Pakhtunwali*. They always prefer to live self sufficiently and independently.

The overall structure of the *Pakhtun* society is imbedded in their famous code of conduct (*Pakhtunwali*). Not only *Pakhtunwali* maintains the overall social structure but also maintains social harmony in *Pakhtun* society. There is no place for those forces which might damage its essence. *Pakhtuns* not only protect their cultural values from outsiders but also preserve it in true spirit. Thus, it is considered a social obligation for them to protect their culture according to its spirit.

The tribal people always resisted state forces which were considered against their culture. In this regard, the British policies were considered against their culture; therefore, they faced strong resistance in *Pakhtun* society (Roberts & Spear, 1952). The British failed to control them by force and, therefore, they were defeated in the first and second Anglo war. Had British understood the cultural values of *Pakhtuns*, they would not have failed to control the tribal people. It is, hence, considered obligatory for *Pakhtuns* to protect their families and culture in accordance with the spirit of *Pakhtunwali*. Security experts as interviewed in this study also almost unanimously considered the understanding of their (tribal people) cultural traits as a pre-condition for the success of military operations in curbing radicalization and terrorism.

4.5.2 Indifference to Pakhtunwali: A Cause of Radicalization

Various socio-cultural and political factors, as discussed in chapter 2, are considered responsible for the current radical tendencies in *Pakhtun* society. Along with other factors of radicalization deviation from the *Pakhtun* cultural code of life (*Pakhtunwali*) also fuel its process in the tribal belt of Pakistan. The misunderstanding of their cultural values instigates violence particularly during war time (Edwards, 1986). The element of *Pakhtun* code such as *nang* (society based on the concept of honor), *Badal* (revenge) and *Badhi* (vendetta or blood feuds between the families) normally fuels conflicts.

Moreover, deviation from its tenets causes social humiliation. Disgracing someone instigates violence in *Pakhtun* society. The honor of *Pakhtuns* can only be restored to follow their code of conduct which is normally known as a code of honor (*Pakhtunwali*). *Pakhtun* society is based on *Nang* (society based on the concept of honor); therefore, any kind of humiliation cannot be tolerated. Therefore, *Pakhtuns'* violent behavior is strictly associated with their peculiar code of conduct. Violation from *Pakhtunwali* leads violence and while the following lines explain its relationship with radicalization.

Pakhtunwali and Power

Pakhtunwali sets a standard for the use of power and also allows violence in a culturally defined situation. It allows the use of power against those who violate the peculiar code of conduct. Moreover, it recommends the use of force against those who do not follow its tenets. Such kinds of decisions to allow the use of force are normally taken by *Jirga* through consensus. The houses of the accused person are sometimes destroyed or punished as per its requirements. Everyone needs justification to use force against other fellow *Pakhtuns* which is normally given by *Jargees* (*Jirga* members). Such kinds

of decision in *Jirga* are normally taken unanimously by members not by an individual. The exercise of power against the innocent people is strictly prohibited according to their code of conduct. *Pakhtuns* always take permission from *Jargees* (*Jirga* members) to allow them to use power against the accused person.

Pakhtunwali also sets principles for the appropriate use of power during conflicts. It does not allow us to harm women and children when conflict arises in *Pakhtun* society (Easwaran, 2001). It is considered against its spirit if somebody attacks the enemies' children and women. An ideal *Pakhtun* always stay for the appropriate time to take revenge from his family member but he does not kill women and children (Ahmad & Boase, 2003). Moreover, it is also considered humiliation for *Pakhtuns* if someone attacks their guests. In this regard, there is one of *Pashto* proverb; “*tha kali woza khu da narkha ma uzaa*” (you can leave the village but you would not be allowed to violate the set standards). Therefore, it is socially condemnable if someone violates the dominant principles of *Pakhtuns* society. A person who does not follow the above mentioned principles of *Pakhtun* society he/she known as a *Be Pakhtu*³⁹ (a person who does not follow *Pashto*). Usually violence exercises in case of deviation from establish principles which normally set in the light their code of conduct.

Pakhtuns defend their code of conduct (*Pakhtunwali*) by any cost. Its elements such as revenge and generosity to defeat the enemies are considered the integral part of *Pakhtun* society (Akbar, 2004). They start resistance if state institutions or individual deviate from (*Pakhtunwali*). They start resistance against state institutions when states apply power against its spirit. The violation of their cultural code instigates violence in *Pakhtun* society. Thus, the misunderstanding of *Pakhtuns* cultural values by states not only creates resistance but also provoke them further towards violence.

³⁹ *Be Pakhtu* it is a *Pashto* word meaning a person who does not follow *Pakhtun* code of conduct.

Even the British and USSR failed to deal tactfully with the *Pakhtuns'* code of conduct. They showed strong resistance against the Britishers when they realized the British forces and policies as a threat to their cultural values. They were thus compelled by *Pakhtuns'* resistance to leave this region (Charles, 1977). As a result of misunderstanding of *Pakhtuns* cultural values, the invaders such as British and Soviet Union in different epoch failed to rule over them for a long time (Shinwari, 2010). The culturally blind approaches of these invaders not only created problems for them to control this area but also caused severe violence in the region (Johnson, 2009).

Similarly, in the current war against terror, the culturally blind approach of the coalition forces has almost failed to understand the application of *Pakhtun* cultural values. The current policy of coalition forces in general and Pakistan in particular emphasizes on the use of force against terrorism without understanding their cultural values (see chapter 5 for detail). Their existing kinetic approach is considered against the cultural values of *Pakhtuns*. They (US, and Pakistan) have failed to adopt indigenous approach which recourses to the peculiar cultural values against terrorism in the tribal belt of Pakistan (Cronin, 2009). However, the existing counter-terrorism strategies and political system in the tribal areas of Pakistan both failed due to non-compatibility with *Pakhtun* cultural values. Therefore, they resist the states forces in the war against terror.

Pakistan failed to develop consensus based Policy of the tribal people (English, 2010). The current counter-terrorism strategies of Pakistan are based on the old narratives about *Pakhtun* society, which might have been based on stereotypical theories (see chapter 3 for detail). It is difficult to prove logically that *Pakhtuns* are culturally inclined towards war and violence. They assert, as discussed above, to violence when their peculiar code of conduct allow them. *Pakhtuns* cultural violence can be easily avoided by counter-terrorism strategies which are recourse to their cultural values (McFarland, 2005).

By force it is not possible to suppress the violent cultural traits of *Pakhtun* society (Ahmed, 2008). The existing kinetic approach further reinforces radicalization due to the non-compatibility with prevalent code of conduct (*Pakhtunwali*) (Connable & Speyer, 2005; Cheema, 2008; Crenshaw, 2011).

4.5. Social Disorder: A Push Factor of Violence in *Pakhtun* Society

Social disorder as a result of cultural distortion, as is explained in chapter 6, provides enabling environment to violence in the tribal cultural setting. Social order in the tribal society strictly stems from the prevalent normative structure (Ahmad, 1987). The normative structure is embedded in the prevalent culture which keeps social control and social cohesion in the tribal society (Keesing & Strathern, 1998; Rumi, 2012; Groh, 2006). Therefore, both culture and normative structure play important role in the maintenance of social order (Darlington, 1969). The normative structure maintains social order in tribal societies (Aminata, 2013).

Moreover, *Khaldun's* philosophy has also highlighted the various dimensions of social order in the tribal society (Schmidt, 1978). He argued that social solidarity creates public benefits for people who come together and enhance group capacity (Enan, 1984). Thus, group solidarity among tribal people can be facilitated by their adherence to group norms. Strong group solidarity glues the tribal people and makes them coherent in their social system. Along with the group's norms the strong traditional institutions of the tribal society play a pivotal role in the group solidarity. Strong group solidarity can be found in tribal society as compared to modern/developed society. The tribal social institutions and cultural norms collectively make them coherent in their tribal structure (Charles, 1977). Tribal are dependent on their traditional institutions due to strong group solidarity in the absence of state institutions.

The strong cultural norms and values also glue the overall tribal structure (Gbadegesin, 1998; Munoz, 2010). The inhabitants of the tribal society are socialized according to their shared cultural norms and values and are strictly prohibited to deviate from their cultural norms (Rahman, 1995). Therefore, social sanctions ensure social conformity in tribal society. If someone violates the cultural norms or the tenets of *Pakhtunwali* (*Pakhtuns* code of conduct) severe punishment is given to him/her in the tribal society (Qaiyum, 1945). Deviation from cultural norms disgraces them and creates conflicts in *Pakhtun* society. However, conflicts in *Pakhtun* society usually resolve in the light of their culture to maintain social harmony. Normally, they utilize the elements of *Pakhtunwali* such as *Nanawati* (Asylum), *Tega*, (cease fire) *Swara*, to resolve conflict between the conflicting parties (Shaw, Graham & Akhter, 2012; Brian, 2010).

Social disorder occurs due to cultural distortion that further provides spaces for violence in the tribal society. Socio-cultural vacuum, as found in the field, easily create the problem of social disorder. Their cultural traits and institutions such as *Jirga*, *Malaki* system, kinship structure and *Pakhtunwali* have got distorted as a result of current war against terror (see chapter 6 for more detail). The *Pakhtun* tribal society has got badly affected in the war against terror (Amir, 2005; Sabina, 2011; Abbas, 2009; Nawaz, 2009; Barfield, 2007; Mili & Townsend, 2009). Hussian, the General Manager of Bacha Khan Markaz⁴⁰, also states that;

“the tribal society was not that much destabilized before the commencement of war against terror. However, the prevalent socio-political disorder in tribal society emerged in the time of war against terror. Cultural vacuum is considered responsible for the current social disorder” (Individual interview).

The normative structure has lost grip over the affairs of the tribal people after the socio-cultural disruptions in the tribal society. According to Khaldun philosophy, social solidarity and social order in the tribal, as discussed above, can be glued with the help of

⁴⁰ Bacha Khan Markaz is the welfare and research centre of the Awami National Party (ANP).

the cultural institutions. Therefore, Khaldun thesis on “social solidarity” gives insight to us to understand the present-day cultural vacuum in FATA in the wake of war against terror (Kone, 2013). Such kind of social disorder in the tribal society widens gaps for violence in FATA.

Moreover, the current anomic condition in the tribal society as a result of war against terror can also be explained in the light of Durkheim philosophy (Ozeren, Dincer, Diab & Al-Badayneh, 2007). Durkheim (1949) philosophy highlights the problem of social order. He discusses mechanical and organic solidarity in his famous thesis; division of labor and holds that tribal society is exclusively characterized by mechanical solidarity. The tribal society has strong mechanical solidarity and strong collective moral bonds. He argues that forceful changes in moral and social bonds create problem of social order in tribal society.

Therefore, as a result of cultural distortion in the wake of war against terror the tribal society has turned into anomic condition. The mechanical solidarity in the tribal society has lost grip over the tribal affairs. Along with the social disorder, the current socio-cultural situation has also provided enabling environment for radicalization. Thus, violent traits have got diffused into the tribal culture after the socio-cultural disruption in the wake of war against terror.

