A POLITICAL ANALYSIS

OF

THE

SAUR REVOLUTION

SHER ZAMAN TAIZI

A thesis submitted to the Area Study Centre, Peshawar University, in partial fulfilment of requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, under the title

A Political Analysis of the SAUR REVOLUTION.

Area Study Centre,
University of Peshawar,
PAKISTAN.

1986.

CONTENTS

1.	Preface		iv-vii
2.	Introduction		1
3.	Chapter : I	Revolution or Coup d' etat ?	26
4.	Chapter : II	The Revolution.	60
5.	Chapter : III	Implementation of the Revolution.	93
6.	Chapter : IV	Reaction to the Saur Revolution: Internal.	139
7.	Chapter : V	Reaction to the Saur Revolution: External.	193
8.	Conclusion.		242
9.	Appendix A:	Decrees of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.	247
	App. B :	Summaries of the novels written by Noor Mohammad Taraki.	269
	App. C :	Treaty of Friendship, Good neighbourliness and Cooperation between the USSR and the DRA.	274
	App. D :	The Law for regulating the government duties of the Revolutionary Government and its Legislative Procedure.	278
	App. E :	Tashkent Declaration	282
	App. F :	Islamic Conference Resolution	284
	App. G :	Resolution on Afghanistan adopted May 22, 1980, by the Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers.	288
	App. H :	Text of Geneva Communique	290
	App. I :	Final Resolution of the Florence Round Table (March 26, 27, 28, 1982).	291
	App. J (a) - (e) :	Resolutions on Afghanistan adopted during the 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th and 40th Sessions of Human Rights Commission	292

App. (a) : Text of the UN General Assembly Special Session Resolution adopted on January 15 (sic), 1980 308

App. K(b)-(g) : Resolutions on Afghanistan adopted by UN General Assembly in 35th, 36th, 37th, 39th, 40th and 41st Sessions. 311

10. Bibliography. 329-348

...

PREFACE

This thesis is presented as a humble contribution to our knowledge and understanding of the political development on the inhospitable soil of Afghanistan. For this work, hundreds of books, articles and reports were studied in order to channelize the uneven developments of politics in a tribal kingdom. Hundreds of afflicted Afghan refugees including a good number of intellectuals, writers and theorists were interviewed and various aspects of these developments were discussed with them. It was, however, noted with concern that many interviewees did not like to be identified. Majority of them were, therefore, dropped from the list. Only a few were quoted where the matter was too significant to be overlooked.

The Saur Revolution is a fresh, and fanatically controversial, topic. It was not less than a challenge of the time to discuss it with an absolutely impartial approach. This change has brought out Afghanistan from obscurity to limelight, and the historical crossroads of ancient civilization, heretofore ignored by the West for about forty years, has become, all of a sudden, a focal point of rivalry, this time, between the two Super Powers. The scholars around the world were taken by surprise to know that the Islamic country

of Afghanistan had performed a somersault to Communism. It was, of course, strange and mysterious for the scholars who could attain little from the relevant local literature due to very small squantity of materials and, secondly, due to lack of knowledge of local languages - Pushto and Dari. More so, the unprecedented influx of Afghans into Pakistan and the fast changing situation in Kabul which is, almost, closed to interested scholars add more to these mysteries. For this present work, efforts were made not to miss any piece of information within reach. Pushto and Dari literature, published in Afghanistan, Pakistan or anywhere else was given equal importance in this study. Many books were selected for reading only to understand the land and the people of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union to help the researcher draw a picture as vivid as possible. But the time is running so fast that it has become a Herculean mission to keep up with the situation. This work may not be as complete as desired, but is hopefully considered a ground-work for further study.

I must express my sincerest thanks to Dr. Mohammad Anwar Khan, Director of Area Study Centre, Peshawar University, whose keen interest, and moral and intellectual support enabled me to finalise the thesis. I offer my thanks to Professors Dr Zain-ul-

Abidin Mumtaz, Dr Saeed-ul-Hassan and Abdul Rasul Amin whose valuable guidance helped me at each step to move ahead; and to Dr S. Mustafa, Dr Fazal Hayat Taj, Azmat Hayat Khan, Abdullah Jan Khalil, Abdullah Tora and Abdul Jabar Sabit who gave me lessons on various aspects of Central Asia including Afghanistan. I am grateful to Dr Shams-ud-Din Siddiqui and Mohammad Arif Tahir Kheli, also, of the Area Study Centre; and to my class-mates Bashir Tariq, Hidayatullah Naim, Malik Abdul Hamid and Zahoor Ahmad Awan whose company proved educative for me. I offer thanks to all my friends and colleagues whose names could not be mentioned here for certain reasons, but their assistance and support were encouraging and useful. However, I must mention Heiki Keto, When-hsien Huang, Barry D. Rigby and Dario Carminati of the UNHCR sub-office, Peshawar, whose consultations and counsels were of great help to me. I would, also, like to mention my office colleagues Mrs Mamoona Taskin-ud-Din & Miss Shahnaz Parveen for their pertinent help. My friend Syed Fida Yunus deserves all my sincerest thanks and gratitude, because he is the perennial source of inspiration to me and has provided me with moral, intellectual and material support. Finally I should express my gratitude to the Area Study Centre of Peshawar University which gave me

this opportunity of research in such a sensitive issue of the day, and all its staff members for their polite and courteous treatment.

SZT

INTRODUCTION

In Afghanistan, a Muslim State with a majority of Hanafite Sunnis and a major minority of Shias besides a few thousands of Hindus and Sikhs, the religion of Islam plays an important role in the life of the people. A few hundred Jews lived in Kabul and other cities but a majority of them migrated to Israel in 1970s. The official religion, declared or undeclared, was Sunni Hanafite Islam. All the Abdali rulers adhered to this doctrine.The Hanafite doctrine is, somewhat, flexible and liberal. But the main cause is the pride that Afghans take in the ancestry of Abu Hanifa al-Numan. His grand father, Zauti, was taken from Kabul to Kufa as a prisoner of war. He settled there permanently.[1] The Afghan State could maintain religious harmony and tolerance for more than 230 years. The Shariat courts established in urban centres usually left Sectarian problems to be solved by traditional means when services of the Sufi orders of involved parties were invoked with political favours. The State was almost closed to other ideas and doctrines. Timur Shah (1773-93) established an office in his court to combat the Wahhabi doctrine,[2] founded by Mohammad bin Abdul Wahab (1703-91) as a reform movement aimed at purification of Islam. The Afghan Ulema considered it apostasy.[3] So much

so that even Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani did not conceal his dislike for it. Referring to Syed Ahmad Brelvi, the celebrated Syed says; "He (Akhund Abdul Ghafoor alias Da Swat Akhun Sahib) called the people for Jihad. Thousands of people gathered around him. He was supported and aided by the Indian Wahhabis of the party of Syed Ahmad Wahabi, who had migrated due to fear of Indian Sunnis and settled in Swat and Bunir."[4] Amir Abdur Rahman (1880-1901) directed Ulema to combat Wah - habism which he considered dangerous to his ideological use of Islam.[5] The Amir banned the entry of people from Arabia, even, of those who claimed descent from the Holy Prophet, considering them beggars or European agents.[6] Likewise propagation of Qadianism was also checked. Mian Abdur Rahman, a Qadiani, was executed by suffocation by his orders. Amir Habibullah ordered stoning of another Qadiani Mohammad Abdul Latif of Khost to death in 1903.[7] Maulvi Niamatullah Panjsheri, professing the same belief, was stoned to death under the orders of Amanullah Khan. The British machinations encouraged the Indian press to take note of these executions and to criticise the Afghan government. Ghulam Ahmad, founder of Qadniani doctrine, sent a note of protest to the League of Nations.[8] Aman-i-Afghan, Kabul, defended the executions in

a serial article.[9] When Amanullah was given to understand that the British government of India had infiltrated her agents in the Dar-ul-Uloom, Devband, he banned the entry of Devband Ulema in Afghanistan. The Loya Jirga of 1928 held at Paghman endorsed his edict. Indian immigrants linked with Devband were expelled from the country, and movements of Afghan Ulema who had studied in that Dar-ul-Uloom were confined to given localities. Maulvi Mohammad Ibrahim, father of Mohammad Mousa Shafiq, of Kama and Maulvi Fazal Rabi of Paklae were arrested.[10]

Having closed the country effectively to foreign religious ideas, the Afghan rulers did not tend to encourage religious education at home.The importance of state jurisprudence, too, varied from region to region.[11] Shariat, traditions and government laws of mixed nature went side by side, whichever proved in favour of social status.Religious dignitaries were isolated from the society as a group of a distinct life-style. There was no organized religious platform to forge unity of belief. The religious leaders did not follow one uniform doctrine.[12] This dominant, but disunited, class, to be called clergy, can be split into three categories; (a) the Mullah, (b) the Maulvi or Maulana, and (c) the Pir. The Mullah, a dis-

tinguished religious title, has been devalued in the tribal society. He is supported financially by his community in return for his ritual services, and has, thus, become a parasite. He has no standard of knowledge but only the literacy of a level that enables him to lead the ignorant community in prayers. In his patronising manner, the Mullah is the only person who maintains direct contact with the community and addresses himself to the people frequently. He, therefore, earns a degree of reverence as well as influence which enables him to sway his audience any way. On the village level, the Mullah is a beneficiary of communal economic assistance which is controlled, politically, by the Malik. A solitary Mullah who lacks social status is a nonentity. It is the combination of the knowledge, wisdom and vocalism of the Mullah and the social status of the Malik that constitute the source of power in the polity of the tribal life. In his religious status alone, the Mullah is constrained to confine "the religion to the four walls of the mosque and is mostly concerned with rituals and delivering Khutba in the name of the ruler."[13] The Mullah-Malik combination has proved its value and weight on several occasions. The Maulvi is a religious scholar and a person of conviction. He is normally self-sufficient with some

scope of personal influence. He is independent economically but dependent socially on the will of the tribal chieftaincy in the sphere of his influence. The Maulvis are not inclined to form a-sort-of association and organize this vital religious stratum, mainly due to their hyper-sensitivity in the interpretation of religious problems. Nonetheless, this very sensitivity to foreign intervention binds them in a loose association emotionally to hit with full weight the hostile elements. In a critical situation, the disorganized class of Mullahs, usually, come up to their support and the Maliks are driven,perforce, to join them in defence of their religion. The Pir is the product of mysticism or Sufism which requires profound religious knowledge and devotion to purification of soul and its yearning for union with God. The Pir or Sufi is the spiritual leader, transcending the temporal considerations. He attracts the people without changing their social organizations or cultural traditions. That is one factor of their popularity in the tirbal society. The followers are called Murids. In Afghanistan, Sufism has developed into a hereditary system. The Pir has,now, a defined province of devotees from various sections and tribes. The knowledgeable Pir enjoys the support of like-minded Maulvis also.The

Pir, with all his economic assets, receives offerings and donations, in cash as well as in kind, from his Murids. His religious status, apart, the existence of Pirs in Afghanistan constitutes effective social and political institutions to control the psychology of the masses. It should be a Pir to play the intermediary between warring tribes who transgress the barriers of Pakhtunwali and religious norms. The traditional social and economic considerations, together with ignorance, have driven the people to superstitions which helped the corrupted clergy strengthen its grip on the society, and tempt the righteous to corruption.[14] The real religious and spiritual institutions were pushed into obscurity. With all the drawbacks and weaknesses, the clergy, on the whole, is the power which needs a generator to put it in regulation and utility.

The Afghan rulers were not only conscious but allergic to the power of the clergy. Lacking proper political base, they tried either to suppress the clergy, or please it with favours, or exploit its endemic disunity. It was Amir Abdur Rahman who could establish central authority, after securing his internal position as a subsidy-holder of the British Government of India. He received an annual subsidy of £ 120,000 which was

later raised to £ 180,000.[15] He forced the clergy with ruthless determination to accept overwhelmingly his religious treatise, "Taqweem-ud-Din," and give him the title of Zia-ul-Millat Wad Din on 25 March 1896, when the tribal and religious leaders were invited to gather at Eid party.[16] Whereas, during the first month of his reign, the Ulema had given a Fatwa at Qandahar that he was a "Kafir" and a British agent, and that his rival cousin Mohammad Ayub Khan was a true Mujahid. Two of the prominent Ulema were then executed.[17] The Amir enforced "Taqweem-ud-Din" in the State as Shariat and appointed Ulema on annual salaries for its implementation. Moreover, he subjected the Ulema to presentation of credentials of their qualifications in order to justify their appointments as functionaries of Islamic order, or as stipendholders. He consecrated and nationalised all religious endowments and closed the mystic monasteries. Habibullah (1901-19) restored the status quo and received the title of Siraj-ul-Millat Wad Din in 1902.[18] He launched a programme of Islamization. He ordered the observance of proper "Purdah". Hindus and Sikh were bound to wear yellow turbans. Religious schools were opened, and substituted "Taqweem-ud-Din" with "Siraj-ul-Ahkam Fee Mua'milat-il-Islam" compiled by Maulana Abdur Rahman Paghmani.[19] His brother, Hafiz Nasrullah, provided

sponsorship to the conservative clergy.Behind this Islamicized facade, the palace was Europeanised and the court modernised. The Amir struggled through peaceful means to attain a sovereign status but the British masters did not give it any heed. He received an annual subsidy of Rs 2,050,000 from the British treasury.[20] In return, the foreign policy of Afghanistan continued to be controlled by the British. The Amir was, therefore, obliged to discourage anti-British activities in his State. The "Jihad" declared by Mullah Najm-ud-Din of Hadda, Ningrahar, against the British, in 1909, was nullified by a Fatwa that such a declaration could be made only by the competent Amir. Likewise the joint mission of Turkey, Austria and Germany assigned to win the favour of the Amir against the British was disappointed, and the resolution of the Loya Jirga in its favour, reflecting popular approval, was vetoed in 1915.[22] For all his deviations, extravagant hobbies, glamour and lustre of his palace, and his faithfulness to the Brisith masters,Habibullah was tolerated by the conservative clergy, and popularized among the masses. The opposition to the Amir grew in the privileged elite class. The small group of liberal and reformist Ulema who gather in the "Siraj-ul-Akhbar Association" was liquidated. This group had been formed by the intellectuals as Association at the instance of Maulvis Abdur Rauf Khaki

and Mohammad Sarwar Wasif of Qandahar with the object of awakening the people and acquainting them with modern civilization and current affairs of the world.[22] They entertained liberal ideas and were cynical in regard to traditional orthodoxy, and demanded constitutionalization of the State. They published fortnightly "Siraj-ul-Akhbar" on 11 June 1906[23] which did not please the Amir and was banned. This constitutionalist group which was called Mashroota continued its activity throughout the reign of Habibullah, claiming an attempt on the life, and eventually mysterious assassination, of the Amir. Its extremist radical wing, called Jamiat-i-Sirri-i-Milli (National Clandestine Association) resorted to terrorism to overthrow the government of Habibullah by all means. The constitutionalism attained prominance through re-publication of "Siraj-ul-Akhbar", this time by Mahmood Tarzi. The constitutionalists demanded constitutional government, independence and self-sufficiency in economy. In the second decade of the twentieth century, the young elements preferred to be called Young Afghans. The principal source of their inspiration was Mahmood Tarzi who had been influenced by Young Turks, and, in particular, by Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani during their meetings before the death of the latter.[24] In this critical era, Yahya Khel brothers protected the pro-British elements. While Crown-prince

Inayatullah was being groomed as a "friend of the British", Prince Amanullah was influenced by his father-in-law, Mahmood Tarzi, as a nationalist and modernist, and, hence, anti-British. The anti-British lobby comprised Pan-Islamist, modernist, socialist and nationalist elements. Habibia School, founded in 1903, with Indian teachers, became the centre of political debates on secular concepts. It attracted young nationalists, urban intellectuals and freedom-lovers. There were two more known rendezvous in Kabul where these people came together; one, the residence of Said Ahmad Ludin of Qandahar,[25] and, second, the residence of Taj Mohammad Baluch of Paghman living in Chandawal.[26] Abdur Rahman son of Said Ahmad Ludin and Taj Mohammad led the terrorist youths. Abdur Rahman adopted the nom de plume Kibrit which means the matches,[27] and was, also, called Bolshevik.[28] He was a member of the Afghan delegation headed by Mohammad Wali Badakhshi to Moscow in 1919, and participated in the October Revolution celebrations. He met some Bolshevik leaders also.[29] He was a member of the Afghan Consulate General at Bokhara before his appointment as Vice Chairman of Pushto Maraka in 1923.[30] Abdur Rahman Ludin, Aziz Aqazada and Ibrahim Beg, active members of these movements, were progressive and extremist radical. They are considered poineers of the progressive and democratic ideas.[31]

Amanullah's accession to the throne and imprisonment for life of his uncle Sardar Nasrullah did not evoke any reaction from the people. His declaration of "Jihad" for independence was accorded a rousing response. It was an opportune time that favoured Amanullah to achieve independence, without much loss, from the mightiest power. As a sovereign king, he established bilateral relations with the newly born Bolshevik State - the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR) -, Turkey, Egypt, Italy, France and Germany, as well as the British empire. Since his declaration of independence, king Amanullah had lost the British subsidy. The RSFSR agreed to grant him one million roubles in gold or silver, in coin or bullion; construct Kushka-Herat-Qandahar-Kabul telegraph line; and place at the disposal of the Afghan government technical and other specialists, within two months of signing the relevant treaty.[32] Twelve aeroplanes were also given, to found the Afghan Air Force, with related facilities for training of pilots in Russia.[33] The British were not happy, at all, with this overture, whereas the Bolshevik leader, V.I. Lenin, was satisifed with this change which established bilateral relations with a "progressive monarch". Russian Consulates were opened at Herat, Maimana, Mazar-i-Sharif, Qandahar and Ghazni; and Afghan Consulate General at Bokhara, and Consulates at Petrograd, Kazan, Samarkand, Merv

and Krasnovodsk.[34] The British assigned the well-informed Intelligence Officer in Khyber, Sir Francis Humphrys, to open a new British Legation at Kartae Parwan, Kabul.[35] At home, Amanullah annoyed the clergy by his plan of modernization which was a challenge to its traditional authority on the masses, and its religious monopoly. The British supported the clergy. And the Russians just watched the developments which led to the fall of the "celebrated progressive monarch." Every party had its own reason. The British had received a shameful setback in their six-week indecisive war with Afghanistan, after having emerged from the World War-I as the greatest power on the earth. This setback not only injured the prestige and honour of the mighty British empire, but resulted in encouragement to the freedom movement in India also. For Russians, Amanullah was too progressive to bow before the newly born RSFSR. His image as the champion of independence invigorated the spirit of independence in Central Asia where the Bolsheviks had to fight for a long time against the freedom fighters.But there was another reason, more compelling for both the British and the Russians, but incomprehensible to the clergy. Having adopted the policy of secular modernization at home, the ambitious young king aspired for the leadership of the Islamic world, by reviving Khilafat based in Afghanistan. It posed the real and the

principal threat to both the great powers who were not prepared to see the emergence of a third power. This power would have cut the small island of Britain from most of its colonial sources of strength, and raised a formidable wall against Russia to not only check its expansion on the South but put it in defence of its Muslim-populated territory of Turkistan. Amanullah was so allergice to conservatism that he did not think of taking the home-clergy into confidence, although the Loya Jirga of 1924 had endorsed the plan with a majority.[36] Thus every party was right in its own interest to do the wrong. The clergy won the day but not the power. The jealous jewellers could not cut the diamond with a diamond but spoiled both the diamonds. Whatever respect and reverence the people had for the clergy was depreciated at the end of this game. The emerging educated class was obliged to hold the great educator, Amanullah, in esteem. This group was forming the middle class and building the hard-core of administration, and, thus, raising a platform against the clergy.

The Indian freedom fighters who migrated to Afghanistan on various times -a group during the reign of Habibullah and another in 1920s - also influenced the politics in Kabul. Obeidullah Sindhi and his colleagues established contacts with the

Russian embassy for assistance against the British. Khushi Mohammad of this lot went to Tashkent where a University had been established for the propagation of Bolshevism and teachings against "imperialism". Its department for Indian study was held by a Bengali Hindu Professor Mehendar Nath. He sent Khushi Mohammad onward to Moscow where he met the Communist leaders and studied the Communist literature. Later, Khushi Mohammad joined the Indian Communist Party.[37] Mohammad Umar, a Mujahid of Chamarkand colony, was nicknamed Russian for his contacts with the Russian embassy.[38] Maulvi Abdur Rahim alias Maulvi Bashir from Chinyawala, Lahore, who became Amir of Chamarkand in 1926, received an allowance from the Afghan government. He also contacted the Soviet embassy through Haji Abdur Razaq.[39] The red-shirt movement in the North West Frontier Province was, too, influenced by the victory of the Bolsheviks in 1917.[40] An Indian revolutionary viz Mitha Singh and his German wife ran a coffee shop in Shahi Bazar, Kabul, which was one of the centres of anti-British lobby.[41]

When Nadir Khan came to power in Afghanistan, he tried to eliminate the Young Afghans. He revived titles, restored grants to religious endowments and appointed Fazal Umar Mojaddidi as Justice Minister, who was replaced later by Fazal Ahmad Mojaddidi.[42]

The Pardah was re-enforced by a "Farman".[43] On the other hand, he adopted the policy of "gradual modernization."[44] Having been satisfied with the desired changes, the clergy receded to monasteries, madrassas and mosques. The Young Afghans went undergrownd in a disorganized form, and declared,as their aim, "subversion of the existing government and of its basis - the Islamic code."[45] They arranged a raid on the British embassy, killing three persons, and brought about the assassination of Mohammad Aziz, father of Daud and Naim, who was then ambassador in Berlin, and, eventually, the assassination of Nadir Shah on 8 November 1933 on the first anniversary of execution of Ghulam Nabi Charkhi.[46] Zahir Shah succeeded his father at the young age of 19, while Mohammad Hasham continued to hold on to the office of Prime Ministership until 1946. Hasham curbed political activities. He was replaced by Shah Mahmood who granted some political freedoms. Sardar Daud, annoyed by this change, challenged the authority of Shah Mahmood. Mohammad Rasul Pushtoon used to invite literary figures in 1947 at his residence in Qandahar for literary meetings which developed into Wikh Zalmyan association. Its venue later shifted to Kabul. It claimed, at one time, 5,000 members from Ningrahar, Paktia, Qandahar, Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif.[47] Main

objects of the association were; eradication of corruption, oppression and other social evils; economic reforms; social justice; national unity etc.[48] The students of Kabul University staged anti-government demonstrations in 1949 and formed a union the following year.[49] Babrak Karmal and Hassan Sharq participated in these events.[50] They were encouraged by Daud. Karmal, Sharq and Usman Is'haq formed Kuloop-i-Jawanan, while Noor Mohammad Taraki, then Director General of Petroleum, joined Wikh Zalmyan and was, for some time, its treasurer.[51] In 1949, fifty out of 120 members of the 7th term of the National Assembly were affiliated with Wikh Zalmyan. Abdur Rahman Mahmoodi and Ghulam Mohammad Ghubar, members from Kabul, were more critical of the government. They criticised conservative religious trend,[52] Helmand Project which was financed by the USA, and the government policy on Pakhtunistan.[53] In 1951, the parliament passed the bill on press law[54] which was followed by publication of private 'papers. In order to check the excesses of Wikh Zalmyan in the parliament, a government sponsored group, called National Democratic Party, was formed. This group attracted the Pukhtuns who were somewhat allergic to the vociferation of Persian-speakers for their rights. The NDP supported the government on Pakhtunistan. The government, however, failed

to recruit members for the NDP from the bureaucracy which was dominated by Persian-speakers.[55] The visit of Shah Mahmood to the USA in Jan 1951 resulted in a series of demonstrations against him and the USA. Consequently political activities were banned and 25 liberal leaders including Mahmoodi and Ghubar were arrested. Some of them submitted an apology and were released,[56] while a group of students and intellectuals including Abdul Haye Habibi escaped to Pakistan.[57] Abdul Majid Zabuli separated from Wikh Zalmyan and formed the Enterprise Group with some of Wikh Zalmyan activists. It was more radical and attacked the royal house as well as the clergy but in a less open fashion.[58] Daud replaced Shah Mahmood in 1953 and curbed political activities, but continued to entertain his proteges and let them found Kuloop-i-Milli with a view to developing it into the ruling party. The party did not prosper but the leftists, particularly Karmal and Sharq, enjoyed the patronage of Daud.[59]

The Wikh Zalmyan was the mainspring of the political surge in the decade of constitution. Lacking proper leadership, Wikh Zalmyan was split into many factions, ideologically as well as ethnically. Ethnically it was divided between Tajik-oriented and Pukhtun-oriented; religiously between Sunni and Shia; politically between nationalist, socialist/communist,

liberal/democrat and royalist. Withdrawal of the British from India and creation of Pakistan on the South-Eastern border, and emergence of the USA as a great power after the World War-II, effected changes in the political concepts of the Afghan government and intellectuals, as well. The anti-British sentiments were transformed into anti-Pakistan sentiments, and the USA was considered as the political descendant of the British empire. Pakistan preferred US friendship to the Soviet and maintained the British policy against Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. The impact of the global changes on Wikh Zalmyan was perceptible from their varying demands; criticism of the USA for its involvement in Vietnam, and handling the Helmand Project;[60] demand of internal reforms, economic development; boosting up literacy; freedom of speech and writing; support of the government policy on Pakhtunistan;[61] criticism of the royal house and the clergy;[62] and defence of Islam. During his 10-year premiership (1953-63), Daud suppressed political and religious activities. Emancipation of women, the most sensitive issue, was ordered with ruthless determination, and its resultant opposition at Qandahar was crushed. Finance Minister Abdul Malik Abdur Rahimzai was put behind the bars for opposition to Daud's pro-Soviet policy. Pak-Afghan relations deteriorated to

the extent that they resulted in the rupture of diplomatic relations twice. The USA assisted Afghanistan in various fields but did not consider it in its sphere of influence. The Soviet Union favoured Daud, and, ultimately, Afghanistan depended more on economic and military assistance from that power with growing political influence. The Soviet advisers were enabled to establish direct contacts with socialist elements, and Afghan trainees and students were taught Marxism and other related subjects in the USSR and other Socialist countries. The leftists enjoyed political career and were accommodated in the services. They met and exchanged views. The Pakhtunistan issue promoted the concept of Pakhtunism which caused anti-Pakhtunism feelings in other ethnic groups. Persian literature was imported from Iran and so were the Pushto works of Pakhtunist and socialist writers from Pakistan. Da Bang Musafari, a novel of Noor Mohammad Taraki, was published in 1957 by Pushto Tolana, Kabul. Da Ghairat Chegha, revolutionary poetry of Ajmal Khattak, was procured from Peshawar by the Afghan Consul and sent to the Tribal Affairs Department. Both the books were banned after circulation.

After the promulgation of the constitution of 1964, the leftists took lead in forming the Peoples

Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) on 01 Jan 1965. Without a political parties law, PDPA began full-scale activities. It was followed by other parties. Religious parties like Khudam-ul-Furqan, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Mohammadi did not flourish because the traditional clergy was not accustomed to politics. Professor Ghulam Mohammad Niazi organised a group of Islamists which was called Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen. Its militant group, Jawanan-i-Musalman, was formed by students in 1969 in order to combat the growing threat of Communism. It made considerable impact on campus-politics and won the elections to the Students Union.[63] However, it could not muster the support of the traditional clergy and the Afghans. For them the concept of Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen, influenced by International Muslim Brotherhood, and in liaison with Jamaat Islami of Pakistan, was as alien as others. The Jawanan-i-Musalman, however, contributed more to casual emotional reaction of the traditional clergy towards the sacriligious acts of Communist-oriented youths. In 1970, the Ulema held demonstrations at Pule Khishti mosque for 34 days (22 April to 25 May), against weekly "Parcham" which had published a special edition on the centenary of Lenin. The issue contained a poem of Baraq Shafie with a phrase "Durud Bar Lenin". Whereas Maulvi Mohammad Yunus Khalis lamented the lack of

organised efforts among the Ulema and indifference on the part of the people,[64] Mir Akbar Khyber was satisfied to note that the influence of "the government-sponsored demonstrations held by the Ulema from all over the country did not spread out of Pule Khishti mosque."[65] In July 1973, Daud overthrew his cousin and brother-in-law, King Zahir Shah, with the support of "Parcham".

Other parties which manifested their existence in the political activities were The Afghan Socialist Democratic Party (ASDP) called Afghan Millat; Sitam-i-Milli; The Progressive Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDP) called Masawat; the New Democratic Party of Afghanistan (NDPA) called Shulae Javed. The Afghan Millat was nationalist, aspiring for Greater Afghanistan covering the area once held by Ahmad Shah Abdali as a Pakhtunist State. Sitam-i-Milli was, in fact, not an organized party but a loose association of Tajik-oriented youths who claimed that the non-Pukhtun ethnic groups were persecuted, and wished freedoms to the extent of independence. Masawat was nationalist. And Shulae Javed was dubbed as Maoist. Their parochial ideas were vulnerable to exploitation. The PDPA was divided into Khalq and Parcham factions; the former was open for Pukhtuns and the latter for non-Pukhtuns. All these parties and movements, including Islamist, agreed on one point and that was "the end of monarchy".

The royalist parties Wahdat-i-Milli and Ittehad-i-Milli proved nominal. The King was conscious of the hanging dangers. He did not sign the Political Parties Act. But the governments under five successive Prime Ministers in ten years were not stable enough to suppress the "outlaw parties". President Daud founded the Republic and headed the State for only five years before his fatal fall. He eliminated some distinguished nationalists and religious figures and confined the Pirs to their monasteries. In June 1974, about 200 persons affiliated with Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen, or Jawanan-i-Musalman were arrested.[66] Then a group of 98 people, including Gulbadin Hikmatyar and Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani, sneaked into Pakistan. Majority of them were army officers. They were used by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for subversion against the Daud regime,[67] which affected directly the NAP-JUI coalition in the NWFP also. A group of Shulae Javed activists resorted to underground terrorist activities. The field was clear. The PDPA was confronted directly with the government which was in the process of de-stabilization at the hands of Islamist militant asylees in Pakistan and the underground dissidents, particularly the Shulae Javed. Noor Mohammad Taraki was not wrong in suggesting that the armed cadre of PDPA should be prepared to take power in case imperialism, reactionary or any other group destroyed the Daud regime.[68]

The PDPA took power in April 1978. In the mess of consequent problems, a question arose - Was it a coup d' etat or a revolution? Hence it becomes imperative to define first as to what term could better suit the change.

--

References:

1. Maudoodi, Abul Ala, Maulana; Khilafat-o-Mulukiat; 1966; p.224. Ningrahari, Mohammad Gulab; Abu Hanifa (tr. from Persian; Dr Yousuf Mousa); Kabul; 1344 (=1965); p. 45n.
2. Ghani, Ashraf; Islam and State Building in A Tribal Society: Afghanistan 1880-1901; Modern Asian Studies, Great Britain; XII/2; 1978; p.283.
3. Khugiani, Mohammad Amin; Hayat-i-Syed Jamaluddin Afghan; Kabul 1318 (=1939); p. 169.
4. Ibid; p. 170.
5. Ghani; loc.cit; p.282.
6. Ibid; p.275.
7. Qadiani, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad; Tazkirat-ush-Shahadatayn; Zia-ul-Islam Press Rabwa; 16 Oct 1903.
8. Iqbal Ali Shah, Sardar; Afghanistan of the Afghans; Gosha-i-Adab, Quetta; 1978; Pp. 213-15.
9. Aman-i-Afghan, Kabul; II/20 Hamal 1304 = 9.4.1925; III/29 Hamal 1304= 18.4.1925; IV/7 Saur 1304 = 27.4.1925.
10. Ghubar, Ghulam Mohammad, Mir; Afghanistan Dar Maseer-i-Tarikh, ed.II; Qum, Iran; 1359=1980; p.441.
11. Ghani; loc.cit; p.270.
12. Ibid; p.272.
13. Anwar Khan, Mohammad, Dr; The Third Afghan Constitution, Pt-X; Central Asia; Area Study Centre (ASC), University of Peshawar; Summer 1984; p.14.
14. See Hayat-i-Jamaluddin Afghan by Mohammad Amin Khugiani and Afghanistan of the Afghans by Sardar Iqbal Ali Shah; loc.cit.
15. Tapper, Richard, ed.; The Conflict of Tribes and States in Iran and Afghanistan; Croom Helm,London & Canberra; St Martin's Press, New York; 1983; p. 105.
16. Iqbal Ali Shah, Sardar, loc.cit; p.218.
17. Ghani; loc.cit; Pp 272-74.
18. Ghubar; loc.cit; p.700.
19. Al-Mojaddidi, Mohammad Sadiq, al-Shaikh; Mukhtasarul Bayan Dar Tarikh-i-Shaheed Ilm-o-Iman: Maulana Abdur Rahman; N.; 1984; p.14.

20. Stewart, Rhea Talley; Fire in Afghanistan: 1914-29; 1973; p.154.
21. Ghubar; loc.cit; p. 740.
22. Habibi, Abdul Haye; Junbash-i-Mashrootiat Dar Afghanistan; Sazman-i-Muhajireen-i-Musalman-i-Afghanistan; Arlington, USA; 1364=1985; p.6.
23. Zalmay, Mohammad Wali; Da Qandahar Mashaheer; Kabul; 1349 = 1970; p.255.
24. Azam, G.F.; Afghanistan : Tolo Ta Yau Dars Au Azmoekht; Peshawar; 1982; p.24.
25. Kabul Times; 7.8.1978.
26. Ibid.
27. Habibi, Abdul Haye; loc.cit; p.132.
28. Afghanistan Da Bartania Da Este'mar Tsakha Da Russ Tar Imperialism Pore; 1981; p.65.
29. Kabul Times; 7.8.1978.
30. Habibi; loc.cit; p.133.
31. Afghanistan.. (Cf.28).
32. Treaties, Agreements, Conventions and Protocols: with and relating to Afghanistan; Confidential (13330); p.8.
33. Teplinsky, L; Press Bulletin; USSR Embassy, Islam-abad; 129; 17.6.1985; p.7.
34. Treaties etc (Cf.32); p.6.
35. Wild, Ronald; Amanullah, ex-King of Afghanistan; Nisa Traders, Quetta; 1978; Pp 62, 76, 83.
36. Hugh Seton-Watson; From Lenin to Khrushchev: A history of world communism; Frederick A. Praeger Publishers; New York, Washington; 1965; p.130.
Poullada, Leon B; Reforms And Rebellions in Afghanistan 1919-1929: King Amanullah's failure to modernize a tribal society; Cornell University Press; Ithaca & London; 1983; Pp 47, 242-3.
Stewart, Rhea Talley; loc.cit; Pp 136-9.
Rafie, Habibullah; Wehshiana Teray Au Shermidele Mata; Aman Kitab Khparawano Moassessa;1985;p.23.
37. Sindhi, Obeidullah, Maulana (ed. Mohammad Sarwar); Kabul Mayn Sa'th Sa'l (1915-1922); Sindh Sagar Academy, Lahore; 1982; Pp 74-75.
38. Confidential DO Letter from Chief Secretary NwFP to Deputy Secretary to Government of India; 78-P.C.; 5-6 Jan 1937; p.8.
39. Ibid; Pp 8, 13.
40. Toofan, wali Mohammad; Da Bolsheviko Pa Mulk Ki Za'ti Jaidad; Pukhtoon, weekly; Sardaryab, Peshawar; 01 April 1946; Pp 14-17.
41. Arnold, Anthony; Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective; SASI Book Store, Karachi; 1981; Pp.22-23.
42. Anwar Khan, Mohammad, Dr; Central Asia; Peshawar; I/2; Spring, 1979; Pp 18-24.
43. Mazhar, Fauzia; Future of Democracy in Afghanistan: Thesis for MA (Journalism); University of the Punjab; November 1976 (typescript); p. 21.

44. Amin, Tahir; Afghanistan Crisis; Islamabad; 1982; p.30.
45. Arnold, Anthony; loc.cit; Pp.22-23.
46. Dupree, Louis; Afghanistan; 1978; Pp 474-5.
47. Kodetaha-e-Kamunistee Dar Afghanistan; NP; 4 Hoot 1357 = 23.2.1979; p.30.
48. Azmat Hayat Khan; The Origin of Khalq and Parcham; World Islamic Time, weekly; Islamabad; 30.4.1984; Pp.26-27.
49. Arnold, Anthony; Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism; 1983; p.19.
50. Siddique, Mohammad Zahir, Dr; Az Ishghal-i-Cheko-slavakia Ta Tajawuz-i-Afghanistan; Peshawar; 1984; p. 135.
51. Kodetaha-e-Kamunistee Dar Afghanistan;loc.cit;p.31.
52. Dupree, Louis; Afghanistan; 1978; Pp.494-5.
53. Area Handbook for Afghanistan, ed.IV; Washington DC 20016; 1973; p.159.
54. Dupree, Louis; Red Flag Over the Hindukush Pt-I; Leftist Movement in Afghanistan; 1979/No 44;;p.4.
55. Area Handbook for Afghanistan; loc.cit; Pp.208-9.
56. Dupree, Lhouis; Afghanistan; 1978; p.496.
57. Inamullah Jan; Journal of Central Asia; II/2; Quad-i-Azam University, Islamabad; Dec 1983; Pp. 9-11.
58. Arnold, Anthony; Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism; Pp.9-11.
59. Kodetaha-e-Kamunistee Dar Afghanistan; p.33.
60. Haddad, Qudratullah; Chera Afghan Tolanpal Uluswaki; manuscript; 1360 = 1981; p.4.
61. Arnold, Anthony; Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism; p.10.
62. Azam, G.F.; loc.cit; p.64.
63. Afghan, Rafique; Takbeer, weekly, Karachi; 27 Dec 1985 - 3 Jan 1986; Pp 51-52.
64. O'de Abdul Qadir; Islam (tr. in Pushto); Gaheez Publications; Shaheen Electric Press; Peshawar; 14 Moharram 1391 = 1971; p.13n.
65. Revealed by Mir Akbar Khyber to the author.
66. Hymn, Anthony; Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination: 1964-82; Hongkong; 1982; p.51.
67. Payees list for the month of February 1979.
68. Da Saur Da Inqilab Pa Nakla; Political Department of the Afghan Peoples Army; 01 Jauza 1357 = 22 May 1978; p.15.

...

CHAPTER : I

Revolution or Coup d' etat ?

The icy winter of Kabul was over and the tulip festival of Mazar-i-Sharif was nearing its end. The frozen life of the snow-capped mountains had just started melting into jubilant torrents. The free mind of the Afghan was freshened up with the frag - rant air of the spring. But the high echelon of Daud regime was disturbed over the fast-changing situation. The small centralised group of elite of the PDPA managed to attract a large crowd of the traditional orthodox Afghan Muslims of Kabul city to the funeral of their assassinated leader, Mir Akbar Khyber. The funeral ceremony culminated into agitation against the established, constitutional & one-party government of Daud. A number of PDPA leaders were arrested, most of them for sure death penalty. It was Thursday, half-day of government offices preceding the weekend, the 27th April of 1978, and government employees were, as usual, prepared to wind up and leave offices at mid-day. The normality was disturbed suddenly by the roar of tanks and thunder of aircraft. The President's House in the middle of Kabul city was attacked, shelled, straffed and bombarded. The Kabulites were struck with surprise. They did not understand the situation, and, thus, formed various opinions. Some

considered it a coup d' etat staged by supporters of late Mohammad Hasham Maiwandwal; some linked it with supporters of late General Mir Ahmad Khan; some thought it a rebellion inside the house against Daud and that the aerial action was directed against the rebels; some opined that it was a rebellion against the regime in support of PDPA having been mobilized by Russians.[1] The radio played martial music, straining the public nerves, until 7 p.m. when the voice of Hafizullah Amin echoed in the air. He was interviewing Dagarwal Abdul Qadir and Jagran Aslam Watanjar. The interviewees then proclaimed in Dari and Pushto respectively the overthrow of the Daud regime and the formation of a Military Revolutionary Council as the highest ruling organ. This proclamation was frontpaged by the Kabul Times of 4 May 1978 in the following words:

> "The first radio announcement of the Revolutionary Council of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan.
>
> Evening of Saur Seven 1357.
>
> For the first time in the history of Afghanistan the last remnants of monarchy, tyranny, despotism and power of the dynasty of the tyrant Nader Khan has ended and all powers of the state are in the hands of the people of Afghanistan. The power of state fully rests with the Revolutionary Council of the armed forces.
>
> Dear compatriots.
>
> Your popular state which is in the hands of the Council of the Revolution informs you that every anti-revolutionary element who would venture to defy instructions and rulings of the Council of the Revolution shall be submitted immediately to the revolutionary military centres." 2

The 27th of April 1978 corresponded to the 7th of Saur 1357 of the Solar Hijri calender of Afghanistan. This change was, therefore, given the name of Inqilab-i-Saur which means the Saur Revolution. The small landlocked country , heretofore ignored by world powers, gradually turned into a hotbed of global politics. In this strained situation a question arose as to whether this change was revolution or a coup d' etat. The ruling party and its backers call it a revolution. And the other side call it a coup d' etat. It has now become a rhetorical question. It is, therefore, imperative to analyse this aspect of the change first, academically, and define it appropriately. Evaluation of such a definition necessitates, at least, a cursory review of various descriptions made by different scholars and theorists as well as opinions of the involved parties.

What is a coup d' etat ?

Coup d' etat is a French expression.Coup means a successful act which comes as a surprise to those who are affected by it. Coup d' etat means"a sudden and violent change of government or in political affairs, brought about by unconstitutional methods".[3] Sucha a change does not, essentially, affect the form and system of government or its institutions. After success, the new government may, or may not,

try to change the socio-economic, or even political, order of the state. The successful coup-leaders,not bound, primarily, by political ethics, try to attain favour of the general will and then go ahead either to revitalize the existing disturbed system or revolutionize the state in accordance with their own thinking and will. A coup d' etat is not conceived and backed, necessarily, by a political movement or programme. The coup-makers are usually well placed government servants. By virtue of their status,they can change the government abruptly and without much blood-shed. In such an operation, a small number of persons at the top on both sides within the government are involved. The idea of a coup d' etat grows from personal reasons rather than political. The coup-maker may have a personal cause of fear,or may have developed differences with the government on some policy matter, or may have been influenced and prepared by a foreign power, or driven by personal ambition to attain glory. Whatever the cause may be, the coup-maker, being in an important position, can not reveal and publicise his plan or programme for public support, which act enables the existing government to take legal action without arousing any sizeable opposition. The coup-maker has to find a few confidants in the top echelon who may be able to strike the target with precise accuracy. Lacking

political programme and support, the successful coup-makers usually start with introduction of reforms to satisfy the general will with a view to winning over support of the masses and neutralising political stalwarts, or drive the people on emotional diversion from thinking about the change.

An example of a coup d' etat, grown from personal fear, is that of 18th Brumaire, when Napolean-I, an ambitious person,abolished the power of the Directory which was trying to crush him. In Pakistan, the coup d' etat of General Mohammad Ayub Khan and that of General Zia-ul-Haq were precipitated by their differences on policy matters with the existing governments. As President of Pakistan, the former had, however, termed his coup d' etat as "The Revolution" in his much celebrated political autobiography.[4] In Afghanistan, Sardar Daud was motivated by personal ambition, blood jealousy, palace intrigues and his differences on policy matters. He had tried all through his life to build a political platform but failed. As a last resort, he attracted a number of various political elements but did not rely on them for implementation of his cherished plan.He selected only fifty army officers in the last moments and struck at midnight to overthrow the constitutional monarchy of Zahir Shah. The following day was normal in Kabul city.[5] The coup d' etat of Hafizullah Amin

against his all-worthy master Noor Mohammad Taraki stemmed from personal fear. A few other examples of coup d' etat in the recent history are; abdication of King Farouk of Egypt in favour of his minor son Ahmad Fuad-II when the real power had been usurped by General Mohammad Naguib and Colonel Gemal Abdul Nasir in 1952. The monarchy was eventually abolished in 1953. There was the assassination of king Faisal of Iraq in 1958 and taking over of power by General Abdul Karim Kassem who, in his turn, was overthrown in a subsequent coup d' etat by his comrade-in-arms Colonel Abdul Salam Arif in 1963. The overthrow, and imprisonment, of Ahmad Ben Bellah, President of Algeria, by Colonel Houari Boumedienne in 1965, is another example of a coup d' etat.

Abdur Rasul Amin, an ex-professor of Sociology at Kabul University, considers that the change which took place in Kabul in April 1978 was a coup d'etat. His arguments are based on four factors; (a) it was planned by the Soviets, (b) a small number of armed personnel, Soviet advisers and pilots participated in it. The number of armed officers of the ranks of Sergeant to Brigadier was given first as 137 and then 182, (c) the people of Kabul did not know and understand what was going on, watching from the tops of their houses, and (d) the whole operation took a short time of ten hours, starting at 9 a.m. and

ending at 7 p.m.[6] The Afghan Social Democratic Party (ASDP) has discussed this topic in its literature for the enlightenment of its members. It has described it as; "In French, coup d' etat means the overthrow of a government; sudden and violent change of a government by high officials and military officers of the state. The coup d' etat is staged by a person placed in a high governmental position. In a coup d' etat, key installations such as radio stations, important communication centres, airfields, railway stations and state buildings are captured. The coup d' etat is usually staged at the top. If led by a person of national repute and of progressive ideas, the coup d' etat becomes useful to the people, for it moves in the direction of social justice. On the contrary, if led by an anti-national and reactionary person, or a colonial agent, it becomes reactionary and detrimental to the cause of the nation, for it goes in favour of colonialism and anti-national classes."[7]

According to Samuel P. Huntington, "The distinguishing characteristics of a coup d' etat as a political technique are that; (a) it is the effort by a political coalition illegally to replace the existing governmental leaders by violence or the threat of violence, (b) the violence employed is usually small, (c) the number of people involved is

small, (d) the participants already possess institutional bases of power within the political system". To him, a coup d' etat can succeed only "(a) if the total number of participants in the political system is small, or (b) if the number of participants is large and a substantial proportion of them endorse the coup." He further suggests that "this latter condition is rarely met; for if the number of participants is large, it will be virtually impossible to construct an effective coalition of them to support the coup. In the absence of such a coalition, the coup will either be defeated by the opposition of the other groups, or it will lead to full-scale civil war."[8] Comparing it with revolution, Huntington says; "A coup d' etat in itself changes only leadership and perhaps policies."[9]

FLARS cyclopaedia describes coup d' etat as "A violent change in the government of a state carried by force or illegally."[10] Encyclopaedia Britannica, Micropaedia, has put this in these words; "The sudden overthrow of an existing government by an individual or small group, usually with only limited violence and sometimes with none at all... A coup d' etat usually results in the abrupt replacement of leading governmental personnel but, unlike a revolution, generally does not alter basic economic and social policies."[11]

Coup d' etat has no corresponding political phrasing in Pushto, Persian or Dari, and Urdu. In Persian it has been translated as "Taghayer Nagahani Dar Hukumat";[12] in Urdu as "Nagahani Taghayer; Foree Tabdeelee; Hukumat Ka Foree Inqilab."[13] "Takhta Ulutna" is an Urdu phrase which can be placed nearest to its interpretation. Its literary meaning is "the overthrow (of a government)". In fact, the people of the sub-continent in particular and of Central Asia in general are so used to the word Inqilab, i.e. revolution, that they consider without reservation any change which heralds virtues as Inqilab, and that of vile consequences as coup d' etat. The coup-makers also wish that their achievements should be called a revolution.

Conclusion:

Essentially, coup d' etat is an abrupt change of a government by a person, or a small group of highly placed persons, from within a political system, with limited violence or with none at all. The situation at lower levels in the given political system is rarely disturbed. It does not attract, necessarily, attention of the masses. Due to their vulnerability to legal action, the coup-makers have to exercise a high degree of secrecy. The principal promoter may not share his plan with his confidants even. In case of failure, the coup-makers

are treated, and tried, as traitors. In case it misfires, or is not timedprecisely, or the popularity and strength of the ruling junta are not calculated accurately, the involved groups enter into a bloody clash for survival. Even then, it does not leave any lasting political impact on the overall structure of the society. The consequent brawl is also short-lived and justifies the winner.

What is a revolution ?

Revolution is an English word. It means "the act of revolving; going around; a single complete turn; an entire change in method of government;the overthrowing of a system of government or society; a successful rebellion; a complete change in con - ditions, ways of thinking of doing things etc."[14] In Urdu, it means "Inqilab; Siasi Inqilab,"[15] in Persian "Shoresh; Inqilab; Taghayer-i-Asasi,"[16] in Pushto, "Badloon; Inqilab," in Russian, "Revolutsiya."[17] Since this thesis is concerned with the political aspects of a revolution, discussion on the subject is, therefore, limited to the relevant factors only. Lexicographic meaning of revolution is similar in various dictionaries. The Oxford Illustrated Dictionary has given it as "2. complete change, turning upside down, great reversal of conditions, fundamental reconstruction; forcible substitution by subjects of new ruler or polity for

the old."[18] The American Heritage Dictionary has put it in these words; "3. A sudden political overthrow brought about from within a given system."[19]

The basic change has been discussed and analysed by some of the world-famous political theorists. Most of them have sifted the causes of a revolution in the context of various types of politico-social orders. Aristotle thinks that the root-cause of a revolution as also of a crime is poverty,[20] and that it grows from the personal will of the people; "inferiors revolt in order that they may be equal, and equals that they may be superior. Such is the state of mind which creates revolutions."[21] Millard Fillmore warns that "revolutions do not always establish freedom."[22] Wendell Phillips suggests that revolutions are not made; they come.[23] Herbert Spencer is of the opinion that "old forms of government finally grow so oppressive that they must be thrown off even at the risk of reigns of terror."[24]

A revolution is not like a mathematical theory which must have some basic formulae for calculations. Time and nature define its course with environmental variations. A theorist is influenced invariably by the natural phenomena of his time and the socio-economic conditions prevalent in his own society, which guide him, in the light of empirical past, to

form a universal theory. Changing conditions, language, translation, interpretation and other relevant factors may cause variations in theories, sometimes proliferation of one concept into different theories. Philosophical variation is similar to sculptural variation. Physiognomical difference between a statue of Bhudda cut in China and another cut in the central parts of Afghanistan is so distinct that at the first glance it may strike as depicting different figures. But, in fact, both would have been cut by devoted sculptors with a similar idea emanating from the same tenet of Bhuddism. Similar is the case of political theories of a revolution. Following are some references to works of distinguished philosophers, which have been repeated quite often.

According to Aristotle, a revolution has varying degrees. It may take the form of a change of constitution of a state, or replacement of the government without changing the constitution. It may not be directed against the entire system of government but only against a particular institution or set of persons in the state. It may be complete or incomplete, armed or peaceful, personal or impersonal.[25] Enumerating the causes of a "revolution ranging from personal will to governmental shortcomings, Aristotle does not rule out foreign influence in a state, saying; "Foreign influence,

too, produces revolutions in a state."[26]

The concepts of revolution, and of coup d' etat, developed almost two thousands years later than Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, when European thinkers faced the problem in changing political societies. Jean Bodin, a leader of the French Political party Les Politiques in the 16th century, described a revolution as a sudden and violent, or slow and peaceful change. It may affect the sovereign or the laws and institutions not involving the sovereign power. He does not consider a revolution as a total change in laws, religion or location of a state. To Bodin, a monarchy is least liable to revolutions, and a democracy is most so.[27] An English politician and a member of Whig party, John Locke, tried to justify the English revolution of 1688. Locke considers that a government must depend, not merely on its institutions, but always on the consent of the governed. To him, all rulers are liable to be displaced if they govern tyrannically. He regards the silence of the people as corresponding to their consent. Every member of a society is consenting by implication to its mode of government until he actually rebels against it or leaves the territory of the state by emigrating.[28] He gives the right of revolution to the people who may overthrow the government if she violates any limitation to which

she is committed.[29] Harmon refers to the right of revolution expounded by Locke as "If government violates trust by ignoring its purpose or by using power granted it for a selfish purpose, the people have a right to remove the government, by force if necessary."[30] Thomas Hobbes regards a revolution as the dissolution of the body-politic, and a return to complete anarchy or to the state of nature.[31] The sovereign who fails to govern forfeits his sovereignty to his de facto successor without any need for a further appeal to the verdict of the people.[32] Hobbes considers that men may resist the sovereign if their lives are at stake. But they should exercise great care, for resistance is revolution. It results in the destruction of sovereign power and reversion to a state of nature, which is worse than anything in the social state except death.[33]

French philosopher, Jean Jacques Rousseau, describes a revolution as "There are indeed times in the history of States when, just as some kinds of illness turn men's head and make them forget the past, periods of violence and revolutions do to the people what these crises do to individuals; horror of the past takes the place of forgetfulness, and the State, set on fire by civil wars, is born again, so to speak, from its ashes, and takes on anew,

fresh from the jaws of death, the vigour of youth". To Rousseau, revolutions can not mend the destruction of disturbances, it needs a master, and not a liberator.[34] Edmund Burke suggests that experience and wisdom of the ages must be taken into account in any plan involving a change of governmental structure, operation, or tradition. Change should not be undertaken for light and transcient reasons". To Burke, a revolution undermines and destroys the foundation built over the centuries. It should, therefore, be the last resort. A revolution is justified only when the government is abused and deranged and she makes it apparent that the prospect of the future is as dismal as the experience of the past. Then the remedy should be supplied by the common herd, but by those members of the society who are fitted for the task. Defending the glorious and bloodless revolution of 1688, Burke takes the stand that action was taken to preserve the constitution, not to destroy it; moreover, the revolution was directed by the part of the community which had the requisite knowledge.[35]

Hameed, A.K. Rai, comments on the French revolution that it had not represented a sudden and precipitate action on the part of the French people, for, reforms, political and otherwise were long overdue in France. The French government was a

despotic one, there being little of enlightenment about the French despotism in an age of enlightened despots. Conditions became hopelessly corrupt and unbearable in the long reign of Louis XI. The administration was corrupt and inefficient. On the other hand, during this period, there arose a number of celebrated writers, Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau being a few of them.[36]

Huntington describes a revolution as a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership and government activity and policies.[37] To Huntington, a full-scale revolution involves the rapid and violent destruction of existing political institutions, the mobilization of new groups into politics, and creation of new political institutions.[38] He has quoted Hannah Arendt as saying; "Violence is no more adequate to describe the phenomenon of revolution than change; only where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether different form of government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic... can we speak of revolution."[39] Huntington considers that a revolution is an aspect of modernization.[40] In his opinion counter-revolutionaries, often with foreign

assistance, attempt, in virtually all revolutionary situations, to stop the expansion of political participation and to re-establish a political order in which there is little but concentrated power.[41] Harmon thinks that all the previous revolutions resulted in elimination of one class by another; and one minority usurped power from another minority.[42] Northedge describes revolutions as periods of time in which old theories explaining the legitimacy of government fail, or no longer appeal to rational & indifferent men, and new formulae have to be worked out before the chains of government can lie easily and tolerably on the subject once again.[43] Wiseman defines the political system as the organization of a territorial society having a legi - timate monopoly over the authorised use and regulation of force in society.[44] Discussing revolutionary aspects in a political system, Wiseman says; "A movement to displace a pre-existing system or order becomes a revolutionary movement for national renovation, or to carry the revolution beyond the national borders, or both.There follows the post-revolutionary revolution. In its internal aspect, this is a constructive process of far-reaching change and reform. In its first phase,it is directed either against a foreign colonial regime of foreign dependency, or against an indi-

genous order which is treated as though it were foreign. An ideology will be constructed (or an existing one adapted) to provide both a philosophy of the revolution and a programme for revolutionary struggle. This ideology provides a political orientation and a powerful organizing instrument in the hands of the leadership.[45] Gerarld Chalian considers guerilla warfare as revolutionary war for the reason that it weakens, or should weaken, the regular forces. Nevertheless, revolutionary war is the military strategy which changes one political system with another. A revolutionary war also weakens regular forces, but the guerilla warfare is not destined to take over political power. The war in Afghanistan is revolutionary in its object but guerilla in its techniques, organization and tactics. A revolutionary war ought to have a political programme and be led by an organization. It ought to be free of regionalism and be fought on the national level.[46]

ASDP has defined Inqilab as "Inqilab is that positive and basic change which takes place in political, economic and social aspects of the life of a society, qualitatively and quantitatively. In sociology it means substitution of an old system by a new and progressive system. Revolutions usually come up from the bottom to the top; in other

words, from national strata against the anti-national elements and colonial agents. The basic change comes about with the movement and determination of peoples and nations, and eradicates disparity, cruelty and oppression, and ushers in equality of rights and social justice. Development of objective and subjective conditions is the elementary requirements for the success of a revolution. If both - the objective and the subjective - or one of these, conditions did not mature, revolution and its success are not possible. So far five types of revolutions i.e. social, political, cultural, industrial and religious, have matured in the history of mankind."[47] In another tract, the same party furnishes the following description of a revolution; "Replacement of an old and rotten social system with a new, national, progressive and social system. In the process of this change, every destructive action for the sake of reforms and reconstrucion is legitimate. Destruction beyond the scope of reforms and reconstruction is not considered revolutionary. In backward countries the process of revolution is fast in principles and practice."[48]

In the opinion of Abdur Rasul Amin, the majority of a given political society actively participates in a revolutionary process. The people support it to the last stage of success, safeguard it and willingly implement its programmes. Neither the

minority in the country nor foreign aggression can overthrow the revolutionary regime, nor does it need any outside military support for its sustenance and safeguarding.[49]

The Communist concept of revolution is not new, but is given desired interpretation which varies from time to time and place to place. It is conditional to Communism. As indicated by Dr Mohammad Anwar Khan, "the Communists have shaped Communism into a religion. It has a book, an ideology and a prophet."[50] Having denied all the faiths, divine as well as secular, Communism has itself grown into a faith, and has drifted from pragmatism to dogmatism. Hameed has summarized the description of a revolution by Communist rhetoricians as; "The Communists justify revolution i.e. use of force, both historically and theoretically. The state has always been created and maintained by force, which has always been the essence of historic revolutions. Theoretically, too, violence is justified because there is no other way of breaking the class will of the enemy except by systematic and energetic use of violence."[51] Karl Marx speculated a proletariat revolution in a structural society. To Marx, the philosophers have only interpreted the word in various ways. The point, however, is to change it.[52] He thinks that unlike multi-class revolutions, the proletarian revolution involves only two classes;

the workers' and the capitalists. The development of capitalism produces bipolarization of class interests. A small-size class of capitalists accumulate wealth by exploiting the large-size class of workers who constitute the actual productive class but are deprived of even basic needs of life due to their impoverished condition. The proletariat shall be organized in order to eliminate the capitalist class. This type of revolution is considered to be the first in which a majority gains control and a minority becomes the oppressed class. In the opinion of Marx, a revolution does not abolish the oppression immediately. The remnants of the capitalist class still remain, and that class must be liquidated.[53] Marx draws a line between material revolution in the economic conditions of production, which, to him, can be determined with scientific accuracy, and the juridical, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic revolution - in a word, ideological forms wherein men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Marx thinks that at a certain stage of development the material productive forces of society come into contradiction with the existing productive relationship, or ,what is but a legal expression of these, with the property relationships within which they had moved before.From forms of development of the productive forces these relationships are transformed into their fetters.Then

an epoch of social revolution opens.[54] The speculation of Marx was, however, foiled in capitalist societies and democratic states. This part of his theory generated conflict of opinions of Communist politicians in practical life.

