

**PAKHTUNS AND THE WAR ON TERROR: A CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE**



Submitted by:

ABDUL SHAKOOR
PhD SCHOLAR

**DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR
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PERSPECTIVE**



Submitted BY
ABDUL SHAKOOR
PhD SCHOLAR

Supervised By
PROF. DR. NASREEN GHUFRAN

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**In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN**

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December 2012

Dedication

Dedicated to my wife Naila.

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this dissertation is the outcome of my individual research and it has not been submitted to any other university for the grant of a degree.

Abdul Shakoor

APPROVAL CERTIFICATE

Pakhtuns and the War on Terror: A Cultural Perspective

Dissertation Presented

By

Abdul Shakoor

To the Department of International Relations
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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Ph.D. in International Relations
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We, the undersigned have examined the thesis entitled “Pakhtuns and the War on Terror: A Cultural Perspective” written by Abdul Shakoor, a Ph.D. Scholar at the Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar and do hereby approve it for the award of Ph.D. Degree.

APPROVED BY:

Supervisor:

PROF. DR. NASREEN GHUFRAN
Professor Department of International Relations
University of Peshawar

External Examiner:

.....

Dean:

PROF. DR. NAEEM-UR-REHMAN KHATTAK
Faculty of Social sciences
University of Peshawar

Chairman:

PROF.DR. ADNAN SARWAR KHAN
Department of International Relations
University of Peshawar

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
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1. Map of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)



Source: <http://www.nrdf.org.pk/maps/131-map-of-fata>.

2. Map of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa



Source: <http://www.nrdf.org.pk/maps/132-map-of-kpk>

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ANP *Awami National Party*

ASS *Anjuman-e-Sipah-i-Sahaba*

CAOCL Centre for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

COIN Counter-insurgency

DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid

FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FCR Frontier Crimes Regulation

GDT Global Dependent Target

GIF Global Independent Factor

HTS Human Terrain System

IDP Internally Displaced Person

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

IR International Relations

IRA Irish Republican Army

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence

JI *Jamma-e-Islami*

JUI *Jamiati Ulema-e-Islam*

LeJ *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi*

LT *Lashkar-e-Taiba*

MCIA Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

MMA	<i>Muttahida Qaumi Movement</i>
NAR	<i>Nuclei Armati Revolutionari</i>
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PDMA	Provincial Disaster Management Authority
PDT	Piecemeal Dependent Target
PIF	Piecemeal Independent Factor
PMAP	<i>Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party</i>
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
PML-Q	Pakistan Muslim League Qaid-e-Azam
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
SAW	<i>Swallallahu Allaihi Wassallam</i>
SSG	Special Services Group
SSP	<i>Sipah-i-Sahaba</i> Pakistan
TB	Tuberculosis
TNSM	<i>Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi</i>
TTP	<i>Tehrik-e-Taliban</i> Pakistan
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USA	United States of America

Abstract

The war on terror, starting in October 2001, instead of stemming terrorism from the region, has further radicalized the Pakhtun society. The prevailing terrorism in the shape of Talibanization in the Pakhtun region of Pakistan has not been a result of the normal functional social change; rather, it has been the product of a conscious policy of social engineering in the Pakhtun society. The combination of culture reductionism and policy of social engineering produce a distorted picture of the Pakhtuns' culture. Analysis of the history of religious mobilizations, nature of the current militant uprising, and the phenomenon of violence in the Pakhtun culture demonstrates that the Taliban form of terrorism, whose ideology transcends national boundaries, has no causal relationship with the socially controlled and limited-in-scope violence in the Pakhtun society. State institutions are weak to the point of non-existence mainly due to a limited government writ, especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Therefore, there is a strong reliance on social and cultural institutions. The destruction of, and indifference to these social and cultural institutions by the counter-terrorism campaign and by the Taliban activities has given further impetus to the problem of terrorism in the Pakhtun society.

Introduction

Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have been the focus of much foreign attention, especially after 9/11. This is understandable. The area is inhabited by one of the largest tribal groups in the world, the Pakhtuns. The unique culture of the people, rising Talibanization and the Pakistani military's ambivalent policy to cope with the latter, are all critical issues which, arguably, has indirect implications for the security of the whole world. In fact if we include the Afghan side of the border, the area contains dozens of ethnic groups. The Pakhtuns are by far the largest ethnic group inhabiting the center, but the region is also home to, Baloch, Kitranis, Noristanis, Baruhis, Chitralis, Shinas, Gujjars, Hazaras, Hindkos, Tajiks, Uramrs, Kalamis and Wakhis (Johnson & Mason, 2008). The fact that only the Pakhtuns have been prone to religious militancy and the prevailing Talibanization is an issue which needs careful attention. This leads one to ask some important questions. What is the role of the Pakhtuns in both terrorism and the continued insurgency on their land? (Pakhtun's land for this study refers to only FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). Is there any causal relationship between terrorism and the Pakhtuns' cultural values? How Pakhtuns cultural values are influenced by, and impact upon, terrorism and the war on terrorism? What is the nature of terrorism on the Pakhtuns' land?

Literature Review

A study of the relationship of culture and terrorism should not make one think as a possible deviation from the discipline of International Relations (henceforth IR). Culture is playing an increasingly vital role in international politics. In fact whole volumes have

been written on the subject of culture and IR. Julie Reeves, (2004) for example, in her book *Culture and International Relations: Narratives, natives and tourists*, explores the history of the word culture in the discipline of IR since its founding around the First World War. Reeves, however, admits that IR scholars have no original contribution to the meaning or interpretation of the term culture. They simply borrowed the dominant idea from sociology and anthropology.

Scholars even assert that a new theory, “Culturology”, is in the making (Xintian, 2010). Creating cultural research in IR requires a new set of ideas and concepts; therefore, such a theory will help understand the complexities of development within culture and across international boundaries. Since its founding around the First World War towards the 1980s, mainstream international politics was dominated by ideas of security, hegemony, and power politics. However, after the 1980s and especially after the end of the cold war culture began to enter the mainstream IR research (Xintian, 2010). Huntington’s book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, was a clear indication that cultural studies were making inroads into scholarly debate in IR. Huntington contends that in a multi-polar and multi-cultural world, after the disintegration of Soviet Union, conflicts, alliances and interests of states will be influenced largely by culture (1996).

Narrowing down the discussion to the relationship between culture and terrorism, one finds two views in the literature. Terrorism is a kind of warfare and anthropologists have long studied the relationship between war and culture, especially, in pre-industrial societies (Snyder, 2002). Establishing a causal relationship is not easy; however, there are

scholars on both sides. Writers supporting a cultural explanation of war assert that behavior at the international level is determined by culture. This line of thinking suggests that people take pain to carry out myth-supported rituals. They internalize the messages prescribed by the culture. Ultimately, it is the socialization of the people in a peculiar cultural setting which determined their action (Ross, 1986; Crenshaw, 2000). For example, it is alleged, in the Pakhtun's case, that Pakhtuns' participation in the ongoing militancy is mainly because of *Melmastya* (hospitality or protection), or *Panah* (Asylum), an element of *Pakhtunwali* (the Pakhtun Code of Honor). It is further argued that in the post-cold war era, Pakhtuns provided sanctuary to hundreds of international jihadis, mainly Arabs, but also Chechens, Central Asians and Chinese under this code. This claim is strengthened by the Taliban regime's refusal in Afghanistan to hand over Osama Bin Laden to the US on the same ground, as they argued it was contrary to the Pakhtun cultural values (Rumi, 2009). Furthermore, due to the long lasting blood feuds and inter-personal violence among the Pakhtuns and their suspicion of authority, Pakhtun society is considered as based upon structured violence, unruly, static, anti-change and anti-modernism that would resist any centralizing state apparatus, thereby providing a favorable environment for terrorism (Taj, 2009).

However, it will be interesting to note whether this characteristic of the Pakhtun society (internal violence), limited to inter-personal, inter-family or at the most inter-tribal domain, has any relation with modern day terrorism whose ideology transcends national boundaries. Proponents of this school of thought mainly rely on psychological explanations like the social identity theory (Snyder, 2002). Not fully identical, but

related to this argument is the position held by Nader Kathleen and Danial Yael, (2005). Terrorism, in their view, develops as a result of a clash of cultures on fault lines along civilizations with different histories, religious practices, and gender related issues. Culture, according to them, may not only help spark terrorism but also can be used in healing the post-terrorism traumatic conditions. As positive cultural change in the shape of the fulfillment of basic psychological needs, for example, healing from the past wounds, the promotion of inclusive culture in children, positive ideologies, supportive communities, and education that promotes peace can help promote a culture of caring and peace (Staub, 2003). But on the other hand the denial of the above opportunities leads towards aggression.

Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, (2008), support the above interpretation when discussing the problem of terrorism in the Pakhtun belt. To them the problem of religious terrorism and extremism and the challenge faced by the United States in the region is a “unique cultural problem” contained in a single ethno-linguistic group, the Pakhtuns. The only leader, they say, who can unite the Pakhtuns for a single cause is a typical *mullah* or religious personality. Taliban, according to them is not a new or unique phenomenon. In the past too there have been such leaders like the Faqir of Ipi, who mobilized people for a holy war or jihad, by exploiting their religious inclination contained in culture. Akbar S. Ahmed (1976), however, does not agree with them. According to him, the ideal leader for a Pakhtun combines both temporal and spiritual authority. “The prototype of the Pathan leader is Ahmad Shah Abdali: *Sufi* by temperament, warrior king by profession and Muslim by definition” (1976, pp. 52-53).

The important part of Johnson and Mason argument is that the state through a deliberate policy of social engineering made every effort first, to radicalize and then to exploit the Pakhtun society for its own security interests. The most obvious is the search for a strategic depth through a friendly regime in Afghanistan. However, the writers can be criticized for the same argument on the grounds that, the state, due to its superior economic, political, and propagandist power could use any other ethno-linguistic group. Culture alone should not be blamed for this. The fact that they chose Pakhtuns could be because of their past history, geo-strategic importance of their region, and their numerical superiority over other ethnic groups in the region. For example Dr. Khadim Hussain (2008) pointed out in a study, that the causes of terrorism in the Pakhtun region are many including ideological, political, economic, political economic, and geo-strategic. However, another important point raised by Johnson and Mason is that solution to this problem lies not in extending the writ of the central government, but in empowering the tribal elders and restoring the balance to a cultural system which has been in turmoil since the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.

The above approach is influenced, mainly by the writings of the colonial administrators, but also imitated by indigenous writers in the later years. Unfortunately, Pakhtun's history is mostly written by foreigners in the colonial era. The British- faced with a formidable force in the shape of Pakhtuns, difficult to defeat and strongly resistant to foreign rule- camouflaged their failures by overemphasizing the bravery of the people. This sometimes led to the point of dehumanization, calling them wolves and panthers

(Caroe, 1958). *The Pathan* (1958), by Olaf Caroe, is the best illustration of this approach. His book is the most comprehensive study of Pakhtuns. It covers their history, culture, genealogy, national character, tribal structure, resistance movements and politics. While one must acknowledge that it is the first and most authentic source of Pakhtun history and genealogy, however, the author's own emotional sensationalism and his romanticism of the subject, for example over-stressing Pakhtuns' fighting capabilities and martial character, makes it controversial. By doing this, the author brings the reader to a world of fantasy, away from real and natural settings.

This stereotypical approach, devoid of objective reality and leading, ultimately, to reductionism, continues till this day. Subsequently, other writers and historians, even the indigenous followed suit unthinkingly (Khan, 2008). For example, Ghani Khan's book *The Pathan*, (1948), is a poetic description of the valor and courage of the ideal Pakhtun. It seems unusual of such a great philosopher describing contemporary people in the light of a history woven in myths and half truths.

This debate has adopted a renewed and more intense momentum in the backdrop of the 9/11 terrorist attack where Pakhtuns have suddenly found themselves in a difficult situation. A noticeable corollary of this is that the difference between the militants and the civilians is blurred. There is a danger of considering the whole ethnic community either active militants or their passive supporters.

The second school of thought argues that ideas and culture should not be viewed as autonomous, but embedded in complex material and institutional arrangements (Snyder,

2002). Culture alone cannot account for behavior at the international level. Culture shapes, and is shaped by, a particular environment, material circumstances, institutional settings, and strategic choices or options. Pakhtun's culture is no exception in this regard. Proponents of this perspective argue that Pakhtuns cultural values have no extremist elements. They consider Pakhtuns as essentially peace-loving. This view is mainly held by the two Pakhtun nationalist parties, the ANP (*Awami National Party*), (the ANP won 10 seats for National Assembly in 2008 general elections and also formed government in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), and the PMAP (*Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party*), mainly based in Balochistan but also has a considerable following in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA. The two parties have a declared policy of rooting out every kind of extremism and terrorism even through the use of force.

Those who hold this view proudly cite the *Khudai Khidmatgar Movement* (Servants of God) in support of their argument. Led by Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan (Bacha Khan), this is one of practical demonstration of peaceful movement and non-violence. Together with religious principles, Bacha Khan used Pakhtun cultural traits of courage, bravery, honor, and uprightness for a totally different cause, that of non-violent movement against the British. Giving a practical shape to the organization of non-violent movement, Ghafar Khan created a unique army, probably the world's first unarmed army. More than 100000, followers of Bacha Khan would be dressed and disciplined like an army but they never carried arms nor used violent means to achieve their objectives (Khan, 1969). Starting in 1929, for more than two decades, the Servants of God demonstrated to the world that the Pakhtuns are capable of taking constructive actions and that too by using

non-violent means. Aware of the potential for mass mobilization in the movement, the colonial administration dealt it with an iron hand. Many of its leaders, including Bacha Khan, were jailed. Hundreds of its activists were tortured, killed or even beaten to death. For example, in a single incidence at Kissa Khwani in Peshawar on 23 April 1930, over 200 of *Khudai Khidmatgar* members were shot dead who came to welcome a Congress Committee (Banerjee, 2000). Yet with all the atrocities against its leaders and other members, there was not even a single incidence where people had resorted to violence or armed resistance. “No matter how successful Pashtun sniper and guerilla tactics seems to be, superior British power could always be brought in to punish the Pashtuns further” (Johansen, 1997: p. 58). It was a totally different strategy - non-violent organization and peaceful resistance by the *Khudai Khidmatgars* together with the Indian Nationalist Movement – which finally compelled the British to retreat (Johansen, 1997).

Pakhtuns commitment to non-violence and peaceful organization can be gauged from the oath that the *Khudai Khidmatgars* took at the time of their recruitment. They pledged:

I am a Servant of God, and as God needs no service, but serving His creation is serving Him, I promise to serve humanity in the name of God.

I promise to refrain from violence and from taking revenge.

I promise to forgive those who oppress me or treat me with cruelty.

I promise to refrain from taking part in feuds and quarrels and from creating enmity.

I promise to treat every Pathan as my brother and friend.

I promise to refrain from antisocial customs and practices.

I promise to live a simple life, to practice virtue and to refrain from evil.

I promise to practice good manners and good behavior and not to lead a life of idleness.

I promise to devote at least two hours a day to social work. (Ghafar Khan, 1969: p. 97)

In fact, it is very difficult to prove a causal relationship between terrorism and the Pakhtun cultural values from the available literature, since so little has been written on the subject. Instead, if we hypothesize that the Pakhtun culture has no extremist tendencies but that it was a combination of state intervention, due to its strategic interests, and a stereotype and essentializing approach towards the Pakhtuns, coupled with major events at the international level like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which paved the way for the radicalization of the Pakhtun society, can we find abundant literature.

The Talibanization of Pakistan and the rise of religious extremism in the country can be attributed to a wide range of internal and external political dynamics including the cold war, the Saur Revolution in Afghanistan, Islamic Revolution in Iran, the process of Islamization initiated in Pakistan by General Muhammad Zia ul Haq, and the civil war and the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan (Marwat, 2005). It has also much to do with the Pakistani army policies, like the *mullah-military* alliance and the covert role of the security agencies, and the dynamics of Pak-US relations (Abbas, 2005; Hussain, 2007). The Pakistani intelligence agencies, in connivance with CIA, played a leading role in

creating, training and equipping different militant groups to wage a guerrilla war in Afghanistan and Kashmir (Rashid, 2009).

Pakhtuns are thus caught in terrorism and the war on terror only because of their geography which has long been used by the Pakistani state for activities inside Afghanistan, to seek the so called “strategic depth” as a result of its threat perception from India. Moreover, Taliban are remnant of the former *mujahideen*, who were jointly recruited, trained and equipped by the US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia including assistance from China and some European states to fight the Soviet army in Afghanistan in the 1980s (Rashid, 2000). Pakistan acquired an unmatched position in the Afghan affairs when the US left the region after the defeat of the Red Army. On the one hand, it vigorously pursued its objective to seek friendly regime in Kabul through the help of its home-grown jihadis and on the other hand, it turned a blind eye to the *mujahideen* activities inside its own territory. Thus in the process Pakhtun areas had become a safe haven for all the regional and international jihadis. It was after the attack of 9/11 that the world rediscovered the region. In the backdrop of this attack, the US launched its global campaign against terrorism and Pakistan reluctantly withdrew her support of the Taliban regime in Kabul and started military operation against the militants on this side of the border.

Statement of the Problem

Due to their culture and geography, Pakhtuns have found themselves in a predicament in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Their land being the central battle field,

Pakhtuns bear the brunt of the global war on terrorism in which Pakistan itself is a front-line state. Due to the semi-administered nature of FATA and the close proximity to Afghanistan, the area provides a safe refuge to some of the top Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership, whose role is seen instrumental in recruiting and training the youth to the militant organizations. Therefore, the area is considered as the hub of continued resistance to the counter-insurgency campaign. The people of the area have not only suffered from collateral damage but there has been an unprecedented increase in terrorism-related incidents in the region. Most of the terrorism-related incidents in the last decade took place in the Pakhtun belt. For example, 106 terrorism-related incidents occurred only in Peshawar in 2009 which included suicide and remote-control bombing, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and target killings (Fidayeen, 2009). Over two million people became internally displaced in the Malakand Division due to the military operation against the militants. They were rehabilitated after an enormous effort by the government, national and international aid agencies. Some 300 schools have been destroyed in Swat alone, either by the militants or the military (in case of the military as a suspected hide-out of the militants), only to mention a few (On the Charge in Malakand, 2010). Resultantly, the social fabric of the society has torn apart and life has become miserable for the people.

Importance of the Study

The study is significant because an impartial and objective analysis of the nature of terrorism on the Pakhtun land is of immense importance to the Pakhtuns themselves.

Moreover, by identifying the true genesis of terrorism on the Pakhtun land, the study would help policy makers to formulate effective counter-terrorism policies.

A voluminous literature is available on terrorism including the nature, psychology, and sociology of terrorism. However, no in-depth study has been carried out on the nature of terrorism on the Pakhtun land in the context of Pakhtuns cultural values. The study is significant in analyzing the nature of terrorism on the Pakhtun land by exploring the causal relationship, if any, between terrorism and the Pakhtuns cultural values.

Objectives of the Study

- 1) To explore the genesis of terrorism in the Pakhtun society and evaluate the historical description about the Pakhtuns in the backdrop of the war on terror.
- 2) Critically analyze the role of Pakhtuns cultural values in the rising militancy
- 3) Explore the influence of Pakhtuns cultural values on terrorism and the war on terrorism
- 4) To propose a framework for exploring terrorism, especially in a cultural perspective.

Research Questions

The purpose of the study is to explore answers for the following questions:

- Is there any causal relationship between terrorism and the Pakhtuns cultural values?

- How Pakhtuns cultural values are influenced by, and impact upon, terrorism and the war on terror?
- What is the role of the Pakhtuns in both terrorism and the continued insurgency on their land?

Methodology

This is a qualitative study and utilized the ethnographic research design. Ethnographic research belongs to the field of anthropology and has gained increasing popularity among the modern day social science researchers. In accordance with the spirit of ethnography, the study obtained a holistic picture of the question in hand through observation, in-depth interviews, and focussed group discussions. However, relevant secondary data was also utilized for exploring the subject thoroughly.

The whole research process was judged through the prism of the two theoretical perspectives, **social engineering** and **culture reductionism**. The theories provided a framework through which data was collected and analyzed.

Setting

The focus of this study is the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, called the Pakhtun region in case of this study. While FATA is a semi-autonomous region bordering Afghanistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is a fully governed province of Pakistan. Both the regions are inhabited by ethnic Pakhtuns. Not only the issue

of Talibanization is centered in the region but it is also the focus of the counter-terrorism campaign, therefore, its selection as case study is logical.

Tools of Data Collection

Data was collected through:

- In-depth, structured and semi-structured interviews with concerned experts on Pakhtun culture and extremism-terrorism;
- Focussed group discussion with experts and academics;
- Secondary data analysis, for example, Books, Conferences, Journals, Periodicals, Newspapers and the work of other researchers related to the topic was also consulted;
- Online information and related Internet sources were employed.

I carried out numerous structured and semi-structured interviews with serving and retired army officers, experts on the Pakhtun culture and the dynamics of extremism and terrorism in the region (this category of respondents mainly included think tanks and university professors), prominent journalists who have vast experience observing and covering terrorism and related issues in the region, IDPs and other locals in the Pakhtun region (see bibliography of the study).

Open-ended questions were used in the questionnaire to allow more room and leverage to the respondent, as demanded by qualitative research (see annexure 1 for the sample questionnaire). Interviews were first recorded, using a recorder. In the next stage the

recorded interviews were transcribed. The final stage was the analysis of the interviews which demanded careful attention.

While going through the thesis one finds several references to “personal communication”. This is the demand of ethnography to use primary source, instead of heavily relying on secondary data. More importantly, some interviews were not only extensive but the argument was based on first-hand information and could hardly be found in a written source, therefore, the scholar was compelled to cite personal communication instead of relying on secondary data. Although, in some cases the argument put forward by the respondent could also be found in his/her writings but still the scholar preferred to use primary source as a reference.

Apart from interviews, focussed group discussion was also utilized as a tool of data collection. Some of the proceedings of the focussed group discussion were recorded in other cases only written notes were taken for data collection.

Participant Observation

The scholar was a natural participant observer in case of this study, although settled in Mardan district, basically hails from Safi tehsil of Mohmand Agency, the worst affected area in the entire agency. The research is basically an insider’s account of the issue. It would have been difficult for the scholar to conduct interviews and ask questions from the respondents on such sensitive issues as terrorism, Talibanization, counter-insurgency campaign and its effects on Pakhtuns and their culture had the scholar been an outsider.

Limitations of the Study

The study suffers from some limitations. First of all, it is not an easy task to cover all the dimensions of extremism and terrorism in the Pakhtun region. It is a complex issue and multiple factors are responsible for it. Even using the prism of culture for analyzing the problem, in the case of this study, is not exhaustive. Secondly, the area is a virtual battle field and, therefore, carrying out extensive field work is difficult, if not impossible. Although, my respondents were mainly experts, practitioners, and policy-makers who are mostly settled in the safe zones, however, occasionally I had to travel in FATA to communicate with the locals. This was not an easy task keeping in view the security situation in the region. Lastly, owing to the sensitive nature of the topic, respondents often felt hesitant to express themselves freely. Although, being an insider the scholar made every effort to overcome the problems, but still more research would be needed in the future to fully comprehend the issue of terrorism in the Pakhtun region. The role of non-Pakhtun inhabitants of the Pakhtun region in the process of terrorism and Talibanization of the society is an area which needs special attention by prospective researchers in the area.

Scheme of the Study

The study spreads over six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the theoretical framework for the study. The theory of Social Engineering is employed to explain the problem. Help is also taken from the Culture Reductionist approach for analyzing the myths created about the Pakhtun culture. In the beginning, however, some concepts, for example, Pakhtuns,

Culture, *Pakhtunwali*, Terrorism, Extremism, and Insurgency are discussed in the context of the study. In Chapter 2: The Rise of Terrorism in the Pakhtun Region: The Role of Culture, the historical background is discussed. The present turmoil on the Pakhtun land is but a continuation of a long process, spread over decades or rather centuries. The chapter highlights the reasons for the creeping in of terrorism, the social and political environment, vulnerabilities and weaknesses, if any, in the Pakhtun society. Chapter 3: The Nature of the Current Insurgency in the Pakhtun Region discusses the current turmoil on the Pakhtun Land. The chapter critically analyzes the current wave of terrorism in the Pakhtun region. There is an on-going debate about equating the current insurgency with Pakhtun nationalism. An attempt has been made to know the exact nature of terrorism in the contemporary Pakhtun society. Chapter 4: Pakhtun Cultural Values, Terrorism and the Contextual Meaning of Violence, analyzes Pakhtun cultural values, their national character and the phenomenon of violence in the Pakhtun society. Further, it analyzes modern day terrorism in the context of Pakhtun society to find out the links, if any, between terrorism and the Pakhtun cultural values. Chapter 5: The War on Terror and its Effects on Pakhtuns and their Culture, critically evaluates the War to know whether it has been successful in stemming the rot or not. Many a writers and researchers agree that the war has further exacerbated the situation; therefore, an attempt has been made to analyze the consequences of the war on terror for the Pakhtun society. Some conclusions have been drawn in the sixth chapter.


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3. Map of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)



Source: Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA)
http://www.pdma.gov.pk/./Map_of_KP_FATA.pdf.

Chapter 1

Theoretical Framework

This chapter provides a theoretical framework to the study on Pakhtuns and the War on Terror: A Cultural Perspective. Two theories-Culture Reductionism and Social Engineering are briefly explained. Some of the major concepts and terms used in the study e.g. Pakhtuns, Culture, *Pakhtunwali*, Extremism, Terrorism, Insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare are also defined. Terrorism for this study refers not only to the specific acts of terrorism but, most importantly, to the whole process of Talibanization in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

1.1: Introduction of the Concepts

The Pakhtuns

Pakhtuns in this study refer to the people living in FATA and the Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (See figure 1.1), speaking Pakhto, and claiming their descent to one of the numerous Pakhtun tribes. The people of these two areas belong to the world largest group of tribesmen.

Two most important aspects while discussing Pakhtuns are the questions of their descent and the history of the region. Who is a Pakhtun? The question of the origins of the Pakhtuns has generated a protracted debate among the Pakhtun historiographers.

Pakhtuns' descent is as controversial as his history is obscure. According to the theory of Jewish descent King Talut or Saul, who was appointed by God to rule over the children

of Israel, as according to the Quran, (Chapter 2, verses 246-251), had two sons. The theory claims that one of his sons, Irmia or Jeremia had a son Afghana, and that the Afghans are his children. When Bakht Nasar, King of the Neo-Babylonian Empire (c.605 BC-562 BC), expelled Jews, including the sons of Afghana, from Jerusalem after the occupation, one of the lost tribes came to settle in “Hari Rud” area of South Afghanistan. The theory further says that Pakhtuns as a whole were converted to Islam when one of their kinsman and a Companion of The Prophet Muhammad (SAW, Peace be Upon Him), Khalid bin Walid invited their leader, by the name of Qais, to Arabia to embrace the Faith at the Hands of the Prophet (SAW) himself. Qais was re-named as Abdur Rasheed by the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) as the former name implied Jewish descent. Abdur Rasheed came back and settled in the Ghor area of modern Afghanistan. He had three sons, Sarbanr, Bitan and Ghurghusht. A fourth one, by the name of Kirilanri, whose status as a son of Qais alias Abdur Rasheed is controversial, completed the family. According to the theory, all the Pakhtun tribes living in Afghanistan and Pakistan claim their descent to this family. Thus the proponents of this theory stress that the Afghans or Pakhtuns are of Semitic and not Aryan origin. Although, they admit that the language, Pakhto, is a sister of Persian and at roots is an Aryan tongue, but language is not a proof of ethnic origins. They maintain that the Semites merely adopted the language of the indigenous population when they came to settle in Afghanistan (Caroe, 1958).

Most writers, however, reject the above theory on the grounds that it is mainly based upon myths. Sir Olaf Caroe, in a scholarly way identifies the fallacies in the theory. For example, history is testimony to the fact that Jews rarely convert to other faiths.

Secondly, it is learnt from reliable Muslim sources, like the traveler Al Berun, the Iranian Muslim Scholar of the 11th century, and the courtier Al Utbi, (a famous poet from the city of Basrah in Iraq, who reported ancestral stories and news about the Arabs), that even after a span of four hundred years after the time of Qais, Afghanistan was not Islamized. In fact, Islam came to Afghanistan with Mahmud Ghaznavi (971-1030 AD), the most prominent ruler of the Iranian Ghaznavid Dynasty, who ruled most parts of today's Iran, Afghanistan as well as North-West India. The most glaring weakness of the theory is that its main source is *Makhzan-i-Afghani*, a book written by Nematullah, who was a courtier at the court of Mughal King Jehangir. He and his other companions who had taken service down in India had long been de-linked from their ancestral area and was unable even to speak Pakhto, the language of the Pakhtuns (Caroe, 1958).

There are others, especially the modern Afghan historiographers, who maintain that Pakhtuns are neither of Semitics, Greek or Turk origins, rather they are purely of Aryan origins. They painstakingly stress the point that Afghanistan is the original country of Aryans. In support of their argument they point out the similarities in the names of places mentioned in the *Rig Veda* (Khattak, 1984).

One can safely assume from the preceding discussion that Pakhtuns origins are obscure and shrouded in myths. This leads one to assume that Pakhtuns did not originate from a single source, rather they are a blend of many. Modern research complements the same. In fact, from 1st century B.C to 5th century A.D, the area of Afghanistan recieved three immigrations from Central Asia of such large proportion, those of the Sakas, Huns, and

Kushans and Gujjars, that the original Afghan identity either perished or submerged in them.

We are aware that the lands which are now Afghanistan and the North-West frontier of Pakistan have seen perhaps more invasions in the course of history than any other country in Asia, or indeed the world. Each horde, as it passed, will have left its mark on the inhabitants of the country, one way of life constantly overlaying another. (Caroe, 1958, p.25)

The great Pakhto poet and philosopher, Ghani Khan, referring to the Pakhtuns, concludes: “He is perhaps a mixture of every race that came to India from the heart of Asia – the Persian, the Greek, the Mongol and the Turk” (1947, p. 5).

Pakhtuns living on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border share a common history, genealogy, language and culture. However, there is a little difference in dialects as Abdalis or Durrani, living in southern Afghanistan, together with the southern tribes of Pakistan speak a soft dialect of Pakhto. Pakhtuns living in the Kandahar-Paktia region of Afghanistan together with the eastern tribes of Pakistan speak a hard dialect, replacing “*sha*” with “*kha*” (Magnus & Naby, 1998). The latter use the Pakhto alphabet *khe*, which gives the *kh* sound in English, in place of alphabet *sheen* which gives the *sh* sound.

As mentioned earlier, the strategic importance of the region made it prone to foreign invasions. However, since the area hardly provided any other incentive to foreign

invaders, the mere strategic location was not worth the cost of occupation, keeping in mind the tough resistance provided by the people. Therefore, no one made a permanent mark on the region (Rashid, 2000). The Sikhs in the early 19th century, coming from the South, controlled the area for about 34 years (1815-1849) (Spain, 1979). Only the British were successful, though partially, to penetrate deep into the region, administratively and militarily. Even after the Durand Line agreement of 1893 between Amir Abdurahman and the British, which laid the foundations of a permanent border between the state of Afghanistan and the British Indian Empire, the area remained as part of the province of Punjab. In 1901, the area was accorded the status of a separate province. However, the tribal belt between Afghanistan and the new province of NWFP was kept under special administrative system. In fact five political agencies, namely Kurram, Malakand, Khyber and South and North Waziristan were created in this belt. The Agencies were, and are still, governed under special set of laws called the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), under which people can be summarily sentenced for an indefinite period of time, without the right to appeal, and even could be entitled to expulsion for life from their own area. The Colonial Authorities' apprehensiveness of the local population can be gauged from the fact that they even excluded the entire settled region of NWFP from the reforms they introduced in other provinces in 1909 and 1920 (Khan, 2003).

At the time of the partition of India, the Congress led government in the province and the supporters of the *Khudai Khidmatgars Movement* demanded the creation of a separate state of Pakhtunistan. However, the subsequent referendum showed an overwhelming majority of the people opting for the new state of Pakistan. Subsequently, the nationalists

modified their stance. They whole-heartedly accepted the creation of Pakistan but declared that from now on they would struggle for an autonomous province within the new state. Authorities of the new state of Pakistan considered the nationalists forces as a threat to the security of the state. In fact, even before the creation of Pakistan, the Muslim League leadership looked upon the Congress leadership in the province with suspicion. Now in command of the new state, especially in the centre, they overthrew the democratically elected government in the province. Most of the leaders were jailed and almost all the nationalist literature was destroyed (Banerjee, 2000).

Most ironical, however, was the fact that the new state did not do away with the notorious governing system in FATA. They continued with FCR and other draconian laws under which superior courts had no jurisdiction in the area, political parties were not permitted to function and people were deprived of basic human rights. The area has been made a virtual no mans land. Developmental works tantamount to nothing. Even for the fiscal year 2007-2008, per capita spending in FATA was just Rs. 2391 as compared to Rs. 4000 for the rest of the country (Shaheed Bhuto Foundation, 2008). The above policies have had serious consequences for the Pakhtun's land. With state offering nothing, its institutions nonfunctional and with few or no economic opportunities available, people turned to alternative, mostly illicit, economic activities. With growing sense of alienation, they became prone to manipulation, culturally and ideologically.

A perfect opportunity came in the shape of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when people were galvanized and manipulated, not only religiously but culturally and

ideologically. Appeal to jihad or holy war was used to train and equip tens of thousands of people in and around Peshawar to fight the Red Army inside Afghanistan (Rashid, 2008). This paved the way for the subsequent Talibanization of the Pakhtuns' society (Marwat, 2005). In fact the Afghan jihad and General Zia ul Haq's policy of Islamization are the two most important contributing factors in the radicalization of the Pakhtun's society. Three factors, themselves the by-product of the above, contributed to this whole process of radicalization. First, foreign jihadis acquired a permanent foothold in the tribal areas of Pakistan. They were instrumental in the future regrouping of *mujahideen*, not only in the shape of Taliban under Mullah Umar inside Afghanistan, but also in the form of *Tehik-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) in FATA. Second, a wave of sectarian violence among different religious groups started across the country, but especially in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Third, closely linked to the first and second factor is a large network of *madrassas* (religious schools). This not only provided new recruits to the jihadis but also sparked sectarianism in the country. Thus this process of manipulation has diluted the ideal Pakhtun culture and it is not surprising that the region and its inhabitants have attracted a renewed attention in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack.

Culture

In 1942 the famous American anthropologist, Margaret Mead stated that "we are our culture" (as cited in Reeves, 2004: p. 1). Although this school of thought, representing anthropological interpretation of culture, has gained increasing popularity among social science writers, however, the statement "we are our culture" itself may have implications unimagined by her (Reeves, 2004). For example, sometime we may not be our culture.

This is true of the Taliban, who are predominantly ethnic Pakhtuns, and sometimes may even use Pakhtun cultural traits to camouflage their activities or to further their agenda. This was evident from their refusal to handover Osama Bin Laden to the US, as they argued that it was contrary to Pakhtun cultural values to handover a guest to an enemy (mentioned in the introduction of the study). But at the same time, majority of the Pakhtuns would not own the Taliban or support their activities. On the contrary, they would consider them as a counterculture force, bent upon destroying their true cultural traits through targeting the elders, punishing women, bomb blasts in *jirgahs* (Tribal Council) and suicide attacks at religious places, acts which strongly contradict Pakhtun cultural values.

The word “culture” is derived from the Italian word “*cultura*”. References to “*cultura*” can be found in 13th and 14th century literature. “*Cultura*” literally means to cultivate the soil and to rear the animals from which sense the word “agriculture” is obtained. The French borrowed the term from the Italians first as “*couture*” and then “culture”. The word “Culture” quickly spread across Europe and made appearance in England in the 15th century (Reeves, 2004).

What is culture? There are two schools of thought. The first, dominant before and until the early 20th century, was represented by the “Humanists”. For the Humanists culture was acquired. Culture referred to literature, art and music. It was an artifact to be visited at galleries and museums. Thus culture was something which represented the higher or finer things of life (Reeves, 2004).

The second school of thought, represented by Mead and others, attach anthropological interpretation to culture. To them, culture defines us. It is all-encompassing and admits everything, including the worst of things (Reeves, 2004). It is in this sense that the word is used nowadays in academic as well as popular discourse. The transformation from one concept to the other has not been abrupt, it has been transitional. With growing sense of nationalism, search for identity, and regard for one's own values, as a result of modernization, especially after the First World War, the Anthropological perspective has replaced the Humanist conception. Reeves, (2004) has rightly observed that the term culture originally does not belong to International Relations, therefore, IR writers have no original contribution to the origins or interpretation of the word; they simply borrowed the idea from the anthropologists and sociologists and followed the dominant trends in the literature.

The most comprehensive and widely held definition of culture is that given by Sir Edward Tylor. He says, "Culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" (as cited in Horton & Hunt, 1984, p.52)

Some attributes of culture can be deduced from this definition: Firstly, culture is socially transmitted and not genetically. Secondly, culture is a learnt or acquired behavior. And thirdly, the fact that it is acquired points towards its dynamism. Culture is not static;

rather it changes with the passage of time. This would help us in analyzing Pakhtun's culture, especially the stereotypes attributed to them by the critics.

Culture is an elaborate set of norms. It defines the way things should be done. Culture shapes people's expectations towards an action. For example in our society, we are expected to eat with right hand; this is a norm in our culture. Pakhtuns are supposed to stand up when an elder enters a room, as a sign of respect.

There are two kinds of norms. The one which actually exist, termed statistical norm, is referred to as the real culture. The other is what is expected to exist. This is sometimes called the "ideal culture." Example of the ideal culture is that *jirgah* in the Pakhtun society is impartial and respected by all. In reality, however, it is being manipulated by the political administration to suite the interests of the authorities. There are many norms which give form and substance to a culture, for example, folkways, mores, values, institutions, religion, and language.

Folkways are the ordinary habitual ways of people doing things and performing certain actions. Different societies may have different folkways. For example, they may eat with hand or use utensils, they may eat with right hand or they may use either. They may shake hand with every one or hug friends and relatives. With the passage of time, an act is approved by the people, consciously or unconsciously, and accepts it as a way of meeting a particular need. It is then passed on to succeeding generations and becomes the way of the people (Horton & Hunt, 1984). Some folkways are more important than others

and must not be violated. There are two kinds of folkways: one which should be followed because it is demanded by civilized conduct and good behavior, and the other which must be followed because it is necessary for social life. The violation of a traffic rule, for example, may do no harm but premarital birth may not only disturb family life but will harm the social structure, especially in a conservative society. These strongly-held ideas of right and wrong which encourages certain acts and prohibits others are called mores (Horton & Hunt, 1984).

On the other hand values shape our ideas whether experiences are important or not. Some people who care for their fitness may like to play some sort of a game, for others playing a game may be a total waste of time. Every society prizes some values more highly than others. For example, bravery, courage, and egalitarianism are some of the major values in the Pakhtun society. In a tribal structure where there is a self-help system because of limited governmental writ, especially in FATA, it is natural that people will regard such values highly. A tribal *Lashkar* (a group of volunteer armed men), is the best illustration of this in which people defend themselves against a threat, and in some cases, to implement the decision of a *jirgah* in case of non-compliance.

Some ideals, norms, values and beliefs, when combined in an organized way, make social institution. Social institution is a very important element of culture. They deal with highly important activities of social life, for example forming family life and raising children. In most complex societies there are five basic institutions: Family life, religion, government, education, and organization of economic activities (Ember, Ember & Peregrine, 2006).

Some important institutions among the Pakhtuns are *Hujra* (guest house), *Jumaat* (mosque), and *Jirgah* (Council of Elders). *Hujra* and *Jumaat* represent the temporal and spiritual aspect of Pakhtuns' life respectively. A village life is incomplete without a *hujra*. Guests not only stay but they are also treated collectively by the villagers at the village *hujra*. Unmarried youngsters of the village stay at the *hujra* for the night. Elders in the village sit at *hujra* in the evening to discuss various issues related to the community. Different functions like death and wedding ceremonies also take place at *hujra*. Thus, *hujra* plays a vital role in the socialization of the people in the village. *Jumaat* is also a vital institution in the communal life of Pakhtuns. *Jumaat* is at the same time a religious and a social institution. Not only the five time obligatory prayers are offered at the village mosque but in some cases the final round of *jirgah*, in which decision is to be taken, also takes place at *jumat*. Expenses of the mosque are shared by the people collectively. (For *Jirgah* section 1.1.3)

Religion is another important element of culture which has a great deal of influence upon peoples' lives. Religion basically includes a belief in supernatural power or powers. Religion not only establishes values and beliefs how people worship the divine being or forces but it also defines their behavior towards each other (Ember, Ember & Peregrine, 2006).

Lastly, language is an essential element of culture. It is the most important source of transmission of culture. Language is a complex system of spoken, symbolic communication. It is a set of sounds with a particular meaning attached to each sound. A

mere emotional set of yips and yells is not a language. It is when the culture of a particular society has attached artificial meaning to each sound-only then do we have language (Horton and Hunt, 1984).

It is important to note that no complex society has a single, uniform culture. Therefore, the two concepts, subculture and counterculture point towards cultural variability. There are groups of people in every modern society who share some beliefs and ideals which are not shared by the rest of the society. “Army culture”, “school culture”, or “culture of the factory” suggest some special sets of behaviors. These patterns of behavior are not only linked to the mainstream culture but are also distinguishable. There are many subcultures in a modern complex society. For example, religious, social-class, regional, age, and sex. It is important to note that every counterculture is a subculture but every subculture is not a counterculture (Horton & Hunt, 1984).

Subculture which is in active opposition to the mainstream or dominant culture is called counterculture. However, it should be remembered that counterculture rejects some, but not all, of the norms of the mainstream or dominant culture (Horton & Hunt, 1984). Militants in the Pakhtun society use Pakhtuns’ cultural traits like “*Melmastyā*” and the rhetoric of appealing to the true “*Pakhtunwali*” to maintain their presence and to enlist new recruits. But at the same time they are sabotaging the secular and non-violent Pakhtun culture by targeting its other values, for example, killing and kidnapping of tribal

elders and bomb blasts at *jirgas* and religious places. Thus, militants in the Pakhtuns' society can be called as a counterculture.

Pakhtunwali

Pakhtuns have a unique culture characterized by “*Pakhtunwali*”, the code which governs Pakhtuns' life from the cradle to the grave including social, political and even religious aspects. It shapes people's lives in the community and defines their behavior towards each other. Conformity to *Pakhtunwali* is taken for granted. Non-adherence to its precepts questions one's identity as a true Pakhtun. It is based upon the principles of individualism, egalitarianism, honour and hospitality including the granting of asylum (Khan, 2007). *Pakhtunwali* is characterized by some remarkable universal principles, for example: *Jirgah* (Council of elders), *Teega* (Planting of stone to end hostilities), *Panah* (Assylum), *Memastya* (Hospitality), *Badal* (Revenge), and *Nang* (Honor). While the first four can help end hostilities, the last two may lead towards hostilities. All these are explained below.

Jirgah (Council of Elders) is an important tool for ending hostilities and solving disputes. *Jirgah* is usually composed of the elderly or the greybeard in the community who have vast experience of the local traditions. They intervene between the opposing parties and hold long deliberations to come to a conclusion. Decisions are taken unanimously which are binding and implemented strictly (Gohar, 2010).

Teega or the planting of stone means ceasefire. Pakhtun makes war but he follows rules as well. A stone is planted in the ground which demarcates the boundary between the two parties. In this, parties with mutual consent or through the intervention of *jirgah* make ceasefire for a specified period of time. The terms of the deal are honored strictly by both the parties (Gohar, 2010).

Another important tool of ending hostilities is *Nanawaty* (entering the house). With all the talk of honor and ego of the Pakhtun, he does not even hesitate to go to enemy's house to beg apology. When a wrong is done to someone, the accused, accompanied by the elders of the village, goes to the aggrieved party. A lamb is slaughtered at the door of the aggrieved person as a sign of compensation and thanks giving. The apology of the accused is accepted with dignity.

Still another important element of *Pakhtunwali* is asylum or *Panah*. Asylum is given even to the enemy when he is in need. This also helps in ending hostilities as the host is responsible for the security of the person who has taken shelter.

Closely related to *Panah* is *Melmastya* or hospitality. Pakhtuns take pride in feeding, protecting and providing abode to the guests so long as they wish to remain. In this case also the security of the guest is the responsibility of the host.

Badal or revenge contributes to hostilities. Pakhtun must have his revenge in order to be called a Pakhtun. According to a famous Pakhto quote *Badal*, even if it is taken after a

100 years, is not delayed. An insult meted out to a person or his relative is paid in the same coin. Those unable or unwilling to have their revenge according to the demands of *Pakhtunwali* lose their prestige in the community. In fact they render themselves liable to *Paighor* (Accusation/Taunting) (Spain, 1962). However, *Badal* can be avoided under special circumstances, for example in the case of *Nanawaty* as discussed above.