Conclusion

The chapter concludes that *Pakhtuns* are considered the world largest tribal ethnic group. Their origin is not yet clear, however, the dominant theory that circulates in the academic circle is the “Aryan theory of decent”. They predominantly reside in the northern parts of Pakistan and across the Durand line in Afghanistan. *Pakhtunwali* (code of life) guides their interactions and defines their violent traits associated with *Zar* (gold),

Zameen (land) and *Zan* (women). *Pakhtunwali* and their cultural institutions play vital role in the socio-political order in *Pakhtun* society.

This chapter also concludes that social disorder in tribal society provides enabling environment to violence. The current violent cultural traits such as suicide bombing and human slaughtering have got diffused as a result of social disorder and cultural distortion in the wake of war against terror in *Pakhtun* society. Hence, the cultural factors play a vital role in the emergence and persistence of radicalization in the wake of war against terror in *Pakhtun* society. Thus, this chapter discussed the ways the cultural violence cause radicalization while the next chapter is focused on the current counter-terrorism strategies of the coalition forces against the terrorism. This chapter also analyse the various aspects, such as socio-cultural and political dimension of the current counter-terrorism strategies and also explains military operations impacts/effects of the *Pakhtun* tribal society.

Chapter 5

Current Counter-terrorism Strategies in *Pakhtun* Belt: Cultural Perspective

Introduction

The previous chapter described the origin of *Pakhtuns* and the impact of their cultural traits on the present-day radicalization. While this chapter describes the nature of existing counter-terrorism strategies of United States in general and Pakistan in particular and their radicalizing impact due to the non-consideration of *Pakhtuns* cultural paradigms. To understand the issue in-depth, the chapter is divided into three parts. The first part of the chapter is focused on the conceptual understanding of counter-terrorism strategies and its types. This part also analyzes the nature of states responses towards domestic and transnational terrorism. The second part evaluates the performance of the current counter-terrorism strategies of US and Pakistan in curbing terrorism inside the Pak-Afghan border. The third part critically analyzes their strategies in the light of socio-cultural and political discourses of *Pakhtun* society.

Part 1

5.1 States Responses to Terrorism as a Reinforcing Factor of Radicalization

Over the last two decades, we have seen dramatic increase in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism related research (see Bloom, 2005; Weimann, 2006; Richardson, 2007; Post, 2007). Some works advance our understanding about the causal factors of terrorism while other advances our understanding about counter-terrorism paradigms (Robert, 2007; Enders & Sandler, 2006). However, the existing literature does not explore all the possible dimensions of terrorism to frame a single and holistic counter-terrorism strategy to curb all kind of terrorists' activities (Wilkinson, 2006). Moreover, the concept and

focus of the counter-terrorism are not also clearly defined in the existing literature. Therefore, it is hard to define and fix a single strategy which can be considered a panacea for the menace of every kind of terrorism and make agreement over the agreed upon definition of counter-terrorism.

Nevertheless, keeping in view the various dimensions of counter-terrorism strategy, it refers to the means, including practices, policies, tactics, techniques and strategies by which terrorism is confronted and averted (Hoffman, 2002, P: 153). In other words, counter-terrorism comprises all those means such as policies, tactics and techniques which can be utilized to eradicate terrorism both on national and global level. Moreover, to present more clear picture of counter-terrorism strategy it may be referred to institutionalize or ad-hoc efforts, which may be administered by the government (federal state or local or community groups) with the aim of preventing terrorism (Schmid, 2011). In addition, counter-terrorism can be viewed as a set measure which can be taken by states to curb terrorism (Kelman, 2012).

However, states normally face numerous challenges to choose, frame and develop holistic and clearly defined approach to eradicate the menace of terrorism (Rineheart, 2010). Owing to the complex nature of terrorism the international community faces numerous hurdles to develop consensus over the single holistic counter-terrorism strategy which is acceptable for every nation's states. In this regard, after 9/11, United Nations (UN) is perceived to have failed to develop consensus over a single counter-terrorism strategy among the nation states in the last one decade. However, it is essential to develop consensus over the counter-terrorism approaches because collective efforts of all nation states are immensely important to fight terrorism on the global level.

Terrorism is considered a global issue. Multi-faceted national, international and indigenous factors cause terrorism. Furthermore, it equally jeopardizes transnational and

national security. Therefore, the United Nations passed a resolution mandating that all nation states must adopt specific measures to combat, prevent and suppress terrorism for the sake of transnational security after 9/11 (Arlene, 2007). To follow the United Nations resolution various counter-terrorism policies have been adopted by different states (federal state or local or community groups) to diminish terrorism. However, counter-terrorism strategies of various states are being criticized for not curbing the menace of terrorism.

However, among all, United States and Pakistan are playing a leading role in the war against terrorism. They have adopted more often than not two major approaches such as kinetic approach and non-kinetic approach to fight terrorism in Afghanistan and Pak-Afghan border region (Cindy, 2003). The Kinetic approach, as explained in chapter 1, emphasizes on military actions and the use of excessive force against terrorism. In contrast, rehabilitation of the terrorists, development and diplomacy are considered the top priority of the non-kinetic approach (soft counter-terrorism strategy) (Gregory, 2007). However, the logic behind the formation of both kinetic and non-kinetic approach is still debatable in the academic circle (De Mesquita, 2005; Boucek, 2008).

The positive and negative aspects of such counter-terrorism strategies have been widely discussed by policy makers and experts (Wolfendale, 2007; Silke, 2004). The kinetic approach against terrorism has been criticized for its inability to annihilate terrorism in the hotbeds of terrorism (Newman, 2006). The basic reason behind its failure is the multi-faceted causal factors of terrorism which cannot be wiped out only through military means (Vidino, 2010). In order to fight terrorism, states' reliance on military power can further exacerbate the problem of terrorism especially in complex cultural setting. Furthermore, the use of force can result in increasing the harsh response of the local population (Gentile, 2009) and such violent state responses towards terrorism

encourage more population to support terrorist organizations (Shellman, 2006; Ajar, 2008). It breeds more terrorists to use violence for curbing terrorism (Moore & Shellman, 2008; Allen, 2006). Moreover, the kinetic approach does not win the hearts and minds of the local population because it mainly relies on force that causes extreme hatred among people.

However, the aggressive response of states to counter terrorism has also been supported by some experts in the field of counter-terrorism studies (see Sergio & Oliviera, 1972; Rajesh, 2007). They believe that reputation of states is strictly associated with their responses towards terrorism. It means that states' soft corner for the terrorist activities can encourage terrorists to destroy governments' installations and found safe haven in their territory (Anuj, 2010). Additionally, harsh counter-terrorism strategies discourage terrorists' activities and also remove the label of being soft towards terrorism (Graaf, 2011). For example, an expert in this regard says:

“Government's reputations are based on how they deal with terrorists; hence, different reputations yield different effects on terrorism. If governments are harsh on terrorism, they develop reputations for being tough on terror, which deters future attacks. If governments are conciliatory towards terrorist, they develop reputations for being soft, which invites future attacks” (Miller, 2004: 151).

Such kind of dichotomy between the “kinetic” and “non-kinetic” approach has been widely discussed in the fields of counter-terrorism (Perl, 2007). The non-kinetic approach opposes kinetic approach due to its inability to curb terrorism (Nye, 2004). It is held that the non-kinetic approach gives more desirable results as compared to kinetic approach (Banlaoi, 2009).

However, some of studies narrate the success of non-kinetic approach which gives emphasis on diplomacy, dialogue and rehabilitation not by military operations (Horgan, 2009). For example, the Israeli hard-line approach was less effective in combating against terrorism as compared to the conciliatory Italian approach adopted in 1980s

(Ginges, 1997). Of course, there are still supportive regarding the effectiveness of kinetic approach, however, it is not as effective as non-kinetic approach is. It is considered a best option to use diplomacy, dialogue, development and rehabilitation of terrorists as a best permanent solution of terrorism (Bjorgo & Horgan, 2005). Furthermore, diverse socio-political and ideological factors of terrorism cannot be countered through kinetic approach. The non-kinetic approach effectively addresses all reinforcing factors of terrorism include ideological, socio-cultural and political (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2006). It means that reinforcing factors of terrorism can easily be curbed through soft counter-terrorism strategies not through kinetic approach. Therefore, states aggressive responses instigate violence, while conciliatory policies lead to negotiations, settlements, and fewer terrorist incidents. States reliance on military power and oppressive tactics provide in certain cases congenial environment to radicalization due to numerous damages such as socio-cultural and economic (Hafez, 2006; Ganor, 2011; Azam, 2009; Araj, 2008).

States, thus, to avoid further radicalization need wider knowledge of the socio-cultural and political dimensions of terrorism. The existing current approach has failed to curb the local socio-cultural and political dimensions of domestic especially at the local level. The use of force against terrorism without understanding its socio-political dimensions further creates socio-political disorder and complexities. Resultantly, socio-political disorder provides fertile grounds for domestic terrorism and radicalization (Moghaddam, 2004; Yousafzai, Sami & Moreau, 2007). Socio-political reinforcing factors of domestic terrorism can be curbed by holistic approach the one which is recourse to prevalent culture. The culturally recourse counter-terrorism strategy can effectively reduce the reinforcing factors of radicalization which manifests in the shape of domestic terrorism (Lorenzo, 2010; El-Said, 2012; Horgan & Braddock, 2010).

Of course, various studies have narrated different dimensions of holistic counter-terrorism strategies (see Abrahms, 2006; Adams, 1986; Addison & Murshed, 2005; Alexander, 2002; Burtley, 2005; Carter, 2001; Crenshaw, 1987; Crenshaw, 1990; Desker, 2003; Hurb & Leenders, 2005). Among such studies some works are specifically focused on international terrorism and its causal factors (see Enders & Sundlers, 2001; Barros & Proença, 2005; Enders & Sandler, 2000). Transnational terrorism (see Jones & Libicki, 2008; Kegley, 2003) is considered a potential threat for the global peace. However, domestic terrorism has been ignored in the available scholarly works. Resultantly, various states are not able to design concrete counter-terrorism strategies for domestic terrorism which is mostly embedded in the local socio-cultural discourses in the wake of war against terror (Sandler, 2010; De Graaf, 2011; Jones & Fair, 2010; Gaibullov & Sandler, 2011).

It is generally believed that terrorism does not occur in vacuum its motivating factors are context based (Schmid, 2011; Abuza, 2003; Holiday, 2002; Paul, 2010). Therefore, political and socio-cultural discourses carry significant influence on terrorism and its counter-terrorism strategies (Moore & Shellman, 2008). The indigenous socio-cultural factors have significant influence especially on domestic terrorism (Crenshaw, Dugan & LaFree, 2010). Hence, it is difficult to fight domestic terrorism without understanding its root causes (Hoffman, 2009; Kilcullen, 2005). Therefore, states responses against the domestic terrorism are considered counter-productive in certain cases. For example, the blind use of military power against terrorism is considered counter-productive in the Pak-Afghan border region (Thomas & Mason, 2008). The existing kinetic approaches of Pakistan and United States increases social and cognitive support for terrorism in FATA. Such kind of support for terrorism in FATA can be reduced effectively by non-kinetic approach that recourse to the prevalent culture (Enders

& Sandler, 2004). Culture, as described before, carries significant influence on terrorism and also on counter-terrorism (Omran, 2009). Therefore, the missing of cultural discourses in counter-terrorism approaches instigates the process of radicalization (Seth & Munoz, 2010; Martin & Murphy, 2003). It is held that due to missing of *Pakhtuns* cultural discourses the success of the existing counter-terrorism strategies of Pakistan has been nominal in an eliminating terrorism on permanent basis.