Vladimir Ilich Ulianov, better known as Lenin, expounded the idea of professional revolutionaries which necessitated the foundation of cells in every organized body; political, industrial, military, cooperative, educational, athletic; open or secret, under a centralized supervision, guidance and control, legal or illegal. His organizational principles were secrecy, minority leadership, centralized authority and use of illegal means.[55] Lenin considers that the history of all previous revolutions clearly indicates that the more organized, more class-conscious, better armed minority forces its will upon the majority.[56] To Lenin, Communism is revolutionary. Revolutionary violence is force used to further the natural evolution of society; violence used against Communism is violence in the service of reaction.[57] Lenin considers it necessary to have a party, an elite leadership, to create a revolutionary sentiment and to lead the proletariat in its struggle to destroy the bourgeois State and establish its own.[58] Joseph Stalin agrees with Lenin's view regarding the role of a highly discip-

lined group of trained revolutionaries.[59] However, the Chinese Communist leader, Mao Tse-Tung, thinks that "Without the poor peasants there can be no revolution,"[60] because he was confronted in China with a situation different from speculative theory of Marx. Leon Trotsky says that; "The most indutible feature of a revolution is the direct interference of the masses in historic events." In his opinion, classes are in conflict in a society that is seized by revolution.[61] He considers that;"The masses go into a revolution not with a prepared plan of social reconstruction, but with a sharp feeling that they cannot endure the old regime. Only the guiding layers of a class have a political programme, and even this still requires the test of events, and the approval of masses."[62] He elaborates further that "Only on the basis of a study of political processes in the masses themselves, can we understand the role of parties and leaders, whom we least of all are inclined to ignore. They constitute not an independent, but nevertheless a very important, element in the process. Without a guiding organization the energy of the masses would dissipate like steam not enclosed in a piston-box. But nevertheless what moves things is not the piston or the box, but the steam."[63]

Kathleen Gough and Hari P. Sharma, who have

compiled eighteen articles on various situations under the title "Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia" consider a revolution as the destruction of imperialism.[64] In general, the Communists still follow Leninism and Stalinism in forming a small centralized and disciplined party to lead the people to a revolution. All their struggles, open or secret, legal or illegal, ranging from indoctrination to overthrow of the existing government, are considered revolutionary. Since Communism is an ideology, its propagation transcends political territories.Its revolutionary process entails indoctrination, subversion, disinformation,sabotage, terrorism,strikes, revolts,rebellions and, ultimately, the overthrow of a non-Communist government by violence and force.The same factors directed against a Communist government are considered reactionary, imperialist, capitalist and counter-revolutionary. Engels justifies forcible suppression of reactionaries by the party which brings about revolution.[65]

The Islamic concept of revolution needs thorough study which is out of the scope of this thesis.Nevertheless, a brief noteshould not be irrelevant. Islam, the latest Divine religion, spread rapidly in large parts of the world with the Divine gift of the Holy Quran, embodying guiding principles,[66] and esprit de corps, and brought about an ideological revolution.

Internally, it is evolutionary, but, externally, revolutionary. In a Muslim state, a change may affect the government but not the fundamental tenets of the religion which stem from the contract between God and man by which the latter is "slave to God", or, in other words, he is bound by faith to worship, and obey the commands of the Almighty, in political terms, the Sovereign of the Universe. His Universal Sovereignty is unaccountable and can not be challenged. Nor are His basic commands open to question. But, stagnation of life is against the nature of life and, thus, it leads to the end of life. The Holy Quran has, therefore, left the venue open, suggesting evolutionary struggles and revolutionary growth; saying; "Allah does not change a people's lot unless they change what is in their hearts."[67] It gives man the right of struggle for improvement of his condition. The evolutionary process is guided by the basic source of the Holy Quran and the supplementary source of Ahadees, with additional sources of Ijma' and Ijtihad. In the light of this manifestation, forcible change of an Islamic government is not permissible unless it grows corrupt beyond repair. Any such change, be it in the form of a coup d' etat or a revolution in political terms, is un-Islamic. But, when there arises any threat to Islam, or its basic

tenets or the State, or to the life and property of the Muslims, then its revolutionary phase starts. Both these, evolutionary as well as revolutionary, aspects within the mandate of Islam are termed as Jihad. The mediaeval Muslim scholars, therefore, did not give proper attention to these philosophical terms. Empiricism, however, inspired Qutbud Din bin Abdur Rahman,popularly known as Shah Wali-ul-Lah (1702-63), who lived in a critical situation of uncertainty, to reinvigorate the spirit of Jihad in the Muslim society of the Indian sub-continent. A prudent religious scholar with a sense par excellence of survival of Muslims in India and conservation of Islam, Shah Wali-ul-Lah propounded the concept of revolution as; "When a society grows corrupt beyond proportion, it becomes necessary to bring about a revolution. A social institution under which the people are deprived of their primary needs of life, is like an abscess in the body which the sooner it is removed the better it would be... But it should be borne in mind that the bringing of a revolution is a very distressful and hard job, as in addition to the sacrifice of life and property one has at times to part with even his beloved country... For the working of such a revolution, sometimes, one has to struggle through protests, at times, through demonstrations, and, at times,through

raising of slogans etc., and on certain occasions he has to put an actual fight. Whatever sacrifice is made in this direction is reckoned from the best of actions."[68] Shah Wali-ul-Lah's concept of revolution mobilised the Muslim society of India. The slogan of 'Inqilab Zindabad' proved to be the guiding force behind the freedom movement, not for Muslims only but for other religious groups also, through the long British reign. Another Muslim scholar, Abul Hassan Ali-ul-Hussain al-Nadvi has discussed Inqilab as; "Any type of reform, and social or political revolution, cannot mature without awakening of consciousness and identification of the objective. The (French) leaders of revolution could not make it useful to the cause of humanity, and probably it was not their idea, even then they brought about the revolution, because the fountain of this revolution gushed out of the mind and heart of the people. It was backed by the general will. The consciousness was prepared for it."[69] Al-Nadvi has diagnosed its essence as; "A revolution or a rebellion has no value in its essence (even if it is useful, apparantly, to the country and the people) unless it is based on strong faith, right thinking, prepared and enlightened consciousness."[70]

Having given a few examples of the realm of knowledge, it would be appropriate now to take into

D.U-764 c.2

account the universally accepted concept of revolution. The World Book Encyclopedia describes it as; "a political movement which seeks to overthrow a government... Revolutions usually result from discontent among large numbers of people, who hope by revolution to improve their conditions. Some political scientists point out that a revolutionary movement seldom takes power by violence. The revolutionists have seized control and the old rulers try to get their power back... In China the Communist movement might be considered revolutionary, and the efforts of the established government to stop it might be called counter-revolutionary. Any far-reaching change in the way people live may be spoken of as a revolution."[71] The Macropaedia edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica has discussed it at length with a set of references. Hereinunder are quoted only introductory and concluding parts which reflects its own idea;

> "Revolution,Political: "Revolution", its connotations in astronomy apart, has in political & social thought come to mean a sudden, major, & hence typically violent alteration in govern - ment and in related associations and structures. It is used by analogy in such expressions as the industrial revolution, where it refers to a radical and profound change in economic relationships and technological conditions." 72

> "Conclusions; in conlusion, one might say that the phenomena of political revolution and resistance are endemic in any political order & that they are closely related. To avoid them or reduce their menace to a minimum, effective change by means of gradual transformation has to be organized to make possible recurrent

> adaptations of the institutions and processes of a political order to evolving values, interests, and beliefs. Otherwise violence will spread, sporadically as resistance at first, globally and all-engulfing as revolution afterward. Political orders resemble forests and families. They contain the potentiality of self-renewal, but this potentiality does not exclude the chance of failure and ultimate death. Revolution, when successful, signalizes the passing of such a political order. It is not in itself a good, as contemporary political romantics are inclined to feel, but it is better than the death of the society that such an order is intended to serve." 73

Its Micropaedia edition has condensed the whole article in these words; "Major alteration in government and society, usually embodying a departure from the old order, and typically carried out with violence."[74] Encyclopedia Americana has defined revolution as "A term used to designate a fundamental change in the government or the political constitution of a country, mainly brought about by internal causes and effected by violence and force of arms on the part of a considerable number of individuals. The American Revolution typifies those in which one people or region achieves independence from another. Considerable confusion has resulted between the use of such terms as coup, insurrection, mutiny, rebellion, revolt, and revolution, and to solve this difficulty a revolution is sometimes defined as a struggle, more or less successfully and completely accomplished, in which the ruling power of a country passes from one economic class to another."[75]

Conclusion:

Political revolution is a wide term, applied to a wide range of changes; from preservation of a constitution to a total change. The people, in general, have, however, developed romantic ideas about revo - lution, considering it a cherished goal, and a set of virtues. But, it is not so. Revolution, in itself, has no quality, good or bad. It may be good for one group and bad for other group(s). A revolution within a political system is brought about through a political process for indefinite period. The number and strength of revolutionaries could not be defined. The political revolution may be a mass revolution or a party revolution. The mass revolution like that of France and the recent one of Iran (1979) can meet success if it could create leadership as done in the latter case. Without a dynamic leadership such a revolution destroys the existing system but cannot reconstruct anew and the State is plunged in anarchy. This type of revolution comes. The revolution which is brought about by a party or a group may not involve the masses. The revolutionary group plays a blindman's buff and tries to undermine the existing political system by all means, legal or illegal, open or secret. Once the revolution matures, the group usurps the power immediately and tries to control all the State institutions according to the party mani-

festo. A revolution normally precedes counter-revolution which comes from various factors, mainly; (a) the remnants of the overthrown government or system, (b) the affected employees, (c) if there is/are any other group(s) in opposition, (d) those affected directly by the revolutionary programme, and (e) personal jealousies and ambitions of party leaders. etc. etc.

The sumtotal of this discussion is that a process of revolution involves an undefined size of a political group and takes indefinite period. It is guided by a political programme, which is carried in three phases; (a) pre-revolutionary, (b) of revolution, and (c) post-revolutionary. The first phase involves struggle, the second, achievement, and, the third, its defence. The second phase is transient. The success, or defence, of a revolution depends on the strength, determination and strategy of the revolutionary institutions in the third phase. The general notion about the goodness of a revolution and the badness of a coup d' etat is not supported by empiricism.

Differences between coup d' etat and revolution:

Coup d' etat	Revolution
A small group of armed personnel without any political backing.	A political group of undefined size.
Opportunism directed by personal consideration.	Political programme in continual process.

Secrecy and Conspiracies.	Overt or Covert.
Illegal.	Legal or illegal.
Abrupt and surprise change with limited violence or none at all.	Violent change by use of force.
Conscious of general will. Adopts policy of reforms, and moves towards revolutionary changes, if considered, warily.	Conscious of a political programme and puts it to implementation immediately.
Imperceptible reaction.	Immediate reaction and consequent resistance.

Definition of the Events which occured in Afghanistan in 1978.

In the light of the preceding discussion, the change which occurred in Afghanistan in April 1978, corresponding to Saur 1357 was a revolution by all means. The achievement of the Saur Revolution is discussed in the next chapter.

--

References:

1. Amin, Abdur Rasul; Da Saur Coup d' etat Keh Inqilab; Khpalwaki; I/1; 1364= 1985; p.30.
2. The Kabul Times; 4 May 1978; p.1.
3. The Oxford English Dictionary of Current Usage; Tehran; 1363=1984; p.251.
4. Ayub Khan, Mohammad, Field Marshal; Friends Not Masters; Oxford University Press, Lahore,Karachi, Dacca; 1967; p.70.
5. Personal observation of the author.
6. Amin, Abdur Rasul; (Cf.1); Pp 30-31. and The Saur Revolution?; WUFA: I/2; 1986; Pp 4-5.
7. Siasi Istilahat; ASDP; 1359 = 1980; Pp 47-48
8. Huntington, Samuel P; Political Order in Changing Societies; London; 1975; p.218.
9. Ibid; p.264.
10. PEARS Cyclopaedia, 7th ed; 1969; Suffolk, Great Britain; p L-28.
11. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Micropaedia, 15th ed; III; The University of Chicago, USA; 1974;p.192.
12. The One-Volume English-Persian Dictionary (S. Haim's); Farhang-i-Moaser,Tehran; 1984; p.192.

13. English to English and Urdu Dictionary, 7th ed; Ferozsons Ltd, Lahore; 1978; p.193.
14. The Oxford English Dictionary of Current Usages; Tehran; 1984; p.1081.
15. English to English and Urdu Dictionary; loc.cit; p.781.
16. The One-Volume English-Persian Dictionary; loc. cit; p;1144.
17. Karmanniyee Russko-Urdu Slovar, pocket size; Moscow; p.564.
18. The Oxford Illustrated Dictionary; II;1978;p.1445.
19. The American Heritage Dictionary of English Language, 20th ed; DELL Publishing Co Inc; New York; June 1977; p.604.
20. The Shorter Bartlett's Familiar Quotations; 10th printing; Permabooks, New York ;May 1960; p 11-v.
21. Ibid; p. 11-a.
22. Ibid; p.129-k.
23. Ibid; p.289-f.
24. Ibid; p.375-r.
25. Hameed, A.K. Rai; History of Political Philosophy, I; Aziz Publishers, Lahore; 1981; p. 72.
26. Ibid; p.73.
27. Ibid; p.226.
28. Cole, G.D.H.; Rousseau: The Social Contract - Discourses; Everyman's Library, London; 1955; Pp xv-xvi.
29, Hameed A.K. Rai-I; loc.cit; p.295.
30. Harmon, M. Judd; Political Thought: From Plato to the Present; McGraw-Hill Book Co; (reprinted by the National Book Foundation of Pakistan,Lahore); 1964; Pp.252-3.
31. Cole. G.D.H.; loc.cit; p.xxi.
32. Ibid; p.xv.
33. Harmon, M. Judd; loc.cit; p.227.
34. Rousseau, Jean Jacques; The Social Contract: Discourses : (tr.with introduction by GDH Cole); London; 1955; p.36.
35. Harmon, M. Judd; loc.cit; p.332.
36. Hameed, A.K. Rai-I; loc.cit; p. 356.
37. Huntington, Samuel P; loc.cit; p.264.
38. Ibid; p.266.
39. Ibid; p.265.
40. Ibid; p.265.
41. Ibid; p.269.
42. Judd, C.E.M.; Jadid Siasi Nazriye Ke Ta'aruf (tr. Abdul Mahsi); Majlis-i-Taraqi-i-Adab, Lahore; 1971; p.113.
43. Northedge, F.S.; The International Political System; Faber & Faber, London; 1976; p.123.
44. Wiseman, H.V.; Political Systems: Some Sociological approaches; Routledge & Kegan Paul,London; 1971; p.130.
45. Ibid; p.92.

46. Chalian, Gerarld; Guerilla Warfare (tr. in Pushto; anonymous); NP; ND; Pp.4-5.
47. Siasi Istilahat; ASDP; Pp.45-46.
48. Afghan; Milli Mutaraqi La'r; ASDP; 1358=1979; p.9.
49. Amin, Abdur Rasul; The Saur Revolution?; loc.cit; p.5.
50. Anwar Khan, Mohammad, Dr.; The Muslims of Soviet Russia; The Frontier Post, daily, Peshawar; Friday Supplement; 28.2.1986; p.7.
51. Hameed, A.K. Rai-II; Pp 594-5.
52. Treadgold, Donald V.; Twentieth Century Russia,4th ed; Rand McNally College Publishing Co; Chicago; 1976; p.48.
53. Harmon, M. Judd; loc.cit; p.400.
54. Treadgold, Donald V.; loc.cit; p.47.
55. Hameed, A.K. Rai-II; Pp.604-6.
56. Ibid; p.601.
57. Ibid; p.595.
58. Harmon, M. Judd; loc.cit; p.422.
59. Hameed, A.K. Rai-II; Pp.607-8.
60. Ibid; p.612.
61. Trotsky, Leon; The History of the Russian Revolution (tr. Max Eastman); Victor Gollancz Ltd; London; 1934; p.17.
62. Ibid; p.18.
63. Ibid; p.19.
64. Gough, Katheen; and Sharma, Hari P.; Imperialism and Revolutions in South Asia; People's Publg House, Lahore; 1975; p.vii.
65. Judd, C.E.M; loc.cit; p.115.
66. Suhrawardy, A.H.; The Necessity For Ijtihad;Muslim, daily, Islamabad; 26.11.1982.
67. The Quran; Dar-al-Choura; Beirut, Lebanon; Ist ed; 1980; XIII/11; p.177.
68. Hameed, A.K. Rai-II; loc.cit; p.722.
69. Al-Nadvi, Abul Hassan Ali-ul-Hussain; Insani Dunya Par Musalmanon Kay Uruj-o-Zawal Ka Asar; International Islamic Federation of Student Organization; Salimiah Kuwait; The Holy Koran Publg House, Damuscus, Syria; 1977; Pp 415-7.
70. Ibid; Pp.415-17.
71. The World Book Encyclopedia, Vol 14; Chicago; 1952; p.6896.
72. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia, Vol XV, 15th ed; Chicago, USA; 1974; P. 787.
73. Ibid; p.791.
74. Ibid, Micropaedia; Vol VIII; p.540.
75. Encyclopedia Americana, International ed; Vol 23; New York; 1969; p.445.

...

CHAPTER : II

THE REVOLUTION

The revolution came with all its implications and consequences. But not by itself; nor abruptly. It was the achievement of the PDPA with the favour of many factors. Ignorance of the masses and pedantry of the knowledgeable class; social mixture of contrasting traditional and religious values which proliferated supertitions and, ultimately, resignation to fate; illusion of State control over the autonomous tribes and nationalities; palace intrigues and incapacity of government organs to cope with the requirements of the time; isol-ation of the country from one super-bloc and covetousness of the second are a few factors which contributed to the revolutionary struggles of the political elements. The small land-locked country of about 253,860 square miles,[1] with an estimated population of 17,855,000 (1978) including 2.54% nomads, was groaning under ignorance and poverty. 82.8% of the population were rural and 17.2 urban. (Forty six percent of the se-dentry population was under the age of 15). 51.60% were estimated to be male and 48.40% female.[2] Of the rural population about 5% were landlords; about 65% petty landowners and the remaining 30% landless farmers. This agrarian rural group formed the socio-economic order of the country, basically feudal

and tribal.[3] Although the government boasted of 13% literacy,[4] it was not more than 5%.[5] Modern education flourished with the assistance of various countries; France assisted the Faculty of Medicine, and the Faculty of Law and Political Science, Kabul;F.R. Germany assisted the Faculty of Economics and Natural Sciences Department; USA assisted the Faculties of Engineering, Agriculture and Department of Education at Kabul and the Faculty of Medicine at Jalal Abad; the Soviet Union assisted the Polytechnic Institute, Kabul; and Egypt assisted the Faculty of Theology.[6] The students coming out with conflicting impressions were confronted with unemployment.Highly foreign-educated ones topped the ranks after the World War-II, particularly after the exit of Sardar Daud (1963). The rotting rural, self-educated, government servants found it difficult to adjust themselves under their younger seniors. They were pushed out gradually to accommodate the growing number of educated people in the middle ranks which were also saturated.[7] According to a claim of the PDPA, 5 out of 15 Afghan students in Frankfurt had joined the party after having been disillusioned with imperialism.[8]

During 1970-72, Central Afghanistan was hit by a severe drought and famine. The toll of deaths by starvation was not revealed officially, but, was,

eventually,guessed at as many as 500,000 human and thousands of animal lives. The World Food Programme arranged the supply of 300,000 tons of wheat from Iran, USA, USSR, France, Canada and Peoples Republic of China. The consignment of 56,000 tons of US wheat was delayed in Karachi due to Indo-Pak war. Inside the country, the flow of supply was slow due to bad road conditions and corruption.[9] It was a common belief in Kabul that the wretched Hazara people were bringing their children for sale in the busy streets of the metropolis.[10]

For almost two hundred years, the successive governments of Abdali clans - Sadozai, Barakzai and Musahibeen or Yahya Khel - had hung in the air without the dependable basis of the consent of the ruled. It was only in the 20th century that four attempts of constitutionalization were made. And all the four failed. In fact, it continued for such a long period of history as a tribal confederation in which loyalty to the State was second to loyalty to the family. The Chief of tribal Chiefs, be a king or an Amir, was considered the central authority without the competence of interference in the tribal life of the people which was dictated by traditions. The longest and comparatively peaceful reign of the turbulent history of Afghanistan was that of King Zahir Shah. The Muhasibeen Royal House had an understanding which bound

the two sets of step-brothers to certain modalities. Nadir Shah, Shah Mahmood and Shah Wali were from one mother; Mohammad Aziz, Mohammad Hasham and Abdul Aziz from the other. Mohammad Aziz, assassinated in Berlin as Afghan Minister in 1933, was survived by his two sons Mohammad Daud and Mohammad Naim who played a striking role in palace intrigues and State politics. The understanding was that the king should be from one set and the prime minister from the other. It was violated when Hasham was replaced by Shah Mahmood in 1946, sparking off the lurking tension. The other set, then represented by Daud and Naim exerted all their efforts to achieve their "right".[11] When Daud got the premiership, Sardar Wali son of Marshal Shah Wali had grown strong enough to challenge his authority. Wali courted Princess Bilquis, fiancee of Abdul Azim Ghazi, and ultimately married her.[12] It annoyed Shah Mahmood family. While Zahir Shah was considering abdication in favour of Crown-prince Ahmad Shah, Daud and Wali entered into an underground contest for kingship. Amid the prevailing tension in the Royal House, Dr Anahita Ratibzad was brought up by Qamrul Banat wife of Shah Mahmood, and Babrak Karmal enjoyed the patronage of Sardar Daud. The Royal House had to pay a heavy cost for the exit of Daud in 1963. The suppressed political activists rose in an aggressive mood, for

mysteries of the Royal House were being unfolded; and the fear of the invisible was exorcised. Facts magnified with imagination motivated the vested interests to give vent to their feelings. In one decade of constitutional freedom, five prime ministers, out of the ruling family, were tried.But the situation was going from bad to worse. Even the government press had started criticism of declining services, rising prices, flourishing drug trade, scandals involving government operations, growing signs of moral decadence among rich people of Kabul etc.. It was realised in 1970s that the State was almost bankrupt economically and paralysed politically.[13] Daud mustered the support of the Parcham faction of PDPA, through Karmal, and toppled King Zahir Shah in July 1973. The same day - 17th of July - the Central Committee of PDPA (Khalq) welcomed the end of monarchy and introduction of democracy as the "result of the efforts and struggles of progressive elements including PDPA."[14] The Karmal regime confirmed it by admitting that "both the factions of PDPA declared support to the new republican system at the end of monarchical regime."[15] At that time the PDPA was split and not prepared to overthrow the monarchy, while Mohammad Hasham Maiwandwal to whom the leftists were allergic was believed to be preparing for a coup. The Soviets must have been anxious

to see a putsh. Sardar Daud was given to understand that the situation was ripe for him. He was helped, or dictated, through Parcham to use the KGB recipe of disinformation which has been defined in intelligence terminology as "misleading the adversary".[16] A list of loyal army officers was provided to the intelligence network of Sardar Wali that they were plotting for a coup. Wali prevailed upon the Defence Ministry to sack them. He received, at least, three such lists in early 1970s. Most of the loyal officers whom the leftists feared were removed. Then he had a list of those officers who had pledged support to Maiwandwal and another of Daud supporters when he was arrested.[17] The old folk were disturbed and the young jubilant. The Kabul Times of 29 Aug 1973 carried the translation of a letter from the deposed King dated 21 Asad 1352 (12 Aug), saying;

> "In the name of God, the Merciful and the Compassionate.
>
> My brother, Excellency, the President.
>
> Eversince I heard the news regarding the recent occurence my thoughts were occupied with my country, and was concerned for its future. But as soon as I realised that the people of Afghanistan for future conduct of their national affairs, with absolute majority welcomed a Republican regime, respecting the will of my compatriots I consider myself as having abdicated from the throne of Afghanistan, and herewith I inform you of this resolve. While my wish is for the prosperity of my dear country, I place myself as an Afghan citizen under the banner of Afghanistan. It is my prayer that the Great and Almighty God will ever remain

protector and helper of my country and my compatriots.

Mohammad Zahir."

Daud proclaimed Islamic Republic of Afghanistan[18] and formed a Central Committee, keeping with him portfolios of President, Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister and Defence Minister.[19] The prefix of Islamic was later removed. Circulation of Payam-i-Haq, a government magazine, was stopped for the only reason that it carried the original name of the State. Its 6,000 copies were not circulated.[20] The participants of the coup were given two-step promotion,[21] and a number of junior officers got higher positions of responsibility. The army, already stripped of senior loyal officers, was purged immediately of the "undesirables". The vacuum was filled with accelerated promotions. The majority of these "desirables" and vacuum-fillers belonged to Parcham and Khalq or "independents". Niamatullah Pazhwak, a Parchamite, who was Interior Minister of Shafique cabinet and had betrayed Shafique and Sardar Wali, was retained, for some time, on the post. He recruited 160 Parchamites in the police who were later posted to various parts of the country to work for PDPA against Daud regime.[22] Mohammad Khan Jalalar, the man of all seasons, continued to hold the post of Finance Minister. Faiz Mohammad Mahsud from South Waziristan, graduated from Khushal Khan Lycee, Parcha-

mite and a Jagran in the army, was appointed Interior Minister in place of Pazhwak who took over as Education Minister. Mohammad Wali Mandozai, Director General, Employment of Education Ministry, Parchamite, recruited his partymen.[23] Ajmal Khattak who had absconded from Pakistan in March 1973 after an attack by Peoples Party on a meeting of the opposition on the 23rd March at Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi, was encouraged by Faiz Mohammad to visit Bala Hisar, Police Academy and other sensitive places and entertain his admirers with revolutionary poetry.[24] Dr Mohammad Hassan Sharq who did not profess affiliation with any of PDPA factions, an old protege of Daud, was given the portfolio of First Deputy Prime Ministry. Some other important figures of Daud government who were affiliated with PDPA were; Ghulam Jeelani Bakhtary,Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation; Syed Abdul Illah, Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister;[25] Pacha Gul Wafadar, Minister of Frontier Affairs; Abdul Hamid Mohtat, Minister of Communication;[26] Captain Zia Mohammadzai, Commander of the Republican Guard of 2,000 highly trained troops, promoted to the rank of Major and then Lt. Col in 1975 and appointed Military Attache in New Delhi;[27] Shah Mohammad Dost and Abdul Hadi Mukammal of Foreign Affairs Ministry;[28] Lt. Col Pacha Sarbaz, Chief of Counter-Intelligence;[29] Rahim Rafat of Information Ministry;[30] Lt. Col. Abdul Qadir of Air

Force; Aslam Watanjar, Said Mohammad Gulabzoi, Sher Jan Mazdooryar,[31] Col Rafie of the Army; Samad Azhar, Nasrullah and Yaqub Farooqi of Police in the Secret Service Investigation Cell of the Interior Ministry. Daud realised, at last, that he had been snared. On 9 May 1974, he addressed the nation on the occasion of hoisting the standard of the Republic, saying;

> "The Republican system is completing its tenth month. In this period, we saw many things, heard many things and learnt many things. (Even) our faith and integrity were doubted. We were called to be lacking ideology. We know, and our conscience is clear, what we have done for the country. Let us leave it to the future of the country and history to decide. Nonetheless, we must say something about these people who blame us for this and that. Their blames are biased and baseless. It is rather an insult to the Afghans' patriotism and pride of nationalism. Believe it that these people, who have no faith and principles, have never been the source of (any) great and valuable service to the country and the society, and will never be" 32

Similarly, he declared at the Polytechnic Institute, Kabul, in an address to the students, that he was a Muslim and was not affiliated with any party. He also reaffirmed, in a meeting with a Scouts team, that he did not believe in any -ism but in service to the country.[33] He re-framed his foreign policy, turning now to better relations with Islamic countries and the US-bloc. "Encouraged by a pledge of US $ 7 billion in economic

aid from Tehran, Daud just before his April-1978 fall had tried to eradicate what by then had become an all-pervasive Soviet influence in Afghanistan.He installed strongman Nooristani (Abdul Qadeer, Chief of Police) as his home minister and accepted a unit in Kabul of the dreaded SAVAK (Sazman-i-Amniyat-wa-Ite'la'at-i-Kishwar) - the secret police of the Shah of Iran. The Nooristani-Savak combine began iden - tifying and neutralising the local communists."[34] The shift in the policy of Afghanistan could not pass unnoticed in Moscow. The Soviet Union procrastinated the much needed aid in order to break down Afghanistan economically, while the promises of the Islamic countries had not grown to reality. In Jan 1977, when Daud paid a visit to Moscow, Leonid Brezhnev asked him to "get rid of all those imperialist advisers in your country." Annoyed by the blunt command of the Soviet leader, Daud retorted; "I am the President of an independent country. Nobody has the right to ask me such question. When Afghanistan has no further need of foreign advisers, they all would be asked to leave."[35]

The PDPA was split in four factions; Khalq, Parcham, Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP) of Zahir Ufaq, Achakzai of Qandahar, and Workers Party of Dastgir Panjsheri. The latter two were small groups. There was, however, another force which supported

one or the other faction, as its members or free-lancers. This force, to be called the Third Force, in line with Khalq and Parcham, comprised government servants. Much of the spade-work was being done by the Third Force; systematic elimination of nationalist and Islamic elements, undermining the government programmes and functions, and keeping their respective factions abreast with developments. By the time, activities of Russian agents were also growing to realisation. Russian duty-free shops provided necessities at cheap rates to natives through Russian customers. Diplomatic functions of the Soviet Embassy became more gorgeous and Vodka more popular. Radio stations in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkemenistan charmed the listners in "Afghan Turkistan" with music and songs, and, without much noticeable impact, fertilized the sense of ethnic pride. Some Russians on ordinary jobs were engaged in widening circles and lived permanently in Spinzar Hotel at Kunduz which was the only hotel for the visiting dignitaries. Technical experts were interested more in academic studies than in exploration of natural resources. Abbasov, an engineer of Ginning and Pressing section of Spinzar Shirkat posed to be an ordinary but sociable person to have easy access to any society in Kunduz. After "Saur coup d' etat", he came out to command the show, and was, then, known


to be an authority, higher in status than the Ambassador when the latter was on a visit to Kunduz and stayed at Spinzar Shirkat Hotel. Archi, inhabited by people from Ningrahar, Paktia, Paktika and Ghazni, was called "little Moscow." The residents had been, once, uprooted from their original habitats for political reasons, were despised by Sitam-i-Milli as "usurper." Nazeefullah Nuhzat son of Maulvi Mohammad Sarwar Momand, a member of Khalq could easily exploit their sentiments.[36] It was a joke in Kabul that a lonely Russian or Chinese in the street must be a member of respective Intelligence agency and communist party. The Government Monopoly Department had distributed one-band radios on easy instalments. These radio-sets could catch only Kabul and some Soviet stations.[37]

President Daud removed Pacha Gul Wafadar, Abdul Hamid Mohtat and Faiz Mohammad Mahsud from the cabinet, and appointed Abdul Qadeer Nooristani, Chief of Police, as Interior Minister. Daud had also agreed to cease anti-Pakistan propaganda and expel Ajmal Khattak from Afghanistan.[38] The bell of danger rang which necessitated the alliance of PDPA for joint efforts. Ajmal Khattak who was confined to his residence tried to mediate between Khalq and Parcham. Soviet Ambassador Alexandar Puzanov and the Communist Party of India were also involved in fusion of PDPA factions.[39] The

Parchamites met at the residence of Ghulam Jeelani Bakhtari under the cover of attending Pushto classes conducted by Suleiman Laeq.[40] Khalq, on the other hand, devised broken-chain communication called "Crow's Foot". One person contacted three others individually at unfrequented rendezvous in the darkness. The three were unkown to each other, but to the contact-man. The primary cell was duplicated, triplicated, and so on. Hundreds of cells were built in the army, police and civil services.[41] Taraki's message to Amin was, thus, passed on to a cell of confidants of Amin. Each one of them had a 3-person cell. After 1973-coup, Taraki guided PDPA to take a short-cut to power. Amin was assigned to organize the party in armed forces and inform Taraki weekly of the progress for briefing of the Central Committee in weekly meetings at Taraki's residence.[42] In 1975, Saleh Mohammad Zeray and Abdul Karim Misaq were also assigned to assist Amin in recruitment of armed personnel. In 1977, Amin reported that the armed wing of Khalq was prepared for taking power.

In July/August 1975, Parcham and Khalq held first reconciliation talks which led to final reunification on 3 July 1977 under the supervision of Alexandar A. Novokreshchniko, Second to the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul.[43] Dastgir Panjsheri and Zahir

Ufaq were also brought in to the united PDPA.[44] After almost two years of dialogue, the re-unification was based on two conditions; (a) all the leading organs should comprise equal number of members from both the factions, (b) General Secretary of the Central Committee would be Noor Mohammad Taraki with three other Secretaries - one Khalqi and two Parchamis including Karmal.[45] Karmal succeeded, this time, to prevent admission of Hafizullah Amin to the Secretariat and to get the second position to Taraki. During Daud regime, PDPA had an advantage. Its actual and real rivals, the Islamic and nationalist elements, were removed completely from their way. They were either eliminated or forced to recede from political field or go underground for subversion against the regime. Similarly, the attention of the government was also divided, and priority was given to suppression of active hostility from Pakistan side through the migrants of the Islamic movement. The work of PDPA was made easy. They concentrated more on subversive activities; floating of rumours, criticism of the clergy, backwardness and poverty, and other weaknesses of the government, distribution of ideological literature in the armed forces and of night-bills in the streets. Noor Mohammad Taraki, if he had actually said so, was not wrong to advise his armed cadres through Amin that they should be prepared to take



power. He used to say; "In case imperialist, reactionary or any other group destroyed Daud regime, PDPA should (be able to) take the power..."[46]

Mir Akbar Khyber, Niazi Ghilzai from Logar, leader of Parcham, was assassinated late in the evening of 17th April 1978. His deadbody was found on the road-side north of Government Press. It was not removed to the morgue for autopsy but kept at Micro-royan. On 18th, it was taken in a procession through Ansari Watt, in front of the presidential house, Nadir Pukhtoon Watt and Jadai Maiwand to the cemetry of Shuhadai Swaleheen (the Holy Martyrs)and buried at Neerangi on the road-side. All along the way, the processionists, men and women, were raising slogans in favour of Khalq. In front of the U.S. Embassy, they slowed down, to a standstill, to give an impression that the assassination had been committed at the instance of the USA. In front of the presidential palace, slogans of retaliation were raised and grave concern was expressed over the incident. At the grave, almost all the leftists took an oath for retaliation of the "blood" and the government was held responsible for it.[47] It is not clear as to who had assassinated Khyber, "though the KGB, with a 'team' in Afghanistan came under some suspicion and was undeniably involved in helping to engineer the subsequent coup. The funeral on

19 April (sic) turned into a large-scale anti-American demonstration which gave Daoud the excuse he needed to arrest of the PDPA ruling triumvirate of Taraki, Amin and Karmal a week later."[48] The funeral procession was large and pompous and made a display of resentment against the government.[49] The official history of PDPA claims that about a hundred thousand people participated in the funeral ceremony.[50] It was propagated throughout the country, but the observers knew it well that he had been assassinated by Russians.[51]

"Parcham and Khalq held a joint meeting to plan the overthrow of Sardar Daud. Mir Akbar Khyber, a labour leader and dogmatic communist (sic), opposed establishment of communist government in Afghanistan and emphasized that the time was not ripe for establishment of Communist government in Afghanistan.The situation was not congenial to success of communist government in Afghanistan. The leaders of Parcham & Khalq did not like his arguments. It is worth-mentioning here that only a few of the leaders of Parcham and Khalq belonged to middle or lower stratum. In accordance with my research, Hafizullah Amin got Mir Akbar Khyber assassinated while he was walking back to his home from this meeting. Sardar Daud was disturbed by this sudden assassination. He ordered inquiry. But Parcham and Khalq were not

prepared to give Sardar Daud an opportunity of investigation into the case to unfold the facts, put blame on Parcham and Khalq and vindicate his own position."[52] It was, generally, believed that Mohammad Siddique Alamyar and his brother Mohammad Arif Alamyar, confidants of Amin, were the assassins. They held portfolios of Planning Minister and Head of Transport respectively during the short-lived regime of Hafizullah Amin, and were executed in June 1980 by Karmal regime.[53] This is a pertinent clue to involvement of Amin in this case. But this very important event which led to a change in Afghanistan with universal consequences has been mystified by guess work. A question arises as to why Amin was interested in elimination of Khyber and not Karmal or Taraki. In the factional politics of PDPA, Khyber vied with Taraki and not Amin for leadership, For Russians, Khyber was internationalist, and closer to Moscow than Taraki who was a nationalist socialist. For Karmal, Khyber was the guiding source and force. Qadeer Nooristani had constituted an Inquiry Commission which could not keep pace with the fast-changing situation. It suspected the "Ikhwanul Muslimeen."[54] But none of the leaders or factions of Mujahideen in Pakistan claimed it. They were rather emotionally unanimous on the version of Amin's involvement in the case. The silence of successive PDPA governments

suggests that it was the Great Leader of Saur Revolution, Noor Mohammad Taraki, who wanted to remove the stumbling block from his way for two reasons; (a) ideological and (b) personal. His this wish was implemented by his obedient student Hafizullah Amin. Nonetheless, it is open to question. The main point in this episode is the agreement of all the sources on the unprecedented size of the funeral procession and the anti-government sentiments of the people; their demonstrations in front of the US Embassy and the presidential palace; and the bewilderment of the government. The burial was followed, as usual, by condolence meetings, in typical Afghan style, for three days at Pule Khishti mosque, much against the will of the government.

Daud cabinet met on Monday, 24th April 1978, and decided to round-up the small group of communists in civil and armed services, and record its reaction for future line of action. The information leaked out. Daud was pressing for the arrest of PDPA leaders and members of its Central Committee by Tuesday evening without fail. Instead, the Kabul Police prepared the plan and organized parties for simultaneous raids. The party led by Dagarwal Asadullah Ahmadzai raided the house of Taraki at 10 p.m. on 25th. The wife of Noor Mohammad Taraki blocked their entry and resisted all the courtesy and pleas offered by the Police until

her right hand, which had a scab, was slightly injured by a nail to bleed. The Police, still trying to console her, being a lady, and making an apology, forced their entry and searched the house. A big quantity of documents, which bore testimony of direct link of his party with the Soviet Union, was recovered. The material was stuffed in bags and Taraki was given a proper receipt for it. It was preserved for legal evidence. At about 4 a.m. of 26th, Taraki was put in the prison of Kabul Police Headquarters, after his medical check-up. By that time, Babrak Karmal, Dastgir Panjsheri, Nizamuddin Tehzeeb, Dr Shah Wali and Abdul Hakim Sharayee Jauzjani had been interned. The party assigned to arrest Hafizullah Amin exercised negligence. Mohammad Isa Noorzad, Chief Of Intelligence of Interior Ministry, informed him to escape. Isa's brother Mohammad Sakhi Noorzad was then Mayor of Kabul. These two brothers did not experience any inconvenience until their departure on valid passports for India after the Soviet invasion. Both the brothers left India for the USA for permanent resettlement.[55]

The short time given Hafizullah Amin by the raiding party was critical. "Comrade Amin was asleep on the night when his son Comrade Abdur Rahman shouted 'Police! Hearing the cry, Comrade Amin took immediately the lists of armed officers from the

almirah and threw it to the scarf of his wife. His wife took those lists, wrapped in her scarf, to the bedroom of the daughters. The Police entered the bedroom of Comrade Amin and put all the books and progressive materials in those bags, which they had brought with them and were taken away by the police-men. They informed Comrade Amin that his house had been besieged by the Police on duty and that he could not leave the house, but his children could move out and in." During this time, as claimed by the PDPA, Amin sent a message to Said Mohammad Gulabzoi to start action at 9 a.m. on 27th April. Gulabzoi was directed to carry the message to the high command cadres in the Air Force and Air Defence Units at Khwaja Rawash Kabul. Not only the movements of his children were not checked, but Amin was allowed to receive some Khalqis at home and discuss with them, and even put in on paper, the plot of the overthrow of Daud regime. He received Comrades Faqir and Zarif at home. Preparation of the plot and issuance of the order concluded at 10.30 a.m. After that, Hafizullah Amin was taken by armed police in three vehicles to prison at 10.45 a.m.[56] Amin gave Faqir Mohammad Faqir an elaborate set of orders of be delivered to Gulabzoi and other key officers. These orders specified the following appointments:

Comrade Aslam Watanjar; Comd of all Ground Forces.

Com. Abdul Qadir; Comd, all Air Forces.
Coms. Aslam Watanjar, Sherjan Mazdooryar and Asadullah Payam; Unit Comds of 4 Armd Corps.
Coms. Abdul Majid and Mustafa; Comds, 15 Armd Corps.
Com. Agha Mohammad; Comd of the Guards.
Com. Mohammad Ali; Comd, 7 Div at Reshkhor.
Com. Allauddin; Comd, 8 Div, Qargha.
Com. Mohammad Dost; Comd, 32 Bde.
Com. Shaikh Ahmad; Comd, 88 Artillery Unit.
Com. Shah Nawaz; Comd, Commandos.
Com. Sharafuddin; Comd, Paratroopers.
Com. Nek Mohammad; Comd, Military Police.
Com. Sardar Mohammad; Comd, Pule Charkhi Workshop and Technical Services.
Com. Inzar Gul; Comd, Defence Ministry Headquarters.
Com. Bahram; Comd, 11 Div, Ningrahar.
Com. Nazar Mohammad; Comd, Khwaja Rawash Airport.
Com. Hashim; Comd, Bagram Airport.
Com. Bahram; Comd, Shindand Airport.
Com. Azam; Comd, Balkh Airport.
Com. Mir Najibullah; Comd, Qandahar Airport.
Com. Abdul Haq; Comd, Air Defence.
Com. Ali Shah; Comd, 99 Rocket Bde.

The above commanders were ordered to contact their party colleagues. All Khalqi officers should be informed individually to report to their respective unit commanders at 8 a.m. of the 27th April, asking them what they wished to say now that they had been summoned. The commanders should ask them to wait until all the colleagues were present before their commanders.

The revolution would be announced by Comrade Aslam Watanjar at 9 a.m. of the 27th April at the Headquarters of the Armd Corps for his colleagues. Two tanks from the Armd Corps should move towards Khwaja Rawash Airport where Comrade Gulabzoi would be waiting for them. Immediately upon his arrival

at the airport headquarters, the tank commander would call "Comrade Sayed Mohammad" upon which the latter would order the capture of the airport. Comrade Nazar Mohammad would take the command of the Khwaja Rawash airport. Comrade Abdul Qadir would leave for Bagram airport in a helicopter and after contacting Com. Hashim instruct Com. Sakhi to issue the order for the flight of the aeroplanes by Comrade Hashim. Com. Abdul Qadir would immediately return to Khwaja Rawash airport by helicopter to assume the charge of the Air Force. The Comd of the Armd Corps would first capture Radio Afghanistan so that the citizens of Kabul should presume that the Khalqis had wrested power, and then open fire on the Arg. The Comrades in other regiments should carry out the following duties:

1. The anti-aircraft batteries in and around Kabul should block the movements in favour of Daud by the 7 and 8 Divisions.
2. The Comrades in all detachments should not allow their respective units to defend Daud by either neutralising these units or bringing them under control.
3. The aeroplanes should, upon the instructions issued to them by the party leadership, deal the anti-revolution forces the necessary blows. 57

Said Mohammad Gulabzoi contacted Mohammad Dost, Ali Shah, Asadullah and Said Daud Taroon near Deh Mazang in the morning of 27th and passed on Amin's final instructions. Aslam Watanjar announced the revolution "with a high spirit and in firm revolu-

tionary phraseology." He assumed the command and moved first tank from Pule Charkhi at 11.30 a.m. The Defence Minister was disinformed that some students were preparing to come out and they might arouse the masses in support. Jagran Mohammad Rafie of 4 Armd Corps proposed declaration of emergency. 4 and 15 Armd Corps, stationed at Pule Charkhi, were ordered to go in operation. One Kandak of each moved. They occupied the radio station first and given in charge of Khial Mohamad Katawazi. The roads and streets were occupied and the presidential house was attacked. The detained leaders were released. Dagarwal Abdul Qadir had been suspended some time back and then reinstated. He killed General Mousa, Comd of Air Force and Air Defence, took a helicopter, flew to Bagram and led the air attack on the President Guard and Reshkhor Division.[58]

Not all units welcomed the call for a revolution. The Daudist forces began to realise the full danger. Both sides initiated battle manoeuvres.The Commanding Officer of 15 Armd Corps, Colonel Mohammad Yusuf, led his tanks against the rebels.He sent two armoured personnel carriers (APCs) to block off the military section of Khwaja Rawash airport,Kabul, and informed Defence Minister that 4 Armd Corps had revolted. Defence Minister, General Rasuli, ordered

at 9.30 a.m. to suspend all communications between the Defence Ministry and the 4 Armd Corps. He telephoned all military units in Kabul area and ordered all troops and vehicles to converge on the presidential house. Most unit commanders, however, chose to do nothing until the action developed.[59] According to hour-to-hour account of Louis Dupree, Aslam Watanjar dispatched 9 light tanks to Kabul, while he rode in the lead, heavy T-62, about 40 to 50 of which lumbered towards Kabul. The nine light tanks sped past the U.S. Embassy about 11 a.m. Following are some excerpts from Dupree's account:[60]

> "Meanwhile, Commando units under Rasuli's orders tried to reach the Presidential Palace. They were blocked by Khalqi T-54 tanks and their commander was killed. Comrade Shah Nawaz took command,but most of the Commandos sullenly refused to fight against Daud. They were disarmed and held under guard. General Rasuli contacted the Shindand Air Base because neither he nor Daud completely trusted the pilots at Bagram Air Base. The Shindand C.O. ultimately scrambled to Kabul with two fully armed MIG-21s. The 40-50 tanks led by Watanjar arrived in Kabul just before noon and began to fan out to pre-assigned points. Communications between some elements broke down almost immediately, and tank commanders often could not tell friend from foe. So, whenever a tank hove into the sights of another, a firefight resulted.Apparently, of the four Khalqi tanks destroyed on April 27, bazookamen of the Republican Guard accounted for two and Khalqi tanks the other two. Even at noon, only a very few in Kabul realised a coup was in progress. The rebels quickly occupied the Ministry of Defence, thus immobilizing any attempts by Daudist officers to contact provincial units for help. Most Unit

commanders set tight until the fighting ended and the victors emerged. Only the Jalalabad commander and some of his staff resisted, but, again, too little and too late. Daud's forces still controlled the Khwaja Rawash airport. Two Khalqi tanks were dispatched to capture this important objective. Comrade Gulabzoi was seriously wounded in the fighting and had to be removed to a hospital. The Khalqi tanks took the airport after a brief firefight. Qadir and Watanjar tried to direct the widespread fighting, largely unsuccessfully, until 1700. The accurate bazooka fire and the aggressive defense by Presidential Guard forced the tanks to move out of range. Some went to Pakhtunistan square, others to nearby crossroads, but they kept the Presidential Palace surrounded. About 1300, Daud ordered General Rasuli to go to Qargha Rocket Arty Base personally and find out why the rocket arty units and 8 Div had not come to his rescue. General Rasuli sped through the tanks in his staff car. In a road accident at Ansari cross, his arm was smashed. He finally got part of 8 Div moving under the command of his son-in-law. But Col Allauddin, a Khalqi tank commander, alongwith several junior officers halted the advance near Polytechnic Institute, strung up Rasuli's son-in-law by his heels, and returned to Qargha. Two MIGs from Shindand appeared over Kabul about 1430. They had come in response to Daud's call for air support. Having flown 450 miles, the aircraft had only enough fuel to remain over Kabul for 10 minutes and return to their base. No ground-to-air contact could be made with the circling aircraft, so they could not be given targets. The pilots had no way of determining friend from foe. They circled fruitlessly until their fuel ran low, then returned to Shindand without firing a shot or launching a single rocket.

"In the meantime, back at Qargha, General Rasuli tried to get the officers in charge of SAMs to prepare them for action. The officers, though not Khalqis, procrastinated, for they wanted to wait and see who would win and, naturally, be on the winning side. At about 1530, the first two SU-7s slashed through the sky and fired rockets and 20 mm cannon shells into the Presidential Palace with precise accuracy. The jets also fired into the Qargha area, where fight

had broken out between Daudists and Khalqis. Colonel Karim, Khalqi Comd of anti-aircraft troops, ordered fire on 8 Div loyalists, and defeated their holdouts. Many of them joined in with the Khalqis. By 1700, Rasuli accompanied by Abdul Aziz, Chief of Staff, and Abdul Ali, Comd Officer of Central Forces Kabul, reached Reshkhor and made preparations to mov 7 Div commanded by Major General Nazim to Kabul. Air strikes from Bagram began in earnest about 1600. Flights of two MIG-21s or SU-7s remained constantly in the air until about 1730. Never more than six were over Kabul at one time.

"Radio Afghanistan finally fell to an armour infantry assault at 1730. Luckily for the rebels, the broadcasting equipment was almost completely intact. At the same time, assault teams smashed through the prison walls and liberated Taraki, Amin and their fellow inmates. The Khalqi command post moved from Khwaja Rawash to Radio Afghanistan. Amin went to Radio Afghanistan to take command of the final operations, a gesture indicating the subordinance of the military to the Khalqi civilian cadre. Colonel Qadir escorted Taraki to Khwaja Rawash airport for safe-keeping, and Major Watanjar continued to run the military mop-up. Meanwhile, back at Reshkhor Garrison, Rasuli (still in great pain) and other pro-Daud generals tried to shape up 7 Div. Pro-Khalq officers tried to take command and failed. Major Mohammad Ali was "martyred". The Khalqis went on the air in Kabul about 1800 and announced a curfew from 2000 to dawn, and informed the public that an important announcement would be made at 1900. By that time, 7 Div moved in full battle gear in parade ground formation along the broad 5-KM road leading from Darul Aman towards Deh Mazang. The tight columns made easy targets for the persistent fighters and fighter-bombers, and by midnight the 7th broke up as an effective fighting unit. The infantry never reached the centre of Kabul, but sporadic skirmishes continued in the Reshkhor area until late in the afternoon. Like many other survivors of the day's fighting, a great number of the soldiers simply took off for home and never returned.

"The Khalqi rebels hunted down Rasuli and three other Generals: Mohammad Musa, Chief of Staff, Abdul Aziz, and Abdul Ali. They were found

> hiding in a chicken coop and in the resulting Battle of the Chicken Coop, all four were killed. (n. Chief of Staff was Abdul Aziz.) Straffing and rocketing had taken a heavy toll among the Presidential Guard, and as dawn approached, the survivors, singly and in small groups began to fade away. With little hope and less ammunition, the remaining small groups surrendered about 0430, April 28,1979."

The revolutionary government announced the death of Syed Abdul Illah, Vice President, Defence Minister General Ghulam Haidar Rasuli, Interior Minister Abdul Qadeer and Commander of Air Force and Air Defence Gen Mohammad Moosa.[61]

At 7 p.m. of 27th April, when Dagarwal Abdul Qadir and Jagran Aslam Watanjar were making announcements of the revolution over radio Kabul, fight in the Presidential House continued and Daud was still alive. He heard the proclamation before his death.[62] The fight continued for more than ten hours. On 28th and 29th, a Revolutionary Council was formed and on 30th, Noor Mohammad Taraki was elected unanimously as President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the State.[63] On 29th April, a Decree was issued by the Armed Forces Council,saying;[64]

> "In the name of God Almighty!
>
> Historical decree of the Revolutionary Council of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan,dated 9th Saur 1357, corresponding to April 29, 1978, 9 p.m.
>
> The Revolutionary stand of the patriotic officers and soldiers of Afghanistan at the will of the people of Afghanistan took place on Saur Seven 1357.
>
> This stand which is considered the beginning

of the democratic and national revolution of Afghanistan broke up the despotic regime of Mohammad Daud in less than 24 hours and laid the foundation of a democratic and national order under the powers of the revolutionary council of the armed forces in Afghanistan. Hence in order that this revolution of Saur Seven performs its grave democratic and national duties in creative all round and effective manner the Revolutionary Council of the Armed Forces transferred all high state powers to the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and merged itself in the latter council.

In accordance with the resolution of the Revolutionary Council of the Armed Forces execution of the democratic and national responsibilities rests with the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan."

On the first of May, 1978, the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan announced the first cabinet which, combined with the portfolios held by Taraki, was as under;[65]

Noor Mohammad Taraki, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister.
Babrak Karmal, Vice Chairman of the R.C., and Deputy Prime Minister.
Hafizullah Amin, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Communications.
Abdul Qadir, Minister of National Defence.
Shah Wali, Dr; Minister of Public Health.
Noor Ahmad Noor, Minister of Interior.
Dastgir Panjsheri, Minister of Education.
Sultan Ali Keshtmand, Minister of Planning.
Suleiman Laeq, Minister of Radio and Television.
Saleh Mohammad Zeray, Dr; Minister of Agriculture.
Abdul Karim Misaq, Minister of Finance.
Mohammad Hassan Baraq Shafiyee, Minister of Information and Culture.
Abdul Hakim Sharayee, Minister of Justice and Attorney General.
Anahita Ratibzad, Dr; Minister of Social Affairs.
Abdul Qudus Ghorbandi, Minister of Commerce.