Lastly, *Nang* or honor is inherent in *Pakhtunwali*. It stands for the bravery, valour and honor of Pakhtun. While *nang* on the one hand can lead to agnatic rivalry among first cousins, on the other it requires of the person to adhere to the precepts of *Pakhtunwali* mentioned above i.e. *Jirgah*, *Panah*, *Teega*, *Nanawaty*, and *Melmastya*.

The approach adopted by some writers stressing *nang* (honor) and *badal* (revenge) as the cardinal features of *Pakhtunwali* has done great harm not only to the concept of *Pakhtunwali* but to the image of Pakhtuns as a whole. Akbar S. Ahmad (1976), for example, seems to be obsessed with the idea of *nang* describing the nature of the hill tribes in the Pakhtun society. The British pioneered this approach in the colonial era when they were faced with a threat from Tsarist Russia. It was a difficult task for the imperialist power to administer the region due to the nature of the people. Therefore, they could do nothing but to appeal to the extraordinary and exaggerated valor of the people (Caroe, 1958).

In fact *Pakhtunwali* has evolved over a long period of thousands of years in the great Gandhara* valley as a result of the contacts of multiple civilizations. The region has always served as a frontier and, therefore, played an extremely vital role in the civilizing processes of South Asia, Central Asia, and China (Banerjee, 2000). Therefore, it should be conceptualized in the context of the phenomenal developments which have taken place in the history of Gandhara. Any approach ignoring these facts would be tantamount to grossly misunderstanding the concept of *Pakhtunwali*. In fact this has been the case with Pakhtuns and *Pakhtunwali* for the last three decades. Pakhtuns as an ethno-linguistic group are termed as extremists and terrorists and their culture, *Pakhtunwali*, is blamed for such tendencies. The following section explains these inter-related concepts i.e. extremism, terrorism, and insurgency in the context of Pakhtuns.

Extremism

“Anything outside the political centre of the society, political views from the far left or far right, can be counted as extremism” (Hussain, 2008, p. 57)

Thus, extremist is a person who holds an extreme view on a particular subject or domain. In this way Mahatma Gandhi was an extremist who held extreme views about the philosophy of nonviolence (Islam, 2005). In other words extremism is deviance from the norms of the society. Extremism should not be confused with terrorism, however.

* Gandhara also known as Waihind in Persian is the name of an ancient kingdom (Mahajanapada), located in northern Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan. Gandhara was located mainly in the vale of Peshawar, the Potohar plateau and on the Kabul River. Its main cities were Purushapura (modern Peshawar), literally meaning City of Man and Takshashila (modern Taxila).

Although it is true that extremism may lead to terrorism, but every extremist is not a terrorist. A whole political organization or even an entire society may hold extremist views but that does not mean that they will practice terrorism (Dr Khadim Hussain*, personal communication, Oct. 10, 2010). However, extremism may be more dangerous than terrorism in many respects. Extremist tendencies in a society may lead to the emergence of break away groups who believe in violent actions to achieve certain goals. More importantly, it is the extremists within a society whose support is vital to terrorists. They can not operate successfully without the moral and, in some cases, logistical support of the local population. Extremist elements within the state of Pakistan were instrumental in the creation of Taliban, on whose support they not only thrived but are operating successfully.

Terrorism

Inspite of a large amount of literature available on the subject, a comprehensive definition of the word is hard to come by. This is mainly due to two factors. Firstly, modern media in its effort to communicate a highly complex message in the briefest possible amount of time or print space have led to label diverse events of violence as “Terrorism” (Hoffman, 2006). Secondly, numerous and often competing political interests make the task of defining terrorism difficult. Hence one man’s terrorist may be another man’s freedom fighter (Hoffman, 2006).

* Professor Dr. Khadim Hussain is Managing Director Bacha Khan Trust Educational Foundation Peshawar, and Professor of Linguistics at Bahria Uniniversity, Islamabad. He is also a member of the think tank, Consultative Committee, of the Awami National Party (ANP). He has written extensively on the sociological aspects of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan and the Pakhtun region. His most recent book in the field is “The Militant Discourse”. Interview was carried out with him on July 9, 2012.

Although an agreed upon definition is not available, however, most people would generally know what constitute terrorism. The following two definitions would clear some of the conceptual air:

- 1) Terrorism is, (a) illegal use or threatened use of force or violence (b) with an intent to coerce societies or governments by inducing fear in their populations (c) typically with political and/or ideological motives and justifications and (d) an “extra-societal” element, either “outside” society in the case of domestic terrorism or “foreign” in the case of international terrorism (Smelser & Mitchell, 2001, pp. 1-2)

- 2) The U.S State Department defines terrorism as: “Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (as cited in Wienberg, 2006, p. 4).

Thus we can say that terrorism is the intentional use of indiscriminate violence against civilians in violation of the law of war for the purpose of provoking fear for political reasons (Islam, 2005).

Three common factors can be found in most of the definitions of the term: Firstly, the purpose of most terrorist activities is to achieve a psychological effect. The target of the terrorist attack is only a part of an operation whose main goal is to change the behavior of a wider population or the policy of a government (Wienberg, 2006). Secondly, unlike

other violence terrorism is inherently political. The purpose of a terrorist activity is to achieve political objectives and finally, terrorism is about power. Its primary aim is the pursuit and acquisition of power to effect political change (Hoffman, 2006).

For the first time the word “terrorism” was used during the French revolution. However, it should be emphasized that the usage of the term during the French revolution had a positive connotation. It referred to the reign of terror adopted by the revolutionary government during the transitional anarchic period from 1793-94. The purpose of this system of terror was to maintain order and suppress the counter-revolutionaries (Wienberg, 2006). However, since then from the terrorist organization *Narodnaya Volya*, or people’s will, (A small group of Russian constitutionalists, founded in 1878 in opposition to Czarists) to Al Qaeda, the meaning of the word has changed considerably. The twenty-first century has already seen terrorism in its new and most lethal forms, evident from the devastating attacks of 9/11. Terrorism has thus transformed from a national or regional problem to a global challenge.

Insurgency and Guerrilla warfare

Terrorism is sometimes confused with insurgency and guerrilla warfare. This equation with insurgency and guerrilla warfare is not surprising as guerrillas and insurgents adopt the same tactics employed by terrorists, like hit and run, assassination, kidnapping, bombing of public places, and hostage taking etc. Moreover, terrorists as well as guerrillas and insurgents do not wear uniform and are therefore difficult to distinguish

from the civilians or non-combatants. They may share some common features but there is considerable difference between the three.

Guerrilla, for example is referred to a larger group of people who act like a military unit, attack enemy through hit and run strategy and in most cases exercise sovereignty over a specific geographical area. This last point is important as guerrillas can not act without the support of the local population. Insurgents share these characteristics with guerrillas. However, they go a step further by employing psychological warfare through effective propaganda to mobilize popular support against an established government or occupying power, what is called modern revolutionary warfare or people's war. Terrorists are considerably different. They are numerically small and can not face the enemy in the open. They do not control territory and can not mobilize popular support or exercise sovereignty over an area (Hoffman, 2006).

It should be emphasized, however, that these are not mutually exclusive categories and considerable overlap may exist in many cases. Most of the established groups like the Taliban are also called insurgents due to their combat strategy, their hold over a certain territory and their psychological and propagandist influence over a segment of the local population. The Taliban not only use hit and run strategy, like the insurgents do, but they also virtually control whole regions in FATA. For example they had established their own courts in the Safi Tehsil of Mohmand Agency before the military operation in 2009. "The military operation has done nothing except displacing the local population. Taliban are still roaming in the region. and the military is unable or unwilling to clear the region

from them”, observed one IDP belonging to Tehsil Safi and now settled in Charsadda (Personal Communication, June, 22, 2011). The term terrorism will be used in the course of this study to refer to all such activities of extremism, terrorism, and insurgency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA.

1.2: Theoretical Framework

The interplay of **culture reductionism** and **social engineering** shape my argument. The first is a parochial or stereotypical approach to Pakhtuns while analyzing the problem of terrorism on their land. The second is the state intervention in the society for a deliberate social change. These theoretical approaches are briefly discussed in the next section followed by application of the two to argue my perspective that Pakhtuns have been the victims of culture reductionism and social engineering.

1.2.1 Culture Reductionism

Reductionism can either mean (a) an approach to understanding the nature of complex things by reducing them to the interactions of their parts, or to simpler or more fundamental things or (b) a philosophical position that a complex system is nothing but the sum of its parts, and that an account of it can be reduced to accounts of individual constituents (Reductionism, 2011, para. 1).

Keneth Waltz has argued “the effort to explain the behavior of a group through psychological study of its members is a reductionist approach” (1979, p. 18)

The first proponent of reductionism was Descartes. He was a mechanist. He described the phenomenon in the Discourses (1637). Descartes compared the world with a machine, and argued that only by analyzing the individual pieces can we understand a machine.

The opposite of reductionism is an approach called “holism” or “emergentism”. Holism asserts that the whole can have properties not explainable only by analyzing the constituent parts. As Aristotle has said in the Metaphysics that, “the whole is more than the sum of its parts” (Reductionism, 2011, para. 7).

Reductionism in culture defines it as “shared knowledge or symbols that create meaning within a social group” (Snyder, 2002, p. 7), thus, it is culture which determines behavior, and in a crises situation the symbolic life of a group is reflected in its war behavior.

Research in cultural anthropology, however, proves the opposite, that is only by judging the whole cultural background rather than some abstract standards, can we understand the established behavior (Xintian, 2010). Culture is relative and every custom or cultural trait is meaningful only in a particular society. Research on war has proved that ideas and culture are not autonomous but embedded in a complex system and shaped by material circumstances and institutional arrangements (Snyder, 2002). Thus, it is important that culture should not be treated in isolation. Although, it is true that culture plays a vital role

in individuals' life, but at the same time one can not ignore that culture can be manipulated by individuals and state institutions. This is done through social engineering.

1.2.2: Social Engineering

Christopher Hadnagy defines social engineering as, “the act of manipulating a person to take an action that may or may not be in the “target’s” best interest. This may include obtaining information, gaining access, or getting the target to take certain action” (2011, p. 11).

Adam Podgorecki, Jon Alexandar and Rob Shield, concisely explain it. According to them, “social engineering means arranging and channeling environmental and social forces to create a high probability that effective social action will occur” (1996, p. 1).

The advent of social engineering is closely associated with the rise of nation state. The state through its institutions and specialized agencies embarked on major interventions in the society in the name of strategy, national interest, social order, and morality. State activities increasingly expanded by engulfing wider areas of social life, from checking certain social trends up to determining standards of behavior. However, it should be noted that social engineering is not totally dependant on state alone. It also takes place at micro-level. It is not only top-down but also bottom up (Podgorecki, Alexander & Shield, 1996).

France presented a perfect example of social engineering at the close of eighteenth century. State activities in France even included efforts to change earlier and strongly held religious beliefs and ceremonies. Elsewhere in Europe, Marxism provided the greatest inspiration to social engineering in the nineteenth century. Marxism encouraged revolutionary reconstruction on a global scale. British historian Paul Johnson (1983), however, termed the twentieth century as the age of social engineering (as cited in Podgorecki, Alexander & Shield, 1996). The twentieth century's great social engineers who changed facts on a global scale were all dictators, Lenin, Stalin and Hitler. This process of social engineering ended in Europe at mid-century but continued in Asia and Africa, mainly in China, but also Cambodia, and the Middle East. Americans abhor the word social engineering as, according to them, it applies to dictators. Critics argue otherwise and believe that the US itself is increasingly leading its society to a world of new forms of social engineering based upon motivational psychology and triggered by modern technology. However, most social engineering projects of the twentieth century met with failure, as "the material that social engineers use- human beings- is resistant. One cannot easily adjust this material to the designer's end" (Podgorecki, Alexander & Shield, 1996, pp. 1-2).

All social engineers are utopians and moralists. They envision a future society and claim to have the necessary technical knowledge to achieve what is good and eliminate what is bad. Institutions run by these utopians that sought to transform the societies often move in unpredictable directions, unforeseen by the members. For example, engineering in culture to move it in the desired direction may produce culture counter-projects (Snyder,

2002). The interplay of three factors, utopia or an idealist vision of the future, power of the state or other institution, and masses produce dangerous implications. Without powerful intermediate social structures between the masses and the state, individual stand alone and unprotected before the rulers. Social engineers, when unhindered, may fabricate the reality. They may camouflage their real intentions. Often the intelligence agencies do this to redirect the attention from what is needed or essential. Furthermore, this process of social change is not fully controllable; it has its own dynamics. No one may want or even notice what is happening.

There are two main forms of social engineering, piecemeal and utopian social engineering. In piecemeal form a social engineer takes small steps, regularly correcting his moves. He does not envision a total transformation of the social system. While a utopian social engineer want a total transformation of the society. He knows in advance what ought to be done and what is bad enough to be eliminated (Podgorecki, Alexander & Shield, 1996).

Levels of Socio-technical Operations

Four fundamental possibilities may appear in discussing social engineering projects.

1. The first is called Piecemeal Independent Factor (PIF). Social engineer in this strategy identifies a certain factor of little or limited influence. He can recognize the effects of the factor and predict its possible negative by-products. Since its scope is limited and results confined, everything remains under control. A newly formulated law with validity for the economy (re-privatization of industry, for

example) is an example of this strategy. Since the law has already been tried out and its negative effects kept in mind, it can be easily reversed if it does not work in the new settings.

2. The second is called Global Independent Factor (GIF). In this strategy a specific factor, with effects for the whole society, is utilized. Its possible negative or positive effects are not recognized in advance, however, its overall effectiveness is tested through accumulated knowledge. The imposition of a monolithic ideology in a totalitarian manner can be an example of this strategy.
3. The third is termed as Global Dependent Target (GDT). This is the most dangerous of all social engineering strategies. In this a social engineer does not identify a specific area to serve as a target. Instead, the whole society is taken as a target of social change. Transforming the entire social system (for example a liberal democratic society occupied by a totalitarian state, as Soviet Union's occupation of some of the East European countries in the 20th century) is an example of this strategy. Al Qaeda is also working on this strategy. One of the main objectives of the organization is to transform the entire international system.
4. The fourth strategy is called as Piecemeal Dependent Target (PDT). A specific social area, keeping in mind its possible malleability, is selected and analyzed to prepare it for the desired social change. Targeting strategies may involve identifying the type of the target society, character of the people, level of socio-economic development, and its readiness to undergo cultural change.

This strategy has been used for social engineering in the Pakhtuns' society, as FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have been chosen for bringing about the desired social change, a militant or jihadi mindset in this case. Targeting strategies included:

- a. establishing a network of *madrassas*, bent upon disseminating jihadi knowledge and literature;
- b. channeling of foreign money, especially from the Arab countries, to these *madrassas*;
- c. empowering *mullahs* or religious people against politicians (in settled areas) or *maliks** in (tribal areas);
- d. training of Afghan *mujahideen* in refugee camps located in Peshawar and tribal areas in the 1980s;
- e. giving leverage to foreign jihadist elements to stay in FATA.

Thus the emergence of Taliban should not be a surprise if one analyzes the situation in retrospect. The following section discusses the argument in light of the two theoretical approaches mentioned above.

1.3: Reductionism, Social Engineering and the Pakhtun Culture

Pakhtun culture has been distorted due to reductionism and social engineering. When the ground work was done through a process of image or perception-building, the stage was set for a possible social change.

* A malik is a tribal elder or chief appointed by the government who works as a representative of the concern tribe in FATA.

Contemporary image of the Pakhtuns has largely been shaped by the stereotypical approach in the historical literature and the resultant myopic policies by the British colonial administration. The British had adopted this approach as part of the colonialists' project of treating the indigenous people as 'Others'. This was the strategy which they used not only to justify their occupation but also their inhuman treatment of the subject population. "When Other is not only dehumanized but has been successfully converted into an 'it', deprived of manhood, the stage is set for any type of direct violence, which is then blamed on the victim" (Galtung, 1990, p. 298). From this perspective Pakhtuns suffered from double "Otherization". In line with the colonial outlook,

Not only were they an undervalued mass peasantry who were deemed incapable of constructive political action by their own (or at least the Indian) bourgeoisie; they were also as Pathans, the victims of particularly extreme orientalist representations, which portrayed them as far more hotheaded and unpredictable than even the average Indian peasant. (Banerjee, 2000, p. 13)

The British colonial policy towards the Pakhtuns, however, vacillated between the two extreme poles and along with it the description about the Pakhtuns. Colonial policy was torn apart between a "closed border" and a "forward policy". The former policy was a myopic one, limiting actual administration to the settled districts only. It was effected from a strong base within the settled districts through blockades, subsidies to the concern tribes, tampering with the existing tribal system by occasionally manipulating the tribal

affairs, and, when absolutely inevitable, armed expeditions against the tribes. This was the situation towards the second Afghan war in 1878-80. When this policy bore little fruit, they jumped to the forward policy after the 1890s. The forward policy was more assertive and more dynamic. It was meant to push the international frontier far northward and westward as far as physically possible. They adopted a carrot and stick policy for this purpose. For exercising a full sovereignty over the whole region they used both education and force of arms (Spain, 1979).

Thus, one finds two opposing views in the literature about the Pakhtuns. The initial administrators, for example, had a more positive view of the indigenous people. Elphinstone, one of the first emissaries to the Kingdom of Kabul, wrote about the Pakhtuns,

An English traveler from India would view them with a more favorable eye....the cold climate.....people not fluttering in white muslins while half their bodies are naked, but soberly and decently attired in dark-colored woolen clothes..... . He would admire their fair complexions and European features, their industry and enterprise, the hospitality, sobriety and contempt of pleasure which appear in all their habits; and above all, the independence and energy of their character. (Elphinstone, 1839, p.198)

It is surprising, even, that the Pakhtuns were compared favorably to the other people in India. For example the same writer goes on to say:

All communication with the Afghans is rendered agreeable by the dependence which can be placed on what they say. They have not that indifference to truth, and that style of habitual and gratuitous falsehood, which astonishes an European in natives of India and Persia.....one may generally rely on the Afghans both for correctness and fidelity.
(Elphinstone, 1839, p. 326)

This positive depiction of the Pakhtuns or the indigenous people for that matter reflects the intellectual currents in the contemporary Europe and the educational and philosophical background of the initial administrators. More importantly, this was the time when no direct military confrontation between the British and the Pakhtuns had taken place; therefore, the early writers could afford generosity in their approach (Banerjee, 2000).

However, this situation soon changed after the first Anglo-Afghan war which started in 1839. The war was a humiliating defeat for the British. The British forces, actually, withdrew after it installed a government of its own choice in Kabul, in the belief that the country has been brought under control. In 1840, however, Kabul rose in revolt and the withdrawing British forces were butchered by tribesmen; to the extent that only one soldier was left alive. This was a humiliation of unprecedented nature for the colonial power. Along with the first Anglo-Afghan war, the 1857 Indian war of independence, called mutiny by the British, were the events which changed British policies towards the

Punjab and, particularly towards the Pakhtuns. “Because India was the greatest source of wealth in the British Empire and the Pashtuns inhabited the overland gateway to India through the Khyber Pass, the stakes in this region were extremely high” (Johansen, 1997: p. 57). The British was determined to hold the region at any cost and sent almost 100 military expeditions during their rule to achieve their objectives (Johansen, 1997). It was made difficult for them by the Pakhtuns, however. As ‘the dog must be given a bad name to kill it’, their image of the Pakhtuns increasingly changed. Bellew wrote, for example:

We have judged the Afghan as we have found him and we have found him very wanting. He has his virtues and he has his vices, and to our mind the latter overbalance the former very heavily. He is not fit to govern either himself or others, and sadly wants a master. If we don’t take up that role, Russia will. For a master the Afghans want, and a master they must have sooner or later. Which is it to be? (H. W. Bellew, 1880, p. 55)

Pakhtuns were blamed for all the violence in the region, although, the British forgot that as colonizers they were originally responsible for the prevailing chaos. Thus, in 1896 William Crooke wrote, “The true Pathan [Pashtun] is perhaps the most barbaric of all the races with which we are brought into contact. Pashtuns are cruel, blood-thirsty and vindictive in the highest degree....” (Crooke, 1896, pp. 167-168).

In the process of their contacts with the Pakhtuns, the British gradually realized that it was difficult to subdue them on their own soil. Therefore, the policy of attributing

stereotypes to the Pakhtuns was also part of the strategy to camouflage their failures in the frontier. Thus, in between one finds a grudging admiration of the Pakhtuns. Edward Oliver wrote in 1890, for example:

When you meet a Pathan, you meet a man like yourself....He will never allow you to abuse him, but makes up for it amply by never making you wish to do so....He takes his independence for granted, and seldom parades it in the garb of rudeness. (Edward E. Oliver, 1890, p. 224.)

However, this admiration aside, and that too based on myths and part of the stereotypes, British approach towards the Pakhtuns was extremely negative. Although, they did not succeed to subdue the people, however, what they left behind was a distorted image of the Pakhtuns which haunt them even today. One of the dangerous things about the stereotypes is that it becomes a self professing reality: people themselves believe in, and react accordingly, what has been attributed to them. To a certain extent, this has been the case with the Pakhtuns. Such was the influence of the British intellectual ascendancy that the indigenous writers followed them in similar vein. Ghani Khan, for example, romanticizes this approach when he says:

He (Pakhtun) is forbidden colorful clothes or exotic music, for they weaken the arm and soften the eye. He is taught to look at the hawk and forget the nightingale. He is asked to kill his beloved to save the souls of

her children. It is a perpetual surrender – an eternal giving up of man to man and their wise follies. (Ghani Khan, 1948, p. 27)

This approach was even hardened after the creation of Pakistan. It was given a practical shape in the 1980s and onwards, and it is still haunting the Pakhtuns. The Talibanization of the Pakhtun society, which is a product of this approach, is solely blamed on the Pakhtuns. As a result, Pakhtuns are punished for the problems which are hardly of their own making.

Culture reductionism in the case of Pakhtuns has transformed it to a dangerous scenario in the hands of the modern media discourse and a handful of foreign writers, especially in the aftermath of 9/11. From the Taliban harboring al Qaeda fugitives to the militants destroying girls' schools, women wearing *burqas* (Veil), slitting the throats of the people in an inhuman way, everything seems compatible with Pakhtuns' culture for them. Taliban's Islam, in this way, is equated with the Pakhtuns' culture, (Taj, 2008; Thoms & Mason, 2008).

“Jihad is oven in the Pakhtuns' culture”, said General (ret.) Hameed Gul*. “The blood of the two peoples have warmth in them, he continued, the blood of the Arabs and that of the Pakhtuns’. “Pakhtuns love the Holy Quran, and the Quran teaches jihad in the way of

* General Hameed Gul is a retired General of the Pakistan army and ex-Chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). He has played a leading role in the rise of Taliban inside Afghanistan. In fact, it was during his tenure, as chief of the ISI, that Pakistan vigorously pursued the policy of cultivating the Islamist militia in Afghanistan. The scholar carried out an extensive interview with him for the purpose of this study on December 8, 2010 at his residence in the garrison city of Rawalpindi.

Allah”, said the General emotionally. He was of the view that Pakhtuns are compelled by their culture to fight the imperial power (the US) and its supporters, so long as it maintains a presence in this region (personal communication, December 8, 2010). The General is not alone in saying this. It has been a dominant view about the Pakhtuns for centuries now. It does not really matter what is real and what is not, what matters is that you make people believe that something is real. These are only myths and have nothing to do with Pakhtuns and their culture but people like General Hameed Gul have successfully convinced a segment of the population that this is reality.

When this policy of attributing myths and stereotypes was successful the rest was relatively easy. Social engineering in the Pakhtuns’ region in the form of religious indoctrination of the youth and inculcation of a reactionary, militant, and jihadist culture in the society, started with the April 1978 revolution and the subsequent Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Since its independence Pakistan had to bear with a formidable enemy in the shape of India on its eastern border. It was obvious that Pakistan did not want turbulence on other borders. The communists’ revolution of 1978 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were bound to have implications for Pakistan’s strategic policy. Even before that, there were two factors which compelled Pakistan to intervene in the Afghan affairs. The first was the search for a military or strategic depth in the shape of a friendly regime in Afghanistan and the second was the Pakhtunistan issue. In fact the two were interrelated in that a friendly regime would not take up the Pakhtunistan issue to irritate Islamabad (Marwat, 2005). So even before the Communist intervention

Pakistan had started training certain Afghan dissidents against the Communist government in Kabul (Gul, 2009).

The conscious policy of manipulation and engineering started, however, with the influx of refugees after the April revolution and the Soviet occupation. Most of the refugees were concentrated in camps in the tribal area and in and around Peshawar. They were divided in seven *Tanzimat** or parties based on their political inclinations and religious beliefs. Everything was strictly monitored by the Pakistani military through its secret agencies. Funds coming from the United States and other Middle Eastern countries were channeled to these groups through the hands of these secret agencies. The distribution of the funds was not uniform. The process was covertly manipulated by the concerned authorities (Marwat, 2005). The bulk of these funds and other resources went to *Hizb-e-Islami* of Gulbaddin Hikmatyar, an orthodox, *Sunni*, *Hanafi* group, considered as Pakistan's closest ally.

Distinction was made between a *muhajir* (refugee) and a *mujahid* (holy warrior). As every *mujahid* was a *muhajir* but every *muhajir* was not a *mujahid*. The *mujahideen* were to fight the Soviet army in Afghanistan. Subsequently, they were trained and equipped with modern weapons to prepare them for the war (Rashid, 2008). Jihadi literature was created and disseminated to galvanize the people to support the war cause, morally

* The seven parties included, 1: *Hizb-i-Islami* (Party of Islam) led by Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, 2: *Jamiat-i-Islami* (Islamic Society) led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, 3: *Itehad Islami* (Islamic Unity) led by Abdul Rauf Sayaf, 4: *Hizb-i-Islami* (Party of Islam) led by Maulavi Younas Khalis, 5: *Mahaz-i-Milli Islam* (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan) led by Pir Syed Ahmad Gilani, 6: *Jabhai-i-Nijat-Milli* (Afghan National Liberation Front) led by Sibghatulla mujadidi, and 7: *Harkat-i-Inqilabi-Islami* (Islamic Revolutionary Forces) led by Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi.

financially, and logistically. Furthermore, jihadis from around the world were encouraged to come and fight the “infidels”.

The process was backed by a network of *madrassas* or religious schools throughout the country but especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA. About one thousand *madrassas* and *Dar-ul-Ulum* were established in the country. Money coming from the Middle Eastern countries or the so called petro-dollars was funneled to these *madrassas*. Rs. 15969 million were distributed amongst forty two *madrassas* alone during 1985 to 1991. Stress was on the jihadi content so as to produce more and more jihadis. These *madrassas* also hosted thousands of foreign students from other Islamic countries who were instrumental in the Afghan jihad (Marwat, 2005).

Some of the religious institutions established by the Afghan refugees parties themselves were the following:

- 1) *Madrassa Hijrat aw Jihad* (Seminary of Emigration and Holy War)
- 2) *Da‘wat wa Jihad Pohantoon* (University of Islamic Propagation and Holy war)
- 3) *Madrassa Abu Hanifa*
- 4) Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani School
- 5) *Dar-ul-Hufaz Madrassa* (For memorizing of Holy Quran)
- 6) *Uminat-ul-Mumineen* (Mothers of the Believers) for female students.

The most dangerous of all these manipulating strategies and the one which had implications for the future was that regarding the school children. Schools were set up for the Afghan refugees’ children, run by different UN specialized agencies like the

UNHCR, other NGOs, and political parties like the *Jamat-e-Islami*. Strict indoctrination of militant Islamic ideology was the main purpose of these schools. Text books which were published in the US included much unnecessary material designed for ideological propaganda (Gul, 2009). For example the mathematics books included problems such as: If out of 10 infidels 5 were killed by 1 Muslim, 5 would be left. $5 \text{ guns} + 5 \text{ guns} = 10 \text{ guns}$. $15 \text{ bullets} - 10 \text{ bullets} = 5 \text{ bullets}$ etc (Marwat, 2005, p. 34).

It should be mentioned here that most, if not all, these activities were taking place on the Pakhtuns' soil and bound to have implications for the society in the future. For example, firstly, *madrassas* set up in the region were not limited to the Afghan refugees alone. In fact majority of the students enrolled in these *madrassas* belonged to FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The number of these *madrassas* has increased over the years and currently there are over 20000 religious seminaries in the country (Mir, 2009). Important thing is that these *madrassas* have not brought about any significant changes in the curriculum. Money, coming from abroad, is still channeled to these *madrassas*. Thus, the Afghan war is no more there but a constant supply of *mujahideen* has been unhindered. *Madrassas* have been set up along sectarian lines. As a result there are separate *madrassas* for *Sunnis* and *Shias*. Even further demarcation has been made within *Sunnis* and *Shias*. Groups like *Deobandis*, *Barelvis*, and *Ahl al Hadith* have their own religious schools. Hate speeches, directed against each other, have been instrumental in the wave of sectarian violence in the region for the last three decades. Secondly, Pakhtun society has become militarized. Apart from the concentration of heavy weaponry in FATA, the Kalashnikov (AK 47) culture has engulfed the entire settled region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. A house without a

Kalashnikov can hardly be found even in the urban areas. And thirdly, drug trafficking and illegal trade in goods and arms has hindered healthy economic activities.

Moreover, the process of manipulation and social engineering was not confined to the refugees' camps alone. Zia ul Haq, through the process of Islamization embarked upon a vigorous policy to transform the society. Major reforms were introduced in the legal and constitutional system of the country. The parliament was renamed as *Majlis-e-Shoora* and laws deemed repugnant to the Islamic *Shariah* were either amended or abolished. Government official were appointed not on merit but on their credentials of being practical Muslims. Five-time prayer was made compulsory in all the departments of the government and the Islamic curriculum in the educational system was given a renewed attention (Abbas, 2005). Thorough a well thought out strategy the role of armed forces in the country was strengthened and the pluralistic voice of the people was silenced. The *madrassa* certificate or *Sanad* was made equivalent to the university degree which brought the religious forces from the periphery to the mainstream politics of the country. *Hudood** Ordinance was passed to effect Islamic sentences for major crimes (Marwat, 2005).

Through this combination of religion and politics, the Islamic groups gained more leverage as against the political forces. In a nutshell, the Afghan war and the policy of

* Hudood Ordinance is a law in Pakistan that was enacted in 1979 as part of then-military ruler Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization. The *Hudood* Law was intended to implement Islamic *Shari'a* law, by enforcing punishments mentioned in the Quran and *sunnah* for *Zina* (extramarital sex), *Qazf* (false accusation of *zina*), Offence Against Property (theft), and Prohibition (the drinking of alcohol).

social engineering carried out by the state brought about a negative social change in the society, which surfaced after 9/11.

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Chapter 2

The Rise of Terrorism in the Pakhtun Region: The Role of Culture

2.1: Introduction

This chapter provides the historical background to the rise of terrorism in the Pakhtun region. The present turbulent situation unleashed by an unprecedented wave of terrorism on the Pakhtun land is but a continuation of a long process, spread over decades. The areas now comprising FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have a long history of resistance movements, however, it is clear that the notion of jihad has transformed considerably over the years, not only in terms of the leadership of the jihadi movements and the means employed by them but also in terms of its goals and objectives. Before the creation of the state of Pakistan jihadi or religious movements were rallied around a saintly figure or “*Sufi*”. However, leadership was taken over by the political *mullah** in the new jihad which started in the 1970s and flourished in the 1980s after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (Akhtar, 2010). Objective of the former was to clear the Muslim land of foreign powers, the Sikhs and the British; the new jihad unleashed by the orthodox *mullah* was mainly centered on the acquisition of political power by the traditional *mullah*, hitherto marginalized and considered non-Pakhtuns in the Pakhtun dominated society. The machination of the new state of Pakistan came as a catalyst in the process of the orthodox *mullah* coming into prominence, mainly to contain secular forces inside the country, and to use the former as “strategic tools” to achieve “strategic objectives”, outside the country in the two rival neighbors (Afghanistan and India) (Akhtar, 2010). In

* Generic term to refer to the leader of prayer at the mosque

fact in both the cases state patronage was vital for the successful implementation of the strategy.

Seminal anthropological studies on Pakhtuns rightly suggest that religion plays a dominant role in the Pakhtun society, as saintly figures acquire enormous powers in times of extraordinary crises (Haroon, 2011). Religious mobilizations led by such figures like Syed Ahmad Bareilly (19th century), Hada Mullah and Haji Sahib Turangzai (20th century), are a clear indication of this trend. However, it does not mean that Islam overpowers or engulfs the culture. Fredrik Barth has rightly observed in his “Segmentary Lineage Theory” “that *Sufis* and saints were outsiders to the Pakhtun *Jirgah*-style assemblies and asserted no political power there” (as cited in Haroon, 2011, p. 63). Akbar Ahmad suggests that “the actual structure of the tribe did not involve religious authority in any form except in opportunist seizer of power in situations where traditional *maliki* authority weakened” (as cited in Haroon, 2011, p. 63). At the same time recourse to religion by the Pakhtuns has been selective. For example the Pakhtun culture has retained the right to *Badal* or revenge even after embracing Islam. *Badal* in the personal capacity is clearly contradictory to the spirit of Islamic judicial system. However, it does not imply either that cultural framework completely define Pakhtuns’ discourse in the day to day life. Many other factors including religion, state policies and socio-political environment play a role. It also does not mean that cultural outlook is completely violent. For example the notion of *Badal* is modified by the other two cardinal elements of Pakhtun culture, that of *Panah* (Asylum), and *Melmastya* (Hospitality), as discussed in the first chapter of this study. The following sections discuss these arguments in greater detail. Armed

religious mobilizations before the creation of Pakistan in the Pakhtun land are discussed in the second section. It is an important starting point as except for the movement led by Tipu Sultan, and that too in the initial years of the British rule when it was consolidating its power in India, hardly any other part of the country had produced a genuine armed resistance movement. The third section analyzes the rise of non-state actors under the state patronage right from 1947. The section, however, mainly focuses on the period of the Afghan jihad and the rise into prominence of different jihadi groups. This is certainly the most important of all the phases in the rise of terrorism in the Pakhtun land. This era saw the now lethal jihadi groups mushrooming, mainly due to a network of *madrassas*. The last section discusses the rise of terrorism in the backdrop of the US led War on Terror. Analyses of this new form of terrorism is imperative, as for the first time the terrorist have turned their guns to the state of Pakistan which hitherto patronized these groups. Of special importance is the discussion about the formation, activities, and objectives of the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) in this section.

2.2: Historical Background

Two factors which largely influenced armed religious mobilizations in the Pakhtun region, before the partition of Indo-subcontinent, were: 1) *Sufi* revivalist movements in the Indo-subcontinent and, 2) the establishment of *Darul Ulum Deoband* in the 19th century.

Millenarian (Religious belief in a future period of ideal peace and happiness) movements and systems of *Sufi* religious practices had always attracted Pakhtuns of the northern

India. Most of these movements originated in mainland India (Present day India), while the theatre of its militant offshoots were the Pakhtun regions. Different *silsilas* or *Sufi* orders have appealed to the Pakhtuns of the region. The *Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya silsila* inspired most of the militant uprisings against the Sikhs and the British in the 19th and 20th century. *Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddadiyya tariqa* or method was inspired by the teachings of Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi, the seventeenth-century Muslim *Sufi* and philosopher, also known as Mujaddid AlfSani (1564-1624). Shah Wali Ullah (1703-1762), student and successor of Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindi, further elaborated the teachings of his mentor emphasizing *Shariah* (Islamic Law) as the basis of social practice (Haroon, 2011). This *tariqa* while retaining the tenants of *Sufism* added emphasis to individualized religious practices by returning to the teachings of Quran, *Hadith* (Sayings of the Prophet SAW), and authoritative commentaries. However, Pakhtuns did not follow *Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya* order exclusively. They intermingled it with other prevailing *Sufi* orders like *Qaderiyya*, *Suhrawardiyya*, and *Chishtiyya* thought (Haroon, 2011). One of the main reasons of the popularity of these movements was the cult of its charismatic leaders. Sainly figures like Syed Ahmad Bareilly, Shah Ismail, Akhund Abdul Ghafoor (19th century), and Haji Sahib Turangzai (20th century) could easily mobilize large numbers of Pakhtuns by appealing to their love of religion. Although, they capitalized on the Pakhtuns' sentiments, however the cardinal feature of the success of these movements was state patronage. Analyses of Mughal accounts suggest that *pirs* and religious personalities among the Pakhtuns were given powers and were patronized to control the politically volatile regions. Emperor Jehangir would give allowances to *pirs* of *Naqshbandiyya* order in return for their loyalty (Haroon, 2011). These *pirs** would

* A pir is a spiritual guide in the Sufi tradition.

work as eyes and ears of the imperial government in asserting the state control. State patronage in turn strengthened the *pirs'* role in dominating religious organizations through reinforced personal prestige and wealth. Given their weak political position, Afghan rulers were even more willing, than their Indian counterparts, in patronizing religious personalities to consolidate state control in the far-reaching areas. Ahmad Shah Abdali (1723-73) and Amir Dost Mujhammad Khan (1826-63) entrusted a juristic role in religious personalities, appointing them *qazis* or jurists, not only to adjudicate disputes at the local level but to regularize a legal code for the nascent state. This confidence in the *pirs* and *Sufis* made them rulers in their own respective areas. It was this combination of religious and temporal power which brought to prominence such religious functionaries as Akhund Abdul Ghafoor.

2.2.1: Akhund Abdul Ghafoor and his Jihad

Akhund Abdul Ghafoor (1793-1878) was the son of a Safi-Mohmand from upper Swat. He received his initial training in the *Sufi tariqa*, *Naqshbandiyya* line, from the Hazrat Ji of Kabul in Peshawar. However, the most extensive education in multiple *silsilas* was imparted to him by Akhund Muhammad Shoaib. Akhund Shoaib had himself taken *bait* (Oath of allegiance to the pir) in *Naqshbandiyya*, *Chishtiyya*, *Qaderiyya* as well as *Suhrawardiyya* line. Akhund Ghafoor attained his most vigorous training in all *silsilas* from Akhund Shoab and took *bait* in *Naqshbandiyya* and *Qaderiyya*. His mastery in the *Sufi tariqa* earned Abdul Ghafoor the title of Akhund, a title denoting distinction in the *Sufi tariqa*. Akhund Abdul Ghafoor came to prominence during the Afghan Amir Dost Muhammad Khan's campaign against the Sikh Kingdom of Ranjit Singh (1780-1839) in

1835. The Amir referred to the campaign as a jihad and appealed to the Yusufzai *pirs* for assistance. The Akhund came to the call for jihad, raised an armed *lashkar* and fought against the Sikhs at Peshawar. As a reward for this campaign, the Amir awarded him land among the Yusufzai in Swat, Lundkhwar, and Mardan (Haroony, 2011). This helped the Akhund in two ways: first, this earned him the reputation of a *Mujahid* and took part in the subsequent mobilizations, i.e. Syed Ahmad Bareilly's jihad against the Sikhs. Second, it provided him with enough wealth to cater for his generous *langarkhana* (An open community kitchen) which fed 500 men on a daily bases. This in turn strengthened his following. Among his followers was Mullah Najmuddin of Hadda, called the Hadda Mullah.

Hadda Mullah's succession and Akhund Abdul Ghafoor's death coincide the coming into power of Amir Abdur Rehman (1879-1901) in Kabul. Amir Abdur Rehman initiated the process of the consolidation of the Afghan state authority from the centre. Under this policy, autonomy given to local religious figures was curtailed as formal military and administrative system evolved. The situation was made more difficult by the British forward policy which was initiated from the east. As against the closed border policy, the imperial power made westward advances through active military campaigns, thereby creating hurdles for Hadda Mullah to achieve an autonomous sphere of influence in the region. Therefore, Hadda Mullah's efforts focused on resisting these pressures to his regional autonomy. His major military campaigns were targeted against the British. He mobilized against the imperial power in 1893 in opposition to the latter's encroachment into Chitral and the penetration of the area by railway lines and cantonments. In

collaboration with Sadullah Khan, called *Sartor Mullah* (Bare-headed), also called “Made Mullah” by the British, Hadda Mullah fought against the British in the battle of Malakand in 1897-98, mobilizing people from Buner and Mohmand. This was the time when descendants of the Akhund Abdul Ghafoor led by Mian Gul Abdul Wadud, parted their ways from Hadda Mullah, thereby weakening the reformist agenda of Akhund Ghafoor *piri-muridi** line. This made things even more difficult for Hadda Mullah in achieving an independent sphere of influence in the Swat region.

However after their death, Akhund Ghafoor and Hadda Mullah’s reformist agenda was taken well into the 20th century by his murids. Prominent among them was Haji Turangzai who fought a prolonged jihad against the British in the tribal areas. Haji Turangzai will be discussed later. Syed Ahmad of Rai Bareilly who had enormously influenced Akhund Abdul Ghafoor in the initial years, and who precedes Haji Turangzai in his jihadist campaign, is discussed in the following section.

2.2.2: Syed Ahmad of Rai Bareilly

Syed Ahmad is considered as the founder of the *Wahabi-Ahl Hadith* movement in the Indian Subcontinent. In fact the Al Qaeda-inspired Taliban-led jihadi ideology now at work in the region was initiated by Syed Ahmad Shaheed in the early 19th century (Ahmad, 2009). He was a close friend and student of Shah Ismail, grandson of Shah Wali Ullah, founder of the revivalist movement in India. Syed Ahmad went to Makkah for pilgrimage in 1821. During his stay in Arabia he was strongly influenced by the teachings

* The relationship between pir as teacher and murid as disciple

of Sheikh Abdul Wahab, founder of the *Wahabi* ideology. After coming home he toured India for the next seven years, making ground for his jihadist campaign (Ahmad, 2009). Subsequently he proclaimed jihad upon the Sikhs in Punjab. Starting from Akora Khattak in 1826 he finally liberated Peshawar from the Sikhs in 1830. He was declared as *Amir-ul-Momineen* or leader of the believers, *Shariah* was imposed in Peshawar and the city was given in the hands of two brothers, Sultan Muhammad Khan and Yar Muhammad Khan. However, through a treacherous plan in connivance with the Pakhtun leaders, the Sikhs were able to recapture the city. This strengthened Sikhs position vis-à-vis Syed Ahmad Bareilly and they bounced back strongly. In the final battle at Balakot in 1831, Syed Ahmad was killed along with Shah Ismail and other of his companions (Ahmad, 2009). Although the battle brought an end to hostilities in the short run, however, the movement inspired by Syed Ahmad Shaheed became a harbinger of more such events in the region in the future. Soon after the battle of Balakot myths were created about the person of Syed Ahmad. It was rumored that he was alive, taking refuge in a cave and one day, would resurrect the jihad against the non-believers (Ahmad, 2009). His shrine at Balakot is still revered by many as a symbol of the cause of Muslim *Ummah* (Community of the believers). Syed Ahmad Bareilly died but the movement initiated by him was kept alive by his followers. Even Akhund Abdul Ghafoor was strongly influenced by the revivalist movement of Syed Ahmad right from the beginning. He even vigorously took part in Syed Ahmad's campaign against the Sikhs (Haroon, 2011). In turn, among the followers of Akhun Abdul Ghafoor was Haji Sahib Turangzai who engaged the British for more than two decades in the tribal areas.

2.2.3: Haji Sahib Turangzai

Haji Sahib Turangzai was born in 1858 to a religious family in the small town of Turangzai in district Charsadda. His real name was Fazal Wahid. Haji Sahib received his early religious education from a renowned religious scholar of his area, Syed Abu Bakar. After completing his early religious training in his home town he was admitted to a famous religious seminary in Tehkal in the outskirts of Peshawar. This *madrassa* was affiliated to the *Naqshbandiyya-Mujadiddiyya* school of thought in line with the teachings of Mujaddid AlfSani and Shah Wali Ullah (Haroon, 2011). The *madrassa* had profound effect on his future life, making him one of the influential revivalist leaders of his time. Soon after graduating from the *madrassa*, he visited *Darul Uloom Deoband* in India, one of the great religious institutions in the world. During his stay at the *Darul Uloom*, he was introduced to Maulana Mahamudul Hassan by the Pakhtun students of the *madrassa*. The Maulana was a prominent religious authority and Haji Sahib grew an attachment to him. He accompanied the Maulana on *Haj* (Pilgrimage) to Makkah. At Makkah he took *bait* (pledge of allegiance) at the hands of Haji Imadadullah, one of the members of the *Wahabi* revivalist movement (Razarwal, 2008; Haroon, 2011). Haji Imadadullah showed great trust in Haji Turangzai, convincing him to take the task of Islamic revivalism in his own area. Upon his return, Haji Sahib took yet another *bait* at the hands of Najmuddin Hadda Mulla, trusted ally and successor of Akhund Abdul Ghafoor (Haroon, 2011). From then onwards, Haji Sahib channeled his whole energies for the cause of Islamic revivalism, mainly through armed resistance.