Part 2

5.2 Appraisal of Counter-terrorism Approaches in *Pakhtun* Belt

The tribal belt of Pakistan has received attention of international community in the wake of war against terror. After 9/11, the region has been used by the terrorists' organizations as a training center to attack US military installations inside Afghanistan and provides safe sanctuary for such organizations (Burki, 2002). That is why the American President Barak Obama declared Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan as one of the major threats for the transnational security and world peace (Yochi, 2011; Eric, 2008). To counter the growing influence of the terrorist organizations, the international community started exerting pressure on Pakistan to initiate military operations against terrorist organizations in this region. As a result of international pressure, Pakistan has initiated military operations to eliminate the hideouts of the terrorist organizations from *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa* in general and FATA in particular.

However, Pakistan as a major ally in the war against terror has not been able to formulate a concrete counter-terrorism doctrine to fight insurgents or terrorist groups on its own soil (Beg & Bokhari 2009). Pakistan's army is mostly prepared for conventional warfare against their neighboring country; India and does not have expertise in countering insurgency (Fair, 2007). Therefore, the civil and military establishments were hesitant to

start military operations on its soil against the terrorist organizations. However, despite of these weaknesses Pakistan has initiated military operations against terrorism in *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa* and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) without compact counter-terrorism strategy to understand the geographical and cultural complexities of this region (Fair, 2009). Therefore, Pakistan has failed so far to achieve tangible results against terrorism in the tribal belt. Meanwhile, the terrorist incidence has been increasing day by day generally in Pakistan and particularly in tribal belt.

The existing flawed kinetic paradigms of Pakistan have failed to counter militants on ideological, political and cultural front particularly in this region. Military operations under the existing flawed security paradigms such as Enduring Freedom (2001-2002), *Kalosha 11*, 2004, *Sher Dil*, *Rah-e-Haq*, and *Rah-e-Rast* (2007–2009), *Rah-E-Nijat*, 2009-2010 have failed to control the growing terrorism generally from *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa* and from FATA in particular (Pakistan Security Report 2008-09). Moreover, military operations such as *Daraghlam*, (coming) *Bia Daraghlam*, (coming again) and *Khuwakh-Ba-Desham* (I will teach you a lesson) also launched against the militants specifically in *Khyber Agency* to eliminate the safe haven of terrorists organizations. After the failure of such operations recently “*Khyber one*” another military operation has been started in *Khyber Agency*. However, despite of several cleanup operations still the militants have a strong hold in the entire FATA.

Despite the Swat military operations, Pakistan has failed to defeat *Taliban* in the rest of tribal areas. The *Taliban* successfully targets the public places and government installations in anywhere in Pakistan. Not only military and government installations are being targeted but the local people are also not safe from the onslaught of terrorism in this region. In addition, it is astonishing that during the military operations the terrorists’ network gradually moved into the settled district of *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa*. Meanwhile,

the terrorist attacks on government installation increased up to 48 percent in major cities of Pakistan such as Lahore, Islamabad and Peshawar despites of several military operations (Pakistan security report, 2009). Moreover, the tribal region is still insecure as it was before the military operations against terrorism. In addition, the military of Pakistan itself has suffered losing thousand of its men and officers without achieving any tangible targets in the war against terror.

Furthermore, the terrorist organizations have strengthened their networks in the shape of *Tehreek Taliban* Pakistan despites of spending billion dollars on the war against terrorism (Shah, 2009; Behuria, 2007). The terrorist organizations particularly *Tehreek Taliban* has expanded his networks to the settled areas of *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa* (Fair, 2009). Even, they can challenge the writ of the state in the settled districts of *Khyber Pakhtunkhwa*. In terrorists attacks hundreds and thousands police officer have killed in the settled district of *Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa*. They can easily targets police in the settled districts because police are not that much equip to compete with them. Hence, the existing strategies of civil and military establishment have failed to defeat *Tehreek Taliban* and other such kinds of organizations (Rashid, 2009). Ultimately, the growing strength of *Taliban* has compelled the government of Pakistan to sign peace truce with them (Tajik, 2011).

Pakistan signed peace agreements such as *Shakia* agreement, *Sararogha* peace deal, *Meranshah* Peace deal, *Khyber agency* Pact and *Swat* agreement with various militants groups (Sohail, 2011). However, these peace agreements have failed due to certain weaknesses (Perlez, 2009). These “peace agreements” have signed with the strong term and condition of *Taliban*. Pakistan has failed to compel *Taliban* to abandon insurgencies in FATA (Perlez, & Shah 2009). Resultantly, the terrorists have repeatedly violated peace agreements in the tribal belt of Pakistan. Thus, the peace talks and signing

truce with militant organizations have not remained intact for a long time. Therefore, through several peace agreements, even still peace is not restored in FATA.

However, several factors are considered responsible for the failure of peace agreements with Tehreek *Taliban* in FATA. Firstly, Pakistan always adopted immature stance over the issue of militancy during the peace talks and failed to develop consensus over peace talks with *Taliban* (Perlez, 2009). The military and political leadership always divided different insurgents groups between good and bad. The division of insurgents groups between good and bad has badly affected Pakistan stance over terrorism (Iannaccone & Berman, 2006). It has further divided the military establishments and political leadership over the peace agreements with *Taliban*. Secondly, Pakistan failed to develop consensus in several all parties' conferences (APC) over the peace talks with *Taliban*. Pakistan has also failed to develop consensus over peace agreements among the different stakeholders to take them into confidence during the peace talks (Seth & Fair, 2010). Therefore, such agreements with terrorist groups have criticized both on national and international level due its failure to protect the people of Pakistan in general and FATA in particular from the onslaught of terrorism (Rashid, 2009).

Along with peace agreements the international community tactics in the tribal belt are also criticized for not producing any tangible results. United States, Unmanned Predator Drone attacks on the tribal areas also failed to achieve high asset value targets. United States, as discussed above, like Pakistan military also relied on the use of force to contain terrorism in this region. Therefore, their policies against terrorism have criticized that they steadily ignores the policies of three D, development, deterrence and dialogue particularly in this region. It is necessary for the durable solution of terrorism to launch developmental projects in this region. The local inhabitants of tribal society are living under the poverty line. Moreover, they are deprived from the political rights and Pakistan

is badly failed to extend democratic institutions to FATA. The socio-political and economic condition of FATA is collectively exacerbating the problem of terrorism. However, the existing approaches of counter-terrorism steadily ignore the development of this region for the durable solution of terrorism. The existing approaches are considered inconsistent in dealing with the issue of terrorism in FATA. The growing strength of terrorism cannot be countered on the existing kinetic approaches. The present-day terrorism, as discussed above, has diverse social, ideological and political roots in FATA. A holistic counter-terrorism strategy is required to deal effectively with all possible factors of terrorism such as socio-political and economic.

The existing military operations are not carried out in the way which is acceptable to the local people. The cultural discourse of *Pakhtun* society is not properly utilized in the war against terror (Orakzai, 2011). It is also considered responsible for the failure of coalition forces (Chellaney, 2001; Akorlie & Dorothy, 2004). Furthermore, collateral damages provoke *Pakhtuns'* revenge according to the spirit of their culture. The local people who lost their family member, in some cases, join the terrorist organizations to take revenge of their family members (Charles, 2003). At the same time, the terrorist organizations exploit *Pakhtuns'* cultural traits such as revenge in their own favor (Cathell & John, 2012). Therefore, such kinds of collateral damages can easily instigate the process of radicalization in this region (Richards, 2003; Hughes, 2011) (see chapter 6 for detail). Radicalization is flourished in the wake of military operations in this belt. Thus, the misunderstanding of socio-cultural and political discourses in the wake of war against terror sets a tune for further radicalization particularly in the tribal belt of Pakistan (Hodges & Nilep, 2007). The overall performance due to the above weakness is not satisfactory. This is what presents the existing position of Pakistan against terrorism while

following part covers criticism over the existing strategies of Pakistan against terrorism in this region.

Part 3

5.3 Criticism on the Kinetic Approach against Terrorism in *Pakhtun* Belt

The current counter-terrorism doctrines of United States in general and Pakistan in particular have been criticized on many grounds specifically in the context of *Pakhtuns* culture. These strategies are criticized due to its failures to take into account the indigenous discourses of terrorism. The socio-cultural and political reinforcing factors of terrorism in *Pakhtun* society, as discussed above, are not properly counter by existing kinetic approach of Pakistan.

The current counter-terrorism strategies can be evaluated in the light of its success against terrorism. So far, achievements made out of states efforts against terrorism are nominal in this region. The inhabitants of this region are still not safe from terrorism despites of military operations. In turn, it has numerous negative impacts on *Pakhtuns*' economy, politics and society. The economy of Pakistan in general and *Pakhtun* society in particular have badly damaged. However, the impact of this war cannot only be confined to economic damages. The socio-cultural institutions, as discussed in chapter 6, have distorted. The current kinetic approaches are considered responsible for the damages caused to *Pakhtun* society and their cultural institutions. Along with the socio-cultural distortions politically the region has become destabilized. Pakistan has failed to protect the cultural institutions of *Pakhtun* (Aziz, 2008). The socio-cultural institutions can be protected by understanding the cultural dimensions of the present-day terrorism in the *Pakhtun* belt.

Along with the damages caused to *Pakhtun* culture the current war has displaced the local people into squalid refugee camps (Picou, Steven, Brent, Marshall & Duane, 2004). The displaced people are suffered due to economic and psycho-social problems in refugees' camps. They are socially humiliated after displacement and their women face more problems due to the strict separation of gender in refugees' camps. Women are not allowed to live without proper *Purdah* (veiling) in *Pakhtun* society. Therefore, after displacement their women are socially humiliated in refugees' camps (Berry, 2003).

Therefore, military operations indescribably damage their social image and their cultural traits (Evelin, 2006). One of the respondents in *Jaluzia* refugee's camps states that:

“As a result of military operations we left our native land. We have lost our *baradari*, (brotherhood) family members, *Hujra* (community gathering places). We are now living in refugee's camps in which our people are socially humiliated and they are prone to numerous problems” (Individual Interview).

Pakhtuns have also lost their kinship ties after displacement in the war against terror. They are famous for their strong kinship ties. They support each other reciprocally and such kind of support mostly can be founded among close kins (Weiss, 2006). It is considered the integral part of *Pakhtuns* society to support each other in general and their close kins in particular in term of socio-economic matters. However, they have lost such kinds of support due to indescribable damages caused to their kinship institutions as a result of displacement in the war against terror (Raja, 2009).