Mohammad Ismail Danish, Eng; Minister of Mines and Industries.
Mohammad Rafie, Major, Minister of Public Works.
Mohammad Mansur Hashmi, Minister of Water and Power.
Mohammad Soma, Minister of Higher Education.
Nizamuddin Tehzeeb, Minister of Frontier Affairs.

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was recognized by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, India, Mongolia, Czechekoslavakia, Cuba, Poland,[66] Pakistan, Turkey, Democratic Peoples Republic of Yemen, Vietnam, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Iran,[67] the U.S.A., Britain, South Korea, Italy, Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic,[68] Saudi Arabia, Syria, Bangladesh, Japan, Canada,[69] Australia, Nepal,[70] Iraq, Egypt, North Korea, Ethiopia,[71] Denmark, Belgium, Norway and Holland.[72] It occupied all the international seats, also, held by the previous regimes of Afghanistan.

Conclusion:

The change in Afghanistan that took place in April 1978 was not abrupt. It was the outcome of political struggles of the PDPA which had formally come into being on 01 January 1965. The parties involved in the final show-down were the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the PDPA, and not a few high-ups. The PDPA's armed wing assisted by cadres in the civil services launched their offensive in broad-day light, a challenge to the established government with all her resources and forces, and the people watched the fight with habitual indifference and curiosity for more than

ten hours. It was preceded by about 10 days of demonstrations against the government following the assassination of Mir Akbar Khyber; thousands of people turned out to participate in these demonstrations and shouted slogans against the U.S. imperialism and the Daud regime. The pledge solemnized at the grave of Khyber by the PDPA leadership could not be considered a strategy of a coup d' etat by any norm of politics. It was revolutionary. The old system of Daud's Republic which was nationalist dictatorship was destroyed completely and a new system of Democratic Republic based on socialist dictatorship was introduced. The PDPA government of Noor Mohammad Taraki adopted the socialist system of the USSR and embarked on implementation of the party's policy, without taking into consideration the general will of the people, which resulted in many problems at national as well as international level. Implementation of the party's policy by the revolutionary government is being analysed in the following chapter.

--

References:

1. Shah Zaman; Humanitarian Assistance Programme for Afghan Refugees in NWFP; CAR, Peshawar; Dec 1985; p.1.
2. Ma'loomat-i-Ihsa'eyayee Afghanistan; Issue No 4; Republic of Afghanistan; 01 Sartan 1356 = 22 June 1976; p.16.
3. Amin, Abdur Rasul; Brief Analysis of Characteristics of the Afghan Society (typescript); p.2.

4. Fullerton, John; The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan; p.222.
5. Bandewal, Numa Khan, ex-Adviser Education Ministry, Afghanistan; an Afghan emigre'.
6. Azam, G.H.; Afghanistan:..; Peshawar; 1982; p.79
7. Dupree, Louis; Afghanistan; 1978; p.657.
8. Fullerton, John; loc.cit; p.30.
9. Arnold, Anthony; Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism; 1983; p.43.
10. Heard from many people by the author who was then in Kabul.
11. Shams, Shamsul Huda; an Afghan emigre'.
12. An Afghan, close to the Royal House, en emigr'.
13. Newell Richard S; The Government of Mohammad Mousa Shafique; Central Asian Survey; Oxford, OXI 2NJ; England; July 1982; p.54.
14. Da Afghanistan Da Khalko Da Demokratic Gund (PDPA) Land Tarikh; Kabul; 1357 = 1978; p.61.
15. Da Afghanistan Da Khalk Demokratic Gund Da Fa' aleeno Rahmuma; Swaloona Au Zhwaboona NP; ND; p.19.
16. For detailed study on strategy of Disinformation of KGB, read "New Lies For The Old" by Anatoly Golitsyn, an ex-KGB officer, pub. DODD,MEAD & Co; New Yor; 1984. And "The Soviet Dirty Tricks Squad"; Newsweek,weekly; 23.11.1981; p.52.
17. Arnold, Anthony; Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective; 1981; p.58. The author was then in Kabul and heard it from many Kabulites.
18. Qudus Hashmi, Abdul, Syed, Allama; Tarikh-ul-Afghan by Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani (tr. addition and completion); Karachi; 1982; p.198.
19. Afghanistan: Yesterday and Today; ORBIS Press Agency; 1982; p.14.
20. Dastan-i-Mazalim (tr.from Impact International; 13.9.1974); Pp.14-15.
21. Siddique, Mohammad Zahir, Dr; Az Ishghal-i-Chekoslavakia Ta Tajawuz Bar Afghanistan; 1363 = 1984; Pp 88-89.
22. Arnold, Anthony; (Cf.17); Pp.57-58.
23. Ikram, Mohammad Asef; Russo-Afghan Relations; WUFA, Peshawar; I/1; 1985; p.58.
24. Personal knowledge.
25. Dupree, Louis; Red Flag Over Indukush-I; 44; 1979; p.12.
26. Male, Beverley; Revolutionary Afghanistan; 1982; p.57.
27. Arnol, Anthony; (Cf.17); p.63.
28. Kodetaha-i-Kamunistee Dar Afghanistan; 4 Hoot 1357 = 23.2.1979; p.37.
29. Arnold, Anthony (Cf.9); p.59.
30. Nayar Kuldip; Report on Afghanistan; New Delhi; 1981; p.14.

31. Arnold, Anthony (Cf.17); p.57.
32. Da Khpalwakai Taroon; Republic of Afghanistan, Kabul; 1353 = 1974; Pp.22-23.
33. Dastan-i-Mazalim; loc.cit; Pp.14-15.
34. Salamat Ali; A Temptation That Was Too Strong To Resist; Far East Economic Review;23.1.1981;p.28.
35. Nayar, Kuldip; loc.cit; p.14. and Arnold,Anthony; Cf.17; p.65.
36. Psarlay, Mohammad Siddique, an Afghan emigre'.
37. Nangial, Shuhrat; Pa Afghanistan Ki Da Kamunistano Da Qadrat Ta Raseedelo Pa Hakla; 1359 =1980; p.42.
38. Male, Bevereley; loc.cit; p.57.
39. Ibid; p.59.
40. Arnold, Anthony; Cf.9; p.166.
41. Nayar,Kuldip; loc.cit; p.104.
42. Da Saur Da Inqilab Pa Hakla; Kabul; 01 Jauza 1357 =22.5.1978; Pp.6-7.
43. Cf.9; Pp.50-54.
44. Nangial, Shuhrat; Da Afghanistan Siasi Ahzab;1360 = 1981; p.43.
45. For detailed account, refer to DRA's official publications; (a) Da Saur DaInqilab Pa Hakla, (b) Da Afghanistan Da Khalko Da Demokratic Gund Land Tarikh.
46. Da Saur Da Inqilab Pa Hakla; p.15.
47. Siddique, Mohammad Zahir, Dr; loc.cit; Pp.91-92.
48. Griffith, John C; Afghanistan; Key To a Continent; 1981; p.182.
49. Azam, G.F.; loc.cit; p.99.
50. Land Tarikh PDPA; p.83.
51. Haqshnas, S.N., Dr.; Dasaes Wa Jinayat-i-Russ Dar Afghanistan; 1363= 1984; p.294.
52. Ghilzai, Nasrullah; Afghanistan: Maazi Aur Haal Kay Aeenay Mayn; ND; p.149-50.
53. Cf.9; p.58.
54. Ibid.
55. A high-ranking Police Officer who was involved directly in the operation; does not like to be identified.
56. For further information, refer to "Da Saur Da Inqilab Pa Hakla"; Pp 17-28.
57. Dupree, Louis; Red Flag Over The Hindukush-II; 1979/45; Pp.15-16.
58. Zadran, Gul Zarak; Da Afghanistan Da Jihad Tarikh (Landiz); 1363=1983; Pp.134ff.
59. Cf.57; p.6.
60. Ibid; Pp.6ff.
61. Kabul Times; 4.5.1978.
62. An Afghan Lady; close to Royal House; emigre'.
63. Da Saur Da Inqilab Pa Hakla; loc.cit. p.46.
64. Kabul Times; 4.5.1978.
65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.
67. Kabul Times; 6.5.1978.
68. Ibid. 7.5.1978.
69. Ibid. 10.5.1978.
70. Ibid. 11.5.1978.
71. Ibid. 13.5.1978.
72. Ibid. 15.5.1978.

...

CHAPTER : III

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REVOLUTION

While it may be easy to rise on the crest of popularity and enter the citadel of power, it is very difficult to translate into reality the ideals for which revolutionary movements, in the first instance, are launched. Once in power, you simply cannot break the ice without a concrete planning which requires a lot of research work. Good revolutionaries are those who are faithfully fed by party activists of the prioritised needs of the man in the street; of correct statistics; of various tricks of the trade which the bourgeois employ to defeat their policies with the sole objective of discrediting the system after which the proletariat hankers.[1]

The last battle was over. The PDPA rose to power after a bloody show-down. The toll of casualties became another mystery like many other events of the history of Afghanistan. Noor Mohammad Taraki stated in a press statement that not more than 100 people had died,[2] but later the official figures showed only 40 deaths including 10 of "Nadir dynasty".[3] Anthony Hyman has mentioned official statistics as 101 including 17 of Daud, Naim and their families, while estimating at 1,000 deaths from other sources.[4] According to Newells, Peabody Nancy and Richard S.,

"Loyal Units continued to resist in and near Kabul until next day, but lacking a leader and central coordination, most military submitted to the victo-rious Marxists by the end of April 28. Khalq had been suddenly, violently, and spectacularly successful. Estimates of deaths from the fighting vary widely, from as few as 100 to 10,000."[5] The correct number of casualties has been distorted so much by rhetorics of both sides that it has become very difficult, if not impossible, to determine it. But there is no doubt that the fighting was fast and decisive and both parties had suffered losses. The victors were so jubilant and proud that they exhibited the chopped head of Daud for some days to impress upon the people that "Lewanay Sardar", whom the people considered Terrible, was killed.

At the time of revolution, the membership of the PDPA was estimated at 5,000 by Zalmay Khalilzad and Richard Nations,[6] whereas the party leaders claimed 18,000,[7] and the Soviet scholars approximated to "not more than 20,000 by mid-'70s."[8] The Soviet sources give the PDPA credit for having organized more than 20,000 meetings, demonstrations and marches of protest during 1965-73.[9] In mid-1985, the PDPA leaders claimed 140,000 members.[10] In a population of 17.855 million the ratio of the PDPA members, according to the party claims, was nearly 1 : 1,000

in April 1978 and 1 : 400 in 1985. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) claims 24,000 membership in March 1917; more than 100,000 in April 1917; 350,000 in October 1917; and about 19,000,000 in 1985 which form 9.5% of the adult population of the Soviet Union.[11] In 1978, the civil service personnel of Afghanistan numbered over 100,000 including every one; teachers, doctors, lawyers, diplmats etc, receiving salary from the government budget.[12] So was the army. Prior to the Soviet invasion, the Afghan armed forces had numbered close to 100,000.[13] For 5,000; 18,000 or even 20,000 party members it was not at all possible to perform the duties of one hundred thousand civil and one hundred thousand army employees.They needed cooperation, support and backing of these people to run the government. The government servants, civil or army, are normally cut off from the social strata. They live on salaries and fringe benefits, and feel flattered by status and privileges. Theyusually do not hesitate in changing loyalty. The PDPA leadership did not take into account this vital instrument of government and "almost immediately after seizing power, the Taraki regime had dismissed a large number of Afghans holding important positions in the civil and development bureaucracies who were suspected of being anti-Communist. The dismissal of a

large number of men of training and experience severely weakened the administration, which was never very strong. The weakness was felt in no time throughout the country when the government sought to implement a series of radical reforms through the derelict administrative machinery. The dismissals also alienated many educated middle-class people from the regime. When these people returned to their homes in the provincial towns and villages they were easily drawn to the ranks of the rebels."[14]

By a decree dated 29 April 1978, power was transferred to the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan which comprised 35 members including 5 army officers of the Revolutionary Council of the Armed Forces. "Envoys from the acting foreign ministry delivered notes to all diplomatic embassies in Kabul. Abdul Hadi Mukammal, educated in the USSR, delivered the message to the Soviet bloc countries. Shah Mohammad Dost, educated in the West, visited the American, West European, Chinese, and non-aligned embassies. The notes announced the formation of the new government, and stated that the DRA would honour all commitments between earlier Afghan governments and other nations."[15] In order to legitimize the decrees of the Revolutionary Council, the Revolutionary Council of the Armed

Forces issued the following decree:

"The domestic policy of the Revolionary Council of the National Armed Forces of Afghanistan is based on protection of the principles of the Holy Islamic religion, ensuring of democracy, individual freedom and security, realisation of advancement and progress of our beloved country Afghanistan.

The foreign policy of the Revolutionary Council of the National Armed Forces of Afghanistan consists of pursuing a policy of positive and active neutrality, support to peace in the region and the world, good neighbourliness and friendship with all countries on the basis of peaceful co-existence and respect to the Charter of the United Nations..

1. The self-styled constitution of Mohammad Daoud is officially declared abrogated and his state and despotic government is deposed and henceforth all affairs of the country shall be conducted through decrees and instructions of the Revolutionary Council of the Armed Forces.
2. The Revolutionary Council of the Armed Forces is in full control of the situation and all units of the armed forces of the country have declared their loyalty to the Revolutionary Council of the Armed Forces and perform their patriotic duties.
3. Those Generals and Ministers in office of the deposed regime of Mohammad Daoud who have not reported to the Revolutionary Council of the Armed Forces should do so at the earliest possible at the Ministry of National Defence otherwise they will be dealth with in accordance with the regulations of the martial law.
4. In accordance with the martial law regulations until further notice all kind of gathering is forbidden.
5. The people should continue their work and life as usual with full confidence." 16

The Revolutionary Council of the Armed Forces notified the deaths of Daud and Naim on 28 April, next day of the revolution; "The Muslim and hard-working people of dear Afghanistan are hereby

informed that two brothers Mohammad Daoud and Mohammad Naim, traitors to the country, inspite of repeated calls of the Revolutionary Council of the Armed Forces that they should surrender, were killed due to their mad and ambitious resistance. During the revolutionary stand of Seventh Saur 1357 of the National Armed Forces of Afghanistan, which ended with least possible toll, Sayed Abdullah, Vice-President, General Ghulam Haidar Rasuli, Minister of Defence, Abdul Qadeer, Minister of Interior, and General Mohammad Moosa, Commander of the Air Force and Air Defence of Daoud's regime, inspite of warnings of the revolutionary Armed Forces that they should surrender were killed due to their ambitious and anti-revolution resistance."[17]

The Revolutionary Council abrogated the constitution, and laws which did not conform with the objectives of the revolution. Military courts were instituted for trial of cases under martial law.They were concerned mainly with cases of resistance and counter-revolution. The PDPA formed its own courts called Mehkama-i-Hizbi for accountability of party members. Civil courts, however, continued to function. Nevertheless, their jurisdiction was restricted to minor acts of violation of existing laws. They were, infact, ineffective. Gradually the three types of courts intruded in each other's jurisdic-

tion. The factual commanding status was acquired by AGSA (Da Afghanistan Da Gato Da Satelo Idara = The Secret Service which succeeded Masooniat-i-Milli of Daud regime). The legal procedure was disturbed by unwarranted changes in civil administration. The inexperienced, and, in some cases, under-educated,party activists jumped high to occupy chairs of responsi - bility, and imposed themselves arrogantly on the older staff members who had long careers of service and experience. Personal jealousy and minor differences of opinion caused accusations of treason, counter-revolution, imperialist-agent etc. against the government servants. The Khalq-Parcham factional tussle fuelled the mounting unrest The services were haunted by distrust and were subjected to consequential purges. The courts were not able to meet the legal requirements. They were dictated by the AGSA.[18] The majority of government employees were overtaken by the change unawares. They tried to adjust themselves. They joined one or the other faction of the PDPA as a mark of pledge to the revolutionary regime. But, it did not work. The government servants, in general, could not break with their traditional attachment with social strata. Frequent reshuffles and purges, and, in most cases, 'eye-opener' punishments created Khalq-phobia. Insecurity of service, property and life unnerved the government

servants. They were left with two choices; (a) escape, or (b) be more loyal than the king. Each way led to harms. In urban society, the repercussions were wary. The common-man who was not affected directly by the changes was jubilant. It was the small group of religious hierarchy and the moneyed people of Kabul who started feeling the pinch. But in rural areas, particularly on the Durand Line, the situation was different. The tribal and ethnic groups were moved only when the party members of low status took over the charge and challenged rudely the authority of the local chiefs and Mullahs.[19]

The PDPA announced the policy of its government. It was a part of a speech of Taraki which was broadcast over radio Kabul on 9 May 1978, whereas the booklet which contains the text of the speech was dated 7 Saur 1357, the day of the revolution. Fifty thousands copies of this booklet were printed in 5 main languages - Pushto, Dari, Uzbeki, Baluchi and Nooristani at the Education and Training Press, Kabul. Main features of the policy are as under:

1. Agrarian reforms, reclamation of barren land, improvement and extension of irrigation system, solution of the problem of pastures.
2. Abolition of old feudal and pre-feudal systems.
3. Internal and external trade to be regulated in the interest of the people and the country.
4. Improvement of State sector; effective control of natural resources; and training of national cadres.

5. Democratization of social life and State institutions.

6. Demoratic solution of national problem.

7. Eradication of influence of imperialism and its related neo-colonialism in various fields, particularly in economic, political, cultural and ideological.

8. Purge of State institutions of people who are opposed to revolution, democracy,people and country.

9. Strengthening of armed forces for defence of the revolution and its output; grant of political and social rights to the officers and soldiers of the armed forces.

10. Ensure democratic rights and freedoms of workers, peasants, craftsmen,intellectuals, patriotic clergy, hard-working nomads,lower and middle classes and groups i.e. traders and nationalist capitalists of the country; Ensure democracy in the interest of the people; meet the economic and class requirements.

11. Frame and implement democratic laws; abolition of all those institutions and abrogation of all those laws which are not in conformity with aspirations and principles of the revolution of 7 Saur 1357.

12. Ensure equal rights of women to men in all the social, economic, political, cultural and civil fields.

13. Democratic solution of the problem of nomads.

14. Promotion of indigenous industry and productivity against foreign goods; promote, control and guide investments in small and middle industries and institutions.

15. Strengthening and encouragement of economic relations with, and technical assistance of, fiendly countries for development of the country.

16. Thorough review of the State budget in favour of productivity, education, health, construction and general developments.

17. Review of State revenue system to reduce indirect finances and increase direct finances.

18. Stability and control of prices at reasonable level.

19. Ensure compulsory and free elementary education to all children who fall in that age group; create congenial conditions to fight against illiteracy.

20. Expand free education at middle and high levels and technical institutes; review the curricula of schools and higher institutions.

21. Ensure congenial conditions for education, and publication of literature, in mother tongues of the tribes and nationalities of Afghanistan for evolution of a national and progressive culture.

22. Free medical service; elimination of anti-social business in medical practices; fight against various diseases; promote and expand curative and preventive measures.

23. Elimination of all types of cruelties;unemployment, illiteracy, corruption, kite-flying (wasting time in paper works), hoarding, usury, and smuggling; fight against vulgarity, drinks, Chars, opium and other intoxicating drugs.

Foreign policy:

24. Free and peaceful, based on positive and effective nonalignment and peaceful co-existence.

25. Good neighbourly, friendly and co-operative relations with all the neighbours; strengthening and expansion of all-round relations with northern great neighbour of the Soviet Union; expansion of relations with India; ensure friendly relations with Iran,Pakistan & China.

Solution of the problem of Pukhtuns and Baluch between DRA and Pakistan by peaceful means & negotiations according to their determination and in historical perspective.

26. Struggle for world peace;stability of peace in the region;struggle for general disarmament; prevention of proliferation of atomic weaponry.

27. Support to national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America against neo and old colonialism and imperialism.

28. Support the legitimate rights of Arab people for liberation of their lands from occupation & encroachment of Israel; support the rights of the Palestinian Arab and formation of Palestinian State.

29. Support the peoples and patriotic forces of South Africa in their struggle for liberation

and attainment of rights, and against the policy of apartheid.

30. Honour and favour the Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the United Nations. 20

The Revolutionary Council issued eight decrees which are placed at appendix A. Decree No. 1 dated 30 April 1978 announced election of Noor Mohammad Taraki as Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (RC DRA), while he was, at the same time, head of the government i.e. Prime Minister. It changed the appelation of the State to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The Revolutionary Council was defined as the highest authority. The government, elected by the R.C., was made responsible to the Council. By Decree No 2, issued on 11 Saur (01 May 1978),Babrak Karmal was elected as Vice-Chairman of the RC DRA. The first cabinet of the DRA was also announced. Decree No 3 of 12 Saur (2 May) provided for nationalization of properties of Nadir Shah dynasty, as published in the Kabul Times of 4 May 1978. It was, however, substituted by another Decree on Judiciary. These three Decrees, published in the Kabul Times of 4 May 1978, opened with Kalma "In the name of God Almighty; In the name of God Almighty and benevolent and merciful; and In the name of God, Almighty" respectively. But the booklet which contained all the eight Decrees and four Decrees

of President Taraki does not carry the Kalma in the opening of any Decree. The Third Decree which appeared in the Kabul Times, and later substituted by another Decree on Judiciary, is reproduced as under:

"In the name of God, Almighty;

The Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Decree No.3,
(Saur 12, 1357, May 2, 1978, 10 a.m.)

The Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan met under the chairmanship of Noor Mohammad Taraki, the Chairman of the Council and Prime Minister, and while the principle of private ownership is respected, adopted the following historic decision;

As the movable and immovable property and wealth of the families of Mohammad Nader, Sardar Mohammad Daoud, Sardar Mohammad Naim, Sardar Shah Wali, Sardar Shah Mahmoud, Sardar Mohammad Hashim were acquired in defiance of the values of the Holy Islamic religion, and standards of human conduct and amassed from the fruits of labour of the toiling of the people of the country, they shall belong after the issuance of this decree to the people of Afghanistan, i.e. the treasury, and are declared nationalised."

The title of the Chairman was replaced with President. By the fresh Decree No. 3, which was issued on 24 Saur (14 May), a High Judiciary Council was established and authority of the Supreme Court was entrusted to this Council comprising Minister of Justice as President, Deputy Minister of Justiciary Affairs, President of Cassation, Deputy Minister of Justice and Administrative Affairs, Deputy Attorney General and one or several other persons, as proposed

by the Minister of Justice and approved by the President of the R.C., as members. While confirming abrogation of the Constitution of Hoot 5, 1355 (24 May 1977), the Decree allowed currency of other laws, regulations and decrees in force provided' they are compatible with the objectives of the DRA and not abrogated through decrees of the RC DRA. Authority of the Chief Justice was delegated to the Minister of Justice. Articles 7 and 8 of the Decree provided for establishment of Revolutionary Military Court, stationary or mobile, and defined jurisdiction of their functions as "Civil and Military persons who have committed or commit crimes against the revolution of Saur 7, 1357, against the interest of the people and against national interests, against internal and external security of the DRA shall be tried and punished in accordance with the Penal Law and Military Criminal Law and provisions of the Decree of the RC DRA."

Decree No 4, issued on 22 Jauza (12 June 1978), prescribed the state emblem of DRA and the flag. Noor Mohammad Taraki hoisted the bright blood-red banner with gold symbols of "KHALQ" in Persian script on 19 October 1978, "amid waves of clamor, delight, excitement, revolutionary enthusiasm, long clappings, shoutings of hurrah, and revolutionary slogans by our noble people."[21] About 50,000 people

were estimated to have marched past the flag when it was hoisted by Taraki[22] at 9 a.m. In his speech on that occasion, Taraki said; "They vilify us and call our Khalqi government as anti-Islamic; God forbid, but we always express it in clear terms that this government will pay eternally special attention and respect to the fundamentals of Islam."[23] Decree No. 5 was issued on 22 Jauza (12 June) in replacement of Decree No. 3 of 12 Saur. By this decree the surviving members of the Royal House were declared fugitives and traitors. Twenty three persons of the family were named whose citizenship of the DRA was withdrawn and properties nationalised.

Decree No.6 of 21 Sartan 1357 (12 July 1978) abolished usury in all forms. It was the first Decree which touched upon the delicate relation between the ruler and the ruled. Sood-o-Salam, various forms of interest, were traditionalized by the Afghan society to which it had just resigned.As a novelist, Taraki was deadly critical of this practice. An appendix in three chapters to this Decree provided for formation of Committees for Solution of Peasantry Problems at various levels and defined their duties and responsibilities.Decree No. 7 of 25 Mizan (17 October 1978) restricted matrimonial traditions, prohibiting Walwar or Toyana (bride-money). Walwar or Toyana is a tradition

by which a price is fixed for the bride. Mahar is an Islamic requirement which means payment in cash or in commodity to the bride before consummation of the marriage. The Mahar was limited to "not more than ten Darham according to Shariat which does not exceed three hundred Afghanis on the basis of the Bank rate of silver." (Article 3). "The engagement and marriage for woman under sixteen and for men under eighteen years are not permissible." (Article 5). Decree No. 8 was issued on 7 Qaus (28 November 1978) "on the basis of the proposal dated 7 Qaus 1357 submitted by the Prime Ministry", in order to eliminate the "feudal and pre-feudal relations from the socio-economic system of the country." "In order to settle disputes arising from the implementation of the provisions of this decree Khalqi Specified Committee at Woloswali level, and final Khalqi Specified Committee at Provincial level, shall be established."(Article 26).

The Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties and consequent Decrees of the Revolutionary Council did not ignore the importance of Islam and its influence on the Afghan society. The Revolutionary government emphasized time and again its commitment to honour Islamic values. However the policy of the government on the whole, based on manifesto of the PDPA and literary works of Noor

Mohammad Taraki, and the party's ideological and practical attachment with the Soviet bloc, did not leave any doubt in the minds of the people that the DRA was cast completely in the die of Socialism in order to change the entire political system of the tribal kingship, and Daud's one-party nationalist presidency. The new system was steered to destruction of the tribal system and clerical monopoly which are the two main elements of the traditional tribal society. Of all the classes, integrity of the clergy was suspected. (Cf. item 10 of the Basic Lines). In foreign policy, a clear line of distinction was drawn between "the northern great neighbour of the Soviet Union" and other neighbouring States of Iran, Pakistan and China. A comparative study of the works of Taraki and the Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties and consequent Decrees suggests that Taraki had enormous influence on the policy-making body. Summary of his three novels - Da Bang Musafari, Spin and Tsara are placed at appendix B. Emphasis on the word KHALQ and KHALQI was a clear indication of asserting Khalq's ascendancy over Parcham.

The first cabinet of DRA met under the chairmanship of Taraki on 3 May 1978 which expressed satisfaction over the law and order situation.[24] The Interior Ministry, however, issued a statement that:

"Social security of the citizens and revolutionary order prevails throughout the country. Nonetheless it is not impossible that in such a revolutionary situation a number of profiteering wicked, intriguing, subversive and anti-revolutionary elements appear on the scene posing themselves as revolutionaries and consequently cause inconvenience and indulge in threatening and provoking of compatriots and social disruption.In such case it is the duty of every compatriot that when confronting such persons and incidences they contact at the earliest possible security and revolutionary centres so that with the patriotic voluntary and alert cooperation of the people such profiteering, corrupt, intriguing and subversive and anti-revolutionary elements are handed over to concerned authorities of the revolutionary orders." 25

On 3 May 1978, Noor Mohammad Taraki answered some questions from "a representative of Ministry of Information and Culture" on certain speculations. Excerpts of this interview are reproduced as under:

"Inter alia the mass media of international reaction state that the coup d' etat was launched under the leadership of the Communist Party of Afghanistan with the help of this or that foreign country while the revolutionary stand of Seventh Saur is the beginning of a truly democratic and national revolution of the people of Afghanistan and not a coup d' etat.

This great armed and revolutionary resurrection took place during day light based upon the independent will of the people of Afghanistan without the slightest interference of any foreign country and at the vanguard were the officers and brave soldiers of the country and enjoys extraordinary vast backing of the millions strong masses of the people of Afghanistan.

It ought to be noted that in Afghanistan there has never existed a party named the Communist Party and does not exist.

International reactionary circles shamelessly lie that thousands of our patriots were either

killed or executed in the course of the revolution and that one of the great religious figures has been executed or that the revolutionaries had acted in contravention of the principles of Human Rights, the Islamic religion and our national traditions.. Not more than one hundred of those who resisted had been killed and the Afghan revolutionaries have dealt with all respect to the Holy Islamic religion, the religious figures, princi - ples of Human Rights and their national tra - ditions." 26

On 7 June 1978, President Noor Mohammad Taraki announced general amnesty. Following is the text of the Decree on Amnesty and Commutation of Punishments of prisoners of common offences:

"TheDecree of the people's great leader and able teacher, Noor Mohammad Taraki, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister, issued under number 111 dated Jauza 17, 1357 corresponding to June 7, 1978 based on clemency and revolutionary human affection incentive of the people's beloved leader for amnesty and commuting of punishments of our prisoner compatriots.

Taking into consideration the democratic and humanitarian values of the Basic Lines of the Revolutionary Duties of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on the basis of the proposal of the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the Attorney General, approval of Noor Mohammad Taraki, President of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the following decree has been issued in regard to Amnesty and commuting of sentences of those prisoners who have committed common offences and the final decision of the court has been issued on their cases.

1. Amnesty to all prisoners suffering from chronic and difficult to treat diseases, seniles and those physically invalids regardless of the kind of offences and the period of imprisonment.

2. Amnesty to poor and destitute prisoners

who are breadwinners of their families and have not been sentenced to death or life imprisonment and have completed one third of their prison term.

3. With due observation to the other provisions of this decree, amnesty to the punish - ment of the prisoner who has been sentenced up to five years of imprisonment for commit - ting of crime inside the prison.

4. Amnesty to the remaining imprisonment period of prisoners, sentenced for six months to three years of imprisonment.

5. Amnesty to persons sentenced from more than three to five years imprisonment and have passed one quarter (one fourth) of their imprisonment term in the prison.

6. Amnesty to the remaining prison term of the prisoner who is the breadwinner of the family from amongst several members of the family in prison at the same time.

7. Commuting half of the prison term of those sentenced to more than five to ten years imprisonment.

8. Commuting one third of the imprisonment term of those sentenced to more than ten to fifteen years of imprisonment.

9. Commuting of death and life imprisonment sentences respectively to fourteen years and ten years imprisonment.

10. To deliver up the prisoners suffering from leprosy and other contagious and dangerous diseases to specific health centres.

11. The provisions of Articles of this decree in regard to recidivists and dangerous criminals in whom signs of rehabilitation are not discerned, are applicable by the ascertainment of an authorised committee under the supvervision of the Attorney General, deservers of amnesty and commuting of punishments shall be identified and determined.

12. Provisions of the articles of this decree in relation to those convicted by the final decision of the court shall be in force up to two months after its publication." 27

The Decree on amnesty was followed by release of prisoners. The government claimed release of

14,000 prisoners. It was also revealed, and publicised, that Daud regime had established torture cells at Qala-e-Zaman and Allauddin where the victims were found buried in mass-graves. It was believed that these cells were run as mental wards which were administered by Parchamites of a clandestine torture group called Jaraseem Kush (insecticide).[28] They did not eliminate only the target-persons of importance but tortured to death many innocent people also on bribes received from interested parties. The dead, and even some still breathing, were buried without any funeral ceremony.[29] Most of the prisoners who were released in such a dramatic way joined the PDPA, particularly its Khalq faction. Their effectiveness was noted by dissidents who considered it a strategy to win over habitual criminals and use them against the opposition.

Decree No. 4 of the President ensured essential conditions for evolution of literature, education and publications in mother tongues of tribes and nationalities. Broadcasting of programmes in Uzbeki, Turkemani, Baluchi, Nooristani languages, and introduction of the culture of all tribes and nationalities of the "unitary country" were guaranteed.[30] This Decree was in line with item 21 of the Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties. It was the first step to Sovietization. Heretofore, non-Pukhtoons were bound to

attain working knowledge of Pushto language. They had to attend Pushto courses and acquire certificates to justify their proficiency. In 1960s, Pukhtuns made the struggle at parliamentary level for Pukhtunization of the government offices. The Loya Jirga of 1964 was moved by Engineer Ghulam Mohammad Farhad to place Pushto first to Dari as an official language of the bi-lingual State. The 13th term of Ulusi Jirga (National Assembly) also took up this issue. The majority of its Pukhtoon members proposed elimination of Pushto courses. Instead entry into the service should be conditioned to working knowledge of Pushto so that the non-Pukhtoons must learn it in schools. Other ethnic groups were not happy with those moves. The PDPA government did not define the official language (s), but Noor Mohammad Taraki himself favoured more Pushto and was moving towards Pukhtunization of the State. Exhibition of Pushto films made in Pakistan was previously prohibited. Taraki allowed the exhibition over newly established Television, and playing of music and songs of these films over radio Kabul. By the end of 1985, the government claimed publication of 15 dailies, 21 weeklies, 39 magazines in the country with a total print of more than 500,000 copies whereas one-time print before the Saur Revolution did not increase 40,000. Broad-

cast-time of radio Kabul increased from 18 to 43 hours a day. Including the broadcast-time of local radio stations in 13 provinces, the daily total rose to 80 hours. Television network was set up after the revolution. T.V. Centre, Kabul, and six provincial centres operated for 20 hours a day.[31] Provincial T.V. stations were established at Jalalabad, Ghazni, Qandahar, Farah, Herat and Faizabad.[32] While expanding the sphere of publicity media, the successive PDPA governments could not retain experienced and skilled people the majority of whom emigrated. "Majority of radio/TV staff and professional speakers have left their jobs. Radio/TV is now under direct control of Prime Ministry and unskilled KhAD members are appointed to the vacant jobs (sic)."[33] "The DRA decided that practical steps be taken to attain the objective of equality, and the Ministry of Radio and TV began broadcasting programmes in Uzbeki, Turkoman, Baluchi, and Nooristani languages and introduced the culture of all tribes and nationalities of our unified country, dear Afghanistan. Indeed, the DRA in addition to the official daily organ of the PDPA, Da Saur Enqelab (The Saur Revolution), which began publication on December 1,1978, inaugurated several newspapers in minority languages: Yoldaz (Uzbeki Turkic, first published July 10, 1978); Sob (Baluchi, September 23, 1978); and Gourash (Turk-

mani, October 25, 1978) - publication stopped in every case after a few issues.[34]

Literacy rate in Afghanistan was not more than 5%.[35] The whole politicised population of the country was a small portion of this group of literates which was divided into several political parties. The Afghan society, on the whole, was impervious to foreign ideas mainly for this reason. The revolutionary government considered illiteracy as one of the main obstacles to the development of the socialist state. It, therefore, put more emphasis on the literacy programme.[36] The functional Literacy Directorate assisted by the UNICEF and UNESCO in late 1960s had proved ineffective due to lack of interest of the people.[37] Taraki regime established National Agency for Campaign Against Illiteracy (NACAI). In the beginning, NACAI concentrated its efforts on armed forces. Six thousaand soldiers were selected for learning. They were distributed to be taught by army officers.[38] Shah Mahmoud Haseen, Chairman of NACAI, explained at a seminar that NACAI, as an important literacy propagation organization, can play an important role in enlightening the masses and it was on this basis that it was deemed necessary that teachers and supervisors of the literacy courses in Kabul province take the course. The literacy campaign was seen by

government as an opportunity to explain the party's objectives and the aims of the revolution, and the seminar was at least in part designed to raise their political consciousness. In July 1978, NACAI held the first series of seminars to train teachers and supervisors.[39] A 17-day seminar was held from 27 Jan to 13 Feb 1979 in order to "create a Khalqi and progressive education." It was conducted by Secondary Teaching Department of Education Ministry with the cooperation of UNICEF in Kabul. It was attended by 735 teachers. Mohammad Jan Safi, President of Primary Teaching Department, addressing the concluding session, called "the role of the seminar as effective for familiarising and acquaintance of the teachers with new text books of First Grade."[40] To serve the objective of teaching in mother tongue, NACAI formed a Board of Editors for publication of material in Nooristani and Baluchi as well as major languages i.e. Dari and Pushto.It set the target of five years for total eradication of illiteracy but later realised its over-optimism. Hafizullah Amin revised the programme and extended the target period to 10 years in October 1979. The main problems which the NACAI faced were shortage of trained personnel and teaching materials.[41] Sultan Ali Kishtmand, Vice President and Deputy Prime Minister of Karmal regime, in his report on

the draft of economic-social development plan for 1360 (1981/82), said that development and renewal of educational system was one of the most important aims and social duties in 1360. It was envisaged that 550,000 people would participate in literacy courses, and the number of general education schools would rise by 1,000 units to raise the total number of units to 5,382.[42] In April, 1986, Kishtmand, addressing a press conference in Moscow, claimed that 1.2 million people learnt to write and read.[43] In July 1986, the DRA government claimed that 1.5 million Afghans could "state with pride that they have learned to read." It was revealed that 30,000 courses were opened in towns and villages for 600,000 people, where classes were conducted in all the 22 languages of the ethnic groups and nationalities.[44] Abdur Rahman, incharge of Literacy programme in Balkh province, disclosed that 13,736 out of 600,000 population of the province were enrolled (August 1986) in 978 special courses. He said; "We accept anybody between 10 and 70 years of age, but we prefer students under 50." One of the aims was to enable adults to read the papers within nine months. In mid-1986, after eight years of the Saur Revolution, shortage of qualified teachers was still a problem. According to Abdur Rahman, he had 172 qualified

instructors out of 850.[45] The Women Democratic Organization of Afghanistan of Karmal regime, successor of Khalqi Organization of Afghan Women of Taraki regime, was running literacy courses for the females. In November, 1984, it reported to be running 532 courses in Kabul with 6,193 participants, 11 courses in Doshi with 114 housewives and 53 courses in Parwan with 412 housewives.[46] In September, 1986, it was disclosed that 22,000 women in Afghanistan were engaged in production, over 11,000 in education and upto 5,000 in armed forces.[48] Based on the government claims of July 1986, UNESCO awarded a medal and diploma to Afghanistan, for this achievement, in September 1986. UNESCO Director General M. Bow presented the award to the representative of the Embassy of the DRAin France.[48]

The PDPA gave high importance to literacy with ruthless determination. Whether it was Taraki, Amin or Karmal, the party moved on recklessly to bulldoze all the obstacles of the traditional society to achieve the cherished goal. They did not mind what might come. At Salimi, Herat province, the team assigned to implementation of Literacy Programme called upon all the females of the village to come out. The Khateeb of congregational mosque refused to send his daughter to the course. The head-teacher tried to pull out by force all the females. The

people reacted sharply and gave him a beating. He went away and returned with troops from Pushtoon Zarghun Uluswali. The troops drove out all the males and females from their home and hearth, on 01 March 1979. The Khatteb and Arbab Nisar Ahmad Khan were arrested and fire was opened in the air. Inflamed by this action, the people attacked the troops and tanks and lost 23 persons. Those who had been captured by the troops were lifted by a 'plane from Herat airfield and dropped one by one from the air. They included the Khatoeb and Arbab Nisar Ahmad Khan. Other arrested in this connection were shot dead at the Uluswali headquarters. They included Haji Suleiman.[49] It was admitted, without reservation, by Mahmoud Baryalay, as a member of the Politburo, Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee, and Head of the Department of Ideology and International Affairs, in an interview with Mushahid Hussain, Chief Editor of daily Muslim, Islamabad, on 8 October 1985; "Soon after our Revolution a lot of mistakes took place with the result that our Revolution could not proceed at even pace. Our previous leadership was in a hurry to move forward. It did not have a correct assessment of the objective and subjective realities prevailing in the country. Ours is a backward country where the people did not have a high degree of political

consciousness. They tried to impose a democratic land reform on a peasantry which was not prepared for it. Hence they (peasants) opposed these measures. Literacy classes were forcibly started with a 70-year old woman or an 80-year old man, being made to attend."[50]

While changing the curricula of the schools and colleges, the PDPA government put more emphasis on indoctrination of its members and other people. Ideological literature was distributed among amy officers,[51] while young students at University level were put into discussions on secular aspects of the political life. The PDPA had established a Theory Commission which arranged classes, open as well as secret, for teaching of Scientific Theory of workers class. The Commission held courses each year at different places for teaching the party's theory. "Learned and distinguished teachers imparted lessons in all the three branches of Scientific Ideology of Workers Class i.e. Philosophy, Economics and Dialectic Socialism."[52] While in power, the PDPA introduced a Department of Ideology and International Affairs. Students of various age-groups were sent to the Soviet Union and other countries of the Soviet bloc on study-trips or for education. Children of 7-10 years' age-group are trained for 10 years.[53] At the age of 10, they are recruited in the Young

Poineers who form the Democratic Youth Organization, successor of Khalqi Organization of Youth of Taraki regime. DYO serves a nursery for training of new party members. According to radio Kabul (2 July 1986), a programme for sending young students to USSR was launched in 1981. Since then 6,200 young students, called Desh Ahangan were sent to USSR on study tours, and 1,500 more were scheduled to be sent in 1986/87; while some 1,500 Afghan citizens were admitted to colleges and technical schools in the Soviet Union on annual basis.[54] At home, the PDPA government established Palanzais (nurseries) to educate 'orphans and helpless children'. The first Palanzai was inaugurated in Sep 1981 by Dr. Najibullah when he was Head of KhAD and President of Pukhtoon Tribes in the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities.[55] Apart from the programmes of education and indoctrination for Afghans, the PDPA government and the Soviet Union encouraged Pakistani students, particularly Pukhtoons and Baluch, to seek admission in those countries. In his interview with Mushahid Hussain, Babrak Karmal, then President of the Revolutionary Council and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA, referred to "educational facilities to Pukhtoons and Baluch as part of cultural programmes and flourishing the culture of all fraternal tribes and nationalities of Afghan-

istan." He said; "The doors of our universities and other educational and cultural establishments are wide open to all nationalities, tribes and clans of the country including the Pukhtoon and Baluch brothers."[56] The Central Library of the PDPA Central Committee in Kabul was expanded with books donated by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, German Socialist Party and Bulgarian Communist Party; books, brochures, magazines, dailies published after maturity of the Saur Revolution, in order to enable the party activists to study ideology, sociology and politics in relation to their duties defined by the Saur Revolution.[57]

In the beginning, Taraki regime was shared by Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA equally. But the implementing agencies emphasized more the word KHALQ, which by coincidence suited more the ideological aspect of the revolution than PARCHAM. Its rhetorical use, probably intentional, ws effectively fading away the image of Parcham. The Royal Citadel, renamed by Daud as the Presidential House, was renamed Da Khalqo Kor (People's House). Then every action and programme was called Khalqi. Similarly various organizations were also named as such; for example Khalq Organization of Women of Afghanistan chaired by Dilara Mehak, and Khalqi Organization of Youths of Afghanistan chaired by Babrak Shinwari.[58]

The word KHALQ was substituted with Democratic by Karmal regime. Taraki government formed Peace and Solidarity Organization on the pattern of other Socialist countries. But the most important organization was the Homeland Higher Defence Council which was announced on 28 March 1979 for coordinating the security forces against the mounting resistance. Its chairman was Noor Mohammad Taraki and Vice-Chairman Hafizullah Amin; the members were Defence Minister Aslam Watanjar, Interior Minister Sherjan Mazdooryar, President of Political Affairs of Armed Forces Mohammad Iqbal, Chief of General Staff Major Yaqoob, Comd Air Defence Col. Ghulam Sakhi, Comd Air Force Lt. Col. Nazar Mohammad, Chief of AGSA Asadullah Sarwari and Chief of Security of Interior Ministry Syed Daud Taroon. Syed Taroon, a confidant of Amin, was a later entry.[60] Yaqoob and Iqbal were also pro-Amin, which suggest that the latter was very much conscious of his position vis-a-vis Taraki.

Along the overall changes in the Executive and Judiciary, Taraki government reorganized the secret services also in the name of Da Afghan Da Gato Da Satelo Idara (AGSA). It means the Department of the Security of the Interests of Afghanistan. Its predecessor was Mas'ooniat-i-Milli (National Immunity) which had been reorganizad from Istikhbarat-i-Daulati

(State Intelligence) by Prime Minister Noor Ahmad Etemadi. Mousa Shafiq, during his premiership, tried to reform Masooniat-i-Milli in order to curb the national evils. During Daud regime, some Parchamites infiltrated this department and made it dreadful.[61] AGSA grew more power and terrible. It was headed by Asadullah Sarwari until 15 September 1979. Hafizullah Amin reorganized it and renamed as Kargari Istikhbarati Moessessa (KAM) which means Workers Intelligence Department. KAM was first headed by Aziz Ahmad Akbar (15 Sep to November 1979) and then by Asadullah Amin until the fall of Amin. In 1981, Karmal regime introduced KhAD (Khidmat-i-Itela'atee-i-Daulati = State Information Service) under Dr Najibullah Ahmadzai. Dr Najib relinquished the charge in Dec 1985 when he first became Secretary and then General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA. He was replaced by Major General Ghulam Farooq Yaqubi. KhAd was upgraded in January 1986 to ministry level and renamed Wizarat-i-Amniyat-i-Daulati (WAD = Ministry for State Security). The upgradation was announced at a function arranged to celebrate the 6th anniversary of the organization. Yaqubi, promoted to the rank of Turan Janral, continued to hold the charge as Minister. KhAD was so notorious for its network of torture and its growing dominance over other agencies and services that it was called, in

general, as the KGB of Afghanistan, and still it has not given way to WAD in rhetorics used by the opponents.[62]

The External policy of the PDPA was clear that Afghanistan had slided away to the Soviet bloc which was a matter of grave concern for the US bloc and other countries which did not like ascendancy of the Soviet Union in this region. Frequently repeated commitments of Taraki and Amin to nonalignment were regarded with scepticism in the West, where the notion that a Third World Marxist regime, particularly one in a country bordering the USSR, might not be a creature of the Soviet Union was scarcely entertained.[63] Americans believed that there was no evidence of "Soviets behind the coup." But the Soviets welcomed the change and moved quickly to turn it to their advantage. By early June 1978, the number of the Soviet military advisers increased from 350 to 650. The Soviet personnel were placed virtually in every Afghan ministry. They took over key positions in the Afghan Defence and Security apparatus. Afghanistan and the USSR signed over 30 economic deals negotiated under the Daud regime.[64] The US Ambassador met Taraki on 6 May 1978 and expressed his apprehension that; "In the past time, I noted, our policy had been to try to construct bloc against Soviet expansionism, but that our approach to this problem had,in

the course of time, become more sophisticated. I stated we could readily understand - given Afghanistan's geographic position and economic needs-why it would want a close relationship with the Soviet Union. But, I said, we would be disturbed if Af - ghanistan's foreign and domestic policies were to become indistinguishable from those of the Soviet Union because that would give rise to tensions in this part of the world which would threaten peace. I said that it is in this context that we appreciate Afghanistan's nonaligned policy."[65] In response, Taraki said that; "Afghanistan is and desires to remain independent country and master of its own destiny."[66] On religious policy, Taraki expressed the hope in his this meeting with the US Ambassador that; "The Soviet Union would not judge him badly if he built more mosques. We would not judge him badly if he, himself, did not go to a mosque."[67] The New York Times of 5 September 1978 expressed,in its editorial note, concern that a genuine nonaligned government had fallen to an avowedly communist one that is likely to tilt towards Moscow. It anticipated trouble for Pakistan and Iran and bloodshed from tribal resistance. It concluded; "Outsiders can do little beyond offering sanctuary to those who flee. Countries in the region should be prepared to lend a hand, and the wealthier nations should help them

carry the burden."[68]

Within two months of the revolution, the PDPA leadership realised that it was premature. They were, in fact, deceived by the "wait and see" attitude of the people and took it for granted that the unwilling reticence implied consent. They were too proud of their achievement and too much ambitious to dictate the people to yield to their will. Soon after the revolution, a Jirga of Kharoti elders called on Hafiz-ullah Amin at his residence at Paghman to offer him congratulation. In the customary way, the elders expressed their sentiments vocally that it was a pride for the whole clan that he rose to the pedestal of power. They offered financial contribution to entertainment of his guests and visitors. In return, Amin rebuked them in his Marxist language, calling them exploiters, feudals, usurers etc. The elders did not comprehend exactly what Amin meant but they were not wrong in understanding that they were insulted. They considered Amin crazy.[69] Similarly, some Jirgas of elders from various clans called on Taraki to see the new Head of State and pledge their allegiance. While these Jirgas were given publicity by government media to give an impression of popularization of the regime, and particularly the great leader and able teacher, these Jirgas were utterly disappointed by the arrogant behaviour and insulting

language of Taraki.[70] From the very beginning, Taraki and Amin tried to suppress the people into submission rather than placate them to cooperate.

Having felt the growing tension, Taraki and Amin blamed, though indirectly, each other for taking a short-cut to revolution. The official account of the Saur Revolution mentions that in 1976, Hafizullah Amin reported in writing readiness of the armed forces for revolution, but Taraki gave him further guidance and "very important instructions."[71] Hafizullah Amin, in his speech on the occasion of the 14th anniversary of the first congress of the PDPA, as Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, said; "Socialist revolution is not possible without conducive revolutionary conditions and objective struggle of a workers party equipped with dialectic ideology of the workers class. Therefore, socialist revolution is a historical achievement of the workers class guided by its revolutionary party."[72] Discussing "previous struggles of the people of Afghanistan without guidance from a party", Amin said; "At that time that the role of workers class could not be defined in transformation of capitalism into socialism in Afghanistan, Comrade Noor Mohammad Taraki founded the party of workers class, the PDPA, and introduced the politics in its real meaning i.e.

political struggle in the interest of the classes. It was inspiring objectively for those people who live in conditions similar to Afghanistan's, that Comrade Taraki conceived that even in feudal conditions we can fight against the system of exploitation through the party of workers class of the country." According to Amin, Taraki added emphasis on three principles; intensification of class struggle; dialectic theory of workers class; and above all extensive propagation of its philosophical aspects. "Taraki studied the behaviour of the people and structure of the society."[73] In the words of Amin; "The workers party guides the people's revolutionary movement to its success. The party does not bring about revolution, but guides people's revolution. But our great comrade did not believe in this principle, inspite of his awareness of this fact, to wait for as long as to see gradual development of the people's movement to the level that it should be guided by the party. The party should get support of the people by force and action until the time that the party proceeds to revolution and, then, attain the confidence of the people. In such condition, the party brings about revolution worthy of people's support."[74] Comrade Taraki had appraised the Afghan soceity on a scientific basis and had intimated to the party since 1973-coup that it was possible in

Afghanistan for the people to wrest power through a short-cut as the classical way in which the productive forces undergo different stages to build a society based on socialism would take a long time. This short-cut would be utilised by working exclusively within the armed forces. Previously the army was considered as the tool of dictatorship and despotism of the ruling class and it was not imaginable to use it before toppling its employer.[75] Addressing officers of 8 Div, Noor Mohammad Taraki said; "We did not wait for a moment after success of the revolution, to spend days, or even hours, but took immediate start to work for the welfare of the people."[76]

"The first six months of the revolution passed off reasonably quietly. The Saur Revolution had only occurred in Kabul; the rest of Afghanistan took a little time to react to it. Both Khalq and Parcham parties were city-based without any organizational reach to the rocky depths of rural Afghanistan. But the revolutionary regime was impatient to bring about radical structural change in Afghanistan's traditional-bound, backward society."[77] "This new Afghan government was fairly popular at first, partly the result of disappointment with Daud's regime but also because "reforms were promised by ruling Democratic Party of the Peoples of Afghanistan, a coali-

tion grouping between the so-called

tion grouping between the so-called Khalq and Parcham political factions."[78] In July 1978, the Parcham faction was eliminated from the government and its leaders were exiled on ambassadorial posts; Babrak Karmal to Prague, Noor Ahmad Noor to Washington, Abdul Wakil to London, Mahmood Baryalay to Islamabad and Anahita to Belgrade. On 27 November 1978, Taraki informed the plenum of CC-PDPA that a conspiracy against the government had been discovered and investigations conducted by the party and reports from AGSA and Police revealed that it was led by Karmal.[79] After ouster of the common rivals, the great leader and able teacher Noor Mohammad Taraki and the obedient and faithful pupil Hafizullah Amin entered into direct intrigues against each other. In the meantime, the Khalq government signed an agreement on 5 December 1978 with the Soviet Union in Moscow on mutual defence. The agreement is reproduced at appendix C.[80] On 28 March 1979, the cabinet was reshuffled. Taraki retained the power as President, General Secretary of CC-PDPA and Supreme Commander of Armed Forces. Hafizullah Amin became Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The latter brought in Engineer Siddiq Alamyar as Minster of Planning and Khial Mohammad Katawazi as Deputy Minister of Radio/TV,[81] in order to equate the balance of the 18-man cabinet in his favour. Similarly, as

mentioned before, he could include his confidants in the 10-member Homeland High Defence Council which was formed the same day. It was the time when the revolutionary government was really worried about the mounting threat to its survival. On 31 March 1979, a law for regulating the government duties of the revolutionary government and its legislative procedures was passed by which the Revolutionary Council was entrusted the supreme State power of the country. The law is reproduced at appendix D.[82]

The 'Marxist Government' had not mobilized popular political support before launching its reform programme.[83] The people were rather more surprised to listen over transistorised radios to the strange expressions of Taraki and Amin. "The speeches of Taraki and Amin were laced with Marxist rhetoric, and in Dari (Afghan Persian) and Pashto the phrases sound alien and somewhat stilted, just as they do in English."[84] The government made many errors and mistakes when the ruling party was lacking an organizational base beyond the main towns and cities and its city-based youth cadres were alienated from the rural population, their customs, passions, prejudices, culture and behaviour. Some of its errors were; (1) The wholesale sacking of experienced administratives and technocrats not regarded as committed supporters of the revolution, (2) Too much was

attempted in too short a period in a country long accustomed to traditional torpor and inertia, (3) Biased language of Marxist-Leninism in which the projection of the reforms was couched was foreign to the Afghan villagers who had long been accustomed to a purely Islamic political language and society, (4) Too much force was used to suppress even the initial acts of resistance that was necessarily a low-level of violence.[85] The Taraki-Amin regime did not realise, or else refused to recognize, the constant and dynamic role that Islam and the ideals of Jihad had played in the history of Afghanistan since the 18th century.[86] Noor Mohammad Taraki, though well-versed with the socio-economic values of the society and the dominant role of tribal and clerical hierarchies, did not take a lesson from the history of Afghanistan. Many of the issues the PDPA considered purely economic had social components, and many of its social reforms affected such basic values as family honour.[87]

"Within 20 months, the Saur Revolution was brought to the brink of collapse. The mounting resistance was not the only factor that drove the regime to the precipice. An equally contributory factor was the war within the revolutionary leadership. Afghan factionalism proved fatal for the Khalq phase of the revolution. It also denied the resistance its chance of

offering a credible alternative to the Afghan people."[88]

Conclusion:

The PDPA, then a coalition of its two factions - Khalq and Parcham -, formed the Revolutionary Council and government to hold the State. Noor Mohammad Taraki was put at the Head of the State as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA with all powers. The Parcham faction was eliminated from the government, but Taraki and Amin entered into personal intrigues which split the Khalq faction,too. The PDPA presented a 30-point policy called the Basic Lines of Revolutionary Duties to provide a base of legitimacy for power. The Revolutionary Council issued eight Decrees; President Taraki issued a Decree on Amnesty, three Decrees on re-distribution of land and one Decree on the importance of mother tongues. The Revolutionary Council prepared a Law for regulating the government duties which defined the Revolutionary Council as the Supreme State Power of the country. The Decrees published in the Kabul Times of 4 May 1978 were introduced with the usual Islamic convocation - Bismillah. When collected and reprinted in a booklet form, the convocation was deleted, although Taraki and Amin repeatedly professed their adherence to Islam. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan emphasized its policy of nonalignment,but drew a clear line between its relations with the

"Northern great neighbour of the Soviet Union" and other neighbouring countries. Nonetheless, the Revolutionary government faced many problems which forced the revolutionary leaders to admit that the revolution was premature. These problems, emanated from personal jealousies and proliferated to global issues. Some internal problems are being discussed in the next chapter.