This was the period of widespread resistance against the British and Haji Turangzai started his campaign by actively participating in the *Hadda Mulla's* attack on the British cantonments at Malakand and Chakdara in 1897 (Rauf, 2006). Heavy losses were inflicted on the British in this attack, making the *Mujahideen* emboldened to accelerate their armed activities. After the demise of Hadda Mulla in 1902, Haji Turangzai gave a renewed pledge of allegiance to his successor, Maulvi Alam Gul. In turn Maulvi Alam Gul gave him his sword and turban, thereby making him his *Khalifa* (Deputy). Moreover, judging his caliber, Haji Sahib was appointed as *Amirul Mujahideen* (Commander of the Mujahideen) of the militant wing of the *Tehrik-e-Hizb Ullah* (Movement of the Party of God), an independence movement, in a secret meeting in Delhi's Fateh Puri mosque in 1914 (Haroon, 2011). Haji Sahib accelerated his jihadist campaign and mobilized large numbers of people in support of his cause after these responsibilities were entrusted to him. Fearing large scale mobilizations in the Pakhtun region the colonial authority issued orders for the arrest of Turangzai on 12th June 1915 (Razarwal, 2008). However, escaping the arrest Haji Sahib migrated to the Mohmand territory along with his sons and close friends. He settled in Sur Kamar, later renamed as Ghazi Abad by Haji Sahib, in the Safi region of Mohmand territory (Haroon, 2011). Tribal region provided a perfect base for Turangzai from where to launch activities against the colonial power: safe refuge, a responsive population, and enough arms and ammunition. Capitalizing on these factors Haji Turangzai engaged the British for 20 long years in the tribal region and the adjoining settled districts. For example on one occasion in 1916 Haji Sahib, along with *mujahideen* from Mohmand, Bajaur, Peshawar, and Mardan launched a massive attack on the Shabqadar Fort. They inflicted heavy losses on the British, albeit with a considerable

collateral damage as the colonial authority had resorted to aerial bombardment, fearing a complete loss of ground to the untrained militia (Rauf, 2006).

In 1923 the British sent troops to Mohmand. But this time without shedding any blood they managed to sign a peace deal with Haji Turangzai, thereby avoiding hostilities for the time being. However, in 1926 the British decided to construct a road network in the region to pave the way for the swift mobilization of the troops. This was vehemently opposed by Haji Turangzai. Two major confrontations were made with the British on this issue in 1926 and 1927 (Haroon, 2011). Although the *mujahideen* did not suffer much losses but the colonial authority was able in spreading the road network. The British were annoyed by such threatening activities of the *mujahideen*, however. They sent three brigades to the upper Mohmand in 1935 to settle the issue once and for all. The *mujahideen* confronted the British troops at Nahaqi Pass on 29 September 1935. The *mujahideen* demoralized the British troops due to their courageous performance at the battlefield, killing 35 of their officers and injuring another 60 in just one night (Haroon, 2011). Thus the British were compelled to send men to the Mohmands for talks. The latter agreed and a grand jirgah of all the Mohmand tribes was held at Gandhab. After a prolonged discussion, peace was restored as a result of a truce. This was to be Haji Sahib's last jihad. He fell ill in 1936 and died one year later on 14th December 1937 (Rauf, 2006). However this was not to be the end of jihad. *Mujahideen*, inspired by the Akhund Abdul Ghafoor-Hadda Mullah and Haji Turangzai's movements were busy in armed resistance till the departure of the British from the Indian Subcontinent, not only in Mohmand but in other tribal agencies as well. One such mujahid was the Faqir of Ipi.

2.2.4: The Faqir of Ipi

Mirza Ali Khan or the Faqir of Ipi as he was called by his followers was born in 1897 in Shankai Kairta in North Waziristan Agency. After completing his early religious education in different *madrassas*, Mirza Ali Khan went to a place near Jalalabad and became *Murid* (Disciple) of the Naqib of Chaharbagh, a famous religious scholar in Afghanistan. He went to Makkah in 1923 and performed *Haj*. After returning from Makkah the Faqir settled in Ipi near Mirali in the North Waziristan Agency and started his peaceful religious preaching. He attained the status of saintliness and attracted large number of followers (Hauner, 1981).

Although, he was already inspired by the Islamic revivalist movements led by different *Sufis* in the Pakhtun region, however, the event which turned Mirza Ali Khan from a saint to a jihadi and made him the most feared yet unconquered man for the British was the story, in early 1936, of a young Hindu girl by the name of Ram Kor and a Muslim boy Amir Noor Ali Shah from Bannu. They both fell in love and decided to marry. The girl converted to Islam, was renamed Islam Bibi, and subsequently married Noor Ali Shah in a simple wedding ceremony. However, this was strongly resented by the mother of the girl and she reported to the Bannu Police Station, accusing Noor Ali of kidnapping the young girl. In April, 1936, the court proceedings ruled the girl to be a minor and declared the marriage null and void. The girl was given back to her parents and Noor Ali was jailed. The ruling of the court aroused strong indignation among the majority Muslim

community, accusing the British government of undue interference in a purely religious affair (Haroon, 2011).

At this juncture the Faqir rose to prominence. Other religious leaders of the area were mobilized and an appeal for jihad was made, attracting the wider population. In the ensuing crisis the Faqir engaged the British in an intense guerrilla campaign right until their departure from the Indian Subcontinent in 1947 (Dupree, 1973). The Faqir's tactics were simple in utilizing the insufficient and inferior-quality weapons in an effective way. He would use hit-and-run strategy, ambushing a British convoy or military installation and hiding in the nearby caves, mostly capitalizing on local informants for his intelligence (Hauner, 1981). The British, with its superior quality of weaponry and better trained troops were unable to kill or capture the religious leader, wasting their men and resources for more than 10 years, starting from mid 1930s to 1947. At one point about 40,000 British and Indian troops were searching for the Faqir trying to capture him but to no avail (Hauner, 1981).

Keeping in view the Faqir tactics, a remarkable parallel can be made with Osama bin Ladin. The latter, living in the same mountainous region on the Pak-Afghan border, successfully used local informants to escape a US attack in 2001. The Faqir, however, had an added advantage. He was a local and knew the people and its terrain very well, using it to the best of his advantage. Through his own personal courage, miraculous power (as his followers believed he possessed), and some of the brave and loyal fighters,

the Faqir was able to keep not only the British at bay but also inflicting heavy losses on them.

Even after the British departure and the creation of Pakistan the Faqir did not reconcile and continued with his activities. He was supported by the government of Afghanistan, inimical to the new state of Pakistan, for its own national interests. The insurgency was brought to an end only after the surrender of Maher Dil, Commander-in-Chief of the Faqir, to the Pakistani authorities in November 1954. The Faqir himself died peacefully in 1960 (Hauner, 1981). This completely brought an end to his militant campaign in the region, only to be imitated more than half a century later by Baitullah Mehsud, Hakimullah Mehsud and other Pakistani Taliban leaders, albeit for different objectives.

2.2.5: *Darul Ulum Deoband* and Religious Mobilizations in the Pakhtun Land

Darul Ulum Deoband was established in 1864 at Deoband in the United Provinces in India, mainly to impart religious education to students from around the world. However, its role in the twentieth century Pakhtun region was more of a political nature than a religious one.

At the start of 20th century, some religious scholars at the *Darul Ulum* were busy in bifurcating the revivalist and *Sufi* tendencies in the work of Shah Wali Ullah. They emphasized his revivalist agenda but rejected the notion that its genesis was in the *Sufi* practice. Instead, they stressed on the actual content of Quran and *Sunnah* (Practice of the

Holy Prophet SAW) and individualized method of religious practice, thereby removing the *pir* as an intermediary between man and God (Haroon, 2011). Programs were started to rid the society of heretical practices. Students of Deoband long considered themselves as heirs and carrier of the idea of Pan-Islamism, expounded by the Persian religious philosopher Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1839-97). Pan-Islamism sought solidarity among the Muslims around the globe. This was largely influenced by colonialism, as miseries of the latter were shared by Muslims from all over the world. Around 1910, the idea of Pan-Islamism was gaining ground in India, especially among the prominent scholars at Deoband (Haroon, 2011).

In 1914, Maulana Mahmudul Hassan, Chancellor of the *Darul Ulum*, proposed a plan for the liberation of India. It was decided that he would send his deputies to the tribal areas' Pakhtuns to support religious figures there to wage a militant campaign against the imperial power. They pointed out that it was a contradiction to wage armed resistance from mainland India since the nationalists had adopted a non-violent course. Hence the tribal areas provided a perfect waging ground owing to the free nature of the tribes, character of the people, and past relation of the area to the Indian politics. Maulana Hussian Ahmad Madni observed:

Without violence [*we believe*], evicting the *angrez* from Hindustan was impossible. For this [violent action of the *angrez*] a centre, weapons and *mujahidin* were necessary. Hence, it was thought that arrangement for weapons and recruitment of soldiers should be conducted in the area of the 'free tribes'. (Haroon, 2011, p. 90)

Under this discourse, a well thought out strategy was adopted and a narrative was built about the Pakhtuns, highlighting the un-administered nature of their land, militaristic character of the people, and their love for independence. Maulana Obaidullah Sindhi (1872-1944), a scholar at Deoband, and Hussain Ahmad Madni, another religious figure at the *Darul Ulum*, articulated this political ideology about the Pakhtuns. Pakhtun population of the tribal region was described as a separate and distinct people from the rest of the Muslims in India. Highly idealized appraisals of the Pakhtun society and their past history were stressed to back their strategy in the tribal region. Pakhtun youth of the free tribes (*Azad Qabail*) were described as ‘strong willed and brave’, which had always been busy in jihad. Jihadist activities of Hadda Mullah and Syed Ahmad Breilly were emphasized as a mark of Pakhtun commitment to the cause of independence and the protection of their religion (Haroon, 2011).

Links between the twentieth century *Deobandis* and *mullahs* of the *Hadda* line had already been established in 1875 when Haji Turangzai joined a party of *ulama* (Religious Scholars) from Deoband to perform Haj. Haji Sahib spent a few years in Deoband to further cement the ties. In fact later in 1914, it was Maulana Mahmudul Hassan that compelled Turangzai to move from Utmanzai to Mohmand to shift his jihadist campaign to the tribal areas (Haroon, 2011).

Under the new strategy, Maulana Obaidullah Sindhi, Maulana Fazal Rabbi of Lahore and Maulana Fazal Mahmud of Peshawar were sent to the tribal area to organize a new political strategy by re-establishing the military bases of Syed Ahmad at Chamarkand in

Bajaur and Asmat in Buner to pave the way for the movement. Funds were channeled to the tribal region for the purchase of weapons, printing press for effective propaganda campaign, and other necessities.

It is important to emphasize here that these scholars or *ulama* from Deoband were never directly involved in the militant activities on the ground. Instead, their role was that of intermediaries, helping the local leaders of the movement. Therefore, it can be deduced that their real objective was not the independence of the country but the empowerment of the local *mullahs* or religious figures. Through ideological patronage, financial support, and institutional help the *Darul Ulum Deoband* firmly entrenched the authority of the local religious figures in the future politics of the tribal region. Even after the failure of the movement due to the apprehension and subsequent deportation to Malta of some of the prominent Deobandis including Maulana Mahmudul Hassan, the tribal area mullahs maintained links with Deoband, sending later generations for studies. They would later contribute to the organization of the Deoband legacy in the areas which became Pakistan in 1947.

2.3: Jihadi Discourse after the Creation of Pakistan in 1947

It is common wisdom that most of the jihadi groups that are now active in the country owe their existence to the Afghan jihad, waged in the back drop of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979. However, it should be emphasized here that the Pakistani state used non-state actors as a tool of foreign policy right from the independence of the country in 1947. Soon after the partition of Indo-subcontinent in 1947, volunteer armed

groups, mostly from the tribal region, intervened in the disputed territory of Kashmir in an effort to free it from the clutches of 'Hindus'. Officers of the Pakistan Army, dressed as civilians, actively supported the untrained militia in their campaign for the liberation of Kashmir (Fair, 2011). The adventure led to the 1947-48 war between India and Pakistan, which ended on 1st January 1949 only after the UN intervened in the matter. However, Pakistan did not abandon its policy of using non-state actors to pursue its foreign policy goals in India. Again in 1965, in the prelude to an all out war between the two countries, Pakistan initiated "*Operation Gibraltar*". Shuja Nawaz is of the view that almost 17000 armed volunteers, mainly from Jammu and Kashmir, specially trained for this purpose took part in the adventure (as cited in Fair, 2011). Officers from the two Para-military organizations, the NLI (Northern Light Infantry) and the Azad Kashmir Rifles accompanied irregulars. The purpose of using the volunteers was to ensure deniability that regular forces were not part of the operation. This strategy was to be repeated again in 1999. In May of that year Pakistan launched a limited incursion in the Indian-held Kashmir. *Mujahideen* were supported by the Northern Light Infantry, disguised as irregular civilian, in an effort to capture a small territory in the Kargil-Dras sectors. A miscalculation on the part of Pakistani strategists, the issue led to a conflict between the two countries, the Kargil War in 1999.

While Pakistan continued its covert activities in Kashmir, by the early 1970s it had started supporting dissidents Pakhtun leaders in Afghanistan as well. Long before the direct Soviet military intervention Pakistan had started training dissident leaders like Gulbadin Hikmatyar and Ahmad Shah Masood (Gul, 2009). The strategy was dictated by

Pakistan's efforts to pressurize the Soviet supported Daud's regime to abandon its support for the Pakhtunistan issue. The Daud Khan regime had resurrected Afghanistan's irredentist claims on the Pakhtun region in Pakistan by supporting Pakhtun nationalist leaders in both the countries.

Pakistan's reliance on non-state actors as a tool of foreign policy has been dictated by two factors. First, Pakistani military began to study guerrilla warfare in the 1950s in its engagement with the US in an alliance against the Communist threat. Not only extensive arms and equipment were channeled to Pakistan but vigorous training in the guerrilla tactics was imparted to its military to help the latter to cope with any likely challenge. While the purpose of the United States in imparting the training was to equip Pakistan to suppress such conflict, the latter was keen how to wage guerrilla warfare in its neighborhood. Second, the concept of jihad is very old in the Indo-subcontinent and especially in the areas that now constitute Pakistan. Ayesha Jalal considers Balakot, situated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, to be the epicenter of jihad (as cited in Fair, 2011). It was here that Syed Ahmad of Ria Bareilly and Shah Ismail were martyred while fighting against the Sikhs in May 1831, as discussed in the previous section. It is considered to be the only genuine jihad by scholars. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that the Pakistani state chose Balakot to set up training camps for the Kashmiri *mujahideens* in the 1990s. Moreover, the notion of jihad was idealized through a well thought out discourse by the state right from its inception. This anti-India policy, perpetuated through military, civilian, and educational institutions, was actually the product of the Pakistan ideology. The later itself was influenced, mainly, by the long and hard struggle for Pakistan and the

subsequent communal riots as a result of the partition of India (Mir, 2009). It should be mentioned, however, that the concept of jihad was not entirely centered on India. Soon Pakistan would use it against the Communists in Afghanistan. Jihad in Afghanistan was dictated by many factors, including the above mentioned ones.

2.3.1: Afghan Jihad and the Rise of Religious Militancy

Imtiaz Gul rightly says,

I don not believe that extremism and terrorism are part of our DNA. When I look back down the years, I believe the turning point was in the mid 1970s when the then civilian government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto decided to recruit dissident Afghans as assets to deploy against a new government in Kabul that was leaning alarmingly towards the godless Soviet Union. It was then that Pakistan's semi-autonomous tribal areas bordering Afghanistan became the springboard and the training ground for the Afghan dissidents. (2009, p. 18)

Major General Naseerullah Babar, the main architect of Pakistan's Afghan policy in the 1990s, was then inspector general of the Frontier Corps (FC). FC is mainly stationed in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan and its primary task is to help the local law enforcement authorities in maintaining law and order (Gul, 2009). Babar was instrumental in Pakistan's strategic thinking about Afghanistan and thus largely responsible for the miseries of Afghans and Pakhtuns, inside Pakistan, in the ensuing

period. With the help of some of his subordinates like brigadier Aslam Bhodla and Aftab Sherpao, then a captain in the Pakistan Army, Babar consulted Afghan dissident leaders who had taken refuge in Pakistan. A training process in the guerilla tactics was initiated in the mountainous area of Cherat, some eighty kilometers south east of Peshawar, to help prepare leaders like Gulbadin Hikmatyar and Ahmad Shah Masood for activities against the Soviet inclined Daud regime in Afghanistan. Apart from the leaders who had taken refuge in Pakistan, others too, active inside Afghanistan, were on the pay role of the FC (Gul, 2009). It was part of a comprehensive strategy to not only ward off the communist threat but to destabilize the Daud regime and help prepare grounds for a pro-Pakistan, friendly and pliant government in Afghanistan. The policy of training and brainwashing Afghan religious leaders served two objectives. First, Pakistan wanted to ensure that Pakhtun ethnic feelings be channeled through religious aspirations. As religious leaders, against the nationalists, would not take up the Pakhtunistan issue and recognize the Pak-Afghan border as a permanent boundary between the two countries. And second, to acquire a strategic depth in Afghanistan, to be used in any future confrontation with its arch-rival enemy, India.

It was the time when the United States started taking interest in the Afghan affairs, as it had long perceived an imminent communist threat to the south. Babar served as intermediary between the Americans and the Afghan dissident leaders. In May 1978, Babar even sent some of the leaders to the American diplomats in Islamabad for an evaluation (Gul, 2009). Although, the Saur Revolution and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan accelerated the process, Pakistan and the United States were long

busy cultivating Afghan dissidents to pitch them against the communists (Abbas, 2005). However, the direct Soviet military intervention in December 1979 came as a godsend to both Pakistan and the United States.

The ensuing decade (1979-1989) was defined by a happy marriage of convenience between Pakistan and the US. Soon after the Soviet invasion the Carter administration sought Pakistan's help in its effort to teach a Vietnam-like lesson to the Red Army. The military dictator in Pakistan, General Muhammad Zia ul Haq (1977-1988), showed no hesitation in coming to terms with the US. For the US it was a golden opportunity to turn Afghanistan to another Vietnam, but this time for the Soviets. Pakistan had other objectives. Although, it was not oblivious to the communist threat, the main purpose of joining the war was to turn Afghanistan into a client state and use its alliance with the US and the military and financial benefits such alliance would accrue, against its enemy, India (Cooley, 1999).

Wasting no time, the US powerful intelligence agency, the CIA, in collaboration with its Pakistani counterpart, the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), made plans for a comprehensive guerilla campaign against the communists. Soon Pakistan's tribal areas and the adjacent province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were turned into a launching pad for the war inside Afghanistan (Mir, 2009). Funds coming from the US, Saudi Arabia, and other western countries were channeled through the ISI as the latter was mainly responsible for intelligence and operations (Yousaf & Adkin, 2001). In fact Pakistan ensured that no direct contact would be made between the Americans and the

mujahideen, hence only the ISI was responsible for training the *mujahideen*. The CIA's job was to transfer the requisite amount of money, and if necessary, buy arms and other war-related equipment. Its job would end here, leaving the ISI the ultimate arbiter of planning and executing the operations (Yousaf & Adkin, 2001; Abbas, 2005).

Funds coming from abroad can be divided into two categories. First, the official funding or money given by different states, mainly the US which released \$ 3.2 billion only in the initial five years of the war, and Saudi Arabia, which matched every US dollar for a dollar (Abbas, 2005). Second, the contribution made by wealthy individuals and other charity organizations, mainly from the oil-rich Arab countries. The official funding was instrumental mainly in the execution of the war. Huge amount of arms and equipment were bought in Egypt, China, Israel, and even in some East European states (Yousaf & Adkin, 2001). The rest of the official money was used by the ISI for training the *mujahideen* and for executing the operations. The bulk of the unofficial or private funding was mainly used for catering the *mujahideen* families, settled in different refugee camps in Peshawar and FATA, and establishing thousands of *madrassas* around the country (Abbas, 2005; Gul, 2009; Mir, 2009). Both these factors, the ISI handling of the *mujahideen* groups and the flow of official and unofficial money, (manipulation and commercialization of the jihad), although vital for the effective execution of the war, had serious consequences for the Pakhtun region in the future.

Pakistan made its own choices while using the funds coming from abroad. The seven *mujahideen* groups based in Peshawar were never treated equally by the ISI (Marwat,

2005). Strategists in Pakistan were as concerned with the post-war Afghanistan as they were concerned with the execution of the present war. The ISI looked into it that the bulk of the funds and arms went to the *Hizb-e-Islami* of Gulbadin Hikmatyar, the most conservative and pro-Pakistan group. Pakistan heavily invested in Hikmatyar, because in him the Army saw a future ally to be trusted upon (Gul, 2009). As discussed previously Pakistan was cultivating the Islamist Pakhtun, Gulbadin Hikmatyar from the mid 1970s. The former wanted to set the stage for a pro-Pakistan Islamist government, led by him, after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. Later events, however, proved Gulbadin an unreliable ally as Pakistan turned its patronage from him to the newly emerged Taliban, led by Mullah Umar.

From the onset of the war it was clear that Pakistan had long term designs for Afghanistan. However, in retrospect it seems the policy was a myopic one, overlooking its disastrous consequences for the society. Popular media discourse in the west and in Pakistan advertised the jihad, calling it a holy war against the godless communists. *Mujahideen* were made heroes, calling them the champions of Islam and the free world (Marwat, 2005). This appealed to the emotionally charged youth, making sure a constant flow of new recruits. State patronage of the jihad and heavy investment in the non-state *mujahideen* groups made the jihad a profitable enterprise. Therefore, more and more jihadi groups plunged into the arena to have their share of the booty (Gul, 2009). Most of the lethal jihadi groups that are now active in the country, including those in Kashmir, emerged during the Afghan jihad.

Apart from the ISI handling of the jihad, a constant flow of the so called “petro-dollars” into the country made a huge impact not only on the war but also on the future events in the Pakhtun region. The large network of *madrassas* across the country and especially in the Pakhtun region owes its existence to the Afghan jihad (Abbas, 2005). In fact at the time of the creation of Pakistan there were about 140 religious seminaries in the country. Now there are about 20,000 of them (Mir, 2009). Most of the private funding to the jihad was directed towards this enterprise. The establishment of thousands of *madrassas* pertaining to different schools of thought like the *Deobandi*, *Ahl-al-Hadith*, and *Baraillvi*, ensured a constant flow of new recruits to the jihad. Apart from the foreign volunteers such as the Arabs, Chinese, Afro-Americans, and Central Asians, these *madrassas* were the main source of recruitment for the *mujahideen* (Abbas, 2005). Literature in most of these *madrassas* was directed towards inculcating a spirit of jihad among the students (Marwat, 2005). Apart from the jihadi-oriented literature, speeches by religious scholars in the *madrassas* and in different religious congregations galvanized the people for jihad. Although there were Afghans and other foreigners in the *madrassas*, the bulk of the students came from the local population. This made an enduring impact on the region, as the students, qualified from these *madrassas*, continued to send later generations to the religious schools. More importantly, the number of these *madrassas* not only multiplied but it continued to gain strength, even after the Afghan jihad was over. Another aspect of these seminaries was that they were established along sectarian lines; therefore, it helped trigger a wave of sectarian violence across the country. There were different *madrassas* for *Sunnis* and *Shias*. *Sunnis* were further divided between *Deobandis*, *Ahl-al-Hadiths*, and *Baraillvis*. Foreign financial and ideological support was instrumental even in the

sectarian violence. *Sunnis* were mostly supported by the Saudis while *Shias* were financed by Iran. Thus in the 1980s and 90s Pakistan became a battle ground for the proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia (Mir, 2009; Gul, 2009). This was a further step towards the militarization of the society.

The manipulative strategy, which had long term implications for the Pakhtun region, involved the education of the Afghan refugee children (see first chapter of this study). The jihadi literature was mostly printed in the United States. The University of Nebraska was given the task of preparing an Islamize curriculum for the Afghan students (Gul, 2009; Cooley, 1999). The literature was intended for propaganda purposes and involved much unnecessary materiel. Children were indoctrinated in the strict militant Islamic ideology (Marwat, 2005). A closer analysis of this strategy suggests that it had nothing to do with the execution of jihad. It only sowed the seeds of militarization in the society. Thus the next generation of the Afghans and of the Pakhtun region inherited this tradition (Mir, 2009).

The war ended when the last Soviet forces left Afghanistan in 1989 but it left behind a legacy of militarization which has been haunting the region for more than two decades now (Abbas, 2005). At home in Pakistan, such lethal jihadi groups as, *Sipa-i- Sahaba Pakistan* (SSP) (Corps of the Companions of the Prophet SAW), *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* (Army of Jhang), *Jaish-e- Muhammad* (Party of Muhammad SAW), *Lashkar-e-Taiba* (LT) (Army of the Pure), *Harkatul Mujahideen* (Movement of the Holy Warriors), and *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi* (TNSM) (Movement for the Enforcement of

Shariah) emerged. Except for the TNSM, which originated in the Pakhtun region of Malkand Division (to be discussed later in some greater detail), and *Hizbul Mujahideen*, which is located in the Indian-held Kashmir, the rest of these *mujahideen* groups are largely centered in Punjab and draw its leadership and recruit from the same province (Gul, 2009). A cardinal feature of these militant groups is that their area of operation is Kashmir. They consider Kashmir an integral part of Pakistan and regard armed resistance to be the only way to liberate the former from the Indian occupation. Backed by the Pakistani establishment these organizations brought havoc in Kashmir in the decade of 1990s. In 1999 alone *Harkatul Mujahideen* claimed to have killed 43 officers and 1825 soldiers of the Indian army during their attacks on convoys and military posts (Gul, 2009). However, the *Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan* (SSP) – or the Corps of the Prophet Muhammad’s (SAW) Companions – is an exception to this rule. The SSP, established in the mid 1980s as a response to the Iranian Revolution, is an ant-*Shia* fanatic sectarian organization. Considered to be an offshoot of the *Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam* (JUI), a religio-political party, the SSP was established by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, Maulana Ziaur Rehman Farooqi, Maulana Esra-ul-Haq Qasmi and Maulana Azam Tariq. Initially it was named as *Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan* (ASSP) (Mir, 2005; Gul, 2009). However, it was renamed as *Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan* after Haq Nawas Jhangvi, the chief of the organization, parted ways with JUI as a result of serious differences with the later. The SSP aspires that Pakistan should be declared a *Sunni* state. It wants the restoration of the Caliphate system and has termed the country’s *Shias* as non-Muslims (Mir, 2009). In the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks, Maulana Azam Tariq, the then head of the organization, had joined hands with the Afghan Jihad Council, an alliance of Pakistan’s

religio-political parties opposed to the American occupation of Afghanistan. The SSP strongly opposed Pakistan's alliance with the US and the coalition attack against the Taliban regime in the neighboring Muslim country (Mir, 2009). In fact the SSP is not alone in showing solidarity with the Afghan Taliban. After the Musharraf regime, under pressure from the US and India, banned some of the jihadi groups in Pakistan in 2002, cadres of the militant organizations secretly pushed to join the ranks of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban (Gul, 2009). This became even more apparent,

When the state decided in 2009 to separate itself from the process, the non-state actors it had raised decided to go over to the Taliban. With them went – as if uprooted by the momentum of change – some elements of the state establishment, too. Some left the establishment and raised the standard of revolt from behind their NGO covers, some took to crime on behalf of the Taliban and their warlords, and some, more dangerously, remain embedded inside the guts of the state. (Mir, 2009, p. xi)

The aforementioned jihadi outfits were mainly Punjab or Kashmir based. However, the TNSM is an exception to this as it originated and operated in the Pakhtun heartland, as pointed out earlier.

2.3.2: The Rise of *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi* (TNSM)

The *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi* (Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law) was launched by Maulana Sufi Muhammad on 28th June 1989 (Mir, 2009). The

TNSM is a *Wahabi* militant organization, mainly active in the Malakand Division of the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Malakand Division comprises the districts of Malakand, Buner, Upper and Lower Dir, Swat, Shangla, and Chitral. Apart from Malakand, the organization also has considerable influence in the adjacent Bajaur Agency. The TNSM goal is to implement a strict version of the Islamic *Shariah* in the entire Malakand region. The founding father of the organization, the 80 year old Maulana Sufi Muhammad, is a Tajik by origin. He was born in a village in Maidan in Dir district. He completed his religious education in 1959 from a seminary in Saidu Sharif, headquarters of Swat. After returning from *madrassa*, Sufi started preaching Islamic teachings at his native village. Although, he qualified from a *Deobandi madrassa*, however, his long association with the Afghan *mujahideen* and Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad introduced him to the *Wahabi* school of thought (Mir, 2009). Moreover, in a region which has long served as ground for the *Wahabi-Ahl-al-Hadith* movement under the influence of Akhund Abdul Gafoor, Hadda Mulla, and Haji Turangzai, the emergence of Sufi Muhammad representing the same school of thought should not be a surprise. Sufi Muhammad's main objective was to enforce the strict Islamic system in the society. Towards achieving this objective, he joined *Jamat-e-Islami*, a religio-political party. He remained a vigorous member of the *Jammat* for years and participated in the Afghan jihad as well.

However, after returning from Afghanistan Sufi Muhammad developed serious difference with *Jamat-e-Islami* on the issue of electoral process in practice in Pakistan. He was bitterly opposed to the western-style democracy, terming it un-Islamic. Therefore, in June

1989, he launched his own organization, the *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi*. Within five years of its establishment, the organization gained such strength that in 1994, Sufi led a force of over 20,000 TNSM followers to block the Swat-Peshawar road for seven days and prompted the federal government for talks. Sufi's demand was clear, the enforcement of Islamic *Shariah* in the Malakand Division (Gul, 2009).

Under enormous pressure, due to the law and order situation, the provincial government announced the proclamation of an ordinance, declaring the enforcement of *Shariah* in the Malakand Division. However, after a period of four months when the ordinance expired, the TNSM activists again came out on the roads, demanding that the ordinance should have been converted into an act of Parliament. This time the government, however, refused to bow down. The ensuing crisis led to armed clashes between the TNSM activists and the law enforcement authorities. A member of the Provincial Assembly, Badiuzaman Khan from the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), was also killed in the process. After a prolonged discussion with Sufi Muhammad, the Provincial Governor again enforced the *Nifaz-e-Sharia Regulation* on 1st December 1994 to set up *Qazi Courts* (Mir, 2009).

Two years later, in 1997, the Nawaz Sharif led Pakistan Muslim League government was compelled by the renewed agitation by the TNSM activists to amend and promulgate the *Nifaz-e-Shariah Regulation*, making the already established *Qazi Courts* more effective. This appeasement on part of the government enormously strengthened Sufi's position. His sphere of influence was enlarged as he made inroads into the adjacent district of

Hazara and the tribal territory of Bajaur Agency. Moreover, this was the time when the Taliban had consolidated their position in Afghanistan and Sufi developed close ties with them (Mir, 2009). Therefore, it is not a surprise that in the backdrop of the US invasion of Afghanistan, he led a force of 10,000 armed men to fight alongside the Taliban against the foreign forces. Upon his return from Afghanistan, Sufi was arrested by the Pakistani authorities. He was subsequently imprisoned for seven years on 24th April 2002 after a trial (Mir, 2009).

Sufi's misadventure into Afghanistan gave a severe blow to his stature and the TNSM went to the background for a few years while he was in jail. However, the group resurrected in 2006 when some of its leaders pledged to avenge the 31st October 2006 US predator missile strike on a religious seminary in the Chengai village of Bajaur Agency, killing at least 80 people (Mir, 2009). In the aftermath of this attack there was a significant resurgence in the TNSM activities, targeting the security forces. This renewed wave of militant activity compelled the government to sign yet another peace deal with Sufi Muhammad. As a result of the deal he was released from jail on 20th April 2008. In the coming 12 months, the Maulana signed at least two more deals with the government, but this time on part of the Swat Chapter of the Pakistani Taliban, headed by Maulana Fazlullah. In fact, in the absence of Maulana Sufi Muhammad, the TNSM was surreptitiously transformed to the Taliban Movement by the most dreaded commander in the Malakand region and the son-in-law of Sufi Muhammad, Maulana Fazlullah (Mir, 2009). He will be discussed later.

Inside Afghanistan, as a legacy of the Afghan jihad, a new and more fundamentalist group, the Taliban emerged. The Taliban, led by the one-eyed Mullah Muhammad Omar, were largely the religious students who had graduated from the Pakistani *madrassas* (Rashid, 2000). They emerged in 1994 in opposition to the prolonged in-fighting between the different war lords and the prevalent moral corruption in the country. Backed by Pakistan, the Taliban became victorious in 1998 by bringing about 95% territory under their control (Rashid, 2000). Although they managed to establish a contested form of security, the Taliban had already annoyed the world through its treatment of women and destruction of Bhuddist statues at Bamyán. However, it was their hosting of Al Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden, which brought the American indignation. The events of 9/11 came as a catalyst when the US and NATO forces attacked Afghanistan in October 2001, in an effort to dislodge the Taliban regime and capture Osama bin Laden. The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 gave a renewed impetus to terrorist activities in the Pakhtun region.

2.4: 9/11 and the Rise of Pakistani Taliban

Pakistan's tribal areas again came to the spotlight in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on Pentagon and World Trade Centre. As a result of the attacks the United States, with the help of an international coalition, proclaimed the Global War on Terror and unleashed the 'Operation Enduring Freedom' against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan on 7th October 2001. Within weeks the coalition forces were able to destroy the Taliban regime, leaving no option with foreign terrorists, including Arabs, Chechens, Uzbeks, Chinese Uigurs as well as Afghan Taliban to retreat to the tribal areas of Pakistan for a

safe refuge (Gul, 2009). The tribal region of Pakistan or FATA provided a perfect natural, social, and political environment to the foreign terrorists. All the seven tribal agencies of Pakistan, but especially North and South Waziristan contain high mountainous ranges with rugged and difficult terrain, thus making the task of a guerrilla campaign all the more easy. The responsive tribal ethnic Pakhtun population with a long history of jihad and tribal wars, and who hold honor and hospitality in high esteem, provided a perfect natural and social environment. At the same time, since 1947, Pakistan has kept the tribal areas at bay, treating it separately from the rest of the country. The legal and administrative system in vogue in FATA, the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), a legacy of the Colonial system of governance, and neglect on the part of successive governments in Islamabad have been instrumental in creating a political vacuum in the region. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, this vacuum was used by the non-state actors to their advantage.

Two of the Afghan war veterans, Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbaddin Hikmatyar, already present in the region, not only facilitated the entry into the region of the foreign Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters but also sought the support of local *mujahideen*, like Abdullah Mahsud and Baitullah Mahsud (Gul, 2009). Both Abdullah and Baitullah Mahsud had been captured during the Operation Enduring Freedom and kept at the Camp X-ray in Guantanamo Bay, but released after a couple of years. With the help of such local figures, Jalaluddin Haqqani and Hikmatyar were able to find strong hold for Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in FATA. Capitalizing on these factors the foreign *mujahideen*

reorganized their cadres and started a renewed campaign inside Afghanistan against the US-NATO forces.

In December 2001, Pakistan had deployed thousands of its armed forces in the region to secure the border and made sure that no foreign *mujahideen* entered into the region. By 2003, army officials were bragging that the area had been secured and denied the allegations that foreign *mujahideen* were using the region as a safe haven (Gul, 2009). However, facts were contrary to what the army officials say. Pressure at the international level was mounting on Pakistan and the United States was especially concerned over the growing influence of foreign jihadists in the region. The US military and civilian officials were constantly questioning the resolve of the Pakistan Army to take on the militants. The answer from Pakistan was that it increased the number of troops on the border, taking the total deployment to 120000 by 2006 (Gul, 2009). Increasing the number of troops made little to ameliorate the situation. Instead, Al Qaeda's influence continued to grow unabated in Waziristan, especially in Wana, capital of South Waziristan, and Shawal, the region which separates North from South Waziristan.

The Kaloo Shah operation in March 2004 against the Uzbek commander Tahir Yuldashiv near Wana was a turning point in the Talibanization of FATA. As the FC was searching for Tahir in a compound, hundreds of its soldiers found themselves in siege, as scores of Uzbek fighters and local Ahmadzai Wazir tribesmen retaliated against the operation. About 200 FC personnel were killed in the ensuing fighting (Gul, 2009). The incidence opened the eyes of many officials in Pakistan who were hitherto in a state of denial. From

then on it was clear that FATA was increasingly going into the hands of Al Qaeda and Taliban.

Local Taliban commanders came to prominence after the Kaloo Shah operation that now saw the Pakistan Army as enemies. Initially Nek Muhammad, the dreaded Ahmadzai Wazir Taliban Commander, rose to distinction. He fearlessly fought the security forces, compelling the latter to sign a peace deal at Shakai in 2004. Terms of the deal were mostly in favor of Nek Muhammad, as the accord was signed at Shakai, his stronghold, and he was publicly garlanded by the 11th Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Safdar Hussain. Enormous media coverage conferred legitimacy on Commander Nek Muhammad, recognizing him as a force to be reckoned with (Fair, 2011). Nek Muhammad was killed by a US drone strike the same year (2004), as the latter did not like Pakistan's appeasement policy and strongly criticized the peace accord which was giving leverage to the militants. However, Nek Muhammad was to be replaced by Baitullah Mahsud, more composed and widely recognized Taliban leader across FATA. Baitullah remained the head of the Pakistani Taliban until his death in a US drone strike in August 2009.

Another event which brought strong resentment from the militants across the country and gave a renewed impetus to militant activities in FATA and in other parts of Pakistan was the *Lal Madjid* (Red Mosque) Operation in 2007. Lal Masjid and the adjacent *Jamia Hafsa*, the religious seminary for girl's student, situated in the heart of Islamabad the capital of the country, shook the entire world. The girl students, under the direction of the

utwo brothers, Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid Ghazi, took control of a public library, taking hostage the foreign massage centers in the capital, and coming out to roads, demanding the imposition of *Shariah* and an end to un-Islamic practices, such as ban on the music and video shops. In fact the mosque had become a hub for Punjabi militants whose influence extended to FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Musharraf regime came under intense pressure from the US not to negotiate with the radical leader Abdul Rashid Ghazi. The radical Mullah, along with 150 of his diehard students, instead of surrendering to the authorities chose to fight the security forces. The ensuing fierce fighting between the militants and the Pakistan Army Commandos, which came to an end on 10 July 2007, left dozens of students dead, including Ghazi himself. The event infuriated the Taliban, who struck back with a series of suicide attacks across the country. About 57 suicide attacks with a total of 3599 terrorism-related fatalities occurred in 2007 alone, as compared to 648 fatalities in 2005 and 1471 in 2006. 2008 was even bloodier with sixty one suicide attacks and a total of 6400 terrorism-related fatalities (Gul, 2009).

A major shift in the militants' was noticed after the Lal Masjid Operation. After bringing havoc in the tribal region, they were now increasingly targeting urban population centers, including Lahore and Islamabad, although, Peshawar which is surrounded by tribal agencies from three sides had always been on their hit list. At the same time the Taliban were now searching for a unifying force to coordinate their activities under an organized command structure. They found such unifying force in Baitullah Mahsud, who was able to form a loosely knitted umbrella organization, called the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP), for all the militants across the FATA region.

2.4.1: *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)*

The Taliban in all the seven tribal agencies but, especially, in North and South Waziristan, Bajur, Mohmand, and Khyber, were independently busy in carrying out activities until the creation of the TTP. It was Baitullah Mahsud, hailing from the South Waziristan Agency and a former member of the Afghan Taliban who unified all the Taliban groups scattered over the entire FATA region of Pakistan (Fair, 2011). Qari Hussian Mahsud, a strong supporter of Baithullah and a former member of the *Sepah-e-Sahaba* Pakistan (SSP), who had fled to FATA after a ban on SSP, announced the formation of TTP on 14th of December 2007 (Gul, 2009). The name was not new, as an organization by the same name; the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* had already been formed by a former Afghan war veteran and a local from the Orkazai Agency, Abdur Rahim, in 1998. Abdur Rahim had publicly executed a person by the name of Khyal Ghaffar, suspected for a murder. Abdur Rahim would refute the allegations of having any links with the Afghan Taliban, saying that the purpose of establishing the organization was to cleanse the society of un-Islamic practices (Gul, 2009). However, this time, the facts on the ground had changed considerably from what was the case in 1998.

By 2007, the Taliban had virtually engulfed the whole of FATA from Bajaur to South Waziristan. The formation of the TTP only added to their capacity of engaging the security forces in more deadly battles.

Many analysts, including the prominent Pakistani journalist and expert on the Afghan affairs, Rahimullah Yousufzai, argue that the TTP does not have a coherent command

and control. According to them, it is at the most a loosely knitted formation of the different Taliban factions, independently busy in their own respective agencies (as cited in Fair, 2011). However, a closer analysis suggests that the TTP does have an organizational structure. It is headed by an *Amir* (Chief or Ruler). Baitullah Mahsud was its *Amir* since its formation in late 2007 to August 2009, when he was killed in a US drone strike while sleeping at his father-in-law's house in South Waziristan. After his death the organization was taken over by Hakimullah Mahsud. A forty member consultative *Shura* (Consultative body) works under the *Amir* to coordinate the activities of the organization. Almost two dozens deputy commanders in their own respective areas form the wider body of the organization. The deputy commanders include Maulvi Faqir Muhammad in Bajaur and Umar Khalid (Abdul Wali) in Mohmand. Maulvi Fazlullah was the deputy *Amir* of the Swat chapter of the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* until his eviction from the area in the 2009 military offensive against the militants in Swat (Gul, 2009). Thus, the Taliban commanders in different tribal agencies carry two titles, not only they work as deputies to the head of the organization but also as *Amir* of their own respective groups. Maulvi Nazir, the Taliban Commander in the Ahmadzai Wazir area of South Waziristan, is an exception to this rule, however. While the organization was taking hold in the two tribal agencies of North and South Waziristan, it split along tribal lines. Baitullah was a Mahsud and his stronghold was both the Mahsud and Wazir areas of South Waziristan. Maulvi Nazir on the other hand is a Wazir from the Ahmadzai sub-tribe. One of the reasons for the differences was the approach towards foreign Taliban and Al Qaeda elements in the region. While Baitullah shared the foreign militants' objective of carrying out attacks inside Pakistan and against the security forces in the

country, Nazir objected to the presence of the foreign elements in FATA (Gul, 2009). In fact Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, in the North Waziristan Agency, are considered as pro-Pakistan Taliban commanders in the region. They only fight inside Afghanistan and want that foreign forces must leave the country.

The rest of the Taliban commanders, including Umar Khalid, Maulvi Fazlullah, and Maulvi Faqir Muhammad shared some common objectives with Baitullah Mahsud: Pakistan must end its cooperation with the coalition forces in Afghanistan; US-NATO forces must end the illegal occupation of Afghanistan; and *Shariah* must be enforced in Pakistan (Gul, 2009).

The TTP has adopted some of the most modern and lethal techniques of terrorism for the fulfillment of these objectives, including suicide attacks and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). Scores of suicide attacks and bomb blasts have killed thousands of people in the country in the last few years. They mostly target security forces personnel, high-ranking military and civilian officials, police check posts, and other government installations. They do not tolerate those who oppose them or do not conform to their worldview. Therefore, they consider most of the secular forces in the country, including the leadership of some of the political parties like MQM—a secular ethno-political party—and the ANP—a Pakhtun nationalist party, as well as the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), as their enemies. In fact the Musharraf regime blamed Baitullah Mahsud for the killing of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. She was assassinated in a suicide attack after addressing a rally at Liaquat Bagh, in the garrison city of Rawalpindi, on 27th

December 2007. However, the ultimate sufferers in the whole process are the common people. Social fabric of the society has torn apart in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as the ordinary people are caught between the militants and the military. An atmosphere of fear looms large over cities as well, as people hesitate to freely visit market places because of the frequent bomb blasts in major population centers. In reality, Pakistan is suffering from a mid-level insurgency where Taliban not only control large swaths of territory in FATA, but have also challenged the writ of the government even in the settled areas of the country (Gul, 2009). Swat, a settled district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, is a clear example of the later where, Maulvi Fazlullah, *Amir* of the Swat chapter of the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan*, virtually established a state within the state. Fazlullah brought havoc to the picturesque Swat valley through his terrorist activities and challenged the state for more than two years, from 2007-2009. He is discussed in the following.

2.4.2: Maulana Fazlullah in Swat

Fazlullah's real name is Fazle Hayat. He was born in March 1975 at the house of Baladar Khan at Mamdheray area in district Swat. After passing his intermediate examination from Government Degree College Saiudu Sharif, he became a daily wage earner. For a few years he operated the manual chairlift at the Swat River to earn a livelihood. After that Fazli Hayat left Swat and went to Maidan in the Lower Dir district to join *Jamia Mazahir-ul-Uloom*, a *madrassa* run by Sufi Muhammad (Mir, 2009).