Furthermore, *Pakhtuns*' social institutions also play a pivotal role to help out civil administration under the patronage of political agents. The civil administration intervenes in the tribal matters with the help of their social institutions include *Jirga*. Political agents utilize their cultural institutions to maintain socio-political order in the tribal belt of Pakistan (Lindholm, 1986). *Jirga* is mostly used for this purpose but it does not remain functional after their displacement as result of war against terror. Moreover, the overall

Pakhtun code of conduct (*Pakhtunwali*) has become completely dysfunctional in refugee's camps. Further, the traditional institutions such as *Malik*, (traditional tribal leader) *Hujra* (community centre) and *Jirga* (assembly of the elder) have got disrupted specifically after the displacement. *Jirgees* and *Maliks* are targeted in the war against terror (Khan, 2008). *Pakhtuns* local leadership has lost control over the tribal affairs. Approximately, more than 1200 hundred *Maliks* (the traditional leaders of *Pakhtuns*) have killed in the war against terror. The tribal's are dependent, inherently; on their traditional institutions. However, the local leadership and socio-cultural institutions have lost power to maintain socio-political order in the tribal belt of Pakistan after the commencement of war against terror (Synnott, 2009). Therefore, their displacement as a result of military operations has also created problems for civil administration in FATA.

Furthermore, *Pakhtuns* are not safe in their funeral and wedding ceremonies. Such kinds of ceremonies have targeted by Drone strikes and indiscriminate shelling by the Pakistan's military force. Innocent people have suffered in the indiscriminate shelling against terrorism. The main objective of military operations to eradicate terrorism from FATA is not achieved and most of the innocent people are suffered as a result of it. Hussian general manager of Bacha Khan Trust and expert on *Pakhtuns*' culture states that:

“Military operations have failed to achieve their objectives in a stipulated time in FATA. It has created the problem of social disorder after the displacement of the local population. As a result of war against terror violent cultural traits have diffused into tribal society. Resultantly, the civil administration has lost control over the tribal affairs” (Personal interview)

The civil and military establishments have failed to protect the local inhabitants from slaughtering and suicide bombing. Such incidents started in the presence of military forces in FATA. Human slaughtering and suicide bombing are not actually considered the part of *Pakhtuns*' culture. Their violent cultural traits are totally different from the

present-day violence (Megoran, 2008). These violent traits are not considered as the inherent part of *Pakhtun* culture. Their cultural violence is usually exercised in the time when there is threat to the cultural traits of *Pakhtunwali* (see chapter 4 for detail). The community members' state in the Tehsil of *Khyber Agency*, Landi Kotal that;

“Traditionally, violence is associated with *Zar* (gold) and *Zameen* (land) and *Zan* (women) in *Pakhtun* society. As a result of war against terror new violent traits such as suicide bombing and human slaughtering have diffused to *Pakhtun* society after the distortions of their traditional institutions” (Focus group discussion).

The exhibition of violence further provides congenial environment to terrorism. It is generally believed that the violent *Tehreek Taliban* emerged from the wreckage of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) war in Afghanistan in back 1979. Violence had also diffused in that time into *Pakhtun* society (see Ahmed, 2008; Cooley, 2002; Faruqi, 2003). Arguably, the present conflict, in the shape of the “War against Terror” has also instigated violence in the tribal areas of Pakistan (Abbas, 2009; Miko, 2004). These violent conflicts and violent social engineering have caused damage to the traditional institutions of *Pakhtun* society.

Moreover, *Pakhtuns'* cultural distortion also provokes their resistance against the coalition forces particularly in the wake war against terror (Johnson and Mason, 2007). The kinetic approaches of coalition forces against terrorism instigate resistance. It would not have instigates *Pakhtuns'* resistance if the current approaches had made in the light of their cultural values (Tehrani, 2002). However, the existing military operations under the kinetic approaches are considered against the spirit of *Pakhtun* culture. The missing of *Pakhtun* cultural discourses in the existing security paradigm sets a stage for *Pakhtun* resistance (Julian, 2010). Their resistance against state forces also causes socio-political disorder. Socio-political disorder creates administrative problem in FATA (Omrani, 2009). One of community member state that;

“The resistance is created by the state itself in *Pakhtun* belt. The government has created such an environment which compels the people to do so in the wake of war against terror. Culture is considered important entity if state forces distort our culture, people would show resistance” (Individual interview).

The local people are frightened as a result of state responses towards terrorism in FATA (Seth, Martin & Libicki, 2008). Pakistan as a major ally in the war against terror has failed to reduce collateral damage in counter-insurgency. The collateral damages undermine the existing peace efforts because it instigates the violent cultural traits of *Pakhtuns* society (Raja, 2008; Joustra, 2007). Collateral damages can easily instigate their cultural violence in the form of revenge. Moreover, the killing of innocent people on the name of collateral damage, humiliation of the people and destruction of cultural values provide enabling environment to radicalization (Zulfiqar, 2008).

Therefore, the prevalent counter-terrorism strategies are critical to the subsequent discussion of the current cultural distortion and radicalization (see Ehrlich & Jianguo, 2006) (see chapter 6 for detail). Cultural distortion provides spaces to radicalization in *Pakhtun* belt. They can easily become radicalized if something happen against the spirit of their culture. However, the coalition forces have failed to understand the socio-political nature of the tribal's as the British forces in the first Anglo war. The British had faced *Pakhtuns* resistance in the first and second Anglo war (John, 2012). Later on, the British were introduced new policies such as “forward policy” and “closed border policy” according to the socio-political nature of the tribal society to control their resistance. Ijaz Khan Chairman department of International Relation, University of Peshawar states that:

“The present socio-political turmoil and welter situation after the war against terror in the tribal society needs the academic efforts of political sociologists to understand its socio-cultural and political dimensions. It is immensely important to frame research based counter terrorism policies in the light of socio-political realities in the tribal society. The current kinetic approaches cannot be considered the durable solution of the present problems in this region. The current culturally blind counter terrorism can create *Pakhtuns*’ resistance”. (Individual interview)

However, Pakistan as a major ally in the war against terror once again is repeating the same policy of the excessive use of force. This approach is considered totally against the *Pakhtuns'* culture (Byman, 2003). In turn, the current approaches sabotage the existing peace efforts. Furthermore, it can also create the governance problems in FATA after emergence of war against terrorism.

The writ of the state is not seen in FATA in the present situation (Ahmed, 2008). Moreover, justice is draconian and corruption appears to be rampant in the tribal areas of Pakistan (Brain, 2010). The outdated and idiosyncratic legal system of FATA hampers not only development but also the process of peace maintenance. The rampant corruption jeopardizes the existing peace efforts. The present day terrorism cannot be separated from the discourse of development and good governance in the tribal society. Therefore, it is immensely important to ensure good governance for peace maintenance in FATA. It provides congenial environment to terrorism and radicalization. One of community member state that:

“The terrorist organizations in this belt can easily recruit people. There is a lack of economic opportunity in the tribal belt. The people are susceptible towards terrorism. State need to provide economic opportunities to the tribal people, and then they would be less willing to involve in offenses towards state” (Individual Interview).

The undesirable prevalent situation in FATA jeopardizes the existing counter-terrorism efforts (Jebb & Madelfia, 2005). The eradication of terrorism needs logical and serious thinking to reform the prevalent governance of FATA. However, the existing counter-terrorism strategies have further jeopardized the existing governing body of FATA.

Fasihuddin, Deputy Inspector General of Police says,

“The clash of civil and military establishment during the military operations has created problems for the local inhabitants. After the war against terror, the FATA affairs have been directly controlled by military establishment. Military established has no expertise to run the tribal affairs. The presence of two governing bodies in the same territory has created the governance vacuum in FATA” (Individual interview).

The civil and military establishment has failed to resolve the administrative issues in FATA after the war against terror. The clash not only seems to be found on the administrative issue but also on the socio-cultural and political level over the current counter-terrorism approaches. The political ideological forces are clearly divided over the current counter-terrorism strategy. Pakistan has failed to make counter-terrorism strategies, which are acceptable to all groups (Price, 2010). The political parties are ideologically divided between the leftist and rightist in Pakistan. More often than not the terrorist attacks seem to be against only the leftist groups in Pakistan. Awami National Party (ANP), Pakistan People Party Parliamentary (PPPP), and Mutahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) are considered on the hit list of terrorist organizations. Rafit Ullah Khan Journalist in leading news paper states that:

“Ideologically the leftist and rightist political groups are clearly divided over the counter-terrorism policies. The rightist political parties give ideological support to extremism. Particularly, Islamic extremism is being supported by rightist political parties. Pakistan has failed to define a clear ideological position against the terrorism in Pakistan in all party conference (APC). Political parties have failed to make laws against the terrorism” (Individual interview).

The rightist political parties and military establishment in Pakistan do not take serious actions against terrorism. The non-state actors have been supported for the political interests particularly by the rightists and military establishment (Khalid, 2008; Zahid, 2007). Pakistan has been used non-state actors for the political interests from vary inception. Such organizations have been used to advance the interests of Pakistan in this region particularly in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Therefore, the government of Pakistan is not taking clear action against the non-state actors’ despite of the international pressure. Pakistan’s establishment characterized the terrorist organizations such as *Taliban* into a “good” and “bad” on the basis of political interests. Therefore, the international community has doubts about Pakistan current policy against terrorism. It is considered as a

failure of Pakistan to take international community into confidence in the war against terror.

Along with international support the public support is also considered essential for the success of state policies. Pakistan has failed to develop consensus over the current policy against terrorism. The current counter-terrorism policy has further undermined the public support against terrorism. More often than not, the people believed that the war against terror is not in the interest of common man. Therefore, the current counter-terrorism strategy has criticized for its failure to eradicate terrorism. In one decade, Pakistan has failed to eradicate terrorism particularly from the tribal society. The current tumultuous security situation in the *Pakhtun* society cannot be resolved without the knowledge of the prevalent culture and socio-political realities. However, culturally recourse counter-terrorism strategies can stop cognitive support for the terrorist organizations.

The holistic counter-terrorism strategy needs to be framed to deal tactfully with *Pakhtuns'* cultural values to avoid cultural distortion. However, it is considered a lingering challenge for Pakistan to make consensus based counter-terrorism doctrine in which all ideological and military forces come on the same page. For this purpose, Pakistan made a separate department of national counter-terrorism authority (NACTA) to frame effective counter-terrorism policy. However, NACTA has also failed so far to achieve something tangible to eradicate terrorism generally from Pakistan and from *Pakhtun* belt in particular.

Conclusion

The counter-terrorism strategies of United States and Pakistan critically evaluated in this chapter. In simple words, counter-terrorism strategy refers to the means, including

practices, policies, tactics techniques and strategies by which terrorism is confronted and averted. There are two kinds of counter-terrorism strategies such as kinetic and non-kinetic to fight war against terror in the tribal belt of Pakistan. Kinetic approaches puts emphasis on the use of power and non kinetic approaches give emphasis to diplomacy, development and rehabilitation. There are some positive and negative aspects of both kinds' strategies.

This chapter concludes that both Pakistan and United States have adopted the kinetic approaches against the terrorism in *Pakhtun* belt. However, the current approach of counter-terrorism is being criticized by various security experts. The current approaches of coalition forces do not take recourse to *Pakhtun* culture. Moreover, as a result of indiscriminate shelling, the people are suffering and their homes are destroyed. They have left their native place and now they are living in refugees' camps. The killing of innocent people cannot be tolerated according the *Pakhtuns* code of conduct; *Pakhtunwali*. Therefore, the terrorists' incidents have been increasing in the *Pakhtun* belt. This is what that the current approaches are not recourse to *Pakhtun* culture; the next chapter is analyzing the people perception about radicalization in the tribal belt of Pakistan.