--

References:

1. Revolution and Revolutionaries (Cassandra); Frontier Post, daily, Peshawar; 29.4.1986.
2. Kabul Times; 4.5.1978.
3. Ibid; 18.5.1978.
4. Hyman, Anthony; Afghanistan under Soviet Domination - 1964-82; 1982; p.77.
5. Newells, Nancy Peabody and Richards S; The Struggle for Afghanistan; Ithaca & London; 1981; p.71.
6. Khalilzad, Zalmay; Moscow's Afghan War; Problems of Communism; Jan-Feb 1986; p.8. Richard Nations; Dr OX's Quandary; Far East Economics Review; 3.7.1986; p.16.
7. Mushahid Hussain; The Emerging Order; Muslim; 28.10.1985. He had visited Kabul and interviewed President Babrak Karmal and other top-leaders of ruling PDPA.
8. Ulyanovsky, R.A.; The Victories and Difficulties of the National Liberation Struggle (contains a chapter on the April Revolution in Afghanistan; Political Literature Publications, Moscow: Quoted by Press Bulletin of USSR Embassy, Islamabad; 87; 25.4.1989; p.11.
9. Ibid.
10. Khalilzad, Zalmay; loc.cit.
11. Press Bulletin; USSR Embassy, Islamabad; 40; 17.2.1986; p.2.
12. Male, Beverley; Revolutionary Afghanistan; 1982; p.9.
13. Khalilzad, Zalmay; loc.cit.
14. Gupta, Bhabani Sen; Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society; London; 1986; p.48.
15. Dupree, Louis; Red Flag Over the Hindukush-III; 23 (LD-2-80); 1980; p.1.

16. Kabul Times; 4.5.1978.
17. Ibid.
18. Safi, Aminullah, ex-Toncanwal in Baghlan, an Afghan emigre'.
19. A sumtotal of numerous interviews.
20. Da Afghanistan Da Demokratik Jamhoori Inqilabi Wazeefo Asasi Kerkhi; Kabul; 7 Saur 1357 = 27.4.1978.
21. Dupree, Louis; Red Flag Over the Hindukush-I; 44 (LD-2-79); 1979; p.1 (quoting DRA's Annual; 7 Saur 1358 = 27.4.1979; Pp.559-564).
22. Siddique, Mohammad Zahir, Dr; Az Ishghal..; 1363 = 1984; p.101.
23. Khalqi Rozana, monthly, Kabul; combined issues 7, 8, 9; 1357 = 1978; p.3.
24. Kabul Times; 4.5.1978.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Decrees of the R.C. and Decrees of the President of the RC-DRA; Ministry of Justice, Kabul; June 1979; Pp 42-44.
28. Dastan-i-Mazalim; p.9.
29. Azam, G.F.; Afghanistan:..; Peshawar; 1982; p.94.
30. Kabul Times; 16.5.1978.
31. Press Bulletin, USSR Embassy; 279; 29.12.1985; p.15.
32. Jiddat, daily, Peshawar; 18.5.1985.
33. Monthly Bulletin; Afghan Information Centre; Peshawar; 19.10.1982; p.7.
34. Dupree, Louis; Red Flag Over the Hindukush-I; 23; 1980; p.5.
35. Ibid; Afghanistan; 1978; p.587.
36. Christian Fuerst; Kabul Making Huge Stride in Eradicating Illiteracy; Frontier Post; 20.8.1986.
37. Male, Beverley; loc.cit; p.113.
38. Kabul Times; 18.7.1978.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid; 15.2.1979.
41. Male, Beverley; loc.cit; p.113.
42. Aryana; Kabul; 1 & 2; 1360 = 1981; p.7.
43. Press Bulletin; USSR Embassy; 104; 22.4.1986; p.17.
44. Ibid; 172; 9.7.1986; p.11.
45. Christian Fuerst; loc.cit.
46. Kabul New Times; 19.11.1984.
47. Press Bulletin; USSR Embassy; 243; 14.9.1986; p.21.
48. Ibid; p.20.
49. Qiyam 24 Hoot - Herat; Shoora-e-Saqafati-i-Jihad-i-Afghanistan (SSJA); 24 Hoot 1360 = 15.3.1982; Pp.14-16.

50. Mushahid Hussain; The Revolution's Ideologue; Muslim, Islamabad; 20.10.1985.
51. Da Saur Da Inqilab Pa Nakla; Kabul; 1357;p.12.
52. Da Khalqo Da Demokratik Gund Land Tarikh; Kabul; 1357=1978; Pp.87-88.
53. James Rupert; Russians Send Afghan Children to Soviet Union For Education; Nawai Waqt, daily, Rawalpindi; 25.1.1986.
54. Mangal, Sarwar, Vice President of the Council of Ministers and President of State Planning Committee, DRA; Press Bulletin; USSR Embassy; 106; 24.4.1986; p.23.
55. Ghamzhan, Sher Zaman; Pakenzai; unpublished; 21 Dec 1981.
56. Muslim, daily, Islamabad; 12.10.1985.
57. Masa'el Baynul Millalee, IV; Dalv-Hoot, 1359= 1981; p.140.
58. Male, Beverley; loc.cit; p.134.
59. Gupta, Bhabai Sen; loc.cit; p.70.
60. Male, Beverley; loc.cit; Pp.164-5.
61. Psarlay, Mohammad Siddique, an Afghan emigre'.
62. Personal Notes.
63. Male, Beverley; loc.cit; p.144.
64. Asnad Laneha-i-Jasoosi; Afghanistan-I; Danish-jooyan-i-Musalman Pero Khati Imam; Tehran; 29; p.136.
65. Ibid; Pp.60-61.
66. Ibid; p.61.
67. Ibid; p.63.
68. Male, Beverley; loc.cit; p.144.
69. A Kharoti Afghan emigre' who does not like to be identified.
70. A Safi Afghan emigre' who does not like to be identified.
71. Da Saur Da Inqilab Pa Nakla; loc.cit; Pp.12-13.
72. Da Afghanistan Da Khalko Demokratik Gund Da Lomrae Kangre Da Tswarleseme kalize Pa Hunasibat Da Afghanistan Da Khalko Da Demokratik Gund Da Markazi Komite Munshi Da Sadre Azam Mrastial Au Da Bahranayo Charo Wazir Hafizullah Amin Da Weyna Latan; Theory and Education's Central Committee; Govt Press, Kabul; 11 Jadi 1357 = 1.1.1979; Pp 14-15.
73. Ibid; Pp.17-20.
74. Ibid; Pp.22-23.
75. Male, Beverley; loc.cit; p.56.
76. Address of Noor Mohammad Taraki to Officers of 8 Div; (Dari); Kabul; 10 Dalv 1357 = 30.1.1979.
77. Gupta, Bhabani Sen; loc.cit; p.66.
78. The Afghan Refugees Situation In Pakistan; World Council of Churches; Geneva; April 1983; Pp.1-2.

79. Da Afghanistan Da Khalko Da Demokratik Gund Land Tarikh; 1357 = 1978; Pp.101, 109-110.
80. Dupree, Louis; Red Flag Over the Hindukush-I; 44; 1979; Pp.13-15.
81. Gupta, Bhabani Sen; loc.cit; Pp.69-70.
82. Dupree, Louis; Red Flag Over the Hindukush-III; Pp.12-14.
83. Gupta, Bhabani Sen; loc.cit; p.73.
84. Dupree, Louis; Red Flag Over the Hindukush-III; p.3.
85. Gupta, Bhabani Sen; loc.cit; p.71.
86. Ibid; Pp.58-59.
87. Ibid; p.77.
88. Ibid; p.66.

...

CHAPTER : VI

REACTION TO THE SAUR REVOLUTION

INTERNAL

Revolution is an attractive, fascinating and interesting term that builds a rosy imagination and arouses high expectations. A revolution destroys the existing political system and re-builds a new system in the eddies of personal ambitions, jealousies, prejudices and differences which come up to the surface when the revolution matures. Simultaneously opposition from the remnants of the defeated system, affected institutions, political and ideological rivals, and other numerous elements is just natural. In Afghanistan, the revolution was quite a new phenomenon. The history of Afghanistan is replete with power struggles, rebellions, revolts and intrigues in which the tribes and ethnic groups were involved partially or wholly. The 40-year reign of King Zahir Shah was the longest and comparatively peaceful. During this period, the urbanised citizenry produced an educated middle class and a small size of workers class which indulged in politics. These classes were almost cut off from the mainstream of the social order. The Saur Revolution was, therefore, misconceived for mainly two reasons; (a) ignorance of the revolutionary process due to lack of publicity, non-availability of relevant materials, and difficul-

ty in understanding, particularly for foreign scholars, of the Afghan languages, (b) prejudice, created by the notion that revolution is good and coup d' etat is bad.

"The Musahiban strategy of coopting traditional leadership proved effective - at least in the short run - the new structure of power relations had important long-term local and national effects. On the local level, many of the traditional leaders who relied on community consensus, their own power of persuasion, and examplary authority, were now effectively transformed into an official ruling elite with an independent source of coercive power and authority. Their association with government and often spatial isolation from their communities resulted in gradual weakening of their ties and credibility as community leaders, creating a parallel structure to deal with community concerns. Nationally the new official elite began to perpetuate itself through rampant nepotism and a patronage system, thus effectively reducing social and political mobility for those who were not already part of the ruling structure."[1] This situation changed slightly with the growth of education and entry of those educated youths in the services who were not so important in the social life. In both cases, this elite class and its parasite bourgoise class forming the urban society was alienated, on the whole, from the stagnant socio-

economic rural society of the country.

"The majority of the people of Afghanistan live under tribal code and are accustomed to the tradition of collective ownership of properties. The socialist concept of nationalised property is not strange to them. The people do not have much education and political awareness. But they have a definite concept of freedom. Therefore, if individual and religious freedoms were not restricted, they will remain content. Nevertheless, most of the members of the Royal House are safe, and live in Rome. They can create problems for Taraki. They can exploit tribal feuds and religious sentiments, and an anti-Socialism movement can start in Afghanistan which may be supported by the USA, Iran and Arab countries. Local nobility under persecution can play a significant role in such a struggle. In such a case, Taraki will be compelled to consider improvement of relations with Iran and Pakistan. It is, however, remote, Pakistan and Iran should first think of relations with the new Afghan government, for the revolution in Afghanistan has brought the Russian influence closer to their borders. The Taudeh party of Iran, which had strong relations with Khalq and Parcham in the past, is establishing relations with the new government of Afghanistan. This party was supported by Russia, and the Democratic Republic

of Germany had provided this party with the facility of radio transmission. Russia has been seeking excuses for the overthrow of the present monarchic system of Iran."[2] Encouraged by the revolution in Afghanistan, the revolutionaries in Iran accelerated their struggle. Iran was shaken by a wave of terrorism. The Shahinshah, Mohammad Reza Shah Pehlvi, left the country in January 1979. The Communist-sponsored revolutionary movement was, however, overtaken by religious sentiments of the majority Shia population which was ruled by Sunni Pehlvis. It turned into a mass revolution, and Ayatullah Khomeini who lived in exile for about 15 years, then in France, emerged as the leader and Imam. He entered Iran in February and declared it as an Islamic State. It appealed to the sentiments and ambitions of the majority of the population and was, therefore, acclaimed with popular support. It may be recalled that the French Revolution in 1789 had not been able to form any type of a stable government. It destroyed the absolute despotism, smashed the privileges of the Church and the nobility, and gave the land to the peasants, but, on the uncertain and shifting class-structure of France, it could not build political institutions of lasting value.[3] Unlike the mass revolution in France and Iran, the Saur Revolution in Afghanistan was brought about by a small political party with the support of

its army cadres. The revolutionary government did not enjoy popular support, and it did not care for the general will. "The revolutionaries were in a hurry, and they announced their first reforms with more idealism than realism. The reforms were hasty. The revolution had not prepared the people for them. The programme was not intellectually understood nor emotionally accepted. Even the dispossessed who had benefited by it, considered it unjust to take other people's land. Revolutions always make mistakes even when they are led by Lenin or Mao. But the errors can be corrected, if the party has courage to face self criticism and analysis."[4] The PDPA did not have that courage and, more so, that much strength which could enable it to run the government evenly. "Most basic difficulty faced by the national government was its own weakness at the provincial and sub-provincial levels. Villagers still sought out non-governmental leaders when they wanted solutions to many problems. The existence of such an alternative power structure while of minor importance in normal times, provided a ready-made political structure to organize against the new government."[5]

In-fighting within the party:

The PDPA which brought about the revolution was a coalition of its Khalq and Parcham factions. Babrak

Karmal, then leader of Parcham, was the arch-rival of Hafizullah Amin who enjoyed full support and backing of Noor Mohammad Taraki. Since the inception of the PDPA, Karmal and Amin did not hide, and did not hesitate from expression publicly of, opposition to each other. They ignored political norms and made the affair personal. By chance all the four important leaders of the party were Ghilzai by tribe; Noor Mohammad Taraki, Hafizullah Amin Kharoti, Mir Akbar Khyber Niazi and Babrak Karmal Mullah Khel. (And so is Najibullah Ahmadzai). Karmal, grand-son on the mother's side of Malik Mohammad Umar Khan of Kamarai, Kabul, was somewhat spoiled and had once been denounced by his father General Mohammad Hussain, who got a second wife after the death of Karmal's mother. He was so alienated from his people, and Persianised, that his origin faded. The rift between Khalq and Parcham was steered masterfully by the Soviet masters to build up the former as Pukhtoon-oriented and the latter as Persian-oriented to take most of the ethnic-conscious society. Even after the coalition, the distrust continued to prevail between the two factions. Taraki and Amin hid many things from Karmal, particularly achievements of Amin in recruitment of cadres in the armed forces. Karmal was, therefore, sceptical about the success of the revolution. While explaining the

process of the "Great Saur Revolution", Hafizullah Amin referred to the fear of Karmal, saying; "When the heroic officers entered the jail right there Babrak Karmal strongly protested to me that why had I given the command of revolution. I told him that it was according to the instruction of the great leader Noor Mohammad Taraki. When we were in Radio Afghanistan, Karmal strongly stressed that the party leadership should escape but the great leader rejected it seriously. Then he started serious dispute to the effect that Daoud should not be killed but should be negotiated with. But the heroic officers entered the headquarters of the government of Daoud and seized all government power".[6] On the face value of this statement, it should not be wrong to judge that Karmal was right to express his fear that the conditions were not conducive for the revolution and the consequent trouble could be minimised to a great extent by bargaining over the life of Daud. Karmal had also suggested to take the headquarters of the revolution to a remote place to which Amin did not agree.[7]

Numerically, the cabinet was balanced, but, politically it was a Khalqi government. Important portfolios were held by Khalqis. As Vice-President, Karmal, however, forced a decision on Taraki that diplomats and journalists should see Karmal first

before meeting Taraki.[8]

The Khalq and Parcham could not get on together for longer. Within ten weeks the rift was made public when Karmal and Noor Ahmad Noor were designated ambassadors to Czechekoslavakia and the U.S.A. respectively.[9] Dr. Anahita Ratibzad was sent to Yugoslavia, Mahmood Baryalay to Pakistan, Abdul Wakeel to the U.K., and Dr Najib to Iran. In the old style, appointment of dissidents on ambassadorial posts was a sort of banishment of the assignee who could not be awarded any punishment at home otherwise. Karmal was reported to have refused to leave the country and decided to remain in Kabul come what may.[10] The Parchamites were, thus,purged out of the government. The determination of Karmal to stay back at Kabul as reported by American diplomats gives credibility to the discovery of a plot of Parchamites to overthrow the Khalqi government. Dagarwal Qadir was arrested on 17 August 1978 followed by arrests of Lt. Col. Mohammad Rafie and Sultan Ali Kishtmand on the reports that Qadir, who maintained relations with Karmal, had prepared the plot for August. Karmal and other exiled Parchamites were believed to be returning to Kabul clandestinely to lead a coup.[11] By that time the Parchamite ambassadors had defected and were accused of taking away all the funds at their disposal.[12]

They had gathered at Prague. Taraki disclosed at the plenum of CC-PDPA held on 27 November 1978 that some "extremist leftists and short-sighted nationalists" were working against the Khalqi government. He mentioned about the arrest of Mir Ali Akbar Shah also, and informed the plenum that Tahir Badakhshi, too, was involved. The ambassadors were recalled for trial, but they did not obey the command. Based on the investigation of the party (Khalq) and reports of AGSA and Tsarandoye (Police); Karmal, Noor, Kishtmand, Anahita, Baryalay, Wakeel, Najib, Wadir and Rafie were expelled from the PDPA; Nizamuddin Tehzib, Sarwar Yurish, Majid Sarbuland and Fida Mohammad Dehnashin were demoted from full membership of the Central Committee to probationary membership; and Baraq Shafiee and Suleiman Laeq who resigned voluntarily from the Politburo were allowed to retain their seats in the Central Committee.[13] Nothing was mentioned about the fate of Tahir Badakhshi, but it was revealed by many Afghan ex-prisoners that he had been arrested and tortured to death. It was confirmed by the Karmal regime.[14] Kidnapping of the U.S. Ambassador, Adolph Dubs, on 14 Feb 1979 was connected with the case of Tahir Badakhshi.

The anti-Parcham drive launched by the Khalqi government gave a serious setback to the government. During Daud regime (1973-78), while the Khalq con-

centrated more on the armed forces, the Parcham had infiltrated the civil services from top to bottom. Daud had also tried to purge them out but that affected the upper level - some ministers and heads of departments. Similarly, the Khalq government, too, removed Parchamites, particularly those who were known, from the top. The lower levels, bound by the party discipline, formed a loose front to undermine the government effectively. Those who were exposed went underground or emigrated to other countries.

While the Khalq-Parcham tension was on the rise, the Khalq itself fell in the process of disintegration. A number of progressive nationalists felt that the party was not independent but dictated by the Soviets. They found that the party had taken a dogmatic line of Marxist-Leninism and had totally ignored a pragmatic approach the national problems. These elements, though small in number but important in the party structural organization, broke away.[15] Another group was influenced by the philosophy and ideology of Taraki and considered him not only the leader but the teacher also. The third group was formed by those activists who had been organized by Hafizullah Amin. Then there were those elements who were linked directly with Moscow. They were to adjust themselves anyway. The tussle actually started

between Taraki and Amin over distribution of power which resulted in frequent changes in the administration. Amin, an impressive orator and strong administrator, entertained high ambitions. His brother Abdullah Amin, an employee of Spinzar Shirkat, Kunduz, had played a role in organizing the Khalq there. He was considered a religious man. But he was corrupt and had accumulated wealth by unfair means. While working for the Khalq, he tried to convince the simple people of the area that they would gain a lot when Hafizullah Amin became the king.[16] Aspiring for kingship, Amin could be fitted well in the role of a Michaevellian Prince. The Taraki-Amin intrigues, not so spectacular to catch the attention, split the Khalq and put the Khalqi government on road to disaster. The pro-Moscow group came to the help of Taraki. "In 1979, Taraki, with Moscow backing, attempted to eliminate his Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, whom the Soviets considered unreliable, but Taraki himself was killed in fighting."[17] In September 1979, Taraki attended the nonaligned conference in Havana. On return he stopped in Moscow where he was directed to remove Amin and bring in Karmal. Said Daud Taroon who had accompanied Taraki as his ADC was a confidant of Amin. On arrival at Kabul, Taroon whispered to Amin at the airport.[18] It was believed

that Karmal had also reached Moscow and attended the briefing given by Brezhnev to Taraki. On 14 Sep., 1979, the encounter took place in which Taraki was captured, Aslam Watanjar, Sherjan Mazdooryar, Said Mohammad Gulabzoi and Asadullah Sarwari escaped to the Soviet Embassy. Said Taroon; Nawab, Deputy Chief of AGSA; Engineer Khair Mohammad, President of the Afghan Construction Unit and Dr Surgul, President of the Preventive Medicine Department of Public Health Ministry, were killed.[19] Amin rushed to the army headquarters to assume command of the armed forces. The Soviet Ambassador, Puzanov,tried to persuade Amin to release Taraki but failed.[20] The leader of the Saur Revolution was, thus, killed in a coup d'etat staged by Hafizullah Amin. It was believed that the Soviet Ambassador was also present in the meeting of the Revolutionary Council that day. He was later recalled at the request of President Hafiz-ullah Amin.[21] By the end of 1979, Amin was eliminated when the Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan and installed Babrak Karmal.

There were two other factions of the PDPA also but they did no create any impression on the political life through the Khalq regime. They were;(a) Jamiat-i-Inqilabi Zahmat Kashan (Workers Revolutionary Party) led by Zahir Ufaq, and (b) Groh-i-Kar (Workers group) led by Dastgir Panjsheri.

The pro-Taraki Khalqis who were dissociated from the main body added more to the violence because of their acquaintance with the weaknesses and strategy of the ruling faction. Having annoyed the Soviet Union, Amin had to seek friendship with the USA and Pakistan, and settlement with Afghan refugees leaders in Pakistan as well. It did not work.[22] The situation deteriorated more and more. The atrocities committed by Taraki and Amin regimes could not be verified but a picture could be drawn from the statistics released by the successive PDPA Governments to show the extent of their ruthless suppressive actions. Hafizullah Amin claimed in November 1979 that Taraki had executed 12,000 political prisoners. Karmal claimed release of 2,000 political prisoners.[23] Parcham sources later gave out some statistics that Amin had executed 1,000 party members, 2,000 political prisoners, about 3,000 others - altogether 6,000 -, and had detained 13 to 15 thousand prisoners in Pule Charkhi prison, the capacity of which was only 5,000.[24]

External pressure.

The revolution-makers were grown up Afghans, mature and educated. They should have been the best students of the complex socio-economic, religious and political values of the Afghan society. Of them, Taraki was quite well-versed in the

traditional social life of the people. He had manifested his knowledge of these aspects in his works as a critic of the whole socio-economic system and its institutions such as Khan, Malik, Mullah, Pir, traders and government employees. When in power, they just forgot everything; the people, their history, religion,culture, behaviour, and more so the delicate relations between the ruler and the ruled in this tribal society.

Often the most dramatic relations with other countries are not the most critical of Afghanistan's problems. The real tasks facing its governments are internal, the problems of unity and minorities; the conflicting pressures, social and economic, of traditionalism and modernization (particularly in regard to the status of women and to Islam); and the difficulties of imposing sophisticated political methods and institutions on old tribal loyalties and attitude.[25] All the historical factors are witness to the political developments in Afghanistan that whenever the Central government has tried to curb the traditional freedom of the Pukhtoon tribes,they have reacted definitely against the encroachment.[26] Most Pukhtoon problems arise from Zan, Zar, Zamin (woman, wealth and land). The Pukhtoon thought that nationalization of Zar and Zamin would be followed by nationalization of Zan. The "Communist

coup d' etat" had, infact, challenged the Pukhtoon Namoos (honour) by interference in their private possessions.[27] In the Afghan society, Zan (woman in general and wife in particular) is considered the property of the man like Zar and Zamin. These are the most sensitive elements of the Pukhtoon life. The Pukhtoonwali (the unwritten code of the Pukhtoon life), therefore, put more emphasis on the security of these elements. It was reported by Nadir Khan to Sir Francis Humphry, British Minister in Kabul in 1920s, after the eruption of Mangal rebellion in 1924, that; "First, Amanullah tried to push through his reforms far too precipitately. Afghans as a race are fanatical, bigoted, conservative. It is not safe to run roughshod over their cherished customs and attempt to dragoon them into civilization on the European standard."[28]

The people,in general, did not think much of the changes in Kabul. The rural population was almost autonomous, if not totally free, in their traditional life. They were not, at all, interested in politics. "Lacking political awareness and ill-informed about the events in the capital, most of these (village Mullah and traditional Maulvi) did not react immediately to the 'Communist coup d' etat' in April 1978. It was not until there was direct interference by the Communists at village level that

their call for a holy war was launched. Three elements provided them with an impetus; the agrarian reform which called into question the notion of private property, guaranteed by the Quran; the enforced literacy programme (considered to be closer to political indoctrination than to attend lessons conducted by man); and finally the massive, indiscriminate arrest of local Maulvis in 1979. The uprisings began in the autumn of 1978, culminating in April 1979."[29] "Islam in Afghanistan, in fact, did not threaten either the Soviets or even the Afghan Communist regime. As long as traditional patterns were left untouched, Afghans remained by and large indifferent to the exact form of government. The April 1978 coup that brought the Khalqi Communists to power, however, also marked the beginning of an attempt to alter radically the existing Afghan value system and social structure. It was that attempt on the part of a minority regime, and the brutality associated with it, that finally precipitated large-scale resistance by the Afghan people."[30] The foreign scholars are not to be blamed for drawing conclusions of the affairs of an "ignored country" which has no outlet for its publicity. But they were not so wrong to assume that the reaction to Taraki regime was not immediate and politically motivated.

The first voice which has been put on record was raised on the 7th day of the Saur Revolution. True to its nature, it was the province of Paktia which demonstrated its disapproval of the revolution. On 3 May 1978, Maulvi Aziz Khan, after consultation with local elders, declared Jihad against the "red non-believers". Addressing a gathering at the funeral of Noor Mohammad Khan of Alama, as a religious obligation, at Zerok, he switched over to a quotation from the Holy Quran; "O believers! make war on the infidels who dwell around you. Let them find firmness in you. Know that Allah is with the righteous" (Al-Tawba = Repentance; 123; The Quran; Dar al-Choura, Beirut; 1980; p.145). The excited mob rose and attacked Illaqadari, killing the Parchamite Illaqadar and his brother, and the school where the 'atheist' teachers were separated from the 'Muslims' and executed.[31] It was followed by a series of unnoticed local disturbances;

The Shoora-i-Saqafati Jihad-i-Afghanistan, Islamabad (SSJA), compiled the counter-revolutionary uprisings in chronological order as under:[32]

22 May 1978	Vaigal valley of Nooristan.
"	Shigal valley of Kunars.
4 October	Throughout Nooristan and declaration of Jihad.
8 "	Hissarak, Ningrahar.
20 November	Khugiani, Ningrahar.
22 January 79	Dasht-i-Archi, Kunduz.

20 February	11 Div, Ningrahar.
22 "	Charkant and Sholgarah Uluswali, Balkh.
" "	Suff valley of Samangan.
" "	Sholgarah.
6 March	Baghlan province.
12 "	Uruzgan "
13 "	Farah "
15 "	Herat "
22 "	Badghis "
29 April	Paktia "
30 "	Ghore "
9 May	Ghazni "
" "	Logar "
" "	Pule Khumri Uluswali of Baghlan.
23 June	Chandawal, Kabul city.
" "	Badakhshan province.
29 "	Alishang and Alingar of Laghman.
8 July	Jalrez of Maidan Wardak.
11 "	Maidan province.
16 "	Bamian "
5 August	Bala Hisar Garrison, Kabul city.
7 "	Panjsher valley.
20 "	Asmar Brigade, Kunars.
7 September	Throughout Ghazni province.
22 Feb 1980	Kabul city.

The Cultural Committee of Jamiat-i-Islami, Afghanistan, Tehran, published a brief of some resistance activities at the bottom of its calender for the year of 1365 H.S. (1986/87) which are put in chronological order as under:

5 October 1978	Uprising in Nooristan.
*Oct-Nov	Attack on the Kabul Airport by Tara Khel of Kabul.
*" "	Uprising in Kunduz.

*6	January 1979	Uprising in Takhar
20	Feb	Mutiny in Jalalabad Garrison.
*22	"	Bloody demonstrations in Kabul city.
23	"	Uprising in Suff valley.
*"	"	" Baghlan.
12	March	" Uruzgan.
13	"	" Farah.
14	"	" Herat-more than 25,000 people were martyred.
23	June	" Chandawal, Kabul, in which Umar Khan was martyred.
"	"	" Badakhshan.
29	"	" Laghman.
*8	July	Jihad starts in Paktia.
*11	"	Uprising in Parwan.
"	"	" Wardak.
5	August	Mutiny in Bala Hissar, Kabul.
18	"	Execution of Engineer Habib-ur-Rahman.
22	"	Mountain Brigade, Asmar, Kunars, joins the Mujahideen.
5	Sep	Uprising in Ghazni.
*9	"	" Zabul.

(* these events have not been put on record by the SSJA).

These reports from the Mujahideen sources make it clear that inspite of rising tension within the ruling party and all its weaknesses, the people of Afghanistan, in general, were not moved by the "Communist coup d' etat" for about six months.These chronologies suggest that the resistance took start at a noticeable level in Nooristan after about a month for some reasons other than ideological. The

reasons of some of these uprisings could be analysed from available sources which are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

The government sacked some officials from Nooristan which was resented by the people.A number of tribal leaders were arrested in this connection. Consequently rebellion began in Kamdesh valley of Nooristan. The people attacked a government post near a village Yurmur and captured it after a fighting for three days. The people went on and freed the whole of Nooristan. The government resorted to 'divide and rule' policy and raised other hostile tribes against Nooristanis. It was the government machinary which declared that Nooristanis had abondoned Islam and became apostates. A Gujar leader, Gul Mohammad, was appointed commander of tribal irregulars to suppress the rebellion staged by their rivals. The Nooristanis led by Mohammad Anwar,Chief of Kom tribes, defeated the Lashkar and established a form of rebel government. "The Kalash" of Vaigal valley also rose in protest against the dismissal of their people from government posts. They were alarmed to find that unlike previous regimes the Marxist regime took the reforms seriously and meant to implement them. They found the new government's pronouncements 'antagonistic and confrontational'.[33] The Charkant uprising started on 22 Feb 1979, after

ten months of the revolution. The religious and apiritual leaders preached Jihad in mosuques. In the meantime, some people, including Din Mohammad, Mohammad Hussain Masroor alias Said Qumandan, Ghulam Rasul who were leading figures from Qauland Paykan village in Sholgarah valley; Khwaja Sikandar an elder from Arlat Kashinda of Balkh province; Barat Ali an elder of Hazara group from Punjab Yangicharak Jauzjan; Mohammad Ali brother of Ghulam Rasul; Qazi Mohammad Sharif and Maulvi Mohammadullah Graduates from Darul Uloom Asadia Mazar-i-Sharif from Furshqan Sangicharak; Maulvi Abdur Rahim Graduate from the said Darul Uloom from Auqaf Sangicharak; Saif-ud-Din from Zumchi valley Sangicharak; Wakeel Noor Mohammad from Roye Doab Uluswali, started consultations and meetings, and finally pledged to unite under the banner of Islam to launch Jihad. The people followed them and the hilly areas of Balkh were freed totally and the plains were also controlled by them. On 25 Feb, troops attacked the 'defence-less' people of Charkant. In this attack "a great number of Khalqis and troops" and tanks took part. A number of people, while running for safety fell to the firing of guns, tanks and other weapons. That night Mujahideen were not present in the village. The ill-armed group of Mujahideen consis-

ted of not more than 300 while the troops with modern weapons approximated 2,000. After three days of intensive fighting the troops retreated to Mazar-i-Sharif with 160 dead and dozens wounded. The retreat was given cover by the Air Force. Two Mujahideen, Mohammad Rahim from Arlat and Abdur Rasul from Amrakh Punjab, were killed. In June/July 1980, Zabihullah arrived in Balkh and formed the Marmal Front in Balkh province.[54]

The uprising in the Suff valley of Samangan province also started on 22 Feb 1979. Governor Allah Dad Toofan assigned Andesh teacher and Abdul Khaliq Panjsheri to organize a group of 'communists' to put every man who came to the market on horse-back in jail and seize the horse. A number of people rode the horses to bi-weekly fairs held each Tuesday and Thursday in that province. These three, Toofan, Andesh and Khaliq, used to drive in vehicles and arrest the horse-riders. The horse was either taken away or put to auction in the fair and the rider was sent to jail. Andesh and Khaliq were given authority to search the houses for wheat, livestock and other properties. (It may be a reference to anti-hoarding campaign which created similar conditions at some other places also.) After a night or two of the search, they would raid selected houses and take away all the

house-hold effects in vehicles and throw the males of the house in the wells, used for storage of wheat. They would not hesitate in any act of insult to the chastity and honour of the house.The loots were divided among themselves. This was the situation in almost all the villages around Samangan city. The people who could not afford to give them enough money were threatened to be killed and then released to arrange the amount of money. A businessman who was ordered to pay ten million Afghanis left all his properties and migrated alongwith his family to Kabul. Many other noble families also migrated to Kabul from Samangan for this reason. Mohammad Ismail Urya Khel, proprietor of Amin Asri Medical Store at Mazar-i-Sharif, while on way to Kabul in his own car with a sum of 500,000 Afghanis for the purchase of medicines, was checked by Andesh. His car and money were confiscated and he was shot dead in public. Similarly an army officer sought permission of the governor on telephone for "Gulpashi (throwing flowers)". At 4 p.m. the same day, all the detainees were brought out to Buzkashi ground and shot dead in the presence of the people. When the campaign against illiteracy was launched,a team was sent to Suff valley also. They called upon the people to bring their daughters, sisters and wives for admission in literacy courses. In

response to all their submissive arguments, the team insulted the people. One of them said to the people; "Good enough that your wives spend the night with you, let them attend the courses at day-time." The team returned unsuccessful to the Uluswali which annoyed the Uluswal. He said that the people who did not allow their daughters and sisters to come out, were liable to be killed. An army officer ordered strong action against such people. It was the month of Jaddi, 1357 (Dec 1978/Jan 1979), when the Uluswal with five guards rushed to the coal-mine. The agitated workers chopped his head with axe and killed his guards. "The Muslim workers" were directed to destroy the road and prepare themselves for defence against the anticipated action by the government.The governor of Balkh ordered the Mazar-i-Sharif Garrison which dispatched a Battalion for the operation. A detachment of this Battalion cleared the way and reached Suff where it was completely annihilated. The Mujahideen got their arms. On the order of the governor of Samangan, the provincial commander of Police with a police contingent moved to Suff valley. This party was also eliminated on way near Kotal Ghulam Ali. Then Abdul Hafeez Panjsheri, Police Officer of Uluswali Hulm, volunteered and moved with a strength of the police. Abdul Hafeez with three police-men was executed by the Muslims while the

rest fled away. The people were, thus, preparing for a general uprising. Similar condition prevailed in Doab Uluswali. The Governor collected about fifty party workers from Baghlan and dispatched them in a 10-tyre heavy truck to Doab. The driver drove the truck off the road and escaped, while the rest died. In the wake of this situation, troops from Kabul and Nahrain with tanks and guns, and a commando unit, commanded by Hashim Rafiq, Revenue Officer of Samangan, moved to Suff. They were provided cover by 'planes and helicopters. The vehicles carrying ration were destroyed at Kotal Chashma. On 6 April 1979, Suff was attacked. Governor Toofan arrested all the males, tied their hands on the back and put them in the school. The females were taken to the mosque. Six hundred people of Suff were massacred and thrown in ditches which were covered by bulldozers. Only two men escaped death miraculously who joined Mujahideen in a nearby village. On 8 May 1979, Suff again fell to Mujahideen.[35]

The uprising in Herat was marked as "the first sign of major dissent in the Afghan Army."[36] It was soon after the Saur Revolution that the people felt unrest in Herat. During the month of Ramzan, some religious figures decided to declare Jihad over loudspeakers in the mosques on the occasion of Eid-ul-Fitr. But only a few of them could make the

declaration. And they disappeared. Then it was decided in secret meetings that Jihad would be declared on Eid-ul-Azha. On the reports of the AGSA, sixty important persons were arrested.They included Aqa Farooq Shah from Pashtun Zarghun, Malang Khan Tezani, Mir Hamza, Shaikh Ghulam Hussain Talib, Ghulam Mohammad Roohani, Ahmad Khan Deeno Khateeb, Baba-e-Barq Khateeb, Said Faghfoor, Haji Ghaznichi, Mir Ahmad Khan teacher, Said Moazzem son of Hazrat Karkh and Haji Abdul Ghafoor. It happened in September 1978 when Herat was terrified. In january 1979, again some people were arrested. They included Abdul Baqi, Abdus Samad, Mohammad Anwar, Fazl-ul-Haq and Ali Ahmad of the Mojaddidi family. In February, residents of Salimi were subjected to brutal persecution on account of their opposition to literacy programme. (Cf.p.118). On 14 March 1979, Qari Abu Bakr was executed on account of anti-government activities. In Ghorian, the people were called for voluntary work, and an old man was beaten in public.

The land reform was rejected. The landless people who were awarded mutation papers tore them on 8 March 1979. Some of them still holding the papers joined Mujahideen. Seven of them went to Uluswali and returned the papers. They were executed. Next day, the people attacked Ghorian

Uluswali and killed all the officials except one who escaped to Herat to take the news. Troops moved from Herat and opened indiscriminate firing inflicting great losses on the people. On 9 March, Baha-ud-Din declared Jihad publicly at the central congregational mosque of Herat. On 10th Haji Mohammad Ayub arrived with a message from Sibghat-ullah Mojaddidi calling upon the people for Jihad. On 12th, a team arrived at Gazrah Uluswali for distribution of land. Gul Mohammad Tezani fired 'the first' shot on them. Next day, the people gathered around Tezani at Gazrah. Maulvi Saleh was holding up the banner of Islam. On 14th, about 2,000 Mujahideen marched to Herat city. More people joined them on the way. Some government servants also joined in while one officer and one other were killed. The jeep of the officer was captured, and Gul Mohammad Tezani got it. Fighting in and around Herat continued for five days. The Zalmay Kot Garrison revolted and joined the freedom fighters. In this fighting, about 25,000 were killed on the Mujahideen's side, and similar number of people were arrested subsequently from various places.[37] The toll of casualties on the other side is not certain. However, thirty Russian advisers were also killed due to which the government resorted to ruthless retaliation. The

government claimed that 4,000 Iranian soldiers in plain clothes had penetrated in Herat to ignite the unrest.[38] Consequently, the Iranian Consul at Herat was expelled.[39] Gul Mohammad Tezani, Ahmad Deeno and some other leaders of the uprising migrated to Iran. On 21 March, 3,000, approximately, were arrested in Herat province and executed. They included Maulvi Baha-ud-Din and his son Ahmad.[40] Zia-ul-Mashaikh Mohammad Ibrahim Mojaddidi with 19 other members of his family and relatives were also arrested in Kabul in this connection,[41] and executed.

The uprising of Chandawal is related to the general unrest in Kabul city. About 500 armed personnel were arrested on reports that they had made a plot in connivance with some citizens for a mutiny in the army and public demonstrations against the government on 17 March 1979. Then Qazi Ghulam Sakhi Qirghizi gathered some people in an Association for Defence of Islam and formed a Revolutionary Council. The Qazi and all the armed personnel in link were arrested. A plan of uprising was chalked out at Chandawal with the support of Hizbi Islami, Jamiat-i-Islami, Harkat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami and Harkat-i-Islami. 23rd of June 1979 was fixed for the start with explosions in the city. Mohammad Umar Khan who was later killed in this

uprising had made time-bombs. A speech was pre-recorded for play over radio Afghanistan to announce success of the plan. A time-bomb went off at Pule Bagh-i-Umoomi before the time and all the routes were immediately blocked by security agencies and troops. The plotters were informed a day before the target date that government had infiltrated the group and the plot had been revealed. So, all the cells were directed to keep out of the plan. The message could not be communicated to the cell in Chandawal. They raided the Police Post in the area according to the plan. All the occupants of the post, but a Zabit who was Khalqi, surrendered. The Zabit was killed. The raiders found 200 arms of various types and distributed among themselves. The area was immediately besieged by troops which opened indiscriminate firing and killed a great number of people including Umar.[42]

Defection enmasse of the Mountain Brigade of Asmar on 22 August 1979 has been analysed comprehensively by its commander Brigadier Abdur Rauf Safi.[43] The previous governments kept the army away from politics. The armed personnel were not allowed to study political literature. On this account the army officers were placed at a level, from political point of view, that they could not understand the ideas, and even the "coup-makers"

of Seven Saur.[44] The rank and file of the army was immediately disturbed when junior and less-important officers assumed commanding positions. The neutral seniors were confused by violation of order and discipline of juniors who were affiliated with the PDPA. The experienced senior officers were either sacked, jailed, executed, or pushed behind. Similar was the case with security police and other related agencies. The enthusiastic activists in command did not have patience and experience of defusing the trouble with the least possible force and casualties. They ran into trouble so recklessly with all the sources at hand that both the sides had to sustain heavy losses in each operation. Such ruthless operations were creating more troubles. While the victims were gaining sympathies, the army was losing faith. Defections from the conscript-army in command of childish officers became usual. Of these events, defection of the Asmar Brigade was very important.

Mass-persecution became the common practice. 300 adepts of Chistia arrested in the autumn of 1978 were believed to have been buried alive. Pir Baha-ud-Din Aimaq of Purchaman with numerous other religious persons were killed in the meantime.[45] On 20 April 1979, a small village called Kerala presented the most gloomy picture. This village is

situated close to Asadbad, headquarters of Kunars province, at the entrance of Pech valley. General Bahram who had got two-step promotion following Daud-coup and was a Jagran at the time of the Saur Revolution, was GOC of 11 Div at Jalalabad, and Nizam-ud-Din was Governor of Kunars. That day an outsider preached Jihad in the mosque of Kerala. The governor sent for local elders and ordered to hand over the preacher whom they did not know.Then came in General Bahram with some Russians and troops and besieged the village. The whole population was collected and charged with "their collaboration with Ashrar". About 1200 adult males were separated and gunned down in the presence of their wives,daughters and children. The bodies were bulldozed to ditches and buried. The Afghan Millat claimed to have killed General Bahram and eight Russians at Jalalabad the same night.[46]

Two to three thousand young people majority of whom were Hazara were transported as usual for work, on daily wages, at the rate of Afghani 200 per head per day, after the Chandawal uprising in June 1979, and were killed at Pule Charkhi.[47]

The political movements and groups of constitutional period had gained some experience of understanding each other. During Daud regime,when political activities were banned, they were scattered,

disorganized and ill-informed of the muffled political developments in the country. In whatever form they were, they had one common goal, as they had during Zahir Shah regime, i.e. the end of the regime (Daud's). But they were shocked to learn about the rise of Taraki to power. The Afghan political nature is also void of tolerance. Taraki was no exception. The political elements were right, and on time, to react and oppose the government. They were also right to reorganize themselves and call upon the people to rise against the government. They were encouraged by a number of religious leaders, Mullahs, Maulvis and Pirs who were aware of the developments. They Islamicised the counter-revolutionary movement as Jihad and formed Islamic fronts and parties to fight communism out of Afghanistan. Gathering at Peshawar, the leaders, however, could not succeed in forging unity and nationalising the regional resistance. The more they talked of unity the more they were divided. During the 17 months of Taraki regime, they could not get more than 150,000 refugees in Pakistan, who, leaving the country for any reason, formed the Peshawar-based parties.[48] The influx of refugees increased during the two and a half months of Amin regime, and more after the Soviet invasion. It may not be irrelevant to put

hereinunder excerpts from a note made of a chat with a Mullah on 27 November 1985 at Zarmelana in South Waziristan by the author;

> "There live about 100 families of Andar clan of Ghilzai tribe in a separate quarter (at Zarmelana). They had left homes at Taloqan, close to the Soviet border, in Takhar province, in September 1985 due to overlapping intrusion in their life by Russian-Karmal soldiers and Mujahideen, each side harassed them for their alleged collaboration with the other side. Men and women were frequently questioned, household effects plundered and properties destroyed. They had no other alternative but to flee. These families, as a Mullah spokesman described, had migrated thirty years back (1955) from Qandahar and settled at Taloqan. They purchased land and built houses, and lived happily. They were never bothered by the changes in Kabul which cast no effect on their life. When they heard that Taraki came into power, they did not know who Taraki was but felt happy to learn that the power had shifted to Ghilzai. They were so isolated that they knew nothing about developments around until they experienced the bitter fact through unwarranted intrusion in their life."

Political and religious leaders could not mobilize public opinion but capitalize on the people's own reasons. Daud-time Islamist group of refugees in Pakistan which was inactive for some time resumed its activities along the border against the "Godless Communist regime of Taraki." The armed resistance in Panjsher which had taken start on 20 July 1975 against Daud was re-animated. Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi with a group of orthodox Maulvis and Mullahs migrated to Pakistan and succeeded, though provisionally, in uniting Hizbi Islami led by Gulbadin and

Jamiat-i-Islami led by Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani in July/August 1978 into Harkat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami. Pir Said Ahmad Gilani Effendi and his family escaped to Pakistan in early 1979, and Sibghatullah Mojaddidi who was in Denmark as the Head of an Islamic Mission at the time of the Saur Revolution also came to Peshawar. Maulvi Mohammad Yunus Khalis, a member of Hizbi Islami, broke away to form his factional group in April 1979. While agreeing on one point of Jihad, they disagreed on any other point.[49] Since the tribal society of Afghanistan was not much interested in any revolution or counter-revolution, the struggles against implementation of government order were sentimental, local and provisional. For a scholar of the Afghan society, these struggles were not a new phenomenon, because "the death of a ruler was always followed by civil wars".[50] This time, the political elements, however, gave it a new touch. While the Peshawar-based parties were re-organizing their own cells of Mujahideen, the segments of Shulae Javed assmilated again to resume underground activity after April 1978. Led By Majid Kalakani, an alliance of "less left-committed nationalists" was forged in early 1979 in the name of Sazman-i-Azadi Bakhsh-i- Mardum-i-Afghanistan (SAMA = The Afghan Peoples Liberation Organization). It claimed to have organized with the help of its

8,000 militants the bloody uprising in Kabul on 22 February 1979. The SAMA changed into Jabha-i-Mutahida-i-Milli (JMM = United National Front) in Jan 1980 when some left-over leftists of Millat and Sitam-i-Milli also joined it. Their motto was "Freedom or Death."[51] The Sitam-i-Milli was responsible for kidnapping of the US Ambassador in Feb 1979 and demanding the release of some leaders of the group. The Ambassador was killed in action. The same group attacked an army post at Baharak, Badakhshan, in April 1979, and captured the sub-district centre. In a counter-action by the army, forty of them were killed and the rest were captured and executed.[52] The SAMA and the Afghan Millat, both claimed to have organized the Bala Hissar mutiny on 5 August 1979.[53] Some educated Hazara had formed their own party which advocated the cause of the 'oppressed minorities'. It was not affiliated with any of the factions of the PDPA. On account of their criticism of the clergy, they were declared Kafirs by local religious figures. In 1979, they assembled again to lead the Hazara insurrection against the government. They could not make any headway and had to give way to religious people to organize the people. Ayatullah Said Ali Beheshti formed Shoora-i-Ittefaq-i-Afghanistan and ex-Lieut Said Hassan was appointed General Commander of three

fronts. The Shoora represented different political groups namely Raad, Niron, Nuhzat and Nasr. They formed village defence committees. The three fronts under the command of Said Hassan were Ghazni front commanded by Gharib Dad, Turkmen front by Haji Nadir and Jaghori front.[54] Inspired by Ayatullah Khomeini, the Shoora received assistance from Iran and religious leaders for guidance. According to Zalmay Khalilzad, Nasr and Sepah Shia groups were influenced by the Iranian revolution, while Shoora-i-Ittefaq, Harkat-i-Islami and Mustazafin Shia were independent.[55] The pro-Khomeini groups in Central Afghanistan, Nasr and Sepah-i-Pasdaran, later, vanquished the traditional Shia resistance groups that had held sway since the "coup". These pro-Iranian groups moved to establish an Islamic Republic in Hazarajat. "The previously dominant Shoora party reportedly is no longer active in the region." Harkat-i-Islami led by Ayatullah Mohsini was also pro-Iranian.[56] The slogans of the pro-Iranian groups are "Long live Khomeini - Down with America." In Peshawar, the Hazara Shia representing these groups are linked with Said Ahmad Gilani, leader of the Mahaz-i-Milli Afghanistan.

Migration to Pakistan started soon after April 1978. It was, however, at an unnoticeable scale for more than one year. In fact, the resistance

movements were strengthened more by the atrocious actions of Taraki regime. Similarly the ruling PDPA which was blighted by frictional politics was made conscious of its survival by the mounting threat of the growing resistance. In the beginning, this process was very slow as it appears from the statistics of the influx of refugees recorded by the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees, N.W.F.P., Peshawar, in November 1979:

Month	Number of Afghan Refugees	Increase
April-Dec, 1978	13,863	-
Jan 1979	18,329	4,466
Feb	19,399	70
Mar	23,945	5,546
Apr	42,390	18,445
May	50,348	7,958
May 27	54,616	4,268
Jun 30	74,171	19,555
Jul 27	100,742	26,571
Sep 02	140,217	14,646
Oct 04	153,476	13,259
Oct 30	181,838	28,362
Nov 15	209,171	27,333

The situation aggravated more after promulgation of Decrees No 6 of 12 July 1978, No 7 of 17 October 1978 and No 8 of 28 November 1978 by the Revolutionary Council, and put to implementation by the over-optimist administration. Decree No 6, prohibiting usury and other means of exploitation, affected a small group of moneyed people and businessmen. They used to lend money on interest, or for acquisition of merchandise at

pre-fixed nominal rates in return in the harvest season. No doubt it was a blessing for the exploited people. However the reality of the traditional life was not taken into consideration. The second form of interest was Islamicised as Salam and the exploited class was led to believe that it all related to fate to which they had resigned. This decree also caused resentment. The moneyed people, on the whole, were reluctant to part with wealth and property so easily. The majority of them were urbanised. They surrendered and continued their business, even offering donations to government-raised funds. The other side, relieved of exploitation and exempted from repayment of more than the principal amount of the loan, did not understand this notion. Most of them honoured their commitments privately. The affair did not end there.Those who migrated to Pakistan were bound by traditional and social norms to liquidate their commitments accordingly. Until the end of 1979, it was a common practice that money-lenders who lived in Afghanistan used to visit, or send their agents to, the refugees in camps to receive their "right".[57]

Decree No 7 sparked off general resentment among the people. Its reaction in Kabul was felt first among the terrified citizens who watched helplessly scores of couples turning out every day to get their

marriages solemnized without the consent of their parents.[58] This decree was a direct intrusion in the age-hold tradition of dowry and bride-price. The female is considered the property of man. The marriage is arranged by parents after fixing a price for the girl and settlement on other related arrangements. These expenses had soared to unbearable heights. It is one of the major factors which has impoverished the society and made it so money-conscious. Economy apart, the female is considered the 'honour of the house'. Any irrelevant talk about a female is taken as an insult to the related family. Courtship is just out of the question. Elopement, abduction and adultery are serious crimes which merit execution of both the involved parties. Another element of this tradition is confinement of the matrimonial relation to the related family unless some specific conditions compel otherwise. After promulgation of the decree, some carefree party members chased girls of their choice and took them by force to marry. In many cases both the families were so disturbed and annoyed that they could think of nothing else but violence. A few cases reacted violently on the spot by shooting the aggressor, be killed, or condemned to death, or go to prison, on rhetorical charges of 'counter-revolutionaries,

imperialist agents etc'. Others waited for the time to demonstrate their reaction in various ways, and finally emigration. The girls going out for decreed marriages were called sarcastically Seh-Sadi (worth three hundred) by the female folk of Kabul; a reference to the prescribed amount of Mahar against which the marriages were solemnized.[59] "People with unmarried daughters resented the decree most because they could no longer expect to receive bride-price payments for them when they married. The decree was particularly unpopular because it represented a threat to male honour."[60] The fair sex was so accustomed to this tradition that they felt pride in a high price and lived under the protection of man. Turning overnight this tradition unside down should not have been taken lightly as the harebrained rulers did. In rural areas, the tribal and ethnic bonds were so firm and strong that the so-called authorities could not disturb their life easily. Therefor, it could not be transformed into immediate reaction. In some cases, the rural dissidents abducted girls and sold them as a mark of protest. Nonetheless, it made an enormous impact on the changing situation in favour of the resistance.

The main cause of resistance was reaction to Decree No 8 on land reforms. The notion of land reforms was not new for the people. Zahir Shah

and Daud regimes had also enforced land reforms in order to settle the nomads whose seasonal movements across the international borders divided their loyalties while their internal movements caused numerous administrative and socio-economic problems on their itineraries. The previous regimes offered them government lands and facilities. Still they were reluctant to abandon their migratory tradition and adop a sedentry life. The new element in these land reforms was the objective of wiping out the "feudals". The optimistic viewpoint of the government was; "According to official figures, there exist in Afghanistan 2.5 million families; 1.9 million in villages and the balance in towns. From the latter figure, 36% has no land at all while 4% of big landowners possess more than 50% of the total cultiveable land in the country. Since these feudal lords are not interested in raising productivity because they suffice to live with a fraction of annual produce as they own from 15,000 acres to 50,000 each, they consider investing on machinery or fertilizers a waste of good money. The issuing of Decree No Eight by the Revolutionary Council was a fatal blow to feudalism in this country as each feudal lord will hereafter be entitled to keep only 15 acres for himself and leave the rest to be redistributed among the landless peasants, poor nomads

or those who have less than five acres of first grade land or equivalent thereof."[61] The government approach was subjective and wishful. They took into account the figures and did not think of the traditional force behind these 4% big landowners. "This nominally called democratic land reform brought misfortune to the whole nation."[62] "Party members who were unaware of the social norms and values trampled on the land owner's prestige. They deprived them of their rights by dividing their lands among their tenants."[63] "On the other hand the traditionalist class of tenants/landless farmers who received the land ownership title, either tore them or submitted them to the original landowners. Those who, by any chance kept the title, delivered the produce to the actual owners of the land after the harvest was collected and then received their share of products."[64] While the resistance was mounting in the name of Jihad, Taraki declared "Jihad against Ikhwanush Shayateen" in September 1978.[65] Like the Bolsheviks who called the freedom fighters in Central Asia as Basmachi (bandits), Taraki called the dissenters as Ashrar (trouble-makers).

The UN Human Rights Report on Afghanistan analysed the factors behind the opposition to these reforms in the following words:

"The principle of the redistribution of land came into conflict with the notion of the protected nature of property as defined in the Shariah. The Afghan peasant perceived the domination to which he was subjected by wealth, power and corruption to be an abuse, but not the ownership of property.

The basic criteria of the reform did not take into account the socio-economic realities of the life of the Afghan population. Thus the restrictive definition of the family and the redistribution of land in line with that new definition did not correspond to people's perceptions and lives in Afghanistan. In fact the notion of the family is of a very extended one whereas the law defines it as being composed of an adult man, his wife and children.

Lastly, the measurement of land is perceived more in terms of availability of seed, equipment and water rights than in terms of the actual area of land owner." 66

The Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights visited Refugees Tented Villages in Baluchistan and NWFP from 25 July to 10 August 1985 and interviewed a number of persons from sixteen provinces of Afghanistan. He submitted his report to the commission in December 1985. Some relevant excerpts are reproduced hereinunder:

"44. These reforms were the subject of a strict implementation deeply affecting the customary law, the customs and traditions of the majority of the population in the rural areas and the religious consciousness of the majority of the population. In particular, the manner in which these reforms were implemented created growing resistance against which governmental pressure was directed. This resistance developed into virtual uprising which in its time provoked even stronger governmental pressure.

47. There was strong opposition, particularly on the part of the rural population, to the way in which the literacy campaign was carried out. This campaign was intended to reach

children, adult men and women and the elderly, but it did not have the desired effect, not because of the basic principles, but because of the action taken to implement it. As it happened, the often-arrogant behaviour of the instructors, obligatory attendance at classes for elderly people and obligatory participa - tion for women in mixed classes were felt to be humiliating and were sufficient to set off a revolt.

48. So the methods of implementing these Decrees rather than their content met with strong opposition on the part of the popula- tion concerned. Several eye-witnesses des- cribed to the Special Rapporteur the manner in which the military authorities and, in certain cases, civilian governors, had attempted to enforce the application of the reforms contained in the Decrees described above. In the main, this applied to the rural areas. According to information received by the Special Rapporteur, resis- tance to these reforms was met with harsh reprisals, which sometimes even went as far as taking of hostages. These reprisals in turn led to action against the government and to violent incidents between civilians and military.