Interaction with Sufi Muhammad was instrumental in the future life of Fazlullah. Sufi renamed him as Fazlullah and gave him his daughter's hand in marriage. After

completing his early religious education from the seminary Fazlullah returned to Swat and became a religious preacher at a mosque. However, until then he was a little known figure. The event which brought him to prominence was the *Lal Masjid* Operation in July 2007.

As Fazlullah had taken over the leadership of the TNSM in 2002 in the absence of Sufi Muhammad, he shifted its headquarter from Qombar area in Maidan to Mamdheray in district Swat. In the aftermath of the *Lal Masjid* Operation he speeded up the TNSM activities. Within no time he raised his own militia of armed volunteers and vowed not only to avenge the killings of innocent students in the *Lal Masjid* Operation but to work for the enforcement of *Shariah* in the Malakand Division, a long cherished dream of TNSM. Apart from raising a 5000 strong armed militia, he prepared a special force of about a 1000 mujahideen, called the ‘*Shaheen Commando Force*’ (Mir, 2009). In a matter of months Fazlullah’s influence grew enormously. He took control of the entire communication system in Swat, especially roads, as his armed militia would patrol the valley in a show of power. He was able to paralyze the existing government machinery by bringing about 95% area of the 5337 square kilometer Swat valley under his control (Mir, 2009). This was done through targeting the police check posts, ambushing the security forces convoys, carrying out suicide attacks against the military and paramilitary soldiers, destroying government buildings and other installations, and killing or intimidating civilian government officials to stop them from going to their duty. A clear indication of the prevailing law and order situation in the region is that, by 2008, almost 800 policemen— about a half of the total police force in Swat—had either deserted or

proceeded on long leave (Mir, 2009). Fazlullah established his own *Qazi Courts* to hear cases and impart speedy justice according to the Islamic *Sharai*h. Being a powerful orator, he used his illegal FM radio station, located at Mamdheray, to galvanize people for the cause of jihad and the enforcement of Islamic *Shariah*. Apart from advertising his version of the Islamic *Shariah*, he used the radio to warn people of the consequences of un-Islamic practices, such as sending girls to school, shaving beards, and listening to the music (Gul, 2009).

The Pakistan Army had deployed a force of 3000 men in the region by mid 2007 to flush out the militants, in the first phase of what is called, the *Operation Rahi Haq* (Operation Just Path), but it achieved little success. Therefore, the government was compelled to come to negotiation. They released Sufi Muhammad in the spring of 2008 to broker a deal with the militants and restore peace to the militancy-struck Swat valley. In the ensuing negotiations, Sufi, serving as intermediary between the Taliban and the government, signed at least two peace deals with the authorities, in April 2008 and February 2009, to enforce *Shariah* in the Malakand Division and bring an end to the militancy (Gul, 2009). However, by this time public opinion in the country had turned against the growing atrocities of the militants and the appeasement policy of the government. Secular and liberal voices in the country had already shown concern over the government peace deals with Taliban, saying it was tantamount to legitimizing the influence of the non-state actors and encouraged others to follow suite. At the same time international pressure was mounting on Pakistan not to negotiate with the militants (Mir, 2009).

Thus, in mid 2009, under pressure from the United States of America and growing public opinion at home, the army acted decisively. On 8th May 2009, Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani ordered to launch the military operation against the terrorists in Swat. The same day Chief of the Army Staff, General Ashfaq Pervez Kyani, while presiding over the meeting of the 118th Corps Commanders Conference, vowed to win the battle against the militants in the third phase of the *Operation Rahi Haq* (Mir, 2009).

On 12th May, the army dropped commando units of the Special Services Group (SSG), in a decisive move to recapture Peochar, one of the strongholds and headquarter of the Swat Taliban. On 24th May, the army was able to retake large parts of Mingora, headquarter of the Swat district (Mir, 2009). Although, Fazlullah escaped unharmed to an unknown location, on 28th July, the Pakistani media reported that Sufi Muhammad had been arrested and shifted to the Peshawar Central Prison, after a sedition case was registered against him in the Saidu Sharif Police Station (Mir, 2009). Earlier in the same month, more than two million people displaced by the operation, started returning their homes under a rehabilitation program. Although, the military operation continued for a few months, the army announced its victory in late July by claiming it had recaptured the control of Mingora, the administrative seat of Swat.

However, as rightly pointed out by Amir Mir (2009), most security experts argue that counter-insurgency campaign is not a one time endeavor. Therefore, the army's victory in Swat should not be considered as a final victory. Instead, it is more likely that the insurgents would buy time, shift to other safer places, reorganize themselves and resume

their hit-and-run strategy. If Pakistan wants a complete end to the terrorist activities on its soil, it must destroy the jihadist infrastructure it has created over the years, especially in the Afghan Jihad. At the same time the state must change its strategic paradigm of treating Afghanistan a client state and using non-state actors against India for achieving its foreign policy goals.

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Chapter 3

Nature of the Current Insurgency in the Pakhtun Region

3.1: Introduction

The issue of identifying the actual nature of the ongoing terrorism in the Pakhtun region has generated a hot debate among analysts around the world. It is generally believed that it as an Islamist-jihadist movement, inspired by the short but effective Taliban rule in Afghanistan (1996-2001) and supported by Al Qaeda for the ultimate purpose of establishing *Shariah* not only in the Pakhtun region but in Pakistan and the whole world. However, the task has been made difficult by many factors. First of all, as this terrorism mainly takes place on the Pakhtun land and is dominated in most cases by ethnic Pakhtuns, therefore, instead of simply labeling it as Islamist militancy, it leads to suspicion. This is because Pakhtuns have a long history of struggling with the federation. This was evident from 1947 towards the mid 1970s when the Afghan state was supporting Pakhtun nationalists in Pakistan and Afghanistan for achieving an independent state, the Pakhtunistan (Gul, 2009). Therefore, although with the passage of time the Pakhtuns have fully integrated with Pakistan, any uprising having a significant numbers of Pakhtuns will resurrect that doubt among the minds of the Punjabi dominated Pakistani establishment (Ijaz Khan* personal communication, February 1, 2012). A related issue is Pakhtuns' history of defending their soil. Never in the history has the Pakhtun region

* Professor Dr. Ijaz Khan is director FATA Cell, a think tank affiliated with the University of Peshawar, and Professor at the Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar. Dr. Khan is an expert in the field and has written extensively on terrorism-extremism, Talibanization, and the nature of the current insurgency in the Pakhtun region. He presents an insider's account of the issues that can hardly be found in any secondary literature. Although, numerous personal communications were conducted with him for the purpose of this study, however, this extensive interview was recorded on February 1, 2012.

including Afghanistan been permanently occupied by a foreign power. Therefore, the present insurgency is considered by some as an attempt to free the Pakhtun land from a foreign power, the United States of America, and the Taliban uprising is termed as a Pakhtun nationalist movement.

Though terrorism is mainly taking place on the Pakhtun land, it is not entirely dominated by the Pakhtuns. The Taliban are joined by militants from other ethnicities as well, like the Punjabis (Gul, 2009). There are non-Pakhtun groups active in the region too. Prominent among them are Al Qaeda, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and the Haqqani Network, led by Sirajuddeen Haqqani, the son of the former Afghan warlord, Jalaluddeen Haqqani (Wadhams & Cookman, 2009). The Taliban themselves do not act coherently. Although they are grouped under an umbrella organization, the TTP, most of the Taliban leaders act independently in their own respective areas (Fair, 2011). An analysis of the objectives of the militants in the Pakhtun region indicates that it is neither a Pakhtun nationalist movement nor a struggle for the imposition of *Shariah* Law. Rather it is a politically motivated struggle for the ultimate goal of achieving power. Even this contention (that it is a struggle for power) can be overruled, especially, when one analyzes the state's inability or rather complicity, in most cases, to put a brake on the process of Talibanization of the Pakhtun region. The Taliban thrived and gained power at a time when the Pakistan Army had the largest military deployment in the history of the region (Rshid, 2008). The remaining chapter is an attempt to explore the true nature of the current terrorism on the Pakhtun land. It draws heavily from the group discussions and interviews that the scholar carried out with different experts, academicians, and

journalists in the field. The second section identifies the current militant landscape of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The section explores the profile and composition of different Taliban and non-Taliban militants in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. To understand the nature it is imperative to know the aims and objectives of the militants. Therefore, the third section critically analyzes the objectives of different militant groups operating in the Pakhtun region. The fourth section is a narration of the factors which led to the Talibanization of the Pakhtun society. Only after analyzing composition of the insurgency, objectives of the militants, and the contributing factors in the rise of Talibanization in the Pakhtun society that the true nature of the current insurgency in the Pakhtun region becomes clear. There is an ongoing debate about equating the current militancy with Pakhtun nationalism. An attempt is made in the last section to prove this contention wrong.

3.2: Current Militant Landscape of the Pakhtun Region

Currently the Pakhtun region is home to a diverse range of terrorist groups, having different objectives and asserting varying degrees of influence. There are groups having international agendas and composed of foreign terrorists who may be using the area as a safe haven. Al Qaeda mainly composed of Arabs and Central Asians and having a jihadist agenda that transcends state boundaries is a clear example of a foreign terrorist organization that is based in FATA. Another FATA-based foreign terrorist organization is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Then there are groups composed of local Taliban elements and focused on Pakistan and/or Afghanistan like the TTP and non-Taliban groups like that of Hafiz Gulbahadar, Mullah Nazir and the Haqqani Network.

3.2.1: Al Qaeda

Al Qaeda which was established in 1988 in Peshawar under the leadership of Osama bin Laden is certainly the most influential international terrorist organization that is using FATA as a safe haven. It was the successful Afghan jihad of the 1980s which encouraged Osama bin Laden and the Egyptian medical doctor and the Afghan war veteran, Aiman al Zawahiri to form such organization (Jones, 2010). In that jihad Osama bin Laden and other *mujahideen* were heavily supported by the US and Pakistan to fight the Soviet forces. The Afghan jihad had given Osama such power and prestige as an international jihadist that he had to channel those energies to some other power after the withdrawal of the Communist forces from Afghanistan. His obvious choice was the United States of America, for its perceived anti-Islamic role around the world and its support to the state of Israel.

Al Qaeda is basically a *Sunni Wahabi-Salafi* organization which draws its leadership and resources mainly from the wealthy Arab states. It considers the Christian-Judaists dominated western world as enemy of Islam and jihad against them as the primary responsibility of the *Ummah* (Community of the believers) (Jones, 2010). At the same time it wants a regime change in the Middle East to bring an end to the ‘corrupt’, ‘dictatorial’, and ‘un-Islamic’ systems in the region (Bjorgo, 2005).

Al Qaeda was held responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks by the US, therefore, Afghanistan was invaded in October 2001 to disrupt the Taliban regime that was hosting the Al Qaeda fugitives and destroy the terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan. As a result

of the attack Al Qaeda had no other option but to take refuge in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Although, hundreds of its leaders have been captured by Pakistan and handed over to the US since then, however, the organization has firmly established itself in the region. It not only coordinates its activities in FATA but trains and equips Afghan and Pakistani Taliban groups to fight the US-NATO forces in Afghanistan. In fact other local Taliban and non-Taliban groups in the region mainly owe their existence to Al Qaeda. Through ideological patronage and financial support Al Qaeda has successfully made the other militant organizations dependent upon itself, therefore, the latter are compelled to take actions according to the wishes of the former. In fact the Afghan Taliban had to pay heavily for hosting the top Al Qaeda leadership and refusing to hand it over to the US. Similarly Pakistani-based militant organizations turned their guns to the state when they increasingly came under the influence of Al Qaeda as the latter wanted to punish Pakistan for its alliance with the US and NATO forces. Ironically, its head Osama bin Laden was hiding in a house, a few hundred meters from the Pakistan military training academy, Kakol, in the garrison city of Abbottabad. He was killed in a special operation by the US forces on May 2, 2011.

Al Qaeda in the Pakhtun region wants that foreign forces must end the illegitimate occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistan must end its cooperation with the US-NATO forces and stop military operations in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Taliban-styled *Shariah* must be enforced in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

3.2.2: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

Qari Tahir Yuladashiv and Jumaboi Ahmadinovich Khojaev founded the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in 1998 in Kabul (Rashid, 2002). The sole purpose of the creation of the organization was to enforce the Islamic *Shariah* in Uzbekistan (Rashid, 2002). Jumaboi was killed in the ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan in 2001. Responsibility of leading the organization was assumed by Tahir Yuldashev after Jumaboi was killed. The IMU shifted to Wana of South Waziristan Agency after the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 (Gul, 2009). The organization has close links with Al Qaeda and TTP. In fact the presence of IMU in South Waziristan was a catalyst in the Talibanization of FATA. It was the Pakistan security forces operation against the Uzbek militants in Kalosha in 2004 that caused a rift between supporters of Yuldashev and the pro-government militants in the region (Gul, 2009). When the TTP was formed in 2007 the organization split along tribal lines with Mullah Nazir of the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe supporting the government policy of evicting the foreign militants from the region while Baitullah Mahsud on the other hand was fighting the Pakistani security forces in support of the Uzbek militants (Gul, 2009).

Influenced by Al Qaeda, Uzbek militants are considered as ruthless fighters. Most of the un-human acts of terrorism like slaughtering and imputation of the killed are attributed to IMU. In fact it was the IMU which was strongly in favor of attacking the Pakistani security forces. Initially the Pakistani Taliban did not fight inside the country; it was the IMU which influenced the Pakistani Taliban to indulge in terrorist activities inside the country (Gul, 2009). Their Tahir Yuldashev was killed in a US drone strike on October 2,

2009; however, most of the Uzbek militants are still hiding and operate from South Waziristan.

3.2.3: Pakistani Taliban

It is important to mention here that the term Pakistani Taliban is exclusively reserved for the TTP militants. The reason for this is because they have formally declared the formation of the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan*, the only unified organization of the militants in the country, but also they have been officially termed as such. But this does not imply that the Punjabi Taliban and the non-Taliban militants in the country (to be discussed below) are non-Pakistani Taliban. They are discussed under separate headings because, in the case of non-Taliban militants, they either oppose the TTP activities or otherwise act independently for various objectives. Punjabi Taliban, on the other hand, is a contested term. Although, there is no doubt that they operate in the Pakhtun region but they do not call themselves the Punjabi Taliban. The term is used only to emphasize the fact that the prevailing uprising in the Pakhtun region is not exclusively dominated by ethnic Pakhtuns.

Emerging in 2004 as a result of the Kalosha operation by the security forces, the Pakistani Taliban have intensified their activities after the formation of the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) in 2007 (Yousufzai, 2008). Although they have their presence in the settled districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, however, they operate actively from the eight operational zones in FATA, namely: South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Kurram, Orakzai, Darra Adamkhel, Khyber, Mohmand, and Bajaur.

South Waziristan Agency: Of all the tribal agencies South Waziristan is considered as the stronghold of the Pakistani Taliban Movement. It was in South Waziristan that Nek Muhammad Wazir came to the media limelight in 2004 as a result of the Kalosha operation by the security forces due to the presence of Uzbek militants in the region. The subsequent Shakai peace deal between Nek Muhammad and the Pakistan Army conferred legitimacy on Nek Muhammad as a force to be reckoned with (Yousufzai, 2008). However, the young charismatic militant commander was killed in a US drone strike the same year. Subsequently, Baitullah Mahsud emerged as a prominent commander of the Pakistani Taliban in South Waziristan. The government was quick to sign a peace deal with him as well, called the Sararogha Agreement of February 2005. As a result of the deal Baitullah pledged not to support Al Qaeda and restrained the Taliban from carrying out attacks against the Pakistani security forces. The Pakistan military on its part agreed to end operations against the militants (Wadhams & Cookman, 2009). However, the agreement soon collapsed as both parties blamed each other for violation of the accord. Ironically, it was the Pakistani military peace deals and appeasement towards the militants that helped the latter to strengthen their grip on the tribal region. Therefore, in 2007 the Taliban were able to announce the formation of the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP), an umbrella organization for all the militant groups across FATA (Gul, 2009). Baitullah Mahsud was declared as the head of the forty-man *Shura* or council. Hafiz Gulbahadar of the North Waziristan Agency was appointed as deputy to Baitullah while Maulvi Faqir Muhammad of Bajaur was appointed third in command (Wadhams & Cookman, 2009). Military operations in 2008 and 2009 have killed many mid level TTP leaders; however, it did

little to stop the Taliban from carrying out the unprecedented terrorist activities across the country but especially in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Gul, 2009). Baitullah was killed in a US drone strike on August 5, 2009, after which leadership of the TTP was quickly taken over by Hakimullah Mahsud, another fierce militant commander from the South Waziristan Agency. Under the leadership of Hakimullah Mahsud the TTP has intensified its activities (Fair, 2011). Hakimullah is considered to be behind all suicide attacks in Pakistan as his lieutenant, Qari Hussain Mahsud, former *Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan* member, is believed to be the mastermind of suicide attacks (Mushtaq Yousufzai* personal communication, February 2, 2012). One of the reasons of the success of Hakimullah is his strong militant commanders in South Waziristan. Most prominent among them is Waliur Rehman.

Waliur Rehman emerged in 2004. He belongs to the Mahsud tribe. He was a close ally of Baitullah and was appointed as his deputy in 2006. He took over the finances of the TTP in 2007. At the time of the death of Baitullah Mahsud, Waliur Rehman commanded a force of 7000 to 10000 personnel (Wadhams & Cookman, 2009). Waliur Rehman is considered as a possible successor to Hakimullah Mahsud.

Kurram Agency: Kurram Agency is marked by sectarian violence between *Sunnis* who are in majority in the Lower Kurram valley, and *Shias* who form the majority in the Upper Kurram valley. The government has little writ in Kurram except for Sada (Yousufzia, 2009). Both the TTP and the Afghan Taliban have their influence in the

* Mushtaq Yousufzai is one of the leading journalists in Pakistan. He is particularly renowned for his in-depth knowledge of almost all the militant groups operating in FATA. Mushtaq is working for the English Daily *The News International*. This interview was carried out with him on February 2, 2012.

region. The TTP made inroads into Kurram through its regional commander Hakimullah Mahsud in 2007 and 2008. The mountainous region is mostly controlled by the Taliban for two reasons: firstly, it is close to the Afghan border, and secondly, there have been few drone strikes in Kurram as compared to North and South Waziristan (Mushtaq Yousufzai personal communication, February 2, 2012).

Orakzai Agency: Orakzai is the only tribal agency in FATA that does not border Afghanistan. It has a *Sunni* majority and *Shia* minority population. The TTP made sanctuaries in Orakzai in 2006 under its regional commander, Hakimullah, who was also responsible for the affairs of Kurram and Khyber agencies (Wadhams & Cookman, 2009). It was in Orakzai agency that Hakimullah invited media in November 2008 to give his first news conference. This interaction with media was vital in making Hakimullah a commander in his own right (Yousufzia, 2009). Bordering Hangu and Kohat districts, Orakzai is strategically very important. Analysts believe that a smooth supply of weapons and ammunition to the security forces may easily be disconnected if Orakzai agency remains under the control of Taliban (Wadhams & Cookman, 2009).

Darra Adamkhel: Darra Adamkhel is a semi-autonomous area, officially called as the Frontier Region of Kohat. Located on the main road linking Peshawar with the southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Kohat tunnel, Darra Adamkhel is strategically important. Two militant groups operate in the region, the TTP and *Al Hizb*. In fact two groups, *Tehrik-e-Islami* and the *Islami Taliban* had been in the region since the mid 2007. *Tehrik-e-Islami* was established by Muneer Khan, a local of Darra Adamkhel, while the *Islami*

Taliban was established by Momin Afridi. Subsequently the two groups merged to become part of the TTP. Both Muneer Khan and Momin Afridi were killed in the military operation in 2008 (Yousufzai, 2009). Leadership of the Darra Adamkhel chapter of the TTP then passed to Commander Muhammad Tariq. Commander Muhammad Tariq is from the Bazidkhel sub-tribe. Another commander, Mufti Ilyas is deputy to Muhammad Tariq and considered as his ideologue (Mushtaq Yousufzai personal communication, February 2, 2012).

The Darra Taliban are considered as the most lethal and intolerant chapter of the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan*. It has seized the Kohat tunnel three times and destroyed convoys and tankers carrying fuel and food for the NATO forces stationed in Afghanistan. Moreover, the group is not only involved in the sectarian violence, killing *Shias*, but has also targeted *jirgahs* (tribal council) (Yousufzai, 2009).

The military operation in the region has weakened the group by recapturing Kohat tunnel and Darra bazaar, Commander Muhammad Tariq is still believed to have several hundred fighters under his command. Although the group is still able to occasionally target the security forces, its leadership has shifted to the adjacent Orakzai Agency.

The other group, *Al Hizb*, emerged in 2008, in opposition to the other militant groups. It distributed pamphlets and leaflets offering an alternative platform. However, both local tribesmen and the other militants suspect it was part of the government strategy to create differences in the ranks of the militants (Yousufzai, 2009).

Khyber Agency: Due to its closeness to the provincial capital Peshawar, Khyber Agency holds special position in the entire tribal region. Until late 2008, Kamran Mustafa Hijrat, whose real name is Muhammad Yahya Hijrat, was the TTP regional commander in the region, when he was arrested by the government at Hayatabad (Gul, 2009). Hijrat is an Afghan by birth and had fought in Afghanistan alongside Taliban before becoming a member of the TTP. He was deputy to Hakimullah Mahsud and was considered responsible for several attacks on convoys carrying supplies for US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. After the arrest of Hijrat, his deputy, Rahmanullah, who is also an Afghan, has taken over as acting commander of the TTP in Khyber Agency (Yousufzai, 2009).

Other non-TTP militants operating in Khyber Agency will be discussed later, under the heading, non-Taliban militants.

Mohmand Agency: Militants under the leadership of Omar Khalid, (real name Abdul Wali), emerged in July 2007 in Mohmand Agency when they captured the shrine of the famous 20th century freedom fighter and religious scholar, Haji Sahib Turangzai. Abdul Wali is a former member of *Harkatul Mujahideen* who also fought alongside the Afghan Taliban against the US-NATO forces (Yousufzai, 2009). They renamed the mosque adjacent to the shrine of Haji Turangzai as “*Lal Masjid*” (Red Mosque), so named after the Lal Madjid in Islamabad that had been seized by the Pakistani security forces the same month.

In fact Abdul Wali came to prominence after he evicted the Shah Khalid Group from Mohmand Agency in July 2008. This group, also called the *Ahl Hadith* (Believers of the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad SAW), had been busy in Mohmand Agency for two years (Mushtaq Yousufzai personal communication, February 2, 2012). Shah Khalid or Shah Sahib, so called by his followers, had no interest to fight the Pakistani security forces. He sent his men to Afghanistan to fight against the US-NATO forces. This did not suit Omar Khalid's agenda, as the latter wanted to punish the Pakistani security forces for their mishandling of the Lal Masjid issue and the killing of innocent religious students there. Therefore, Omar's men raided the compound of Shah Khalid in July 2008, killing him and capturing 70 of his men (Gul, 2009). This successful operation against a rival militant group made Abdul Wali a commander in his own right. From then onwards, in a matter of one year, he brought the entire Mohmand Agency under his control. Through his terrorist activities Omar Khalid was able to keep the government at bay, virtually establishing a Taliban rule over the Agency. Although, the strength of the group has been weakened by the military operation of 2008 and 2009, Abdul Wali still commands a force of several hundred fighters (Yousufzai, 2009).

Bajaur Agency: Militants in Bajaur Agency are led by Maulana Faqir Muhammad, a former member of the banned *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi* (TNSM). An important TTP leader, Faqir Muhammad was appointed third in command to Baitullah Mahsud, when the organization was formed (Wadhams & Cookman, 2009). In 1994 the black-turbaned activists of the TNSM under the leadership of Maulana Fiqir Muhammad, turned violent. A resident of the Sewai village in the Mamond area of Bajaur Agency,

Faqir Muhammad commanded a force of several thousand fighters before his position was weakened by the military operation of 2008 and 2009 (Yousufzai, 2009). Although, the militants put up a stiff resistance to the security forces but the operation was successful enough to disrupt their command structure and destroy their supply route. As a result of the operation most of the militants ran away to other tribal agencies as well as to the Kunar and Nooristan provinces of Afghanistan (Wadhams & Cookman, 2009).

Another militant commander in Bajaur Agency is Waliur Rahman, also called Rehan. He leads a group called *Jaish-e-Islami*. His group parted ways with *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) in 2008 but now seems to have mended its ties with the latter, apparently to resist the Pakistani military operations. Most of the followers of Waliur Rahman hail from Damadola, a militant's stronghold which was attacked at least three times in 2007 and 2008 by the CIA-operated Predator drones (Yousufzai, 2009).

Karwan-e-Naimatullah, a militant group led by Naimatullah from the Salarzai area of Bajaur Agency, joined the TTP in its cause. However, activities of the group were curtailed by the tribal *lashkar* (an armed force raised with a specific objective). Supported by the government and led by tribal chiefs the *lashkar* was successful to diminish the strength of the militants. The militants retaliated with suicide attacks, killing scores of activists of the tribal *lashkar* on one occasion in 2008 (Yousufzai, 2009).

Another militant commander active in the region is Dr Ismail. A former supporter of the *Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam* Fazalur Reman, a politico-religious party, Dr Ismail had several

hundred militants under his command in Bajaur before the military operation in the area. Dr Ismail has lost two young sons while fighting in Afghanistan against the US-led forces. Ismail focuses his attention on fighting in Afghanistan and strongly objects to the TTP policy of fighting the Pakistani security forces. Although, he does not fight inside Pakistan, the TTP still considers him as part of the organization (Wadhams & Cookman, 2009).

Maulana Abdullah, another TTP commander operates mostly in Charmang and Utmankhel areas of Bajaur Agency. Abdullah does not have a large following. At one time he enjoyed the command of a few hundred fighters (Yousufzai, 2009).

3.2.4: Punjabi Taliban

Since April 2009 the term ‘Punjabi Taliban’ has become popular in media discourses. In fact it has become a controversial political issue as the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) leadership strongly objects to the use of the term by the interior minister Rahman Malik. The former accuse Rehman of fomenting trouble between provinces by using terms like ‘Punjabi Taliban’ and ‘Punjabi Militants’ (Fair, 2011). Punjabi Taliban are those militants who were created by the Pakistani establishment in the decades of 1980 and 1990 to concentrate on fighting the Indians in the disputed territory of Kashmir, argues Raza Rahman Khan Qazi*, a Peshawar based researcher and analyst (personal communication, February 21, 2012). Pakistan considers jihad in Kashmir as a legitimate

* Raza Rahman Khan Qazi is a researcher, analyst, and Ph.D. research scholar at the Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar. He is a producer of current affairs program at Pakistan Television centre Peshawar. He regularly writes for English newspapers on issues pertaining to the Pakhtun region, including extremism and terrorism. This interview was carried out with him on February 21, 2012.

struggle for the right of self-determination and support Kashmiri mujahideen through every possible means (Jones, 2002).

In fact at the time of the creation of the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) there were few, if any, Punjab-based militants in the ranks of Pakistani Taliban. However two factors have largely influenced the Punjabi Taliban groups to become actively involved in militancy in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Firstly, owing to the increasing influence of the Pakistani Taliban as a result of its control of North and South Waziristan in FATA and Swat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Punjabi Taliban saw an opportunity in the tribal areas militants to further their own agenda. Moreover, there was controlled jihad in Kashmir, dictated by the Pakistan army. The tribal areas provided them with an opportunity to act freely (Mushtaq Yousufzai personal communication, February 2, 2012). Secondly and more importantly, the Punjabi Taliban, especially *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* and *Jaish-e-Muhammad*, shifted to FATA because the Pakistani authorities initiated strict actions against them in Kashmir and Punjab. The Musharraf regime in Pakistan was under immense pressure from the US and India to take tough actions against the militants who were using Pakistani soil for activities in the Indian-held Kashmir (Mir, 2009). Pakistan was compelled to take actions against the Kashmiri *mujahideen*, especially after the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament. Musharraf had no other option but to announce a ban on the groups operating from Pakistan apparently for two reasons. Firstly, Pakistan had a huge military deployment at western border due to the ongoing War on Terror and it did not want any turbulence on its eastern border. Secondly, Musharraf quickly realized that India could no more tolerate cross-border

infiltration and knew that the latter was seriously contemplating retaliatory attacks on militant hideouts in the Pakistani-controlled Kashmir and Punjab. This could have easily sparked a major war between the two countries and the military dictator could ill afford such adventures due to the growing international criticism of his country and the fragile internal situation in Pakistan. Therefore, in a televised address to the nation on 12 February, 2002 Musharraf announced a ban on some of the Kashmiri groups like *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* (LeJ) and *Jash-e-Muhammad* (Gul, 2009).

It was after this U-turn by the government against them that some of the *mujahideen* groups changed their names as a disguise to reappear and resume their activities while others shifted their cadres to FATA to join the Taliban (Mir, 2009). Between March 2005 and March 2007 alone about 2000 militants moved from Punjab to South Waziristan. Qari Hussain Mahsud, a former SSP activist who has also spent time at *Jamia Benori* Town was instrumental in bringing the Punjabi Taliban and the Kashmiri *mujahideen* closer to the TTP (Abbas, 2009). Some analysts even believe that it was a well thought-out strategy by the government to send these Punjabi Taliban to FATA, not only to hide them from the mounting international criticism but to use them for activities in Afghanistan. Had it been their own motivation, they would have gone to FATA soon after 9/11 (Raza Rahman Khan personal communication, February 21, 2012).

The arrival of the Punjabi Taliban groups has further complicated the problem of terrorism in the Pakhtun region, largely because the Punjabi Taliban have totally different world-view than the Pakhtun militants in the region. The former mainly subscribe to the

Wahabi and *Ahl-Hadith* School of thoughts and believe in the total transformation of the existing system in the country. Moreover, they are more sophisticated as compared to the local Pakhtun militants as they are specially trained for cross-border terrorism (Gul, 2009). The local Taliban in the Pakhtun region, on the other hand, do not have an elaborate agenda. Furthermore, in majority of the cases they do not have any *madrassa* education and therefore, do not have any grand religious strategy.

Punjabi Taliban have brought ferocity to the acts of terrorism in the Pakhtun region. “Punjabi Taliban are the worst of all the militants in terms of violence as they work under the broader umbrella of international Islamic jihadist movements”, argued Dr. Razia Sultana* who is Chairperson of the department of history at the Qaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad (personal communication, December 8, 2011). Qari Hussain Mahsud, the mastermind of almost all the suicide attacks in the Pakhtun region, is a former member of the banned *Sepah-i-Sahaba Pakistan* (SSP), as discussed earlier. The Punjabi Taliban boast the fact they have extended the reach of the tribal militants from FATA to the major urban cities (Abbas, 2009). In fact the Pakistani Taliban’s animosity towards the state could be interpreted in their coming under the Punjabi Taliban’s influence. The former thought that the state has let them down by compromising on the Kashmir issue by leaving Pakistan’s long-standing stance on Kashmir through giving up the demand for the UN-mandated plebiscite in the valley.

* Dr. Razia Sultana is a historian. She is currently Chairperson Department of History at the Qaid-e-Azam University. She regularly contributes to the English dailies on issues related to the Pakhtun region. She is considered as an expert on the Pakhtun culture and extremism and terrorism in the Pakhtun belt. For the purpose of this study the scholar carried out an extensive interview with her on December 8, 2011.

In turn, the Punjabi Taliban's animosity towards Pakistan was largely due to their intimacy with Al Qaeda in the Pakhtun region. Many factors are responsible for their close affinity with Al Qaeda. Firstly, both subscribe to the *Sunni-Salafi* ideology. Secondly, Al Qaeda believes in international jihad and Punjabi Taliban are specially trained for cross-border terrorism, so both have a common objective, and thirdly, both have been alien in the region, so it is natural that they would protect each other.

This intermingling of the Pakistani Taliban with the Al Qaeda-inspired Punjabi Taliban has brought havoc to the Pakhtun region. After engulfing almost the entire Pakhtun region the TTP has become a country-wide organization. It has not transformed into an insurgency in other parts of the country, like it has in the Pakhtun region, but still no major city of the country is immune from their terrorist activities.

3.2.5: Non-Taliban Militants

Apart from the TTP, there are other militants in the Pakhtun region who are called the non-Taliban militants. The non-Taliban militants are distinguished for their pro-government stance. As against the TTP, they do not fight the Pakistani security forces and are not involved in terrorist activities inside the country. Instead, their whole hearted energies are focused on fighting in Afghanistan against the US-NATO forces. Haqqani Network, led by Sirajuddeen Haqqani, a faction of the Afghan Taliban is a pro-government militant organization based in North Waziristan. Mullah Nazir in South Waziristan, Hafiz Gulbahadar in North Waziristan, and Mangal Bagh Afridi in Khyber

Agency are other pro-government non-Taliban commanders. In fact Hafiz Gulbahadar among them was appointed as deputy to Baitullah when TTP was initially formed but he soon parted ways with the organization as he did not want to fight the Pakistani security forces. They are discussed in the following.

3.2.6: The Haqqani Network

Sirajuddeen Haqqani, son of Jalaluddeen Haqqani, a major recipient of US funding during the Soviet-Afghan war of 1980s and a prominent *mujahideen* commander, is leading the Haqqani Network based in village Dande Darpakhel near Miramshah, headquarters of North Waziristan. Sirajuddeen Haqqani has surpassed his father in power and prestige and may rival Mullah Omar for the Taliban leadership (Wadhams & Cookman, 2009). Although analysts believe that Haqqani Network is a part of the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar, however, the US officials consider the Network as a separate entity, largely controlled by Pakistan. The group has unparalleled influence in the three Southern Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika. The group also controls the Zardan dominated districts between Paktika and Paktia provinces, which serves as a transit route for Taliban entering into Logar and Kabul. The Network also has a large support base inside Pakistan in the North Waziristan Agency, especially in and around Miramshah. The Network operated a *madrassa* in village Dande Darpakhel in North Waziristan before it was shut down by the Pakistan security forces through a raid in September 2005. The *madrassa* was completely destroyed by a US drone strike in September 2008 (Wadhams & Cookman, 2009).

The Haqqani Network wants a complete end to the US occupation of Afghanistan. It considers jihad as obligatory upon every Muslim so long as the foreign forces do not leave Afghanistan. At the same time the group has termed the imposition of *Shairah* and a reversion to the Taliban-styled governance in Afghanistan as its first priority. Although, the group does not operate in Pakistan, it has been busy inside Afghanistan since 2006 in some of the fierce militant activities for achieving these objectives. Some of the major attacks carried out by the group are the 2009 attack on the Afghan government officials and a prison headquarters, killing 19 and wounding 50, the July 4, 2009 attack on a US outpost in Paktika, killing two US soldiers and wounding four others, the October 4, 2009 attack on a UN facility at Bakhtar guest house which killed 12 people including 6 UN personnel (Wadhams & Cookman, 2009), and the unprecedented attack in September 2011 on the CIA facility in a hotel in Kabul which killed 14 Afghan nationals and injured 28 others including 6 NATO personnel (Riffatullah* personal communication, March 1, 2012).

3.2.7: Hafiz Gulbahadar

Hafiz Gulbahadar is another pro-government militant commander in North Waziristan Agency. In fact it is in North Waziristan that the government has made agreement with the militants, mainly on the terms and condition of the latter. Actually the government started military operations in North Waziristan in 2006 and 2007 but achieved little success; hence the security forces were compelled to come to terms with the militants. It seems the government is not serious in clearing the area from the militants. It is most

* Riffatullah is a Peshawar-based journalist, working for *The News International*. He keeps a close eye on events happening in the region. This communication was carried out with him on March 1, 2012.

evident in North Waziristan where the government has given open hand to them. “In actual sense the government has given the control of the Agency in the hands of the militants. They have established their own jails and courts. People bring their disputes to the Taliban for settlement”, so said a prominent Peshawar-based journalist and expert on terrorism, (Mushtaq Yousufzai personal communication, February 2, 2012).

Hafiz Gulbahadar is one such commander who has signed most of the deals with government in North Waziristan Agency. He is an Utmanzai Wazir but his followers include militants from both Utmanzai and Daur sub-tribes (Wadhams & Cookman, 2009). When the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* was formed in December 2007, Hafiz Gulbahadar was appointed second-in-command to Baitullah Mahsud, however, since then he has not been on good terms with the TTP (Yousufzai, 2008). Although, together with Mullah Nazir of South Waziristan, he formed the *Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen* (Council for United Holy Warriors) with TTP, to coordinate their activities inside Afghanistan, but the organization was short lived. One of the reasons for the failure was Hafiz Gulbahadar’s opposition to the TTP policy of carrying out activities in Pakistan. Gulbahadar was clearly interested in fighting inside Afghanistan. Since he had signed a peace deal with the government, he was opposed to the idea of indulging in terrorist activities inside Pakistan (Yousufzai, 2008).

3.2.8: Mullah Nazir

Mullah Nazir of the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe is heading another pro-government militant faction in South Waziristan. In fact Mullah Nazir was leading the Ahmadzai Wazir tribe

in 2007 when serious difference emerged between the Taliban over the presence of Uzbek militants in South Waziristan. Majority of Ahmadzai Wazir tribesmen decided to support the government decision of evicting the IMU militants from Wana and Shakai areas of South Waziristan Agency. After a fierce fighting the Uzbek militants were successfully evicted from the region. Two other militant commanders who supported Mullah Nazir in this endeavor were Maulvi Muhammad Iqbal and Malik Abdul Hannan. The latter was reportedly killed by pro-Uzbek militants in July 2008. Mullah Nazir had sporadic relations with TTP throughout 2008 (Yousufzai, 2008). Serious differences emerged between the TTP and Mullah Nazir when 9 tribal elders, affiliated with Mullah Nazir's group were allegedly killed by TTP and Uzbek militants. In February 2009 Mullah Nazir joined hands with Hafiz Gulbahadar to form an alliance with Baitullah Mahsud, the *Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen* (Wadhams & Cookman, 2009). However as discussed earlier, the alliance was short lived. (Note: At the time of writing of this piece Mullah Nazir was alive. He has been killed by a US drone strike on January 3, 2013.)

3.2.9: Non-Taliban Militants in Khyber Agency

There are unique groups in Khyber Agency. The two main groups which are active in the agency emerged due to sectarian rivalry in the region. One of the groups, *Lashkar-e-Islam* (Army of Islam), led by Mangal Bagh Afridi was actually armed and equipped by the government to use it as a counter-force against the likely encroachment of TTP into Khyber Agency, as the Agency is strategically important due to its proximity to the provincial capital Peshawar (Mushtaq Yousufzai personal communication, February 2,

2012). Mangal Bagh Afridi enjoys the command of about 10,000 fighters (Wadhams & Cookman, 2009). He assumed the leadership of *Lashkar-e-Islam* shortly after the organization was founded in 2005. The organization has enforced a strict moral code throughout the agency. The group has been involved in some of the major terrorist activities in and around Peshawar. Although, the group was officially banned in 2007 but it continued to operate with the hidden support of the intelligence agencies, as some local report (Gul, 2009). The Pakistani security forces started military operation apparently against *Lashkar-e-Islam*, but Mangal Bagh has denied the charges that he was challenging the writ of the state. He has also denied any connections with Al Qaeda or the TTP. Instead Mangal Bagh together with Haji Namdar and Hafiz Gulbahadar formed the *Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban* (Local Taliban Movement) to resist TTP and its regional commander, Hakimullah Mahsud (Wadhams & Cookman, 2009). Haji Namdar on his own part led another group called *Amr Bil Maruf wa Nahi Anil Munkar* (Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice). He shared the ideology of *Lashkar-e-Islam* but kept an independent character. Namdar was killed by the TTP militants in August 2008 (Gul, 2009).

Another most important non-Taliban militant group which emerged in stark opposition to Mangal Bagh's *Lashkar-e-Islam* is *Ansarul Islam*. It was given the name of *Aman Lashkar* (Peace Committee) by the government. "The group was actually developed by the government to counter both TTP and Mangal Bagh", says Mushtaq Yousufzai (personal communication February 2, 2012).

Militants in Khyber Agency have made the local people hostage. “In Khyber Agency you must be part of one of the groups to survive. You must collect charity and do other things for the same group” (Mushtaq Yousufzai, personal communication, February 2, 2012).

3.3: Objectives of the Militants in the Pakhtun Region

It is imperative to analyze the objectives of different Taliban forces in order to know the true nature of terrorism in the Pakhtun region. Without exploring both the latent and stated objectives of the militants it is difficult to comprehend the phenomenon of terrorism in the region.

Analyzing the objectives of the militants is not an easy task. It is a complex phenomenon. If one analyzes the Taliban operating in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, from Swat to Khyber and from Orakzai and Kurram to Waziristan, one finds different Taliban groups with different agendas. They do not have one common objective (Mushtaq Yousufzai personal communication, February 2, 2012). There are varieties of Taliban groups. Some of them are more active in Afghanistan; they have made deals with government not to operate in Pakistan, for example Mullah Nazir, Hafiz Gulbahadar, and the Haqqani Network. Some of them are active at both sides of the border, like the TTP. Some of them, with limited reach are busy in certain specific areas inside Pakistan. “For example the Mangal Bagh group in Khyber Agency do not call themselves Taliban but they are the same people. Their operations are limited only to Khyber Agency. They are not interested in what happens in DI Khan, Qandahar or elsewhere. So there are variations

among the different Taliban groups, categorizing them under a single brand is not correct”, (Ijaz Khan personal communication, February 1, 2012).

However, broadly speaking all the militant groups in the Pakhtun region want the imposition of Islamic *Shariah* in the region and ultimately in the country (Gul, 2009). It was evident from the demands of the *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi* (TNSM), a predecessor to the Swat chapter of the Pakistani Taliban originating in the Malakand region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. TNSM, initially a peaceful movement, turned violent in 1994 when it came on the roads demanding an immediate enforcement of the Islamic *Shariah* in the Malakand region (Mir, 2009). The Bajaur and Dir Taliban shared this objective with the Malakand Taliban. This was the time when the Afghan Taliban were at the helm of affairs in Afghanistan. Therefore, militants in the Malakand region wanted their own interpretation of the Islamic *Shariah*, the Afghan Taliban-style governance. The latter although euphemistically called the Islamic *Shariah* was in actual sense the dictatorship of the clerical group. This was a selection of a few extreme tenants of the Islamic *Shariah*, lacking the rationale and philosophical background of the *Shariah* Law. Some of the features of this Taliban-style *Shariah*, evident in both Afghanistan and Swat under the Taliban were:

- i) The enforcement of justice was ensured through a mechanism of extreme punishments i.e. execution, stoning to death, and cutting of hands for murder, adultery, and theft without having to provide for the necessary social and economic well being of the individual, based on the true Islamic system of governance.

- ii) There was no concept of human liberties based upon the concept of Basic Human Rights, enshrined in Islam as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. There was a complete closure of all the social and cultural congregations including ban on music and other means of entertainment.
- iii) Women were kept marginalized in the Taliban-form of *Shariah*. Not only women education was strictly prohibited but there was also a complete ban on women's appearance at public places. This policy was also not backed up by the Islamic concept of women's rights according to which the acquisition of knowledge is necessary for all males and females, women are to be treated humanly and their due share in the property of the family must be ensured.

Pakistani Taliban's demand for the enforcement of *Shariah* was largely influenced by their interaction with Al Qaeda (Gul, 2009). As discussed earlier, when the Pakistani Taliban came into being they had no intentions to fight inside Pakistan and had not declared the imposition of *Shariah* in the country as their ultimate objective. Al Qaeda played an instrumental role in the Pakistani Taliban's change of hearts towards their own country and the subsequent demand for the enforcement of *Shariah* (Rashid, 2008).

However, it must be emphasized that contrary to the Afghan Taliban who were mostly graduated from *madrassas*, the Pakistani Taliban, except for Sufi Muhammad and Fazlullah, have no or little religious education. In most of the cases they do not have any affiliation with *madrassas* (Gul, 2009). Therefore, having no religious training, it is a contradiction on their part asking for the imposition of *Shariah*. As opposed to

Afghanistan where Taliban came to power by ending the infighting among different warlords and the resultant chaos in the country, no such conditions prevailed in Pakistan at the time of their emergence.

More importantly, except for the TNSM, cadres of the TTP active in different tribal agencies have even not declared the enforcement of *Shariah* as their stated objective. For example it is ironic to note that the Taliban in the Mohmand Agency do not have any demands, except they want that forces should evacuate the agency and bring an end to the military operations in the region. Same is the case in North Waziristan where militants have not demanded the imposition of *Shariah*. They want that the security forces must leave the area, bring an end to curfew, allow free movement to the militants, and the Agency affairs should be handed to FC and Khasadar force (Local Militia which help FC in maintaining law and order in the agency) (Mushtaq Yousufzai personal communication, February 2, 2012).