Chapter 6

Dissection of Radicalization as a Result of Cultural Distortion in *Pakhtun* Society

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter critically analyzed the current counter-terrorism strategies of coalition forces against terrorism in the context of *Pakhtun* culture. However, this chapter juxtaposes such critiques vis-à-vis peoples/experts' perceptions regarding such strategies for understanding the radicalized effects spurred out as a result of kinetic approach in *Pakhtun* society. Thus, to ensure a clear understanding, the chapter is divided into four parts. The first part elaborates the importance of cultural institutions and their role in social coherence and social order to understand the impact of cultural distortion in *Pakhtun* society. The second part analyzes the emergence of cultural distortion after the war against terror and its radicalized effects on *Pakhtun* society. The third part analytically explains the application of the given theoretical framework “*Pakhtuns*’ resistance” and “the model of conflict and non-conflict zone” (see chapter 2 for detail) for understanding the motivating factors of radicalization in the *Pakhtun* society.

Part 1

6.1 *Pakhtuns*’ Reliance on Cultural Institutions

Pakhtun society, as discussed in chapter 4, is considered the world largest tribal society. The tribal people have strong dependency on their socio-cultural institutions as compared to modern society due to the absence of state institutions (Scupin, 2012; Ferraro & Andreatta, 2011). Their economic and socio-political thinking and actions are being guided by the prevalent tribal institutions. The tribal cultural values not only guide their actions but also help them in finding ways to resolve their diverse socio-economic and

political problems. The tribal cultural values comprises customs, traditions, ideologies, beliefs, rituals and settlement patterns that carry significant influence on the socio-political and economic pattern of society.

Therefore, culture influences are more visible on the socio-economic and political pattern of the tribal society as compared to modern society. The tribal society has different socio-cultural and political pattern as compared to modern society (Boyd & Joan, 2008). They have strong cultural institutions and strictly follow their own cultural institutions (Lindholm, 1986). They prefer their cultural institutions as compared to state institutions. The socio-economic and political problems of the tribal society can be resolved with the help of their culturally embedded institutions. Therefore, culture is considered the basic source of social harmony and social cohesion among the inhabitants of the tribal society.

The tribal people have strong social bonds that work like a social capital in helping each other in the socio-economic and political matters. It is obligatory for the tribal to support each other in the socio-economic matters on the basis of reciprocity. Reciprocity is considered an integral part of the tribal culture that strengthens social ties (Malik, 2006). Furthermore, strong kinship institutions also serve as a social capital in the context of the *Pakhtun* society. The kinship ties and brotherhood (*baradari* system)⁴¹ are used to act collectively in socio-economic spheres (Ahmed, 1980). They support each other in the socio-economic matters particularly their kins and clan members. Kinship ties of the tribal people have also significant influence on the political alliance and conflicts between and among different clans. Political alliance is made on the basis of kinship or tribal ties. In addition to kinship, *Khair Khaigarah*⁴² (supporting someone) and *Ashar*⁴³

⁴¹ *Baradari* is an urdu word meaning brotherhood.

⁴² *Khair khairgarah* is the *Pakhto* word which means amelioration of the society.

⁴³ *Ashar* refers to collective work for the accomplishment of any task either concerning agriculture, war or any other things needing the help of others.

collective help are considered the integral part of *Pakhtuns*' culture. As some elders in a focus groups discussion in *Khyber* agency while describing the importance of such features stated that:

“Reciprocity is considered as a dominant culture norm in our society. It is obligatory for the fellow *Pakhtuns* to support each other in different kinds of socio-economic needs. Traditionally, they form *Ashar* (kind of community forming) and *lashkar* to support each other in field. It is considered against the social norms if they refuse to support each other at time of need”.

The tribal norms set standards for the socially acceptable and condemnable actions. Deviancy is discouraged through punishment for the purpose of maintaining social conformity and social order must be punished to bring social conformity in the tribal society (Emadi, 2005). Further, deviation from the cultural norms causes social humiliation in *Pakhtun* society.

Furthermore, deviancy from the cultural norms normally causes conflicts. Thus, the tribal people put *Tega*⁴⁴ (cease fire) to resolve conflict peacefully between or among the as per the spirit of *Pakhtun* culture. The traits of *Pakhtunwali* such as *Nanawati* (Asylum) and *Swara* can be used for this purpose. Khattak, Dean of linguistic and oriental sciences, University of Peshawar reflects on the importance of *Pakhtunwali* stated that:

“*Pakhtunwali* plays a crucial role in the coherence of *Pakhtun* society. Its tenets such as such as, *Nanawati*, (asylum) *Badal* (revenge) *Mailmastia* (hospitality) and *Panah* (refuge) play important role to resolve conflicts” (individual interview).

Jirga (assembly of the elder), as described in chapter 4, also plays pivotal role in *Pakhtun* society. *Jirga* members take decision over socio-economic disputes through consensus (Emadi, 2005; Guest, Ken, et al, 2010). They sit in circle to give equal opportunities to everyone as they are egalitarian by nature; therefore, everyone has the right to speak in *Jirga*. It is considered as a form of informal mechanism to resolve various kinds of socio-

⁴⁴ *Teega* is the *Pakhto* custom refers to cease fire to resolve conflict between rival parties.

political conflicts among them (Gulliver, 1979; Horgan, 2004). The tribal community members in a focus group discussion almost jointly held that:

“We adopt traditional approaches according to the spirit of *Pakhtun* culture for the solution of various socio-economic matters. The traditional institutions are considered obligatory for every *Pakhtun* to follow them for the solution of various problems. If someone violates the tenets of *Pakhtunwali*, society gives strict punishment to him or her. Furthermore, *Pakhtunwali* makes people equally responsible to follow such tenets”.

Pakhtuns are socialized to follow their cultural institutions. The people who speaks *Pakhto* language and do not follow *Pakhtunwali* are strictly speaking, not *Pakhtuns*. *Pakhtuns* identity is also associated with their norms and values (McCallister, 2005). Therefore, *Pakhtunwali* is considered the integral part of their culture (see chapter 4 for detail). This is what presented the picture of *Pakhtuns* inherent socio-cultural institutions and cultural values.

As for as, *Pakhtuns*’ cultural values are concerned they have got distorted. Their inherent cultural values have lost its originality in true spirit. Similarly, *Pakhtuns*’ cultural institutions have also lost grip over the tribal affairs. Such cultural vacuums have been providing potential spaces for radicalization generally in *Pakhtuns* society and particularly in the tribal belt particularly in the wake of war against terror. The radicalizing effects of *Pakhtun* cultural distortion has occurred in this region generally in the last three decades particularly in the wake of war against terror. The following lines explain the radicalizing impact of cultural distortion after the commencement of war against terror.

Part 2

6.2 The Radicalizing Impact of Cultural Distortion: *Pakhtun*’s Perspective

Cultural damages as a result of military operations as discussed in chapter 5 have radicalizing effects on *Pakhtun* society. Military operations as such as Al Mizan (2002-

2006) (South and North Waziristan), *Zalzala*⁴⁵ (2008) (in South Waziristan), *Sherdil*⁴⁶, *Rah-e-Haq*⁴⁷ and *Rah-e-Rast* (2007-2009) (Bajur, Mohmand Agency and Swat *Rah-e-Nijat*⁴⁸ (2009-2010 (in Swat), *Kazha Punga* in South Waziristan were launched against terrorist in different parts of PATA and FATA. Such military operations distorted *Pakhtuns*' cultural institutions that resultantly led to the emergence of radicalization.

The main reason behind the distortion of *Pakhtuns*' cultural institutions is the missing of their cultural discourses in the current approaches of countering terrorism. Resultantly, cultural distortions led radicalization in the tribal belt of Pakistan. It is founded in the field area of this study that cultural distortion, dissolution of *Pakhtuns*' traditional institutions, collateral damages and displacement of the local people in the wake of war against terror provide congenial environment to radicalization. In this regard, the available statistics about displaced people and collateral damages reinforce my arguments as for example, in 2009; three million people from PATA and FATA left their houses due to severe hostility between military and militants. By the end of 2009, the total number of internally displaced people from the tribal region was 428,000 (Raja, 2009; Din, 2009).

Moreover, innocent people have been killed during military operations and Drone strikes in FATA against terrorism. For instance, in one day, 19 innocent *Afridis* from the *Sepah*⁴⁹ tribe, including children, women and old men were gunned down by Pakistan security forces in the indiscriminate shelling (Ayaz, 2013). Collateral damages cases took place in so many other places in the different parts of PATA and FATA (Wheeler, 2002).

⁴⁵ It is a *Pashto* word meaning earth quick. This name was given to military operation which was held in *South Waziristan*

⁴⁶ It is an *Urdu* word meaning lion heart or brave. It was the name of military operation which was held in *Bajur agency*.

⁴⁷ It is an *Urdu* word meaning true path. It was also military operation against terrorism which was conducted in *Mohmand Agency*.

⁴⁸ It is also *Urdu* word meaning the path of success. It was also the name of military operation which was held in Swat.

⁴⁹ It is the name of sub *Afridi* tribe.

Such collateral damages cases undermine public support for military forces and the local people also raise question over the authenticity of current military operations in *Pakhtun* society. Hatred in the hearts of local people has developed against the military as a result of growing collaterals damages and suppression of the local people. The tribal people perceived the current military operations against their culture and people. As one of the community members in an individual interview stated that:

“If you injure an animal, it will start resistance. In the war against terror the innocent people have been killed both by militants and military operations. It is natural that our people how show resistance due to collateral damages”

Along with collateral damages *Pakhtuns*’ socio-cultural institutions such as *Hujra*, (community center) Mosque⁵⁰ and almost every element of *Pakhtunwali* code of life have been targeted by the military operations. Social gatherings such as wedding and funeral ceremonies have also been targeted in the wake of war against terror (Kerr, 2010; Rahman, 2004). Most of the tribal people have left their native places and their property houses have destroyed. They are now living in refugees’ camps. Khan, lecturer in the department of International Relation, University of Peshawar in this regard stated that:

“Tribal people left their native land due to the fear of military operations rather than due the fear of *Taliban*. Homes have been destroyed, civilian have been killed and women have been socially humiliated in such operations. They not only left their native places but also left their own traditions which they exercised in their native places” (Individual Interview).

Displacement of the tribal people from their native places has greatly affected their traditional institutions. It is difficult for them to follow their cultural institutions in refugees’ camps. These institutions were used as a social capital for helping each other in their native places in numerous matters. In the absence of their social institutions now they are more socially marginalized in refugees’ camp. One of the community member states that;

⁵⁰ Mosque is a place of worship for followers of Islam.

“*Pakhtuns* traditional institutions such as *Jirga* lost its importance after 9/11. *Jirga* members such as the local elders and leaders have been killed in the wake of war against terror. However, after the leadership vacuums either the terrorist organizations or government take decision on various issues. Such kind of decisions in the absence of the tribal local leadership is mostly violating their cultural norms. Traditionally, *Jirga* has the right to take decision on various disputes not the government. Vacuum after the distortion of *Jirga* has filled by outsider forces” (Individual Interview).