49. In the urban areas also, the implemen- tation of the reforms is said to have been marked by the arbitrary arrest of persons who did not agree with them or who offered a certain amount of resistance. During this period, the Pule Charkhi prison in Kabul is said to have acquired the reputation of being the place of detention of several tens of thousands of persons." 67

Dr Najib, as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA, admitted that "Before the new and evolutionary phase of the revolution, a series of mistakes and deviations took place in the vital and key points of revolutionary process such as the implementation of land reforms, the approach to culture and beliefs of people, observance of party norms and democratic bases in the society and

the recognition of the stage of social development and the tasks of the National Democratic Revolution. However, after the victory of the new and evolutionary phase of the revolution, the revolutionary power has not only corrected the past mistakes step by step, but, also, through issuing special resolutions and enforcing laws, worked out the implementation of national democratic tasks based on the realities of the Afghan society."[68]

The resentment developed into resistance, and the resistance into guerilla warfare, particularly after the Soviet invasion towards the end of 1979. "If some of the Afghans were fighting Jihad against Taraki and Amin, now all of them have joined it."[69] The fighting has escalated with the blessing of anti-Soviet international communities. The oft-repeated claims of Mujahideen of their control over 80 to 95% of the country have sufficient reason of credibility. The rural areas of the country had never been subjected directly to the writ of the central authority. The local people were free in their life regulated by their customs and traditions, which are safeguarded by tribal/regional nobility and clerical hierarchies. The government writ rarely touched this delicate equilibrium of the society. The indirect control over these areas depended on loyalties of the local elders. The

tribal king at Kabul could not award punishment to tribesmen on political grounds without the consent of tribal nobility due to fear of retaliation, violence and riots, and fanaticism. Members of the ruling family, as well as government employees of status, were, however, awarded dreadful punishments because they did not have any force behind in support or for retaliation.[70] Any sort of punitive or reformative action of the government was considered intrusion in the freedom of the people and was never allowed without a consequence. The tribal insurrections were not suppressed by government forces but through neighbouring hostile tribes. The only effective instrument that the central authority had was "exploitation of personal and tribal prejudices" and assuming itself the role of mediator. The PDPA pushed the classes of tribal/regional nobility and clerical hierarchies to resistance. These classes followed by their communities formed regional fronts of resistance. . The Peshawar-based parties recruited these leaders and labelled the fronts in their names. Commenting on the lack of unity and discipline among the rank and file of Mujahideen, Gulbadin Hikmatyar indicated; "How should the people who had never exercised discipline be expected to gather under one banner?"[71] Discussing the rift in the resistance movement, the

Afghan Information Centre, Peshawar, concluded in July 1981:

> "In short, the above analysis tends to demonstrate that there are two fundamentally different conceptions of Jihad among the externally-based Afghan resistance groups; firstly the war of liberation fought by nationalists, liberal and pro-West elements seeking to establish a liberal regime with traditional methods of election, and secondly, the Islamic Revolution pursued by so-called fundamentalist elements which favour an Islamic Revolution rather than national liberation. The second course of action pursues its ideological objective by using well indoctrinated armed groups in order to found an autocratic, theoratic one-party state inspired by Iranian example; in this exercise the conflict with Russian occupation forces becomes a secondary issue." 72

The same Centre goes further to elaborate its viewpoint in September 1982, saying;

> "Among the Afghan Resistance Organizations stationed in Pakistan, some - especially the 'moderates' or the 'traditionalists' - are adapting themselves to the tribal conditions and are recruiting their followers accordingly. The fundamentalists - especially Hizbe Islami - are imposing their own party structure. However, in order to take root in Paktia, they need to break or at least weaken the tribal system. To some extent they have succeeded in weakening the system but they have not gained in extending their own influence. The tribal instinct of the population is constantly working against them." 73

Following are some excerpts from an evaluation of the predicament faced by Mujahideen made by Mohammad Es'haq of Jamiat-i-Islami Afghanistan:

> "Afghans are united in the main points of the struggle. To force out the Soviets and establish an Islamic, nonaligned and independent government are the objectives. About the rest which are mainly tactical ways to achieve the above aims they have different views and

these differences have historical, geo-graphical and political reasons.

Afghanistan being a mountainous country with limited means of communications, gives rise for the people of different regions to develop their own local customs and become loyal to a specific tribe or region. The wrong policies of past governments and monopoly on mass media by them helped this system which served the purpose of the rulers of Kabul.

During the war this loyalty or dependence to a place showed itself in the form of feeling a responsibility in defence of a village, district or a province. The imaginary lines of districts and provinces took the forms of physical barriers which prevented cooperation and organizational work. The parties, almost all, based their military organization on the old time administrative units (provinces and districts) which contributed in adding to the difficulties mentioned.

The theory of cooperation and coordination through reorganization and training is a relatively new idea and is not quite understandable by all in a short period of time. To tell a man who has lived in his village for decades to "go out of your district and fight the enemy base in a remote area", seems not to be very appealing. To him defending the village is more important than the district or province. To overcome this tendency of local dependence, one needs hard political work. The work becomes harder if you are dealing with people who cannot read and write. You have to talk to them in their own language and show them the usefulness of your ideas in practice.

The task of convincing people becomes more difficult because of the resistance of some local commanders to change. We have given them title of the "local kings". They are people who have one or two victories in the past and because of the location of their area the enemy does not attack them. They have lived in relative peace for 7 years. They consider themselves the "king of the area", do not feel responsible for what is going on a few kilometers away from them and do not permit anybody, even the big commanders of his own party to "interfere in his affairs" to bring about some necessary changes." 74

The causes are different, but the nature is the same. The Mujahideen are not less ruthless than the government agencies. "Inhuman treatment is not solely the province of the Afghan government and the Soviet forces. Responding to the heavy military pressure and the death and extreme treatment that many have received, the Mujahideen have often treated prisoners ruthlessly."[75] Every party of Afghan Refugees/Mujahideen has its own judiciary to try the 'criminals' most of whom are punished. Personal jealousies and feuds also work. The prisoners of war are subjected to disproportionate persecution at both ends to get more of their involvements. Film producer Jeff Harmon described an incident he witnessed in 1985;

> "In Malajat (outside Qandahar, at the headquarters of resistance leader Haji Abdul Latif) I saw 12 Afghan army prisoners lined up in chains before a judge named Mawlvi Abdul Bari, who was awaiting orders to execute them from the guerrillas' high command in Peshawar, Pakistan. Bari claims to have executed 2,500 prisoners.
>
> The judge told me; 'I have personally slit the throats of 1,000 Khalqis, I have sent 500 Russian infidels to the gallows'. Other prisoners, he said, were shot, decapitated or stoned to death..
>
> But Bari's brand of justice is swift and formal compared with that of the Mujahideen at Markazee Apo (sic), a Hezbi Islami guerrilla camp in Qandahar province. There, 12 prisoners, presumably Russian, were recently bayoneted to death. The stench from their decomposing bodies, buried in makeshift graves, permeates the camp." 76

The interest of Refugees/Mujahideen leaders and commanders in frictional politics, bank balances, constructions and transport create many questions which are hushed by the barrage of their rhetorics and claims. But there is no doubt that the eccentric fronts and fighting groups inside Afghanistan are doing enormous damages. Deputy Minister of Mines and Industries of Karmal regime, Mohammad Aziz, estimated the losses at the hands of "subversionists" at 60 million dollars.[77] The Minister of Transport, Sherjan Mazdooryar, admitted that since 1978 the damages caused by the resistance amounted to 35,000 million Afghanis. Out of this amount, 4,500 million Afghani worth damages were inflicted on transport. Over 200 drivers were also killed.[78] Helsinki Watch has compiled some of stories of torture and persecution in Afghanistan.[79]

Conclusions:

The change in Kabul was not a matter of concern to the common Afghan. The Saur Revolution did not arouse any reaction. The call of political and religious leaders did not receive any response until the traditional life of the people was disturbed by the over-enthusiastic revolutionaries' brutal arrogance and rude methods. Whenever and wherever a group of people suffered, then and there the problem arose. The resentment grew into resistance,

and the resistance developed into guerilla warfare. The real problem which the revolutionary government faced was the frictional politics of the ruling PDPA, which was pushing the revolution to the brink of collapse. External pressure was precipitating the process. Eventually, the Soviet troops came in to protect the socialist government against both internal and external threats. With the Soviet invasion towards the end of 1979, the prospect of the Saur Revolution changed into a global issue. The capitalist part of the world rose against communism. The next chapter will present an evaluation of external reaction to the Saur Revolution.

--

References:

1. Gupta, Bhabani Sen; Afghanista..; London; 1986; Pp.59-60.
2. Ghamzhan, Sher Zaman; Inqilab-i-Afghanistan; Zindagi, weekly, Lahore; 16-22 June 1978; p.17.
3. Crossman, R.H.S.; Government and the Governed, ed. V; Chatto & Windurs (Educational) Ltd; London WC-2; 1969; p.103.
4. Bulleh Shah; Anatomy of Revolution-III; The Star; 8.5.1986.
5. Gupta, Bhabani Sen; loc.cit; p.77.
6. Kabul Times; 15.2.1979.
7. Siddique, Mohammad Zahir, Dr; Az Ishghal-i-..; Peshawar; 1363 = 1984; p.96.
8. Ibid.
9. Kabul Times; 5.7.1978.
10. Asnad Laneha-i-Jasoosi: Afghanistan-I; Issue 29; Tehran; p.141.
11. Arnold Anthony; Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective; Karachi; 1981; p.75.
12. Siddiqu, Mohammad Zahir, Dr; loc.cit; p.101.
13. Land Tarikh PDPA; Kabul; 1357=1978; Pp.101, 109-111, 118-9.
14. Da Afghanistan Da Khalk Demokratik Gund Da Fa'aaleeno Rahnuma; NP; ND; p.13.

15. Zadran, Abdur Rahim; an Afghan emigre'.
16. Psarlay, Mohammad Siddique, an Afghan emigre'.
17. Afghanistan's Chronology: 1978-1985; US Information Agency; November 1985; p.1.
18. Siddique, Mohammad Zahir, Dr; Pp.106-7.
19. Arnold, Anthony; Afghanistan: The Soviet...; p.75.
20. Siddique, Mohammad Zahir, Dr; loc.cit;Pp.106-7.
21. Ibid; p.108.
22. For further information on the Soviet distrust in Amin; Taraki-Amin tussle; and Amin's inclination towards the USA and his desire of keeping Afghanistan independent of the Soviet influence; study Beverley Male's "Revolutionary Afghanistan: A Reappraisal"; 1982;Pp.171-90.
23. Chaliad, Gerard; Report from Afghanistan (tr. Tamer Jacoby); 1982; p.44.
24. Afghanistan: Yesterday and Today; ORBIS Press Agency; Prague; 1982; Pp.25-27.
25. Griffith, John C; Afghanistan: Key to a Continent; 1981; p.78.
26. Taniwal, Abdul Hakim, and Nooristani, A.Y.; Pashtun Tribes and the Afghan Resistance; WUFA; I/1; Peshawar; 1985; p.37.
27. Ibid; Pp.40-41.
28. Stewart, Rhea Talley; Fire in Afghanistan:1914-29; 1973; p.253.
29. Roy Oliver; Islam in the Afghan Resistance; first published by Keeston College in April 1984.
30. Krakowski, Ell D; Defining Success in Afghanistan; 1985; p.38.
31. Zadran, Gul Zarak; Da Afghanistan Da Jihad Tarikh (Landeez); 1362 = 1983; Pp.183-6.
32. Qiyam-i-Charkant; SSJA; Sartan 1365 = June/July 1986; Pp.a-b.
33. Gupta, Bhabani Sen; loc.cit. Pp.71-73.
34. Qiyam-i-Charkant; loc.cit.
35. Qiyam-i-Darra-i-Suff; SSJA; Nov/Dec 1985.
36. Afghanistan's chronology: 1978-1985; USIA; loc.cit. For detailed study of Herat insurrection, refer to Qiyam-i-24 Hoot Herat; SSJA; 24 Hoot 1364 = 14 March 1985.
37. Qiyam-i-24 Hoot; loc.cit.
38. Nayar, Kuldip; Report on Afghanistan; New Delhi; 1981; Pp.28-29.
39. Male, Beverley; loc.cit; p.161.
40. Qiyam-i-24 Hoot; loc.cit.
41. Ibid. and 'Communist Forces in Afghanistan' by Abdur Rasul Amin (typescript); Jan 1983.
42. Qiyam-i-Chandawal; SSJA; June/July 1985.
43. Qiyam-i-Asmar; SSJA; Nov/Dec 1985.
44. Ibid; p.2.
45. Roy, Oliver; Sufism and The Afghan Resistance; NP; ND; Pp.67-77.

46. Shams, Shamsul Huda; and Rafie, Habibullah; Afghan emigre'.
47. Qiyam-i-Chandawal; loc.cit; p.15. Julian Gearings estimated number of victims at 300- "In one of many incidents, in the summer of 1979, 300 Shiite Hazara prisoners were driven to a field outside Kabul, where half were soaked in petrol and then set on fire, and the other half buried alive." 'No Protection'; Free Afghanistan, quarterly; IV; London; Summer 1986; p.7.
48. Personal information.
49. Ibid.
50. Kakar, Hassan; Afghanistan (1880-1896); Kabul; 1971; p.4.
51. Khalid, Dr; Afghanistan's Struggle for National Liberation; II/3 & 4; 1980; Pp.210-13.
52. Gupta, Bhabani Sen; loc.cit; p.75.
53. Lifschultz, Lawrence; External Resistance, Internal Conflicts; Far Eastern Economic Review; 23.1.1981; p.26.
54. B.M.; The Present Situation in the Hazarajat; Central Asian Survey; I/1; July 1983; Pp.79-92.
55. Khalilzad, Zalmay; Resistance and its Friends; Muslim, daily, Islamabad; 28.12.1985.
56. Afghanistan Six Years of Soviet Occupation; US Department of State; Washington DC; Dec 1985; p.7.
57. Personal information.
58. Shahnaz Parveen, a Pakistan lady who was in Kabul in those days.
59. Ibid.
60. Gupta, Bhabani Sen; loc.cit; Pp.77-78.
61. Census Essential For Development Planning; Kabul Times, daily; 15.2.1979; p.2.
62. Land Reforms In Trouble; Monthly Bulletin; Afghan Information Centre (AIC), Peshawar; No. 19; Nov 1982; p.9.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid; p.10.
65. Kabul Times; 23.9.1978.
66. UN Human Rights Report On Afghanistan; Dec 1985; Pp.17-18.
67. Ibid.
68. Mushahid Hussain; Mistakes of Revolutionary Government; Muslim; 9.7.1986.
69. Shpoon, Saad-ud-Din; Da Afghanistan Da Jihad Lar Da Bari Tar Parawa; NP; ND; p.4.
70. Jamal-ud-Din Afghani, Syed, Allama (tr.Allama Syed Abdul Quddus Hashmi); Tarikhul Afghan; Karachi; 1982; Pp.154-5.
71. Afghan, Rafique; Interview with Gulbadin; Takbeer, weekly, Karachi; 27.12.85-3.1.1986;p.54.

72. Monthly Bulletin; AIC; No 3; July 1981; p.2.
73. Ibid; 17; Sep 1982; p.2.
74. Es'haq, Mohammad; From Theory to Practice; Jamiat-i-Islami Afghanistan, Peshawar; September 1986; Pp.1-3.
75. Gearings, Julian; No Protection: The Fate of Prisoners In The Afghan War; Free Afghanistan; London; 4/Summer 1986; p.8.
76. Ibid.
77. Press Bulletin; USSR Embassy; 30; 2.2.1984;p.7.
78. Ibid; 31; 13.2.1985; p.6.
79. Tears, Blood and Cries: Human Rights In Afghanistan Since Invasion 1979 to 1984; Helsinki Watch, Asia Watch; Dec 1984. Another Report of the same agency was released in Dec 1985.

...

CHAPTER : V

REACTION TO THE SAUR REVOLUTION

EXTERNAL

The Saur Revolution did not create any particular reaction in any part of the world for quite some time. The revolution-makers in a forgotten country[1] of a heterogeneous society were not known to the contemporary enlightened people. Since the withdrawal of the British from the sub-continent, the western scholars took little interest in the study of these people, and their ideological, cultural, social and economic complexities. Political developments in this tribal kingship were not comprehensible to them for these reasons; their lack of interest in this landlocked country of scorching deserts and high mountains, and secondly their inaccessibility to the political circles and their literature. The Afghan Tourist Department in the Spinzar Hotel building on Mohammad Jan Khan Watt had sufficient stories of past glories to absorb the interest of the tourists. When the tribal kingship was changed into presidency in 1973,even then there was no sensation in the press of the free world. It was one of the poorest and most backward countries of the world. While the British left the sub-continent in 1947, and withdrew east of Suez and away from the Indian Ocean in the 1950s and 1960s, the

Americans kept licking their Korean and Vietnamese wounds, defensively, in their self-imposed isolated backy-ard, right upto 1980s. The resultant power vacuum provided an irresistible temptation for the Soviets to spread their sphere of influence to their Asian precincts. The 1955-'78 period was crucial in this connection, for the free western world (lost in itself and else-where), seems to have given an easy walk-over to the Soviets.[2] By 1945, the US emerged from the war immeasureably stronger than it had entered it. Early in 1946, Churchill appealed in Fulton for unity against the eastern communism.[3] US President Truman proclaimed his doctrine which was followed, on 21 June 1947, by the Marshall Plan to holster the nations of western Europe against the threat of the Soviet Union. The principal purpose of the US foreign policy of containment of communism had taken a definite shape, suggesting assistance to Greece and Turkey against the Soviet penetration into western Europe. In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in order to strengthen the defence of western Europe against the Soviet military threat.[4] Earlier, the US had taken the lead in forcing Russia's withdrawal from Iran in 1946.[5] "The Plan To Save The World" presented by George Marshall, US Secretary of State, was practically put in operation, on the

whole, to save Western Europe and the Mediterranean. US President Eisenhower's Special Envoy James P. Richards toured the Middle East from 31 March to 3 April 1957 to explain the doctrine loosely guaranteeing to all the Middle East States American protection against communist invasion. He visited Kabul also but neither the US nor Afghanistan wanted Afghanistan to be put openly and publicly under the American protection.[6] "Afghanistan, seen by most people before the Soviet invasion as a distant, primitive land, has in essence continued in that status. The realization that the Soviet invasion represented a significance strategically because of the Soviet presence, was, it now seems, of brief duration. The Soviet-Afghan war is being perceived as another of those inconsequential conflicts in remote places. Were it not for the involvement of Soviet power and its cruel and inhuman actions, the conflict would attract scarcely more than passing mention. The Soviet-Afghan war remains a forgotten war."[7]

In this quagmire of American diplomacy, Pakistan threw itself in the fold of the US. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan did not visit the Soviet Union at their invitation extended in June 1949, but paid an official visit to the USA in response to President Truman's invitation extended in December of the

same year.[8] Starting from the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement of 19 May 1954 between Pakistan and the USA, the former associated with the USA "through not one, but four mutual security arrangements. In this sense, she was sometimes regarded as 'America's most allied ally in Asia'."[9] In Z.A. Bhutto's words "more royalist than the monarch."[10] Pakistan was armed on condition that she, like other countries in Asia, Europe and Latin America, entered into an alliance against the Communist danger and would be prepared to be a part of the world-wide encirclement of the Soviet Union and China with the common and collective purpose of containing Communism, if necessary, with the use of force. The assumption was that Pakistan, being an ideological state, was a natural opponent of godless communism and, as such, a friend of the United States.[11] Pakistan's alliance with the USA pulled her away from her neighbours. The U-2 incident exposed Pakistan's direct involvement in the America's anti-Soviet strategy. According to "the former Commander of Pakistan Air Force, Air Marshal Asghar Khan,'Pakistani Air Force personnel were not permitted within the perimeter of the Badaber facility', extended by the government of Pakistan to USA according to a confidential agreement of July 18, 1959."[12] In Pakistan, a section

of people believed that contact with Russia would encourage the growth of Communism in the country. It was not until April 1965 that Pakistan was able to establish direct contact with the USSR. For 18 years Pakistan and the Soviet Union knew little about each other at the human level. Inevitably, both sides acted under preconceived notions and suffered from a sense of distance.[13] Field Marshal Ayub Khan admitted that "In U-2 incident, we were clearly at fault."[14] The period from 1966 to 1971 turned in favour of the Soviet Union. Moscow's prestige in Asia mounted with mediation at a meeting in Tashkent in Jan 1966 which ended successfully in resolving the Indo-Pakistan dispute that had led to a war between the two States in previous September. Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin played host at the meeting between Pakistan's President F.M. Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri.[15] The Tashkent Declaration, appendix E, was, however, subverted by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in his frenzied campaign against Ayub Khan. In July 1971, President Nixon made a sensational announcement that US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had paid a secret visit to Peking and that he himself would go there shortly. Nixon visited China in February 1972,[16] and, eventually, the Peoples Republic of China got the permanent

seat of the Security Council of the UNO. The visit of Kissinger to China had been arranged through Pakistan, when the news media had been given to believe that he was ill and taking rest. In August 1971, the Soviet Union concluded a "Treaty of Friendship" with India. By the end of 1971, the civil strike in East Pakistan developed into another war between Pakistan and India.[17] This time, while Pakistan was waiting helplessly for US assistance, the Soviet Union did not hide her interest in favour of India. And Pakistan lost its eastern wing. In February 1972, Iran concluded a contact with U.S. Defence Department to purchase US weaponry worth $ 2.5 billion, including gunship helicopters, supersonic intercepters, phantom jet bombers, C-130 cargo planes and other military equipment. The Shahinshah gave an impression that Iran was building up the strongest defence base to act as watchman of the Gulf. It aroused the Soviet Union's attention.[18] Besides the agreement with India, the USSR concluded "20-year Friendship Treaties" with Egypt in May 1971, with Bagladesh by the end of 1971, with Iraq in April 1972, and with Somalia in July 1974.[19] The Egyptian President Anwar Sadaat scrapped the agreement and announced the termination of the mission of Soviet military advisers and experts in Egypt, on 18 July 1972.[20] While Pakistan and China were coming closer,

the Soviet Union deployed 5 out of 39 Divisions of troops in Mongolia on China's border, calling it a "purely domestic matter" in response to the repeated demands from China of their withdrawal. Occupation of Kampuchia by Vietnam was made another problem for China. The Chinese Vice Premier Wan Li who attended the funeral of Soviet President Andropov in Moscow was not hopeful of improvement of Sino-Soviet relations. Soviet President Chernenko admitted the existence of serious political problems between the two Communist neighbours.[21] The Soviet-Afghan treaty of 16 June 1981 on Wakhan corridor was a cause of great alarm for both Pakistan and China. On 20 June, Afghan President Babarak Karmal presented a copy of the instrument to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow, by which the corridor was handed over to the Soviet troops.[22] It justified China's fear of encirclement,[23] and brought the Soviet Union right on the border of Pakistan. The importance of the defence aspects of the Silk route via Khenjrab was depreciated.

The Soviet-Afghan relations were established under the treaty of 28 Feb 1921 which was followed by an agreement in 1926 on neutrality and non-aggression. In 1931, a new agreement was signed between the two governments on the basis of 1926 agreement. It was extended for another 10 years

in 1936.[24] These bilateral agreements on neutrality and non-aggression entered the crucial phase in 1956 after the US refused arms aid to Afghanistan,[25] although the US State Department had summarized in 1948 part of a meeting with several Afghan officials that Afghanistan needed US arms for internal stability and against the Soviet threat.[26] It was the time that the Soviet Union was composing itself and its resources against the US policy of containment. The Soviet Union and its socialist allies signed the Warsaw Pact on 14 May 1955 against the NATO. When the USA turned down the request for arms because Afghan Prime Minister Daud had refused to join any pact, the latter convoked a Loya Jirga in November 1955 and attained its mandate to receive military and economic assistance from any country in order to strengthen defence and stabilise the economy of the country.[27] The Soviet Union did not lose time in coming up to offer the assistance. On 15 Dec 1955, Soviet President Bulganin and Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev landed at Kabul, on return from India, to fix terms for a hundred-million-dollar loan and assure assistance to many projects for building the infrastructure for the first five-year plan.[28] The plan was drawn up by Soviet advisers and announced by Daud in 1956.[29] On 28 January 1956, Afghanistan

signed an agreement to receive the 100-million-dollar assistance in goods and loans which included construction of Qizil Qala (renamed Sher Khan Bandar) - Kabul road, Salang tunnel and Bagram airport.[30] Another contract for the purchase of warfare equipment worth 25 million dollars was signed in August 1956,[31] by which Afghanistan ordered arms and equipment including T-34 tanks, MIG-17 bombers, helicopters, small arms from the Soviet Union, Czechekoslavakia,Poland, Hungary and East Germany. It also provided for construction/expansion of airfields at Mazar-i-Sharif, Shindand, Bagram.[32] The treaty of 1936 on neutrality and non-aggression was renewed on 18 Dec 1955, then on 6 August 1965 and again on 10 Dec 1975.[33] The last agreement was drawn up and signed in Moscow on 5 December 1985.

Brezhnev proposed "Collective Security in Asia" in 1969 at the international meeting of Communist and Workers parties. On 20 March 72, he explained his proposal, in a speech at the 15th Congress of the Soviet Trade Unions, that it should be based on principles of non-use of force in relations between states, respect for their sovereignty and inviolability of their borders, non-interference in domestic affairs, and broad development of economic and other

cooperation on the basis of complete equality and mutual benefits. He discussed it in a speech at Alma-Ata on 15 March 1973 also and at the World Congress of Peace Forces in Moscow in October the same year. On the western side, he proposed "European Security and Cooperation".[34] The Asian Security Plan was designed to include India, Pakistan, Afghanistan,Iran and Turkey.[35] While Afghanistan was reluctant, the chronic Indo-Pak enmity was effectively exploited by the US lobby to keep these two countries away from a Soviet-sponsored plan. Afghanistan was, in fact, left over to Russian influence.

The Pak-Afghan relations have never been friendly at the government level. From the very inception of Pakistan, animosity grew from the claim of the Afghan government over a part of Pakistan. On 30 Sep 1947, Afghan delegate at the U.N., Hussain Aziz, cast the only vote in opposition to admission of Pakistan to the U.N.O.[36] Later, Afghanistan withdrew its opposition. Marshal Shah Wali Khan, Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan,declared on 13 June 1948 that Afghans would not entertain, hence-forth, border differences with Pakistan.[37] It did not end there. On 30 June 1949, king Zahir Shah, in his address to the Seventh term of the National Assembly, criticised Pakistan,[38] following

bombardment of Mughalgai, 2,100 yards inside the Afghan border, by the Pakistan Air Force on 12 June 1949.[39] Consequently, a Loya Jirga including members of the National Assembly voted on 26 July 1949 national support to Pakhtunistan and declared the Durand Line agreement of 1893 and subsequent ratifications, and any other treaty which referred to the status of the Pukhtoons, illegal and dead.[40] On 12 August 1949, Afridi met at Bagh to establish Pakhtunistan, and on the same day Mirza Ali Khan, Faqir of Ipi, was elected by another Jirga at Razmak as President of Pakhtunistan.[41] These events were linked with the Bannu resolution of 21 June 1947 which says;

> "The Pukhtoons do no want either Hindustan or Pakistan.
>
> A joint meeting of the provincial Jirga, members of the assembly, the Khudai Khidmatgar officers and the Jirga of 'Zalmay Pukhtoon' was held at Bannu under the presidentship of Khan Amir Mohammad Khan on 21 June 1947. The meeting took unanimous decision that an independent government of all the Pukhtoons should be established in this country. Its constitution will be based on the tenets of Islam, democracy, equality and social justice. This meeting appeals to every Pukhtoon to unite at one centre for achievement of this high goal, and should not bow down to any power but Pukhtoons'." 42

Discussion on this issue is out of the scope of this thesis. But it was the main cause of difference between the two Muslim neighbourers which led to rupture of their diplomatic rela-

tions twice; in 1955 and again in 1961, both times during the premiership of Daud. India and the Soviet Union showed interest in this issue, time and again, to pinch Pakistan. On Pakistan's side, too, the 'patriotic' media exploited the issue. The two States were, thus, held in a state of cold war. Changes in these States did not arouse any remarkable interest of either government against the other. Opposition to the government in any form was favoured by the other party. The transit facility through Pakistan was considered a right by the Afghan government. And the Afghan neutrality in both the Indo-Pak wars did not remove misunderstandings. The Daud-coup in 1973 intensified the strains which caused subversion and sabotage on both sides. The government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto recruited a group of Afghan emigres including Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani and Gulbadin who had sneaked into Pakistan in 1974.[43] This group of 98 refugees, most of them being ex-army officers, was paid allowances for 1331 persons and, after the Saur Revolution and consequent influx of refugees, they were called 'old refugees'.[44] In July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Bhutto's government and declared Martial Law which adopted the policy of gradual Islamicisation. In April 1978, Afghanistan was taken over by the 'Communist-oriented' PDPA.

The pro-Government Jamaat Islami of Pakistan which had old connections with Jawanan-i-Musalman in Afghanistan assumed responsibility of supporting the cause of the Islamist Afghans. It renewed its relations with Rabbani and Gulbadin and welcomed the influx of refugees. The news and views appeared in Pakistani press gave an impression that the situation was not clear to the Government of Pakistan. The scheduled visit of Agha Shahi, then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, to Kabul, in response to the invitation extended by Daud during his visit to Pakistan in March 1978, was cancelled. The World Peace Conference held in Kabul in August 1979 emphasized the need of the visit of Agha Shahi which was not responded to.[45] The Government of Pakistan was, probably, trying to mobilize public opinion before taking a clear stand. Former Governor of NWFP, General Fazal Haq expressed his opinion about Taraki that he was not a stranger for him. He had lived in Malakand agency for quite a long time and was known to many Pakistanis. He was mature. Although he was a puppet, yet he was seasoned and had some nationalistic sentiments. His meeting with President Zia-ul-Haq at Havana was very satisfactory and hope-inspiring.[46] But the political parties, especially the Pakistan Peoples Party, Pakistan National Party and National Demo-

cratic Party, which were opposed to Zia-ul-Haq and Jamaat Islami, supported the Saur Revolution and opposed the influx of refugees, their involvements in local politics and the interest of Jamaat Islami in the affair. When political activities were banned for about eight years, some refugees' leaders were given freedom of speech from the platform of the Jamaat which continued its activity in the name of Ahya-ul-Uloom-i-Islami. In their Jihad conferences and rallies, the refugees' leaders criticised directly the banned political parties and some of their leaders. Their statements were published by the national press. Not only this, the Jamaat's support to a particular group of refugees widened the schism in the rank and file of refugees and resistance groups to the extent of discrimination among various groups.[47]

The Government of Pakistan established the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees at Peshawar on 01 April 1979, after about one year of the Saur Revolution, when the number of refugees was about 24,000. Sher Mohammad Khan was appointedCommissioner, Syed Fida Yunas as Additional Commissioner and th present author as Liaison Officer to found the set-up. By the end of 1979, Kuwait was the only foreign State to dispatch 52 wagons' load of edibles and blankets for the Afghan refugees. A

lack of understanding of the situation and the local needs was confusing the situation. For instance, tinned sardines and cheese were brought in bulk for the refugees alongwith blankets of excellent quality. Both the food and the blankets were sold in the markets.[48] The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) concluded an agreement with the government of Pakistan on assistance to Afghan refugees for one year commencing on 01 October 1979.[49] "After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, heads of governments and other political VIPs frequently visited Peshawar and the Khyber Pass. They visited the refugee camps and expressed sympathy. The refugee camps became tourist attractions. The world leaders were photographed nodding their heads in sympathy and pointing portentously to the Khyber Pass."[50]

Soon after the Saur Revolution, Iran was gripped by a wave of terrorism, and the Shahinshah, Mohammad Reza Shah Pehlivi, who was considered a threat to the new government of Afghanistan, was bogged down in the internal strife which, ultimately, led to his abdication in January, 1979. The Islamic revolution could have been more harmful to the Socialist revolution in Afghanistan, but the former was driven to war with Iraq. The change in Iran was a great setback to the USA in the region,

although it did not please the Russians either. But the latter was not disappointed. On 4 November 1979, a group of zealous Muslim students captured the US Embassy in Tehran, seized all the documents and kept 53 Americans as hostages.[51] With a view to averting confrontation of the two Supers on the soil of Iran, Ayatullah Khomeini abrogated all treaties with both of them arbitrarily.[52] With Iran gone and the Soviets in Kabul, the US needed Pakistan just as badly to check Russian expansionism towards the West's oil lifeline in the Persian Gulf. In April 1981, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi "shook hands on the outline of a compromise - a five-year package of military and economic aid worth roughtly 2.5 billion dollars".[53] Earlier, when Zia-ul-Haq visited New York, it was believed that "no one in the West is helping him bar the door to any Soviet advance." China had sent some military aid, but Pakistan's US connection had been cut. "After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Washington offered Zia $ 400 million in military aid, which he rejected as 'peanuts'. Zia believes that the Carter Administration is more interested in making up with India, Pakistan's archenemy, than with Pakistan."[54] Pakistan then considered itself a 'frontline state' in the path of one super-power, without direct support from

the other."[55] The National Security Adviser of Carter administration, Brezezinski considered that "Islamic Fundamentalism can stop Communism."[56] "It's a tough call", says former CIA Director, William Colby. "If there is a chance of (the rebels) actually winning? It doesn't look very promising," adds a former senior official of the Carter government, "If you help Afghan insurgents who have no hope of winning, then are you sending them to slaughter? On the other hand, if you get over that moral hurdle, you can go all out and really bleed the Soviets, even if you can't beat them." The Reagan administration is definitely attracted to the second option.[57] The administration of President Ronald Reagan hoped that its $ 3.2 billion economic aid and military sales package to Pakistan would help demonstrate that American diplomacy 'is now to be much more flexible.' Both Islamabad and Washington insisted that the new relationship was based on the principles of sovereign equality and was governed solely by their common concern to strengthen Pakistan's ability to confront Soviet power in Afghanistan.[58] "In June 1981, following a visit to Islamabad by Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance James Buckley, the US agreed upon a separate cash-and-carry sale to Pakistan of six

F-16s plus other military equipment as yet unidentified during the 12 months before October 1982 when the congressionally approved Foreign Military Sale programme was scheduled to begin. It was understood here that Saudi Arabia had agreed to provide US $ 50 million for the cash purchases."[59] Reacting swiftly to this deal, India's Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi warned that her country was modernizing its already powerful and partly Soviet-supplied armed forces. She thought it a serious mistake on the part of Reagan administration.[60] The C.I.A. started backing Mujahideen to "bleed the Russians." During first five years, it spent $ 325 million to arm and help Mujahideen and earmarked $ 250 million for fiscal year of 1985. It was considered the largest US 'covert' operation since Vietnam war.[61] "Foreign military aid to the Afghan rebels based in Peshawar, Pakistan, is expected to top US $ 500 million this year (1986). While serious factional infighting has already broken out among the Afghan groups competing for this aid."[62] Not only this, but Reagan administration wooed China also, through a goodwill trip to Peking of Secretary of State Alexander Haig, to come "shopping for military hardware in Washington." The administration contended that both agreements were vital if the

United States meant to contain Soviet adventurism.[63] Reagan tried to persuade the 10-nation European Community also to with-hold the "planned dollar 10-billion pipeline that was supposed to deliver natural gas 3,500 miles from Siberia to the heart of Western Europe starting in 1984."[64]

"Follwing the relative failure of the Olympic boycott and trade sanctions to restrict Soviet policy in Afghanistan, the United States has been rapidly reorganizing its military forces to deter any more Soviet gains in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. The military programme includes a new nuclear strategy, new bases in the Middle East and B-52 bomber staging routes through Guam, Diego Garcia and Australia. It is the biggest change in US defence strategy for years. The US response includes a clear threat to use nuclear weapons to overcome an inevitable disadvantage in any conventional Southwest Asian conflict."[65] The US policy envisaged many steps which included; There is no doubt that for post-Afghanistan, we will have to maintain some kind of permanent presence in the Indian Ocean."[66]

The architect of the 'prevailing' Pak-Afghan relations, Agha Shahi explained the rationale of policy posture adopted by Pakistan with respect to the Afghan crisis. According to him, there

were three policy options for Pakistan, after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, in Dec 1979; (a) to directly confront the Soviet Union by participating in the Afghan resistance movement; (b) to accept the fait accompli imposed by the Soviet Union; and (c) to oppose the Soviet Union for its violation of accepted international norms in the UN and other international forums without directly confronting a super power while at the same time seeking to strengthen its security posture without aligning with either side in the super power confrontation. "It is understandable why Pakistan did not opt for the first option. No nation wheter big or small, would desire to have tense surroundings and it is specially true for a smaller country having a super power as its neighbour. Why Pakistan could not accept the second option was, because 'in my opinion' Pakistan had the following reasons to voice its concern;

> "Pakistan is a country with limited resources. It was impossible for Pakistan to feed 2.5 million people, when it has not been able to cater for the basic needs of its own masses. The Bihari Muslims who fought the battle of Pakistan and who number in thousands only, have not been absorbed by Pakistan so far. So it was practically not possible for Pakistan to provide a problem-free atmosphere to this adventure of the Soviets."

Coming to the third option of opposing the Soviet Union in the U.N. and other international forums, Agha Shahi says;

> "Apart from the problems created by the mass migration of Afghan refugees, the developments in Kabul cannot be ignored, because of the ups and downs that the bilateral relations have gone through since the creation of Pakistan. Kabul has been the sanctuary for the dissident leadership of Pakistan. After December 1979, these apprehensions have been strengthened by the aggressive attitude of the Karmal regime. Unprecendented number of air space violations and bombing of civilians across the border justify the need of an early solution".[67]

"By adopting third policy option, Pakistan closed every option for herself, but to depend upon USA for her security needs as well as making any headway in the Afghan crisis. The fundamental factor which has not been taken into account so far, is that the Soviet Union and her friends in Kabul have not been made party to the solution seeking process. Their alienation has made things more complicative. Thus an option was lost by being quick in finding a solution out of opposition. Things moved so fast in this direction that no avenue led towards normalization of the complex situation. One reason for this attitude may be that the resistance movement by Afghan Mujahideen was over-estimated and their enthusiasm to fight back the Soviets misconceived. An impression of the United Afghan Nation's struggle was created by the news media of the west. It was thought that Afghanistan would become a Vietnam for the Soviets. But on the other hand, Afghan Mujahideen

preferred to become 'Muhajareen'".[68] "Occasionally the leaders of the resistance movement have complained about the shortage of arms and ammunition. If the complaint is genuine, then who is to blame? Moreover it is a crisis created by a super power. So naturally one would look toward another super power under these circumstances."[69]

By adoption of the third option, Pakistan moved fast to internationalize the Afghan issue. An Extraordinary session of the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference was held at Islamabad from 27 to 29 January 1980. Inter alia, it demanded immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops stationed on the Afghan territories; suspended membership of Afghanistan in the Organization of Islamic Conference; and resolved that the members of the OIC would with-hold recognition of the 'illegal regime in Afghanistan', and resolved to assist the Afghan refugees.[70] The Islamic Conference Resolution is placed at appendix F. At the regular Eleventh IFMC, also held in Islamabad (May 17-22, 1980), the resolution on Afghanistan, placed at appendix G, was just as strong as the previous one, despite vigorous opposition from the Steadfastness Front (Algeria, South Yemen, Libya, Syria, and the PLO). The overall impact, however, was diminished by theApril 24-25 CIF (Carter's Iranian Foulup) in

the Dasht-i-Kavir, the disastrous attempt to rescue the American hostages in Tehran (the US Embassy).[71] The USSR and the US, both, were condemned as aggressors in separate resolutions. The IMFC reaffirmed its January stand on the Russian aggression, and reiterated its demand for the "immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in the territory of Afghanistan". The Conference went one step further, however, and appointed a three-man standing committee to hold meeting with Moscow, Kabul, and the Mujahideen in order to seek a political solution to the Afghan problem.[72] The standing committee comprised Iran, Pakistan and the Secretary General of the OIC. "The first attempt by Pakistan to resolve the Afghan problem created by the Russian intervention in that country took place in June 1980, at MT Pelerin in Switzerland under the aegis of the OIC. The standing committee appointed by the OIC comprised Secretary General of the OIC Habib Chatty, Foreign Minister of Iran Sadigh Qotebzadeh and Agha Shahi. They were to have talks with leaders of the resistance groups based in Peshawar, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. The talks were held but no results could be achieved as both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan refused to participate in the talks. Soon after, Iran, too, disassociated

itself from the standing committee of the OIC."[73] Three days before the start of the Eleventh IFMC at Islamabad, Babrak Karmal offered his own proposals (14 May 1980) which included; (a) recognition of the Afghan government; (b) withdrawal of Soviet troops after the outside intervention was stopped; and (c) international guarantee for non-interference in Afghanistan. Kabul regimes had been accusing America, China and Pakistan of interference in that country. Karmal regime and the Soviet Union insisted that the "presence of small contingents of Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan was the internal affair of that country."

The UN Secretary General, S.G. Waldheim mandated in November 1980 indirect talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan and assigned his Personal Representative for Afghanistan, Perez de Cueller, who launched his mission in 1981. The mission was interrupted when Kurt Waldheim was replaced by Perez de Cueller as U.N. Secretary General in late 1981. The latter appointed UN-Under Secretary General Senor Diego Cordovez as Special Envoy for Afghanistan. On 21 April 1982, the Special Envoy announced agreement of Pakistan and Afghanistan on indirect talks in Geneva in June. Iran would not participate directly but agreed to be kept informed and thus to be associated with talks.[74] The

talks were based on the four-point agenda which included; (a) withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan; (b) non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs; (c) guarantees against such interference; and (d) the voluntary return of the Afghan refugees. The decision to discuss these four aspects of the Afghanistan crisis was made on the initiative of Diego Cordovez who visited Islamabad, Kabul and Tehran in April 1982 to settle the modalities for negotiations.[75] At the end of the second session of Geneva Talks (June 16-24, 1983), a press communique was released by the UN Information Office, placed at appendix H, in which the USSR and the USA had, by then, been identified as possible guarantors. While heading for the fourth round of talks, Cordovez expressed his views in an interview to put an end to unfair criticism of the UN role in facilitating a peace settlement. He thought that there were solid grounds for his belief that an agreement was possible. But it was contingent upon the political will on both sides if the interlocuters were prepared to take the necessary political decisions a settlement would emerge. He underlined the need for broad political support from the super-powers to make the agreement implementable and to make it stick.[76]

In 1982, two 'important conferences' were held outside Afghanistan. Both gave moral support to the freedom fighters, and encouraged all interested nations to provide food, medicine, and money to the refugees. The International Committee of Solidarity with the Afghan Resistance and the Bureau of International Afghanistan, mainly socialist oriented,sponsored the March (26-28) moot in Florence, Italy. About 300 delegates from a dozen countries attended the conference, held in conjuction with Afghanistan Day (21 March; the Afghan New Year). Afghanistan-Day 1982 was the brainchild of members of European Parliament Lord Nicholas Bethel (Conservative-UK), Garlo Ripa di Meana (Socialist - Italy), Gerard Israel (Gaullist - France).[77] Final resolution of the Florence Round Table is placed at appendix I. The Round Table, first of its kind held in Europe, discussed the following three basic themes; (a) the reasons for the Soviet invasion and the rise of the Afghan resistance movement; (b) the present situation of the resistance movement; both in the field and on the international scene; and (c) possibilities of immediate and effective international help towards furthering the goal of Afghan self-determination. The Soviet News Agency Novosty branded it "a meeting of international bandits."[78] Earlier

an Afghan delegation was received at Strasburg by European Parliament President Pietr Dankert, who recalled that the European Parliament was the first international body formally to condemn Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. European Parliament members forming a special commission on Afghanistan include Great Britain's Lord Bethel, France's Gerard Israel, Italy's Carlo Ripa di Meana, Jiri Pelikan and Maria-Antonietta Macchiocchi. The European Parliament 'could well be on its way to becoming the first world body fomally to recognize the Afghan resistance'. (It has not come true until November 1986).[79] The shadow of Khomeini, like that of a new Savonarola, fell darkly over the proceedings, attended by five guerilla commanders, also, fresh from the Afghan battlefield. From the podium, European speakers reiterated their support for the Afghan resistance (often after hours of florid rhetoric), but also expressed their worry that an intolerant religious dictatorship could one day replace Soviet rule, with a fundamentalist tyranny raging tomorrow in Kabul as in Tehran today or in Florence five centuries ago.[80] The Islamic posture of the resistance movement which was quite in line with traditional Afghan rebellions against the foreign invasions, created doubts in the minds of the western intellectuals

who were obssessed with the Islamic revolution in Iran. Al their anti-Soviet sentiments were, therefore, restrained in favour of the Afghan resistance movement. Their moral, financial and material supports were calculated to place the Mujahideen groups at a level that they should "bleed and not beat the Russians". How much the Afghan Mujahideen avail themselves of these resources is open to question.

The Permanent People's Tribunal (formerly the Russell Tribunal on Vietnam and Latin America) arranged a conference in Paris from 16 to 20 Dec 1982 and condemned the Soviet Union for aggression in Afghanistan and violation of human rights.[81] Many nations outside the pro-Communist bloc passed Afghanistan-Day resolution. The US Congress also passed a resolution which was signed by Reagan on 10 March 1982. It called for support (unspecified) for the 'brave Afghan nation in its fights for freedom', withdrawal of Soviet troops and the right of the Afghan people to self-determination. The President also dedicated the 22 March Columbia flight to Afghanistan-Day.[82]

The Ministerial Conference of Non-aligned countries held in New Delhi from 9 to 13 Feb 1981 adopted a declaration which, while noting with grave concern the situation in South West Asia

and agreeing that it carried dangerous consequences for the peace and stability of the region and agreeing further that the continuation of the situation posed serious implications for international peace and security, called, inter alia, for a political settlement on the basis of the withdrawal of foreign troops and full respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and nonaligned status of Afghanistan, and strict observance of the principle of non-intervention and non-interference.[83]

The 43-nation UN Human Rights Commission adopted five resolutions (1980-84), texts of which are placed appendix J (a-e).[84] The result-table of these resolutions is given below:

Date	Votes		
	In Favour	Against	Abstention
14.2.1980	27	8	6
6. 3.1981			
25.2.1982	32	7	4
16.2.1983	29	7	5
29.2.1984	31	8	4

The United Nations General Assembly started with an emergency session and has adopted eight resolutions (until November 1986).[85] Texts of resolutions are placed at appendix (K: a-g - the resolution of 1983 could not be procured). Following is the result-table:

Date	Votes In Favour	Against	Abstention
14. 1.1980	104	18	18
20.11.1980	111	22	12
19.11.1981	116	23	12
29.11.1982	114	21	13
24.11.1983	116	20	17
15.11.1984	119	20	14
13.11.1985	122	19	12
5. 11.1986	122	20	11

While the annual rituals of the 159-nation United Nations General Assembly and the U.N. Human Rights Commission, and Amnesty International continued, the fighting in Afghanistan with conflicting claims also went on, and so did the influx of Afghan refugees. The imaginary fears of Pakistan developed into real fears. It was not only the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, but the continuing influx of refugees with increasing socio-economic and political problems, and the increasing involvement of foreign countries and agencies in Pakistan. By the end of 1985, the following agencies were working in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan.[86]

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

World Food Programme (WFP).

United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Worth Health Organization (WHO).

World Bank.

Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS)

League of Red Cross Societies (LORCS).
International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC).
Saudi Red Crescent Society (SRCS).
Save the Children Fund (SCF).
International Rescue Committee (IRC).
Austrian Relief Committee (ARC).
Pakistan Medicos International (Pak Medicos).
International Aid Committee (Inter-Aid).
Kuwait Red Crescent Society (KRCS).
Union Aid for Afghan Refugees (Union-Aid).
Caritas Pakistan.
Salvation Army.
Idara-e-Ihya-ul-Uloom.
Norwegian Refugee Council.
Swedish Releif Committee.
Afghan Aid (U.K.).
Danish Refugee Council.
Serving Emergency Relief and Vocation Enterprises USA (SERVE).
Islamic African Relief Society (Sudan).
Italian Cooperation for Development (ICD).
International Labour Office (ILO).
Church World Service (CWS).
Action Internationale Centre La Faim (International Action Against Hunger), France (AICF).
German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ).
Seventh Day Adventist.
Enfants dui Monde (Children of the World)-Swiss-based.

The CAR, established at Peshawar, with three officers on the first of April 1979, has grown to a vast Federal set-up with a Chief Commissioner at Islamabad, and Commissioners for NWFP, Balhuchistan and Punjab, under the States and Frontier

Region (SAFRON). With all her efforts, the government of Pakistan could not achieve concensus of its own subjects on the Afghanistan issue. Political and intellectual circles are divided for and against the government policy. Even the partyless parliament of Pakistan, while debating the Foreign policy, on 27 Dec 1985, was divided with three options; one section strongly pleaded for keeping equidistance with the US and the Soviet Union; second forcefully advocating all out friendship with the United States; and the third calling for increased contacts with the Soviet Union.[87] President Zia-ul-Haq, in his address to the joint session of the Parliament on his return from Moscow where he had met new Soviet leader Mikhael Gorbachev, mentioned, "the country may face more difficulties on Afghan question."[88] The government of Pakistan summarized the consequent 'Major Problems' in the following words:[89]

> "The impact of this influx has been as great as its ramifications are varied and far-reaching.
>
> On the political and diplomatic front, this event has soured Pakistan's relations not only with a neighbour with whom she has had religious and ethnic relations spreading over centuries, but, also, with a Super-power. With march of the Soviet army into Afghanistan, Pakistan has become a 'front-line' state. The geo-political equilibrium has been upset as has been Pakistan's socio-economic fabric.
>
> So far the northern and north-western borders of Pakistan had been militarily secure, despite

periodic back-scratching by Afghanistan with the so-called 'Pakhtunistan' stunt.

Now, Pakistan is face to face with a Super Power directly on the north, after Russia's de facto annexation of the Wakhan region of the Afghanistan pan-handle, and indirectly on the north-west where Russia assists and directs her surrogate government in Kabul.

For Afghans, it is a case of the conflict of ideologies. Atheistic, godless Communism is pitted against a living faith, Islam. The Afghan masses may be suffering from the ills of illiteracy, tribalism, feudalism, poverty and what not, but they are fierce warriors, unsubjugated by any invader. And despite the disadvantages of what Marxist and other members of materialist society may call primitiveness and backwardness, they, the Afghan people, have as jealously guarded their honour and their faith as they have contemptuously resisted the temptations of materialism which as a corollary brings in permissiveness and promiscuity, and shatters the moral edifice of the society.

So, the able-bodied among the refugees have formed resistance groups. They call themselves 'Mujahideen' or 'holy warriors'...

On the socio-economic front, the efforts of the refugees' influx are even more worrisome. Straight away, it had turned Pakistan's development plans topsy-turvey...."

Since the Saur Revolution, three Soviet Presidents - Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko-have died, and two Afghan Presidents - Noor Mohammad Taraki & Hafizullah Amin - have been killed. But the policy enunciated by Brezhnev is pursued by the Soviet Union relentlessly. His wish for "Asian Security", aimed at isolating China, which had nearly roped Daud in to concurrence in 1973[90], has been held up by his successors down to Gorbachev. At the dinner hosted in honour of the visiting Indian Prime Minis-

ter Rajiv Gandhi, Gorbachev said; "India, as a great power enjoying much prestige and respect both in Asian countries and throughout world, can play a very important part in this process." [91] In an article on "Peace, Goodneighbourliness And Co-operation to Asia", Y. Sergeyev writes; "Symbolically, the Sovet Union's call to jointly seek ways of strengthening security in Asia and the Pacific was issued during the official Soviet visit of Rejiv Gandhi, Indian Prime Minister, last May (1985) in Moscow. A major role in the work to turn Asia into a zone of peace, neighbourliness and cooperation is being played by Soviet-Indian relations".[92] In the recent years, the historic Russian determination to control the Middle East which originated under the Tsars, has been given new impetus by Communism's ambition for world domination. In Nov 1940, in the secret negotiations with the Nazis, the documents of which were uncovered after the war, the Soviet leaders stated bluntly that their territorial aspirations centred in the direction of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.[93] In the nationalities policy enunciated by Joseph Stalin, "two crimes were now stressed - nationalism and cosmopolitanism. A non-Russian was guilty of nationalism if in any way he stressed the differences that separate his nation from the Russian

nation; of cospolitanism if he stressed any cultural links that bind his nation to any nation whose country is outside the Soviet Union. To these two vices corresponded the two virtues of internationalism and patriotism. To be an internationalist is to stress solidarity with, or servility to, Russia: to be a patriot is to stress superiority to nations of similar culture living outside the Soviet Union, and when possible to put forward, on behalf of the Soviet Union, territorial claims directed against neighbour states.[94]

In an interview with Pravda Correspondent on 13 Jan 1980, L. Brezhnev, referring to NATO budget approved in May 1978 in Washington (till the end of 20th century), SALT-2 Treaty on disarmament, deployment of medium range nuclear missiles in several West-European countries (Dec 1979), expressed his views as regards Afghanistan; "We on our part warned those concerned that if the aggression was not stopped we would not abandon the Afghan people in their testing time. As is well-known, we keep our word." Commenting on dispatch of military contingents to Afghanistan, he said; "It was no easy decision for us to send Soviet military contingents to Afghanistan. But the Party's Central Committee and the Soviet government acted in full awareness of their responsibility and took into account all

relevant circumstances. The only task of the Soviet contingents is to assist the Afghans in repulsing the aggression from outside. They will all be withdrawn from Afghanistan once the reasons for the Afghan leadership's request for them disappears."[95] Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko said at a banquet in New Delhi on 12 Feb 1980; "If Pakistan continues to serve as a puppet of imperialism in the future, it will jeopardize its existence and its integrity as an independent State."[96] In his report on the world situation to the 26th Congress of CPSU held in Kremlin in February 1981, Brezhnev said; "As for the Soviet military contingents, we will be prepared to withdraw it in agreement of the Afghan government... But before that is done, the infiltration of counter-revolutionary gangs into Afghanistan must be completely stopped..... The undeclared war launched against the Marxist government in Afghanistan had posed a direct threat to the security of our southern frontier and compelled the Soviet Union to render military aid... Dependable guarantees are required that there will be no new intervention such is the principled position of the Soviet Union and we will keep firmly to it."[97] In his interview to Der Spiegel on 25 April 1983, Yuri Andropov said; "It is, however, far from being a matter of indifference to us what is happening on

our southern border. We have a rather long common border with Afghanistan. And so, in assisting friends, we at the same time think of ensuring the interests of our own security."[98] In December 1983, Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, V.I. Smirinov sounded a threat to Pakistan; "Russia and Afghanistan will take joint action if intervention from the soil of Pakistan did not cease; Mujahidden are trained in Pakistan, and armed. Russia is openly criticized on television."[99] Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevadnadze, in his address to the 40th Session of the U.N. General Assembly in November 1985, said; "Let me make some specific comments about Afghanistan. A political settlement of the situation that has arisen around that country is also possible. What is required for this is that all should recognize the Afghan people's right to build their life as they desire and that armed and other forms of outside interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan should be stopped. When such interference is ended and if its non-resumption is guaranteed, it will become possible to withdraw the Soviet military contingents from Afghanistan by agreement with the Afghan Government..."[100] Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, in his address to the Soviet Parliament meeting, favours political

settlement to normalize the situation around Afghanistan which would solve the withdrawal of Soviet troops. He said; "The Soviet Union wanted that Afghanistan should be a sovereign and nonaligned country and that there should be guarantee for non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs."[101] The political report of the CPSU's Central Committee which met by the end of February 1986, says; "The Soviet position is clear. We should like, in the nearest future, to withdraw the Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan at the request of its government. Moreover, we have agreed with the Afghan side on the schedule for their phased withdrawal as soon as a political settlement is reached that will ensure an actual cessation and dependably guarantee the non-resumption of foreign armed interference in the internal affairs of the DRA."[102]

It should not be irrelevant to take into consideration the thinking of the intellectual minds of the Soviet Union. What the intellectual minds of the Soviet Union think can be judged from the following notes. Literaturnaya Gazeta noted in August 1951;[103]

> "As a result of the enforced division of the Afghan tribes, who were, almost equally divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan and are carrying on a struggle for self-determination, and also as a result of the original traditions of the numerous nomad tribes, a situation is arising apparently

> of itself, apparently spontaneously, in which there could occur demarcation by bloodshed of the frontier that was originally plotted on the maps of the imperialists in London and Washington. Spontaneously rising tension, mutual enmity and incidents are exactly what the imperialists need in order to divide and rule."