If the enforcement of *Shariah* is not the objective of the militants in the Pakhtun region then what is the real motive behind their activities? Analysts believe that militants in the Pakhtun region aim, ultimately, at the acquisition of power.

These are the people who were engaged with the Afghan Taliban in one way or the other; therefore, they have a taste of power. Most of the TTP leaders have fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan, when returned they became warlords in their own areas. Different militants groups have

different agendas but ultimately all of them want power (Mushtaq Yousufzai personal communication, February 2, 2012).

This is evident from the activities of different Taliban leaders who, although part of the umbrella organization, TTP, act independently to enhance their own personal or political power in the areas under their control. Sufi Muhammad in Dir and Fazlullah in Swat clearly aimed at the acquisition of political power in their own respective areas. In fact Dir and Swat were the two princely states ruled by individuals, called “*Nawab*” and “*Wali*”, respectively, under the British. The two states merged into Pakistan almost two decades after the partition of India. This must have been clearly on the minds of Sufi Muhammad and Fazlullah when they started the religious mobilizations in the region. By appealing to the emotionally charged people of the two former states, the two leaders wanted to resurrect the past. Accepting their demands and the subsequent imposition of *Shariah* in Dir and Swat would have made Sufi Muhammad and Maulvi Fazlullah absolute leaders in their own respective areas. This was not to be the case, however, as successful military operations in Dir and Swat in 2008 and 2009 has broken the back of the militants in the region (Yousufzai, 2009). However, the quick military victory against the militants in Dir and Swat has not been replicated in the FATA region.

Ironically, it was in the presence of huge military deployment that the Taliban thrived in FATA, especially in North and South Waziristan Agencies. In fact the Pakistan Army had deployed 120000 troops in FATA by 2003 (Gul, 2009). At that time, apart from a small number of Al Qaeda and Uzbek fighters, there were few, if any, indigenous Taliban

militants in the region. This huge and early deployment of the security forces should have checked the spread of Talibanization in the region. It is interesting to note however, that since then the strength of the militants has not only increased vertically but also horizontally, by bringing more and more areas under their control. This rapid growth of Talibanization in the presence of the huge military deployment in the region questions the resolve of the security forces in taking on the militants. Whatever be the objectives of the militants, analysts believe that it is the unwillingness on part of the security forces to bring an end to the problem of terrorism in the Pakhtun region. “I think in many cases the government’s institutions and the intelligence agencies are part of this violence and promote it for their own vested interests”, said Mushtaq Yousufzai. He further argued, “They do not want to resolve the issue. They have made a situation in the entire tribal region where common people are caught between the militants and the military” (personal communication, February 2, 2012). The next section identifies, among other factors, how and why the machination of the Pakistani state worked as a catalyst in the spread of Talibanization in the Pakhtun region.

3.4: Talibanization of the Pakhtun Society

Three factors have historically helped the rise of terrorism in Pakistan generally and in the Pakhtun society specifically. These are the role of the Pakistani civil and military establishment, the realization on the part of the largely marginalized religious forces or *mullahs* that they too have a right to rule (Nasr, 2004), and the socio-political and administrative vacuum created by the colonial-era governance system in FATA (Gul, 2009). The three are interconnected as it has been the Pakistani state establishment’s

patronage of and appeasement towards the religious forces which brought the latter from periphery to the mainstream of the society. In turn both the establishment and the religious forces had a stake in deliberately keeping FATA as a virtual no go area.

It is interesting that demand of the Taliban for the enforcement of *Shariah* in the country is in line with the basic ideology of Pakistan. The Pakistani state was created on the premise that Hindus and Muslims were two different nations and that it was impossible for the latter to live under the rule of the former after the departure of the British from the Sub-continent (Jones, 2002). Leaders of the Pakistan Movement thought that an independent country of their own would serve as a laboratory where to practice the glorious Islamic governance system based upon *Shariah* Law. The ‘Directive Principles’ of the 1973 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has declared the enforcement of *Shariah* as the ultimate goal. The constitution further enshrines that no law that is repugnant to the true spirit of Quran and *Sunnah* (Words and Deeds of the Prophet Muhammad SAW) would be passed by the parliament. Although Muhammad Ali Jinnah, founder and first Governor General of Pakistan, and his successors were largely secular and the dream of establishing *Shariah* in the country has not been realized till this day (Cohen, 2003), however, the state’s establishment and the powerful military have not changed their mind about the future of the state. In fact the military, which considers itself the custodian of the ideological and physical boundaries of the state, has been at the helm of affairs most of the time. The military dictators have ruled the country for 33 years, more than half of its history. The internecine fragile democratic governments have made little impact on the social and political scene of the country. Resultantly, the policy

of the state has always been under the influence of the powerful military establishment. The army considers India as its biggest enemy for its anti Pakistan policies and its illegal occupation of Kashmir. Therefore, the military-dominated Pakistan foreign policy has always been India-centric (Haqqani, 2005). Since it is difficult to confront the powerful Indian armed forces through traditional military means the Pakistan Army reserved for itself the right to use proxies to challenge India. Hence, Pakistani military establishment has used religion to further this policy and to camouflage their real political objectives in its relations with India. This has not been limited to only using non-state actors in the Indian-held Kashmir. All the means, including civilian, military, and educational institutions were used to create a jaundiced view about India in the minds of the new generation. In fact the concept of jihad against India has been internalized in the social fabric of the society through a well thought out strategy. Hence it has always been easy for them to recruit *mujahideen* from the religiously manipulated population of the country and to use them anywhere they like.

The policy of using *mujahideen* against India was carried through towards 1970s when, for the first time the military establishment of the country realized that by making Afghanistan as its backyard Pakistan had a better chance of challenging India (Gul, 2009). The concept of ‘Strategic Depth’ in Afghanistan is actually the product of Pakistan’s India policy. Through acquiring a ‘Strategic Depth’ in Afghanistan the Pakistan Army wanted to extend its operational capacity in any likely confrontation with its arch rival enemy, India. This would have helped the Pakistani military in two ways. First, by making Afghanistan a backyard the Pakistani armed forces would have been in a

better position to avoid a major traditional military attack from India. Moreover, by going deep into the Afghan territory, Pakistan would have the second strike capability in case of a nuclear strike.

Pakistan had already actively started interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by encouraging dissident leaders to destabilize the Soviet-inclined Sardar Daud government; however, a golden opportunity to give a practical shape to this policy came in the shape of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 (Gul, 2009). With the help of the United States of America Pakistan created huge jihad machinery in the Pakhtun region to recruit, train, and equip different *mujahideen* groups to fight the Red Army in Afghanistan (Abbas, 2005). This has been discussed in detail in the second chapter of this study. Here it is important to know that the successful jihad in Afghanistan generated a realization in the religious forces that they too have a right to rule. Although, the military establishment was using the religious forces as a tool of foreign policy right from 1947, however, the Afghan jihad was the first major issue where the interests of both the religious forces and the military establishment converged.

In fact, historically *mullahs* or religious figure have been marginalized, especially in the Pakhtun society. Anthropologists agree that *mullahs* have no role in the day to day secular affairs of the Pakhtun society and have never acquired leadership position. They acquire power only in times of extraordinary crisis. As soon as the crisis situation is over, society comes to its normal secular discourse (Haroon, 2011). This is evident in the contemporary Pakhtun society where turbulent situation for more than three decades have

made the religious forces powerful. Moreover, the recognition of *Sanad* (*Madrassa* Certificate) as equivalent to the university degree by the Zia ul Haq government in the 1980s was also a major step in this regard. For the first time in the history of the country graduates from seminaries or *madrassas* were able to contest parliamentary elections. It is interesting to note, however, that except for the 2002 elections, the religious-political parties have never gained a considerable number of seats in either the provincial assemblies or in the national parliament. Internal situation in the country in 2002 was totally in favor of the religious parties. The United States had invaded the neighboring Muslim state of Afghanistan and the religious parties fully capitalized on the religiously and emotionally charged sentiments of the population.

Before the general election in 2002 the diverse religious parties in the country formed a grand alliance called the *Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal* (MMA). In fact the coming together of the diverse religious forces, having major ideological differences, under the banner of MMA was made possible by the hidden hand of the establishment. MMA was actually the outgrowth of the 'Afghan Defense Council', an alliance of about 40 Islamic groups formed in 2001 by the secret intelligence agencies of the country to oppose the likely US attack on Afghanistan and to show solidarity with the Afghan Taliban (Rashid, 2008).

The MMA made a successful election campaign by leading the anti American demonstrations across the country. It emerged as the second largest political force, after the Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q), by securing 53 seats in the national assembly. More importantly, through a landmark victory, the MMA emerged as the largest political

force in the strategically important province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by winning majority of the seats for the provincial assembly. The alliance also formed a coalition government with PML-Q in the province of Balochistan (Cohen, 2003).

In fact, the two largest political parties in the country, *Jamiatul Ulama-e-Islam* (JUI) and *Jamat-e-Islami* (JI) have always patronized the *mujahideen* groups in the country (Gul, 2009). However, it was the MMA five year rule from 2002-2007 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan that the process of Talibanization was given a spur. The religious parties not only banked upon the support of the militant groups to enlarge their constituencies but also closed their eyes to the illegal activities of the emerging Taliban groups in the Pakhtun region. The religious parties' soft corner for the militants could be gauged from the fact that when the military started operations against the latter the former vehemently opposed the decision (Mir, 2009). Had there been no official support for the militants, it would have been difficult for the Afghan Taliban to acquire sanctuaries in the Pakhtun region. The latter had already started to shift to the tribal regions of Pakistan after the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.

The entry of the Afghan Taliban and the emergence of the indigenous militants in FATA have been facilitated mainly by the political and administrative system in vogue in the region. In fact the central government in the country has never fully extended its writ to the tribal region bordering Afghanistan. In actual sense the constitution of Pakistan has no jurisdiction in the region as ordinary law of the country does not apply to FATA (Gul, 2009). It is under the direct control of the president of Pakistan and the parliament of the

country can not legislate for the region. Each agency is administered by an official called political agent who works under the authority of the governor Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The governor in turn is directly responsible to the president. It is ironic that FATA is represented in the national parliament but its members have no right to legislate for their own region. Instead, the area is governed under the Colonial era legal framework called the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) (discussed in the first chapter of this study). Like the British who used Afghanistan as a buffer between the Tsarist Russia and the Colonial India to halt Soviet's southward expansion, Pakistani establishment has used FATA as a buffer between Afghanistan and the mainland Pakistan (Raza Rahman Khan Qazi, personal communication, February 21, 2012). Over the years the successive governments in the country have paid little attention to the demand of the people of FATA and other civil society activist in Pakistan to mainstreaming the region, by bringing it at par with the rest of the state. This has mainly been done for two reasons: to avoid any unwanted Afghan influence on Pakistan and to use the region as a launching pad for activities inside Afghanistan.

This policy of keeping FATA marginalized and backward has created a socio-political and administrative vacuum in the region. This vacuum has been fully utilized by the Afghan Taliban and the local terrorists to their advantage (Gul, 2009). Furthermore, the current insurgents or Taliban have even done away with whatever little government writ in the region. By establishing parallel administrative system the Taliban have paralyzed the existing governance structure. The traditional *maliki* system, an important administrative pillar, has been replaced by *mullahs* and militant leaders, making it

impossible for the local administration to run the day to day affairs (Mushtaq Yousufzai, personal communication, February 2, 2012).

Thus, the current chaos and unrest leading to the Talibanization of the Pakhtun society is not a result of the normal social change but a product of the deliberate social engineering by the state.

3.5: Current Insurgency in the Pakhtun Region

Some people believe that the current insurgency in the Pakhtun region is a Pakhtun nationalist movement. This view is mainly promoted by the Pakistani state establishment for their obvious fear of the secular Pakhtun nationalists, who they suspect to be anti-Pakistan. Therefore, through Talibanization they are hitting the Pakhtun identity. “Definitely, Talibanization is de-Pakhtunization which removes Pakhtun identity from you. They portray it as Pakhtun uprising to cover Talibanization, because when you talk of Pakhtuns you do not talk of the non-Taliban Pakhtuns, the secular” (Ijaz Khan, personal communication, February 1, 2012). This has been a long-term policy of the Pakistani state establishment. In the East Bengal crisis in 1971 they used *Al Badr* and *Al Shams*, the extremist groups, against the nationalists (Jones, 2002). Even originally when Gulbadeen, Rabbani and Ahmad Shah were invited to Peshawar, it was against the nationalist government of Sardar Daud (Gul, 2009). It was not against the Communists, as it was not a religious issue. In reality it was an anti-Pakhtun strategy. Another important aspect of the nature of the current terrorism in the Pakhtun society is to be found in the history and strategic location of this region. Dr. Ijaz Khan argues,

We need to understand the reasons for this are because of this region not because of Pakhtuns. To put it in an extreme way.... if say, Punjabis or Baloch or Sindhis or Marhatas were occupying this same region, chances are, with definitely a little cultural or other minor differences, it would have been the same case (personal communication, February 1, 2012).

In fact it is the region, due to its close proximity with Afghanistan, which has been used by the Pakistani strategists to achieve the regional aspirations of the state. They may have capitalized on the Pakhtun culture to a certain extent but in reality the issue has nothing to do with the people. However, one can not deny the fact that people of the area have been used to achieve the desired objectives. Thus Pakhtuns are caught in the dellima not because of their culture but because of their region. The history of the Pakhtun region can not be separated from the history of Afghanistan because of the natural and physical commonalities of the two.

Due to the Soviet intervention in the recent past, Afghanistan and the Pakhtun region, especially FATA, have become more of an ungoverned territory. Militants from allover the world were encouraged to come to Afghanistan for the war against the Soviet Union (Rashid, 2008). Human beings are not machines, so when they came they not only developed personal relationships but also gained knowledge of the area. Some of them went back to their own countries after the war was over; some of them remained and never went back. Even a phrase became popular in those days; they used to refer to such

people, even Arabs, Nigerians, and other *mujahideen*, as Afghans (Ijaz Khan personal communication, February 1, 2012). Those who went back and tried to bring Islamic changes in their own countries, they found it difficult because theirs were well established governed states. So they had to get away somewhere. Afghanistan was the natural choice for two reasons. First, they knew Afghanistan, its people and territory because they fought there and had lived there. Secondly, Afghanistan was ungoverned so no one could stop them from coming. There were a lot of people welcoming them, but those who may have stopped them were also not to be seen. So Afghanistan very fast became a centre for militants of all kind. Al Qaeda, which also had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets, finding it difficult to operate from the Middle East, shifted to Afghanistan for the same reasons: being ungoverned and known to them (Rashid, 2002).

In fact a number of Pakhtun nationalists looked towards Taliban when they first appeared in Afghanistan in 1994. There are reports that the Taliban even recruited a certain number of Khalqis (Khalq was a faction of the Communist Party of Afghanistan) and former Afghan Army soldiers. There were even pro Zahir Shah People who were supporting them. “It would be interesting to note that originally when the Taliban emerged in Afghanistan Pakistan’s ISI actually opposed them” says Ijaz Khan (personal communication, February 1, 2012). The Pan-Islamists like Qazi Hussain Ahmad of the JI and Gulbadin Hikmatyar called the Taliban as agents of the British secret services, against Islam and Pan-Islamist movements. Some Pakhtun nationalists, pro Shah people and other moderates thought that although the Taliban would defeat the *mujahideen* groups, however, being unable to govern the country, the moderates will take over the

responsibility of governing the country and will establish a relatively moderate and peaceful government. Because they never thought that Taliban themselves will be able to do much. However, very soon ISI and Pakistani establishment realized that Taliban was a strong upcoming force. Rather than alienating them, they were embraced. Along with this the Pan-Islamists, JI and others, also changed their stance within a few months. While these changes were taking place, for different reasons, even the US had a more positive view of the Taliban. They considered Taliban as traditional *Sunnis* and not Pan-Islamists, confined to Afghanistan and a counterweight to *Shia* Iran. In those days they considered *Shias* more of a challenge to western interests than any extremists *Sunnis* would be. The Americans feared the Pan-Islamists *Sunnis*, however, they considered the Taliban as traditional Muslims, posing no threat to their interests (Siddique, 2011). Gradually when the Taliban gained power, the assessment of the Pakhtun nationalists, pro Shah people and Americans proved wrong. Taliban may not have the capability but they were able to control the state and run it for themselves, with the help of the Pan-Islamists and Pakistani state establishment. The other supporters of the Taliban were gradually sidelined. Their connection with Pan-Islamists and the Pakistani state establishment strengthened, simultaneously increasing the animosity with the west. Gradually the Pakistani establishment considered the Taliban to be their best bet in Afghanistan. Taliban were more comfortable for Pakistan than their experience with *mujahideen* under Burhanuddin Rabbani, when they came into power in the early nineties. Especially Pakistan's concern was vis-à-vis India. They knew that Taliban will deny, and had denied Afghanistan to India, which the *mujahideen* under Rabbani and others had not (Siddique, 2011). Moreover, Pan-Islamists were satisfied because the Taliban gave them space.

The current phase of insurgency started in the Pakhtun region when the US-NATO forces, authorized by the UN, attacked Afghanistan, displaced the Taliban and removed them from government in 2001 (Gul, 2009). As a result resistance by the Taliban started. This resistance had all the components including the original Taliban and Al Qaeda Arabs, who thought that the removal of Taliban had denied them the safe haven which they had in Afghanistan. Pakistani establishment was not happy with the disruption of the Taliban regime because it thought that in Taliban it had a chance, the only chance to meet the minimum of their policy towards Afghanistan, its denial to India. With the US intervention, Afghanistan was now open to Indian influence as well. Pakistan had not found it very attractive (Siddique, 2011).

After the fall of the Taliban regime, most of the insurgents easily came to the different areas of Pakistan, including to FATA, there was an administrative vacuum in the region, as discussed earlier. Some people interpret it that because there were fellow Pakhtuns in FATA, who gave refuge to the Taliban, but this is a wrong impression. For those who wanted to fight in Afghanistan, FATA was the best place. Due to its particular administrative system they could hide there, train themselves, and reorganize themselves (Rashid, 2002).

Therefore, the current insurgency in the Pakhtun region has all the components which the original Taliban had: the Pakistani state interest, the Arabs, and militants from all over Pakistan including the Punjab. They also go inside Afghanistan to fight with a nominal

allegiance to Mullah Umar, but most of them act independently. Inside Pakistan, some groups are Pakistan-specific, they fight only in Pakistan, some go inside Afghanistan for fighting, but they share one thing, Islamic extremism (Mir, 2009).

An important point is that the Taliban have never called their struggle as a Pakhtun nationalist movement. Ijaz Khan rightly says,

Calling this a Pakhtun nationalist movement is totally misleading. There are Pakhtuns among them but it becomes more visible because it is mostly pronounced in the Pakhtun territory due to the location, not because of the Pakhtuns. Even the term Punjabi Taliban is misleading, the term should be Punjab-based Taliban. (personal communication, February 1, 2012)

Nationalists movements strive to protect their language and promote their culture and national identity through political means. They may also want to take the economic resources in their own hands without outside interference. At the same time, they may want autonomy within a multinational state or total independence in certain cases. Taliban in the Pakhtun region meet none of the above criteria, therefore, they can not be considered a Pakhtun nationalist movement (Taj, 2012).

The Taliban insurgency in the Pakhtun region has to be understood more of a religious movement or Arab movement, not as a Pakhtun nationalist movement. In fact the nature is to be found in the overall global system, the Muslim extremists' and the Arab reaction

to the international system, expressing itself in a particular interpretation of Islam. “So the roots are mainly in the Middle East rather” (Ijaz Khan personal communication, February 1, 2012).

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Chapter 4

Pakhtun Cultural Values, Terrorism and the Contextual Meaning of Violence

4.1: Introduction

The issue of exploring the causal relationship between terrorism and the Pakhtun cultural values is a complex phenomenon. Two things are important to understand the question in hand: First, to locate the violence, if any, in the cultural values of the Pakhtuns and, second, to carefully analyze the prevailing terrorism in the Pakhtun society. By highlighting the direct and symbolic violence in the Pakhtun culture and by clearly delineating the distinguishing features of the current terrorism in the Pakhtun society it will be possible to see whether there is any relationship between the two. It is important first, however, to generally distinguish terrorism from other forms of violence and to see whether there is any relationship between violence and terrorism. This is both simple and difficult. It is simple because in majority of the situations people know whether an event is an act of terrorism or not. Although, the means employed may be the same but it is the ends which distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violence (Schinkel, 2010).

Terrorism is inherently motivated by political objectives (Abrahms, 2008). Other forms of violence may or may not involve political motives (Schinkel, 2010). On the other hand the often differing and competing definitions of terrorism makes the task of distinguishing terrorism from the ordinary forms of violence all the more difficult. Terms like “narco-terrorism” (illegal production, movement, and use of narcotics which badly affects humans), “environmental terrorism”, and “cyber-terrorism” indicates how loosely

the word is applied to different situations (Guelke, 2010). Further, the fact that more civilians have been killed in political violence as against terrorism, especially in Central American countries over the last few decades, indicates that the line between terrorism and other forms of violence is delicate, and often even blurred (Guelke, 2010). More importantly, it is not the question only of distinguishing terrorism from other forms of violence but it is the fact to know whether violence prevailing in a particular culture, society or a group of people can be related to terrorism in the same society, culture or group of people. Theories of terrorism, especially psychoanalytic and psychocultural hypotheses indicate that it can be (Ross, 1986). For example harsh socialization, especially the rearing of a child in a violent and unfriendly environment warrants deviant behavior in adulthood (Crenshaw, 2000). As grown up in a harsh environment and prone to violence such individuals provide easy recruits to the terrorists, as against other normal human beings. A related theory which identifies somewhat the same causes of terrorism is the frustration-aggression hypotheses (Ferracuti, 1982). While coupled with psychoanalytic theory the frustration-aggression hypotheses connects early child physical punishment with displacement of personality and aggressive behavior in adulthood, another paradigm, the social learning theory, explain the connection in terms of modeling, imitation, and reinforcement (Guelke, 2010). Although, these theories explain a general violent disposition, not terrorism specifically, however, it can be indirectly related to terrorism. For example there is no denying the fact that terrorism involves an extra normal use of violence, albeit for different objectives.

The above mentioned theories are vital as causal factors for a comprehensive study of terrorism; however, the psychological theories can not be accepted as explanation of terrorism. Terrorists are normal human beings. The questions of a pathological mind or early socialization as causal factor play little, if any, role in explaining terrorism and terrorists. Terrorists come from all backgrounds (Borun, 2004; Wienburg, 2006). The bulk of the modern day terrorists come from middle and upper middle class with a sound economic background and often even having a university degree (Turk, 2004). Moreover, early socialization of some of the modern day terrorists, indulging in acts of terror against the industrialized western states, has taken place in the same societies.

However, the case of terrorists in the Pakhtun society is different from the ones discussed in the above paragraph. As apart from the leadership, the rank and file of the terrorists in the Pakhtun society come from modest economic background, often having little or no education (Gul, 2009). The fact which is being stressed here is that early child rearing conditions or culture for that matter have no direct connection with the process of becoming a terrorist. Taliban or terrorists in the Pakhtun society may be using some of the Pakhtun cultural values to further their objectives, but at the same time they are targeting other elements of *Pakhtunwali* which questions their Pakhtunness. Therefore, Taliban can not be considered as a product of the Pakhtun culture but a counter-culture force, as discussed in the introduction chapter.

This chapter explores Pakhtun cultural values, their national character, and the phenomena of violence in the Pakhtun society. The chapter also analyzes the current

terrorism in the Pakhtun society to know whether there is any relationship between terrorism and the Pakhtun cultural values. The second section analyzes violence and terrorism in general. In particular, it distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violence. The third section highlights the historical roots of violence in the contexts of some of the pre-industrial societies other than the Pakhtuns. It is a cursory analysis of the culture of violence in medieval Europe, pre-industrial United States of America, *Surma* in Ethiopia and *Yanomamo* in Brazil and Venezuela. The purpose of exploring the culture of violence in other societies is not only to show that violence has been a human universal, not limited only to the Pakhtun society, but also to highlight the effects of positive and negative state interference in the society. For example, constructive state interference in the first case, Europe and America, led to the pacification of these societies, while negligence on the part of state, especially in the case of *Surma*, led to the further radicalization of the society. The fourth section delineates Pakhtun cultural values. It especially evaluates those elements of the Pakhtun culture which are directly or indirectly related to violence. The last section explores the relationship, if any, between the contemporary terrorism in the Pakhtun society and some of the elements of Pakhtun culture that are related to violence.

4.2: Violence and Terrorism

Both violence and terrorism lack clear definitions because of various reasons. First of all, the problem common to all social science concepts is that researchers have a tendency to take things for granted. Owing to the popular nature of many terms, scholars leave much for the readers and assume that they know what is being explained (Schinkel, 2010). Both

violence and terrorism suffer from this problem. Furthermore, in violence other than terrorism social scientists usually focus too little on the event itself. Opposite is the case with terrorism, however, where the actual event of terrorism, in what is actually a political process, receives much more attention (Schinkel, 2010). Then there are some other difficulties peculiar to each. For example, violence bears non-recognizable character. It is hard to recognize whether a particular situation or event is violent or not. For example it is very difficult to know whether only physical assault is to be considered violence or whether abusive language and the threat of violence also contain violence (Schinkel, 2010). Another difficulty in explaining violence is that because of culture relativism an act considered violent in a particular society may be accepted quite a normal behavior in another society (Ember, Ember & Peregrine, 2006). Terrorism also suffers from such difficulties. One of the glaring difficulties in the definition of terrorism is the loose nature of the term. It is ironical that on the one hand because of the lack of agreement on a common definition it is difficult to know what actually constitute terrorism. On the other hand the term is used to cover a diverse range of events. As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, terms like narco-terrorism, environmental terrorism, cyber-terrorism, and economic terrorism indicates how carelessly the word is applied to different situations (Guelke, 2010). However, the lack of agreement on a common definition in case of violence and terrorism does not mean there are no definitions. In fact there are numerous definitions for both. For the purpose of this study it is important to define these terms so that a background can be set for a distinction between the two.

The word violence is derived from the Latin noun *violentia* which means vehemence. The verb to which *violentia* relates is *violare*, meaning to dishonor, to outrage or to treat with violence. It has become an independent word in Anglo-French somewhere around fourteenth century (Schinkel, 2010). Violence is defined by Spierenburg as “.....all forms of intentional encroachment upon the physical integrity of the body” (2005, p. 1). Spierenburg does not include in this definition encroachment on the body for medical reasons or unintentional harm to the body, for example that caused by a traffic accident. He also rightly rejects notions like psychological or structural violence which according to him is an excuse for ideological purposes. Although, it is a restricted definition but it is not narrowed. As according to the author it includes such minor encroachment upon the physical integrity of the body which may appear too trivial for a court to prosecute. On the other hand Riches define violence as, “Contestably rendering physical hurt” (1986, pp. 11-12). The word “contestably” indicates that the writer does not consider only the shedding of blood as violence. Rather it is an expansive definition which may include not only psychological and structural aspects of violence but also cover contestable events on which there is a dispute between the victims and the perpetrators about the legality of violence. The notions of legality and illegality comes into play because although violence is a condemnatory word, which itself indicates that the action is illegal, nevertheless, there are situations in which people agree that violent action is justified. For example tyrannicide has long been legitimized in many parts of the world. It has been recognized by many political philosophies that in extraordinary circumstances the violent overthrow of the existing political system is justified (Guelke, 2010). This study prefers the latter definition over the former. Pakhtun culture is portrayed in the literature as having a

violent disposition and this study is concerned mainly with violence structured in culture, therefore, this definition best fits in the scheme of the study. Since the notion of violence in the Pakhtun culture is contestable, as discussed earlier, therefore, this definition is preferred.

One of the important things while discussing violence is that it should be distinguished from force. This is another factor where the questions of legitimacy and illegitimacy have a role to play. In fact violence is usually attributed to the society or to the individual in the private capacity, while force is ascribed to the agent of state. Since state is considered as the only repository of the legitimate use of violence, therefore, the use of force by its agents is accepted as legal (Guelke, 2010). Since the development of the modern nation state and the criminalization of various acts by the state, the use of force in the private capacity has largely been declared as illegitimate and therefore, considered as violent (Spierenburg, 2005). However, transgression or the excessive use of force by state institutions may also be considered as violence.

Terrorism on the other hand can not only be used against the state but for the service of state as well (Crenshaw, 1981). Since terrorism has been discussed in detail in the first chapter of this study, it is suffice here to outline some of the themes common to its different definitions. This will indicate that politics is involved not only in the objectives of terrorism but also in its definition (Schinkel, 2010). As a result there has been no agreement on a common definition of terrorism even after numerous international efforts to do so (Bjorgo, 2005). It can also be gauged from the fact that more civilians have been

killed in political violence in Central America over the last few decades than in terrorism in the same period (Guelke, 2010).

There are some elements which are common to most, if not all, definitions of terrorism. They include, for example the use of violence, civilians or non-combatants as targets, political objectives of the perpetrators, clandestine nature of the act, and the element of fear involved (Hoffman, 2006). However, some of the controversial elements found in most definitions make the process of defining terrorism all the more difficult. They include, among others, for example, that the nature of terrorism is international and that it is mainly directed against the liberal democracies of the west. This element is wholly responsible why thousands of civilians killed in other forms of political violence in countries other than the west have not been included in the victims of terrorism (Guelke, 2010). Another element common to most definitions is that terrorism is the killing of few to influence many. If we accept the indirect nature of terrorism, the purpose of which is to influence the larger population through targeting a few, then what to do with the thousands killed in direct forms of violence? Furthermore, some of the other issues including the ideological usage of the term, rooted in a specific liberal western concept, and the problem of making no distinction between a terrorist and a freedom-fighter also dilute the effort for reaching a conclusion (Wienburg, 2006). These and some other issues prove that it is not an easy task to differentiate terrorism from other forms of violence since the boundaries between the two may look delicate on closer analyses. Nevertheless, an effort is made below to distinguish terrorism from ordinary forms of violence.

4.2.1: Distinguishing Terrorism from other Forms of Violence

A good approach to differentiate terrorism from other forms of violence is to delineate salient features of the two. Although, both involve an element of harm to the person or the property of human being, it is generally easy to distinguish terrorism from other forms of violence. Probably the most important feature of terrorism is its relations to politics. Terrorism is always motivated by political objectives (Abrahms, 2008). Even the religiously or ideologically motivated terrorists want to bring political changes in the target society. The element of harm, which is shared by other forms of violence as well, is another feature of terrorism. Whatever its ultimate objective, the immediate effect of terrorism can be seen in the shape of harm inflicted on the individual, property, or institutions of the state. Another important feature of terrorism is the indirect nature of the act. As Schinkel has rightly said that “terrorism is inextricably bound to the reaction to terrorism that makes it a political process instead of a singular event” (2010, p. 136). In fact the element of indirectness is doubly present in the process of terrorism. The immediate targets of the attack are either target of opportunity (unarmed civilians) or randomly selected (such as high profile political assassinations). The terrorist randomly kill few to influence the larger population who, in the terrorists’ scheme of things may in turn influence the state to take the desired action (Schinkel, 2010). This leads one to another feature of terrorism, the element of fear. Almost all acts of terrorism aim at generating fear in the larger population. By selecting a random target, for example, the terrorists aim at intimidating the people psychologically and want to generate an expected but unpredictable fear in their mind. This is an effective tool of coercion as the fear and panic among the general population can easily destabilize the existing political system

which is the ultimate goal of almost all terrorist campaigns. Still another distinguishing feature of terrorism is the covert or clandestine nature of the terrorist activity. Terrorists do not act in the open. In majority of the situations it is difficult to establish the charges against any one unless the terrorist group or individual himself claim the responsibility for an act of terrorism. An act of terrorism may be expected but it is always unpredictable. Last but not the least, its reliance on excessive use of violence and its disregard for any norms and values, make terrorism the most condemned activity.

Apart from the element of harm, present both in violence and terrorism, the former bears entirely different features. First of all, although violence itself is a value-loaded word, indicating illegitimate or unwanted use of force, however, as discussed earlier, there are situations where people agree that the use of violence is not only legitimate but also desirable. This is usually not the case with terrorism. A minor act of terrorism, even one involving no human loss is condemned in the strongest of words. In other words ordinary form of violence may sometime escape public indignation, but terrorism is entirely unacceptable. Secondly, violence may or may not involve political objectives. Even in politically motivated acts of violence the process does not exceed beyond the actual target. For example in the process of political assassinations or tyrannicides the immediate target is usually the actual target. Terrorism on the other hand “is a political process that is always a part of a larger political process” (Schinkel, 2010, p. 136). Thirdly, violence is directly communicated between the victim and the perpetrator, there is no carrier in between the two like that in terrorism. One of the hallmarks of almost all terrorist campaigns is its indirect nature, as previously discussed. This is done for the obvious

reason that terrorists can not face the superior force of the state head on, therefore, they coerce the latter indirectly. On the other hand the discrepancy in the potential force of the contending parties in ordinary form of violence is normally lesser than in the case of terrorism as it usually takes place between individuals or groups of individuals. Although, there are situations where individuals and state are involved in violence other than terrorism but that are exceptions. Some writers even question why these are not included in the general category of terrorism (Guelke, 2010). Fourthly, in the process of violence the gap between the ends sought and the means adopted to pursue the desired ends is always minimum. Violence is usually directed to achieve certain specific goals. On the other hand the gap between the goals sought and the means adopted in the process of terrorism is so huge that the event fails to achieve the desired objectives. This is because the actual event receive such condemnation that people ignore to think about the terrorists' cause (Schinkel, 2010). Although much of the conceptual dust has been cleared by delineating the distinguishing features of violence and terrorism, however, Adrian Guelke has proposed broadly three ways of distinguishing terrorism from other violence.

The first is the normative way. This identifies terrorism with the kind of action that violates the basic norms of the humanitarian law for the conduct of conflict. The excessive use of force against the unarmed innocent civilians makes terrorism illegitimate and hence totally unacceptable. Terrorism is a kind of warfare that follows no rules of war and accepts no limitations. The other way identifies terrorism with a specific form of violence. This treats terrorism as a technical term applying to only political form of violence against or in the boundaries of stable and liberal democracies. In fact it is one of

the controversial issues in the discussion of terrorism. For example, why is there a tendency of labeling politically motivated violence in the liberal democracies as terrorism but not applying the same standards to the political violence in the third world? One of the obvious reasons for this double standard is that the liberal democratic states of the developed world think there is ample opportunity for every grievance to be redressed peacefully. This is guaranteed by values such as the opportunity for the freedom of expression, the right to peaceful demonstration, free and fair election, and a free and impartial judiciary. Hence in such an environment, they think, there is no room for acts like terrorism. However, one may add, that the events of 9/11 have changed the rules of the business. For example terrorism in the Pakhtun region in the form of Talibanization clearly indicates the threat is no more limited to only liberal democracies of the west. The third way of distinguishing it is an analysis of the chronology of terrorism over a period of time. The list identified by Guelke include acts, among others, like kidnapping, hostage taking, bombing, assassinations, attacks on diplomats, missile and rocket attacks, attacks on airlines, and product contamination (2010). It is an important approach because acts like attacks on diplomats and missile and rocket attacks which may some times escape the label of terrorism, have been included.

After differentiating terrorism from violence I believe it is important to discuss the culture of violence in some of the pre-industrial societies other than the Pakhtuns'. This will show that inter-personal and inter-group violence is not Pakhtun society specific. In fact violence is one characteristic shared by almost all societies known to anthropologists (Ross, 1986).

4.3: Violence in other Cultures

Violence has been a recurring phenomenon throughout the human history (Spierenburg, 2005). Its cultural roots may be different and the circumstances in which the experience of killing and wounding is embedded may vary from society to society but violence is shared by almost all societies known to anthropologists (Spierenburg, 2005; Ross, 1986). Almost all pre-industrial societies, including some of the tribal societies in the modern world, are characterized by violence. The fact that violence has been a hallmark of pre-industrial and tribal societies is because the concept of violence is intrinsically tied up with the concept of honor (Schinkel, 2010). The prevalence of the notion of honor in these societies, on the other hand, is indicative of the absence of the power of the state. In the absence of an overarching authority in the pre-industrial societies individual relied on his/her abilities, and those who successfully accomplished this earned respect. The traditional male honor was closely associated with the “physical person” or the “body”. Therefore, any kind of physical encroachment on the body, even a minor one, (including on the body of the close kin) demanded immediate vengeance (Spierenburg, 2005).

Medieval Europe and pre-industrial America provide a clear example of the above. A culture of duel (a fight between two persons over a matter of honor) and vendetta (a prolonged, often violent, dispute) prevailed in the medieval Europe. In fact the ritualistic killing and wounding of individuals in inter-personal and inter-group violence continued in Europe even until the late nineteenth century (Schinkel, 2010). The culture of killing and wounding was an intrinsic part of the social fabric of the society in most of the

countries of Europe but especially Holland, Italy, France, and Germany (Schinkel, 2010). This was because state institutions were not developed, a system of self-help prevailed and the concept of honor was strong. Feuds between families, land lords, factions, and any other two groups were common in most of the Europe in the middle ages towards the sixteenth century (Dean, 1997). An extended concept of honor prevailed under which injury caused to one individual in the family brought shame to all the members. Thus enmities were normally carried to the succeeding generations. It was considered lawful, for example, to take revenge from the offender's children in case of his death, and the victim's family could carry the feud with in the fourth degree of cousinship. When the offense was established, vengeance was considered appropriate. Judges in 14th and 15th century Italy were forbidden to take actions against lawful vendettas (Larner, 1980). Vendettas were only checked towards the sixteenth century under increasing pressure from the church and the newly developing state institutions (Schinkel, 2010). With the passage of time homicide and other violent acts were criminalized by the state and vendettas were completely banned towards the seventeenth century (Spierenburg, 2005).

However, this did not mean that inter-personal violence was completely brought under control. Duel, for example, was still pervasive in most parts of Europe but especially in Holland. Duels in Holland, were characterized by a typical knife-fighting. This tradition of knife-fighting between two persons was mostly popular among the lower classes of the population (Vail, 2006). This is because the concept of male honor symbolized by the physical body was still strong in these segments of the society. Almost all encounters between two persons were preceded by a written challenge and there were no sudden or

surprised attacks. However, duel could easily degenerate into a prolonged encounter between the contestants leading to homicide. Since most of the duels would be preceded by a written challenge, therefore, homicide was tolerated and was not considered a punishable crime.

However, the replacement of church by the state and the subsequent cultural and social change brought about by this process ushered in a new era of legal and political reforms. Towards the 19th century the state was able to achieve an autonomous position by giving itself the right to acquire the legitimate use of violence and check or control the illegitimate or private use of violence. This process was accompanied by a change in the concept of honor. Technological development and the simultaneous improvement in the life styles of the people brought about a social change which transformed the traditional concept of honor from the one centered on the physical body and characterized by courage and bravery to a more rational and acceptable notion of the concept. Along with the integrity of the physical body, sound economic position and a reasonable social status were now also included in the concept of honor for a man (Spierenburg, 2005). Thus, the development and strengthening of state institutions and the transformation of the concept of honor brought about by social and economic advancement were the two instrumental factors in the civilizing process of Europe (Schinkel, 2010). A clear illustration of this change is that violence in the private capacity fastly diminished at the end of eighteenth century. Homicide rates dropped from 30-50 per 100,000 inhabitants in the middle ages to 10-20 in the 16th century, and to 2-3 by the end of 18th century. This process continued and the homicide rate was below one in large parts of Europe in the first half of the

twentieth century (Eisner, 2003). However, this process of social and cultural change was not uniform across the world. There were still other societies where state interference was minimal. The United State of America is one such example.

As compared to Western Europe, the US is considered as the more rowdy society of the two. Violent crimes are among the highest in the world even in the contemporary US society (Spierenburg, 2005). The culture of violence in the US is closely related to the concept of frontier in the colonial American history (Turner, 1953). Westward expansion was considered manifest destiny (Kissenger, 1994), and the killing and wounding of the native Indians as the “civilizing process” (Nagingast, 1994). No part of the US in this period could be considered non-violent because not only it is difficult to differentiate between war and inter-personal violence in the frontier region but the data for homicide rate is unreliable due to the official silence, in most cases, over the violence against the native population (Lane, 1997). The prevailing violence was most visible in the South as compare to the North. In the South the white colonists practiced an honor code which endorsed courage and bravery and encouraged physical attack in case of insult (Geenberg, 1996). This honor code was similar to the one in Europe discussed above. The honor code was mostly visible in another related factor, that of racial prejudice and slavery. In fact, slavery was the single most important factor in the prevailing culture of violence in the US. Racial prejudice, on the other hand, contributed to the social segregation and economic marginalization of the black population (McKanna, 1997). However, the difference is that this honor code was confined to the marginal regions and the lower classes of the population in Europe by the first half of the nineteenth century,

but not so in the United States of America. For example, between 1844 and 1858 homicide rate for Edgefield County, SC, stood at 18 per 100,000 inhabitants (Butterfield, 1995).

Violence, based upon the concept of male honor code, was still pervasive in the nineteenth and twentieth century US society. It is indicative of slow state formation in the latter as compared to Western Europe. Moreover, there are other factors which show why inter-personal violence is still higher in the US in comparison to Western Europe and some developed Asian countries. These include, the presence of private militias in rural areas, different laws and voting mechanisms for different states, the widening gap between rich and poor, mainly because of a tendency among the rich to share a locality and invest their taxes in the same locality, leading to the further marginalization of the poor segments of the society, and the identification with the immediate region or locality rather than the United States as a whole (Spierenburg, 2005). Apart from Medieval Europe and pre-industrial United States of America the two tribal societies characterized by a culture of violence are the *Yanomamo* in Brazil and Venezuela and *Surma* in Ethiopia.

The *Yanomamo* or *Yanomami*, living in the rain-forests on the Brazilian-Venezuela border region in some more than 200 villages, are considered as the world's most violent people as a group (Chagnon, 1968). The *Yanomamo* are known mostly through the writings of Napoleon Chagnon who studied them for 24 years and spent almost 50 months living among them. It was Chagnon's most famous and controversial book,

Yanomamo: The Fierce People, (1968) which spurred a hectic debate among anthropologists and socio-biologists on the question of whether social behavior could be determined through genetic basis or not. In fact the sub-title of the book, '*The Fierce People*' clearly indicates that Chagnon was in favor of the role of the genes in determining human social behavior. His revelations of the facts and figures about the *Yanomamo* were startling: almost 30 per cent of the population dies not from natural causes but from violence. Almost half of the population, aged 25 or older, have participated in killing in one way or the other. Moreover, Chagnon suggested the *Yanomamo* life is characterized by the Darwanian theory of the 'Survival of the Fittest', implying that through fierce violence the individual enhances his reproductive power and becomes "fitter" (cited in Horgan, 1988). Killings mostly occur as a result of prolonged and senseless feuds over petty issues. "*Yanomami* duels are public, institutionalized, conventionalized, and ritualized forms of inter-personal aggression that are governed by a set of rules" (Sponsel, 1998: p. 100). Women are mostly at the centre of all the feuds. Men of one village may raid another and kidnap a woman resulting into a violent conflict between the two parties. Also two men in the same village may desire a woman which may lead to fierce fight between the two and the eventual fleeing of the victim's family from the village to prepare themselves for retribution (Sponsel, 1998). Chagnon is of the view that violence in the *Yanomamo* is positively related to the male reproduction power. In similar vein he sees biological reasons responsible for much of the violence in the *Yanomamo* community (Chagnon, 1968).

Chagnon has been strongly criticized by other writers who assert that he has overlooked environmental and other factors while describing *Yanomamo* violent behavior. They argue, for example, that the *Yanomamo* are subject to the environmental stress. As the population density increases in the area food and meat, in particular, decreases. Thus the *Yanomamo* must exert greater energy to obtain food in the limited area. They assert that the prevailing violence result from an adaptation to food shortages and is a strategy of population control. It is a competition for material resources and not an urge for reproductiveness (Horgan, 1988). Moreover, one can add that entire cultures can not be termed as violent, there will always be exceptions. While analyzing *Yanomamo* or any other culture for that matter, one should not overlook the external and internal environment and the interplay of other diverse factors affecting human behavior. In short both structure and function should be given due importance while analyzing a tribe or a group of people. The *Surma* provides another such example.

Surma in Ethiopia is a tribe whose violent practices are characterized by the ritualized male stick dueling, called *sagine*. The *Surma* are about 30000 people living in the extreme southwestern region of Ethiopia near the Sudan border. They are subdivided into two groups called *Tirma* and *Chai* with different origin traditions and divergent dialects. Although, for centuries the *Surma* have interacted with neighboring tribes in the region and the outside powers, however, they largely consider themselves a distinct cultural and political unit. Recent efforts by the Ethiopian authorities have not been successful to integrate *Surma* into the economic and political structures of the country, however, as

will be discussed later, external developments in the region have largely influenced or rather disturbed *Surma* traditional culture in the recent years (Abbink, 1999).