Social order was maintained with the help of their traditional institutions before the war against terror. However, as a result of displacement, *Pakhtuns* lost their traditional institutions and strong kinship ties. They became socio-economically marginalized. They have, hence, become susceptible to radicalization in the absence of their strong traditional institutions in squalid refugees’ camps. Refugees’ camps provide fertile environment to radical ideologies. Haq, Lecturer in Gender Studies, University of Peshawar, in this regard explained that:

“*Pakhtuns*’ local networks on communal level have got badly affected after their displacement. They have lost *baradari* (brotherhood) and kinship ties. As a result of social disruption the overall social structure of *Pakhtuns* society has lost control on their affairs” (Individual Interview).

Such social disruption has led to the breakdown of *Pakhtunwali* especially after the dissolution of *Pakhtuns*’ traditional institutions (Shinwari, 2012; Ansari, 2005). *Pakhtuns* have easy excess to weapons and their society is materialized especially in the wake war against terror. Social disorder in the tribal society and the tribal people exposure to weapons provide congenial environment to radicalization. For instance, it is generally held that *Taliban* emerged from the social wreckage of the Soviet-Afghan war, amidst the religious school in refugee camps in the Pak-Afghan border land (Nella, 2008). They were recruited in *Jihadist* organizations from Afghan refugee camps in the Soviet-Afghan war (see chapter 2 for detail).

Once again in the wake of war against terror *Pakhtuns* have been facing the same situation and resultantly they are susceptible to radicalization (Reza, 2009). Violence has

injected into the social and religious fabrics of *Pakhtun* society in the wake of war against terror. Suicide bombing, indiscriminate shelling and target killing have increased. The new waves of violence have badly affected the social outlook of the local people. Salman, Lecturer, Department of history, university of Peshawar, rightly observed that;

“Violence can frequently be observed in the socio-cultural fabrics of *Pakhtuns*, particularly, as a result of the war against terror. The exhibition of violence in various shapes reinforces radicalization in *Pakhtun* society” (Individual Interview).

Moreover, they are more exposed to violent social engineering in refugees’ camps. They have lost their moderate social institutions especially after displacement. They are exposed to extremism in the absence of their strong secular traditions in refugees’ camps. Therefore, displacement of local people as a result of military operations instigated violence and radicalization. In this regards, in a focus group discussion almost jointly held in *Jaluzia* camp that:

“Our women and elders mostly suffered due to various socio-economic problems in refugees camps. Refugees’ camps provide congenial environment to radicalization due to its pathetic condition. Terrorist organizations can easily manipulate the minds of the displace people. In camps, we are exposed to violent social engineering”.

Pakhtuns can be easily manipulated in the current situation. States institutions deliberately create social and political chaos to manipulate local people. Therefore, they perceived threats, injustice and suppression during war against terror both from the terrorist organizations and state forces. The current military operations against terrorism are being perceived as a threat to *Pakhtuns*’ cultural institutions. As one of the community member in *landi Kotal* in an individual interview expressed that:

“Everyone is terrified in this region i.e. *Khyber* agency. The local people are hesitant due the fear of state force and *Taliban* to discuss something about them even with the family members. They both create problems for the local people and the local people mostly suffered in the war against terror”.

According to the available statistics, more than 80 per cent people in FATA dislike/oppose military operations. Military operations are being viewed by people in FATA and PATA as a threat to their ethnicity and identity (Rana, 2009; Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens, 2006). Safi, an expert on terrorism and assistance professor in the institute of social sciences, *Bacha Khan University* says that:

“The military operations have not only failed to take into confidence the local tribal’s but have also provided fertile grounds to terrorist organizations in the tribal areas. Tribal people left their native place due to the fear of military operations rather due to fear of militants. However, cultural vacuum as a result of displacement, hence, provides spaces to terrorist organizations. Tribal people can now be easily manipulated in the absence of their traditional institutions” (Individual Interview).

The cultural vacuum has further provided cognitive support to the terrorist organizations. Cognitive support for the terrorist organizations can be reduced if state forces protect cultural values of *Pakhtun* society. Gul, PhD scholar, in the Department of International Relation, University of Peshawar and belonging to tribal area i.e. South Waziristan explained the same situation and held that:

“Cultural values of *Pakhtun* society have been destroyed by conscious political decisions. Sometime states consciously promote policies, which can serve their interests. They do not realize the repercussions of such policies on society. Similarly, Pakistan current counter-terrorism policies also disturb the natural evolution of *Pakhtun* culture. The civil and military establishment deliberately promotes social engineering in *Pakhtun* society. Once again, Pakistan does not realize the possible repercussions of the current counter-terrorism strategy on *Pakhtun* cultural values” (Individual Interview).

The current counter-terrorism strategies have badly affected the social structure of *Pakhtun* society (see chapter 5 for detail). As for example, *Jirga* which used to be an impartial institution and system solving almost all kinds of problems of people has lost its importance and power. Similarly, *Maliks* and tribal elders who used to be the members of *Jirga* before any more due to their forced migration into the settled areas after the military operations were launched (Kheshgi, 2010). The tribal leaders being deliberately killed to

create leadership vacuum in FATA (Hussain, 2011). Khan, Lecturer in the Department of Gender Studies, University of Peshawar in this regard held that:

“The tribal elders and *Maliks* are targeted in the wake of war against terror. As a result of it, *Jirga* has been badly affected in the tribal society. In the absence of *Jirga* institution, terrorists easily find sanctuaries in the tribal society. Therefore, *Jirga* institution is deliberately targeted by militants. Furthermore, military establishment has also failed to protect the tribal elders” (Individual Interview).

Jirga in *Pakhtun* society, as discussed above, is immensely important in FATA to maintain socio-political order. The civil administration through *Jirga* takes the services of tribal *Maliks* and elders to implement the writ of the state (Fair, Howenstein & Thier, 2006). However, the civil and military establishment failed to protect the tribal’s *Maliks* and elders in the wake of war against terror.

Furthermore, girls’ schools and music centers have been blown up to spread terror. The leaders of the secular parties have been targeted and social gatherings and sacred palaces have been destroyed by unknown terrorist organizations (Cheema & Nuri, 2005). In short, *Pakhtun* society has changed into a radical university through such tactics that spreads terror and creates leadership vacuum. In short, they have got exposed to extremism and radicalization. Thus, the current counter-terrorism paradigms have almost failed to protect *Pakhtuns* from the onslaught of terrorism (Gul, 2006). As a result of that they became reactionary towards the state forces. *Pakhtuns* perceived the state forces like imperialist forces as result of damages caused to their culture and people. Khan, the leading Journalist in the “Dawn” news paper states that:

“The present counter-terrorism paradigms do not understand the prevalent culture system to deal efficiently with *Pakhtun* cultural reaction. *Pakhtun* responses to the current war against terror are quite natural due to the current state of suppression. The natural evolution of *Pakhtun* culture has been deliberately disturbed by various conflicts. As a result of these conflicts, they are not able to understand the new socio-cultural realities of the global world. In the present situation *Pakhtun* can be easily radicalized” (Individual Interview).

Pakhtuns' cultural distortion by previous conflicts in this region has blocked the natural evolution of *Pakhtun* society. Likewise, the natural evolution of *Pakhtun* society got disturbed in the wake of war against terror. The state policies pushed them into the menace of illiteracy, extremism, and radicalizations. The secular traditions of *Pakhtun* society have changed by state forces for political interests. The present-day intolerance in *Pakhtun* society is not considered the actual part of it. The present-day intolerance or radicalization generally believed that outcome of state policies in *Pakhtun* belt. This is what describes the cultural distortion of *Pakhtun* society and the following lines cover their resistance (which mostly embedded in their culture) to the current counter-terrorism strategies.

6.4 Radicalizing Effects of *Pakhtun* Resistance in the Wake of Counter-terrorism Strategies

Culture distortion, as discussed above; also legitimize *Pakhtuns'* resistance in the wake of counter-terrorism strategies. *Pakhtuns* always protect their culture values. They always resist external forces especially who violates their code of conduct. The violation of *Pakhtun* code of conduct legitimizes their resistance against the state institutions (see chapter 4 for detail). They resist state authority which is not recourse to the tribal norms (Lindholm, 1977). They preserve their own way of life for centuries and give importance to their own independence (Ahmad, 1976). *Pakhtuns'* resistance cannot be tackled only by applying force (Manus & Midlarsky, 2001).

The decision of Pakistan and United States to adopt kinetic approach against terrorism is considered against the tribal nature. *Pakhtunwali* (*Pakhtun* cultural code of conduct) sets principle for the use of force (see chapter 5 for detail). The use of power needs to be legitimized according to the spirit of *Pakhtun* culture. However, without

proper justification the use of force in *Pakhtun* society provokes *Pakhtuns'* resistance. Historically, the foreign forces have also failed to subjugate them by force. As for example, the British and Soviet Union policies considered against the tribal nature, therefore, they faced the same resistance in *Pakhtun* belt (see chapter 4 for detail).

Pakhtun resistance against the alien forces has been logically explained by various anthropologists (see Ahmed, 1977; Khan, 2007; Lindholm, 1977; Spain, 1962 & Swidler, 1977). Nina Swidler (1977) describes the various dimensions of the *Pakhtuns'* resistance by "glue theory." People resist change that is being imposed on them against their will. As for example, it is the historical norm of *Pakhtun* to live independently and refuse to submit to/before external authority. In this regard, any kind of efforts to change such norm generate their resistance against the state forces. It is generally believed that the coalition forces also imposed policies, which are considered against the tribal norms and are not recourse to their cultural institutions. *Pakhtuns*, as discussed above, have socially humiliated and their cultural institutions have destroyed as a result of state policies. The current counter-terrorism strategies are not recourse to *Pakhtuns'* culture. Therefore, they resist the current counter-terrorism strategies of coalition forces in general and Pakistan in particular.

Moreover, 'prospect theory' sees *Pakhtuns'* resistance through the lenses of cognitive psychology. The prospect theory is focused on the gain and loss analysis of a particular change. It expects that individuals who suffer loss with respect to their reference point undertake risky behavior to regain what has been lost or to prevent future loss (Manus & Midlarsky, 2001). As result of counter-terrorism strategies *Pakhtuns* have lost property, homes and family members. They perceived the current counter-terrorism strategies against their culture and identity. Moreover, *Pakhtuns'* resistance have exploited by terrorists' organizations. It was found in the field that terrorist organizations

can easily recruit people from *Pakhtun* belt. Thus, the current counter-terrorism strategies are not only creating *Pakhtuns*' resistance but these strategies are also considered counter-productive.

Along with the prospects theory, the Charles Lindholm theory of "segmentary societies" is particularly helpful that why *Pakhtuns* are so difficult to co-opt. *Pakhtuns* expect benefits from the state, but are not ready to lose authority on their own way of life. *Pakhtuns* are willing take money or benefits in exchange for promises to alter their behavior and to be more in line with the state's rule of law, but will not hesitate to break the contract if it contradicts with *Pakhtunwali*. *Pakhtuns* refuse to accept change easily and it is perceived among *Pakhtuns* that they would no longer be honorable. *Pakhtuns* rejects state policies which are against the tribal norms. Therefore, they always show resistance if someone implements state authority over them by force (Gizabi, 2006; Sørensen & Vinthagen, 2012).

In the light of the above *Pakhtun* resistance theories Pakistan and United States could not understand their resistance against states' institutions in the wake of war against terror. They always show resistance against the state policies which do not recourse to their culture. *Pakhtuns* resistance provokes their cultural trait (*Badal*) revenge against the state force which can further increase their susceptibility towards radicalization.