Professor Aslanov and Mrs Graseemova compiled their works on the national language and literature of Afghanistan. Its translation in Pushto was published by Pushto Academy, Kabul, in 1968. Aslanov has noted that language problem is aggravated by certain causes; one being the division of a nation by state boundaries into two or three parts - it fits the Pukhtoons and their language. About locations of the Pukhtoons, he has mentioned, if the translation is true, Pukhtunistan and Pukhtunkhwa. Propagation of Russian ideas and ideology is a continuous and systematic process. A report included in a Press Bulletin of the USSR Embassy, Islamabad, says;[104]

> "The books from the Raduga Publishers (Moscow) are known to the readers in 140 countries. It annually puts out some 500 book-titles in about 50 languages of the peoples of the world and nearly 100 book-titles by foreign authors in Russian, in a total edition of 15 million copies. Editor-in-Chief of Raduga Publishers, Georgi Anjaparidze told an ANP correspondent: The range of the books published by the Raduga is wide; fiction, poetry, plays, literature for children, art criticism, literary studies, sport and tourism. Works by Maxim Gorky, one of the founders of Soviet literature, are being published, besides other languages, in Urdu, Pushto, Punjabi, Arabic etc. Novels and stories by Mikhail Sholokhov in Arabic and

> Pushto. Novels by a modern writer Ghinghiz Aitatov are being published in Pushto. As for philological sciences, the Raduga will gladden scholars in this field by some interesting publications. At the end of the year it will put out a collection of articles by well-known Soviet Orientalists, entitled 'New Achievements in Soviet Arabian Studies', dealing with different aspects in studying Medieval and modern Arabic literature."

The apprehension expressed by Dr Mohammad Anwar Khan, Director, Area Study Centre (Central Asia) has sufficient weight to believe; "The Russians are within Afghanistan and they are not willing to vacate it till they have accomplished their task. Afghanistan will be converted into a Soviet satellite, controlled by the man and management acceptable to Moscwo."[105] The Soviet policy of building-up a new elite to take Afghanistan in hands has been dictated, explicitly, in an article captioned "Kabul University 40Years" which is reproduced in full as under;[106]

> "Kabul University the main centre of science, knowledge and higher education in the country provided facilities of higher education to eligible students without regard to their religion, sex, race or other discrimination, runs an article carried by Kabul New Times.
>
> This outstanding institution which will celebrate 40th anniversary of founding in near future, has progressed vastly after the April Revolution. Currently, over 6,000 students are enrolled in the University and the instructions are carried on by 593 highly qualified teachers. Since the founding of the University, 23,500 graduates have received bachelor's or master's degrees. Basic and advanced changes were introduced in its academic

system after the victory of the April Revolution, the article pointed out. Among the 12 faculties of Kabul University today, the faculties of geology, art, social sciences and journalism were opened after revolution. To provide educational opportunities to those who could not receive higher education in the past due to various reasons, evening faculties of journalism, law and political sciences were opened in the current year (1986). In 1980 a worker's institute was established in the framework of Kabul University to provide educational opportunities to the children of working people.

Foreign students from Bulgaria, Iran, Iraq and Japan, as well as Palestinian and Pashtoon and Baluch free tribes students are studying in Kabul University.

On December 18, 1980, the DRA Government & the USSR signed a protocol of assistance in teaching in the university. Accordingly, about 50 Soviet teachers and experts in different fields joined the several institutions of Kabul University and through their assistance and efforts a two stage system of teaching providing for 4 years post-graduate courses began. About 40 teachers of the Kabul University every year go to different universities and institutions in the Soviet Union for further research. The Kabul University has established close links with Tajik and Tashkent Universities, and protocol was concluded between them. A protocol of cooperation was signed between the Kabul University and 'Humboldt' University, Berlin, according to which 10 to 12 teachers of that university work in Kabul University. In its return, the Kabul University sends Dari and Pushto teachers to Berlin University. Every year 10 to 15 teachers of the Kabul University are sent to German Democratic Republic for further experience. Since 1980, four teachers from Cuba are teaching Spanish language at the Department of Philology of the Kabul University. An agreement of cooperation has been concluded with the Sofia University, Bulgaria, according to which the staff of Kabul University are sent there for post-graduation and research. The Kabul University is maintaining relations with Delhi Universtiy also. Negotiations on concluding a protocol have been held with University of Brno, Czechekoslavakia. The faculty of veterinary sciences of Kabul University receives assistance from the UNDP,

> FAO, especially to equip the faculty's laboratories, 12 of which are already completed.
>
> Likewise international organizations render assistance in promoting research programmes in nuclear physics and solar energy. On the basis of well established international relations, the Kabul University's Central Library is equipped with many modern, scientific and progressive books, journals and magazines."

Dr Zainul Abideen Mumtaz, an Afghan scholar, apprehends that the long range policy of the Soviet Union reveals that they seem determined to stay in Afghanistan till their puppet regime is consolidated. They try to avail themselves of the chance for a longer stay in Afghanistan in order to impose complete Sovietization on the young generation in Afghanistan and wait for political change in Pakistan's attitude which they think might be for their benefit.[107] Once again the Soviet Union is standing on the borders of promising lands - Pakistan and Iran - made attractive by internal fragmentation.[108] Edward Girardet thinks that "On the civilian front the Afghans are in danger of losing the war. Soviet advisers effectively control the decision making in ministries and the army, and they are in the process of Sovietizing virtually every aspect of soceity in the communist-occupied areas."[109] A section of Mujahideen is proud of referring to the remarks of Soviet leader Gorbachev that "imperialism and anti-revolutionary forces

have turned Afghanistan into a bleeding wound."[110] They say; "They control more than 80% of the land and a major portion of the population. The world has started to take the Mujahideen seriously in the military field and even the Soviets have called the war of Afghanistan a 'bleeding wound'."[111] In the course of his fortright and unvarnished talk to senior American journalists in the NBC TV-Radio network programme 'Meet-the-press', President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq said; "..... Their struggle in defence of their freedom is perhaps unprecendented in the annals of human history,but time is on the side of the Soviets.[112].

Conclusion:

External reaction to the Saur Revolution emanated from prevailing distrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan, U.S fear of Soviet expansion, and China's fear of her encirclement by the Soviet Union. Still it was imperceptible for quite some time. The revolution in Iran, abduction and murder of U.S. Ambassador, Adolph Dubs, in Kabul, the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and failure of subsequent U.S. rescue mission, and increasing activities of Russian delegations and advisers in Afghanistan were posing a serious challenge to the prestige of the United States in this region. For the United States, Pakistan was

the only State in the region which could help her restore her prestige and honour. Nevertheless, she had first to restore confidence of the Government of Pakistan which had been shaken on several occasions in the past. Pakistan, on her part, as "more royal than the king" afforded all the facilities to the immigrants which she could not give her own people. It was, in fact, not opposition to the Saur Revolution but to the government of Afghanistan in old style. But this time, the situation was quite changed. The Afghan government was backed by the Soviet Union, as part of the Socialist bloc. Until the invasion of the Soviet troops, Pakistan and the USA were trying to hold Afghanistan out of the Soviet orbit, more so during the short span of Amin's regime. The refugees were used as a lever. The Soviet invasion towards the end of 1979 forced Pakistan to internationalize the issue, and the USA to raise it to the Super Power level. They did it so. And it is no more, now, an issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan, a regional or ideological issue, but an issue between the two Super Powers.

--

References:

1. Zulfikar Ali Khan, Air Chief Marshal (retd); Afghanistan : Quest for a settlement; Muslim; 18.3.1984.
2. Azam, Ikram; Afghan Crisis: Seeking a realistic solution; Muslim; 3.5.1985.

3. Treadgold, Donald W.; Twentieth Century Russia; 1976; p.410.
4. Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali; The Myth of Independence; 1969; p.39.
5. Bowles, Chester; Ambassador's Report; Collins Paper Books ltd; London; 1954; p.177.
6. Dupree, Louis; Afghanistan; 1978; p.511.
7. Krakowski, Ell D.; Defining Success in Afghanistan; Spring, 1985; p.37.
8. Ghilzai, Nasrullah; Afghanistan: Mazee Aur Haal Kay Aeenay Mayn; Lahore; ND; Pp.121-2.
9. Ayub Khan, Mohammad, Field Marshal; Friends Not Masters; 1967; p.137.
10. Bhutto, Z.A.; The Myth of Independence; p.1.
11. Ibid; Pp.103-4.
12. Lifschultz, Lawrence; The US-Pak Strategic Relationship; Muslim; 30.10.1986; p.5.
13. Ayub Khan, Mohammad, F.M.; Friends Not Masters; p.168.
14. Ibid; p.171. For detailed information on Soviet reaction to U-2 incident, refer to "No Return For U-2"; Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow; 1960.
15. Treadgold, Donald W.; loc.cit; p.488.
16. Ibid; p.499.
17. Ibid.
18. Freedman, Robert O; Soviet Policy Towards The Middle East Since 1970; Praeger Publishers; Praeger Special Studies; New York; 1978; Pp.96ff.
19. Treadgold, Donald W; loc.cit; Pp.499-500.
20. Freedman, Robert O; loc.cit; Pp.47-95.
21. Gittings, John; Dispute Over Soviet Troops In Mongolia Sours Talks; Muslim; 18.3.1984.
22. Azmat Hayat Khan; Afghanistan: A Springboard for Soviet Expansion?; Muslim; 27.9.1982.
23. Nayar, Kuldip; Report on Afghanista; New Delhi; p.93.
24. Afghanistan, Yesterday and Today; ORBIS Press Agency; Prague; 1982; p.38.
25. Nayar, Kuldip; loc.cit; p.118.
26. Mehdi, S.G., Col (retd); The Destiny Of The States of Afghanistan And Pakistan; Pakistan Economist; 25.8.1979; p.13.
27. Da Khpalwakae Taroon; Ministry of Frontiers; Kabul; 9 Sunbala 1353= 01 Sep 1974; p. ش
28. Ikram, M. Asif; Russo-Afghan Relations; WUFA; 1/1; 1985; p.55.
29. Siddique, Mohammad Zahir, Dr; Az Ishghal...; 1363 = 1984; p.85.
30. Nayar, Kuldip; loc.cit; p.118.
31. Ibid.
32. Mehdi, S.G; loc.cit; p.13.
33. Ghilzai, Nasrullah; loc.cit; p.27.

34. Russel, Kent; History of the USSR-III (tr); Progress Publishers, Moscow; 1977; Pp.222-3.
35. Khurshid Ali; Pakhtunistan Bedevils Pak-Afghan Relations; World Islamic Time (WIT), weekly, Islamabad; 7 Sep 1984; Pp.31-35.
36. Quddus, Abdul, Syed; Afghanistan and Pakistan (a geo-political study); Ferozsons Ltd; Lahore, Rawalpindi; 1982; p.99. and Rizvi, S.H.; No War No Peace; Pakistan Economist; 25.8.1979; p.16.
37. Azam, G.F.; Afghanistan..; Peshawar; 1982; p.62.
38. Khurshid Ali; loc.cit; p.32.
39. Dupree, Louis; Afghanistan; 1978; p.492.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Da Khpalwakae Taroon; loc.cit; Pp.213-4. It may not be irrelevant to note that the Khudai Khidmatgars denounced the Bannu Resolution at a conference held at Sardaryab on 3 and 4 Sep 1947 through the following resolutions; (a) The Khudai Khidmatgars regard Pakistan as their own country and pledge that they shall do their utmost to strength and safeguard its interest and will make every sacrifice for this cause; (b) The dismissal of Dr Khan's ministry and setting up of Abdul Qayum's ministry is undemocratic; but as our country is passing through a critical stage the Khudai Khidmatgars shall take no step which might create difficulties in the way of either the Provincial or the Central Government, and (c) After the division of the country the Khudai Khidmatgars sever their connection with the All India Congress Organization and, therefore, instead of the tricolour adopt Red Flag as the symbol of their party. In Feb 1948, Abdul Ghaffar Khan attended the first session of the Constituent Assembly at Karachi and took the oath of allegiance to Pakistan. (Yahya Khan, Mohammad; Truth About The Khudai Khidmatgars; Peshawar; 25.2.1970; Pp.2-3.
43. Nasirullah Babar, a leader of Pakistan Peoples Party and a former Governor of NWFP; statement; Jiddat, Peshawar; 18.1.1986; Back-page.
44. Current Afghan Refugees Situation; CAR; Peshawar; ND; typescript.
45. Saeed, Riaz Ahmad; Almiya-i-Afghanistan; Historical Research Institute; Islamabad; p.112.
46. Fazal Haq, Lieut. General; a former Governor of NWFP; Interview published in Urdu Digest, Karachi, and reprinted by CAR Peshawar;Pp.3-4.
47. Personal information.

48. Akbar S. Ahmad; Resettlement of Afghan Refugees and the Social Scientists; Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies; IV/1; Fall 1980; Pp. 82-3.
49. Current Afghan Refugees Situation; loc.cit.
50. Akbar S. Ahmad; loc.cit; Pp.82-3.
51. Martin David C; Inside The Rescue Mission; Newsweek; 12.7.1982; p.16.
52. Fullerton, John; The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan; Hongkong; p.203.
53. Brecher, John, and Coleman, Fred; Pakistan : Mending a Breach; Newsweek; 4.5.1981; p.38.
54. Watson, Russell, and Coleman, Fred; Zia Bars The Door; Newsweek; 13.10.1980; p.7.
55. Ibid.
56. Wyer, Judith; London's Divide And Conquer Plan; Executive Intelligence Review; Middle East; 3-9 April 1979; p.18.
57. Talbott, Strobe; Afghanistan : In the Quagmire; Time; 26.12.1981; p.8.
58. Nations, Richard; F16s and Flexibility; Far Eastern Economic Review; 25.9.1981; p.19.
59. Ibid.
60. Richardson, Michael; Arms And The Woman; F.E. Economic Review; 25.9.1981; p.20.
61. Girardet, Edwar; Migratory Genocide; 4.3.1985; p.14.
62. Rashieed, Jamal; Shortening Fuse of Zia's Powderkeg; F.E. Economic Review;18.4.1985; p.42.
63. Strasser, Steven, etc; Arms Across The Sea; Newsweek; 29.6.1981; p.18.
64. Painton, Frederick; Trouble In The Pipeline; Time; 12.7.1982; p.41.
65. Edwards, John; The Distant But Real Threat Of Nuclear War; F.E. Economic Review; 5.9.1980; p.22.
66. Ibid.
67. Chishti, Abdullah, Amir; Rationale of Afghan Policy; Muslim; 24.8.1984.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Dupree, Louis; Afghanistan : The World Turned Upside Down; 1980/37; p.3.
71. Ibid; p.5.
72. Ibid.
73. Zulfikar Ali Khan, Air Chief Marshal (retd); Afghanistan: The Refugees; Muslim; 5.9.1984.
74. Afghanistan: Three Years Of Occupation; Special Report 106; US Dept of State, Washington DC; Dec 1982; p.11.
75. Rizvi, Hassan Askari, Dr; Geneva Parley on Afghanistan; Mulsim; 29.6.1982.

76. Lifschultz, Lawrance; No Solution Possible Without Super Power Support; Muslim; 16.5.1985.
77. Dupree, Louis; Afghanistan in 1982; typescript; Pp.12-13.
78. The Letter From The B.I.A. (Bureau International Afghanistan); April-May 1982; Pp not marked.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Dupree, Louis; Afghanistan in 1982; loc.cit; Pp.12-13.
82. Ibid.
83. 5th Resolution: UN Human Rights Commission; Geneva; 29 Feb 1984; Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt of Pakistan,Islamabad; p.21.
84. 5th Resolution: UN Human Rights Commission; Geneva; 29 Feb 1984; Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt of Pakistan,Islamabad.
85. Texts of UN Resolutions reproduced from various sources at appendix K(a-g).
86. a. Humanitarian Assistance Programme For Afghan Refugees In NWFP; CAR, Peshawar; Dec 1985 (compiled by Shah Zaman); Pp.9-10.
b. Humanitarian Assistance Programme for Afghan Refugees In Pakistan; Chief CAR; Rawalpindi; August 1983; p.24.
c. Shabbir Hussain, Syed; Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: The Long Wait; Kamran Publishing House, Islamabad; ND; p.24.
87. Muslim; 28.12.1985.
88. Ibid; 24.3.1985.
89. Afghan Refugees in Pakistan; Ministry of Information & Broadcasting; Islamabad; ND; Pp.4-6.
90. Arnold, Anthony; Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism; 1983; p.45.
91. Press Bulletin; USSR Embassy, Islamabad; 106; 22.5.1985; p.5.
92. Ibid; 224; 20.10.1985; p.7.
93. Howles, Chester; Ambassador's Report; London; 1954; p.126.
94. Watson, Hugh Seton; From Lenin To Khrushchev: A History of World Communism; New York, Washington; 1965; p.242.
95. On Events In Afghanistan: Leonid Brezhnev's replies to Pravada Correspondent; Tass Statement; Novosti Press Agency Publg House,Moscow; 1980; Pp.6-8.
96. Harrison, Selig S; In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptation; New York, Washington; 1981; p.132.
97. Khyber Mail, daily, Peshawar; 23.2.1981.
98. Rifaat Hussain, Syed; Soviet Strategy in Afghanistan: Rhetoric And Actions; Muslim; 31.12.1985.

99. Nawai Waqt, daily, Rawalpindi; 21.12.1983.
100. Press Bulletin, USSR Embassy; 210; 29.2.1985; p.9.
101. Khyber Mail, Peshawar; 01.12.1986.
102. Press Bulletin, USSR Emb; 101; 21.4.1986.
103. Griffith, John C; Afghanistan: Key To A Continent; 1981; p.74.
104. Press Bulletin, USSR Emb; 242; 10.9.1986; Pp.9-10.
105. Anwar Khan, Mohammad, Dr; On A Visit To Russia; PAKISTAN; Area Study Centre, Peshawar; 7; Spring 1983; p.74.
106. Press Bulletin; USSR Emb; 121; 14.5.1986; Pp.15-16.
107. Mumtaz, Z.A., Dr; Soviet Aggression of Afghanistan; WUFA, Peshawar; I/1; 1985; p.23.
108. Salamat Ali; Where Do We Go From Here; F.E. Economic Review; 5.9.1980; Pp.21-22.
109. Girardet, Edward; Migratory Genocide; 4.3.1985; p.14.
110. Dawn, daily, Karachi; 26.2.1986; refers to Gorbachev's address to the 27th Congress of CPSU held at Kremlin by the end of Feb 1986.
111. Afghan News, fortnightly; Jamiat-i-Islami Afghanistan; Peshawar; II/14; 15.7.1986; p.1.
112. Defence Journal, Karachi; IX/1-2; 1983; p.1.

...

CONCLUSION

The Afghan issue, orginating from the Saur Revolution, has been internationalized. The two Super Powers are now involved directly in this issue. It is, now, one of the burning US-SU issues, and is no more in the hands of Pakistan or Afghanistan. The US wanted to "bleed Russia" and the SU has felt the "bleeding wound". Does it mean that the game is going to be over? No! Because the reason which has forced millions of Afghans to leave the country has not ceased to exist. "The bleeding game" has done much damage to the lives and properties, which can not be calculated or estimated according to Afghans' customary practice. The whole of more than 17 million population of Afghanistan,which resembles a battered fry-pan on a burning cooking range, has been thrown in the man-made inferno. It is a tragedy, a great tragedy; the greatest tragedy in the life of the Afghans who are made targets of modern sophisticated weaponry on the testing ground of their land. But what benefits do go to the promoters of this tragedy? The USA has no interest in Afghans and Afghanistan. Their main objective is "containment of Russia". Chain the Polar Bear and check its onward prowl. Iran has slipped from their hands. So, Pakistan was made

the front-line state. But here has, now, developed the fear of Pakistan becoming a buffer state between the Soviet Union and India.

Pakistan which has become a sanctuary for millions of Afghan refugees, is facing many consequent problems. If a settlement could be achieved, Pakistan may find its implementation difficult. Some groups of Afghan refugees and Mujahideen will never go back. They could not be resettled like Biharis. They will demand privileges. Moreover, they have to be restrained from resistance. But it will not help, because the Afghans, on any side, have earned nothing but scorched land and enmities with abundant sophisticated arms.

The Soviet Union might not have anticipated the intensity of the reaction, and the level to which it soared, before seding of "limited contingents of Soviet troops to Afghanistan". But they would not be cowed by condemnations, resolutions and threats which are considered strategies of indirect confrontation. Big, or Super, powers try to avoid a direct confrontation. Here, the Soviets do not feel any risk of direct confrontation. Afghanistan is secure within the state boundaries. The Afghan government persists in implementation of her policies which have been termed "Sovietization". More stress is put on the programmes of

literacy and education. The existing groups of educated people, academicians, intellectuals etc. have been eliminated, or forced to leave the country, or join the PDPA and contribute to its policy. By April, 1987, nine years would have elapsed since the Saur Revolution. They will need, at least, three more years to bring out a fresh elite of the society to fill-up the gaps and make the core of the administration. The present set of PDPA leadership will have to give way to the rising generation. Time is on the Soviet side. The other side is losing as time passes.

The vital question, however, arises about the status of Afghanistan. Will it regain its sovereign status, or survive only as a satellite of the Soviet Union. Or, will it be dismembered and divided into administrative units on ethnic basis, and ultimately merged with the Soviet Union. The first option is out of the question. Annexation of Wakhan corridor, formation of the ministry of Tribes and Nationalities and its stress on ethnic values go in favour of the third option. The future governments of Afghanistan, when passed on to the emerging elite, will be dictated to work out the plan "in response to popular demands of various ethnic groups" and give away the parts north of Hindukush to the Soviet Union. The

Pukhtoon, Baluch and Nooristanis which are tribal groups may be allowed to exist as "independent Socialist State (s) of the Soviet bloc" in order to maintain pressure towards the Gulf through the Baluch, and on Pakistan through the Pukhtoons. Further expansion, in this age, is detrimental to the centralized structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; hence a danger to the Union itself.

Presently, there seems no danger to the political existence of Pakistan. Neither the Soviet Union nor India would like to see any move of either against Pakistan. Nevertheless, if India falls in the process of disintegration and the Soviet Union does not see a "great power" on the eastern frontier of Pakistan,then the possibility of indirect move by the Soviet Union could not be ruled out. The great danger for Pakistan will be cultural invasion from both sides. India has already launched her attack. From the western side, it will depend on the stability of the situation. But the government of Afghanistan has a programme to extend the radio/TV networks along the Durand Line, and some progress has been made. She has also offered publication of Pushto works of the writers of Pakistan on royalty in Afghanistan, in order to exploit their sense of

deprivation. Pakistan should, therefore, review its internal and external policies for necessary adjustments.

***

Appendix A

Decrees of the Revolutionary Council of the Dmocratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

-- -- --

DECREE No. ONE

The Revolutionary Council of the DRA in its first session held at 3 p.m. on Saur 10th, 1357 corresponding to 30th April 1978, issued the following Decree;

I. The Revolutionary Council of the DRA in its first session elected Noor Mohammad Taraki, the great national and revolutionary personality of Afghanistan, as the President of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA who is at the same time the Head of the Government (Prime Minister).

II. The Revolutionary Council of the DRA being the highest power of the State in the country, in its first historical session as a great historical turning point in the destiny of the liberating movement of the people of Afghanistan unanimously approved that:

1. From this date (10th Saur 1357 corresponding to 30th April 1978) Afghanistan from the view point of political structure of the State is the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

2. The Government as the highest executive power in the country shall be elected by the Revolutionary Council of the DRA and shall be called the Government of the DRA. The Government is responsible to the Revolutionary Council of the DRA.

3. The Revolutionary Council of the DRA unanimously approved that until further notice martial law shall remain in force throughout the country.

4. The Revolutionary Council of the DRA will shortly elect vice-chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA, deputy prime minister of the Government of the DRA and the members of the Government and approve and proclaim its policy.

5. Actually prominent matters of the State and Government shall be conducted through decrees of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA and the Government of the DRA.

DECREE No. TWO

The Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (RC-DRA), in its second session, at 9 p.m. on 11th Saur 1357 corresponding

to first May 1978 held under the chairmanship of the People's Great Leader, Noor Mohammad Taraki, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (CC-PDPA), President of the RC and Prime Minister, issued the following Decree.

The RC-DRA in its second session, presided by Noor Mohammad Taraki, President of the RC-DRA unanimously elected Babrak Karmal as Vice-President of the RC-DRA.

Likewise the RC-DRA in accordance with its Decree Number One, dated 10 Saur 1357, elected the Deputy Prime Ministers and members of the Government of the DRA as follows:

*Babrak Karmal, Deputy Prime Minister.
Hafizullah Amin, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Major Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Communications.
*Col. Abdul Qadir, Minister of National Defence.
Dr Shah Wali, Minister of Public Health.
*Noor Ahmad Noor, Minister of Interior.
Dastagir Panjshiri, Minister of Education.
*Sultan Ali Kishtimand, Minister of Planning.
Suleiman Laeq, Minister of Radio & Television.
Dr. Saleh Mohammad Zeiri, Minister of Agriculture.
Abdul Karim Mesaq, Minister of Finance.
Mohammad Hassan Bareq Shafiee, Minister of Information & Culture.
Abdul Hakim Sharaee Jauzjani, Minister of Justice & Attorney General.
*Dr. Anahita Ratebzad, Minister of Social Affairs.
Abdul Qudus Ghorbandi, Minister of Commerce.
Eng. Mohammad Ismail Danish, Minister of Mines & Industries.
*Major Mohammad Rafi, Minister of Public Works.
Pohanwal Mohammad Mansur Hashemi, Minister of Water and Power.
Prof. Mahmood Sooma, Minister of Higher Education.
Nezamuddin Tehzeeb, Minister of Frontier Affairs.

The Plenum of the CC-PDPA in its session of 6th Qaus, 1357 held at the People's House under the chairmanship of the people's great leader, Noor Mohammad Taraki, founder and General Secretary of the CC-PDPA, President of the RC and Prime Minister, among other topics decided that:

Seven members of the CC and two members of the RC comprising of:

1. Babrak Karmal, 2. Noor Ahmad Noor,
3. Sultan Ali Kishtmand, 4. Dr Anahita,
5. Mahmoud Baryalay, 6. Wakeel,
7. Dr Najib, 8. Qader
9. Rafi

who had an active part in the treacherous conspiracies against Great Saur Revolution, against the DRA and against our glorious party, the PDPA, and from amongst whom six of them have not returned to the country, in order to be placed vis-a-vis of our people and be given account of their behaviour, have been expelled from the PDPA. Four members of the CC who participated in illegal activities are comprised of:

1. Nezamuddin Tehzeeb, 2. Majid Sarbuland
3. Sarwar Uresh, 4. Fida Mohammad Dehnesheen

At this stage, they are being demoted from membership of the CC to probationary membership.

DECREE No. THREE

The RC-DRA, in its session of 24th Saur 1357 corresponding to 14th May 1978, held under the chairmanship of the people's great leader and able teacher Noor Mohammad Taraki, General Secretary of the CC-PDPA, President of the RC and Prime Minister, issued the following Decree:

With the triumph of Revolution of Saur 7,1357 (April 27, 1978) dear compatriots were officially informed of the abrogation of self-styled constitution of Mohammad Daoud. The RC-DRA in order to regulate legal relations of real and legal persons and to regulate the duties of the state organs, approved the followings:

Article 1: Except the Constitution of Hoot 5, 1355 which was earlier declared abrogated, other laws, regulations and decrees in force are applicable, provided if they are compatible with the objective of the DRA and not abrogated through decrees of the RC-DRA.

Article 2:

1. Authorities of the Supreme Court, provided for in the law on Judicial Organization and Authority are entrusted to the High Judiciary Council of the DRA. The High Jidiciary Council is responsible to the RC-DRA.

2. The High Judiciary Council consists of:

a. The Minister of Justice, as President.
b. Deputy Minister of Judiciary Affairs, as member.
c. President of Cassation as member.
d. Deputy Minister of Justice & Administrative Affairs as member.
e. Deputy Attorney General as member.
f. One or several other persons, as proposed by the Minister of Justice and approved by the President of the RC shall be appointed.

3. The duties of the Judiciary Council as regards defending democratic rights and interests of the people and realisation of the Revolutionary aspirations of the basic lines of the Revolutionary Duties as approved by the RC-DRA and listening to the periodical reports of the Court works, shall be expanded by separate decrees.

Article 3: The authority of the judiciary includes tending to all cases in which real or legal persons are involved as plaintiff or claimant, and are submitted to it and resolved in accordance with the provisions of the law.

Article 4: All final verdicts of the Courts are binding except death sentence passed on a person, the execution of which sentence is conditioned to the ratification by the President of the RC-DRA.

Article 5: The contained authorities in the law on Judicial Organization and Authority in force granted to the Head of the State of the time, are entrusted to the President of the RC-DRA.

Article 6: Authorities invested in the Chief Justice by the law on Judicial Organization and Authority in force are entrusted to the Minister of Justice.

Artice 7:

1. A Court called Revolutionary Military Court (RMC) will be formed and until its dissolution by the RC-DRA, continues to perform its duties, and shall be responsible to the RC-DRA.

2. Trials method in this court shall be subject to provisions of regulations pertaining to court martial.

3. This court may be stationary or mobile.

Article 8:

1. The judges of the RMC are appointed by the RC-DRA.

2. In this court civil and military persons who have committed or commit crimes against the Revolution of Saur 7, 1357, against the interest of the people and against national interests, against internal and external security of the DRA shall be tried and punished in accordance with the Penal Law and Military Criminal Law and provisions of the RC-DRA.

Article 9: Other organs of the State of the DRA shall perform their duties in accordance with the provisions of laws and regulations in force.

Article 10:

1. On the basis of the principle of equal pay for equal work Article Thirteen of the Civil Service Law promulgated on Jauza 12, 1356 is amended as such:

"The administration may when necessary, appoint a civil servant who has the capibility and worthiness, with due consideration to the provision of Article Eleven of Civil Service Law at any rank higher than his actual rank."

2. The administration may when necessary, appoint any one of the citizens of Afghanistan who has the eligibility and the desired capability with due consideration to provisions of article eleven, regardless of conditions contained in Article Five of the Civil Service Law at needed ranks. In botn cases the civil servant is entitled to the salary and privileges of the rank to which he is appointed from the date of his appointment.

3. Ascertaining of rank, promotion and retirement of civil servants of clause two are subject to regulations which will be-enacted later.

Article 11:

1. The promotion of officers, third lieutenants, teachers and civil servants which were due on Sartan 26, 1357 shall be given from Saur 7, 1357 the day of triumphant Revolution of the DRA.

2. All workers and State employees who were entitled to grade promotions from Saur 7, to Sartan 26, 1357 shall be promoted to higher rank on Saur 7, 1357.

Appendix Number Two to Decree Number Three of the RC-DRA.

In order to eliminate problems faced by the people and prevent piling up of minor cases, the authorities of primary, and appellate courts are ascertained as follows:

Article 1: The decision issued by the primary court on all petty offenses and in civil and commercial cases, when the claim value does not exceed ten thousand Afghanis, shall be final.

Article 2: The decision issued by the Court of Appeal in misdemeanour is punishable with one year imprisonment or fines in cash upto twelve thousand Afghanis and in civil and commercial cases, when the claim value thereof does not exceed forty thousand Afghanis, is final.

Article 3:

1. This provision comes into force after its publication in the Official Gazette, and with its enforcement provisions of items two and three of Article Sixty Two of the law on Judicial Organization and Authority, and provisions of other laws contradicting it, are abrogated.

2. The provisions of this appendix are also applicable to those cases which are not finalised.

DECREE No. FOUR

The RC-DRA, in its session of 22/3/1357 corresponding to 12/6/1978, held at the People's House under the chairmanship of the people's great leader and able teacher Noor Mohammad Taraki, General Secretary of the CC-PDPA, President of the RC and Prime Minister, issued the Decree Number Four as follows:

1. The State emblem of the DRA consists of:

The word Khalq in the centre of two wreaths of wheat decorated around by ribbons in golden colour and a five point star on the high part between the two extremities of the wreaths and the script "The Saur Revolution 1357 of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan" placed in the lower part in the connecting point of ribbons.

11. The flag of the DRA is composed of two parts:

1. A fabric red in colour and rectangular in form, the length of which is twice its width and with the state emblem placed in its first third upper part.

2. The flag pole is placed on the right side.

DECREE No. FIVE

Decree No. Five includes the following provisions:

The RC-DRA, in its session of 22 Jauza 1357

corresponding to 12 June 1978, held under the chairmanship of the people's great leader, Noor Mohammad Taraki, General Secretary of the CC-PDPA, President of the RC and Prime Minister, issued the following decree concerning the withdrawal of citizenship from trasoners of the nation;

Insuring and withdrawal of citizenship of the DRA is of the prerogatives of the RC-DRA.

Every citizen of the DRA, parallel with rights and freedoms he enjoys, is obliged to defend and support independence, territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the people of Afghanistan and the accomplishments of the Great Saur Revolution.

Abide by and observe the decree of the RC of the Government and the laws and regulations of the DRA.

Protect the property of the people and not to accord the right and permission to self or any one else to misuse public property for personal and family gains, and transgress on the public property of Afghanistan.

On the basis of the above fundamental principles treason against the people and the country and treason against national interests is the greatest and gravest unpardonable crime.

Accordingly, as it is evident to all, mature members of the families of Nader and his brothers and relatives, from amongst them Mohammad Zaher & his sons and his sons-in-law Abdul Wali and Aziz Naim, who are fugitives outside the country and have always committed, in collusion and cooperation with aliens and foreign enemies of Afghanistan, grave and open treasons against national independence, national sovereignty and national interests and against the interest of our beloved people and country, Afghanistan, and have abundantly misused public property for personal and family gains.

The RC-DRA declares them as national traitors, deprives them of all rights, and withdraws from them the citizenship of the DRA.

Thus the RC-DRA informs all international sources that henceforth the followings, consisting of twenty three persons are no more citizens of the DRA, and may not enjoy the rights of an Afghan:

1. Abdul Wali, son of Sha Wali
2. Mrs. Belqis, daughter of Mohammad Zaher, former King, wife of Abdul Wali.
3. Ahmad Shah, son of Mohammad Zaher, former King.

4. Mrs Khatol, wife of Ahmad Shah
5. Mohammad Nader, son of Mohammad Zaher, former King.
6. Mrs Lailuma, wife of Mohammad Nader
7. Walishah Wali, son of Shah Wali
8. Mrs Marghali Wali, wife of Walishah Wali
9. Mustafa Walishah Wali, son of Walishah Wali
10. Sultan Mahmoud Ghazi
11. Mrs Alia Mahmoud Ghazi, wife of Sultan Mahmoud Ghazi
12. Mohammad Aziz Khan, son of Mohammad Naim
13. Mrs Mariam Aziz Naim
14. Mohammad Daoud, son of former King
15. Mrs Fatema Daoud, wife of Daoud
16. Zalmai Mahmoud Ghazi
17. Mohammad Zaher, former King
18. Homaira Zaher, former Queen
19. Mirwais Zahir, son of former King
20. Mrs Torpaikai Mahmoud Ghazi, daughter Mohammad Daoud
21. Mrs Samarul Seraj, wife of Shah Wali
22. Tareq Arif, son of General Mohamad Aref, son-in-law of Abdul Wali
23. Homaira Wali, wife of Tareq Arif.

DECREE No. SIX

The RC-DRA, in its session of 21 Saratan 1357 corresponding to 12 July 1978 held from 3 to 5.30 p.m. at the People's House under the chairmanship of the great and beloved leader of the people, Noor Mohammad Taraki, General Secretary of the CC PDPA, President of the RC and Prime Minister, issued the Decree Number Six as follows:

The victorious Saur Revolution launched by the will of the oppressed people of the country, under the leadership of the PDPA ended the political sovereignty of the exploiting classes, and laid the foundation of the new glorious and democratic society of Afghanistan.

The DRA which considers ensuring of prosperity and well-being of the people of the country as its fundamental duty, and in pursuance of the Basic Lines of the Revolutionary Duties has put on the order of the day the ensurance of the well-being and tranquility of peasants and relieving them from the heavy burden of mortgage and back-breaking interests collected by landlords and userers.

The RC-DRA in order to emancipate millions of toiling peasants from the yoke of oppressive exploiters, issued the following decree:

Article 1: The person who has taken into mortgage, before 1353 agricultural land of another, owning ten jiribs of first grade land, or its equivalent, or less, after collection of the standing harvest, shall return the said land to the orginal owner without collection of the mortgage money.

Article 2: The person who has taken into mortgage the agricultural land of another, owning ten jiribs of first grade land, or its equivalent, or less, in 1353 or thereafter, shall immediately return the land to its original owner after collecting the standing harvest, and then obtain the mortgage money from the owner of the land as follows:

1. In case the land is taken into mortgage in 1353, only twenty percent of the mortgage money is returnable after one year, in the course of the second year.

2. In case the land is taken into mortgage in 1354, only 40% of the mortgage money is returnable, after one year, within two years period.

3. In case the land is taken into mortgage in 1355, only 60% of the mortgage money is returnable after one year, within three years period.

4. In case the land is taken into mortgage in 1356, only 80% of the mortgage money is returnable, after one year within four years period.

5. In case the land is taken into mortgage in 1357, only ninety percent of the mortgage money is returnable, after one year, within five years period.

Article 3: Landless persons who work on the land of the landlord as peasant or labourers, are exempted from payment of the debts due to land-owners and usurers and from payment of interest.

Article 4: Landless peasants, and persons owning ten jiribs of first grade land, or its equivalent, or less, if indebted to one or several persons before 1353 on the basis of the usury, salam (purchase of grains by peasants from landlord at exorbitant price) or mortgage, are exempted from payment of debts and interest.

Article 5: Peasants owning ten jiribs of first grade land, or thereafter, to one or several persons, on the basis of usury, salam and mortgage, shall return the principal amount of the debt without interest to the creditor or creditors after one year, in the following manner provided legal document is available;

1. If the debt document is of 1353, only 20% of the total debt is repayable after one year, in the course of the second year.

2. If the debt document is of 1354, only 40% of the total debt is repayable after one year, in the course of two years.

3. If the debt document is of 1355, only 60% of the total debt is repayable after one year, within three years.

4. If the debt document is of 1356, only 80% of the total debt is repayable after one year, within four years.

5. If the debt document is of 1357, only 90% of the total debt is repayable after one year, within five years.

Article 6: Mortgage and debt documents are annulled with the realisation of the provisions of Articles, One, Two, Three, Four and Five of this decree.

Article 7: This Decree comes into force after its publication in the Official Gazette.

Appendix No One of the Decree No 6:

With the issuance of decree number six of the DRA, in order to ensure the well-being and prosperity of the people of the country, especially the noble and hardworking peasants, a heavy duty is imposed on the local administrative authorities.

The RC-DRA, in order to eliminate problems faced by the peasants, and for proper implementation of decree No 6, issues this appendix in order to create the committee for solution of peasantry problems, and determining the duties of this committee.

Chapter 1

Woloswali (district) Committee for Solution of Peasantry Problems (CSPP).

Article 1: CSPP shall be formed in every Woloswali.

Article 2: The Woloswali CSPP may create "sub-committees for solution of peasantry problems" (Sub-CSPP) in its concerned areas and make use of its

Article 3: The Woloswali CSPP may, with the approval of the provincial CSPPs, entrust the areas which are distant from its work areas, to the adjoining Woloswali CSPPs.

Article 4: The Woloswali CSPP is responsible to the provincial CSPPs, and shall function under its

supervision.

Article 5: The Woloswali CSPP is comprised of:

1. The Woloswal (District Magistrate) as chairman.
2. The official in charge of properties, as member.
3. The representative of the Attorney General's Office as member.
4. Representatives of peasants (two) as members.
5. Representative of education department, as member.
6. Representative of the agriculture department, as member.

Cahpter II

Duties of the Woloswali CSPP.

Article 6: The Woloswali CSPP shall perform the following duties:

1. Just solution of the dispute between the landlords and the peasants, and decision for restoration of the mortgaged land under dispute.
2. Ascertaining of the landownership area on the basis of progressive tax registration record and effective legal documents, and in case, necessary, ownership area shall be determined by the Woloswali CSPP.
3. Ascertaining of the standing harvest, and determining restoration of the land to the owner thereof in accordance with Article One and Two of Decree No. 6.
4. To study the mortgage and usury documents and ascertaining of the date and the validity thereof.
5. To distinguish the landless peasants and landless labourers.
6. To study the debt documens and distinguishing interest free debts from debts on the basis of mortgage and usury and issuance of decision.

Article 7: In case the decision of the Woloswali CSPP in regard to the disputes of the peasants with landlords, and on disputes of peasants among themselves, is considered by both parties to the dispute, or one of the parties thereto, as unjust, it shall be referred to the provincial CSPP.

Article 8: The Woloswali CSPP shall ascertain

and distinguish organizations and persons deserving acquisition of credits from the Agriculture Development Bank to purchase chemical fertiliser, improved seeds, chemicals to fight plant and animal diseases and pests, machine tools, and land improvement and other agricultural services.

Cahpter III

Article 9: The provincial CSPP consists of the following:

1. The Governor, as chairman.
2. Auditor General of the province (provincial chief of finance) as member.
3. Director General of properties as member.
4. Director General of Agriculture as member.
5. Representative of the Attorney General's Office as member.
6. Director of Education as member.
7. Representatives of peasants (three) as members.

Article 10: The provincial CSPP considers and reviews those decisions of the Woloswali CSPP which are not to the satisfaction of either of the parties to the dispute, and is authorised to either reject or endorse any of the decisions and issue just decision in regard.

Article 11: In case the Woloswali CSPP can not settle an issue, it refers it to the provincial CSPP, and the provincial committee issues a just decision in regard.

Article 12: In the area of the centre of the province, a sub-committee of SPP may be established with the authority of the Woloswali CSPP, by the provincial CSPP.

Article 13: The decision of the provincial CSPP is binding and final.

Article 14: This appendix comes into force after its publication in the Official Gazette.

DECREE No. SEVEN

The RC-DRA in its session of 25/7/1357 (17 October 1978) held at the People's House on the basis of the proposal submitted by the Prime Ministry, approved the following decree:

Decree No Seven concerning dowry (Mahar) and marriage expenses in seven articles.

The above mentioned decision of the RC has been ratified by Noor Mohammad Taraki, President of the RC and Prime Minister.

Article 1:
1. No one shall engage or give in marriage (nikah) a girl in exchange of money in cash or commodity.

2. No one shall compel the bridegroom to pay money in cash or commodity in the name of marraige portion (toyana or walwar) at the time of marrage.

Article 2: No one shall compel the bridegroom or his guardian to provide clothing or presents for the girl or her family in the name of Idi, Nawrozi, Barati or, on ther occasions.

Article 3: The girl or her guardian shall not take money in cash or commodity in the name of dowry (mahar) mor than ten Darham according to Shariat which does not exceed three hundred afghanis on the basis of the Bank rate of silver.

Article 4: The engagement and marriage shall take place on full consent of the parties; thus;

1. No one shall force the marriage.

2. No one shall prevent the free marriage of a widow or force her into marriage because of relationship or tribal ties.

3. No one shall prevent legal marriage of another person on the pretext of engagement, forced engagement expenses or by using force.

Article 5: The engagement and marriage for woman under sixteen and for man under eighteen years are not permissible.

Article 6:
1. Those violating the provisions of this Decree shall be liable according to their conditions, to imprisonment for six months to three years.

2. The money in cash or commodity which has been accepted in violation of the provisions of the Decree shall be confiscated.

Article 7: This Decree shall come into force after its publication in the Official Gazette.

DECREE No. EIGHT

The RC-DRA in its session of 7/9/1357 (28 Nov 1978) held at the People's House, on the basis of the proposal dated 7/9/1357 submitted by the Prime Ministry, approved the following decree;

Decree No Eight of the RC concerning the Land, in eight chapters and forty articles.

The decision of the RC has been approved by Noor Mohammad Taraki President of the RC and Prime Minister of the DRA and communicated to the

government by Decree No. 2060 dated 7/9/1357 of the President of the RC and Prime Minister.

Chapter 1

General Provisions

Article 1: This decree is issued pursuant to the objectives of the PDPA and the forty aims of the Saur Revolution for the realisation of the provisions of Articles One and Two of the Basic Lines of the Revolutionary Duties of the DRA and for the purpose of meeting the following objects:

1. The elimination of feudal and pre-feudal relations from the socio-economic system of the country.

2. Popularisation, consolidateion and deepening of the unity of workers and peasants classes for the purpose of further strengthening the unity of the people of Afghanistan for the construction of a society void of hostile classes and free from the exploitation of man by man.

3. Raising the volume of agriculutural products in order to supply sufficient and diversified food for the people, supply of raw material for the growing export of agricultural and industrial produces.

Article 2: The following terms have the following meanings;

1. Family, is comprised of husband, wife and children who have not completed eighteen years of age and are under direct dependency or custody of the chief of the family and living in one house.

A person who is not married and has completed the age of eighteen shall be considered a separate family for the purpose of land distribution.

2. Landless peasant, is the one who, himself has no land and is directly cultivating the land of another person on the basis of a prior legal agreement or local custom.

3. Petty land holder, is the person who is directly working and cultivating the land and is the owner of less than five jiribs of first grade land or its equivalent.

4. Agricultural worker, is the person who is not the owner of the land and performs agricultural or other specific works on the land of the owner against specified amount of wage in cash or commodity on the basis of prior legal agreement or local custom.

5. Owner, is the person who according to valid legal documents is in possession of his land ownership.

6. Destitute Koochi (nomad), is a Koochi who, except labouring and cattle grazing has no other source of income.

7. Plot, is a piece of land possessed or owned by a person or persons jointly and is surrounded by the properties of other persons or state, river, ditch, public road, mountain, hill and barren lands. Orchard land or vineyard, even if it is a part of a plot of the owners land, is considered as a separate plot and the non-vineyard land or non-orchard land of a plot shall be considered as a separate plot of land.

8. Land holding area, is comprised of one or several plots of land which, partly or wholly is in the ownership possession of a person and is located in the form of one or several plots, in one or several villages or several Woloswalis (districts) or several provinces.

9. Surplus jiribs of land is part of the land holding area of a person which is determined as surplus of his deserving part on the basis of valid legal documents.

Article 3: No family can possess more than thirty jiribs of the first grade land or its equivalent.

Article 4: No person can mortgage, rent or sell the exceeding standard limit (more than thirty jiribs of first grade land or its equivalent) the surplus jiribs of land which is distributed according to the provisions of this decree.

Cahpter II

Organization of Irrigation

Article 5: For the purpose of effective and utmost utilisation of water resources in agriculture, the distribution of water shall take place justly.

Article 6: The capacity of normal annual flow of a ditch or other source of irrigation shall be established by the Minister of Water and Power and the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reforms and accordingly, the annual right of water for each jirib of land is determined and distributed justly.

Article 7: Improvement and repair of water heads and other establishments of irrigation system shall be made on the basis of a protocol to be concluded between the Institute for the amelioration of irrigation system of the concerned region and pea-

sants or cooperative. The expenditure of ameliorations and repairs shall be paid through Agricultral Development Bank loans, under easy terms on the basis of peasants or cooperative application.

Cahpter III

Land Distribution

Article 8: The land to be distributed to the deserving persons according to the provisions of this decree shall be as follows:

1. Land exceeding the standard limit and surplus jiribs land.

2. Land gifted to the state.

3. Land of the Yahya Dynasty and Royal Family, state lands and irrigation projects which are not suitable for the establishment of state farms.

Article 9: The surplus jiribs and the exceeding standard limit land shall be possessed without payment by the Land Reforms Department.

Article 10: The land is divided into three categories and seven grades and in order to convert it into first grade land, the following coefficients shall be applied.

First Category: (Orchard, vineyard and double irrigated).

First Grade Land (orchard, and irrigated vineyard) coefficient : 1.00

Second Grade Land (double crop irrigated) coefficient : 0.85

Second Category: (single crop irrigated).

Third grade land (single crop irrigated which is cultivated or irrigated 50% and more per year) coefficient : 0.67

Fourth grade land (single crop, irrigated less than 50% of which is cultivated or irrigated annually) coefficient : 0.40

Third Category: (Dry farming)

Fifth grade land (dry farming land which is cultivated once every two years) coefficient: 0.20

Sixth grade land (dry farming land cultivated once every three years) coefficient : 0.15

Seventh grade land (dry farming land which is cultivated once more than every every three years) coefficient : 0.10

Article 11: The unit of measurement of land is jirib which is equivalent to two thousand square meters or 1/5 of an hectare. In calculating the area of a land holding half a jirib or less than it shall not be counted but more than half a jirib shall be counted as one jirib.

Article 12: Land is distributed free to every deserving person and his family as follows:

1. Orchard and vineyard (first grade) five jiribs.
2. Double crop irrigated (second grade) six jiribs.
3. Single crop irrigated (third grade) eight jiribs.
4. Single crop irrigated (fourth grade) twelve jiribs.
5. Dry farming land (fifth grade) twenty five jiribs.
6. Dry farming land (sixth grade) thirty three jiribs.
7. Dry farming land (seventh grade) fifty jiribs.

Land shall be distributed to the petty land holder to the amount of his land holding not exceeding five jiribs of the first grade land or its equivalent.

Article 13: The plot of land which is comprised of two grades of land or more shall be converted on the basis of the coefficient of the respective grade into five jiribs of first grade land and shall be distributed to the deserving people.

Article 14: Land shall be distributed to the first degree deserving person without raffling. If the plots of land on which the deserving persons work, are not sufficient in that village or Woloswali (district), land shall be distributed first to the first degree deserving persons on the basis of raffling and delivered to them.

Article 15:

1. Taking into consideration the priority right, land shall be distributed first to the second degree deservers and then to the third degree deservers if plots of land are available, and then to the fourth degree deservers and in case plots of land are still available, they shall be distributed to the fifth and sixth degree deservers on the basis of raffling.

2. The priority right of distribution of land among the petty land holders shall be established due to the smallness of the size of their land holding area and their neighbourliness to the distributable land.

Article 16: Raffling shall take place in public by the assigned corps, while the majority of deserving candidates are present. That number of the plot of land which is raffled in the name of the deserver shall be delivered to him according to the appropriate procedure.

Article 17: Establishments and equipments of the land which are expropriated according to the provisions of the decree and distributed to the deservers or agricultural cooperative or state farms shall be purchased through the Agricultural Development Bank for a just price for ten years instalments and shall be sold to the cooperatives, deservers and state farms.

The said bank shall recollect the paid money from the deserver or cooperative or state farm in a period of ten years with favourable terms.

Article 18: The land of state farms and state institutions are not subject to the standard limit of this decree.

Article 19: Every family or member of the cooperative can newly construct and make ready and suitable for agriculture upto thirty jiribs of barren land equivalent to first grade land with the agreement of the Land Reforms Department and can possess if according to the standard limit.

Article 20: Scattered plots of land holding area or their partition into small plots which would diminish the effectiveness of the farming of the peasants, shall be corrected, controlled, prevented and organized through separate regulations.

Article 21: The government shall establish the areas of various specified agricultural products, pastures and forests with due consideration to their economic effectiveness and environmental circumstances in accordance with regulations.

Article 22: The date of land distribution to the deservers, in different regions of the country shall be brought to the information of the people of the country by separate decrees of the President of the RC and Prime Minister through radio, television and press.

Cahpter IV

The Deserver and its obligations

Article 23: The person who has the following qualifications shall be entitled to receive land:

1. To have the citizenship of Afghanistan.
2. To have completed eighteen years of age.

3. To be landless peasant, petty land holder, agricultural worker or destitute Koochi (nomad).
4. To have no other income except from farming and labouring.
5. To pledge to work himself or together with his family members on the distributed land to him and to cultivate and preserve it.
6. Not to be the heir of a deceased person's land or to relinquish his right in writing.

Article 24: The priority right of a person having the qualification provided in Article Twenty Three of this decree shall be established as follows:

First degree deserving person:

1. Thelandless peasant who is engaged in cultivating and working on the distributable land.
2. The landless peasant and petty landholder whose farming has been expropriated by the state for public interest.

Second degree deserving person:

The landless peasant and agricultural worker of a village where distributable land is available.

Third degree deserving person:

The landless peasant of a village where distributable surplus land is available after distrition to the first and second degree deserving persons.

Fourth degree deserving person:

The landless peasant who resides in a Woloswali and a Koochi who usually spends part of the year in the Woloswali where distributable land is available.

Fifth degree deserving person:

Landless peasant and agricultural worker of a province where distributable land is available.

Sixth degree deserving person:

The landless peasant or Koochi of any part of other provinces where distributable land is available.

Article 25: The deserving person shall have the following obligations:

1. To fill in the Land Distribution Form in the respective province within a period of three months as from the date of the issuance of land distribution decree and to deliver it to the assigned corps.
2. To describe the characteristics of the land on which he does farming together with the full

identity of the owner.
3. Upon distribution of land the deserving person is obligated to possess the land and start cultivating it within three months.
4. To be in direct contact with the Land Reforms Department and the CSPP in the respective Woloswali.
5. Should take practical and active part in block numbering of the distributable land in the region concerned.
6. Should repay the loans of the Agricultural Development Bank according to the regulations of the bank on due time.
7. Land tax should be paid on due time.

Chapter V

Organization

Article 26: In order to settle disputes arising from the implementation of the provisions of this decree Khalqi Specified Committee (KSC) at Woloswali level, and final KSC at provincial level, shall be established. The decision of the provincial KSC shall be final and decisive in accordance with the provisions of this decree and the enacted regulations.

Article 27: Organization, duties, authorities and responsibilities of the KSCs shall be regulated for the implementation of the land reforms programme according to regulations.

Cahpter VI

Distribution of inherited land

Article 28:
1. If the possessor dies, the members of his family are obliged to cultivate and exploit his possessed land in accordance with regulations.
2. If the family members are not mature or are female and unable to cultivate the land, one of the family members can give the land for farming or lease it until one of the members becomes able to cultivate the land.

Article 29:
1. The land holding area of the deceased person which exceeds thirty jiribs of the first grade land or its equivalent shall be considered standard limit surplus.
2. Heirs can distribute the inherited land, within standard limit among themselves in such a way as the share of each heir shall not be less thanfive jiribs of the first grade land or its equivalent.
3. Distribution of inherited land which is five

jiribs of first grade land or its equivalent or less than that is not permissible. In this case one of the heirs who can directly cultivate the land shall take possession of the land.
4. If one or several heirs receive no inherited land according to the provision of this article, land shall be distributed according to provisions of this decree provided they deserve it.

Article 30: Heirs can not distribute among themselves the surplus of the standard limit or the surplus of the inherited land.

Chapter VII

Penal provisions

Article 31:
1. If a person purposely, without any reasonable excuse, does not register his land holding area within a year after the enforcement of this decree in the official book, all his land holding area shall be considered the property of the state.
2. If a person registers twenty percent false information about his land holding area a part of it from within the standard limit of his land holding area will be confiscated by the state, equal to the facts concealed.

Article 32: If a person damages the irrigation establishment or buildings and equipments of a plot of distributable land he shall be obligated to pay three folds of its price to the state and in addition he shall be prosecuted by the law.

Article 33: The violator of the provisions of this decree shall be liable to punishment from one month to three years imprisonment, according to its conditions.

Chapter VIII

Miscellaneous Provisions

Article 34: The possessor is obligated to cultivate his land every normal year according to its quality and to make use of the instructions and guidance of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reforms in exploiting the land.

Article 35: If on the basis of the ownership document, heirs of a person, as a result of lands settlement or during the inspection by KSC of the land reforms, it is proved that a person without possessing any valid document has usurped the land claimed by another person, in that case a piece of land, equal to the size of land usurped, shall be delivered to the heir or the claimant by the group assigned for identification of land.

Provided that the area of land in his possession will not exceed ten jiribs of first grade land or its equivalent and the remaining of the disputed land shall be considered as state prperty.

Article 36: The Afghan Chemical Fertiliser Company, the improved Seeds Producing Company, the Agricultural Machinery Company, and the Agricultural Development Bank shall open their branch offices in the areas where land reforms programme is implemented and shall provide necessary facilities, loans, tools and materials on easy terms to persons who have been given land.

Article 37: Should a person fail to meet one of the terms of Article Twenty Three of this decree the land shall be taken from him and be distributed to another deserving person in accordance with the provisions of this decree.

Article 38: The government may formulate regulations for effective implementation of the provi - sions of this decree.

Article 39: After the enforcement of this decree the Land Reforms Law published in the month of Asad 1354 and those articles of laws and regulations which are contrary to the provisions of this decree together with their annexes are abrogated.

Article 40: This decree shall come into force after it is published in the Official Gazette.

..

(Decrees of the Revolutionary Council and Decrees of the President of the Revolutionary Counsil of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; Ministry of Justice; Kabul; June 1979; Pp.1-41).

Appendix B

SUMMARIES OF THE NOVELS WRITTEN BY NOOR MOHAMMAD TARAKI

--

Da Bang Musafari:

First edition was published by Pushto Academy, Kabul; 1,000 copies; Feb-March 1957. Second edition by the Sciences Academy, Afghanistan; 10,000 copies; 1978 - with an additional part on Pp 145-50.