Surma are known in the contemporary world because of ritualized culture of violent dueling, called *sagine*. The dueling is organized two to three times a year and continues for three to six weeks. These are spectacular events attended by almost all the people, but especially the girls (Abbink, 1999). Dueling mostly takes place when people, especially young men, are free from their labor in the fields. All unmarried young men must participate in the dueling at least a few times. Dueling is an organized form of ritual violence which took place under some strict rules. Dueling is always supervised by referees who are married old men (Spencer, 1965). It is done with long poles called *donga*, made of tough wood. Poles are normally 2.10 to 2.40 meter long. The use of anything other than wooden pole is strictly prohibited. Further, the tip of the pole should always point to the ground, no pointing straight at the opponent is tolerated. Most importantly, although deep wounds in the flesh or fractured bone are normal, homicide is not desired. In fact, the killing of a contestant in the dueling is strongly prohibited. *Surma* people clearly point out that violence in itself is not the aim of the dueling. Nevertheless, if a person is killed in the fight, it brings immediate end to the proceedings of the *sagine* and a mechanism for reconciliation sets in motion (Abbink, 1999).

Apart from the internal ritualized male stick dueling, *Surma* violence also takes place externally, with neighboring tribes over the questions of pasture, livestock, game area, and access to other resources. This violence is un-regulated and hence far more ferocious

than the culture of stick dueling. Therefore, killing and maiming is common in this form of violence. *Surma* has problematic relations with the neighboring tribes of *Meen*, *Toposa*, and *Nyangatom* (Abbink, 1999). But there was a kind of balance, and the nature and intensity of the violence was limited before the introduction of modern semi-automatic weapons in the region. However, this situation has largely changed since 1988 due to the introduction of such lethal weapons like, M16s and AK-47s. More importantly, deteriorating internal situation in Ethiopia and the introduction of these weapons have seriously affected the *Sagine*. It now takes place more frequently, even four times a year. Players often do not care for the rules and referees have become ineffective. Serious violence in the dueling is now common as the spirit of the event has transformed from a ritual to violent confrontation. Contending parties bring weapons with themselves and they do not hesitate to use them to express their pleasure or anger. This sometimes leads to serious armed conflict between the two groups (Abbink, 1999).

This section explored violence in different cultures other than the Pakhtuns. The aim was to show that violence is not something peculiar to the Pakhtun culture. Three important conclusions can be drawn from the preceding discussion.

- i) Neither of the cases explored above shows any relationship between violence and terrorism. In neither case a well established culture of violence has transformed to a campaign of terrorism. Although, right-wing and social revolutionary terrorism made its impact on Europe in the 1970s and 1980s but that was totally a different phenomenon. Groups like NAR (*Nuclei Armati*

Revoluzionari), *Ordine Nuovo*, and Red Brigade in Italy, *Baader-Meinhof* in Germany, and the provisional IRA (Irish Republican Army) in the United Kingdom emerged for a short period of time and became widely notorious for different campaigns of terrorism (Bjorgo, 2005), but they did not attract considerable number of members. On the other hand the culture of violence in the Medieval Europe and Pre-industrial and Colonial America was a widely held phenomenon. In fact, violence was closely related to the concept of honor and honor, in turn, was intrinsically tied up to the concept of manhood, thus there was no question of a compromise upon honor.

- ii) Another important conclusion is that violence occurs in the absence of state while terrorism mostly occurs in response to the state. Therefore, there can be no relationship between violence that was prevalent mostly in the absence of formal state institutions and terrorism which emerged when state had fully developed in those societies, covering all walks of social life.
- iii) And lastly, cases are purposefully taken from two different kinds of states, two from the industrialized western world and two from the tribal societies in the third world, to show positive and negative state interference in the society. While in the case of Europe and the United States of America constructive and positive state interference has brought pacification to the society and thereby largely diminished interpersonal violence, unwillingness or inability on the part of the Ethiopian state, on the other hand, to foster positive changes in the *Surma* society and to stop the supply of illegal arms and ammunitions have badly affected the already volatile *Surma* society.

After establishing that there is no causal relationship between violence and terrorism and after identifying positive and negative state interference in the above societies, it is now relatively easy to discuss the Pakhtun cultural values and the contextual meaning of violence in the Pakhtun society.

4.4: Violence in the Pakhtun Culture

A comprehensive understanding of violence in the Pakhtun culture should take into consideration three different but not necessarily mutually exclusive factors: first, the nature of the frontier itself. This is important because *Pakhtunwali* evolved in the frontier over a period of thousands of years as a result of the contacts of different civilizations (Banerjee, 2000). Second, the nature of the Pakhtun society, which is based upon a segmentary lineage system (Barth, 1959), is also important. The third factor which should be taken into consideration is the British mechanism for dealing with the frontier and the Pakhtuns. Some of the features of *Pakhtunwali* have been discussed in the first chapter of this study; here once again they are studied from a different perspective particularly finding their possible relationship with violence.

4.4.1: Honor

Honor (*Nang* or *Namus* in Pakhto) is one of the most important elements of *Pakhtunwali*. In fact it is such a vital component of the Pakhtun culture that some writers have called *Pakhtunwali* as the Pakhtun code of honor (Barth, 1969). This is a restricted definition of *Pakhtunwali*, which imply that all the other elements of *Pakhtunwali* revolve around the

concept of honor. Although, *Pakhtunwali* should be called the Pakhtun code of life, which covers everything from the cradle to the grave, and not the code of honor which limits its scope, it is true, however, that honor occupies a central place in the Pakhtuns' life (Guest, 2010). It stands for the bravery, courage, and valor of the Pakhtun. The concept of honor is closely related to women and land in the Pakhtun society (Banerjee, 2000), therefore, honor, as in other societies, is responsible for much of the violence in the Pakhtun society. To be a true Pakhtun, one must protect one's women, land and property. Those who can not protect their women, including children, and property from others, are subject to *Paighor* (Taunting) and are, therefore, not worthy of calling Pakhtuns in the eyes of others. Hence this extended definition of honor, one not limited to the physical body, is mainly responsible for much of the bloodshed in the Pakhtun society.

The opposite of honor is *Tore* (Disgrace), which is an element in the extended definition of *Pakhtunwali*. *Tore* occurs when a man or woman is found guilty of extra-marital sex or elopement. This brings *Tore* not only to the concerned persons but to the whole of the family, therefore, the accused are liable to be killed. The matter often does not end here. Honor-killing sometimes leads to prolonged and violent enmities between the two families (Barth, 1969). Second to woman in importance is land. The holding of land makes one Pakhtun. In fact, those who do not have land are not called Pakhtuns (Ahmed, 1976). They are called *Kasabgar* (Artisan), since they do not have land they rely on different professions such as, carpenter, cobbler, and blacksmith, for subsistence. Therefore, the holding of land and the protection of one's property is closely related to

the concept of honor (Dupree, 1973). Most of the feuds and vendettas in the Pakhtun society, including those spreading over many generations, result mainly from the dispute over land. Honor, in turn, is closely related to the concept of *Badal*.

4.4.2: *Badal* (Revenge)

Honor may indirectly spur violence, *Badal*, on the other hand is directly responsible for violence. In most of the popular literature about the Pakhtuns, *Badal* takes precedent over all other elements of *Pakhtunwali* (Dupree, 1973). The purpose of listing honor before *Badal* in this discussion is to emphasize the point that it is honor, in most cases, which compels a Pakhtun to take revenge. Thus *Badal* follows from honor. Honor demands, for example, that an injury caused or an insult meted out to a person, or his kin for that matter, must be paid in the same coin (Dupree, 1973). Just like in the case of honor, those who can not fulfill the obligation of *Pakhtunwali* by taking revenge, lose their prestige in the eyes of fellow Pakhtuns and render themselves liable to *Paighor* (Taunting) (Spain, 1962). Since a Pakhtun will prefer to desert his home and his village rather than tolerate *Paighore*, therefore, he prefers to fix the issue as soon as possible. But this does not mean that time will heal the wound caused by an insult or an injury. According to a famous Pakhto quote *Badal*, even if it is taken after a 100 years, is not delayed. This ensures the resurrection of hostilities even after long periods of peace. *Badal* is also responsible for the prolonged vendettas in the Pakhtun society, because often an unending vicious cycle of taking revenge starts between the two opposing parties. An extended concept of *Badal* is followed in the Pakhtun society, just like the concept of honor. Thus, not only conflict is often carried to the succeeding generations but it is also considered appropriate to take

revenge from the perpetrator's sons, brothers, or nephews. This leads one to another feature of *Pakhtunwali*, vendetta.

4.4.3: Vendetta (*Fatna*)

Vendetta or *Fatna* (Fitna in Arabic, meaning unrest or violence) or *Gundi* (Enmity or factionalism) refers to the prolonged and violent hostilities between the two families, clans, or tribes. The use of violence in vendetta is as much symbolic as it is direct. Since vendettas continue for a long period of time, therefore, it has its rules, according to which, women and children are exempted, crops and cattle are to be protected, and shooting is to be carried out in the night (Razi Rahman*, personal communication, April 22, 2012). There may be different causes of *Gundi*. It may be caused by an obligation of *Badal*, a dispute over land, or a question of woman (*Tore*). Although, *Badal* may be a cause of *Gundi*, as discussed earlier, it is not necessarily the only cause. More importantly, *Gundi* when started has its own dynamics, irrespective of means and ends. Honor would demand, for example, to carry the *Fatna* to its logical ends. It does not necessarily mean to settle the dispute, the mere sustenance of the hostilities through a show of force and non acceptance of the defeat may do the job. Since it requires a great deal of patience, perseverance and, above all, money and resource (weapons and ammunitions) to continue the vendetta, therefore, it would bring disgrace or *Paighor* to a person unable to carry on the *Fatna*. A young tribal from Mohmand Agency was referring to this fact when he told a story to this scholar about a vendetta.

* Razi Rahman is a resident of the Safi Tehsil in Mohmand Agency. This communication was carried out with him on April 22, 2012.

He said the family of his maternal uncle had a prolong enmity with another family in the village. He also participated on the side of his uncle, under the obligation of *Parajamba* (Taking sides), he said. Although, his uncle had exhausted the ammunition but he did not want to accept the defeat by ending the fire on his part. Therefore, he planted two poles of wood vertically in the ground and tied a strip of thick rubber to it. Young boys of the family would collect stones in the day to be thrown at the enemy's house with the help of this manual device (Razi Rahman, personal communication, April 22, 2012). Although, killing and wounding is not always the aim of vendetta, it does not mean, however, that it always causes no harm to human life. *Fatna* may degenerate into such violent conflict which may kill dozens of people on both sides. *Fatna* may also occur between close cousins sometimes.

4.4.4: *Tarburwali* (Agnatic Rivalry) or *Syali* (Competition)

Tarburwali is a state of mind in which each person in the Pakhtun society considers his first cousin as his competitor in all walks of life (Spain, 1962; Barth, 1969; Ahmed, 1976). *Tarbur* literally refers to cousin while *Syal*, from which *Syali* is derived, means competitor. Thus, a person may be one's *Tarbur* but not *Syal*, because *Syali* is done with one who is equal in status. It is considered inappropriate to do *Syali* with those cousins who are weaker either in terms of man-power or in terms of financial reasons. One of the dangerous things about *Tarburwali* is that it is not always a healthy competition. Dispute may arise often on trivial matter, as one does not allow even a small benefit to his opponent. Majority of the feuds in the Pakhtun society occur between close or distant cousins (Dupree, 1973). In some cases feuds may lead to vendetta or *Fatna* between the

cousins. Moreover, *Paighor* or taunting is mainly associated with cousins. It is the taunting of the cousin that the Pakhtun can not tolerate and compels him to take action as demanded by *Pakhtunwali*. A person may leave his home and village and migrate to some other locality if he can not fulfill the demands of *Pakhtunwali*, for example taking revenge, but he will not tolerate taunting and accusations of his close, as well as, distant cousins.

Apart from the above features of *Pakhtunwali* which are closely related to violence, another factor which has been responsible for much of the blood shed in the Pakhtun society is the easy availability of some of the modern weapons in the region. Weapons of all kinds like, AK-47, M16, RPG (Rocket Propelled Grande), and even small canons are easy available in the Pakhtun region, especially in FATA. Apart from the imported weapons, locally produced weapons are in abundance. One can not deny the fact that all this could not have been possible without the Pakhtun's love of firearms (Khan, 1947). Ghani Khan has rightly observed that "Pakhtun loves his old wife and his new rifle" (1948, p. 1), meaning that both women and weapons, closely related to the concept of honor, have a central role in the Pakhtun's life. Historically in most of the FATA region, people would consider gun as an ornament for men. Hence, it was rare to find a man without hanging a gun to his shoulder, before the emergence of Taliban in the region, who gave themselves the exclusive right to carry and use weapons. Still one can not find a home without a Kalashnikov even in the urban areas of the Pakhtun society (Khan, 2007). So whatever be the cause of the conflict between the two individuals or families,

the large numbers and easy availability of weapons is always the immediate cause (Johansen, 1997).

Much of the above mentioned features originate from the segmentary structure of the Pakhtun society. The latter, as identified by Barth, (1959) is based upon the segmentary lineage system. According to this system the population is divided into families, sections, lineages, sub-clans, clans, and tribes. Membership in the group is defined by descent from a common male ancestor. Thus a section or clan will trace common ancestry back through a dozen generations. The system is strengthened by patrilineal parallel-cousin marriages. In case of a conflict, therefore, first cousins or descendants of the same grandfather will fight each other. But they would join together in a conflict with distant cousins. However, both will unite to fight members of another lineage, and this is how it goes on up to the level of tribe. From this, stems the theory of segmentary opposition (Barth, 1959), or *Parajamba* (taking sides in a conflict), as it is called in Pakhto. The concept of *Tarburwali*, which is considered as the cause of most of the strife in the Pakhtun society, is also a product of the segmentary structure of the Pakhtun society. Moreover, honor is also defined against a background of a competitive relationship with close or distant cousins, as it is the escape from the *Paighor* of a cousin which compels a person to uphold a strong concept of honor.

It is important to emphasize here that, *Pakhtunwali* provides a complete code of life, and not only a code of honor. Some writers are so obsessed with the idea of *Nang* or honor who limit *Pakhtunwali* to the concept of honor only. Akbar S. Ahmed (1976), for

example, limits Pakhtun society to two categories, one characterized by *Nang* (honor), and the other by *Qalang* (tax). *Nang* category referred to the hill tribes where the concept of honor was strong. The latter referred to the people living in the settled areas where a government taxation system was in vogue. Barth (1981) also stresses the concept of honor when he observes that ‘doing Pakhto’ is more important for a Pakhtun than ‘speaking Pakhto’. However, *Pakhtunwali* is more than that. Its ability to remain intact over the years is because of its flexibility and dynamism. Had it been limited to a handful of negative features, like the above mentioned ones, it would not have been possible for *Pakhtunwali* to absorb the vicissitudes of time.

Pakhtun culture has evolved over thousands of years and as a result of the contacts of diverse civilizations in the great Gandhara valley. Therefore, it should be contextualized in the phenomenal developments that have taken place in this region. Any approach ignoring these facts would tantamount to grossly misunderstanding the concept of *Pakhtunwali*. It is important, therefore, to conceptualize *Pakhtunwali* in the nature and context of the frontier which served as a cradle of different civilizations. Toynbee identified two kinds of frontiers. “*Culs-de-sac* are regions on the fringe.....that have received successive influences from the centre but have not been able to pass them further afield” (cited in Banerjee, 2000, p. 24). On the other hand, Toynbee continued, “roundabouts are the regions on which routes converge from all quarters of the compass and from which routes radiate to all quarters of the compass again” (cited in Banerjee, 2000, p. 24). Certainly, the Pakhtun region best fit in the latter category, as it connects, South, Central, and West Asia with the West. As region of roundabout, it received more

than its share of the foreign invasions, including those of, the Persians, Greeks, Kushans, Huns, and Mughals (Banerjee, 2000). Thus *Pakhtunwali* emerged, transformed and was perfected in the frontier region, as a result of the contact of diverse civilizations, to serve as the national character of a people who themselves bear the imprints of the extraordinary developments that have taken place in the region.

It is unfortunate, however, that the contemporary understanding of the Pakhtun culture is largely influenced by outside interference. Much of the violence that has become part of the Pakhtun culture for the last three centuries has largely due to the machination of the imperial powers. Johansen, for example argues,

One should not forget that the violence expressed by people in this society, against both foreign invaders and others within their tribal system, was at least in part a product of being victimized by the violence of external invaders over many years. (1997, p. 57)

Such were the designs of the out side powers, especially the British, that the ideal Pakhtun culture has been transformed over the centuries. This started with their understanding and handling of the frontier itself. Their strategy of dealing with the frontier vacillated between a close border and an open border policy. They certainly considered the frontier as '*Culs-de-sac*' or the fringe. The name given to the area (North West Frontier Province or NWFP) was indicative of the fact that they treated the area as geographical marginality, as identified by Banerjee, (2000). Their main imperial concern

in the frontier region was how to maintain a minimum calm in the region, and that too by avoiding direct contact with the people, and to stop any Soviet southward expansion. Therefore, for this policy to succeed, they devised their own mechanism.

The most important step in this direction was the process of permanent land holdings. Historically, and as a principle of egalitarianism, there was no concept of permanent land holding in the Pakhtun society. Instead, tribal land would be redistributed under a mechanism called *wesh* (Distribution). Land holding period ranged from five to thirty years, after which it would be reapportioned according to the needs of the lineage or section (Ahmed, 1976). The frequent exchanges of land ensured equal access to the best land. Further, due to the absence of permanent land holding class there were no relations of superior and subordination.

However, this situation was gradually disturbed by the outside powers. From the eighteenth century, first the Mughals and then the Afghan state increasingly extended the writ of the central government by introducing a system of land revenues. This disrupted the traditional social and economic system of the Pakhtun society, because under the system those who were responsible for revenue collection were favored by giving them special rights in land holding (Banerjee, 2000). The British, however, completely altered the system by giving legal rights of permanent land holding to the favored class. Thus they created a class of big *Khans*. This strategy was in line with the principle of indirect rule through which they wanted to control the independent minded people using the local influential *Khans*. Thus, two classes emerged: those few who held substantial amount of

land and, that landless class who worked as peasants on the property of the *Khans*. This transformed the principles of *Pakhtunwali*, for example the concept of honor, *Tarburwali*, and *Parajamba*, as well. For example, peasants from the same lineage or sub-clan would often fight each other for their own respective *Khans* (Banerjee, 2000).

Another important factor which changed the traditional mechanism of dispute resolution was the treatment of *jirgah* system by the British. Traditional *jirgah* system was mainly geared towards limiting conflicts rather than locating blame. Its members were elected and decisions were consensual. The British, however, wanted to use the *jirgah* as a means of indirect rule, therefore, it entrusted it with additional powers. *Jirgah*, under the new system was to be appointed by the official of the government, its decisions were binding, there was to be no right of appeal, and fines were to be paid to the government and not to the victim. Transparency of the system was lost and government often appointed its own favored *Khans* as members of the official *jirgah*. This gave an opportunity to the big *Khans* to use *jirgahs* against their enemies which increased the nature and intensity of the hostilities as more and more peasants would be dragged to the conflicts on the side of *Khans*. By the start of the twentieth century, therefore, the two changes brought about by the British, the replacement of *wesh* or land distribution system with permanent land holding and the new role given to *jirgah*, were mainly responsible for the increasing levels of violence in the Pakhtun society (Banerjee, 2000).

Be it the role of the central state, the influence of the out side powers, or the effects of the natural environment, there is no denying the fact that inter-personal, inter-family, and

inter-tribal violence has been a feature of the Pakhtun society. Now that this fact has been established, it is imperative to explore the causal relationship between violence and terrorism in the Pakhtun society.

4.5: Causal Relationship between Violence and Terrorism in the Pakhtun Society?

It has already been proved in the second section of this chapter that violence and terrorism are different phenomena. By distinguishing ordinary form of violence from terrorism, it has been proved that there are little, if any, commonalities between the two. However, the question which is being explored is to know whether the prevalent violence in the Pakhtun society may have provided a breeding ground for the contemporary terrorism in the Pakhtun region or not. Is Talibanization a product of the Pakhtun culture? Therefore, this section not only highlights the rationale behind violence in the Pakhtun society but it also discusses the recruitment and activities of the terrorists in the Pakhtun region to know whether the Pakhtun cultural values are responsible for terrorism or not.

4.5.1: Taliban Recruitment: The Role of Culture

It is a common wisdom that initial induction to the Taliban is largely motivated by religious aspirations, it has nothing to do with culture or Pakhtun nationalism. This has been especially the case with Afghan Taliban. The latter were largely students of the religious seminaries in Pakistan. They were mainly motivated by the young charismatic religious leader, Mullah Muhammad Umer from Qandahar, who wanted to bring an end to the factional fighting between different warlords, transform the existing political and

social system and impose *Shariah* throughout the country (Rashid, 2000). Initially a small number of Pakhtun nationalists joined the Taliban, to fulfill their own agenda, but they quickly abandoned them by realizing that the Taliban were a dangerous upcoming force. The nationalists soon realized that although, majority of the Taliban were Pakhtuns, they were a threat to the cause of Pakhtun nationalism as they relied heavily on transnational religious forces. This was proved in the later years by the Taliban's close intimacy with Al Qaeda (Gul, 2009). Same is the case with the Pakistani Taliban. The emergence of Taliban in the Pakhtun region, although a different phenomenon, has largely been inspired by the Taliban rule in Afghanistan (Rashid, 2008). By and large, the leadership of the Taliban in the Pakhtun region is motivated by religious aspirations. With a few exceptions, leaders of the Taliban in the Pakhtun region have either *madrassa* background or were already involved in jihadist activities before initiating their campaign in the Pakhtun region (Abbas, 2005). Both Abdullah and Baitullah Mahsud, for example, were fighting alongside the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan before they were captured in 2001 and sent to Guantanamo jail by the American forces. On their subsequent release from the jail in 2004 they started a campaign of terror in the Tribal areas of Pakistan, starting from South Waziristan Agency (Gul, 2009).

Abdul Wali, head of the *Tehrik-e-Taliban* in Mohmand Agency, has a jihadist background. He had fought not only in the Indian-held Kashmir but also in Afghanistan against the US-NATO forces before becoming a part of the *Tehrik-e-Taliban* Pakistan. (Yousufzai, 2009). Likewise, Molvi Faqir Muhammad, head of the *Tehrik-e-Taliban* Pakistan in Bajaur Agency, has a similar background. He is a former *mujahideen* leader

who has fought against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s (Cookman, 2009 & Wadhams). On the other hand Sufi Muhammad, head of the *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi* (TNSM) and Maulvi Fazlullah, head of the Swat chapter of the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan*, were product of *madrassas*. Thus, the socialization of the bulk of the leadership of Taliban in the Pakhtun region has not taken place in the ideal Pakhtun cultural values; rather they reflect a militant jihadist outlook.

Apart from the leadership, the rank and file of the Taliban may join the terrorist organizations for various reasons. One of the obvious reasons advanced by various scholars, including Ahmed Rashid, (2008) and Imtiaz Gul, (2009), is the financial benefit that affiliation with group may accrue. It is believed that handsome amount of money is paid to the Taliban foot-soldiers. It is not surprising in an area characterized by abject poverty, limited and mostly illicit economic activities- the production and trafficking of drugs and the manufacturing and free movement of weapons- and huge unemployment, as compared to the rest of the country. Another reason for joining the Taliban may be the search for identity. As identified by research on terrorism, socially isolated or marginalized people may join the terrorist organization in search of identity (Crenshaw, 1981). This holds true for the tribal areas of Pakistan where, limited or no state facilities, meager economic opportunities, and death and destruction in the neighboring Afghanistan for the last three decades and in FATA after 9/11, have disrupted the social fabric of the society and made the people, especially the youngsters marginalized. Hence, in such environment of hopelessness, the terrorist organizations provide ample opportunities to the youth to prove their worth. However, one of the most important

reasons for joining the terrorist organizations, and one which is closely related to the theme of this section, is vengeance. The restoration of honor or the desire for revenge may compel those who were initially not sympathetic towards the cause of Taliban to join them. This may happen when one's loved ones are killed by the security forces without any reason or when someone's sense of honor has been badly damaged, e.g. the maltreatment of women who are closely related to the concept of honor. The killing of innocent people as a result of intentional or indiscriminate firing or shelling and drone attacks may leave no other option with the surviving members of the victim family to resort to revenge in the shape of joining the Taliban, especially for carrying a suicide attack. Analysts agree that there are numerous cases in the Pakhtun society where the surviving member or members of the victim family have indulged in terrorist activities for the ultimate aim of taking revenge. For example, there was a drone attack in 2006 on a *madrassa* in the Chengai area of Bajaur Agency, killing 80 persons. The Pakistan military took the responsibility of the attack. Therefore the subsequent Dargai attack on the Pakistan military's recruitment centre, the Punjab regiment centre, was carried out by a person whose brother was killed in the *madrassa* attack said, Mushtaq Yousufzai. In another instance, he continued, "a person's parents were killed in a drone attack in North Waziristan, he went to the militants, received training and subsequently became a suicide bomber, attacking a military check post 3 km east of Miransha" (personal communication, February 2, 2012).

Thus, honor and revenge, two of the important elements of the Pakhtuns' social life, provided ground for joining the militants. However, it should be noted that honor and

Badal in these cases are not the causes of joining the militants rather they are the effects of the counter-insurgency campaign. Therefore, the campaign against terrorism, instead of stemming the rot, has further radicalized the Pakhtun society.

Another element of the Pakhtun culture, *Melmastya* (Hospitality) or *Panah* (Assylum) is also said to be causally related to terrorism in the Pakhtun region, although, not in the process of recruitment to the Taliban but in giving them safe havens. One of the hallmark of the people of the Pakhtun region, and this include non-Pakhtuns as well, is the tradition of hospitality (Guest, 2010). Pakhtuns take pride in feeding, protecting, and giving abode to the guests, without any charges, so long as they wish to remain. The related tradition of *Panah* (Giving asylum) is also strictly followed in the Pakhtun society. *Panah* is not denied even to the enemy when he is in need (Gauhar, 2010). In line with this tradition the Taliban government in Afghanistan gave *Panah* to Osama bin Laden and refused to handover him, even under immense pressure from the United States of America. There is no denying the fact that Pakhtuns in the tribal areas of Pakistan, too, have given sanctuaries to hundreds of international jihadists after the US and coalition forces launched ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001. Foreign jihadists may have capitalized to a certain extent on the tradition of *Melmastya* to acquire a safe haven among the Pakhtuns. However, analysts believe that most of the foreign militants in the Pakhtun region are paying guests. Tribals who have given shelter to Uzbek, Al Qaeda, or other foreign militants receive handsome amount of money from them (Gul, 2009). Therefore, this means that they have not been given shelter under the obligation of *Pakhtunwali*; rather they are receiving financial

benefits from them. Receiving money from guests is not only against the tradition of *Melmastya* but it is in violation of all the norms of *Pakhtunwali*. Nevertheless, Mushtaq Yousufzai rightly observes that,

Pakhtuns' love of weapons, their inclination towards religion, their poverty, lack of education, nature of the people and of the area, some of the cultural values, and the political and administrative system in region, all provided an opportunity to the militants on which they fully capitalized. However, it was actually the absence of the state institutions which was mainly responsible for the emergence of Taliban. The state's failure to provide social and other facilities to the people provided an opportunity to the Taliban to appeal to the sentiments of the people.
(personal communication, February 2, 2012)

4.5.2: Taliban Activities: The Role of Culture

Since the emergence of Taliban in the in region in 2004 a campaign of terror of unprecedented nature has done irreparable damage to the Pakhtun society. Apart from loss to human life and property, which has been discussed earliar, the activities of the Taliban have disrupted the social fabric of the society (Gul, 2009). This is because they have consciously targeted some of the strong pillars of the Pakhtun culture. Bomb blasts in *jirgahs* and in mosques, the slaughter of human beings, and punishing women in the public are all activities which distinguish Taliban from all other fighters in the Pakhtun history (Taj, 2009). For example, 40 tribesmen, including prominent tribal elders, were

killed and 50 other wounded in a suicide attack in a *jirgah* in the semi-tribal area of Darra Adamkhel, on March 2, 2008 (Khattak, 2008). In another act of inhuman behavior, the Taliban publicly flogged a teenage girl in April 2009, in Swat. They alleged that she came out of her home with a man who was not her husband (Walsh, 2009). Moreover, the Taliban during their parallel administration in the tribal areas and Swat, have transformed some of the strongly held traditions of the people. In their quest for providing swift justice the Taliban overlooked the traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution, such as *jirgah*, *nanwaty*, and *lashkar*. Moreover, the presence of Taliban has transformed the notions of honor, *Badal*, *Tarburwali*, and *Parajamba*. This has been done by applying the Taliban form of *Shariah* rules and by ignoring the dispute resolution mechanism contained in *Pakhtunwali*. It has already brought chaos to the region, however, this will have far reaching implications for the region in the long run, especially when the Taliban are no more there. This may resurrect the old enmities because people may want to settle the issues according to the demands of *Pakhtunwali*.

All the above mentioned activities of Taliban strongly contradict the Pakhtun cultural values. For example the sanctity of *jirgah* is taken for granted in the Pakhtun society. *Jirgah* is normally composed of the greybeard men who are well respected in the community (Gauhar, 2010). Therefore, it is considered against the precepts of *Pakhtunwali* not to respect the *jirgah*. Such is the sanctity of *jirgah* that even the strongest of enemies sit face to face in *jirgah*, in otherwise continuous fighting, and do not say a word to each other. Most importantly, *jirgah* is respected because in the absence of state institutions and a system of self-help it is the only mechanism for dispute

resolution. Therefore, the Taliban's bomb blasts and attacks on *jirgah* strongly question their credential of being Pakhtuns.

Another issue which distinguishes Taliban from other Pakhtuns in the region is the way they kill humans. Pakhtuns have their own way of fighting, including the killing of a person when it is required. Their conduct of war has even compelled their enemies to call the Pakhtuns a worthy enemy (Guest, 2010). Taliban, on the other hand, have crossed every limit in their treatment of the so called criminals. They have slaughtered people on numerous occasions, and that too in front of large numbers of people. Thus, they have violated not only the basic human rights but their treatment of the criminals strongly contradicts the Pakhtuns cultural values. Pakhtuns never slaughter human beings. Dr Razia Sultana, Chairperson Department of History at the Qaid-e-Azam University, who herself is an ethnic Pakhtun, rightly observes: "Pakhtuns do not slaughter, we just use bullet to kill. We do not use knife", (personal communication, December 8, 2011). People in FATA, in particular, observe the rules of conduct, especially in dealing with enemies. Treachery, deceit, or any other immoral act in dealing with one's enemy is considered against the concept of honor, and a person who commits such acts is considered coward. Haider Mohmand, a tribal from Mohmand Agency clarified this,

The slaughtering of people is a Central Asian tradition. Nowhere in the Pakhtun history can one find precedent of such acts of inhuman conduct. In our area, if you have killed a person of my family and I have to take revenge, I will wait for the appropriate occasion. I will follow all the rules

of *Pakhtunwali* in pursuit of taking my *Badal*. For example, I will not kill you on my own soil. Further, I will not attack you if you are accompanied by a woman or children. When I find an occasion where all the above conditions are fulfilled, I will kill you. I will make sure then that your body does not lie on the road or other inappropriate place. In the end, I will inform your family that I have taken my revenge. (personal communication, April 10, 2011)

Women and children are especially exempted from all sorts of hostilities in the Pakhtun culture. Even in prolonged vendettas in which men are targeted if found outside, women and children are free to move. The Taliban, however, spare none. They have not only punished women publicly but they have used children as suicide bombers as well. Therefore, there can be no comparison between the violence in the Pakhtun culture and that committed by the Taliban. The following points will further clarify the issue.

- i) Violence may be a part of the Pakhtun culture but it is important to understand that there is no 'culture of violence'. Violence does not exist ritualistically and in organized form. In fact violence is as condemned in the Pakhtun society as it is in other societies. Those who transgress the limits, for example by killing a person, are dealt with severely. They will quickly be brought to justice by a *jirgah*. If they do not abide by the *jirgah* decision, they will be expelled from the area and their property will be confiscated. In some areas, for example in Utmankhel area of Mohmand Agency, three generations of the accused are not

allowed to return to their area. Further, if honor demands on the one hand to take revenge, on the other, it require of a Pakhtun to abide by the other rules of *Pakhtunwali*. Those who do not respect the traditions of *jirgah*, *teega*, and *nanawaty* (all the three help in ending hostilities), for example, are not considered honorable and, therefore, not worthy of calling themselves Pakhtuns. On the other hand, it seems, violence for the militants is an end in itself. For example, it is not clear what do they want but they have killed hundreds of people, both security forces personnel and civilians, particularly in Mohmand Agency. For example in pursuit of their objectives, the Taliban have killed more than 600 tribal *maliks* in FATA since 2004 (Kerr, 2010). In other areas where their demands are somewhat clear, for example in North Waziristan Agency where they want an end to the security forces operation against the militants, there is a huge gap between the means and the ends.

- ii) Another important point is that since the socialization of the leadership of the terrorists has not taken place in the ideal Pakhtun culture, therefore, they can not be considered as a product of the latter. In fact majority of the people in FATA do not equate themselves with the militants, rather, they are considered as potential ‘Other’. In reality, Taliban are considered as counter-culture force, who may be using some of the features of *Pakhtunwali*, but who, in actual sense are destroying the ideal Pakhtun culture by targeting its other values.
- iii) A related point to the socialization of the terrorists is that the latter is not comprised of only the Pakhtuns. It has been discussed in the third chapter that

the Taliban are joined by other militants with diverse ethnic backgrounds and different objectives. The Taliban are, for example, joined by militants from the Punjab and Kashmir. Then there are other non-Taliban foreign jihadist elements like Al Qaeda and Uzbek militants operating in the Pakhtun region. Therefore, there is no question of searching a causal relationship between them and the Pakhtun cultural values.

The discussion in this chapter demonstrates that, although, violence may be a part of the Pakhtun culture, it is never causally related to terrorism in the Pakhtun society. Rather, one can safely say that the Taliban form of terrorism has badly affected the ideal Pakhtun culture. Negative social change in the shape of Talibanization has transformed some of the glorious traditions of Pakhtun culture to such an extent that it has caused further radicalization of the already radicalized Pakhtun society. This is evident in the shape of people joining the terrorist organizations for the sole purpose of retribution from the security forces. The parallel administration established by the Taliban has almost paralyzed the official dispute mechanism system which was centered on *maliks*. The latter have been replaced by the Taliban and people are compelled, though reluctantly, in FATA, especially in North Waziristan Agency to take their disputes to the Taliban (Gul, 2009). It is true that the concepts of honor and *Badal* may have helped the cause of terrorists, but that too is part of the process of militancy. Because it is indiscriminate firing and shelling by the security forces which results into the killings of innocent people, called collateral damage. Members of the victims' families may see no other option but to join the terrorists. This is the theme of the next chapter.

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Chapter 5

The War on Terror and its Effects on Pakhtuns and their Culture

5.1: Introduction

A great divide exists between the realists' perspective of war as it is and the moralists' view of the war as it should be (Coates, 2006). However, the war on terror should not be taken to mean as an actual war because analysts believe that even calling it a war, in the first place, is misleading (Jackson & Towle, 2006; Fierke, 2005). A more delicate issue is involved in the analyses of the effects of the war on terror on the Pakhtun culture. Here it should not be taken as the actual hostilities in the battlefield. Rather the war on terror should be considered as an overall campaign the purpose of which is to root out terrorism from the region. It is selective targeting of the militants or a fight against the insurgents who may be using the local population as human shield or who may have support of the local population in some cases. In fact the Taliban do more than that. They use the local customs or cultural traits to sustain their movement (See the fourth chapter of this study). Two interrelated issues are important while analyzing the effects of the war on terror on Pakhtuns and their culture. The first is that ignoring cultural values in counter-insurgency campaign can seriously undermine the efforts of combating terrorism. The second is that engaging tribes is a useful strategy in fighting terrorism. Analysts claim, for example, that the tribal system still works and that tribes are capable of collective action (Ross, 2010; Johnson & Mason, 2008). There are others who think differently. For example, according to Bennett Rubin (2002), new structures have emerged in Afghanistan and FATA. Centuries old social system based upon honor-bound tribes and feudal land-ownership have given way to new and more complex structures including the Taliban, political

parties, patronage networks, narcotics cartels and other business associations in the Pakhtun region, especially in FATA. New realities on the ground in the Pakhtun region demand new thinking. One can not recreate the past, according to the writer.

One can disagree with the strategy of engaging tribes in the execution of the war on terror but one can not deny the fact that simply ignoring or deliberately targeting cultural traits can seriously undermine counter-terrorism efforts. Therefore, for the counterterrorism campaign to be successful, it is necessary to gain the support of the local population. In other words winning hearts and minds of the people is required. Analyses of the counterterrorism strategy in the Pakhtun region will, however, reveal the contrary. Disregarding facts on the ground and ignoring strongly-held cultural and religious traditions, in other words indifference towards *Pakhtunwali* has alienated the local population thereby strengthening the militants' cause (Hussian, 2008). In fact the Taliban lure the security forces to take such kind of actions to win over the support of the people for their own cause (Hussian, 2008). Thus former governor Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Ali Muhammad Jan Orakzai rightly says that, "when the so called war on terror began there were about 1500 militant Taliban, but their number has swelled and their movement is gaining strength and has, in fact, "snowballed" (Haq & Hussain, 2008: p. viii). According to one estimate the rate of terrorist attacks has more than doubled since 9/11 and the number of jihadists has risen to about 100000 (Fierke, 2005).

This is a grim picture. If the purpose of the war on terror was the eradication of terrorism from the Pakhtun region, it has done the opposite. The prolonged militancy in the

Pakhtun region and the counter-insurgency campaign in its response, indiscriminate shelling by the Pakistani security force, US drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan, and the lack of financial incentives to the affected people by the government are some of the factors which help the insurgents in their propaganda campaign and in recruiting the people (Brian, 2011). However, indiscriminate killings are not attributed to the security forces alone, the militants may also do so. It has been proved that militants not only use humans as a shield but also increasingly drag the security forces to the civilian populated areas to compel the latter to take actions resulting in enormous collateral damage (Ross, 2010). Therefore, the security forces are no longer viewed as liberators by the local population but as a military that makes indiscriminate decisions in which people are acceptable losses. Furthermore, there are meager compensations for the losses and rare apologies for collateral damages. These things extremely matter in such conservative and tradition-loving people as the Pakhtuns. These cultural violations may, and in fact, have complicated matters. Not only it leads to revenge but it builds the perception of seeing the military as an occupation force (Ross, 2010).

Apart from cultural awareness, legitimacy, credibility, and relevance are necessary for counter-terrorism policies to be successful. Without them the terrorists will be able to gain sympathy of the people. This will also help their cause by strengthening their propaganda campaign about authoritarianism, injustice and discrimination. Counter-terrorists must also strive to undermine legitimacy, credibility, and relevance of the terrorists (Barrett, 2009).

This chapter critically evaluates the continuing campaign against terrorism. It especially discusses those counter-terrorist policies of Pakistan and the United States of America which affects Pakhtuns and their culture. The chapter analyzes whether the war on terror is progressing in the right direction or not i.e. whether it is successful in stemming terrorism. It is important to critically evaluate the counter-insurgency policies and actions because it is argued by some that the war on terror, especially in the Pakhtuns region, has led to the further radicalization of the society. The second section analyzes the logic behind the war on terror. It criticizes the frameworks adopted by the US and Pakistanis for the war on terrorism. The third section highlights the US counter-insurgency policies while the fourth analyzes counter-terrorism policies adopted by Pakistan in the Pakhtun region. The fifth discusses peace deals with the militants by the Pakistani security forces as tool of fighting terrorism. The sixth section highlights how the war on terror has affected some of the core Pakhtun's values. The last section outlines how the concept of *Badal* may be evoked by some to join the militants, probably as a result of the indiscriminate shelling and bombing by the security forces.

5.2: Rationale behind the War on Terror

One of the main reasons of the failure of the counter-insurgency campaign is that the fundamental assumption behind the war on terror is flawed (Fierke, 2005; Jackson & Towle, 2006). In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks the United States of America, blinded by the desire to take revenge, acted in haste. Given the enormous emotional and psychological euphoria created by the unprecedented attack on the sole super power of the world, such an action was understandable. Not only the people of the United States of

America wanted immediate retribution from the culprits but the international community also recognized the US' right to take revenge. Al Qaeda, stationed in Afghanistan, was held responsible by the US for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Thus Afghanistan, by protecting al Qaeda, became a symbolic enemy and a target of the US military onslaught. Although, the attack on Afghanistan may have satisfied the US to a certain extent and restored some of its lost pride, however, it was certainly not the right path chosen by the United States of America.

In the first place, terming it a war is misleading. One can not have a war on terrorism more than a war on TB, cholera or poverty. Terrorism is a faceless enemy. It is a state of mind. The US approach to the war on terror is largely influenced by its experiences in wars in the past. The framework is the same it adopted in the wars in the 20th century where the enemy was identifiable, often personified by a leader like Hitler or Saddam, the conflict involved a specific territory to be liberated, and the issue having clearly identifiable ending (Pillar, 2010). The same approach is replicated by Pakistan in its counter-terrorism policies. However, this is not the right approach in dealing with terrorism. Terrorists may occupy a specific territory for certain period of time but it does not mean they have a permanent state. Living in civilian population only gives them the opportunity to use humans as a shield (Zaidi, 2009). For example:

The Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) reported the Taliban as using 2000 citizens as human shield in bid to ward off a full military offensive in Buner, when it was retaken from militants in an offensive launched to restore the writ of the state. (Zaidi, 2009, p. 264)

Terrorists do not act in the open; therefore, one can not make a successful strategy to defeat them on the ground like normal enemy forces in traditional warfare. Moreover, terrorists living in a state does not warrant aerial bombardment of that country. It may cause unprecedented loss to civilian population. The taking refuge of terrorists in a certain state does not mean that the state is in connivance with the terrorists or that the local population is necessarily sympathized with their cause (Jaggar, 2003). Military action causes considerable damage to women and children, especially women and children in the third world countries. For example more civilians were killed as compared to combatants in wars in the twentieth century (Jaggar, 2003).

The current counter-terrorism policies are geared more towards fighting symptoms rather than eradicating the root causes of terrorism (Jackson & Towle, 2006). Killing a certain number of terrorists does not guarantee a success in the fight against terrorism. Terrorists are like a hydra. If you cut one of its head it grows another one. Success in the war against terrorism can not be counted in the numbers of terrorists killed or captured, nor should a lull in the terrorist activities for a certain period of time be taken a victory. This may mean that they are buying time, preparing themselves and searching for an appropriate opportunity to strike (Khadim Hussain, personal communication, July 9, 2012). So fighting terrorism is a long-term process needing determination, patience and perseverance.

An appropriate response to the 9/11 terrorists attack should have been to properly analyze the conditions and the circumstances that motivate terrorists to take such actions, clearly understand the goals of the terrorists, and then minutely outline implications of the various possible responses. The first is important not only to create a distance between the terrorists and the local population but also to make such environment where it is possible to win over the latter against the former (Jackson & Towle, 2006). As it has been mentioned in the first chapter, militants can not successfully operate without the covert or overt support of the local population. Taliban in the Pakhtun region depend on the local population for a safe haven. The government needs to ensure that the terrorists do not capitalize on the grievances of the people. This can only be possible when state institutions are stronger and are capable of delivering services. In the absence of strong and reliable state institutions, other non-state actors, the militants included, may take advantage of the existing vacuum and win over the support of the local population. This has actually been the case in the Pakhtun region (Hussain, 2011). Therefore, if the government is sincere to eradicate terrorism it should make every effort to win over the support of the local people and neutralize the militants. This will help the counter-insurgency forces to mitigate the conditions which motivate the militants to arise. The second, understanding the goals of the terrorists, is also very important as tool of the counter-terrorism policy. This is closely related to the first point. The goals of the militants can also determine the response of the government. If the terrorists want to transform the existing system by changing the current constitutional, judicial, or administrative system, the government should revise its policy and look into it as to where the loopholes are.