6.5 Role of Revenge in Reinforcing Radicalization in *Pakhtun* Society

Culture has significant influence on terrorism; radicalization and counter-terrorism strategies (Lederach & Paul, 1995). *Pakhtun* cultural traits such as revenge; vendetta and bravery have escalated the process of radicalization in the wake of counter-terrorism strategies. Revenge as discussed in chapter 4, is considered the integral part of *Pakhtun* culture. They as per their cultural traits must take revenge of their family or clan member.

It was found in the field that in the war against terror the innocent people were killed. It has negatively affected the performance of coalition forces especially of Pakistan in the war against terrorism.

There are various cases that have negative effects on war against terrorism in Pakistan. For example, the *All Masjid* (Red Mosque) destruction in the capital of Pakistan has further increased the terrorists' incidents in Pakistan in which more than one hundreds innocent *Madrassas* (religious school) students were killed (White, 2009). In a reaction of All Masjid (Red Mosque) the first suicide bomber blast himself in *Dargai Cant* to take revenge from Pakistan military after killing of All Masjid students. It was first suicide attacked against the military in Pakistan in reaction to Red Mosque destruction.

It was not a single case of suicide attacks, the law enforcing agencies such as police and military were targeted by suicide bombing immediately after the All Mosque destruction in Pakistan (Khan, 2008; White, 2008). Moreover, suicide bombing were also further increased in reaction to destruction of *Damadola* religious school in *Bajur Agency*. It was destroyed by Drone attack. In *Damadola* religious school more than eighty students were killed. Significant increase has occurred in suicide attacks after the *Damadola* strike. Such kinds of incidents have negatively affected the performance of Pakistan counter-terrorism strategies in the last one decade.

Moreover, it was found in the field that civilians have suffered during the military operations against terrorism in FATA (Alonso, 2006). Furthermore, in various Drone strike more than two hundreds twenty five innocent women, children, and men have killed in FATA. Therefore, in reaction to harsh responses of sates, revenge (the trait of *Pakhtunwali*) increases the suicide attacks against the coalition forces. The Director of *Pashto Academy*, University of Peshawar, Shaheen, in this respect says that:

“*Pakhtuns* cultural values play an important role to understand the different dimensions of war against terror. Culture gives complete insights to us to understand *Pakhtun* behavior in the time of war. *Pakhtunwali* not only guides their behaviors in various socio-economic matters but also during the conflict they strictly follow its tenets. The cultural dimensions of the war against terror are immensely important for the effective counter-terrorism strategies” (Individual Interview).

The misunderstanding of the cultural dimensions of this war has been fueling violence in *Pakhtun* society. The new waves of violence have diffused in the shape of suicide bombing after emergence of war against terror. The misunderstanding of *Pakhtuns* cultural has not only undermined the efforts of coalition forces but it also instigates the process of radicalization in the wake of war against terror. Therefore, the existing approaches are considered ineffective because it can neither maintain durable peace nor can stop militant activities (Ashraf, 2010; Cronin, 2009; Aslan, 2009; Siddiq, 2013). (See chapter 5 for further detail). The existing counter-terrorism paradigms do not properly understand the implications of *Pakhtun* culture in the process of peace building (Amato, 2010 & Ronfeldt, 2005). As one of the community members in an individual interview stated that:

“The socio-political factors of the tribal society have had significant influence on the present-day problem. The understanding of socio-cultural realities will give an insight to military establishment to differentiate terrorism from *Pakhtuns* cultural violence. Most of the people are being motivated by the terrorist organization to take the revenge of their family member” (Focus group discussion).

Collateral damage as a result of counter-terrorism has instigated the feeling of revenge among *Pakhtuns* against the coalition forces. The terrorist organizations in the hotbeds of terrorism have got cognitive and social support (Ali, 2010; Newman, 2006). Therefore, the existing counter-terrorism strategies are considered counter-productive (Steven, 2007). The strategy to employ violence for ending violence resulted in more violence particularly in tribal society (Orakzi, 2009). The use of force against terrorism increases

violent trends in *Pakhtun* society (Steven, 2007; Ibrahim, 2007). The state violent responses against the terrorism in the tribal belt not only increase the incidents of collateral damage but also instigate the feeling of revenge (Peter & Katherine, 2007; Widmark, 2010). As result of that radicalization has further flourished in the tribal belt of Pakistan (Latifi, 2009).

Moreover, the indigenous causal factors of terrorism cannot be explored without understanding of *Pakhtun* cultural traits (Sageman, 2004; Rieger, 2008; Briggs, Fieschi & Lownsborough, 2006). Culture, as discussed above, has significant influence on terrorism. It is generally believed that terrorist organizations have exploited the tribal values for their own purpose such as revenge and hospitality (Akram, 2008; Eisenstadt, 2007; Nathan, 2010; Robinson, 2003). For instance, Osama Bin Laden has got refuge in Afghanistan as a guest and exploited *Pakhtun* cultural traits (Metz, 2007).

In response to terrorism, understanding about local culture can be utilized in a best way to frame effective counter-terrorism strategies (Kilcullen, 2009). However, Pakistan does not realize importance of the local culture to fight the war against terror in the tribal society. Therefore, the current counter-terrorism strategy has failed to get public support due to lack of cultural knowledge particularly in the *Pakhtun* belt.

The missing of *Pakhtuns* cultural discourse has badly affected military performance in this region (Richissin, 2004)). At the same time, the local inhabitants of FATA negatively react to use of excessive power against terrorism. In this regard, one of community members in *Khyber* agency stated that:

“I was in Peshawar for some important work. My family members were killed in the indiscriminate shelling against terrorism. I will never forget the killer of my family members and I will take *badal* (revenge). This is not a single case as a few days back my other relatives were also killed during the military operations against the terrorism (Individual Interview).

Such kind of incidents provides spaces to radicalization. *Pakhtuns* cultural factors, such as revenge provides cognitive supports to the terrorists and radical organizations (Fishman, 2010). Hence, the missing of *Pakhtun* cultural discourses not only affected state performance against terrorism but also sets a tune for further radicalization in the tribal belt of Pakistan.

6.6 Application of Conflict and Non-conflict Zone Model in *Pakhtun* Society

Conflict and non-conflict zone model as discussed in chapter 2, has thoroughly elaborated to trace out the motivating factors of radicalization in different region. In the light of this model *Pakhtun* society is also considered one of the conflict zones. Generally, the whole South Asians countries have been suffering as a result of various conflicts for the last three decades. As a result of continuous conflicts the region has been socio-politically and economically affected for the last three decades (Chandran, 2007). The present conflict (war against terror) has further brought social and political problems (Salaman, 2012). The other South Asians countries are not secure either, but the *Pakhtun* dominated border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan are at the centre of this larger conflict zone. As a result of conflict and continuous long cycle of violence, the traditional structure of power has got distorted particularly in the tribal region of Pakistan. The traditional leaders have lost control over the tribal affaires. In addition, the militants and warlords have taken control of the region and replaced the weak and the symbolic presence of the state institutions (Tarzi and McCloud, 2004). As a result of continuous conflicts the state institutions have been paralyzed with the passage of time.

Overall *Pakhtuns* belt is considered one of the worse conflict zones. Various states including; Saudi Arab, United States, Soviet Unions and Pakistan have exploited *Pakhtuns* inside Pak-Afghan border for political interests during various conflicts. These

states deliberately injected violence and manipulate *Pakhtun* society to achieve their own political interests. These states through local war lords, religious clerics exploited *Pakhtuns* during these conflicts to promote the interest of the different groups in this region. Religion has been exploited to achieve political interests in this region. *Pakhtuns* socio-cultural institutions have got damaged. Resultantly, *Pakhtun* society became socio-politically polarized. Socio-political polarization has further increased the exhibition of violence in this region.

Recently, the war against terror has further fuelled the continuous cycle of violence in *Pakhtun* belt. The war against terror not only promotes violence but also causes socio-cultural distortions. In responses to terrorism the excessive use of force (as discussed above) by states institutions against terrorism has destroyed the social fabrics and cultural institutions of the tribal society. Thus, *Pakhtun* society is considered one of the worst conflict zones.

In the light of conflict zone model, *Pakhtun* society as a conflict zone provides more fertile ground to radicalization. Radicalization can be easily flourished in the shadow socio-political disorder. The motivating factors of radicalization in *Pakhtun* society is also analyzed in the light of conflict zone. According to this model the radicalization trajectory can be analyzed to operate as a process that engages individuals on four levels, each operating with its own motivational forces and vulnerabilities (Hafez, 2006; Moghadam, 2003; Speckhard, 2005; Wiktotwicz, 2004). These four levels include; political reasons, the individual's own vulnerabilities, rationalize and justify violence, and the segment of society that supports all the above.

Such factors motivate people to adopt more extreme views in a conflict zone. The inhabitants of conflict zone are more vulnerable due to their socio-political marginalization and exhibition of violence (Speckhard, 2010). In the conflict zone the local inhabitants

displaced and they also are not able to pursue education in refugees' camps. Therefore, the socio-economic marginalization of the conflict zone people increases their vulnerabilities towards radicalization. Furthermore, the rationalization of violence in the shape of revenge increases susceptibilities of the local people towards radicalization.

As a conflict zone, the same situation can be seen in the tribal belt of Pakistan in the wake of war against terror. The local inhabitants of tribal society have socio-economically suffered (Din, 2010). They have left their native place as a result of conflicts in this region between the military and terrorist organizations. Most of them are living in refugees' camps. Hence, in the light of the above arguments; *Pakhtun* society can be declared as a conflict zone.

They have suffered on the same magnitude as a result of state responses toward terrorism. Not only *Pakhtuns* have suffered as a result of terrorism but have also suffered as result of state responses towards terrorism in *Pakhtun* belt. They have left their native places as a result of military operations in the wake of war against terror. In refugees camp the displaced people are not only socially marginalized but are more susceptible to radicalization.

Moreover, refugees' camps provide fertile environment for the nourishment of radical ideologies. *Pakhtuns* do not willing leave in camps (Stern, 2003). Socio-economic marginalization and social humiliation inside refugees' camps reinforces radicalization. Moreover, the perceptions and attitude can be easily manipulated about religion and violence for the sake of material benefits (Burgat, 2008). Refugees have been manipulated through radical literature by radical organizations. Sometimes deliberately states promote violence in refugees' camps to pursue foreign interests. Violence can be easily manipulated in refugees' camp because the people are more exposed to violence (Rhodes, 2000). Moreover, perceived injustices inside camps also instigate radicalization (Mythen &

Khan, 2009). Therefore, they are exposed to violence, extremism and radicalization in camps.

Moreover, the incidents of collateral damages as a result of indiscriminate shelling have increased in the war against terror particularly in the tribal belt of Pakistan (Conetta, 2002). The collateral damages according to the spirit of *Pakhtun* culture cannot be tolerated. The hatred feeling *Pakhtuns* against the state force can be exploited by terrorist organizations. Along with collateral damages and the socio-cultural damages has also provided space to radical forces (Shulte-Bocholt, 2006; Martinez, 2000).