Bang is the central character of the story, and not an intoxicating drug. Such strange names or nicknames characterize the poor stratum. The story describes the social, economic and religious conditions circumscribing the hero. Bang lives in a village in Ghazni, as a member of the lowest stratum, with his mother and two young sisters. The story starts with jealousy between two Mullahs, one ousted by the authoritative Malik and the other brought in to replace him. The predecessor asks the worshippers to pay Sarsaya to him as he had led the prapers for nine/ten months of the year. (Sarsaya is a kind of charity, in cash or in kind for each living soul of the family, payable to the destitutes at the end of Ramzan, the month of Fast). The new Mullah raises objection to it and pleads that it must be paid to the present Mullah. The former submits a petition to the Illaqadar (Sub-district magistrate) who visits the village. The Malik entertains him with good food. By a mutual compromise, the villagers are asked to collect one maund (sixteen pounds) of wheat per house and two Afghanis per adult male to pay off the hospitality extended to the Illaqadar, and compensate the petitioner. Bang who had received 12 maunds of wheat as share of tenancy is, thus, deprived of another maund.

Bang sets out on journey, as usual, for Qandahar this time, to do some labour during the winter and earn some money. On the way, he is robbed of the small quantity of dry fruit by a few robbers. He escapes the death narrowly. The robbers tell him that they were out, in fact, in search of their enemy. Bang, then, takes the main road and joins a Caravan. A family provides him with food in return of his assistance in loading-unloading and grazing of animals. At one station, the Powindahs felt restless when a group of traders approached with some government servants for collection of wool as Salam. The Powindahs Khan advocates the cause of his clients in a

. . .

heated debate which ends in a compromise that all the available wool should be given over, and whatever balance remains should be given next year under a fresh deed. The Khan also receives a share from the traders.

Bang is satisfied with the foster-family headed by Kanray for the food he receives in sufficient quantity, and tends to the camels with pleasure. He parts with the Caravan at Qandahar where he finds another labour Doran from Ghazni. Doran guides him to various labour-spots until they both findjobs in the woollen factory. The heavy machinery fascinates Bang who finds a way to apprenticeship with a worker Mirjan. A Factory Officer selects him for his home service. Bang starts reading. He is excited to see the decoration of the house, hordes of guests, sumptuous foods and other luxuries of the government authorities, religious and tribal dignitaries. He finds that his master is illiterate and dissuades his son from study. "The wise is lost in the country". But he does not loose heart.

Bang remits four hundred Afghanis to his mother who pays it to two usurers pressing her for payment of heavy interests on the principal amounts. The friend of Bang, Doran earns money by malpractices as the scale-tender. On return in Spring, Bang accompanies the same Caravan and the same family. He notices check-posts on the way at which the Powindahs are forced by government collectors to pay Chehl-o-Yak (a local-tax; 1:40); the amounts are bargained between the Khan and the Collectors half of which go to their pockets. On arrival back in the home-area, Kanray gave Bang three goats with sucklings, to be returned in next season. Bang, driving the goats happily towards his home, was informed by an excited child that his mother had arranged his betrothal in exchange of his sister Makhae's.

The additional lines in the second edition take Bang back to Qandahar next winter to find a job in the same factory and take active part in workers' struggle against exploitation, formation of a Workers party, and propagation of socialism.

Depicting various socio-economic institutions like landless peasantry, landlord, Malik, Khan, Mullah, profiteer, usurer, industrialist, worker, labour, Powindah and government servants and collectors, the author criticises vices of the society and describes their remedies in socialism.

Spin:

It is claimed to have been published first in clandestine and then by the Sciences Academy, Afghanistan in 1978 - 20,000 copies.

The central character of the novel is Spin. A wealthy businessman, usurer, hoarder and profiteer, having risen from the status of a street vendor, has married four wives. He dies. Bright Mullahs, influential elders and a large number of paupers gather to aggrandize the funeral ceremony. But the Sqat money (distributed among the Mullahs at the time of burial) was not enough to please the clergy. The wives and their children fall out to claim, and exact more of, the heritage. The brother of the deceased, Miramad, tries to control the house and please the clergy. The dignitaries were served with funeral food inside the house and the public in the street. Sahibzada Sahib, a saint, led the funeral prayer. The widows and their children enter into a messy quarrel.

Eldest son Spin, away at the time of funeral, arrives and conspires with his mother, the eldest widow. The Khan comes to his help as he used to help his father in exploitation of poors, realising interests and Salam. The Mullah, too, joins them inside the room of Spin. All the three discuss as to how Spin could be helped against step-mothers, brothers and sisters. The Mullah asks for clothes of the deceased which he gets. The Khan devises a plan and the Mullah accedes to it. The four widows are divided into two sets. Spin gets one step-mother with one son and one daughter. The step-mother is from a poor family. She and her daughter are sold out and the son is eliminated. Think of the second set, after that. The Sahibzada, Mullah and Khan, custodians of Shariat and traditions, put all their weight in favour of the exploiter who can afford to please them against the exploited people. Spin is protected against all his step-mothers, brothers and sisters. The Khan is given the authority of taking property of the family in his control. Gradually, the Khan and Mullah, in collaboration, grab all the property from the second set. Spin complains against misappropriation by the Khan. The Mullah advises him to exercise patience because his sister was being married to the son of the Khan in exchange of the Khan's daughter to be married to Spin.

Tsara:

Sciences Academy, Afghanistan; 1978;
20,000 copies.

Tor, relieved from conscription, arrives back at home in miserable condition. His only 10-year sister Batkae lived with an old poor uncle. Tor does not join Ashar (free community service) but works on Pilgho (service in exchange). After a few days he joins the group of Tsara (the Single) to go downland and spend the winter there, to do some labour and earn money. All the population of the village turns out to bid farewell to the Tsara group, making a public festivity. The Mullah places Quran in a sheet of cloth and each Tsara bows down to pass under it and throw some coins in the sheet.

Tor, bare-foot like many others, is worried and wants to find a dead donkey or any other animal to skin it and wrap his feet. The toll-tax collectors check the Qafla. Tor and another Tsara Puzprikaray sneaked out to visit the Langar (a public mess) of the Akhundzada, a saint, but were disappointed. They were turned down because they did not offer anything. The pious-looking but hard tax-collector imposes one Afghani tax on every body of the Qafla. The Puzprikaray was overjoyed to find a dead donkey, skin it and wrap his feet. At a place, robbers attack, kill two, injure six and rob the Qafla. The Qafla crosses the border and travel through the Pukhtoons' villages, prosperous and rich. Snow falls on Tobe mountain. At a town three Khasadars appear to collect Tirni (a tax). At Bazargai, the police searches the Qafla for arms and Chars.

A Mullah at a baker's shop, fed by the baker and hired by the contractor to persuade Tsaras to work for him and be exploited, contacts Tsaras. Quetta is a blooming city with abundant supplies of vegetables and fruits. The Tsaras haunt bakers' shops. A Jamadar hires a 6-man party including Tor, Langri (cook) and a literate named Zear Gul. Zear Gul criticises the exploiter contractor. The labour, which is the builder, lives in poverty and disgrace. Unity of the labours is a power. Zear Gul incites the labours to be united against not only the contractors and sub-contractors but the capitalist, landlords, industrialists, bureaucrats who exploit the labour class. Tsaras are transported by rail to Sibi and 20 miles away on foot. The Principal contractor is an English who has employed Kharkars (donkey-drivers) as sub-contrac-



tors for loading and unloading of earth. The sub-contrators keep Dandamar (baton-force) and the labours are tied with ropes during the night.

Tor escapes to Shikarpur, and joins a labour group to remove silt from the water-sources. He begs food in the evening, while earning seven rupees a day. He buys clothes for uncle and sister, but robbed by Kharsgeer (government servants) on return.

Appendix C

Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

December 5, 1978

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Reaffirming their commitment to the aims and principles of the Soviet-Afghan treaties of 1921 and 1931, which laid the basis for friendly and goodneighbourly relations between the Soviet and Afghan peoples and which meet their basic national interests;

Willing to strengthen in every way friendship and all-round cooperation between the two countries;

Being determined to develop social and economic achievements of the Soviet and Afghan peoples, to safeguard their security and independence, to come out resolutely for the cohesion of all the forces fighting for peace, national independence, democracy and social progress;

Expressing their firm determination to promote the strengthening of peace and security in Asia and the whole world, to make their contribution toward developing relations among states and strengthening fruitful and mutually beneficial cooperation in Asia, attracting great importance to the further consolidation of the contractual-legal basis of their relations;

Reaffirming their dedication to the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter;

Decided to conclude the present Treaty of Friendship, Goodneighbourliness and Cooperation and agreed on the following:

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare their determination to strengthen and deepen the inviolable friendship between the two countries and to develop all-round cooperation on the basis of equality, respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

Article 2

The High Contracting Parties shall make efforts to strengthen and broaden mutually beneficial economic, scientific and technical cooperation between them. With these aims in view, they shall develop and deepen cooperation in the fields of industry, transport and communications, agriculture, the use of natural resources, development of the power-generating industry and in other branches of the economy, to give each other assistance in the training of national personnel and in planning the development of the national economy. The two Sides shall expand trade on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and most-favoured nation treatment.

Article 3

The High Contracting Parties shall promote the development of cooperation and exchange of experience in the fields of science, culture, art, literature, education, health services, the press, radio, television, cinema, tourism, sports and other fields.

The two Sides shall facilitate the expansion of cooperation between bodies of state power and mass organisations, enterprises, cultural and scientific institutions with a view to making a deeper acquaintance of the life, work, experience and achievements of the peoples of the two countries.

Article 4

The High Contracting Parties, acting in the spirit of the traditions of friendship and goodneighbourliness, as well as in the spirit of the UN Charter, shall consult each other and take by agreement appropriate measures to ensure the security, independence, and territorial integrity of the two countries.

In the interests of strengthening the defence capacity of the High Contracting Parties they shall continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the basis of appropriate agreements concluded between them.

Article 5

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects the policy of nonalignment which is pursued by the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and which is an important factor for maintaining international peace and security.

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan respects the policy of peace pursued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and aimed at strengthening friendship and cooperation with all countries and peo les.

Article 6

Each of the High Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not join any military or other alliances or take part in any groupings of states, as well as in actions or measures directed against the other High Cont acting Party.

Article 7

The High Contracting Parties shall continue to make every effort to defend international peace and the security of the peoples, to deepen the process of relaxation of international tension, to spread it to all areas of the world, including Asia, to translate it into concrete forms of mutually beneficial cooperation among states and to settle international disputed issues by peaceful means.

The two Sides shall actively contribute toward general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under effective international control.

Article 8

The High Contracting Parties shall facilitate the development of cooperation among Asian states and the establishment of relations of peace, goodneighbourliness and mutual confidence among them and the creation of an effective security system in Asia on the basis of joint efforts by all countries of the continent.

Article 9

The High Contracting Parties shall continue their consistent struggle against machinations by the forces of aggression, for the final elimination of colonialism and racism in all their forms and manifestations.

The two Sides shall cooperate with each other and with other peace loving states in supporting the just struggle of the peoples for their freedom, independence, sovereignty and social progress.

Article 10

The High Contracting Parties shall consult each other on all major international issues affecting the interests of the two countries.

Article 11

The High Contracting Parties state that their commitments under the existing international treaties do not contradict the provisions of the present treaty and undertake not to conclude any international agreements incompatible with it.

Article 12

Questions which may arise between the High Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or application of any provision of the present treaty, shall be settled bilaterally, in the spirit of friendship, mutual understanding and respect.

Article 13

The present treaty shall remain in force within twenty years of the day it becomes effective.

Unless one of the High Contracting Parties declares six months before the expiration of this term its desire to terminate the treaty, it shall remain in force for the next five years, and so on until one of the High Contracting Parties warns the other party in writing, six months before the expiration of the current five-year term, about its intention to terminate the treaty.

Article 14

If one of the High Contracting Parties expresses the wish in the course of the twenty-year term of the treaty to terminate it before its expiration date, it shall notify in writing the other High Contracting Party, six months before its suggested date of expiration of the treaty, about its desire to terminate the treaty before the expiration of the term and may consider the

treaty as of the date thus set.

Article 15

The present treaty shall be ratified and take effect on the day of exchange of the instruments of ratification, which is to take place in Kabul.

Done in duplicate, each in the Russian and Dari languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Done in Moscow on December 5, 1978.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic	For the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
L. Brezhnev	N. Muhammed Taraki

(Dupree, Louis; Red Flag Over The Hindukush, Pt-I; Leftist Movements in Afghanistan; 44; 1979; Pp.13-15.)

(The treaty came into force on May 27, 1979, with the exchange of instruments of ratification at Kabu; Tabibi, Abdul Hakim, Dr.; The Legal Status of the Afghan Resistance Movement; Igram Press; USA; 1986; p.18.)

Appendix D

The Law For Regulating the Government Duties of the Revolutionary Government and its Legislative Procedure.

.....

Chapter-I : Revolutionary Council.

Article 1. The Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is the supreme state power of the country.

In this law the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan hereafter is referred to as the Revolutionary Council.

Article 2. The Revolutionary Council, in case of vacancy of the seat of the President of the Revolutionary Council, shall elect in its first session a person from among its members as the President of the Revolutionary Council.

Article 3. The contact of the Revolutionary Council with the government shall be made through the Office of the Revolutionary Council.

Article 4. The Revolutionary Council shall have the following authorities and duties:

* To approve the constitution of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
* To issue decrees on execution of state and governmental high affairs.
* To approve and proclaim the government policy statement.
* To approve the appointment of the First Minister on the proposal of the President of the Revolutionary Council.
* To approve the declaration of martial law.
* To send abroad regiments of the People's Armed Forces.
* To form organs responsible before the Revolutionary Council.
* To confirm international treaties.
* To confirm agreements, and contracts with foreign states and organizations and to delegate this authority to the government.
* To permit issuance of banknotes.
* To approve the annual state budget.
* To approve laws.
* To approve state plans for economic and social development of the country.

Article 5. The Revolutionary Council shall hold ordinary meetings twice a year in the months of Sunbula (August 23-September 22) and Hoot (February 20-March 20). Each session shall last at least for a period of six days and if necessary can continue up to 15 days.

The extraordinary sessions shall be called on the decision of the President of the Revolutionary Council or on the motion of one third of the members of the Revolutionary Council.

Article 6. In between the ordinary sessions and in case extraordinary session cannot be convened the government can prepare legislatory decrees to handle its urgent affairs.

These decrees shall be enforced after the approval of the President of the Revolutionary Council.

Legislatory decrees shall be included in the agenda of the first session of the Revolutionary Council for approval.

Article 7. The quorum of the sessions of the Revolutionary Council shall require two-thirds of the members.

Article 8. The decisions of the Revolutionary Council shall be taken by two-thirds majority of members present in the meeting except when the law demands otherwise.

Article 9. The decisions of the Revolutionary Council shall be valid after the approval of the President of the Revolutionary Council.

Chapter II : The Powers of The President of The Revolutionary Council.

Article 10. The President of the Revolutionary Council heads the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and guides all state organs according to the provision of the law as well as those of other laws and on the basis of the following powers:

In defence affairs: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the People of Afghanistan: Declaration of war and truce.

Article 11. The appoin-tment of the First Minister, approval of members of the Council of Ministers, dismissal or accepting the resignations thereof.

Article 12. In Legislation Affairs: Signing of laws and legislatory decrees and proclamation of their enforcement; issuance of legislatory decrees; commutation and pardon of sentences.

Article 13. Appointment of Vice-President or Vice Presidents of the Revolutionary Council from among the members of the Revolutionary Council.

Article 14. In Judicial Affairs: Appointment of members of the High Council of Judiciary; appointment, retirement and dismissal of judges, officers of the People's Armed Forces and civil officials in accordance with the provision of law.

Article 15. In Foreign Affairs: Appointment of the heads of diplomatic missions of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to foreign states; appointment of permanent representatives of Afghanistan to international organizations and acceptance of the credentials of the foreign diplomatic missions.

Article 16. Calling the extraordinary sessions of the Revolutionary Council.

Article 17. Conferring medals according to the provision of law.

Chapter III: Government.

Article 18. The government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan personifies the highest executive power and is composed of the First Minister, his deputy or deputies and ministers who will carry out their duties under the leadership and at the behest of the President of the Revolutionary Council.

Article 19. The government as a whole will be responsible before the Revolutionary Council and the President of the Revolutionary Council and each member of the government will also be directly responsible before the President of the Revolutionary Council in relation to the performance of his duties.

Article 20. The government shall have the following duties and powers:

* To propose laws and to work out regulations.
* To prepare and organize state budget.
* To hold talks and to conclude contracts and agreements with foreign states and organizations.
* To take necessary measures for consolidation of order and public security.
* To manage state financial affairs and to draft development plans for expediting economic, social and cultural growth of the country.
* To implement laws, and decrees issued, and to put into effect the decisive verdicts of courts.
* To perform other duties which the Revolutionary Council assign to the government.

Article 21. In cases not defined otherwise by the law, the decisions of the Council of Ministers will be valid after the approval of the President of the Revolutionary Council.

Chapter IV : Legislation Procedure.

Article 22. In the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan the legislative power rests with the Revolutionary Council.

Article 23. 1. For the purpose of handling major and long term issues in the social, economic and political spheres and international relations arena the Revolutionary Council shall legislate, amend and abrogate laws.

2. For the purpose of handling and putting into effect all major and urgent state and governmental issues, the Revolutionary Council shall issue revolutionary decrees.

Article 24. The Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan shall have the authority to:

1. Propose to the Revolutionary Council the approval, amendment and abrogation of laws.

2. Formulate or amend regulations and by-laws within the limit and in accordance with the provisions of the decrees of the Revolutionary Council and the laws enforced in the country.

Article 25. 1. Proposals for approval, amendment and abrogation of laws, regulations and by-laws shall be presented to the Council of Ministers by the Minister of Justice through the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers.

2. With the exception of the procedure mentioned in this article no person or office can propose to the Council of Ministers and Revolutionary Council the approval, amendment or abrogation of laws and regulations.

Article 26. Laws, and the decrees of the Revolutionary Council, together with amendments and appendices which have completed their legal channels shall be proclaimed to the government under the decree of the President of the Revolutionary Council.

Article 27. Laws and decrees of the Revolutionary Council together with amendments and appendices which have completed their legal channels according to this law shall be signed by First Minister and or his deputy and sent to the Minister of Justice for being published in the Official Gazette.

Chapter V: Miscellaneous Provisions.

Article 28. 1. Except otherwise as stated in the text of laws, decrees, regulations and by-laws, their provisions shall be in force as of the date they are published in the Official Gazette.

2. With the publication of laws, decrees, regulations and by-laws in the Official Gazette the provisions of other laws, decrees, regulations and by-laws which are contrary to them shall be abrogated.

3. Laws, decrees and regulations after being published in the Official Gazette shall be published in the press of the country for public information.

Article 29. Any amendment, increase or decrease, in the provisions of the law shall be made on the proposal of the government, approval of the Revolutionary Council and sanction of the President of the Revolutionary Council.

Article 30. This law shall be in force after it is published in the Official Gazette.

March 31, 1979.

(Reproduced from Red Flag Over The Hindu Kush, Part III, by Louis Dupree - LD-2-80; 1980/No. 23; Pp 12-14)

Appendix E

TASHKENT DECLARATION

The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India having met at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between Pakistan and India hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and peaceful relations between their countries and to promote understanding and friendly relations between their peoples. They consider the attainment of these objectives of vital importance for the welfare of the six hundred million people of Pakistan and India.

The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India agree that both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations between Pakistan and India in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. They considered that the interests of peace in their region and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent and, indeed, the interests of the peoples of Pakistan and India were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries. It was against this background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed and each of the sides set forth its respective position.

The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India have agreed that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than 25 February, 1966, to the positions they held prior to 5 August, 1965, and both sides shall observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-fire line.

The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India have agreed that relations between Pakistan and India shall be based on the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.

The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India have agreed that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the other country, and will encourage propaganda which promotes the development of friendly relations between the two countries.

The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India have agreed that the High Commissioner of Pakistan to India and the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan will return to their posts and that the normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries will be restored. Both Governments shall observe the Vienna Convention of 1961 on diplomatic intercourse.

The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India have agreed that they give instructions to their respective authorities to carry out the repatriation of the prisoners of war.

The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India have agreed that the sides will continue discussion on questions relating to the problems of refugees, eviction and illegal immigrations. They also agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent the exodus of people. They further agreed to discuss the return of the property and assets taken over by either side in connection with the conflict.

The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India have agreed that the sides will continue meetings both at the highest and at other levels on matters of direct concern to both countries. Both sides have recognized the need to set up joint Pakistani-Indian bodies which will report to their Governments in order to decide what further steps should be taken.

The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India record their feelings of deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and personally to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for their constructive, friendly and noble part in bringing about the present meeting which has resulted in mutually satisfactory results. They also express to the Government and friendly people of Uzbekistan their sincere thankfulness for their overwhelming reception and generous hospitality.

They invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to witness this Declaration.

(Tashkent Declaration in Perspective; Department of Films and Publications, Government of Pakistan; Ferozsons, Karachi; February, 1966; Pp 8-10)

Appendix F

ISLAMIC CONFERENCE RESOLUTION

Text of Resolution on the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and on its ensuing effects, unanimously adopted at the Islamic Foreign Ministers' Conference held at Islamabad, from 8 to 10 Rabi Al Awwal, corresponding to 27–29 January, 1980;

In pursuance of the principles and objectives of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, and the provisions of resolutions adopted by Islamic Summit Conference, emphasising the common objectives and destiny of the peoples of the Islamic Nation;

Recalling in particular the basic principles of the non-aligned movement of which Afghanistan is a founding member;

Expressing its deep concern at the dangerous escalation of tension, intensification of rivalry and increased recourse to military intervention and interference in the internal affairs of states, which are detrimental to the interests of all nations particularly the Islamic States;

Affirming that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan constitutes a violation of its independence, and aggression against the liberty of its people and a flagrant violation of all international convenants and norms, as well as a serious threat to peace and security in the region and throughout

the world;

Expressing the determination of the Governments and peoples of Member States to reject all forms and types of foreign occupation and expansion and the race for spheres of influence thereby strengthening the sovereignty of peoples and the independence of states;

Seriously concerned over the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan and the effect of this interference on the will of the Muslim people of Afghanistan to exercise their right to determine their political future;

Considering that the continuing presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, its attempt at imposing the fait accompli and the military operations of these troops against the Afghan people flout international convenants and norms and blatantly violate Human Rights;

Reaffirming the determination of Islamic States to pursue a non-aligned policy in respect of super power conflict and to protect Muslim people from the adverse effects of the cold war between these States;

Fully aware of the immense financial burden borne by neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, in particular the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, as a result of the asylum it provides to hundreds of thousands of Afghani people, old men, women and children, driven away by the Soviet Military occupation;

1. CONDEMNS the Soviet military aggression against the Afghani people, denounces and deplores it as a flagrant violation of international laws, covenants, and norms, pri-

marily the Charter of the United Nations, which condemned this aggression in its resolutions No. ES-6/2 of 14 January, 1980, and the Charter of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, and calls upon all peoples and Governments throughout the world to persist in condemning this aggression and denouncing it as an aggression against Human Rights and a violation of the freedoms of people, which cannot be ignored;

2. DEMANDS the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops stationed on Afghani territories, and reiterates that Soviet troops should refrain from acts of oppression and tyranny against the Afghani people and their struggling sons, until the departure of the last Soviet soldier from Afghani territory, and urges all countries and peoples to secure the Soviet withdrawal through all possible means;

3. SUSPENDS the membership of Afghanistan in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference;

4. INVITES the member states to withhold recognition to the illegal regime in Afghanistan and sever diplomatic relations with that country until the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan;

5. CALLS upon all member states to stop all aids and all forms of assistance given to the present regime of Afghanistan by member states;

6. URGES all states and people throughout the world to support the Afghani people and provide assistance and succour to the refugees whom aggression has driven away from their homes;

7. RECOMMENDS to all Member States to affirm their solidarity with the Afghan people in their just struggle to safeguard their faith, national independence and territorial integrity and to recover their right to determine their destiny.

8. SOLEMNLY declares its complete solidarity with the Islamic countries neighbouring Afhganistan against any threat to their security and well being and calls upon States of the Islamic Conference to resolutely support and extend all possible cooperation to these countries in their efforts to fully safeguard their sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity.

9. AUTHORISES the Secretary General to receive contributions from member states, organisations and individuals and to disburse the amounts to the authorities concerned on the recommendations of a Committee of three Members States to be established by him in consultation with the States concerned.

10. CALLS upon Member States to envisage, through appropriate bodies, not participating in Olympic Games being held in Moscow in July 1980 until the Soviet Union, in compliance with the call of the U.N. General Assembly and the Islamic Conference, withdraws all its troops forthwith from Afghanistan;

11. MANDATES the Secretary General of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference to follow up the implementation of these resolutions and report thereon to the Eleventh Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers.

Resolutions on Afghanistan Adopted May 22, 1980, by the Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers

EXPRESSING its deep conviction that termination of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and respect for the political independence, sovereignty, and nonaligned status of Afghanistan and for the inalienable national right of the Afghan people to choose their own political and socio-economic system and form of government without outside interference or coercion are imperative for bringing about conditions of peace and stability in the region and for defusing current international tensions;

SERIOUSLY CONCERNED at the sufferings of the Afghan people and at the continuing influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan and Iran;

DEEPLY CONSCIOUS of the objective enshrined in the charter of the Islamic Conference requiring the member states to strengthen the struggle of all Moslem peoples with a view to safeguarding their dignity, independence, and national rights;

CALLING UPON all states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, nonaligned status, and Islamic identity of Afghanistan;

REAFFIRMING the determination of the Islamic states to pursue a policy of nonalignment and to oppose superpower interference in the affairs of Islamic countries;

EXPRESSING its hope that the nonaligned movement will play an active role in the search for a comprehensive solution to the Afghan crisis consistent with this resolution in order to strengthen peace and stability in the region and in the world and the purposes and objectives of the movement;

[The Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers]

1. REAFFIRMS the resolution on the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and on its ensuing effects adopted at the extraordinary session of the Islamic Conference;
2. EXPRESSES its deep concern at the continued Soviet military presence in Afghanistan;
3. REITERATES its demand for the immediate, total, and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops stationed on the territory of Afghanistan;
4. REAFFIRMS respect for the inalienable national right of the people of Afghanistan to determine their own form of government and

choose their economic, political, and social system free from outside interference or coercion;

5. STRONGLY URGES the creation of the right conditions that would permit the early return of the Afghan refugees to their homeland in security and honor;
6. REITERATES its appeal to all states and peoples to provide assistance in order to alleviate the sufferings of the Afghan refugees;
7. DECIDES, in order to give effect to the provisions of this resolution, to establish a committee comprising the foreign ministers of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to seek ways and means, including appropriate consultations as well as the convening of an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations or otherwise, for a comprehensive solution of the grave crisis with respect to Afghanistan, provided that it is not inconsistent with this resolution.

From *New York Times*, May 23, 1980, p. A10. Official English text: Reuters.

(Tabibi, Abdul Hakim, Dr; The Legal Status of the Afghan Resistance Movement; USA; 1986)

Appendix H

TEXT OF GENEVAL COMMUNIQUE

The following is the text of Press Communique issued here by the United Nations Information Office on the conclusion of indirect talks:

"The second round of discussion through the intermediary of personal representative on Afghanistan of Secretary-General United Nations was resumed in Geneva on June 16 and concluded on June 24, 1983.

Shah Mohammad Dost, Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, and Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, were present at Geneva for the purpose.

The Government of Iran was kept informed of the discussions through its Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

Further progress was made in the elaboration of the draft text of the comprehensive settlement, the discussions having been conducted in a realistic and business-like manner.

The interlocutors reaffirmed their determination to pursue the search for a comprehensive settlement, designed to achieve an enduring political solution. They similarly reaffirmed their conviction that it will be possible to overcome their remaining obstacles, The diplomatic process will continue when Under-Secretary-General, Diego Cordovez will travel to the area later in the summer.

At this stage, the personal representative will conduct preliminary consultations with the Governments of USSR and the USA, so far identified as possible guarantors.

Preparations will also be started for the arrangem nts arrived at ascertaining that the provisions made for the voluntary and unimpeded return of the refugees are satisfactory."

(Defence Journal; Defence Housing Authority, Karachi-46; IX/8; August 1983; Pp 40-41)

Appendix I

(Ref; The Letter from the B.I.A - Bureau of International Afghanistan; April-May 1982.)

FINAL RESOLUTION OF THE FLORENCE ROUND TABLE
(March 26, 27, 28, 1982)

1. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan stands condemned by the entire international community : the United Nations, the European Parliament, the Islamic Conference and also by the Permanent Peoples' Court.

For more than two years, Soviet troops have maintained in power a puppet government rejected by the Afghan people. Faced with the despotism of a Great Power which already oppresses numerous other peoples, the Afghan Resistance Movement has become a reality : from one end of the land to another, the Resistance Movement controls the countryside and vast stretches of territory, and has already spread to the cities.

In its very diversity, composed of multiple strains, the Resistance Movement has become identified with the Afghan people themselves as they take up arms to free their soil from foreign occupation.

2. Aggression against Afghanistan and invasion of its soil constitute serious acts against world peace, all the more serious in view of the fact that Afghanistan was a neutral and non-aligned State. The agony undergone by the Afghan people -with more than three million refugees and thousands of casualties of both sexes- is a warning today to other peoples everywhere.

3. Only when the Afghan people regain the right freely to decide their own fate can the Afghan Question be regarded as settled ; and only the withdrawal of the Soviet Armed Forces -and of the puppet government which they maintain in power- can ensure that such a right be effectively restored.

The only effective political solution to the Afghan Question lies in a free, sovereign, neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan.

4. Because we defend human rights wherever these are violated, whether in the East, in the West, or in the Third World, we take a moral and political stand by openly supporting both the Afghan people and the Afgahn Resistance Movement which legitimately represents this people. But the Afghan people can no longer remain satisfied with words and promises. They must be helped in every possible way, by every possible means.

This is why we call on the world's Governments both officially to recognize the Afghan Resistance Movement and to extend to this Resistance all possible assistance, not only of a strictly humanitarian nature (such as food and medical care) but also of a financial and military nature.

5. The International Commitee for Solidarity with the Afghan Resistance Movement, and the Bureau International Afghanistan, invite all democratic political parties everywhere, with no ideological distinctions, to give all support to ensure realization of the objectives listed above.

In addition, they address a special call to trade-unions in order that they should arouse working people on behalf of the Afghan people's struggle for survival and freedom.

6. To the peoples of the USSR, we can only say : if it's peace that you want, then act to ensure Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

To the peoples of the rest of the world, we can only say : to help Afghanistan is to help protect our own freedom and peace.

(English text courtesy of the Bureau International Afghanistan, Paris)

Appendix J(a)

RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN DURING 36TH SESSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (4 FEBRUARY TO 14 MARCH 1980)

The right of peoples to self-determination and its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation—Denial of the right to self-determination and other fundamental human rights of the people of Afghanistan as a consequence of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and its ensuing effects.

The Commission on Human Rights

Recalling that one of the fundamental purposes of the Charter of the United Nations is "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples".

Noting that the exercise of the right of self-determination has enabled the vast majority of the peoples under colonial and alien domination and foreign occupation to achieve their national independence.

Reiterating the determination of Member States to reject all forms and types of foreign occupation and expansion and the race for spheres of influence, thereby strengthening the sovereignty and independence of States and the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination,

Expressing its deep concern at the dangerous escalation of tension, intensification of rivalry and increased recourse to military intervention and interference in the internal affairs of States, which are detrimental to the interests of all nations,

Seriously concerned over the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan and the effect of this on the right of the Muslim people of Afghanistan to exercise their right to determine their political future,

Affirming that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan constitutes a violation of that country's independence, aggression against the liberty of its people and a flagrant violation of all international covenants and norms,

---

Adopted at the 1541st meeting, on 14 February 1980, by a roll-call vote of 27 to 8, with 6 abstention.

as well as a serious threat to peace and security in the region and throughout the world,

Considering that the continuing presence of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, its attempt to impose a *fait accompli* and the military operations of those troops against the Afghan people flout international covenants and norms and blatantly violate human rights,

Fully aware of the immense financial burden borne by neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, in particular the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which has provided asylum to hundreds of thousands of Afghan people, old men, women and children, driven away by the Soviet military occupation,

Recalling resolution ES-6/2 of 14 January 1980 of the sixth emergency special session of the General Assembly which deplored the armed intervention in Afghanistan and called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from that country,

Noting the resolution adopted by the first extraordinary session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan,

(1) *Condemns* the Soviet military aggression against the Afghan people, denounces and deplores it as a flagrant violation of international laws, covenants, and norms, primarily the Charter of the United Nations, and calls upon all peoples and Governments through the world to persist in condemning this aggression and denouncing it as an aggression against human rights and a violation of the freedoms of peoples;

(2) *Demands* the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops stationed on Afghan territories;

(3) *Reiterates* that Soviet troops should refrain from acts of oppression and tyranny against the Afghan people until the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghan territory;

(4) *Calls upon* all Member States to refrain from providing assistance to the present imposed regime of Afghanistan;

(5) *Urges* all States and people throughout the world to provide generous assistance and succour to the refugees from Afghanistan who have been driven away from their homes;

(6) *Recommends* that all Member States affirm their solidarity with the Afghan people in their just struggle to safeguard their faith, national independence and territorial integrity and to recover their right to determine their destiny, and to provide all possible assistance to them for this purpose;

(7) *Solemnly declares* its complete solidarity with the countries neighbouring Afghanistan against any threat to their security and well being and calls upon all States resolutely to support and extend all possible cooperation to these countries in their efforts fully to safeguard their sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity.

(5th Resolution : United Nations Human Rights Commission; Geneva; 29 February, 1984; published by Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Directorate of Films & Publications, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.)

Appendix J(b)

RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN DURING 37TH SESSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (2 FEBRUARY TO 13 MARCH, 1981)

The right of peoples to self-determination and its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation.

THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

The Commission on Human Rights

Bearing in mind that one of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations set forth in the Charter of the United Nations is to develop friendly relations among the nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,

Recalling its resolution 3 (XXXVI) of 14 February 1980,

Further recalling resolution ES-6/2 of 14 January 1980, adopted by the General Assembly at its sixth emergency special session,

Also recalling General Assembly resolution 35/37 of 20 November 1980 on the situation in Afghanistan which, *inter alia*, reaffirmed the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of Government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion, or constraints of any kind whatsoever, and which called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan,

Recalling further General Assembly resolution 35/35B of 14 November 1980 and resolution 36 (XXXIII) of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of 12 September, 1980,

Taking note of the resolution on the situation in Afghanistan adopted at two successful uniforms of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held at Islamabad in January and May 1980 and at the Third Islamic Summit Conference held at Taif (Saudi Arabia) in January 1981,

---

Adopted at the 1630th meeting on 6 March 1981 by a roll-call vote.

Also Noting the relevant part of the Declaration adopted by the Ministerial Conference of Non-Aligned countries held in New Delhi from 9 to 13 February 1981, which, while noting with grave concern the situation in South West Asia and agree that it carried dangerous consequences for the peace and stability of the region and agreeing further that the continuation of the situation poses serious implications for international peace and security, called, *inter alia,* for a political settlement on the basis of the withdrawal of foreign troops and full respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-aligned status of Afghanistan, and strict observance of the principle of non-intervention and non-interference,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the obligation of all States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of any State,

Reaffirming further the inalienable rights of all people to determine their own form of government and to choose their own economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever,

Gravely concerned at the continued foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan in contravention of the above principles and its serious implications for international peace and security,

Deeply concerned at the increasing outflow of refugees from Afghanistan,

Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a political solution of the grave situation in respect of Afghanistan,

(1) *Reaffirms* its most profound concern that the people of Afghanistan continue to be denied their right to self-determination and to determine their own form of Government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;

(2) *Calls for* the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan,

(3) *Further calls* for a political settlement of the situation in Afghanistan on the basis of the withdrawal of foreign troops and full respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned status of Afghanistan and strict observance of the principle of non-intervention and non-interference;

(4) *Affirms* the rights of the Afghan refugees to return to their homes in safety and honour;

(5) *Urges* all concerned to work towards a settlement which would ensure that the Afghan people should determine their destiny free from outside interference and which would enable the Afghan refugees to return to their homes;

(6) *Further urges* all concerned to co-operate with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in their efforts to resolve the situation in Afghanistan;

(7) *Appeals* to all States and national and international organizations to extend continue humanitarian relief assistance, with a view to alleviating the hardship of Afghan refugees in co-ordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;

(8) *Decides* to consider this matter at its thirty-eighth session with high priority under the item entitled "Right of peoples to self-determination and its implication to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation".

(5th Resolution : United Nations Human Rights Commission: Geneva; 29 February, 1984; published by Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.)

Appendix J(c)

RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN DURING 38TH SESSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (1 FEBRUARY TO 12 MARCH 1982)

The right of peoples to self-determination and its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation: situation in Afghanistan.

The Commission on Human Rights

Bearing in mind that one of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations set forth in the Charter of the United Nations is to develop friendly relations among the nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,

Recalling its resolutions 3 (XXXVI) of 14 February 1980 and 13 (XXXVII) of 6 March 1981,

Further recalling resolution ES-6/2 of 14 January 1980, adopted by the General Assembly at its sixth emergency special session,

Also recalling General Assembly resolution 35/37 of 20 November 1980 and 36/34 of 18 November 1981 on the situation in Afghanistan which, *inter alia,* reaffirmed the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of Government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion, or constraints of any kind whatsoever, and which called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan,

Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 35/35 B of 14 November 1980, 36/10 of 28 October 1981, as well as resolutions 26 (XXXIII) and 11 (XXXIV) of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of 12 September 1980 and 9 September 1981 respectively,

Recognizing the importance of the initiatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the efforts of the Non-Aligned Movement for a political solution of the situation in respect of Afghanistan,

---

Adopted at the 38th meeting on 25 February 1982, by a roll-call vote of 32 to 7, with 4 abstention.

Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the obligation of all States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of any State,

Reaffirming further the inalienable rights of all people to determine their own form of government and to choose their own economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever,

Gravely concerned at the continued foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan in contravention of the above principles and its serious implications for international peace and security,

Noting the increasing concern of the international community over the continued and serious sufferings of the Afghan people and over the magnitude of social and economic problems posed to Pakistan and Iran by the presence on their soil of millions of Afghan refugees and the continuing increase in their numbers,

Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a political solution of the grave situation in respect of Afghanistan,

(1) *Reaffirms* its most profound concern that the people of Afghanistan continue to be denied their right to self-determination and to determine their own form of Government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;

(2) *Calls for* the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan ,

(3) *Further calls* for a political settlement of the situation in Afghanistan on the basis of the withdrawal of foreign troops and full respect for the independence, severeignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned status of Afghanistan and strict observance of the principle of non-intervention and non-interference;

(4) *Affirms* the right of the Afghan refugees to return to their homes in safety and honour;

(5) *Urges* all concerned to work towards a settlement which would ensure that the Afghan people would determine their destiny free from outside interference and which would enable the Afghan refugees to return to their homes;

(6) *Further urges* all concerned to co-operate with the Secretary-General in his efforts to promote a political solution in respect of the situation in Afghanistan;

(7) *Appeals* to all States and national and international organizations to extend humanitarian relief assistance with a view to alloviating the hardship of Afghan refugees, in coordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;

(8) *Decides* to consider this matter at its thirty-ninth session with high priority under the item entitled "The right of peoples to self-determination and its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation".

(5th Resolution: United Nations Human Rights Commission; Geneva; 29 February, 1984; published by Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.)

Appendix J(d)

RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN DURING 39TH SESSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (31 JANUARY TO 11 MARCH 1983)

The right of peoples to self-determination and its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation — Situation in Afghanistan.

The Commission on Human Rights,

Bearing in mind that one of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations set forth in the Charter of the United Nations is to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people.

Recalling its resolutions 3 (XXXVI) of 14 February 1980, 13 (XXXVII) of 6 March 1981 and 1982/14 of 25 February 1982,

Further recalling resolution ES-6/2 of 14 January 1980, adopted by the General Assembly at its sixth emergency special session,

Also recalling General Assembly resolutions 35/37 of 20 November 1980, 36/34 of 18 November 1981 and 37/37 of 29 November 1982 on the situation in Afghanistan which, *inter alia*, reaffirmed the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraints of any kind whatsoever, and which called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan,

Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 35/35 B of 14 November 1980, 36/10 of 28 October 1981 and 37/42 of 3 December 1982, as well as resolutions 26 (XXXIII), 11 (XXXIV) and 1982/21 of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of 12 September 1980, 9 September 1981 and 8 September 1982, respectively,

Recognizing the importance of the initiatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the efforts of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries for a political solution of the situation in respect of Afghanistan.

Adopted at the 23rd meeting, on 16 February 1983, by a roll-call vote of 29 to 7, with 5 abstentions.

Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the obligation of all States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of any State,

Reaffirming further the inalienable right of all peoples to determine their own form of government and to choose their own economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever,

Gravely concerned at the continued foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan in contravention of the above principles and its serious implications for international peace and security,

Noting the increasing concern of the international community over the continued and serious sufferings of the Afghan people and over the magnitude of the social and economic problems posed to Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran by the presence on their soil of millions of Afghan refugees and the continuing increase in their numbers,

Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a political solution of the grave situation in respect of Afghanistan,

(1) *Reaffirms* its most profound concern that the people of Afghanistan continue to be denied their right to self-determination and to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;

(2) *Calls for* the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan;

(3) *Further calls for* a political settlement of the situation in Afghanistan on the basis of the withdrawal of foreign troops and full respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned status of Afghanistan and strict observance of the principle of non-intervention and non-interference;

(4) *Affirms* the right of the Afghan refugees to return to their homes in safety and honour;

(5) *Urges* all concerned to work towards a settlement which would ensure that the Afghan people would determine their destiny free from outside interference and which would enable the Afghan refugees to return to their homes;

(6) *Expresses* its appreciation and support for the efforts and constructive steps taken by the Secretary-General in the search for a solution to the problem;

(7) *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue these efforts with a view to promoting a political solution, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolution;

(8) *Urges* all concerned to continue to cooperate with the Secretary-General in his efforts to promote a political solution in respect of the situation in Afghanistan;

(9) *Appeals* to all States and national and international organizations to extend humanitarian relief assistance, with a view to alleviating the hardship of Afghan refugees, in coordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;

(10) *Decides* to consider this matter at its fortieth session with high priority under the agenda item entitled "The right of peoples to self-determination and its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation".

(5th Resolution : United Nations Human Rights Commission; Geneva; 29 February, 1984; published by Government of Pakistan, Islamabad).

Appendix J(e)

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT 40TH SESSION OF UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

"The right of peoples to self-determination and its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation"

SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

The Commission on Human Rights

Bearing in mind that one of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations set forth in the Charter of the United Nations is to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,

Recalling its resolutions 3 (XXXVI) of 14 February 1980, 13 (XXXVII) of 6 March 1981, 1982/14 of 25 February 1982 and 1983/7 of 16 February 1983,

Further recalling resolution ES-6/2 of 14 February 1980, adopted by the General Assembly at its sixth emergency special session,

Also recalling General Assembly resolution 35/37 of 20 November 1980, 36/34 of 18 November 1981, 37/37 of 29 November 1982 and 38/29 of 23 November 1983 on the situation in Afghanistan which, *inter alia*, reaffirmed the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraints of any kind whatsoever, and which called for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.

Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 35/35 B of 14 November 1980, 36/10 of 28 October 1981, 37/42 of 3 December 1982 as well as resolutions 26 (XXXIII), II (XXXIV) and 1982/21 of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of 12 September 1980, 9 September 1981 and 8 September 1982, respectively.

Recognizing the importance of the initiatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the efforts of the Movement of Non-Alligned Countries for a political solution of the situation in respect of Afghanistan,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the obligation of all States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of any State,

Reaffirming further the inalienable right of all people to determine their own form of government and to choose their own economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever,

Gravely concerned at the continued foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan in contravention of the above principles and its serious implications for international peace and security,

Noting the increasing concern of the International community over the continued and serious sufferings of the Afghan people and over the magnitude of social and economic problems posed to Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran by the presence on their soil of millions of Afghan refugees and the continuing increase in their numbers.

Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a political solution of the grave situation in respect of Afghanistan,

1. *Reaffirms* its most profound concern that the people of Afghanistan continue to be denied their right to self-determination and to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;

2. *Calls for* the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan;

3. *Further calls* for a political settlement of the situation in Afghanistan on the basis of the withdrawal of foreign troops and full respect

for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned status of Afghanistan and strict observance of the principle of non-intervention and non-interference;

4. *Affirms* the right of the Afghan refugees to return to their homes in safety and honour;

5. *Urges* all concerned to work towards a settlement which would ensure that the Afghan people determine their destiny free from outside interference and which would enable the Afghan refugees to return to their homes;

6. *Expresses* its appreciation and support for the efforts and constructive steps taken by the Secretary-General, especially the diplomatic process initiated by him in the search for a solution to the problem;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue these efforts with a view to promoting a political solution, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions;

8. *Urges* all concerned to continue to co-operate with the Secretary-General in his efforts to promote a political solution in respect of the situation in Afghanistan;

9. *Appeals* to all States and national and international organizations to extend humanitarian relief assistance, with a view to alleviating the hardship of Afghan refugees, in co-ordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;

10. *Decides* to consider this matter at its forty-first session with high priority under the item entitled "The right of peoples to self-determination and its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation".

VOTING PATTERN

The Human Rights Commission adopted the resolution on Afghanistan by a roll-call vote of 31 in favour to 8 against, with 4 abstentions. Following is the voting pattern:—

In Favour

Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, France, Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Mauritania, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Spain, Togo, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe.

Against

Bulgaria, Cuba, German Democratic Republic, Libya, Mozambique, Syria, Ukraine and USSR.

Abstentions

Cyprus, Finland, India and Nicaragua.

(5th Resolution : United Nations Human Rights Commission : Geneva; 29 February, 1984; published by Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.)

Appendix K (a)

Text of the U.N. General Assembly Special Session resolution, adopted on January 15, 1980, with 104 votes in favour, 18 against, 18 abstaining and 11 absent.

The General Assembly, taking note of Security Council Resolution 462 (1980) of 9 January, 1980, calling for an emergency special session of the General Assembly to examine the question contained in Document S/Agenda/ 2185,

—Gravely concerned at the recent developments in Afghanistan and their implications for international peace and security.

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all peoples to determine their own future and to choose their own form of government free from outside interference,

—Mindful of the obligations of all States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

—Recognising the urgent need for immediate termination of foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan so as to enable its people to determine their own destiny without outside interference or coercion.

—Noting with profound concern the large outflow of refugees from Afghanistan.

—Recalling its resolutions on the strengthening of international security, on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty and on the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nation.

—Expressing its deep concern at the dangerous escalation of tension, intensification of rivalry and increased recourse to military intervention and interference in the internal affairs of States, which are detrimental to the interests of all nations, particularly the non-aligned countries.

—Mindful of the purposes and principles of the Charter and of the responsibility of the General Assembly under the relevant provisions of the Charter and of Assembly Resolution 377-A (V) of 3 November, 1950.

1. Reaffirms that respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State is a fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations, any violation of which on any pretext whatsoever is contrary to its aims and purposes;

2. Strongly deplores the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan, which is inconsistent with that principle;

3. Appeals to all States to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan and to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of that country.

4. Calls for the immediate, unconditional and total

withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan in order to enable its people to determine their own form of government and choose their economic, political and social systems free from outside intervention, subversion or coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;

5. Urges all parties concerned to assist in bringing about, speedily and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the Afghan refugees to their homes;

6. Appeals to all States and national and international organisations to extend humantarian relief/assistance with a view to alleviating the hardship of the Afghan refugees in co-ordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;

7. Requests the Secretary General to keep member States and the Security Council promptly and concurrently informed on the progress towards the implementation of the present resolution;

8. Calls upon the Security Council to consider ways and means which could assist in the implementation of this resolution.

Appendix K(b)

35/37 The Situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security.

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security",

Recalling its resolution ES-6/2 of 14 January 1980 adopted at its sixth emergency special session,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the obligation of all States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of any State,

Reaffirming further the inalienable right of all peoples to determine their own form of government and to choose their own economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever.

Gravely concerned at the continuing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan, in contravention of the above principles, and its serious implications for international peace and security,

Deeply concerned at the increasing outflow of refugees from Afghanistan,

Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a political solution of the grave situation in respect of Afghanistan,

Recognizing the importance of the continuing efforts and initiatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference for a political solution of the situation in respect of Afghanistan,

1. Reiterates that the preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solution of the problem;

2. Reaffirms the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;

3. Calls for the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan;

4. Also calls upon all parties concerned to work for the urgent achievement of a political solution and the creation of the necessary conditions which would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honour;

5. Appeals to all States and national and international oganizations to extend humanitarian relief assistance, with a view to alleviating the hardship of the Afghan refugees, in co-ordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

6. Expresses its appreciation of the efforts of the Secretary-General in the search for a solution to the problem and hopes that he will continue to extend assistance, including the appointment of a special representative, with a view to promoting a political solution in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, and the exploration of securing appropriate guarantees for non-use of force, or threat of use of force, against the political independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of all neighbouring States, on the basis of mutual guarantees and strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs and with full regard for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

7. Requests the Secretary-General to keep Member States and the Security Council concurrently informed of progress towards the implementation of the present resolution and to submit to Member States a report on the situation at the earliest appropriate opportunity.

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security".

70th plenary meeting
20 November 1980

(General Assembly - Thirty Fifth Session-II: Resolutions adopted without reference to a Main Committee; United Nations; p. 17)

Appendix K(c)

TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE 36th SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 19 NOVEMBER, 1981.

"The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security."

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

Having considered the item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security."

Recalling its resolution ES-6/2 of 14 January, 1980 and 35/37 of 20 November, 1980 adopted at the Sixth Emergency Special Session and the Thirty-Fifth Session of the General Assembly respectively,

Reaffirming the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the obligation of all States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of any State,

I express the hope on behalf of the 44 co-sponsors that the draft resolution contained in Document A/36/L. 15 will receive the full support of the General Assembly. Our obligation to support this resolution flows from our commitment to fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and to world peace.

I thank you, Mr. President.

Reaffirming further the inalienable right of all peoples to determine their own form of government and to choose their own economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever,

Gravely concerned at the continuing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan, in contravention of the above principles, and its serious implications for international peace and security,

Noting the increasing concern of the international community over the continued and serious sufferings of the Afghan people and over the magnitude of social economic problems posed to Pakistan and Iran by the presence on their soil of millions of Afghan refugees, and the continuing increase in their numbers,

Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a political solution of the grave situation in respect of Afghanistan,

Taking note of the Secretary General's report contained in document No.A/36/653 particularly appointment of his Personal Representative,

Recognizing the importance of the initiatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the efforts of the Non-Aligned Movement for a political solution of the situation in respect of Afghanistan.

1. Reiterates that the preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solution of the problem;

2. Reaffirms that right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;

3. Calls for the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan;

4. Also calls upon all parties concerned to work for the urgent achievement of a political solution, in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, and the creation of the necessary conditions which would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honour;

5. Renews its appeal to all States and international organizations to continue to extend humanitarian relief assistance, with a view to alleviating the hardship of the Afghan refugees, in coordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;

6. Expresses its appreciation of the efforts of the Secretary General in the search for a solution to the problem and requests the Secretary General to continue these efforts with a view to promoting a political solution in accordance with the exploration of securing appropriate guarantees for non-use of force, or threat of use of force, against the political independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of all neighbouring States, on the basis of mutual guarantees and strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs and with full regard for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

7. Requests the Secretary General to keep Member States and the Security Council concurrently informed on the progress towards the implementation of the present resolution and to submit to Member States a report on the situation at the earliest appropriate opportunity;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its Thirty Seventh Session the item entitled: "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security."

Voting Pattern : In Favour (116):

Albania, Antigua and Berbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany,

Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against (23):

Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yeman, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libya, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelle, Syria, Ukraine, USSR, Viet Nam.

Abstaining (12):

Algeria, Benin, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo, Cyprus, Finland, Guinea-Bissau, India, Mali, Nicaragua, Uganda.

Absent (5):

Bhutan, Dommica, Romania, Saint Vincent, Yemen.

(Defence Journal; Defence Housing Authority, Karachi-46; IX/10-11; 1983; Pp 44-46)

Appendix K(d)

37/37 The Situation In Afghanistan And Its Implications For Internationa Peace and Security.

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security",

Recalling its resolutions ES-6/2 of 14 January 1980, 35/37 of 20 November 1980 and 36/34 of 18 November 1981, adopted at the sixth emergency special session, the thirty-fifth session and the thirty-sixth session respectively,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the obligation of all States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of any State,

Reaffirming further the inalienable right of all peoples to determine their own form of government and to choose their own economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever,

Gravely concerned at the continuing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan, in contravention of the above principles, and its serious implications for international peace and security,

Noting the increasing concern of the international community over the continued and serious sufferings of the Afghan people and over the magnitude of social and economic problems posed to Pakistan and Iran by the presence on their soil of millions of Afghan refugees, and the continuing increase in their numbers,

Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a political solution of the grave situation in respect of Afghanistan,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,

Recognizing the importance of the initiatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the efforts ofthe Movement of Non-Aligned Countries for a political solution of the situation in respect of Afghanistan,

1. Reiterates that the preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solution of the problem;

2. Reaffirms the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;

3. Calls for the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan;

4. Calls upon all parties concerned to work for the urgent achievement of a political solution, in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, and the creation of the necessary conditions which would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honour;

5. Renews its appeal to all States and national and international organizations to continue to extend humanitarian relief assistance, with a view to alleviating the hardship of the Afghan refugees, in co-ordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

6. Expresses its appreciation and support for the efforts and constructive steps taken by the Secretary-General in the search for a solution to the problem;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue those efforts with a view to promoting a political solution, in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, and the exploration of securing appropriate guarantees for non-use of force, or threat of use of force, against the political independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of all neighbouring States, on the basis of mutual guarantees and strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs and with full regard for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to keep Member States and the Security Council concurrently informed of the progress towards the implementation of the present resolution and to report to Member States on the situation at the earliest appropriate opportunity;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-eight session the item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security".

82nd plenary meeting
29 November 1982

(General Assembly - Thirty-seventh Session: II. Resolutions adopted without reference to a Main Committee;Pp. 25-26)

Appendix K(e)

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE 39TH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 15 NOVEMBER, 1984

The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security.

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security",

Recalling its resolutions ES-6/2 of 14 January 1980, 35/37 of 20 November 1980, 36/34 of 18 November 1981, 37/37 of 29 November 1982 and 38/29 of 23 November 1983,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the obligation of all States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of any State,

Reaffirming further the inalienable right of all peoples to determine their own form of government and to choose their own economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever,

Gravely concerned at the continuing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan, in contravention of the above principles, and its serious implications for international peace and security,

Noting the increasing concern of the international community over the continued and serious sufferings of the Afghan people and over the magnitude of social and economic problems posed to Pakistan and Iran by the presence on their soil of millions of Afghan refugees, and the continuing increase in their numbers,

Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a political solution of the grave situation in respect of Afghanistan,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, and the status of the diplomatic process initiated by him,

Recognizing the importance of the initiatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the efforts of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries for a political solution of the situation in respect of Afghanistan,

1. Reiterates that the preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solution of the problem;

2. Reaffirms the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;

3. Calls for the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan;

4. . Calls upon all parties concerned to work for the urgent achievement of a political solution, in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, and the creation of the necessary conditions which would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honour;

5. Renews its appeal to all States and national and international organizations to continue to extend humanitarian relief assistance with a view to alleviating the hardship of the Afghan refugees, in co-ordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;

6. Expresses its appreciation and support for the efforts and constructive steps taken by the Secretary-General, especially the diplomatic process initiated by him, in the search for a solution to the problem;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue those efforts with a view to promoting a political solution, in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, and the exploration of securing appropriate guarantees for the non-use of force, or threat of force, against the political independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of all neighbouring States, on the basis of mutual guarantees and strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs and with full regard for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to keep Member States and the Security Council concurrently informed of progress towards the implementation of the present resolution and to submit to Member States a report on the situation at the earliest appropriate opportunity;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fortieth session the item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security".