One cannot deny the fact that to a certain extent the terrorists capitalize on local grievances (Tapnar, 2009). Therefore, if there are genuine demands of the people the government should make sure that they are fulfilled, lest the terrorists do it. However, it does not necessarily mean that the state should become hostage to a handful of terrorists. The state has every right to establish its writ wherever and whenever it is challenged (Mir, 2009). Thirdly, implications of the possible response to the militants, is also very critical. In fact it is one of the most important aspects of the formulation of the counter-terrorism policy. By analyzing the possible effects of the counter-terrorism response beforehand, the state will be able to adopt a people-friendly policy. Reliance on absolute military force and indiscriminate treatment of all of the affected population can seriously undermine counter-terrorism efforts. In the process of eradicating terrorism, the state should make sure that the local population does not become hostile to its policies. Otherwise it will strengthen the militants' cause and make it easy to recruit from the local population (Tapnar, 2009).

Unfortunately, the United States of America and Pakistan have not learnt lessons from foreign military experiences in the Pakhtun region. The first and second Anglo-Afghan wars and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 should have been an eye opener for Pakistan and the US. In the first Anglo-Afghan war which started in 1839, the easy march of the army into Kabul and the installation of a puppet leader, Shah Shuja, led the British to violate every cultural norm and disregard every Afghan tradition. Not oblivion to the concept of *nang* (Honor) and collateral damage including the replacing of a

political leader by a puppet led the Afghans to revolt in the true spirit of taking *Badal* or revenge. Thus within months the entire invading force was butchered by the insurgent Pakhtuns (Hussain, 2008). Same was the case with the second Anglo-Afghan war where disregard for collateral damages and tribal code led to a humiliating defeat of the British army. The fate of the Soviet forces who invaded in 1979 was not different as their approach towards the Afghans was hardly dissimilar to that of the British. The Soviet Union adopted a ruthless policy of brutal aerial bombardment and ground forces attacks of the rural areas. The Communist forces were involved in such acts of collateral damage which the Afghans had not seen before (Hussain, 2008). In pursuit of the insurgents the Soviet forces eliminated the entire villages and killed innocent children and women indiscriminately. In one year alone, in 1985, Soviet forces killed about 35000 civilians, according to one estimate (Hussain, 2008). These anti-cultural acts resulting into enormous amount of collateral damage on the part of the Soviet forces only reinforced the concept of *Badal*. Thus religion and culture were combined to defeat the super power.

The war on terror can only be successful if the fundamental assumption behind it is changed. Until the current framework adopted by Pakistan and the United States of America for dealing with terrorism is changed, it will not be possible to eradicate terrorism; on the contrary it will embolden the militants. It can be done if the counter-terrorists accept the hard reality that, unlike the ordinary war, it will be a long-drawn conflict demanding, apart from precious resources, a large amount of patience and perseverance.

5.3: The US Tactics and its Implications

The counter-insurgency activities of the United States of America are largely limited to Afghanistan; however, it is necessary to analyze it because it has indirect implications on such kind of activities in Pakistan. An important question to bear in mind is that has the US been able to reduce terrorism or the threat of terrorism? Whether the actions of the United States of America have created “a new crop of dedicated terrorists” (Jackson & Towle, 2006, p.134)? More than a decade after embarking Operation Enduring Freedom, insurgency in Afghanistan continues unabated. Al Qaeda leadership is as elusive as ever and the Taliban have become the main adversary in Afghanistan (Hussain, 2008). Despite the American military superiority and the use of enormous amount of kinetic force the insurgency is on the rise. Further, terrorist attacks were 53 per cent up in Afghanistan, according to the estimates of the National Counterterrorism Centre (Hussain, 2008).

Soon after 9/11 four goals set by the US to be achieved in the war on terror were: capture Osama bin Laden; capture Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan; bring an end to al Qaeda in Afghanistan and elsewhere; and release prisoners of the United States of America in Afghanistan (Jackson & Towle, 2006).

Although, the US was able to kill Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, in the garrison town of Abbottabad, Pakistan, through a secret military operation, however, it was no indication of an end to the al Qaeda activities or an end to the war on terror. Moreover,

the powerful leader of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Mullah Muhammad Omar is still at large, guiding the insurgency from an unknown place. Most of the eastern and south-eastern provinces of Afghanistan including, Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Nangarhar and Kunar are under the direct control of the Taliban (Wadhams & Cookman, 2009). Situation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan is even more perilous where Taliban have not only established a safe haven but also threaten the state writ in the settled areas as well (Gul, 2009). Due to these failures the US is faced with enormous criticism at home and the international community increasingly doubts the logic behind the prolonged occupation of Afghanistan (Jackson & Towle, 2006). The US response to this state of affairs is the deployment of more troops and the increase in the frequency of drone attacks inside Pakistan. It is reluctant to accept the hard reality that deploying more troops on the ground in Afghanistan is not a solution to the problem in that country. Unfortunately the US has not learnt the lessons from the past military experiences in Afghanistan (Hussain, 2008).

The US failure in the war on terror can be attributed to three main factors. First and as has been mentioned in the previous section, the coalition forces have given little time to the underlying causes that may be fueling the militancy. In fact the US was unaware and indifferent to the problems of the complex and heterogeneous Afghan society. The new set up, led by Hamid Karzai and brought about by the US soon after the removal of the Taliban, was dominated by Tajiks and Uzbeks (Rashid, 2008). The two ethnic groups, representing Northern Alliance, are staunch opponents of the Taliban who are predominantly ethnic Pakhtuns. This may be one of the underlying causes of the rising

militancy in Afghanistan (Rashid, 2008). Other causes may include, the US foreign policy, especially its intervention in different Islamic countries around the world, the military intervention in Afghanistan itself, its past policies regarding Afghanistan, and illiteracy, poverty and lack of economic development in Afghanistan (Jackson & Towle, 2006). Second, the coalition forces led by the US have shown disregard to the Afghan culture (Hussain, 2008). This may also be one of the underlying causes that fuel the insurgency. Both the Mughal and the British Empires utilized *Pakhtunwali* to handle affairs in Afghanistan. The British even would have anthropologists and cultural experts who would guide the military and other officials regarding the native culture (Hussain, 2008). In the case of the US, however, apart from a few CIA officials, no one in the American military had been to Afghanistan for a decade. A few among the CIA officers could speak Dari, and no one spoke Pakhto (Rashid, 2008). This lack of knowledge of the indigenous culture and language proved instrumental in the failure of the war on terror in later years. Frequent incidents of collateral damage as a result of counter-insurgency activities strengthen the Taliban cause and hinder the coalition's efforts to win hearts and minds (Ross, 2010). Shahzad Badr rightly asks, "do you expect flowers in return of bullets? When you kill their children and women, what would you expect in return?" (cited in Latif, 2008, p. 7). The military's resort to indiscriminate force only helps the Taliban cause. (International Crisis Group, 2009). The United States of America has the superior military technology and state of the art weapons but precession is useless in the face of faulty intelligence and poor decision making on the ground (Ross, 2010).

Cognizant of its failures in the war on terror in Afghanistan, the US is now increasingly hiring cultural experts to guide the military. Special teams of experts have been established for the sole purpose to make the military and other officials aware of the cultural issues in the Afghan society. Mechanisms like, the US army's Human Terrain System (HTS), Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) as well as the US Marine Corps' Centre for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL), have each examined *Pakhtunwali*. One of its main purposes is to analyze *Pakhtunwali* and see to it how it can be used in a strategy of engaging the tribes. The Human Terrain System (HTS) places military anthropologists in deployed brigades. This helps update the military on the ground about the cultural specificities. Analysts, however, believe that practically the strategy is not working (Ross, 2010). This is true because incidents of collateral damage are on the rise and the ranks of the Taliban are swelling with the passage of time, as discussed earlier. Thus the US is in serious need of changing its existing strategy regarding the war on terror in Afghanistan. In fact the current policy has alienated the local population.

5.4: Pakistan's Tactics and its Effects

The US policy of 'you are either with us or against us' in the wake of 9/11 hardly left any room with Pakistani policymakers to maneuver. Pakistan was compelled to take a u-turn on its long-term Afghan Policy. Pakistan's entire Afghan and India policy, for that matter, was largely dependent on a friendly regime in the shape of Taliban. By joining the war on terror Pakistan had to swallow the bitter pill of taking on the force it had itself

created. However, four other reasons advanced by the government in power for joining the war on terror were,

- i) to strengthen the efforts at economic revival;
- ii) to protect Pakistan's nuclear weapons program;
- iii) to safeguard Pakistan's interests in relation to the Kashmir issue; and
- iv) to avoid being itself a target of the war on terror (Tellis, 2008)

Pakistan supports the US in the war on terror by giving the US and its military the facilities and access for the prosecution of 'Operation Enduring Freedom' in Afghanistan. It conducts internal security operations (often in collaboration with the US law enforcement agencies) to interdict terrorist financing and apprehend and render terrorist targets for prosecution abroad. Most importantly, Pakistan under Operation Al Mizan deployed battalions from the army's IX corps and Special Services Group (SSG) to the tribal areas for the first time in the history of the country. So far, more than 700 al Qaeda and other operatives have been captured and handed over to the United States of America by the Pakistani security forces (Tellis, 2008).

At the time of joining the war on terror in 2001 Pakistan was not aware that with the passage of time it will have to fight a full fledged insurgency in the shape of Taliban at home. From 2003, when the Pakistan military first arrived in FATA, to 2007 the insurgency in the country became a major force to be reckoned with (Rashid, 2008; Gul, 2009). This can largely be attributed to three factors: firstly, the US occupation of Afghanistan and the subsequent relocation of some al Qaeda and Taliban affiliates to safe

havens in the tribal region of Pakistan. Secondly, Pakistani decision to join the US led war on terror, and finally, Pakistan's ambivalent policy towards the militants, especially the peace deals which gave time to the latter to consolidate their position and bring more areas under their control.

Pakistani performance in the fight against terrorism has not been uniform. While the security forces have successfully cleared Swat and the entire Malakand Division from the militants, they have been unable to replicate that situation in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (See the third chapter of this study). Militancy in the shape of Talibanization is on the rise and the security forces are either unable or unwilling to seriously handle the situation. In fact the activities of the security forces have further deteriorated the situation not only in FATA but in the whole of the Pakhtun region (Kerr, 2010). Pakistani military's awareness of local traditions and values is hardly better than that of the US security forces. In fact, the arrival of the Pakistan army to FATA itself has resulted in social disruption that has undermined its counter-terrorism effectiveness (Tellis, 2008). The Pakistani military's indifference to the needs of the civilians, especially its resort to indiscriminate force, economic blockades of the entire tribes and some of the appeasement deals with the militants in the tribal region is only helping the Taliban cause (International Crisis Group, 2009). Its reliance on brute force, resulting in frequent incidents of collateral damage, its disregard for local mechanism like *jirgah*, and its indifference towards the root causes that may be fueling the insurgency, the Pakistani security forces are only alienating the local population and strengthening the militant's cause (Kerr, 2010).

Another important flaw in the Pakistani approach to the war on terror, as identified by analysts, is its selective approach in dealing with different militant groups. For example, on the one hand it seriously dealt with al Qaeda, helped the US in disrupting its command structure and captured or killed hundreds of its members. Its approach to the indigenous Taliban has been questionable, as Taliban activity has increased, especially in FATA, rather than decreased after the military operations against the militants. Its approach towards the different indigenous *mujahideen* groups has also not been uniform. While, under pressure from the United States and India in 2002, Pakistan seriously dealt with and banned the sectarian organizations like the *Sepah-e-Sahaba Pakistan* (SSP) and its offshoot, *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi*, along with the *Shia Tehrik-e-Jafaria* and its offshoot *Sepah-e-Muhammad*, its dealing with the Punjab and Kashmir based *mujahideen* groups like *Lashkar-e-Taiba*, *Jaish-e-Muhammad*, and *Harkat-ul-Mujahideen* has not been severe. Resultantly, cadres of these groups simply relocated to the tribal areas of Pakistan and joined the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) (Tellis, 2008). As explained in the third chapter, the ferocity in the activities of the Pakistani Taliban can be attributed to their close contact with the Kashmiri *mujahideen* groups. In fact the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan's* opposition towards the Pakistani security forces can also be explained due to their coming in contact with the Punjab-based *mujahideen* groups.

This has increasingly led the international community to doubt Pakistan's resolve to seriously handle the rising militancy. This has also not only alienated the population of the affected areas from the military but led to a growing criticism of the government's current approach to the war on terror in the country. The government policy of signing

peace deals with the militants has come under severe criticism. Making peace deals with the militants has been used as a tool of controlling the militancy; however, in practice it has done the opposite.

5.5: Peace Deals as a Tool of Counter-insurgency

“In response to escalating insurgency, the Pakistani government COIN (Counter-insurgency) policy is inconsistent; ineffective military operations are followed by negotiations, which are usually succeeded by a cease-fire” (Zaidi, 2009, p. 264) (See annexure 2). The militants have almost always violated the intermittent ceasefires and used the intervening period to strengthen their positions. Pakistani military has signed many peace deals with militants, especially in FATA. Almost all peace deals fail to achieve the desired results due to one reason or the other. This usually leads to another military offensive against the militants which again is followed by a peace deal (Zaidi, 2009).

It started from Wana, South Waziristan Agency, with signing of the Shakai agreement with Commander Nek Muhammad Wazir in 2004. Through this agreement the militants were able to spread to Shakai which brought them closer to the Mahsud dominated area of South Waziristan. From there it was easy for the militants to come to the adjacent North Waziristan (Gul Marjan Wazir*, personal communication, October 20, 2012). Although, Commander Nek Muhammad Wazir was killed by a US missile in June 2004 but in the same year the government carried out a blockade of the entire Mahsud tribe of

* Gul Marjan Wazir is a tribal from the South Waziristan Agency. He is a teacher as well as a Ph.D. research scholar at the Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar. He is a keen observer of the developments in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This interview was conducted with him on October 20, 2012.

South Waziristan under the obligation of “collective responsibility”. Hostilities between the two parties led to the signing of another agreement, the Sararogha agreement of 2005 (Zaidi, 2009). Under the agreement the military vacated the area and undertook to refrain from any future military operation in the region. The deal was successful to bring peace to the South Waziristan Agency for a while but the militants were able to utilize the time to strengthen their hold on North Waziristan. Again in a bid to control the spread of militancy in North Waziristan a similar peace deal was signed with Baitullah Mahsud in 2006 (Zaidi, 2009). The purpose of this deal was to secure army convoys and checkpoints from the militants’ attacks. However, the deal was soon violated by the militants as attacks on the coalition forces increased inside Afghanistan along the border of Waziristan. This again compelled the security forces to resume talks with Baitullah Mahsud. In line with the state policy of appeasement towards the militants, a similar agreement was signed with Maulvi Faqir Muhammad of *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi* (TNSM) in Bajur (Zaidi, 2009). Moreover, in 2008 and 2009 a number of agreements were signed with Sufi Muhammad and Maulvi Fazlullah, head of the Swat chapter of the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan*, but to no avail (Mir, 2009). As mentioned earlier, every peace deal has been followed by a military offensive. Again the military offensive has been followed by another round of talks with the militants. The talks normally have led to yet another peace agreement (Zaidi, 2009).

The security forces give their own logic of this selective engagement with the militants in FATA. They would argue that counter-terrorism campaign in the area is not an easy task. The security forces are faced with an enemy who take full advantage of the hospitable

environment, difficult terrain, physical and ideological proximity of the area with Afghanistan, and the porous nature of the Pak-Afghan border. This implies that the Taliban are able to enjoy a comprehensive system of internal communication on both sides of the border. In fact “the Pakistani Taliban have a fluid state of internal lines of communication, coupled with a propensity for using a combination of territorial control and flexible guerrilla tactics” (Zaidi 2009, p. 264). The Taliban, indifferent to every rule of conflict, have also the liberty to use any kind of ruthless tactics, including the use of human shield, while the security forces have to operate within certain limits. Thus according to the security forces, they are faced with an enemy which is both entrenched as well as flexible; it is difficult, therefore, to defeat them in ordinary gun battles.

However, this policy of appeasement characterized by signing peace deals with the militants has been severely criticized by many. Gul Marjan Wazir, who is a Ph.D research scholar at the University of Peshawar and who is a wazir from South Waziristan Agency, argues:

Signing peace deals with the militants have been a ridiculous policy by the government. This has only strengthened the militants’ cause. Normally deals are signed between the contending parties after hostilities are ended and one party come out victorious from the conflict. This has not been the case with peace deals signed by Pakistan with the militants. (Gul Marjan Wazir, personal communication, October 20, 2012)

Deals were signed with the militants when they were not fully defeated and the area under their control was not regained. These peace deals have done several things; firstly, it conferred legitimacy on the militants and recognized them as a legitimate party. Secondly, it gave them time to reorganize and bring more area under their control, because people's confidence on Taliban would increase with every peace deal. Thirdly, because of these peace deals people would join ranks of the Taliban out of fear as they knew that government was unable to protect them from the fury of Taliban if they oppose them (Gul Marjan Wazir, personal communication, October 20, 2012). Wazir rightly said that a proper approach to these deals should have been a prior demand from the militants to surrender weapons. "What is the utility of these kind of deals when it is known from the beginning that they would be followed by a military operation", asks Wazir (personal communication, October 20, 2012). The United States of America too is strongly critical of the Pakistani approach of signing peace agreements with the militants. The US rightly anticipates that this serves as beacon for the militants to regroup and enable them to renew the insurgency and terrorist attacks (Zaidi, 2009).

This policy of appeasement towards the militants coupled with the flawed assumption on which the war on terror is based, and the faulty counter-insurgency policies of Pakistan and the United States of America, resulting into enormous amount of collateral damage, has led to the distortion of the Pakhtun cultural values. How this cultural distortion may be used by the militants to their own advantage is the subject of the following section.

5.6: Cultural Distortion

It is a fact that there are situations where the use of force is inevitable, and it is also a reality that military force is always used as a last resort. Notwithstanding its utility in certain situations, the use of kinetic force always brings misery to many (Hussain, 2008). Its use even brings more disaster where there is disregard for cultural sensitivities. In the latter case it creates a social situation where apparently a friendly force may be considered an enemy by the local population (Ross, 2010). Therefore, it is very important that the local population should be fully taken into confidence before the use of military power. This should be followed by a policy of winning hearts and minds of the people by the military. Otherwise the situation would become a nightmare for the ground forces whose success largely depends on the active support of the civilian population. Keeping in view these facts the story of the war on terror in the Pakhtun region is not very encouraging. It is argued that the arrival of the Pakistan army itself to FATA has resulted in social disruption that has undermined its counter-terrorism effectiveness (Tellis, 2008). Indiscriminate shelling and firing by the security forces, collateral damage in the shape of the killing and wounding of a large number of innocent unarmed civilians, burning of homes and crops, the destruction of social institutions (bomb blasts in *jirgahs*, mosques and *hujras*), and the killing of tribal elders as a result of the war on terror, have brought cultural distortion leading to a vacuum. This vacuum in turn could be filled by radical forces (Kerr, 2010).

Unfortunately state institutions in the Pakhtun region are weak to the point of non-existent. This holds true not only for FATA but also for the settled regions of the Pakhtun

land. The administrative system in vogue in FATA only perpetuates the prevailing marginalization of the people of the region. State writ in the region is limited as political parties are non-functional, and the superior judiciary of the country has no jurisdiction in the region. As a result there is a strong reliance on social and cultural institutions such as *Hujra* and *Jirgah*. These institutions have been completely destroyed as a result of the chaos in the Pakhtun region. In turn this has brought total disorder to the Pakhtuns. The destruction of the social structure has brought enormous changes in the concept of *Pakhtunwali* (Kerr, 2010). The latter guides the behavior of the people in the Pakhtun society. When the concept of *Pakhtunwali* was transformed it brought cultural distortion. Culture is so important that even the militants could use the Pakhtun cultural traits. Although, the erosion of these traditional institutions started in the 1980s when the traditional *mullahs* increasingly gained power (see second chapter), however, the US-led war on terror accelerated this process. The resultant death and destruction in the shape of terrorism and the war on terror have affected the Pakhtun culture in many ways.

For example there has been an unprecedented displacement as a result of the war on terror. Cultural anthropology tells us that geography is very important to culture, as rightly argued by Zafar Khan* of the department of Sociology, University of Peshawar, who is himself a tribal. Changes in geographic conditions bring changes in culture as well. Where there has been migration there has been corresponding changes in culture. Concepts of *Pakhtunwali* such as honor largely transforms as a result of displacement. “*Khalaq ba sa wai*” (what would the people say) is a mechanism of social control in the

* Zafar Khan is a Sociologist, Ph.D. research scholar and lecturer at the department of Sociology, University of Peshawar. He is conducting his research on “Pakhtuns’ Cultural Radicalization in the Backdrop of the War on Terror”. An extensive interview was carried out with him on July 16, 2012.

Pakhtun society. This concept of *Pakhtunwali*, according to which people restrain to do a certain act due to the fear of the opinion of the community, is central to *Pakhtunwali*. However, this holds no meaning as a result of displacement where people come to live in different settings, in public buildings, tents, or among relatives (personal communication, July 16, 2012). In the words of Zafar Khan,

Unfortunately those in Europe and the West do not give us the system but they want us to be civilized. They demand a civilized behavior from us in tents. This is impossible without giving us a stable system. People in tents during the French Revolution, during the war in Iraq and during the conflict in Vietnam were not, and could not be civilized. It's just not possible. (personal communication, July 16, 2012)

History tells us that people in tents in the Pakhtun region have been manipulated and used for different political objectives. As a result they have been easy targets of social engineering. One of the most important examples of this is that *madrassa* in the Pakhtun region nourished when they were in camps (Hussain, 2008). *Salfist* ideology and the concept of global jihad penetrated the Pakhtun society when the Pakhtuns were displaced in large number (Marwat, 2005). Even the use of children in armed conflicts is a result of this cultural distortion. This can be traced in the 1980s in the Soviet-Afghan war but is noticeable in the present Pakhtun society as well.

Another important cultural change in the Pakhtun society is the transformation of the *jirgah*. In fact *jirgah* has been taken over by the inexperienced younger generation as a result of the killing of large numbers of tribal *maliks* and elders. Hundreds of tribal elders have been killed in the continuing death and destruction in the Pakhtun region. Those *maliks* and tribal elders were well versed in classic Pakhtun traditions. *Jirgah* with them, therefore, was in safe hands (Kerr, 2010). Apart from the changes in its leadership, the war on terror has affected the *jirgah* in other ways too. In the prevailing circumstances in the region the institution, organization, and especially the process of *jirgah* has become a risky affair. It has been targeted by the militants on many occasions. This has been consciously done not only to instill fear in the people to stop them from taking sides with the government but to disrupt the government efforts for reconciliation.

Moreover, the ongoing war on terror has badly affected the institution of the traditional tribal *lashkar* (a group of armed tribal volunteers instituted for specific purposes e.g. implementation of the decisions of *jirgah*). The government has been consistent in organizing tribal *lashkars* not only to ward off the spread of the militants but also to use them as a second line of defense. However, this policy of the state, using civilians in combat, has not been effective. In fact, contrary to the utility of tribal *lashkars* in the traditional Pakhtun culture, this strategy has failed (Muzzammil Khan*, personal communication, March 13, 2012). These tribal *lashkars* have been given the names of peace committees by the government. However, through a conscious policy of target killings most of the leadership of these *lashkars* have been eliminated. This has instilled a

* Muzzammil Khan is a Tribal from Mohmand Agency. Interview was carried out with him on March 13, 2012.

fear in the mind of the people who are increasingly reluctant to take part in these committees. Apart from a few exceptions most of these so called peace committees have failed to deliver. Only the *lashkar* formed by the Salarzai tribe in Bajaur Agency was able, to a certain extent, to keep the militants at bay. In the rest of the tribal region peace committees have been unable to check the spread of the militants. This has greatly damaged the image of the traditional institution of tribal *lashkar* which has been highly valued by the Pakhtuns for hundred of years. Traditional tribal *lashkar* is actually a part of the larger cultural institution, the concept of communal life in the Pakhtun society.

Communal life is characterized by *Ashar* (collective action) and *Jirgah*. As identified by Dr. Khadim Hussain, “the concept of communal life can be used for the containment and eradication of militancy as well as a tool of counter-terrorism” (personal communication, July 9, 2012). Dr. Khadim Hussain, who is a linguist, political analyst, and an expert on the Pakhtun culture further, says,

That is why the militants have targeted *jirgah* and they have destroyed the institution of *hujra*. In fact this communal life has got the capacity to throw radicalization out of this whole region; its defense mechanism is so strong. There is an element of pluralism in the concept of communal life. But this defense mechanism of the communal life needs to be institutionalized. (personal communication, July 9, 2012)

Institutionalization of the cultural traditions is only possible in a normal and functional state system. Unfortunately this has not been the case with the Pakhtuns, as identified earlier. In fact the code of *Pakhtunwali* has not been allowed to evolve in a natural way (Banerjee, 2000). It has been disrupted. Foreign cultural and military invasions and social engineering from the above have broken the natural growth and evolution of the Pakhtun culture. These successive disruptions of the Pakhtun culture have compelled the Pakhtuns to live a tribal life. They were compelled to sustain their tribalism because they feared that otherwise they would be destroyed collectively. This is where the Pakhtuns are caught in a dilemma. If they leave tribalism, they fear that they would lose collective identity. On the other hand, if they do not leave tribalism they can not compete with the civilized world. As a result the code of *Pakhtunwali*, which should have adopted itself according to the demands of time, has become inflexible even further (Khadim Hussain, personal communication, July 9, 2012).

Some people argue that one can not recreate the past. They would say that the destruction and the transformation of the traditional set up in the Pakhtun region, especially in FATA, does not mean that one should remain hostage to the past. This line of thinking further argues that, after all, the current turmoil on the Pakhtun land is partly a product of the prevailing cultural, political and administrative system in the region. It was actually the lacuneas in the system and the vacuum created by the legal and administrative set up that was filled by the militants. Therefore, the transformation of this system should be welcomed. Although, it is true that the traditional system has disrupted but there is no alternative system as well. In the absence of a viable alternative system society will be

vulnerable to such forces as radicalization. No society can function normally in chaos and disorganization (Kerr, 2010).

Militants in the Pakhtun region do not have an agenda. Their objectives are not clear and their demands are, at the most, obscure (see third chapter). In short, the Taliban do not have an alternative, political, economic, and administrative system. In the same way the current anti-Taliban campaign in the Pakhtun region is not succeeding in achieving the desired objectives. It seems the war on terror is heading in the wrong direction. At the same time it seems a long and drawn out conflict and there is no end in sight in the near future. Therefore, people do not have optimism regarding the future of the region. Rather, one can safely say that the counter-terrorism campaign has further alienated the people. The misdirected and ambivalent policies of the security forces have strengthened the militant cause. Thus the war on terror may be achieving the opposite of what it was meant to achieve. People may not oppose the Taliban due to the fear. But they may actively join the militants due to the wrong and misdirected policies of the security forces. This is a dangerous scenario where people may not share the ideology of the Taliban but they may support their cause due to personal reasons. This is actually happening in the Pakhtun region. As discussed in the third and fourth chapters there are numerous cases where people have joined the militants and attacked the security forces due to the wrongs done to them or their family by the military. This is where the concept of *Baal* (Revenge) may have played a role. In some cases the affected person may have joined the militants due to his own free will but in others he may be incited by the Taliban by invoking the concept of *Badal*.

5.7: Recourse to *Badal*

Counter-insurgency policies have compelled many in the Pakhtun region to join Taliban for the sole purpose of taking revenge. Pakhtuns live in a contact society where extended relationships take precedent over the individual. The honor of one person affects the honor of the whole family or entire tribe in some cases. Thus it becomes obligatory for a person to restore the honor of the affected family or tribe (Hussain, 2008). The loss of life is considered as the biggest violation of honor, even if it is accidental, and demands immediate retribution or reconciliation, for example, through a *jirgah* (Hussain, 2008). With out a process of reconciliation from both sides the only option left with the affected person or persons is to take revenge.

The approach of the counter-terrorists in the Pakhtun region is not different from the foreign invading armies in the past. There is a heavy reliance on aerial bombardment including drone strikes in the FATA region. Keeping in view the militants' strategy of using humans as shield and their tactic of luring the security forces to populated areas, and heavy reliance on air force by the security forces is resulting into enormous amount of civilian casualties. For example in March 2007, at least 21 civilians were killed in a US air strike in the Southern province of Hilmand in Afghanistan. Similarly, in April that year, in one of the biggest incidents of collateral damage, at least 57 civilians were killed at Shindand in Western Afghanistan (Hussain, 2008). That is why eleven years after the US invasion there are no signs of an end to the Talibanization in Afghanistan. Same is the case in the Pakhtun region in Pakistan. Frequent US drone strikes, aerial bombardment, and ruthless activities by the ground forces have undermined the objectives of the

counter-terrorism campaign and strengthened the militants' cause. For example in 2006 when a US drone strike hit a *madrassa* in the Chengai area of Bajaur Agency, Maulvi Faqir Muhammad of the TNSM stood at the sight of the attack and pledged to take *Badal* (Revenge) from the perpetrators of the attack (Hameed Gul, personal communication, December 8, 2010). Most importantly, the creation of the *Tehrik-e-Taliban* Pakistan in December 2007 was itself a reaction to the enormous collateral damage in the Lal Masjid operation that year.

Apart from collateral damage in terms of human loss, other cultural violations by the security forces, for example displacement from ones home, may also compel the people to invoke *Badal*. The concept of honor demands that a Pakhtun does not leave his home, no matter what are the circumstances. One who leaves his home is called *Beghairata* (without honor). In fact displacement from ones home is one of the biggest sentences given to a wrong doer in the Pakhtun society. Therefore, the concept of revenge or *Badal* may have been invoked by many in the contemporary Pakhtun society as demanded by the dictates of *Pakhtunwali*. It should not be ignored; therefore, that exodus in mass in the Pakhtun region is not helping the cause of the counter-terrorism.

It should be reiterated, however, that *Badal* in the Pakhtun society has its own philosophy behind it. It is not a blind pursuit for retribution. Revenge in this culture is not an obsession for violence, as discussed in the previous chapter. "*Badal* is not preemptive, it is reactionary. Cultural as well as interpretive anthropology anticipate such behavior in such circumstance" (Zafar Khan, personal communication, July 16, 2012).

Literature on radicalization proves that social situation develops thoughts (Aggressive thoughts in the case of Pakhtuns who are displaced from homes). Thoughts are then converted into actions. There would certainly be further radicalization among people in such circumstance. There was no suicide bombing in the Pakhtun society until 2004, says Zafar Khan. Now even the Pakhto literature is not immune from it. “There is a song in Pakhto which says, ‘*Khudkusha damaka yama Khudkusha damaka*’. This means ‘I am like a suicide blast’. Terrorism and counter-terrorism have affected Pakhtuns not only economically but socially and psychologically” (Zafar Khan, personal communication, July 16, 2012).

This is certainly a dangerous scenario. The policies and strategies of the war on terror need to be redirected. Counter-terrorism strategies should be responsive to the aspiration of the local population.

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Chapter 6

Conclusion

The theme common to this study is that it is a combination of social engineering and a stereotypical approach, referred to as reductionism, which is mainly responsible for the current chaos in the Pakhtun region. The rise of terrorism in the Pakhtun region, the mushrooming of different jihadi groups in the 1980s, and the new phase of militancy after 9/11, all have a common genesis. The following conclusions can be formed from the preceding discussion.

- 1) Pakhtun areas have been used as a centre of the militant offshoots of almost all religious mobilization in the Indo-subcontinent. However, it is important to note that the notion of jihad was not indigenous to the region. Outside guidance and state patronage was instrumental in inculcating the discourse of jihad in the Pakhtun society. Mughal and Afghan rulers used religious personalities as intermediaries between people and the concerned central states, while scholars at *Darul Ulum Deoband* enticed armed resistance against the Sikhs and the British. The initial jihad (rallied around *Sufis*), before the creation of Pakistan, was justified because it was a struggle for the liberation of the Muslims of Subcontinent. However, after the creation of Pakistan in 1947 the notion of jihad has been increasingly dominated by the traditional *Mullah* for achieving political power. This was more evident in the 1980s when Pakistan, in connivance with the United States of America, used the Pakhtun region to prepare *mujahideen* for a war against the communists in Afghanistan. Although, state patronage was common in both the cases, however, it was the new jihad rallied around the

political *Mullah* which has transformed a tolerant and secular Pakhtun society to a reactionary and militarized one.

- 2) The highly idealized accounts created about the Pakhtuns and their culture provided the premise for engineering the society from the above. The British created myths about the Pakhtuns to deal with the highly volatile and complicated frontier region. Religious figures in the Indo-subcontinent used them to entice jihad against the imperial power. Vested interests in Pakistan utilized them to serve the regional aspirations of the nascent state.

The imperial power had always treated its subjects as “Others”; however, before the first Anglo-Afghan war in 1839 the British had a more positive view about the Pakhtuns as compare to the other people in the Indo-subcontinent. The first military confrontation with the Pakhtuns colored their view about the people of the region. The first and second Afghan wars showed that it was not an easy task to administer the region. In fact the British had always treated the area as a political marginality. Apart from the strategic interests they had no other objectives in the region. Therefore, they increasingly changed their views of the people and the region. Pakhtuns were termed as unruly, ungovernable, and barbarians. Whatever their intent, they were looking into the matter with the framework of empire. Let alone the Pakhtuns as a whole, they have even bracketed certain tribes of the Pakhtun with specific stereotypes, equating them with animals. They have described the Pakhtuns generally as ungovernable. It means there is a problem in their genes and they can not go with a structure. They can not sustain themselves as a state and, therefore, they need a master.

Religious scholars in the Indian Sub-continent used the myths about the Pakhtuns to justify jihad against the British. Capitalizing on the myths about the Pakhtuns and further reinforcing it scholars at the *Darul Ulum* like Maulana Muhamud-ul-Hassan and Hussain Ahmd Madni designed a plan to initiate jihad against the British in the Pakhtun region. The strategy was executed on the ground by local religious leaders. Prominent among them were Akhund Abdul Ghafoor, Hadda Mullah, and Haji Sahib Turangzai. The execution of jihad in the Pakhtun region largely shaped the future destiny of the area. This served as a precedent for the new jihad rallied around the traditional political *mullah* after the independence of the country in 1947. Pakhtun areas were militarized to an extent that the rhetoric of jihad continued even after the departure of the British from the region. Right from then onwards this perception is present in one form or another. Religious scholars, mainstream academia, and government officials have carried this picture of the Pakhtuns to this day. After the creation of Pakistan vested interests in the country presented this image with a little modification. That is that, Pakhtuns are ungovernable but that they have an extreme love for religion. Therefore, to serve the national interests of the country, they have been used in the name of religion. However, there are no hardcore scientific findings which can suggest that a certain race, nation, people or community hold a certain feature uniformly. There will always be variations.

- 3) Tampering with the ideal Pakhtun culture and social engineering of the Pakhtun society are mainly responsible for the current Talibanization in the region. This started with the imperial policies of the British. They growingly tampered with the ideal Pakhtun culture to alter the structure of the society so that it can serve

their imperial designs. By the start of the 20th century the two changes brought about by the British in the traditional Pakhtun culture: the replacement of *wesh* or land distribution system with permanent land-holding and a renewed role given to the *jirgah* were mainly responsible for the increasing level of violence in the Pakhtun society. The new state of Pakistan, after 1947, practically implemented the policy of social engineering in the Pakhtun society. The fourth level of the socio-technical operations of the theory of Social Engineering, called Piecemeal Dependent Target, best explains this situation of the Pakhtun society. It states that a specific social area, keeping in mind its past history and its possible malleability is selected and thoroughly analyzed to lead it in the desired direction. Targeting strategies involve identification of the type of the target society, character of the people, level of socio-economic development, and its readiness to undergo cultural change.

Radicalization of the Pakhtun society can not be de-linked to the overall process of Islamization in the country initiated by the military dictator, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. He wanted to transform the entire society. Major reforms were introduced in the legal and constitutional system of the country. The parliament was renamed as *Majlis-e-Shoora* and laws deemed repugnant to the Islamic *Shariah* were either amended or abolished. *Hudood* Ordinance was passed under which Islamic sentences were to be given on major crimes such as theft, adultery, and blasphemy. Government official were appointed not on merit but on their credentials of being practical Muslims. Five-time prayer was made compulsory in all the departments of the government and the Islamic curriculum

in the educational system was given a renewed attention. Through a well thought out strategy the role of armed forces in the country was strengthened and the pluralistic voice of the people was silenced. The *madrassa* certificate or *Sanad* was made equivalent to the university degree which brought the religious forces from the periphery to the mainstream politics of the country. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, therefore, was a godsend for Zia. This was the time when the Pakhtun areas were used as a springboard and as a launching pad for activities inside Afghanistan.

According to the demand of the theory the Pakhtun region was best suited for such a grand strategy, although, otherwise too, it was the only option due to its physical proximity with Afghanistan. Past history of the region and nature of the Pakhtun society were largely suitable for the implementation of the strategy. The area has received numerous foreign invasions in the course of its history and the people are known to have defended their soil against each power bravely. More importantly, however, the Pakhtun region had served as a centre of the militant offshoots of most of the religious mobilizations in the Indian-Subcontinent. Akhund Abdul Ghafoor and Syed Ahmad Brially against the Sikhs and Hadda Mullah, Haji Sahib Turangzai and the Fiqir of Ipi against the British, all had used the Pakhtun region for their campaigns. Therefore, the notion of jihad had been fully entrenched in the region at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The national character of the people, as shaped by the past literature about the Pakhtuns, was fully compatible with the strategy. Pakhtuns were known as ungovernable, anarchic and, above all, a martial race. Islamists from around the

world participated in the jihad, however, the bulk of the *mujahideen* who were trained and equipped by Pakistan and the US were the Pakhtuns.

The other targeting strategy, socio-economic condition of the society, was also completely in favor of the strategy. The Pakhtun region and especially the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) had always been kept marginalized not only by the British but by the successive governments in Pakistan. Economy of the region was and, is still, mostly based upon illicit trade. Drug trafficking, the production and trade of opium inside Afghanistan and in the tribal region of Pakistan, and the manufacturing and free movements of weapons characterize the economy. This has not only hindered healthy economic activities but also contributed to the rising unemployment in the region as the prevailing conditions benefits only a few. Successive governments in the country have paid little attention to this situation. The socio-economic conditions of the region can not be separated from the legal and administrative system in vogue. The current legal and administrative system only perpetuates the prevailing socio-economic conditions in the region. Had there been a complete writ of the state with its functional institutions such as executive and judiciary, and a uniform administrative system, in line with the rest of the country, the situation in the tribal region would have been altogether different. However, the successful implementation of the strategy for defeating the Soviet Union in Afghanistan was only made possible by the aforementioned factors in the Pakhtun region. Three aspects of the overall strategy, the hosting and training of foreign jihadis in the Pakhtun region, education of the Afghan refugee children, and a network of

madrassas bent upon disseminating jihadi ideology and literature, although, vital for the short-term execution of the strategy, have fundamentally altered the nature of the Pakhtun society. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan foreign militants continued to use the area as a safe haven, education of the children helped in inculcating a militant ideology in the new generation, and hundreds of *madrassas* across the region have constantly produced fresh jihadis. Therefore, through a strategy of engineering from the above, this policy has drastically altered the nature of the Pakhtun society.

4) The socially controlled violence in the Pakhtun society in the shape of *Badal*, Honor killing, vendettas, and *Tarburwali*, have no relationship with the Taliban form of militancy whose ideology transcends national boundaries. Of course there are situations where people have joined the terrorists as an obligation of honor or *Badal* but that does not mean that the latter are the root causes of terrorism. In this case honor and *Badal* may be a product of the counter-terrorism campaign, as those affected by the war on terror may see no other option but to join the militants to seek revenge from the security forces. History shows that the ideal Pakhtun culture has been peaceful and tolerant. There is a strong assumption that Pakhtuns were Budhists before Islam, as pointed out by Dr. Khadim Hussain discourse (personal communication, July 9, 2012). This can be judged from the monuments and statues of Budha found in every nook and corner of the Pakhtun region. Central to Budhism is the concept of non-violence. Another fact which should be noticed is that history is testament to the fact that trade caravans would start from Bukhara and Tashkent and would travel safely to Peshawar, Lahore,

and even other places of India. There has been no evidence of a single attack on them in the recorded history. If the Pakhtuns were so militant and violent how could these caravan travel safely through them. These two are the facts on the bases of which one can say that militancy and violence are not culture specific. It is a rational political process and it is the permeation of a particular type of political discourse. There has been a conscious and deliberate policy of bringing changes in the Pakhtun culture. The Talibanization of the Pakhtun society after the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, therefore, is a natural outgrowth of the prevailing situation in the region for the last three decades.

- 5) The counter-insurgency policies are not helping the cause of rooting out terrorism from the region. In fact it has done the opposite. The Pakistani security forces' policy of dealing with the rising threat of militancy is ambivalent. For example, military operations have been carried out against the militants in some places but peace deals have been signed with them in other places. Peace deals have only given leverage to the terrorists as it not only confer legitimacy upon them but also give them time to consolidate their position and expand their operational area. It is not surprising, therefore, that the number of active militants has increased at a time when the Pakistan army had the largest military deployment in the history of the region. Initially the Pakistani Taliban emerged in the South Waziristan Agency in 2004 but now they have engulfed the entire seven tribal agencies, six frontier regions and parts of the settled districts of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Even military operations have not been targeted. Indiscriminate shelling and bombardment of the civilian areas and blockading of the entire tribes

in some cases has only strengthened the militants' cause. Moreover, US drone strikes in FATA, resulting into enormous amount of collateral damage, have also alienated the local population from the security forces. In fact, the mechanism of the ongoing war on terror, instead of rooting out the scourge of terrorism from the region, has further radicalized the Pakhtun society.

To sum up, this study clearly argues that there is no causal relationship between violence and terrorism and between terrorism and the Pakhtun cultural values. Although, inter-personal and inter-tribal violence is structured in the Pakhtun society but it has been the case with almost all tribal societies around the world, as mentioned in the fourth chapter of this study. As violence mainly occurs in the absence of state, therefore, positive state intervention, including the strengthening of state institutions, over the years, would have pacified the Pakhtun society to a larger extent. However, the opposite has been the case in the Pakhtun society where ambivalent state intervention in the shape of misdirected and short-sighted policies of the country right from its independence in 1947 has negatively transformed the society. In a nutshell, the prevailing terrorism in the shape of Talibanization in the Pakhtun region has not been a result of the normal functional social change; rather, it has been the product of a conscious policy of social engineering in the Pakhtun society.

6.1: Recommendations

Militancy is a state of mind and it has penetrated deep into the social fabric of the Pakhtun society. Unless and until serious attention is given to this fact one can not completely root out terrorism from the country generally and from the Pakhtun region

specifically. Reliance only on the use of military force is not the right answer to the problem of militancy. A more balanced approach would be to combine both the strategies, military option in the short term and dealing with the social aspect of militancy as the long term policy. Focusing on the use of force only would mean fighting the symptoms of terrorism and not the root causes. At the same time it is important to convey the message to the militants through the use of military force that the state is capable of extending its writ. Three things should be kept in mind, however, while using the military force. These are:

- i) the military operation must be accountable;
- ii) it must be time-bound; and
- iii) it must be targeted.

Unfortunately the current military operation in the Pakhtun region is neither accountable nor time-bound nor targeted. The first is important in that it legitimizes the use of force. Unless and until the local population is fully taken into confidence the use of force may create problems as the security forces can not successfully operate without the active support of the civilian population. More importantly, accountability will compel the security forces to observe the rules of the game and stop them from transgressions. One can not use military power for an indefinite period of time; therefore, time-boundness of the military operation is very necessary. The military should fix a specific time period for each operation and it must have a clear exit strategy. This will give the security forces the confidence and support of the local population who would know before hand that the army is serious in dealing with the problem and that it is not going to stay there for an

indefinite period of time. Moreover, the indiscriminate use of force is always counter-productive; therefore, it is important that the military operation must be targeted. Indiscriminate shelling and firing of the civilian populated areas, heavy reliance on aerial bombardment and the blockading of entire tribes or villages can only strengthen the militants' cause. For a selective targeting of the terrorists it is important to distinguish between the militants and the non-combatants. Cultural sensitivities on the ground must be kept in mind not only to hinder the support base of the militants but to win over hearts and mind of the local population. In dealing with the social aspect of the problem of militancy one needs to understand that there are four levels in the process of terrorism, as pointed out by Dr Khadim Hussain. These are: construction of discourse, permeation of discourse, contagion of discourse, and control of discourse (personal communication, July 9, 2012). While dealing with militancy the first three are often ignored focusing whole energies on the control of militancy. This has been the case in dealing with militancy in the Pakhtun region. As argued by Dr. Khadim Hussain: "you are dealing neither with the discourse of militancy nor with the contagion of militancy. You just deal with the control of militancy". He further continued: "And dealing with control is also contradictory. You are dealing with control in your own country but letting loose the control in other countries" (personal communication, July 9, 2012). Certainly if Pakistan wants the eradication of terrorism at home it must stop the use of its soil against other countries. Taking actions against the Pakistani Taliban but ignoring the free movement of Afghan Taliban in the tribal areas will not help the cause of rooting out terrorism from the region. Moreover, it is at the discourse level that militancy must be stopped, as a long term strategy. Actually the use of force is the last resort. The state should have realized

from the beginning where the loopholes were from which the militants benefited. The discourse can be found in media, in educational system and even in the judicial system. It was the imperial interests of the United States of America and the regional aspiration of Pakistan which nourished militants and helped in the permeation of this discourse. Nationalists, who were the true representatives of the Pakhtuns, were prosecuted and the pluralistic voice of the Pakhtuns was silenced. FATA was consciously kept marginalized for the containment of Soviet Union. Then after 1989, in pursuit of its regional aspirations (for example, securing a strategic depth in Afghanistan and protecting economic interests in Central Asia) Pakistan consciously helped in the construction and permeation of this discourse in the society. Thus Pakistan's educational policy, constitutional provisions, and laws were geared towards the achievement of this goal. Therefore, until and unless serious attention is given to the educational policy, constitutional provisions, and legal system of the country, there can be no end to the problem of militancy.