The coalition forces have failed to analyze the long term impact of cultural distortion on terrorism. The misunderstanding of *Pakhtun* culture has further expedited the process of radicalization. The inherent violent cultural traits in *Pakhtun* society such as revenge, vendetta, are considered important elements of *Pakhtunwali* (Khattak, 2008). The policy makers in Pakistan have failed to see the problem of radicalization and terrorism through cultural lenses (Kelley, 2001; Khashan, 2003; Howenstein, 2008). *Pakhtuns* gave harsh responses to the current policies of the coalition forces. Particularly, collateral damages instigate the process of radicalization in *Pakhtun* belt. They are not only socio-culturally marginalized but the cultural traits of revenge (*Pakhtunwali*) expedite the process of radicalization particularly in *Pakhtun* belt. As result of cultural distortion, the tribal community is being faced normlessness condition (Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay, 2004). In this situation, the tribal people can be easily radicalized by terrorist organizations.

Conclusion

The traditional cultural values have been described to present the ideal picture of *Pakhtun* society. The traits of *Pakhtunwali* including; *Nang*, (bravery) *Nanawati*,

(asylum) *Mailmastia* (hospitality), and *Badal* (revenge) are considered the element of *Pakhtun* culture. *Pakhtun* are depended on their own socio-cultural institutions in the absence of state institutions. Socio-political order is also maintained by cultural institutions. Various socio-political conflicts in the tribal society can be resolved through *Jirga* institution.

This chapter is concluded that the ideal *Pakhtun* cultural traits have distorted as a result of war against terror. The social chemistry and social structure have distorted. Moreover, it is concluded that *Pakhtuns* cultural distortion has significant influence on the radical trends of *Pakhtun* society. The local community argued that cultural distortion has occurred as a result of counter terrorism strategies or the use of force. The use of force in the cultural setting can increase the vulnerability of the local people towards radicalization. The collateral damage can also increase radicalization in *Pakhtun* society.

Further, this chapter analyzes that *Pakhtun* resistance which is provoked as a result of cultural distortion sets a stage for radicalization. *Pakhtun* resistance discussed in the light of ‘glue and prospect theory’. Further, this chapter analyzed the present conflict in *Pakhtun* society in the light of Anne Speckhard theoretical model. In this model she discussed that in the conflict zone people are more susceptible to radicalization. The local communities become refugee in the conflict zone. As a result of this the local people can easily be turned to violence and radicalization.

Chapter 7

Conclusions

This study, as explained in chapter one, aims to understand as to whether the counter-terrorism strategies of Pakistan, an ally with US in combating terrorism, have been effective in curbing terrorism in Pakistan or not. In other words, it intends to know the significance of cultural paradigm as a part of counter-terrorism in addressing the issue of terrorism in Pakistan. The study has been carried out in *Khyber* Agency (see chapter 3 for detail) and the primary data was collected from relevant stakeholders and analyzed vis-a-vis the secondary data relating to terrorism (see chapter 2 and 6). The study reflected that the counter-terrorism strategies launched by Pakistan have been almost a total failure due to their kinetic nature and not taking into account the local cultural feedback for ensuring sustainable peace. It exhibited that the kinetic nature of counter-terrorism strategies further caused and re-enforced radicalization in Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in particular and Pakistan in general. Hence, what paralyzed counter-terrorism strategies to effectively deal with terrorism and how they (counter-terrorism strategies of Pakistan) consequently caused and reinforced radicalization in *Pakhtun* society may well be analyzed and concluded in light of kinetic approach.

7.1 Kinetic Approach: *Pakhtuns*' Cultural Perspectives

Kinetic approach (see chapter 5) emphasizes on the use of military force against terrorism. In other words, kinetic approach advances military actions and excessive use of force against terrorism. Some scholarly works (see Yoo & Sulmasy, 2007; Feickert, 2005; Tushnet, 2004) celebrate and narrate its success in different states in curbing terrorism totally while others (see Charney, 2001; Ryan, 2004; Posen, 2006) criticize it for its

ineffectiveness in dealing with the issue of terrorism. The same has also been reflected by this study wherein the US and Pakistan, in their combined counter-terrorism strategies, almost failed to permanently eradicate the element of terrorism in *Khyber Agency* in particular and Pakistan in general. The reason behind their failure was the non-consideration of the socio-cultural consideration into their overall plan. Their strategies were solely kinetic in nature and did not take into account the local socio-cultural and political realities that might have made their efforts productive in ensuring sustainable peace.

Furthermore, such strategies, as indirectly highlighted above, were almost totally devoid of the cultural significance that plays/played an important role in the social organization of *Pakhtuns*. They misunderstood *Pakhtuns'* culture that plays a vital role in their overall life (see chapter 4 and 5 for understanding the significance of culture in *Pakhtuns'* life). Their (combined counter-terrorism strategies) brutal nature caused further distrust and an element of revenge in the minds of local people. Local people developed complete hatred against such actions and likewise got more radical and revengeful in the wake of war against terror. They held such strategies as a sign of suppression and injustice and, therefore, leave/left no stone unturned in getting organized against such actions and making them a total failure. They (local tribal people) joined, in certain cases, terrorist organizations and got more organized to combat against the military operations and take revenge of all casualties they had in result of such operations on one hand and bounce back the forces deployed in the *Khyber Agency* on the other hand.

Moreover, military operations distorted the prevalent cultural values and social institutions of the tribal society following their culturally blind approach. They disturbed *pakhtunwali* and the indigenous systems of social organization, conflict resolution mechanism i.e., *Jirga* and the informal administrative system i.e., *Malaki* system. Such

indigenous and deep-rooted effective systems, as described in chapter 6, lost their effectiveness in maintaining the social order after the displacement and movement of their members into other settled areas of the province. Their (members of such indigenous systems) movement, hence, from the tribal areas caused an unbridgeable socio-political vacuum resulting into the non-availability of indigenous conflict resolving mechanisms and an hatred against the forces perceived to have distorted their overall social networks, values and *Pakhtunwali*.

7.2 Cultural Distortion and Growing Radicalization in *Pakhtun Belt*

Radicalization, as explained in chapter 2, is considered a complex behavioral issue caused by multiplicity of reinforcing factors imbedded primarily in the local socio-political environment. The kinetic nature of counter-terrorism strategies determine that nothing except force is important and effective in maintaining peace in any region of the world. It romanticizes ‘force’ and considers it a panacea for all ills. Of course it might have been effective in terms of invasions and expansions carried out in the past by Nipolian and Hitler (see Posen, 1986; Tone, & Clifford, 1995) however, its, significance in maintaining peace in the modern world looks a far cry. The same was observed in the study area wherein the people lived exactly in line with their cultural code. The people, before the issue of terrorism emerged, were more peaceful and famous for their hospitality and mutual cooperation (Mirza, Hocine & Riad, 2012). They resolved their issues by their indigenous systems such as *Jirga* and *Malaki*. Such systems, as referred above, ensured complete and proper coherence and conformity. Nonetheless, the counter-terrorism move distorted their available normative and administrative structures and left them with no hope of peaceful life and observance of their established administrative structure in the wake of war against terror.

Hence, the people, as found in this study, developed an extreme hatred against the military moves and found bent upon taking revenge for their cultural and human loss. Furthermore, their hatred got more stringent due to their perceived damage to their gender relations, *Purdah* (veling) system for women, local power and gender structure and their forced movement from their local places. Such loss to them meant irreparable and, thus, a further reason for radicalization and a propelling force for continuous terrorism in the tribal area.

7.3 Theoretical Implications of the Study

Since, 9/11 we see dramatic propensity towards terrorism related research. Some scholarly works highlights the causal factors of terrorism. While others invoke to understand the counter-terrorism strategies in order to curb its roots causes. Among others, kinetic approach is also adopted by few states as a counter-terrorism strategy in shape of deploying coalition forces fighting against terrorism (Gunaratna, 2014). However, kinetic approach is not always successful in countering the socio-culturally deep rooted causes of terrorism (see chapter 5 for detail). This study reflected too that kinetic approach failed to curb culturally imbedded terrorism because it ignored to take into account the cultural paradigm. Application of force in addressing terrorism implied culture distortion and hence it lead to reinforce further radicalization. The same has been reflected in this study that kinetic approach in the tribal of Pakistan against terrorism further reinforced radicalization.

Kinetic approach is primarily criticized for instigating violence and ultimately restricts the scope of diplomatic and developmental channels for the eradication of terrorism (Ganor, 2011; Roach, 2011). This approach does not encompass the complex causal factors of terrorism. Along with other weaknesses of kinetic approach, this

approach is also not taking into account cultural paradigm especially where terrorism is culturally embedded. The kinetic approach is considered culturally blinded counter-terrorism strategy and relies on the excessive use of force. Such kind of blind reliance on the excessive use of power, hence, is resulting into cultural and socio-political distortion. Socio-cultural distortion as a result of kinetic approach widens gaps for further radicalization. Keeping in view the cultural dimensions in making counter-terrorism strategy will effectively counter terrorism in the socio-culturally polarized world.

7.4 Areas for Future Researchers

This research, as described above and also elaborated in chapter 1, unearthed the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies in curbing terrorism without resort to the cultural dimension of the local culture and the resultant failure of such strategies and their ensuing radicalized effects in Federally administered tribal area (FATA). The study, hence, carried out in-depth analysis of how such strategies worked out in maintaining peace. To complete this study primary data was collected from the tribal men of FATA area and some cultural experts cognizant of the whole process of counter-terrorism strategies undertaken in FATA in particular and other areas of Pakistan in general. While conducting this study in the field as well as reading the relevant literature and writing this thesis different issues surfaced that needed in-depth understanding and analysis, however, their inclusion and analysis into this work might have minimized its depth and focus. Hence, this study like other studies have realized and identified certain potential and relevant areas that need to be researched by future researcher.

1. This study, as referred above, focused only on FATA. Of course FATA saw continuous upheavals in terms of terrorism, however, the same issue of terrorism and the resultant counter-terrorism strategies have not been confined to this area

only. Counter-terrorism move was also undertaken in Malakand region, district *Buner*, and North *Waziristan* (it still continue). Hence, it would more important to carry out a comparative study of covering both tribal areas and the settled districts of Pakistan.

2. Furthermore, the issue of terrorism does not prevail in Pakistan only. It happened in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, Sri Lanka, India, Kenya and the developed world like United states of America, United Kingdom, France, German etc, therefore, diversity based researches need to be undertaken so that to develop a feasible and sustainable solution to the problem of terrorism.
3. In addition, this study, as explained in chapter III, covered the ideas and opinions of men only. Therefore, to evolve more generalizable results, women opinion need also to be taken so that more generalize results can be drawn for future policy formulation. It is pertinent to note here that I intended to cover the responses and opinions of women of FATA as well, however, due to law and order situation in the wake of war against terror, forced migration of most of the people into camps, uncertain security situation in the camps, strict gender segregation and women susceptibility to radicalization and, likewise, the perceived threats to my life, I confined my study to men only.
4. More importantly, tribal's areas of Pakistan, adjacent to Afghanistan, are considered a hotbed for *Talibanization* and terrorism and which is why Al-Qaida networks are reported to have been establishing and establish themselves. This study tried its best to cover the reasons of terrorism and the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies; however, it could not focus on understanding the reasons behind such issue. Therefore, it remains a potential area for future

researcher(s) to understand the factors promoting the permeation of Al-Qaida network(s) into such tribal areas of Pakistan.

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