VOTING PATTERN

The General Assembly adopted the resolution on the question of Afghanistan by a recorded vote of 119 in favour to 20 against, with 14 abstentions.

IN FAVOUR

Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

AGAINST

Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libya, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Syria, Ukraine, USSR, Viet Nam.

ABSTAINING

Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Congo, Cyprus, Finland, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iraq, Mali, Nicaragua, Sao Tome and Principe, Uganda.

ABSENT

Bhutan, Romania, Seychelles, St. Christopher and Nevis, Yemen.

(6th UN Resolution; Pakistan Publications, Islamabad.)

Appendix K(f)

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE 40TH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON 13 NOVEMBER, 1985

The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security.

The General Assembly

Having considered the item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security",

Recalling its resolutions ES-6/2 of 14 January 1980, 35/37 of 20 November 1980, 36/34 of 18 November 1981, 37/37 of 29 November 1982, 38/29 of 23 November 1983 and 39/13 of 15 November 1984,

Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the obligation of all States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of any State,

Reaffirming further the inalienable right of all peoples to determine their own form of government and to choose their own economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever,

Gravely concerned at the continuing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan, in contravention of the above principles, and its serious implications for international peace and security,

Noting the increasing concern of the international community over the continued and serious sufferings of the Afghan people and over the magnitude of social and economic problems posed to Pakistan and Iran by the presence on

their soil of millions of Afghan refugees, and the continuing increase in their numbers,

Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a political solution of the grave situation in respect of Afghanistan,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, A/709-S/17527, and the status of the diplomatic process initiated by him,

Recognizing the importance of the initiatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the efforts of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries for a political solution of the situation in respect of Afghanistan,

1. **Reiterates** that the preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solution of the problem;

2. **Reaffirms** the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;

3. **Calls** for the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan;

4. **Calls upon** all parties concerned to work for the urgent achievement of a political solution, in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, and the creation of the necessary conditions which would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honour;

5. **Renews** its appeal to all States and national and international organizations to continue to extend humanitarian relief assistance with a view to alleviating the hardship of the Afghan refugees, in coordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;

6. **Expresses** its appreciation and support for the efforts and constructive

steps taken by the Secretary-General, especially the diplomatic process initiated by him, in the search for a solution to the problem;

7. **Requests** the Secretary-General to continue those efforts with a view to promoting a political solution, in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, and the exploration of securing appropriate guarantees for the non-use of force, or threat of force, against the political independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of all neighbouring States, on the basis of mutual guarantees and strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs and with full regard for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

8. **Requests** the Secretary-General to keep Member States and the Security Council concurrently informed of progress towards the implementation of the present resolution and to submit to Member States a report on the situation at the earliest appropriate opportunity;

9. **Decides** to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-first session the item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security".

VOTING PATTERN

The General Assembly adopted the resolution on the question of Afghanistan by a recorded vote of 122 in favour to 19 against, with 12 abstentions.

In Favour:

Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thiland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yogoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Against:

Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic

Republic, Hungary, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mongolia, Poland, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam.

Abstaining:

Algeria, Benin, Cape Verde, Congo, Cyprus, Finland, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iraq, Mali, Nicaragua, Sao Tome and Principe.

(7th UN Resolution; Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad; January 1986.)

Appendix K(g)

THE TEXT OF THE UN RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN

General Assembly
having considered the item entitled "the situation and its implications for international peace and security",

Recalling its resolutions ES-6/2 of 14 January 1980, 35/37 of 20 November 1980, 36/34 of 18 November 1981, 37/37 of 29 November 1982, 38/29 of 23 November 1983, 39/13 of 15 November 1984 and 40/12 of 13 November 1985. (n. references were corrected)

Reaffirming the purposes of principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the obligation of all States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of any State,

Gravely concerned at the continuing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan in contravention of the above principles, and its serious implications for international peace and security,

Noting the increased concern of the international community over the continued and serios sufferings of the Afghan people and over the magnitude of social and economic problems posed to Pakistan and Iran by the presence on their soil of millions of Afghan refugees, and the continuing increase in their number,

Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a political solution of the grave situation in respect of Afghanistan,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary General and the status of the diplomatic process initiated by him,

Recognizing the importance of the initiatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the efforts of the movement of non-aligned countries for a political solution of the situation in respect of Afghanistan.

1. Riterates that the preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solution of the problems.

2. Reaffirming the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government nad to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever,

3. Calls for the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan.

4. Calls upon all parties concerned to work for the urgent achievement of political solution in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution and the creation of the necessary conditions which would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honour.

5. Renews its appeal to all States and national and international organizations to continue to extend humanitarian relief assistance with a view to alleviating the hardship of the Afghan refugees in coordination with the United Nations High Commissioer for Refugees.

6. Expresses its appreciation and support for the efforts and constructive steps taken by the Secretary General, especially the diplomatic process initiated by him, in the search for a solution to the problem.

7. Requests the Secretary General to continue those efforts with a view to promoting a political solution, in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, and the exploration of securing guarantees for the non-use of force or threat of force, against the political independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of all neighbouring States, on the basis of mutual guarantees and strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs and with full regard for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

8. Requests the Secretary General to keep member States and the Security Council concurrently informed of progress towards the implementation of the present resolution and to submit to member States a report on the situation at the earliest appropriate opportunity.

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its 42nd session the item entitled "the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security."

(Afghan News; Fortnightly; Jamiat Islami Afghanistan; Peshawar; II/23; 1.12.1986; Pp.7-8)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

English

Adamec, Ludwig W; Afghanistan 1900-1923: A diplomatic History; University of California; 1972.

Amin, Tahir; Afghanistan Crisis; Implications and options for Muslim World, Iran and Pakistan; Institute of Policy Staudies, Islamabad; Paper Board, Rawalpindi cantt; 1982.

Anwar Khan, Mohammad, Dr; England, Russia and Central Asia (A study in diplomacy) 1857-1878; University Book Agency, Peshawar; Zarreen Art Press, Lahore; 1963.

Arnold, Anthony; Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq; Hoover Institution Press; Stauford University, Stauford, California; 1983.

Arnold, Anthony; Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective; Hoover International Studies; SASI Book Store, Karachi; 1981.

Ayub Khan, Mohammad, Field Marshal; Friends Not Master; Oxford University Press, Lahore, Karachi, Dacca; 1967.

Bellew, H.W., CSI, Surgeon Major; The Races of Afghanistan; Sang-i-Meel Publications, Lahore; Manzoor Printing Press, Lahore; 1979.

Bellew, H.W., CSI, Surgeon Major; Afghanistan and the Afghans; Sang-i-Meel Publications, Lahore; Manzoor Printing Press, Lahore; 1979.

Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali; The Myth of Independence; Oxford University Press, Lahore, Karachi, Dacca; 1969.

Bowles, Chester; Ambassador's Report; Collins Paper Books Ltd, London SW-1; 1954.

Bowles, Cordon T; The People of Asia; Charles Sribner's Sons, New York; 1977.

Bushnell, Kristine; History of the USSR-II; Progress Publishers, Moscow; 1977.

Caroe, Olaf; Soviet Empire: The Turks of Asia and Stalinism; MacMillan, London; 1967.

Caroe, Olaf; The Pathans: With an Epilogue on Russia; Oxford University Press, Karachi; 1983.

Caudill, Mildred; Helmand-Arghandab Valley: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow; US Agency for International Development, Kabul, Afghanistan Lashkargah; 1969.

Chaliad, Gerard; Report From Afghanistan; The Viking Press, New York; Penguine Books, New York; 1982 (tr. Tamar Jacoby).

Crossman, RHS; Government And The Governed, ed.IV; Chatto and Winders (Educational) Ltd, London WC-2.

Dupree, Louis; Afghanistan, ed.II; Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersy; 1978.

Duverger, Maurice; Party Politics And Pressure Groups; Nelson, USA; 1972 (tr. Robert Wagoner).

Epstein, Leon D; Political Parties In Western Democracies; Pall Mall Press, London; 1967.

Fathur Rahman and Bashir A. Qureshi; Afghans Meet Soviet Challenge; Institute of Regional Studies, Peshawar; Allahwala Printers, Lahore; 1981.

Frankel, Joseph; International Relations In A Changing World; Oxford University Press; 1981.

Fraser-Tyler, W.K; Afghanistan : A study of Political Development in Central and Southern Asia; Oxford University Press, London, New York, Toronto; 1967 (revised by M.C. Gillett).

Freedman, Robert Q; Soviet Policy Towards The Middle-East Since 1970; Praeger Publishers, New York; 1978.

Fried, Robert C; Comparative Political Institutions; The Macmillan Co Collier-Macmillan Ltd, London; USA; 1966.

Fullerton, John; The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan; Far Eastern Economic Reviews Ltd; Yee Tin Tong Printing Press Ltd; Hongkong.

Ganda Singh; Ahmad Shah Durrani: Father Of Modern Afghanistan; Gohar-i-Adab, Quetta; Rina Art Press, Lahore; 1977.

Gillard, David; The Struggle For Asia; Methuen & Co Ltd, London; 1977.

Golan, Matti; The Secret Conversations Of Henry Kissinger: Step-by-step diplomacy in the Middle East; Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co; 1976 (tr. Ruth Geyra Stern and Sol Stern).

Golitsyn, Anatoliy; New Lies For Old; The Communist Strategy of Deception and Disinformation; DODD, MEAD & Co; New York;

Gough, Katheen; and Sharma, Hari P; Imperialism and Revolutions In South Asia; Peoples Publishing House, Lahore; 1975.

Griffiths, John C; Afghanistan: Key to a Continent; Westview Press Inc Boulder, Colorado; 1981.

Gupta, Bhabani Sen; Afghanistan: Politics, Economics & Society: Francis Printers (Publishers), London; 1986.

Hameed, A.K. Rai; History of Political Philosophy-I; Aziz Publishers, Lahore; 1981.
Ibid Part II.

Harmon, M. Judd; Political Thoughts From Plato To The Present: USA; 1964.

Harrison, Selig S; In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism & Soviet Temptations; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, Washington DC; 1981.

Huntington, Samuel P; Political Order In Changing Societies: Ed.X; Yale University Press, London; 1975.

Hyman, Anthony; Afghanistan Under Soviet Domination 1964-82: MacMillan Press Ltd; London; & Basing Stock Companies & representatives throughout the World;Hongkong; 1982.

Iqbal Ali Shah, Sardar; Afghanistan Of The Afghans; Gosha-i-Adab, Quetta; 1978.

Jonsen, G.H; Afro-Asia and Non-alignment; Faber & Faber, London; 1966.

Kakar, Hassan; Afghanistan: A study in internal political developments 1880-1896; Punjab Education Press, Lahore: Kabul; 1971.

Male, Beverley; Revolutionary Afghanistan: A Reappraisal; Croom Helm, London & Canberra; 1982.

Marvin, Charless; The Russian Advance Towards India; Saeed Book Bank, Peshawar; 1984.

Mohammad Ali; The Afghans; The Punjab Educational Electric Press, Lahore; 1969.

Munawar Khan, Dr; Anglo-Afghan Relations 1798-1878 : A chapter in the Great Game in Central Asia; University Book Agency, Peshawar.

Nayyar, Kuldip: Report on Afghanistan; Allied Publishers Private Ltd, New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Bangalore, Hyderabad; Model Press,New Delhi; 1981.

Newells, Nancy Peabody and Richards S; The Struggles For Afghanistan; Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London; 1981.

Northedge, F.S.; The International Political System;Faber & Faber, London; 1976.

Papowski, Joseph; The Rival Powers in Central Asia; Gosha-i-Adab, Quetta; 1977 (tr.Arther Baring Brabant).

Poullada, Leon B; Reforms and Rebellion in Afghanistan: 1919-29; Amanullah's failure to modernize a tribal society; Cornell University Press; Ithaca & Lonedon; 1973.

Qudus, Abdul, Syed; Afghanistan and Pakistan: A geo-political study; Ferozsons Ltd, Lahore, Rawalpindi; 1982.

Robinson, J.A., Capt; Notes on Nomad Tribes; Nisa Traders, Quetta.

Rousseau, Jean Jacques; The Social Contact & Discourses; J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, New York; 1955. (tr. G.D.H. Cole).

Russell, Ken; History of USSR-III; Progressive publishers; Moscow; 1977.

Ryan, Nicel; A Hitch Or Two In Afghanistan: A Journey Behind Russian Lines; Weidenfeld and Nicolson; London; & Butler & Tanner Ltd; London; 1983.

Sherwani, Haroon Khan; Studies In Muslim Political Thoughts And Administration; Ashraf Press; Lahore; 1965.

Schinasi, May; Afghanistan at the beginning of the Twentieth Century: Nationalism & Journalism in Afghanistan: A study of Seraj-ul-Akhbar (1911-1918); Instituto Universitario Orientale, Seminario Di Studi Asiatici Series Minor-III; Naples; 1979.

Stewart, Rhea Talley; Fire In Afghanistan: 1914-29: Faith, Hope & British Empire; Double-Day & Co;Inf; Garden city; 1973.

Tabibi, Abdul Hakim, Dr; The Legal Status Of The Afghan Resistance Movement; Igram Press, 1500 20th street S.W., Cedar Rapids, IA 52404; USA; 1986.

Tapper, Richard (ed); The Conflict Of Tribes and States In Iran & Afghanistan; Croom Helm; London & Canberra; St Martin Press; New York; 1983.

Treadgold, Donald W.; Twentieth Century Russia; Rand McNally College Publishing Co.; Chicago; 1976.

Trotsky, Leon; The History Of The Russian Revolution; Victor Gollanez Ltd, London; 1934. (tr. Max Eastman)

Ulam, Adam B; The Russian Political System: Patterns of Governments; Harvard University; USA; 1974.

Wakman, M. Amin; Afghanistan At The Crossroads; ABC Publishing House; New Delhi; 1985.

Watkins, Mary Bradley; Afghanistan: Land In Trasition; Lancastern Press Inc. Lancaster; 1963.

Watson, Hugh Seton; From Lenin To Khrushchev: A History of World Communism; Frederick A.Praeger Publishers; New York, Washington; 1960.

Wesson, Robert G; The Soviet State: An ageing Revolution; University of California; Johan Viley & Sons Inc; New York, London, Sydney, Toronto; 1972.

Wiseman, H.V.; Political System: Some Sociological Approaches; Routledge & Kegan Paul; 1971.

Education in Afghanistan: During last 50 years; Vol-1; Primary, Secondary & Vocational Education; Ministry of Education; Kabul; 1968.
Constitution of Afghanistan; Education Press; Kabul; 01 October 1964.
Decrees of the Revolutionary Council and Decrees of the President of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan; Ministry of Justice; Kabul; June 1979.
Area Handbook For Afghanistan, ed-IV; For Area Study of the American Universities; Washington DC; 1973.
Afghanistan, Yesterday & Today; ORBIS Press Agency; Prague; 1982.
White Book: Foreign Policy Documents of the DRA; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Kabul; 1981.
White Book: Pakistan's subversive activities against the Afghan Revolution; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Kabul; 1984.
Revolutionary Afghanistan: Through Honest Eyes; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Kabul; ND (An excerpt from Morning Star in the end has been dated August 17, 1982.)
Tears, Blood and Cries; Human Rights In Afghanistan Since Invasion 1979 to 1984; Helsinki Watch, Asia Watch; December 1984.
To Die In Afghanistan; Helsinki Watch, Asia Watch; December 1985.
The Short Bartlett's Familiar Quotations, ed-X; Permabooks, New York; May 1960.
The Concise Oxford Dictionary, ed-VII; 1983.
The Oxford English Dictionary Of Currant Usage; Intisharat-i-Gulshaee-i-Tehran; 1363 = 1984/85.
The Oxford Illustrated Dictionary; Vol I and II; 1978.
English to English and Urdu Dictionary, Ed.VII; Ferozsons, Lahore; 1978.
The One-Volume English-Persian Dictionary (S. Haim's); Farhang-i-Moasser, Tehran; 1984.
The American Heritage Dictionary of English Language, ed.XX; DELL Publg Co Inc; New York; June 1977.
Karmanniya Russko-Urdu Slovar, Pocket Size; Moscow; 1958.
PEARS : Cyclopaedia, ed.VII; Suffolk, Great Britain; 1969.
The Columbia Encyclopedia, Vol.II, ed.III; Columbia University, USA; 1965.

The World Book Encyclopedia, Vol XII & XIV; Chicago; 1952.

Encyclopedia Americana, Vol VIII & XXIII; International edition; New York; 1969.

Encyclopaedia Britannica: Micropaedia, Vol III & VIII, ed. 11; Chicago; 1974.

Encyclopaedia Britannica: Macropaedia, Vol XI, ed 11; Chicago; 1974.

The Quran; Dar-al-Choura; Beirut; 1980.

Pushto:

Abdul Rahman, Amir; Da Pukhtano Tarikh, Vol IV; Idara-i-Isha'at Sarhad, Peshawar; Manzoor Aam Press, Peshawar. (tr. Qazi Attaullah).

Akbar, Abdul Akbar Khan; Da Russi Turkistan Au Afghanistan Safar; Hamidia Electric Press, Peshawar.

Aslanov and Graseemovva; Da Afghanistan Milli Zheba Au Adab; Pushto Tolana, Kabul; 1347 = 1968 (tr. M. Motamid Shinwari).

Azam, G.F.; Afghanistan: Tolo Ta Yau Dars Au Azmowekht; Peshawar; March 1982.

Bakhtanay, Abdullah; Marghalare (Preface); Kabul; 1351=1972.

Benawa, Abdul Rauf; Usani Leekwal, Vol I; Kabul; 1340=1961.

Ibid. Vol II; Kabul; 1341=1962.

Ibid. Vol III; Kabul; 1346=1967.

Carr, E.H.; Tarikh Tse Ta Wayee; Kabul University; Education Press, Kabul; 1970 (tr. Mohammad Hassan Kakar).

Chaliad Gerard; Goreelayee Jang; 1359=1980 (tr.annonymous).

Khalique, Abdul Khaliq; Da Azadae Jang; Idara-i-Isha'at Sarhad, Peshawar; 1972.

Mousa, Yousuf, Dr; Abu Hanifa; Justice Ministry, Kabul; 1344 =1965 (tr. Gulab Nengrahari).

Naim, Hidayatullah; Russee Karanlar Au Mianzanae Asia Kshi Da Patsoon Nakhi Nekhane; Ghani Sons Printers; 1985.

Nangial, Shuhrat; Pa Afghanistan Ki Da Kamunestano Da Qudrat Raseedelo Pa Hakla; 1359 = 1980.

Nangial, Shuhrat; Da Afghanistan Siasi Ahzab; 1360 = 1981.

Oode, Abdul Qadir; Islam; Gaheez Publications; Shaheen Electric Press, Peshawar; 1971 (tr. annonymous).

Rafie, Habibullah; Shah Shuja Au Babrak: Da Tarikh Pa Tela Ki; Aman Kitab; 1985.

Rafie, Habibullah; Wahshiana Teray Au Sharmedele Mata; Aman Kitab; 1985.

Rafie, Habibullah; Da Istiqlal Tsalorema Jabha; Aman Publications, Peshawar; 1986.

Reshad, Abdul Shakoor; Da Ahmad Shah Baba Da Deewan Ghuarchan (Preface); Da Pukhto Tserano Nareewal Markaz, Kabul; 1357 = 1978.

Rishtia, Qasim, Syed; Pa Noolesema Peerae Ki Afghanistan; Historical Society of Afghanistan, Kabu; 1341=1962.

Saleh Mohammad Kandahari; Pukhto Masnavi (Preface by Abdul Haye Habibi); Da Afghanistan Da Uloomo Academy, Kabul; 1351=1972.

Shaida, Fazal Haq; Jamal-ud-Din Afghani, ed.III; University Book Agency, Peshawar.

Shpoon, Saad-ud-Din; Da Afghanistan Da Jihad Lar : Da Baree Tar Paruwa; 1360=1981.

Taniwal, M.A; Da Jihad Da Baree Lar; 1361 = 1982.

Taraki, Noor Mohammad; Dan Bang Musafari; Pushto Tolana, Kabul; 1336 = 1957.

Ibid; ibid; Da Afghanistan Da Uloomo Academy, Kabul; 1357 = 1978.

Ibid; Spin; ibid.

Ibid; Tsara; ibid.

Ulfat, Aziz-ur-Rahman; Siasi Lobe.

Zadran, Gul Zarak; Da Tarikh La Khatero Na Darsoon, Ibratoona: Da Afghanistan Da Jihad Tarikh (Landeez); 1362 = 1983.

Zafar, Bahadur Shah Kaka Khel, Syed; Pukhtane Da Tarikh Pa Rana Kshi; University Book Agency, Peshawar.

Zalmay, Mohammad Wali; Da Kandahar Mashaheer; Government Press, Kabul; 1349 = 1970.

Afghanistan Da Bartania Da Istemar Tsakha Da Russ Tar Impereialism Pre; Da Afghanistan Da Milat Ulusi Sazman; Jaddi 1360 = Dec/Jan 1982.

Siasi Istilahat; Afghan Social Democratic Party; 1359= 1980.

Afghan Milli Mutaraqi Lar; ibid; 1358 = 1979.

Da Afghanistan Pa Bara Ki Rishtia: Sanadoona, Haqaiq, Shawahid; Novesti Publications, Moscow; 1980.

Da Afghanistan Da Khalko Da Demokratik Gund (Da Hewad Da Kargeri Tabqi Mekhki) Land Tarikh Da Saur Tar Inqilaba Pore; Central Committee PDPA; Education Press, Kabul; 1357 = 1978.

Da Khalk Da Demokratik Gund Da Fa'aaleeno Rahnuma; Swaloona and Zhawaboona, NP, ND- (publised by Karmal regime.)

Da Afghanistan Da Khalko Da Demokratik Gund Da Markazi Komete Umoomi Munshi, Da Inqilabi Shoora Rais Au Sadre Azam, Noor Mohammad Taraki, Raport Da Afghanistan Da Jamhooriat Inqilabi Shoora Ta; Theory and Education's Central Committee of PDPA; Govt Press; 9 Qaus 1357 = 30 Nov 1978.

Da Afghanistan Da Demokratik Jamhoori Inqilabi Wazeefo Asasi Kerkhi; 7 Saur 1357 = 27 April 178.

Da Saur Da Inqilab Pa Hakla; Da Afghanistan Da Khalko Da Waslawalo Quwao Da Siasi Charo Kiasat; Kabul; 01 Jauza 1357 = 25 May 1978.

Landa Biography: Noor Mohammad Taraki; Govt Press; 01 Sunbala 1357 = 23 August 1978.

Persian/Dari:

Faqir, Mohammad Nasim; Hizbi Taudeh-i-Iran Dar Aeena-i-Zaman; Itehad-i-Islami Mujahideen-i-Afghanistan; 1363 = 1983.

Fofalzai, Aziz-ud-Din Wakili; Durrat-uz-Zaman; Tarikh-i-Shah Zaman; Govt Press; Kabul 1337=1958.

Ghubar, Ghulam Mohammad, Mir; Afghanistan Dar Maseer-i-Tarikh; Piam Muhajir; Qum, Iran; 1359= 1980.

Habibi, Abdul Haye; Junbash-i-Mash r ootiat Dar Afghanistan; 1364 = 1985.

Haqshnas, S.N., Dr.; Dasais Wa Jenayat-i-Russ Dar Afghanistan; Tehran; 1363 = 1984.

Khafi, Yaqub Ali, Mirza; Padshahan-i-Mutta'khir-i-Afghanistan; Historical Society; Matba-i-Umoomi; Kabul; 1336 = 1957.

Khalili, Khalil-ul-Lah; Ayaray Az Khorasan; Amir Habibullah Khadim-i-Deen-i-Rasul-ul-Lah;Peshawar; Ramzan 1403 (1983).

Khogiani, Mohammad Amin; Hayat-i-Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghan; Matba-i-Umoomi; Kabul 1318 = 1939.

Kushkaki, Sabah-ud-Din; Daha-i-Qanoon-i-Asasi; Shoora -i-Saqafati-i-Jihad-i-Afghanistan (SSJA); 1365 = 1986.

Marwat, Fazal Rahim; Tarikh-i-Junbash-i-Islami Wa Milli Musalmanan-i-Asya-i-Miana Dar Muqabil-i-Kamunism-i-Russ; Itehad-i-Islami Mujahideen-i-Afghanista; 1363 = 1985 (tr. Abdul Jabar Sabet).

Mojaddidi, Shah Agha; Amir Habibullah Khadim-i-Deen-i-Rasul-ul-Lah; al-Jeddah Printers, Lahore.

al-Mojaddidi, al-Shaikh Mohammad Sadiq; Mukhtasir-ul-Bayan Maulana Abdur Rahman Paghmani; Charsada road, Peshawar; 29 Jaddi 1362 = 19.1.1984.

Nawabi, Ghulam Habib; Slang; Matba-i-Daulati; 1343 = 1964.

Siddique, Mohammad Zahir, Dr; Az Ishghal-i-Chekoslawakia Ta Tajawuz Bar Afghanistan; Ittehad-i-Islami Mujahideen-i-Afghanistan; 1363 = 1984.

Tarzi, Mahmood; Watan (Persian); Matba-i-Huroofi,Kabul;1335=1956.

Ulfat, Aziz-ur-Rahman; Jihad Wa Dast-i-Pusht-i-Pardah; Daly,1359 = Jan/Feb 1979.

Umar Shaheed; Ba' Asma-i-Farzandan-i-Mayhan; Hizbi Islami Afghanistan.

KGB Wa Junbas-i-Mqawamat-i-Afghanistan; Jabha-i-Mubarizeen-i-Mujahid-i-Afghanistan; 1364 = 1985.

Kodetaha-i-Kamunestan Dar Afghanistan; MLARU; 4 Hoot 1357 = 23 Feb 1979.

Fajea-i-Haft Saur; Shoora-i-Saqafati-i-Jihad-i-Afghanistan(SSJA) Islamabad; 7 Saur 1364 = 27 April 1985.

Qiyam-i-9 Saur: Dukhtaran-i-Kabul; SSJA.
Qiyam-i-24 Hoot: Herat: SSJA; 24 Hoot 1363 = 15 March 1985.
Qiyam-i-Chandawal; SSJA; Sartan, 1363 = June/July, 1985.
Qiyam-i-Darra-i-Suff; SSJA; Nov/Dec; 1985.
Qiyam-i-Asmar; SSJA; Nov/Dec 1985.
Qiyam-i-Charkent; SSJA; Sartan, 1365 = June/July, 1986.

Asnad Laneha-e-Jassosi: Afghanistan-I; Danishjuan-i-Musalman Pero Khat-i-Imam; Tehran.

Urdu

Adib, Mirza; Hayat-i-Jamaluddin Afghani; Istiqlal Press, Lahore; 1959.

Darbar Ali Shah, Syed; Hijrat-i-Afghanistan : Haji Faiz Mohammad Khan Sahib Marhoom Ki Sarguzasht; Taj Co Ltd;Karachi.

Ghilzai, Nasrullah; Afghanistan : Maazi Aur Ha'l Kay Aeenay Mayn; Almunar Book Centre, Mansora, Lahore; ND.

Judd, C.E.M; Jadid Siasi Nazree-ay Kay Ta-a'ruf; Majlis-i-Taraqqi-i-Adab, Lahore; 1971 (tr.Abdul Mahsi).

Maudoodi, Abul Ala, Maulana; Khilafat-o-Mulukiat; Lahore; 1966.

al-Nadvi, Abul Hassan Ali-ul-Hassan; Insani Dunya Par Musalmanon Kay Urooj-o-Zawal Kay Asar; International Islamic Federation of Students Organization, Kuwait; The Holy Koran Publishing House, Damascus, Syria; 1977.

Qadiani, Ghulam Ahmad, Mirza; Tazkirat-ush-Shahadatayn; Ziaul Islam Press, Rabwa; 10 October,1903.

Qudus Hashmi, Abdul, Syed, Allama; Tarikh-ul-Afghan by Syed Jamaluddin Afghanistan; Nafees Academy, Karachi; August, 1982.

Razaqi, Shahid Hussain; Syed Jamaluddin Afghani; Hayat-o-Afkar; Idara-i-Saqafat-i-Islamia, Lahore; 1979.

Rizvi, Yaseen, Dr; Afghanistan: Baghawat Say Inqilab Tak; Talent Club, Lahore; 1979.

Saeed, Riaz Ahmad; Almiya-i-Afghanistan; Historical Research Institute, Islamabad;

Sindhi, Obeidullah, Maulana; Kabul Mayn Saat Saal; Sindhi Sagar Academy, Lahore; 1982 (ed.Mohammad Sarwar).

Shahnuri, Abad; Turkistan Mayn Muslim Muzahemat; Islamic Publications Ltd, Lahore; 1983.

ARTICLES /REPORTS etc.

English:

Abdullah, Commissioner, Afghan Refugees (CAR), Peshawar; Afghan Refugees in NWFP; Pakistan Times; 19.10.1981.

Adamec, Ludwig W; Who's Who Afghanistan : DRA : First Supplement To The; Austria; 1979 (typescript).

Afzal Khan; All Quiet On The Afghan Front; The Washington Post; 26.10.1980.

Ibid; Pakistan Crisis: Afghan Refugees; Sunday Newsday; 21.12.1980.

Ibid; Afghan Exiles Run Into Hate; The Observer, London; 4.1.1981.

Ahang, Mohammad Kazim; Background and Beginning of the Afghan Press System; Afghanistan, quarterly; XXI/1; Historical Society of Afghanistan; Spring 1349 = 1968.

Akbar S. Ahmad; Resettlement of Afghan Refugees and the Social Scientists; Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies; IV/1; Fall 1980.

Akram, A.I., Lt. Gen; Enter the Russians; Muslim; 24.8.1984.

Amin, Abdul Rasul; Unity is the remedy; WUFA, I/1; Peshawar; 1985.

Ibid; Communist Forces in Afghanistan; 3.1.1983 (typescript).

Ibid; A Brief Analysis of Characeristics of the Afghan Society (typescript).

Ibid; The Saur Revolution?; WUFA; I/2; Peshawar; 1986.

Anwar Khan, Mohammad, Dr; The Muslims of Soviet Russia; Frontier Post, Friday Supplement; 2.2.1986.

Ibid; On a visit to Russia; PAKISTAN, VII; Area Study Centre, Peshawar; Spring, 1983.

Ibid; The Second Afghan Constitution 1931-43-I; Central Asia, I/2; Area Study Centre (ASC), Peshawar; Spring, 1979.

Ibid; ibid 1943-1953-II; I/3; Summer, 1979.

Ibid; The Third Afghan Constitution 1964-65-I; ibid, I/5; Spring, 1980.

Ibid; ibid 1966-67-III; III/7; Winter, 1980.

Ibid; ibid 1966-67-IV; IV/8; Summer, 1981.

Ibid; ibid - X; 14; Summer, 1984.

Azam, Ikram; Afghan Crisis: Seeking a realistic solution; Muslim; 27.9.1982.

Azmat Hayat Khan; Afghanistan : A spring-board for Soviet Expansion; Muslim; 27.9.1982.

Ibid; Soviet Penetration in Afghanistan; World Islamic Time, weekly, Islamabad (WIT); 13.11.1983; Pp 24-29.

Ibid; The Origin of Khalq and Parcham; WIT; 30.4.1984.
Ibid; Factional Organization of the Afghan Mujahideen in Peshawar; Central Asia: ASC; 14; Summer, 1984.
Bab, Thompson; Unrecorded Livestock Export Trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan via NWFP; 20.9.1980 (typescript)
Baldus, Rold D; Starting Cooperative development in Afghanistan.
Benningsen, Alexandre; Soviet Union and Muslim Guerillah Wars 1920-81: Lessons for Afghanistan: Pakistan Times; 11 and 18 Jan 1985.
Ibid; Soviet Islam Since the Invasion of Afghanistan: Central Asian Survey: Society for Central Asian Studies: Oxford, England; I/1; July 1983; Pp 65-78.
B.M. The present situation in the Hazarajat: ibid; Pp 79-92.
Branigin, William; A trek over Afghanistan's "Ho Chi Minh Trail": Washington Post Service; Oct 1983.
Ibid; Despite Soviet Air Power, Afghan War is steadfast; ibid.
Ibid; Battered village is symbol of Afghan resistance; ibid.
Ibid; Soviet Forces in Afghan Stalemate; ibid.
Brecher, John; & Coleman, Fred; Pakistan Mending A Breach; Newsweek; 4.5.1981.
Bulleh Shah; Anatomy of Revolution-III; The Star; 8.5.1986.
Butt, Qaisar; Soviets plan Afghan railways; WIT; 20-26 Jan 1983.
Ibid; Babrak Faces constitutional crisis; WIT; 12-18 Jan 1983.
Ibid; The Afghanistan...; The Afghan Publications, Islamabad, ND.
Cassandra; Revolution & Revolutionaries; Frontier Post; 29.4.1986.
Clairborne, William; Tensions arise between Afghan refugees and hosts in Pakistan; Washington Post; 24.9.1982.
Chishti, Amir Abdullah; Rationale of Afghan policy; Muslim; 24.8.1984.
Christensen, Asger; Afghanistan: Socialism and Tribesmen: Cultural Survival; VIII/1; 1984.
Christian, Fuers; Kabul Making Huge strides in eradicating illiteracy; Frontier Post; 20.8.1986.
Cohen, Stephen P; South Asia after Afghanistan: Nawai Waqt:11.5.1985.
Deming, Angus; The Hostages; Newsweek; 8.12.1980.
Duncan, Mil; Afghan lesson for Europe's Generals: New Scientist; 30.6.1983.
Dupree, Louis; (LD-6/80); Afghanistan 1980; The world turned upside down; 37; 1980.
Ibid; (LD-2/79); Red Flag over the Hindukush-I: Leftist movement in Afghanistan; 44; 1979.
Ibid; (LD-3/79); ibid-II: The Accidental Coup, or Taraki in Blunderland; 45, 1979.
Ibid; (LD-2/80); ibid-III: Rhetoric and reforms, or Promises! Promises! 23, 1980.
Ibid; (LD-3/80); ibid-IV; Foreign Policy and the Economy: 27,1980.
Ibid; (LD-4/80); ibid-V; Repressions, Or Security through terror, Purges; 28, 1980.

Ibid; (LD-5/80); ibid-VI; Repressions...; 29, 1980.
Ibid; Afghanistan in 1982.

Edwards, David Busby; Redefying Islam: Ideology and Conflict in the Afghan Jehad; 2-4 Nov 1984.

Edward, John; The distant but real threat of nuclear war; Far East Economic Review (FEER); 5.9.1980.

Es'haq, Mohammad; Afghan Resistance: Achievements and problems: Jamiat-i-Islami Afghanistan (JIA), Peshawar: Oct 1985.
Ibid; The present situation in and around Panjsher: JIA:
Ibid; From Theory to Practice: JIA; Sep 1986.

Frons, Marc; & Nater, Timothy; France's Guerilla Doctors; Newsweek: 11.4.1983.

Fullerton, John; Afghanistan: Tribal Stick, And Carrot: Moscow holds out the bait of more economic aid while goading Pakistan to come to terms with Kabul FEER; 12.3.1982.

Gerken, Egbert; Population, Agricultural Productivity, and Employment in the rural non-agricultural sector: Interpreting observation in Paktia, Afghanistan: Internationales Asienforum; V/2; 1974.

Gearings, Julian; No Protection: Free Afghanistan, quarterly: IV: London; Summer, 1986.

Ghamzhan, Sher Zaman; Palanzai; 21.12.1981 (typescript).

Ghani, Ashraf; Islam and State building in a tribal society: Afghanistan 1880-1901; Modern Asian Studies, Great Britain: XII/2; 1978.

Ghouri, Hamid Ahmad; Afghan Refugees: The many facets of the problem; Dawn; 13.4.1986.

Girardet, Edward; Migratory Genocide: The Soviets declare Afghanistan a free fire zone; The New Republics: 4.3.1985.
Ibid; Soviet truce with Afghan rebels fades: Christian Science Monitor; 18.8.1984.

Gittings, John; Dispute over Soviet troops in Mongolia sours talks: Muslim; 18.3.1984.

Gupta, Bhabani Sen; United States and Afghanistan: Muslim:4.6.1984.

Habibul Hassan; Gulf: The century-old Russian dream: Muslim: 5.3.1982.

Haddad, Qudratullah; A note on Farhad family; ND (tr. S.Z.Ghamzhan: typescript).
Ibid; An Appeal; ND (tr. S.Z. Ghamzhan: typescript).

Halpin, Frank T; Afghan Mujahideen seek more US aid; Orient Times: 21.11.1985.

Hashim, N.; Will Afghans fight them out? Pakistan Times;22.11.1985.

Hyman, Anthony; Afghanistan: viable government closer as the tribes unite; Bulletin; 9.12.1980.

Ikram, Mohammad Asif; Russo-Afghan relations: WIPA, I/1: Peshawar; 1985.

Inamullah Jan; Abdul Hayee Habibi (in memorium): Journal of Central Asia; II/2; Quaid Azam University, Islamabad: December 1983.

Jacobson, Phillip; Afghan refugees become pawns between Russia and the West; Sunday Times; 20.1.1980.

Joseph, Ralph; A messy war; Herald; Oct 1984.

Kazemzadeh, Firuz; Hints of the future hidden in the past; FEER; 5.9.1980.

Khalid, Dr; Afghanistan's struggle for national liberation: Internationales Asienforum; XI/3 & 4; 1980.

Khalilzad, Zalmay; The Afghan war: 6 years after: Pt I and II: Intervention and Sovietization; Muslim; 27 & 28-12-1985.

Ibid; Moscow's Afghan War; Problems of Communis: Jan-Feb 1986.

Khurshid Ali; Pakhtoonistan bedevils Pak-Afghan relations; WIT; 7.9.1984.

Krakowski, Elle D; Defining success in Afghanistan: The Center of Strategic & International Studies, Georgetown Univ. & the Massachusetss Institute of Technology; Spring,1985.

Laqueur, Walter; US-Soviet relations:

Lederer, Edith; Arms for the love of Allah, Cry the rebels; FEER; 5.9.1980.

Lifschultz, Lawrence; External resistance, internal conflicts; FEER; 23.1.1981.

Ibid; An accord in the offing: Afghanistan-Geneva Talks; FEER; 9.7.1983.

Ibid; No solution possible without Super Power support: Cordovez on Afghan problem: Distrust between parties still great; Muslim; 16.5.1985.

Ibid; The US-Pak strategic relations; Muslim; 30.10.1986.

Louis Arul B; The Kabul regime unleashes a vicious - and possibly disastrous - shakeout: Purges, Coups and executions; FEER; 01.8.1980.

Luijckx, Jamila; & Wennink G.J. Dr; A million deaths since 1979: Who cares for Afghanistan? Pakistan Times; 15.12.1985.

Mahfooz Ahmad; Resistance movement in Afghanistan: WIT; 01.3.1984.

Martin, David C; Inside the rescue mission; Newsweek; 12.7.1982.

Malhuret, Clauds; Report from Afghanistan;

Mazhar, Fauzia; Future of democracy in Afghanistan; Thesis for M.A.(Journalism); University of the Punjab; 22.11.1976: (typescript).

Mehdi, S.G; Col; The destiny of the States of Afghanistan and Pakistan; Pakistan Economist; 25.8.1979.

Mirza; Pak-Soviet relations; WIT; 30.4.1984.

Moheb, A.K.; Moosa Shafique; Central Asia: ASC; 14: Summer,1984.

Morello, Ted; A hiccup at the brink: Afghanistan: The US view: FEER; 9.6.1983.

Mortimer, Edward; Afghans say Soviet offensive failed: Masoud's adviser in London; The Times, London;

Mumtaz, Z.A. , Dr; Soviet aggression of Afghanistan; WUFA; I/1;1985.

Murray Ian; Man with the world's worst refuge problem: Time;11.1.1980;

Mushahid Hussain; Fact Sheet; Muslim; 28.12.1981.
Ibid; Red star over Kabul; ibid.
Ibid; Frontier Diary: The refugee factor: Muslim: 4.12.1984.
Ibid; Journey to Kabul; Parts I-IV; Muslim; 27, 28, 29,30-10-1985.
Ibid; Mistakes of revolutionary government; Muslim; 9.7.1986.

Nabiel, Enayatullah, Representative of the DRA to the 3rd Committee on agenda item 98; Statement; UN General Assembly (38th session); 15.11.1983.

Nations, Richard; F16s and flexibility; FEER; 25.9.1981.

Pakkar Koya, A.M.; Mujahideen leader seeks advanced arms: Tos sustain Afghan resistance; Arab News, Riyadh/Jeddah: 12.7.1984.

Pstrusin'ska, Jaqwiga; Ethnicity among Afghan refugees; read at the Seminar "Crisis of Mass Exodus", Refugees Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford; 5.3.1986.

Quelqujay, Chantal Lemercier; The USSR and the Middle East; Central Asian Survey; 1/1: Oxford, England: July, 1983.

Qureshi, Mohammad Ayub; The problems created by the influx of Afghan refugees; Haidar; 16.12.1983 (tr.SZ Ghamzhan).

Rafat Hussain, Syed; Soviet strategy in Afghanistan: rhetoric and actions; Muslim; 31.12.1985.

Rafiq, Fauzia; Afghan refugees: changing Peshawar's demography; Muslim; 25.4.1983.

Ram, Mohan; A map offensive: Kabul accuses Peking of publishing maps showing parts of Afghanistan as lost Chinese territory; FEER; 12.3.1982.

Rasheed Jamal; Shortening fuse of Zia's Powerkeg; FEER; 18.4.1985.

Richardson, Michael; Resource Wealth and the Soviet Invasion; FEER; 23.1.1981.
Ibid; Arms and the Woman; FEER; 25.9.1981.

Rizvi, Hassan Askari; The Afghan refugees: Muslim; 19.3.1982.
Ibid; Geneva Parley on Afghanistan: Muslim; 20.6.1982.

Rizvi, S.H.; No war No peace: Pakistan Economist; 25.8.1979.

Roy, Olivier; Islam in the Afghan resistance: Keeston College Bromley: April, 1984.
Ibid; Sufism and the Afghan resistance.

Rupert, James; Russians send Afghan children to Soviet Union for education: Nawai Waqt: 25.1.1986.

Sabat, Abdul Jabar: Judiciary in Afghanistan-II: under Communism: Centra Asia; ASC: 14: Summer, 1984.

Sajjad Hyder: Pakistan's Afghan Predicament: Muslim: 6.7.2.1984.

Salamat Ali: Where do we go from Here? Afghanistan: FEER: 5.9.1980.

Ibid; A temptation that was too strong to resist: FEER: 23.1.1981.

Saray, mehmet; The Russian conquetst of Central Asia: Central Asian Survey, Oxford, England: I/2 & 3: Nov 1982.

Shabbir Hussain, Syed: Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: The Long Wait: Kamran Publishing House, Islamabad: ND.

Shahram, Nazif M; Afghanistan's Kirghiz in Turkey: Cultural Survival: VIII/1; 1984.

Shahid, S alim: Altering the ethnic balance: Herald; Oct 1984.

Shah Z aman; Humanitarian Assistance Programme for Afghan Refugees in NWFP; CAR Peshawar: Dec 1985.

Shalinsky, Audery C; Islam and ethnicity: The northern Afghanistan Perspective; Central Asian Survey, I/2 & 3: Oxford, England: Nov 1982.

Shepherd, Gordon Brook; What the Russians are plotting in Afghanistan; Nawai Waqt; 17.8.1982.

Strasser, Steven; etc; Arms across the sea; Newsweek; 29.6.1981.

Suhrawardy, A.H.; The necessity for Ijtihad: Muslim; 26.11.1982.

Talbot, Strobe: Voices of an embattled regime: Talking with Afghanistan's three top leaders; Time; 26.10.1981.

Ibid; Afghanistan: In the Quagmire; Time; 26.12.1981.

Taniwal, A.H. & Nuristani, A .Y.; Pashtun tribes and Afghan resistance; WUFA; I/1; 1985.

Tasker, Rodney; All eyes are on Islamabad: Afghanistan/Pakistan's View; FEER; 9.6.1983.

Wali Khan, Abdul; What is being done in Pakistan? And what should be done? Jang, Lahore; 13.12.1983 (tr. S.Z. Ghamzhan).

Watson, Russell; & Coleman, Fred; Zia bars the door: Newsweek; 13.10.1980.

Wolfe, Nancy Hatch; Herat: A pictorial guide: The Afghan Tourist Organization, Kabul; 1966.

Wyer Judith; London's Divide and Conquer Plan: Executive Intelligence Review; Middle East; 3-9 April 1979.

Zahid Hussain; The price of hospitality; Herald; Oct 1984.

Zulfikar Ali Khan, Air Chief Marshal (Retd); Afghanistan: The Refugees; Muslim; 5.9.1984.

Ibid; Quest for a settlement; Muslim; 18.3.1984.

Afghan Refugees in Pakistan; Government of Pakistan; ND.

Humanitarian Assistance Programme for Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Chief CAR; Rawalpindi; Aug 1983.

Refugees situation at a glance; Chief CAR, Islamabad; Aug 1981 (typescript).

The list of payees for the month of February 1979.

A letter from the CAR, Peshawar, dated 17.11.1979.

Current Afghan Refugees Situation: CAR, Peshawar: ND (typescript).

Russia & Afghanistan will take joint action if intervention from the soil of Pakistan did not cease; Interview of Soviet Ambassador in Pakistan V.I. Smirnov; Nawai Waqt: 21.12.1983 (tr. S.Z. Ghamzhan).

They are enemies of Islam who create worries for Afghan refugees: Jihad Rally was addressed at Peshawar by Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Gulbadin Hikmatyar and Shahbir Ahmad; Mashriq: 01.10.1983. (tr. S.Z. Ghamzhan).

Interview of Abdul Wali Khan with Akhtar Kashmiri: Chatan, weekly, Lahore: 21.12.1981 (tr. S.Z. Ghamzhan).

Bizenjo on Afghan struggle; WIT; 30.4.1984.

Political grouping of Afghan Mujahideen: WIT; 12-18 Jan 1983.

Pakistan stand on Afghanistan; WIT; 12-18 Jan 1983.

What the Americans think of Russians: US Defence Department Study on "Soviet Military Power"; Muslim; 15.1.1982.

The Third World and US-Soviet competition: A Soviet view; Muslim: 15.1.1982.

Focus on Super Powers: Soviet decision-making and the invasion of Afghanistan; Muslim; 27.9.1984.

Concern over smuggling of Russian Arms; Interior Minister Mohammad Aslam Khattak; Muslim; 11.6.1985.

Confidential Demi-Official Letter from A.J. Hoskinson, Esq;Chief Secretary to the Govt of NWFP, to Major W.R. Hay, CIE, Deputy Secretary to the Govt of India; No 78-P.C; 5/6 Jan 1937.

Confidential (13330): Treaties, Agreements, Conventions and Protocols: with and relating to Afghanistan.

Thirty Questions on Marxism circulated by JIA (tr. S.Z. Ghamzhan; 24.10.1982).

The Afghan Socialist Democratic Party during its past 16 years; Afghan Millat; 5 April 1982 (tr. S.Z. Ghamzhan).

The Afghan Refugees situation in Pakistan; 51 E; World Council of Churches, G eneva; April 1983.

Population Headliners; Economic and Social Commission For Asia And the Pacific, Bangkok; May 1984.

Bitter Afghan Wars; Parade, monthly; Australia; June 1980.

The Fire Next Door; Special Report; Newsweek; 01.3.1982.

Afghanistan: In the capital of a quagmire: Moscow conducts an open-ended battle against a resilient insurgency; Time; 26.10.1981.

The Soviet's Dirty Tricks Squad; Newsweek; 23.11.1981.

KGB Agents can not contaminate the brilliant and fighting visage of Afghan women; Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA); March 1985 (typescript).

Communique of RAWA; Aug 1985 (typescript).

Soviet forces gaining in Afghanistan offences; International Herald; 3.6.1985.

Afghans in Pakistan: Towards self-reliance; Refugee, monthly; 4; Geneva; April 1984.

Pakistan: Educating Young Refugees Girls; Refugee, monthly; 5; Geneva; May 1984.

The Letter from the B.I.A. (Bureau International Afghanistan); April-May, 1982.

UN Human Rights Report on Afghanistan; December 1985.

5th Resolution: United Nations Human Rights Commission: Geneva; Geneva; 29 Feb 1984; Govt of Pakistan; ND.

6th UN Resolution; Pakistan Publications, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad; ND.

7th UN Resolution; Govt of Pakistan; Jan 1986.

Afghanistan: Widespread arrests reported; Amnesty International Newsletter; XIII/7; July 1983.

Amnesty International Report; Asia - Afghanistan; 1984.

Afghan Refugees Need continuing help of friends; Yearender; International Communication Agency, USA, Islamabad; 20 Dec 1981.

Afghanistan: Two Years of Occupation: News Release; US Department of State, Washington DC; 29 Dec 1981.

Afghanistan: Three Years of Occupation; ibid; Dec 1982.

Afghanistan; Six Years of Occupation; ibid; Dec 1985.

Afghanistan's chronology: 1978-1985; US Information Agency; Nov 1985.

On Events in Afghanistan; Leonid Brezhnev replies to Pravada Correspondent; Tass statement; Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow; 1980.

Press Bulletins; USSR Embassy, Islamabad;

Historical Background of PDPA; No 318; 26.12.1981.

Central Council of the National Fatherland Front holds the plenary meeting; 318; 26.12.1981.

Five years of the Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty; 377; 11.12.1983.

Future of Afghan power engineering; 385; 21.12.1983.

USSR-Afghanistan: Fruits of Cooperation; 23; 29.1.1984

Stable development of economy: Afghanistan; 30; 2.2.1984.

Defending the interests of Afghan Muslims; 134; 23.5.1984.

65th Anniversary of Soviet-Afghan diplomatic relations: Friendship tested by time; 135; 24.5.1984.

The USSR-Afghanistan Friendship Tested by Time: 213; 8 Aug 1984.

State aid to private enterprises: Afghanistan: Promotion of Afghan-Soviet Cooperation; 242; 16.9.1984.

Economic accomplishments and problems in Afghanistan: 279; 4.11.1984.

USSR: Land and population, social and state structure: 280; 4.11.1984.

Lenin: Socialism and Muslims; 280; 4.11.1984.

Economic upsurge in the DRA: achievements of the April Revolution in Afghanistan: 290; 18.11.1984.

Difficult roads of Afghanistan; 31; 13.2.1985.

Afghanistan's economy making good and steady progress: The development of the Revolutionary process in Afghanistan; 87; 25.4.1985.

106; 22.5.1985.

USSR-Afghanistan: Inviolable traditions of friendship: 129; 17.6.1985.

Statement of Eduard Shevardnadze at the 40th session of the UN General Assembly; 210; 20.9.1985.

224; 20.10.1985.

Land of the Soviets; 238; 4.11.1985.

279; 29.12.1985.
40; 17.2.1986.
101; 21.4.1986.
104; 22.4.1986.
106; 24.4.1986.
121; 14.5.1986.
172; 9.7.1986.
243; 14.9.1986.

Pushto:

Amin, Abdul Rasul; Da Saur Kodeta Keh Inqilab? Khpalwakai: I/1; WUFA publications, Peshawar; 1364 = 1985.

Psarlay, Mohammad Siddique; A note on norther parts of Afghanistan; ND (manuscript).

Rafie, Habibullah; Pa Afghanistan ki Da Syed Jamaluddin Afghani Khidmatoona; Central Asia; ASC; Winter,1982.

Samoon; Da Afghanistan Au Russ Tar Mianz Areeki-I: Tzari Rusia Au Tar Khpalwakai Srande Afghanistan; Afghan Millat, Special Edition; Marghoomay-Kab 1361=Jan-March 1983.

Toofan, Wali Mohammad; Da Bolshoveko Pa Mulk Ki Zatee Jaidad; Pukhtoon, weekly; Sardaryab (Peshawar); 01.4.1946.

Zadran, Abdul Rahim; A note on the background of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and formation of PDPA; ND; (manuscript).

Persian/Dari:

Haqqaq, Zuqratu'llah; Chera Afghan Tolanna' Hijrawaki?; Peshawar: 1360 = 1981 (manuscript).

A manuscript on "Reaction of non-Pakhtuns toward Pakhtunization policy of Zahir Shah regime"; a Tajik teacher, emigre' who does not like to be identified. ND.

Pashuddae Az Tarz Rawajood Amadan Hukumat-i-Kamunosti Dar Afghanistan Ba Asar Kodeta-i-17 Anril 1978 (sic) Va Tahajum-i-Shooravi Bar Afghanistan-i-'zad: A high-ranking Police Officer of Daud regime who does not like to be identified: ND: (manuscript).

Urdu:

Afghan, Rafique; Interview with Gulbadin Hikmatyar: Nakheer, weekly: Karachi: 27 Dec 1985 - 3 Jan 1986.

Asghar Khan, Mohammad, Air Marshal (Retd); Pak-Afghan Ta'alluqat: Jang; 11 & 12 Feb 1982.

Ghamzhan, Sher Zaman: Inqilab-i-Afghanistan; Zindagi, weekly: Lahore; 16-22 June 1979.

Ibid; Afghan Muhajireen: 30.6.1980: (manuscript).

Ibrahim, Mohammad, Auditor General (Retd); Afghan Muhajireen Aur Pakistani Maeeshat: Jan: 11.7.1985.

Nang Yusufzai, Fatehul Mulk; Ek Mukhtasar Jaeza; 20.7.1981 (manuscript).

Waris Mir; Mujahideen-i-Afghanistan: Haftgana Aur Sehgana Ittehad: Nawai Waqt; 26.7.1984.

Afghanistan Ka Mas'ala Aur Afghan Muhajireen: an interview of Lt. General Fazal Haq; CAR Peshawar: Qaumi Press, Reti Gun, Lahore; ND.

Afghan Muhajireen Pakistan Ki Jang Lar Rahay Hain: an interview of Brig Saeed Azhar, Chief CAR Islamabad: Hurmat, weekly, Rawalpindi; 4-10 March 1982.

Azadi Ka Sooraj Kab Tulu Hoga? Research Report; Hurmat; 4-10.3.1982.

Russi Jarhiyat Nay Insanee Rishton Ko Taqseem Kardia Hay; Hurmat: 4-10 March 1982.

Dastan-i-Mazalim (tr. from Impact International 13.9.1974).

Dailies and Periodicals:

Aryana; Issues 1 & 2; DRA, Kabul; 1360 = 1981.

Da Afghanistan Kalane: No 34; Kabul; 1345-46 = 1966-67.
Da Khpalwakae Taroon; Frontiers Ministry, Kabul; 1351 = 1972.
Ibid; 1352 = 1973.
Ibid; 1353 = 1974.
Masa'el-i-Baynul Millali, Government Press, Kabul.

Aman-i-Afghan; Kabul; II/20 Hamal 1304,
III/29 Hamal 304,
IV/7 Saur 1304. (1925).
Afghan Millat, weekly; Kabul - and irregular issues in Peshawar.
Khalq, weekly; Kabul.
Parcham, weekly; Kabul.
Kabul Times; daily; Kabul.
Kabul New Time, daily; Kabul.
Haqiqat-i-Inqilab-i-Saur,daily; Kabul.
Heywad, daily; Kabul.
Khalqi Rozana, monthly, Kabul; combined issues 7, 8, 9; 1357 = 1978.

Afghan News, fortnightly Jamiat-i-Islami Afghanistan, Peshawar.
The Mujahid Afghanistan; Kohat road; Peshawar.
The Jihad Rays; IslamicUnity of Afghanistan Mujahideen, Peshawar.
Hijrat; Itehad-i-Islami Mujahideen-i-Afghanistan, Peshawar.
Qiam-i-Haq; IIMA, Peshawar.
Yadnama-i-Shaheedan; IIMA,Peshawar
Meesaq-i-Khoon; Jamiat-i-Islami Afghanistan,Peshawar.
Bulletin, monthly Afghan Information Centre, Peshawar.
WUFA; Writers Union of Free Afghanistan, Peshawar.
Khpalwaki; ibid.

Defence Journal, Karachi.

Dawn, daily, Karachi.
Frontier Post, daily, Peshawar.
Khyber Mail, daily, Peshawar.
Muslim, daily, Islamabad.
Pakistan Times, daily, Rawalpindi.

Jang, daily Rawalpindi.
Jiddat, daily, Peshawar.
Mashriq, daily, Peshawar.
Nawai Waqt, daily, Rawalpindi.

Haiwad,weekly, Peshawar.

etc.