If peace is taken as lack of war, it is certainly possible in the short run. But if it means peace of mind and peace within the community so that people can handle their cultural, economic, political and social life according to their own wishes, it is only possible when: i) there is a complete de-tribalization; ii) there is a total de-colonization; and, iii) there is redistribution of resources. As for the first one, de-tribalization is the only option left with the Pakhtuns. They can not 'have their cake and eat it too'. They prefer human identity over human dignity. This should not be the case. Pakhtuns must adapt themselves according to the demands of time. The state must also change its policy in this regard.

Legal, political, and administrative system in FATA must be changed to bring the region at par with the rest of the country. Moreover, social deprivations of the Pakhtuns must be taken care of so that they consider themselves as part and parcel of the country. Economic and educational policies of the country must be geared towards greater equality so that people take interest in the national rather than the tribal or regional issues. Unless and until Pakistan is made a welfare state, giving opportunity to the people to solve problems with internal voices, there is no possibility to completely root out militancy from the country. De-colonization is necessary at two levels. First, great powers like the United States of America must stop interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. The same approach should be adopted by Pakistan in relation to Afghanistan. More importantly, the state must stop treating certain areas of its own as colonies. “After all, the problem in Karachi and Balochistan has nothing to do with religious militancy” (Khadim Hussain, personal communication, July 9, 2012).

Re-distribution of resources is required not only at the state level but within the Pakhtun society as well. The state must ensure equal distribution of resources. Every nationality including Pakhtuns must be given their fair share in the natural resources. In fact constitutional provisions should be provided to safeguard the interests of the smaller nationalities. A re-distribution of resources within the Pakhtun society itself is also the need of the time. All the marginalized segments of the Pakhtun society should be given share in the distribution of resources. All the artisans including carpenter, blacksmith, as well as women should be considered in the distribution of resources. Pakhtuns will lose

their identity if they do not act like this. This is a choice they have to make for their survival.

The solution to the problem of militancy is also inherent in the Pakhtun culture. For the complete eradication of terrorism it is necessary to copy the Khudai Khidmatgar model. There is a strong precedent in the shape of the latter as it was purely an indigenous non-violent movement which had its roots in the Pakhtun soil.

Moreover, it is a multi-dimensional problem, which has religious overtones, sectarian overtones, and economic overtones. Counter-terrorism campaign can be successful if a comprehensive and focused approach is adopted. Owing to the complex nature of the problem Pakistan alone can not cope with it. Major powers including the US, UK, and regional stake holders including Pakistan, Iran, and India should collectively make an effort to solve the problem.

Glossary

Afghan: Afghan refers to something from Afghanistan, particularly a citizen of that country. Formerly the term was used by Persian speakers to denote mostly the Pakhtun people. However, in modern times the name is not used as an ethnic term but a national demonym for all citizens of Afghanistan. According to the 1964 constitution of Afghanistan all the citizens of the country are called Afghans.

Ahl al Hadith: *Ahl al Hadith* is a person who subscribes to the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him).

Al Qaeda: Alternatively spelled as *Al Qaida* or *Al Qaidah*, is an Arabic name which literally means “the Base”. It is an international Islamic fundamentalist organization committed to the use of terrorism for the attainment of its goals. Al Qaeda was formed by Aiman al Zawahiri, Abdullah Yousuf Azzam and other veteran Afghan Arabs in 1988. Abdull Yousuf Azzam was later replaced by Osama bin Laden. One of the main goals of Al Qaida is to replace the dictatorial and “heretic” regimes of the Middle East by Islamic governments based on *Shariah* (See *Shariah* below) law. However, it has declared the Christian-Judaist dominated western world led by the United States of America as its prime enemy.

Amir: Leader or chief.

Amir-ul-Momineen: Leader of the Believers.

Amr Bil Maruf wa Nahi Anil Munkar: Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. It was a militant group led by Haji Namdar in Khyber Agency until he was killed by the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* (TTP) militants in August 2008.

Angrez: An English speaker or a person from Great Britain. The people of India would refer to the British as “*Angrez*”.

Aryan: *Aryan* refers to the original speakers of the Indo-European languages. Some of the Pakhtun historiographers contend that Afghans or Pakhtuns are also the decedents of the *Aryan* race.

Ashar: Collective action. *Ashar* is a mechanism in the Pakhtun culture in which people help each other in different social activities.

Baader-Meinhof: Red Army Faction. It was a terrorist gang which started its militant activities in Germany in 1960, against German elites and US army personnel.

Badal: Revenge. An important element of *Pakhtunwali*, the Pakhtun code of life, *badal* refers to the obligation of taking revenge when a wrong has been done to someone.

Barailvi: It is a term used for a movement of the *Sunni* Islam, which originated in South Asia in the 19th century. The name derives from the north Indian town of Barailly where the movement started.

Beghairata: Without honor. It is the opposite of *Ghairatmand* (Honorable).

Bait: Pledge at the hand of a spiritual teacher or *pir* (See *pir* below).

Bourgeoisie: It is a French word, used in social sciences, which originally denoted the wealthy stratum of the middle class that originated during the later part of the Middle Ages. In modern times, the word is used to describe a social class characterized by their ownership of capital, and their related culture.

Burqa: It is a Pakhto (Pashto) word which means “veil”.

Chishtiyya: It is a *Sufi* order within the mystic *Sufi* tradition of Islam (See *Sufi* below). The name derives from Chisht, a small town in Herat in Afghanistan, where it emerged in 1930.

Couture: *Couture* refers to culture. The French borrowed the word from the Italians first as “*couture*” and then “culture”.

Culs-de-sac: The fringe or geographical marginality.

Cultura: It is an Italian word which means to cultivate the soil and rear the animals from which sense the word “agriculture” is obtained. The word culture is derived from *cultura*.

Da‘wat wa Jihad Pohantoon: University of Islamic Propagation and Holy War. It was one of the seminaries established for the Afghan refugees.

Dar-ul-Hufaz Madrassa: Home of the Memorizers Seminary. It is one of the religious schools established during the Soviet-Afghan war for the Afghan refugees.

Dar-ul-Ulum: Its literal meaning is “Home of Knowledge”. *Dar-ul-Ulum* usually refers to a religious seminary.

Deobandi: *Deobandi* is a person who subscribes to the *Deobandi* school of thought. *Deobandi* Movement is a *Sunni* Islamic revivalist movement which started in India in the 19th century.

Donga: A wooden pole, used by the *Surma* tribe in the ritualized violent dueling, called *Sagine* (see *Surma* and *Sagine* below).

Durand Line: It refers to the 2640 kilometers (1640 mi) long porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It was established as a result of an agreement between Amir Abdur Rehman of Afghanistan and Mortimer Durand of British India. It is named after Mortimer Durand who was the Foreign Secretary of the British colonial India at the time.

FATA: The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is the area outside the four provinces of Pakistan, adjoining Afghanistan. It comprises a region of some 27220 square km (10507 sq mi). It is mainly inhabited by the Pakhtun tribes whose population is roughly 3.5 million. FATA is governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), introduced under the British rule.

Fatna: Vendetta; a prolong enmity or factionalism, also called as “*Gundi*” in the Pakhtun society (see *Gundi* below).

Gundi: Enmity or factionalism, also called as *Fatna* (see *Fatna* above).

Haj: One of the major pillars in the Islamic faith, *haj* means pilgrimage to Makkah.

Hanafi: A follower of Imam Abu Hanifa, one of the four major scholars of the Islamic jurisprudence.

Harkatul Mujahideen: Movement of the Holy Warriors. It is a militant organization which was formed during the later years of the *Afghan jihad*. The organization is considered to be responsible for some of the deadliest attacks on the Indian security forces in the disputed territory of Kashmir.

Hezb-i-Islami: Party of Islam. It was one of the seven *mujahideen* parties based in Peshawar and led by Gulbadeen Hikmatyar.

Hindus: The followers of “Hinduism”, the largest practicing faith in India.

Hizbul Mujahideen: Party of the Holy warriors. It is the only *jihadi* organization which is based in the Indian-held Kashmir.

Hujra: Literally meaning “guest house”, *hujra* is an important institution in the Pakhtun society. It works as a centre for almost all the social congregations in a village.

Jaish-e-Muhammad: Party of Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him). Based in the province of Punjab, *Jaish-e-Muhammad* is a militant organization which was established during the Afghan *jihad*. It carries out its militant activities in the Indian-held Kashmir.

Jamat-e-Islami: It is a politico-religious party in Pakistan. *Jamat-e-Islami* literally means “Party of Islam”.

Jamia Mazahir-ul-Uloom: Seminary of the Discovery of Knowledge, A *madrassa* (seminary) established by Maulana Sufi Muhammad in the Qumbar area of Lower Dir district in the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Jamia: University.

Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam: Union of Religious Scholars of Islam. It is a politico-religious party in Pakistan. The party is currently headed by Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman.

Jihad: In Arabic *jihad* means “strive” or “struggle”. *Jihad* is defined as a struggle in the way of God or a struggle to improve one’s self and/or society. Usually it refers to an armed struggle. A person engaged in *jihad* is called a *mujahid*, the plural is *mujahideen* (see *mujahideen* below). According to the Islamic jurisprudence *jihad* is obligatory upon the Muslims if the following two conditions exist: 1) when a Muslim country is invaded by a non-Muslim state, and 2) where there is a Muslim population living under the rule of non-Muslim government and struggle for their freedom.

Jirgah: A tribal council. It is usually a group decision-making process based upon consensus. It is an important tool for ending hostilities between the contending parties. *Jirgah* can be convened at various levels. *Loya jirgah* (Grand *Jirgah*) is convened at the national level.

Jumaat: It means mosque, where five time obligatory prayer is offered. *Jumaat* works both as a religious and as a social institution in the Pakhtun society.

Kasabgar: Artisan. It refers to the land-less class, for example, blacksmith, cobbler, and carpenter, in the Pakhtun society.

Khalifa: Deputy; representative.

Khalifa (Caliph): Highest temporal authority in the Muslim world.

Khalq: People. It was a faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

Khan: A Land owner or wealthy person.

Khudai Khidmatgar Movement: The Movement of the Servants of God. It was an organization formed by Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan (known as Bacha Khan) in 1929, not only to cleanse the Pakhtun society of anti-social customs and traditions but to resist the British rule through peaceful and non-violent means.

Langarkhana: An open community kitchen from which meal is offered to the people free of cost.

Lashkar: It is a tribal militia formed at the time of war and for other specific purposes, such as to implement the decision of a *jirgah*.

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi: Army of Jhang. It is a militant organization which was established during the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s. The organization has been mainly engaged in militant activities inside the Indian-held Kashmir.

Lashkar-e-Taiba: Army of the Pure. *Lashkar-e-Taiba* is a *jihadi* organization which mainly focuses its attention on militant activities inside India.

Madrassa Abu Hanifa: School of Abu Hanifa. It is one of the several religious schools established for the Afghan refugees in the 1980s.

Madrassa Hijra aw Jihad: Seminary of Emigration and Holy War. It was one of the religious schools established for the Afghan refugees.

Majlis-e-Shoora: Consultative Council. It is the name given to the parliament of Pakistan by the military dictator General Muhammad Zia ul Haq.

Makhzan-i-Afghani: *Makhzani-i-Afghani* or history of the Afghans is a book written by Nematullah al-Harawi who was a chronicler in the court of Mughal Emperor Jehangir. The Book is a Persian language epic history of the Afghans.

Malik: A *malik* is a tribal headman. He is appointed by the government to work as representative of the concern tribe in FATA.

Maliki: It refers to the official mechanism in FATA in which *malik* serves as intermediary between the political authority and the people.

Maulvi; Maulana: A title taken by a religious scholar (*alim*); a prayer leader in the mosque.

Melmastya: Literally meaning hospitality *melmastya* is a vital principle of the Pakhtun culture. Every Pakhtun considers it obligatory upon himself to feed, protect, and provide abode to guests so long as they wish to remain.

Millenarian: It is belief by a religious, social or political group, especially in the Christian tradition, in a coming major transformation of society.

Muhajir: A person who migrates; a refugee.

Mujaddidiyya: It is one of the major *Sufi* spiritual orders (*Tariqa*) of *Sufi* Islam. It was inspired by the teachings of the seventeenth century Indian religious scholar, Shaikh Ahmed Serhindi, known as Mujaddid Alf Sani.

Mujahid: *Mujahid* is derived from the Arabic word “*jihad*” which means “struggle”. Thus the literal meaning of *mujahid* is “struggler”. *Mujahid* is a person involved in a *jihad* i.e. fighting in the way of God or holy war.

Mujahideen: It is the plural of *mujahid*, meaning a person who fights in the interest of faith. However, *mujahideen* are popularly referred to the Muslim guerrilla fighters who resisted the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s. After the withdrawal of Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989, the *mujahideen* indulged in an intense in-fighting. Some of them relocated to other places, for example, to the Indian-held Kashmir to continue with their *jihadist* activities.

Mullah: *Mullah* is a generic name which refers to the prayer leader in the mosque.

Murid: Disciple.

Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal: United Council of Action. It was a coalition of diverse religious parties in Pakistan, formed before the general election in the country in 2002.

Namus: *Namus* is closely related to *Nang* (see *Nang* below). It means the defense of female honor.

Nang: It is an element of *Pakhtunwali* which literally means honor. Maintaining personal honor is considered the basic principle of *Pakhtunwali*.

Nanwaty: Literally meaning “entering the house” *nanawaty* refers to the act of seeking forgiveness for wrongs.

Naqshbandiyya: It is one of the major *Suafi* spiritual orders (*Tariqa*) of *Sufi* Islam. It is associated with Muhammad Baha ad-din an-Naqshbandi, hence the name of the order. The *Naqshbandi* order is the only *Sufi* order that claims to trace its direct spiritual lineage to the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him).

Narodnaya Volya: It is a Russian term which means “People’s Will” or the “People’s Freedom”. It was a Russian left-wing terrorist organization which was involved in the successful assassination of Tsar Alexander II of Russia.

Nawab: An honorific title bestowed by the Mughal Emperors upon semi-autonomous rulers of the princely states in South Asia. The ruler of princely state Dir was called “*Nawab*”.

Nifazi-e-Shariah: Enforcement of *Shariah* (Islamic Law).

Nuclei Armati Revolutionari: Armed Revolutionary Nuclei. It was an Italian terrorist organization which was indulged in militant activities from 1977 to 1981.

Ordine Nuovo: Italian for “New Order”. It was a political and terrorist organization founded in Italy in 1956.

Paighor: It is a Pakhto (Pashto) word which means “taunting or accusation”. A Pakhtun does not tolerate the taunting of his close cousins.

Pakhto: Pakhto, alternatively spelled Pukhto or Pashto, is the native language of the Pakhtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Pakhtun diasporas around the world. Pashto is a member of the eastern Iranian languages group.

Pakhtunistan: Pakhtunistan or Pashtunistan, meaning “Land of the Pakhtuns”, refers to the historical region inhabited by the Pakhtun population of Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the time of the partition of the Indo-subcontinent, the nationalist government in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the leadership of the *Khudai Khidmagar* (Servant of God) Movement demanded that the Pakhtun areas inside Pakistan be made an autonomous state, named as Pakhtunistan.

Pakhtuns: Pakhtuns, also called as Pukhtuns, Pushtuns, and Pashtuns, are an Eastern Iranian ethno-linguistic group living primarily in eastern and southern Afghanistan and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces of western Pakistan. Pakhtuns are typically characterized by their speaking of the Pakhto (Pashto) language and practice of *Pakhtunwali*, which is a traditional code of conduct.

Pakhtunwali: *Pakhtunwali* is defined as the Pakhtun code of life or code of conduct. It works as social code, as an ideal of personal behavior, and as law. Some of the major qualities that guide *Pakhtunwali* are honor, revenge, hospitality, and obedience to the dictates of tribal consensus-based decisions.

Panah: Asylum. It is closely related to *melmastya*. It refers to the tradition in the Pakhtun society in which asylum is given to a person in search of protection from his enemies. *Panah* is not denied even to the enemies.

Pan-Islamism: An idea expounded by the Persian religious philosopher Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1839-97). *Pan-Islamism* sought solidarity among Muslims around the world.

Parajamba: *Parajamba*, alternatively called as “*dalla-para*” literally means taking sides in a dispute. It refers to a tradition in the Pakhtun society in which a person or persons join the dispute on the side of a close kin or relatives.

Piri-muridi: It refers to the relationship between *pir* as teacher and *murid* as disciple.

Qaderiyya: It is a *Sufi* spiritual order (*Tariqa*) in Islam. *Qaderiyya* derives its name from Syed Abdul Qader Gilani (1077-1166), the Iranian Muslim scholar.

Qalang: Tax. It refers to the taxation system in the settled areas of the Pakhtun region.

Qazi: Judge.

Rig Veda: *Rig*, “praise, verse”, and *Veda*, “Knowledge” is one of the sacred books of Hinduism. It is counted among the four sacred text of Hinduism, known as *Vedas*.

Sagine: A ritualized violent dueling practiced by *Surma* in Ethiopia (see *Surma* below).

Salafi: It is an Arabic word derived from *Salaf*, which means “predecessors or ancestors”. *Salafi* is a person who considers the earliest Muslims as model to be followed in the practice of religion.

Sanad: It means *madrassa* (religious seminary) certificate. It is equivalent to a university degree in Pakistan.

Saur Revolution: *Saur Revolution* is the name given to the Communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) take over of political power in Afghanistan on 28 April 1978. The word “*Saur*” refers to the Dari name of the second month of the Persian Calendar, the month in which the uprising took place.

Shaheen: A Persian word meaning “Eagle”. *Shaheen* Commandos was the name used by Maulvi Fazlullah to refer to a special force of militants.

Shariah: An Arabic term which means the “Islamic legal system”.

Shia: *Shia* is one of the two largest sects of Islam, the other being the *Sunni* (See *Sunni* below).

Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen: Council for United Holy Warriors. It was a temporary union of militants formed by Maulvi Nazir of South Waziristan, Hafiz Gulbahadar of North Waziristan, and the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan*, to coordinate their activities inside Afghanistan.

Shura: Alternatively spelled as *Shoora*, which means a “consultative body”.

Silsila: A *Sufi* order.

Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan: Corps of the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him). It is a militant organization, affiliated with *Jamiati Ulema-e-Islam* (JUI). *Sipah-i-Sahaba* is a strong opponent of the *Shias* in Pakistan.

Sufi: *Sufi* is referred to a person who is believed to be the practitioner of the inner, mystical dimension of Islam. *Sufis* believe they are practicing the faith as revealed by God to the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him).

Suhrawardiyya: It is a *Sufi* order in Islam which was founded by Abu Najib as-Suhrawardi (1097-1168).

Sunnah: Words and Deeds of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him).

Sunni: The word *Sunni* comes from the word *Sunnah*, which means the words and actions or examples of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him). Therefore, *Sunni* is a person who practices *Sunnah* or the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him).

Surma: A tribe in Ethiopia who practice violence as a ritual.

Syali: Competition. *Syali* is usually done with first cousins in the Pakhtun society.

Taliban: The *Taliban* is the plural of the Pakhto (Pashto) word “*Talib*” which means a student, usually a student from a religious seminary. The *Taliban* are a *Sunni* Islamist organization that ruled most of Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001, when they were removed from power by the US-led NATO forces with the help of anti-*Taliban* war lords, referred to as Northern Alliance. The *Taliban* were headed by Mullah Muhammad Omar.

Tanzimat: It is the plural of “*Tanzim*”, which means a party or organization. In the context of this study *Tanzimat* means the seven *mujahideen* parties based in Peshawar during the Soviet-Afghan war.

Tarburwali: A Pakhto (Pashto) term which means cousin hatred or agnatic rivalry.

Tariqa: Method in the *Sufi* tradition.

Teega: Stone. It refers, in the Pakhtun society, to the temporary sea of fire between the two opposing parties in a prolonged vendetta.

Tehrik-e-Hizb Ullah: Movement of the Party of God. It was a resistance movement, founded in the early 20th century by the religious scholars from Deoband to oppose the British rule in India.

Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi: Movement for the Enforcement of the Islamic *Shariah* (law). It is a militant organization which was formed by Maulana Sufi Muhammad in 1989 in the Malakand Division of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan: Movement of the Pakistani *Taliban*. It is an organization formed, in December 2007, by different militant groups in FATA. It is headed by an *Amir* (Chief). Currently, Hakimullah Mahsud is the head of the organization. A forty member *shura* (Consultative body) works under the *Amir*.

Tore: The literal meaning of *Tore* is “Black”, however, it refers to “disgrace” in the Pakhtun culture; a situation in which a man or woman is found guilty of extra-marital sex or elopement.

Ulama: The plural of “*Alim*”, which means a Muslim religious scholar.

Uminat-ul-Mumineen: It was one of the several seminaries established for the Afghan refugees in the 1980s. *Uminat-ul-Mumineen* literally means “Mothers of the Believers”.

Ummah: Community of the believers.

Utopian: It is a Greek word which means excellent or ideal but impracticable.

Vendetta: A prolonged and violent dispute.

Violare: A Latin word meaning “to dishonor”, “to outrage” or “to treat with violence”.

Violentia: A Latin word which means “Vehemence”. The word violence is derived from *violentia*.

Wahabi: It refers to a member of the strictly orthodox *Sunni* Muslim sect (*Wahabism*), founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahab (1703-92). *Wahabism* calls for a return to the earliest practices of Islam as enshrined in the Quran and *Sunnah* (Words and Deeds of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him)).

Wali: Refers to the ruler of princely state Swat before it merged into Pakistan.

Wesh: Distribution. It refers to a mechanism in the Pakhtun society in which tribal land would be redistributed among tribes, clans, and sub-clans after the span of few years.

Yanomamo: The people living in the rain-forests on the Brazilian-Venezuela border region in some more than 200 villages; alternatively referred to as *Yanomami*. They are considered as the world’s most violent people as a group.

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- *The Daily Times (Pakistan)*
- *The Frontier Post (Pakistan)*
- *The Washington Post (USA)*
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- <http://www.lib.umich.edu>
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Annexure I

Questionnaire**Topic: Pakhtuns and the War on Terror: A Cultural Perspective**

- 1) How can we trace back the origins of extremism and terrorism in the Pakhtun areas?
- 2) Is terrorism alien to the Pakhtun society?
- 3) What is the role of religious mobilization in the militarization of the Pakhtun society?
- 4) What is the role of the state in the militarization of the Pakhtun society?
- 5) What is the nature of the ongoing militancy in the Pakhtun areas?
- 6) Is it a Pakhtun created and Pakhtun dominated militancy?
- 7) Is violence structured in the Pakhtun society?
- 8) How can we distinguish between violence in the Pakhtun society and the modern-day terrorism?
- 9) What is the role of the Pakhtun culture in the Talibanization of the region?
- 10) Is there any public support for militancy in the Pakhtun region?
- 11) What are the perceived as well as real objectives of the militants in the Pakhtun region?
- 12) Can Taliban be considered as an outgrowth of the Pakhtun culture or, are they a counter-culture force?
- 13) What is the role of the myths and stereotypes about the Pakhtuns in the distortion of their ideal culture?

- 14) Is the political/administrative system in vogue in FATA responsible for the current chaos in the region?
- 15) Is it true that the Taliban have filled the vacuum created by the colonial era legal system, the FCR?
- 16) Will amending or abolishing the FCR have a positive impact on the situation in FATA?
- 17) Is it true that the civil and/or military establishment deliberately want to keep FATA marginalized by resisting any reforms in the region?
- 18) To what extent is the porous Pak-Afghan border responsible for the militant activities in the Pakhtun region?
- 19) Is the use of force the right answer to the problem of militancy in the Pakhtun region?
- 20) To what extent is the war on terror successful in stemming the rot?
- 21) What are the effects of the counter-insurgency campaign on militancy?
- 22) Has the counter-terrorism campaign further radicalized the Pakhtun society?
- 23) Have the drone strikes been successful in minimizing the threat of terrorism in the Pakhtun region?
- 24) Are negotiations with the militant a right strategy to cope with the problem of terrorism in the Pakhtun region?
- 25) Have peace deals with militants worked as a strategy of counter-terrorism campaign?
- 26) Is the alternative pluralistic discourse a right answer to the problem of militancy in the Pakhtun region?

Annexure II

Profiles of Militant Commanders in FATA**Baitullah Mahsud****(Deceased)**

Affiliation: *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* (Taliban Movement of Pakistan, TTP); *Shura Ittehad-ul Mujihadeen* (United Council of Mujahideen)

Forces: Commanded a force of 12,000 to 20,000 fighters in South Waziristan, allegedly including foreign fighters from Uzbekistan and Chechnya, before he was killed on August 5, 2009. He also received the loyalty of commanders in multiple Federally Administered Tribal Area agencies as chief of the umbrella TTP organization.

Location: South Waziristan Agency, FATA

Description: Baitullah Mahsud was head of the umbrella *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* organization. He had been linked by Pakistani and American intelligence officials to

major high-profile attacks on the Pakistani government and security services, including the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and dozens of suicide bombings.

Lacking formal religious or secular education, Mahsud reportedly left his *madrassa* schooling to fight in Afghanistan for the Taliban in the 1990s. He joined militant leader Nek Mohammad Wazir and fellow tribesman Abdullah Mahsud (no direct relation) in carrying out attacks against U.S. forces following the 2001 invasion of that country.

Pakistani officials signed a peace agreement with the Mahsuds in February 2005, which Baitullah used to consolidate control over South Waziristan. His forces resumed regular attacks on Pakistani security services following the July 2007 siege of the *Lal Masjid* (Red Mosque) in Islamabad. These actions led to clashes with neighboring commanders Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who formed the *Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban* (Local Taliban Movement) to counterbalance Mahsud's growing influence.

Mahsud was widely reported to have strong links to Al Qaeda and other foreign militants, including Uzbek and Chechen fighters. He was killed in a US drone strike on August 5, 2009. Leadership of TTP has now been resumed by Hakimullah Mahsud.



Maulvi Nazir

(Deceased)

Affiliation: *Shura Ittehad-ul Mujahideen* (United Council of Mujahideen); *Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban* (Local Taliban Movement, MTT)

Forces: Believed to command approximately 3,000 fighters at the time of his death.

Location: South Waziristan Agency, FATA.

Description: Maulvi Nazir was a Pakistani Taliban commander with a base in the city of Wana, South Waziristan. He was a member of the Ahmedzai subtribe of the Wazir tribe. He was believed to have received previous military training with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's *Hizb-e-Islami*.

Nazir signed a peace agreement with the Pakistani military in 2007. From then onwards he clashed with Uzbek and other Central Asian fighters, whom he accused of assassinating tribal elders and robbing locals. Those foreigners are believed to have subsequently received shelter with Baitullah Mahsud, sparking a rivalry between the two commanders.

Nazir joined with fellow Wazir tribesman Hafiz Gul Bahadar in 2008 to create the *Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban* (Local Taliban Movement, MTT) as a distinct group from Baitullah Mahsud's *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan*, and was believed to have received covert Pakistani government support for keeping his attacks directed at American forces in Afghanistan rather than against the Pakistani state.

Nazir formed the *Shura Ittehad-ul Mujahideen* (United Council of Mujahideen) with Gul Bahadar and Baitullah Mahsud in late February 2009 with the shared goal of fighting against the United States. He was killed in a US drone strike on 3rd January 2013.

Hafiz Gul Bahadur

Affiliation: *Shura Ittehad-ul Mujahideen* (United Council of Mujahideen); *Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban* (Local Taliban Movement, MTT)

Forces: Estimates range from 8,000 to 10,000 fighters.

Location: North Waziristan

Description: Hafiz Gul Bahadur is a member of the Uthmanzai subtribe of the Wazir tribe and a prominent militant commander based in North Waziristan. He has established ties to the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network, as well as Al Qaeda.

Gul Bahadur fought off Pakistani military incursions into North Waziristan from 2003 to 2005, which culminated in a brokered peace accord, the 2006 North Waziristan Peace Agreement. Gul Bahadur and other local commanders agreed in the accord to expel

foreign militants—particularly Uzbek fighters from Central Asia—and concentrate their attacks on American forces in Afghanistan, rather than the Pakistani military.

Gul Bahadur took part in a militant council that established the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* as an umbrella militant network, which named Baitullah Mahsud as overall commander. Yet Mashud's subsequent attacks on Pakistani government security forces and the military response against him caused Gul Bahadur to distance himself from the TTP, reportedly resigning as deputy leader.

Gul Bahadur announced in late June that he was abandoning the ceasefire negotiated in 2007 with the Pakistani military due to the continued use of U.S. drone strikes and the Pakistani military's expanding operations in the north-west of the country. He decided to ally his group with Baitullah and claimed responsibility for a deadly attack in June 2009 on a Pakistani military convoy that killed 23 soldiers.



Hakimullah Mahsud

Affiliation: *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan*

Forces: Believed to command approximately 8,000 troops.

Location: South Waziristan Agency, FATA.

Description: Currently heading the umbrella organization TTP, Hakimullah Mahsud was a senior lieutenant of Baitullah Mahsud and headed the *Tehrik-e-Taliban* operations in Orakzai Agency, the Khyber Agency, and the adjacent city of Peshawar. Hakimullah declared the imposition of sharia law in Orakzai in December 2008. After the death of Baitullah Mahsud in 2009, Hakimmullah has assumed the leadership of the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan*.



Faqir Muhammad

Affiliation: *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan*

Forces: Believed to command approximately 5,000 troops.

Location: Bajaur Agency, FATA

Description: Faqir Muhammad is a former disciple of Maulana Sufi Mohammad's *Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi* (TNSM), also known as the Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law, and was allegedly a member of Sufi Muhammad's group of Pakistan fighters who joined to fight with the Afghan Taliban in 2001. He has continued to coordinate attacks into the adjacent Afghan provinces of Kunar and Nuristan after his return to Bajaur.

Muhammad was appointed a deputy leader of the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan*, at its founding in December 2007. There have been multiple reports of Muhammad's death, and military operations were launched against his forces in August 2008, displacing over 500,000 people and allegedly killing over 1,800 Taliban fighters. However, later reports confirmed that Faqir Muhammad is still alive.



Omar Khalid

Affiliation: *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan*

Forces: Claimed to command approximately 3,000 fighters in a 2008 interview.

Location: Mohmand Agency, FATA

Description: Khalid, also known as Abdul Wali, emerged as a prominent militant commander following the July 2007 siege of the *Lal Masjid* (Red Mosque) in Islamabad. Khalid has been the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* representative for the Mohmand agency since its inception in December 2007. In July 2008, Khalid reportedly captured and killed Shah Khalid, a rival militant commander who had opposed attacks on Pakistani security services. He was also linked to the abduction of Afghanistan's ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Khaliq Farahi, who was freed in September 2008. The military has conducted

operations against his forces and those in neighboring Bajaur Agency, but he remains at large.



Maulana Fazlullah

Affiliation: *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan; Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM)*

Forces: Believed to have commanded approximately 5,000 fighters prior to the military operations against them in Swat in April 2009.

Location: Swat district, Malakand Division, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Description: Maulana Fazlullah controls an armed faction of the *Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi*, which has increasingly been identified as an affiliate of *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* since mid-2007. He is nicknamed “Mullah Radio” for his extensive use of pirated FM radio stations to disseminate his message throughout the Swat valley. He is reported to have shifted to Afghanistan’s Kunar or Nooristan province after the successful military operation in Swat.



Maulana Sufi Mohammad

Affiliation: *Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi* (TNSM)

Forces: Does not appear to command forces and is in the custody of Pakistani authorities.

Location: Swat district, Malakand Division, NWFP

Description: Sufi is a former member of the *Jamaat-e-Islami* (JI) Islamist party and the founder of *Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi* (TNSM), which he formed in 1992 and used to call for the imposition of *shariah* law.

Sufi organized local recruits to defend the Taliban regime against the American-backed Northern Alliance in 2001. Most of the fighters were ultimately killed or arrested and a few, including Sufi, returned to Pakistan and were arrested after the group was banned in 2002.

Sufi was released from prison in 2008, renounced violence, and was used as an intermediary to broker a peace deal between the provincial government and the Taliban

in Swat in February 2009 in return for the implementation of *Shariah* law in the Malakand Division. Sufi has been in the custody of the Pakistani authorities as a result of the Swat operation.



Mangal Bagh

Affiliation: *Lashkar-e-Islam* (Army of Islam, LEI); *Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban* (Local Taliban Movement, MTT)

Forces: Unknown; claims to have approximately 10,000 fighters, but this number is likely exaggerated.

Location: Khyber Agency, FATA, and Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Description: Mangal Bagh is a former bus driver who took over leadership of the group *Lashkar-e-Islam* in the Khyber Agency of the FATA shortly after its founding in 2005. LEI imposed a strict moral code through much of the area, operating pirate radio stations and conducting public executions in some reported cases.

The group's activities in and around Peshawar escalated in the summer of 2008, including the kidnapping of 16 Christians who were later released after intensive

negotiations. Bagh denied that his forces were challenging the authority of the state or conducting attacks on NATO supply convoys, and insisted he had no connection to Al Qaeda or *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan*; there have been few reports of subsequent military action against him.



Haji Namdar

(Deceased)

Affiliation: *Tanzim Amr bil Maroof wa Nehi Anil Munkir* (Suppression of Vice and Promotion of Virtue); *Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban* (Local Taliban Movement, MTT)

Forces: Organizational strength unclear following his death.

Location: Khyber Agency, FATA and Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Description: Haji Namdar established the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice in 2003 following a 12-year pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. He modeled the system on Saudi Arabia's own strict religious police and the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, banning

music and television and threatening those who failed to grow beards or cover their heads.

The group was officially banned by the Pakistani government, but continued operations in Khyber and around Peshawar. Namdar resisted joining Baitullah Mahsud's *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan* umbrella organization, however, and instead allied with Mangal Bagh's *Lashkar-e-Islam* and Hafiz Gul Bahadur to form the *Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban* (Local Taliban Movement), which some sources suggest received government support. Namdar fought with the forces of Baitullah's lieutenant Hakimullah Mahsud, and was assassinated in August 2008 at a mosque in Khyber Agency.



Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani

Affiliation: Haqqani Network (HQN)

Forces: Unknown; some estimates suggest between 7,000-10,000 fighters in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Location: North Waziristan

Description: Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani founded the Haqqani network, which is a coalition of militants that train terrorists, provide logistics, and organize operations

against U.S., NATO, and Afghan forces in Afghanistan. Jalaluddin was one of the largest recipients of U.S. and Pakistani aid and arms to fight Soviet forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, Haqqani fled to Pakistan, built a network of fighters, and turned his attention to expelling U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan.

Sirajuddin Haqqani, Jalaluddin's son, has reportedly assumed greater leadership over the group's operations in recent years. The network allegedly controls large areas of southeastern Afghanistan and has established parallel governments in many areas.

Source: Cookman, C. & Caroline, W. (2009). Faces of Pakistan's militant leaders:

Indepth profiles of major militant commanders. *Centre for American Progress*. Retrieved from

<http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/07/talibanleaders.html/#11>.

Annexure III

Pakistan's Peace Deals with the Militants and the Resulting Measures

Peace deal	Result	Counterinsurgency measures
Pakistan entered into the Shakai agreement, one of the first of its kind, with the militant commander, Nek Muhammad Wazir, in South Waziristan.	The agreement broke down within a month due to Wazir's death in consequence of a missile hitting him in June 2004. This targeted assassination was ostensibly carried out due to Wazir's unrelenting pro-Taliban and al-Qaeda activities.	Low-level al-Qaeda arrests, but no operation. Negotiations ensued.
Between March and July 2004, the government imposed a blockade of the Mahsud area of South Waziristan with extreme difficulty, concluding the "Sararogha Accord".	After negotiations, the military at that time vacated these areas with a specific undertaking not to carry out similar operations in future.	Though there was peace for a while in South Waziristan, the insurgency continued unabated in North Waziristan.
Attacks on security forces resumed in South Waziristan in July 2005, which led to talks resulting in a peace deal.	The peace deal was soon violated by the militants.	The state resumed negotiations with the tribes.
A peace deal was signed in North Waziristan in September 2006 with Baitullah Mahsud, for avoiding tribal militant attacks on army convoys and checkpoints.	The peace deal was soon violated by the militants. After the agreement, there seemed to be persistent reports of increases in Taliban attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan near the border with Waziristan.	The state resumed negotiations with Mahsud.
A peace treaty was signed in March 2007 between the state and Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, a close associate of Maulana Sufi Muhammad, head of Tahrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), who later allied himself with Mahsud as his Taliban deputy in Bajaur.	The peace deal turned sour when 80 students and Maulana Liaqat, heading a religious seminary at Chengai, lost their lives in an aerial attack, supposedly carried out by a U.S unmanned drone, with the subsequent responsibility being accepted by the Pakistani government.	Negotiations by the state, which broke down.

The Pakistani government also signed a peace deal in Khyber Agency after the tribal operation “Sirat-e-Mustaqim”.	Despite troops being withdrawn and militants being released, the targeted warlord Mangal Bagh, heading the “Lashkar-e-Islam” in Khyber Agency, though initially routed, reappeared in September 2008 and reestablished himself.	Mangal Bagh and Lashkar-e-Islam left largely undisturbed.
Consistent flouting of terrorist power by Fazlullah in Swat forced the state to launch a military offensive against Fazlullah in November 2007, code-named “Operation Rah-e-Haq 1.	Resultantly, negotiations were initiated with the top-ranking militant leadership. In April and May 2008, the influential Taliban ideologue, Maulana Sufi Muhammad, head of the outlawed Tahrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM: The Movement for the Implementation of Shariah Law), was released, and Shariah was introduced in the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas. Fazlullah finally forced the state’s hands when he abducted 38 Frontier Corps soldiers and killed three ISI personnel in July 2008, causing the NWFP government to request the army to come to its aid.	The Pakistani army launched Operation Rah-e-Haq II in July 2008, relying on air power and artillery, again without much success against the guerrilla tactics of the Taliban. Negotiations ensued after a halfhearted operation.
The Taliban in Bajaur, led by Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, opened another front; the army was forced to withdraw a substantial number of troops from Swat to concentrate on the area contiguous to Durand Line.	Negotiations.	Peace deal, later violated by the militants.

Fazlullah continued his militant activities unabated.	As negotiations again involving Sufi Muhammad made no headway, Operation Rah-e-Haq III was launched in January 2009 to secure the main supply lines to the district capital Mingora in Swat.	Negotiations broke down again, with Sufi Muhammad involved in another round of talks as a mediator between the state and the Taliban.
Peace negotiations with Maulvi Faqir Muhammad-led tribal militants seemed to be making no headway.	A full-scale military operation in Bajaur was launched on August 6, 2008. The Bajaur operation was pursued much more vigorously than previous ones.	A military operation initiated in earnest, which resulted in hundreds of thousands of IDPs.
Negotiations involving Sufi Muhammad regarding the implementation of “Nizam-e-Adal” in Swat and Malkand areas initiated.	The Taliban seemed to be spreading beyond Swat to adjacent areas like Buner, consistently flouting the terms of the peace accord.	Operation Rah-e-Haq 4 launched in earnest in May 2009, generating up to 2 million IDPs.

Source: Zaidi, S. M. A. (2009). Negotiations and the anti-Taliban counterinsurgency in

Pakistan. *Asian Politics & Policy*, 2, (2), 257-277.

Annexure IV

Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) Reforms**Background**

The Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) Reform Committee was constituted in April 2005 by then NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) Governor Khalilur Rehman. The committee included a parliamentarian from FATA, tribal elders, serving and retired civil servants, lawyers and journalists. Justice (r) Mian Muhammad Ajmal, a former judge of the Supreme Court and a former chief justice of the Peshawar High Court, was named as the committee chairman.

The FCR comprises of 64 clauses contained in seven chapters. The FCR Committee held town-hall-style meetings in the tribal areas in which people from all walks of life participated to convey their views about the FCR. The committee prepared its recommendations after consultations with tribal parliamentarians, other politicians, civil society members, lawyers and other experts and presented them to the government, but amending the FCR was low on the priority list of the next governor NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), Ali Muhammad Jan Orakzai, as the law and order situation worsened in the tribal areas and NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). The Subsequent NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) governor, Owais Ahmed Ghani, showed interest in the recommendations of the FCR Reform Committee. After the 2008 general elections, the PPP-led government took up the issue once again and a committee of the federal cabinet was formed under the chairmanship of then federal law minister Farooq Naek to consider the reforms recommended by the FCR committee. The cabinet committee comprised two federal

ministers—Najmuddin Khan of the Pakistan People’s Party and Hamidullah Jan Afridi, an independent MNA from Khyber Agency and the federal minister for environment—several members of parliament including Zafar Beg Bhattani, Akhunzada Chitan and Rahmatullah Kakar. FCR committee chairman Justice (r) Mian Muhammad Ajmal assisted the cabinet committee in finalizing the proposed amendments to the FCR.

Recent Amendments in FCR

On the recommendations of the cabinet committee, President Asif Ali Zardari announced major changes in the FCR on August 14, 2009, the 63rd Independence Day of Pakistan. The package he announced consisted of political, judicial and administrative reforms for the tribal areas.

Amendments

The following recommendations have been made in FCR 1901:

1. The name of FCR has been changed to FATA Regulations, 2008.
2. The arbitrary powers of the Political Agent (PA) have been curtailed. The powers vested in the PA through the FCR to arrest and detain a person without right to bail have been curtailed. Earlier, a person could be sent to jail for three years without trial and the jail term could be extended indefinitely. Now the accused must be produced before an assistant political agent within 24 hours of his arrest, his case would be referred to a council of elders or *jirga* within 10 days and the

jirga is required to submit its findings to the government authority within 90 days.

The provision of bail has been included in the amendment as well.

3. The reform package recommends setting up an Appellate FATA Tribunal with powers similar to those of the provincial high courts. The tribunal would have the powers of revising the orders and judgments of the authority whose verdict is challenged. The tribunal can also lay down a time limit for the disposal of cases.
4. The amendments allow for the promulgation of Political Parties Order, 2002 in the tribal areas.
5. The amendments exclude women and children below the age of 16 from the collective responsibility clause of the FCR. Earlier, the political agent was authorized under the FCR to arrest a person under preventive detention and put him in jail for three years without trial and punishment could be extended several times for further three-year terms.
6. It also envisages audit of accounts by the Auditor General Pakistan of the funds received and disbursed by the political agent.

Reaction to FCR Amendments

The amendments to the FCR have evoked a mixed reaction.

- Most of the people in the tribal areas have welcomed the changes in the FCR and want the government to implement the changes in letter and spirit.

- Most of the educated circles of the tribal areas, including the Awami National Party (ANP), which constitutes a minority, do not endorse these amendments as they believe the solution to the problems of FATA lies in the abolishment of the FCR and merger of FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
- Another section of the society believes the reforms would fail to bring the much needed peace and prosperity in the tribal areas. They hold that FATA should be granted a distinct autonomous status, as given to the Gilgit-Baltistan region, and a FATA council should be established that should look after the affairs of the tribal areas.
- The ANP has rejected the FCR reform package, calling it “peanuts” and “archaic” in the prevailing circumstances in the tribal areas. They hold these reforms would have been suitable for FATA two decades earlier and advocate for rights equal to those enjoyed by the people of other areas of Pakistan. They support the merger of FATA with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and representation of this area in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial assembly.
- A considerable number of tribal elders bitterly oppose the changes in the FCR and argue that it was the appropriate mechanism for the area and was in harmony with the tribal customs and scrapping or changing it would create a vacuum and trigger instability in FATA. They staunchly opposed any changes in the FCR and wanted the status quo maintained in these areas.

Some bureaucrats also resisted large-scale changes in the FCR as they believe the administrative and political changes in the law would have a destabilizing effect on an essentially tribal society.

Source: Rana, M. A., Sial, S. and Basit, A. (2010). *Dynamics of Taliban insurgency in FATA*. Islamabad: Islamabad Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS).